# Refutation of Certain Doctrines of Aristotle - Author: Anonymous - Latin title: *Confutatio dogmatum quorundam Aristotelicorum* - Date: 5th century (disputed) (disputed) - Source: J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca 6 (Paris: Migne, 1857) - Translation: Claude, from the original text, unless a passage says otherwise; each passage below gives the translator - Editions and translations: J. C. T. Otto, Corpus apologetarum christianorum saeculi secundi 3–5, 3rd ed. (Jena: Fischer, 1879–1881) - Work page: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/ - Passages: 66 ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 0 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-0 - Source: PG 6:1494 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Addressing the presbyter Paul, the author proposes to show from Aristotle's Physics that the Greeks reasoned about God and creation by conjecture, while the prophets, taught by God, agree that the one unoriginated God made all things by his will. ### Greek text πείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γινομένων χε λῶν, οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐστὶ δεχτὸν τῷ θεῷ, ὡς τὸ χατὲ δύναμιν σπουδάζειν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Ταύτην οὖν τὴν προθυμίαν ἐν ὑμῖν, ὦ τιμιώτετ πρεσθδύτερε Παῦλε, σφόδρα οὖσαν διάπυρον, ἑτοΐμες τινα ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐχλογὴν τῶν Ἑλληνιχῶν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ χτίσεως δογμάτων " οὐχ ἵνα τι γνῷς ἀληϑὲς ἐξ αὐτῶν: πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ὁ ἄνωθεν ἔχων τὴν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν περὶ τούτων διδασχαλίαν, παρ᾽ αὑτοῦ τοῦ τὴν χτίσιν πεποιηχότος Θεοῦ; ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα γνῷς, κὲ χατὰ τὴν ἀποδειχτιχὴν ἐπιστήμην, χαθ᾽ ἣν ἐπαγγῶλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ χτίσεως τοὺς »όγοὺς ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηχότας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰχασμῷ τὸ δοχοῦν διορισαμένους. Τῶν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ χτίσεως τοὺς λόγους πεποιημένων ἀνθρώπων, οὗ μὲν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ τὴν χτίσιν πεποιηχότος Θεοῦ τὴν διδατχαλίαν ἐδέξαντο περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ χτίσεως διὰ τῶν προφητῶν τῶν πρὸς τοῦτο ὑπουργησάντων τῷ Θεῷ" οὗς πρῶτον θείοις ἔργοις τοῖς δι᾽ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας ἀξίοις τοῦ πιστεύεσθαι ἀνέδειξεν, εἶ θ᾽ οὕτω πειὰ τῶν τοῖς διδασχομένοις ἀδήλων τὴν διδασχαλέαν καρ-. ἔσχεν" οἱ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν προφητῶν ἀπιστήσαντε: λόγοις, τοῖς οἰχείοις αὑτῶν λογισμοῖς ἐπέτρεψαν θεογνωσίας τὴν εὕρεσιν. Καὶ κατ᾽ ἐχείνους μὲν τοὺς ἐχ διδασχαλίας Θεοῦ καὶ χτίσεως ἐγνωχότας τὴν διαρ»ρὰν εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς, καθ᾽ ἑχάτερον τὸν τῇς ἀγεγντσίας τρόπον ἀγέννητος ὥν᾽ Θεὸν δὲ ἢ Θεοὺς οὔτε πρὸ αὑτοῦ, οὔτε μεθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐσχηκὼς, συναΐδιον οὐχ ἔχων οὔτε ὑποχείμενον οὔτε ἀντιχείμενον, ἄφθαρτον ἔχων τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον τὴν ἑνέργειαν, δημιουργὸς ὧν τοῦ κόσμον παντὸς, ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ τὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τὴν ἐχείνου θέλησιν. Ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ διαμένει τὰ μέρη τοῦ χόσμου, ὡς ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ οὐράνια σώματα, καὶ αἱ ἀόρατοι δυνάμεις" ἣ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαί τε καὶ φθείρεσθαι, ὡς τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῶά τε καὶ φυτά. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ γεγονὸς οὐχ ἂν ἐγένετο μὴ ἐχείνου προστάξαντος, γενηθήτω" οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἂν διέμεινε μὴ ἐχείνου θεμένου τὸ πρόσταγμα, τοῖς μὲν ἀφθάρτοις τοῦ ἑστάναι εἰς τὸν͵ αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος, τοῖς δὲ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ τοῦ, Αὐξάνεσθε καὶ ϑύνεσθε, καὶ πληρώσατε τὴν γῆν. Πρὸς ἔνδειξιν δὲ τῆς θείας αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως, καὶ τοῦ μὴ νόμῳ φύσεως αὐτὸν δουλεύειν, ἀλλὰ αὐθεντίᾳ βουλήσεως τὸ δοχοῦν ξργαζόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ φύσεως ἐχ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν ὑδάτων ἐποίησε, προστάξας: Ἐξαγαγέτω ἡ γῆ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν κατὰ γέγος, καὶ φυτὰ ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ σπέρμα, καὶ ξύια ποιοῦντα καρπούς. Καὶ πάλιν: ᾿Εξαγαγέτω τὰ ὕδατα ψυχὴν ζῶσαν κατὰ γένος " τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν γεναρχῶν γεγενημένα, ἐκ τῆς καταδολῇς τοῦ σπέρμᾶτος γενέσθαι ὡρίσατο. Καὶ περὶ τούτων πάντες οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀποσταλέντες προφῆται ταὐτὰ φρονοῦντες διετέλουν, καὶ διαφωνία ἐν αὐτοῖς γέγονεν οὐδεμία. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀπιστήσαντας μὲν τοῖς τῶν προφητῶν λόγοις, οἰχείῳ δ τἰχασμῷ περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ χτίσεως τὸ δοχοῦν διοριἀαμένους, πολλὴ τίς ἔστιν ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς διαφωνία ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς τούτων ἀρχῆς χατ᾽ οὐσίαν τε, καὶ ἀριθμὸν, καὶ χίνησιν, καὶ πέρας " καθὼς δείχνυται ἐχ τοῦ πρώτου λόγου τῆς Φυσικῆς Ἀχροάσεως ᾿Ἀριστοτέλους, μετὰ τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτὸν ἀληθεύειν περὶ ὧν διείληφε διορίσασθαι πραγμάτων. ### English translation (Claude) … of the [offerings made] by men for the [service] of God, nothing is so acceptable to God as to strive, as far as one is able, to make men better. Since this zeal, then, is very ardent in you, most honored presbyter Paul, [I have been] ready to make a selection of the Greek doctrines about God and creation: not that you may learn anything true from them (for how could you, who have from above the teaching about these things through the prophets, from God himself who made creation?), but that you may know that the Greeks have not done this according to demonstrative science, by which they profess to make their arguments about God and creation, but have defined what seemed good to them by conjecture. Of the men who have made arguments about God and creation, some received the teaching about God and creation from God himself, who made creation, through the prophets who served God for this; whom he first showed to be worthy of belief by the divine works done through them, and then in this way provided the teaching of things unclear to those taught. Others, disbelieving the words spoken through the prophets, entrusted the discovery of the knowledge of God to their own reasonings. According to those who have learned by teaching the difference between God and creation, God is one, being unoriginated in both senses of being unoriginated, having had neither God nor gods before him nor after him, having nothing co-eternal with him, neither underlying nor opposed, having an incorruptible essence and an unhindered activity, being the maker of the whole world, whose beginning of being, of being what it is, and of how it continues is his will. For the parts of the world continue either in incorruption, like the heaven and the heavenly bodies and the invisible powers, or in coming to be and passing away, like the animals and plants on earth. And as what came to be would not have come to be had he not commanded, “Let it be,” so neither would it have continued had he not laid down the command: for the incorruptible things, to stand for ever and ever; for those in generation and corruption, “Increase and multiply and fill the earth.” And to show his divine power, and that he is not a slave to a law of nature but works what he pleases by the authority of his will, at the beginning he made the things of the nature subject to generation and corruption from the earth and the waters, commanding: “Let the earth bring forth the living creature according to its kind, and plants having their seed in themselves, and trees bearing fruit”; and again: “Let the waters bring forth the living creature according to its kind”; but he determined that those born of the first parents should come to be by the casting of seed. And about these things all the prophets sent from God to all men continued to think the same, and there was no disagreement among them. But among those who disbelieved the words of the prophets and defined what seemed good about God and creation by their own conjecture, there is much disagreement, both with one another and with themselves, about the things that exist and their principle, in respect of essence, number, motion, and end; as is shown from the first book of Aristotle's Physics, together with the fact that he says nothing true about the matters he undertook to define. ### Scripture references - Gen 1:3: allusion, medium confidence - Ps 148:6: allusion, medium confidence - Gen 1:28: quotation, high confidence - Gen 1:24: quotation, high confidence - Gen 1:11: allusion, high confidence - Gen 1:20: quotation, high confidence ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1 (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - This work is transmitted among the writings of Justin but is pseudonymous; it is generally dated to the fourth or fifth century (some ascribe it to Theodoret). Chapters follow Migne's numbering in PG 6 (1–65), recovered from the numerals and headings of the scan. The opening words are lost in the scan. Migne's Latin and column letters interleaved by the scan are removed by logged corrections. - “Unoriginated in both senses” refers to the two senses of ἀγένητος distinguished later (privation of a possible coming to be, and negation of all coming to be; see chapter 6). ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. pref. (PG 6:1494; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-0). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 1 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-1 - Source: PG 6:1494 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Aristotle's claim that there is always an underlying thing from which what comes to be comes is turned into a series of questions against the eternity of matter. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ πρώτου.όγου τῆς Φυσικῆς ᾿Αχροάσεως Ἀριστοτέλους. « ᾿Αεὶ γὰρ ἐστί τι ὃ ὑπόχειται, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον " οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἐχ σπέρματος. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπλῶς, τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίσει, οἷον ἀνδριάς " τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, οἷον τὰ αὐξανύμενα᾽ τὰ δὲ ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ Ἑρμῆς" τὰ δὲ συνθέσει, οἷον οἰχία " τὰ δὲ ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα χατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Πάντα δὲ τὰ οὕτω γινόμενα, φανερὸν, ὅτι ἐξ ὑποχειμένων γίνεται. Καὶ τοῦτο διττόν ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποχείμενον, ἣ τὸ ἀντι-. χείμενον. Λέγω δὲ ἀντιχεῖσθαι μὲν τὸ ἄμουσον, ὑποχεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. » Εἰ πρῶτόν ἔστι τὸ σπεῖρον σπέρμα, καὶ ὕστερον τὸ ἐχ σπέρματος γιγνόμενον, καὶ γενητὰ ἀμφότερα, τῇ μὲν γενέσει τοῦ χειμένου ἐχ σπέρματος γιγνομίνου ὑπόχειται τὸ σπέρμα, τῇ δὲ γενέσει τοῦ σπείραντὸς ὑποχεῖσθαι τὸ σπέρμα οὗ δυνατόν" οὐχ ἄρσ ἀεὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἐχ σπέρματος γίνεται. Ἔτι, εἰ ξῶον γενητὸν ἑχάτερον, τὸ σπεῖρον καὶ τὸ ἐχ σπέρματος γιγνόμενον, καὶ οὐχ ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὑποχειμένου ἑχάτερον, ἀλλὰ θάτερον μὲν ἐχ τοῦ σπέρματο;, ἕτερον δὲ οὐχ ἐχ τοῦ σπέρματος " πῶς οὐ ψευδὲς τὸ ἀεὶ τὰ ζῶα γίνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σπέρματος; Καὶ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν ὁ αὑτὸς λόγος. Ἔτι, εἰ ἀρχὴ μὲν τοῦ ἐχ σπέρματος γιγνομένου ἐστὶ τὸ σπεῖρον, ἄγνωστον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδιόριστον ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῆς Φυτιχῆς ᾿Αχροάσεως “Ἀριστοτέλους, τίνος ἕνεχεν ἐγράφη αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀγνοουμένης τοῦ πρώτου ζώου τε καὶ φυτοῦ; ᾿Αχολουθεῖ γὰρ τῇ ἀγνωσίᾳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡ ἀγνωσία τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰ τὸ ζῶον τὸ ἐχ σπέρματος γιγνόμενον, γίνεται δὲ χατὲ φύσιν, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ζώου γιγνομένου μὲν, μἢ ἐχ σπέρματος δὲ, οὐ γίνεται κατὰ φύσιν. Εἱπάτωσαν οὖν οἱ ᾿Ἀριστοτελιχοὶ, χατὰ τί γίνεται τὸ ζῶον τὸ μὴ κατὰ φύτιν γιγνόμενον. Ἔτι, εἰ, διαφορᾶς χατὰ γένεσιν τοῦ ζώου δοθείσης, τοῦ τε ἐχ σπέρματος καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐχ σπέρματος, μήτε χατὰ φύσιν γιγνομένου, ἀνάγχη πεπερασμένην εἶναι τ» γένεσιν " πῶς οὖν σύναρχα λέγουσιν Ἕλληνες τά τε ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τῷ θεῷ, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότα, τὰ μήτε τῷ πρώτῳ ζώῳ τε καὶ φυτῷ σύγχρονα εἶναι δυνάμενα; Ἔτι, εἰ ἅπαγ τὸ γιγνόμενογ ἀεὶ σύνθετόν ἐστι, πῶς τὸν τρόπον τῶν χατὰ σύνθεσιν γινομένων ( τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοῦ τρόπου διαφορᾷ τῶν ἄλλων «ὧν τῆς γενέσεως τρόπων διέστειλας; Εἰ γὰρ ἅπαν γενητὸν σύνθετον, κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἀνάγχη γίνεσθαι. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ ὁ τρόπος τῆς χατὰ σύνθεσιν γενέσεως πάσῃ γενέσει ἁρμόττει, περιττῶς τῶν ἄλλων τῆς γενέσειος τρόπων διέσταλται τῇ οἰκείᾳ διαφορᾷ. εἰ τὰ ὑποχείμενα ταῖς ῥηθείσαις γενέσεσιν οὐσίαι εἰσὶ, καὶ ἐν αὑταῖς θεωρεῖται τὸ διττὸν τοῦ ὑποχειμένου, τουτέστι τὸ ὑποχείμενον καὶ τὸ ἀντιχείμενον, ἢ δὲ ὕλη οὐκ ἔστι, πῶς ἁρμόττει ὁ τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἐξ οὐσιῶν γιγνομένων τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς γενέσεως τῶν μὴ ἐξ οὐσίας γιγνομένων; ᾿Ανάγκη ἄρα ἣ οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, ἢ τρόπῳ ἑτέρῳ γίγνεσθαι τὰ ἐκ τ ὕλης γιγνόμενα παρὰ τοὺς ῥηθέντας τρόπους τῇ; γενέσεως. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῆς Φυγικης ᾿Αχροάσεως ἣ ὕλη διώρισται μὴ εἶναι οὐτία, καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἐξ αὑτῆς γιγνομένων Ὁ παραδέδοται, πῶς οὐ περιττὴ αὕτη ἡ πραγματεῖ, ἐν ἡ τὸ σαφὲς ἄπορον; Ἔτι, εἰ, ὡς ἀνάγχη τῇ φύτει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ τὸ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος ποιεῖν τὰ τυχύντδι ἀλλ᾽ ἐχ τῶν ὡρισμένων τὰ ὡρισμένα, οὕτως ἀνάγχῃ καὶ τῷ Θεῷ ἐχ τῶν ὡρισμένων ποιεῖν τὰ ὡρισμένα; τίς ἔστιν ὁ τῷ Θεῷ τοῦτον τὸν ὅρον θέμενος; Ὅτι ὃ τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ὁ Θεὸς ἔθηχε τοῦτον τὸν ὅρα, φανερόν. Ἐὶ δὲ ὁ Θεὸς ὑπὸ τὸν ὄρον οὐχ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ ἐχ τοῦ τυχόντος τὰ τυχόντα, τῇ τοῦ ὅρου ἀνάγκῃ μὴ κωλνόμενος τοῦ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται" πῶς οὐχ ἐλευθέρωται καὶ τοῦ ὅρου τοῦ ποιεῖν ἐκ τῶν ὑποχειμένων χατὰ ἀνάγχην; ### English translation (Claude) From the first book of Aristotle's Physics: “For there is always something that underlies, from which what comes to be comes to be, as plants and animals from seed. Things that come to be without qualification come to be some by change of shape, as a statue; some by addition, as things that grow; some by subtraction, as the Hermes from the stone; some by composition, as a house; some by alteration, as things that change in respect of their matter. It is clear that all things that come to be in this way come to be from underlying things. And this is twofold: either the underlying or the opposite. I mean that the unmusical is opposed and the man underlies.” If the one who sows the seed is first, and what comes to be from seed is later, and both are generated, … then in the generation of what lies before us, which comes to be from seed, the seed underlies; but in the generation of the sower it is impossible for seed to underlie. Therefore animals and plants do not always come to be from seed. Further, if each is a generated animal, both the sower and what comes from seed, and each does not come from the same underlying thing, but the one from seed and the other not from seed, how is it not false that animals always come to be from seed? And the same argument holds for plants. Further, if the principle of what comes to be from seed is the sower, and this is unknown and undefined in the treatise of Aristotle's Physics, why was this treatise written, when the principle of the first animal and plant is unknown? For ignorance of what comes from the principle follows from ignorance of the principle. If the animal that comes from seed comes to be according to nature, it is clear that when the same animal comes to be, but not from seed, it does not come to be according to nature. Let the Aristotelians then say according to what the animal comes to be that does not come to be according to nature. Further, if, once a difference is granted in the generation of animals, between the one from seed and according to nature, and the one neither from seed nor according to nature, generation must be limited, how then do the Greeks say that animals and plants, which came to be according to nature, are co-eternal with God, when they cannot even be contemporary with the first animal and plant? Further, if everything that comes to be is always composite, how did you distinguish the mode of things that come to be by composition from the other modes of generation by its own difference? For if every generated thing is composite, it must come to be by composition. But if the mode of generation by composition fits every generation, it is superfluously distinguished from the other modes of generation by its own difference. If the things that underlie the generations mentioned are substances, and in them the twofold character of the underlying is seen, that is, the underlying and the opposite, while matter is not a substance, how does the mode of generation of things that come from substances fit the mode of generation of things that do not come from substance? Necessarily, then, either matter is a substance, or the things that come from matter come to be in another mode besides the stated modes of generation. But since in the treatise of the Physics matter is defined not to be a substance, and the mode of generation of the things that come from it is not handed down, how is this treatise not superfluous, when in it what should be clear is left in perplexity? Further, if, as nature and art must make not chance things from chance things but definite things from definite things, so God too must make definite things from definite things, who is it that set this limit for God? That God set this limit for nature and art is evident. But if God is not under the limit, but makes chance things from chance things, not being hindered by the necessity of the limit from making what he wishes, how is he not also freed from the limit of making from underlying things by necessity? … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.7, 190b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Phys. 1.7, 190b (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 190a–b. The treatise's method is a series of questions, each beginning “If …”, against quoted passages of Aristotle. The refutation comes after Migne's Latin in the scan (removed); debris at the end is removed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 1 (PG 6:1494; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-1). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 2 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-2 - Source: PG 6:1494 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Aristotle's account of the underlying thing as one in number but two in form is turned against him: if matter has no being as a “this” of its own, it cannot be an eternal principle. ### Greek text Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «ἰόγου. « Ἕστι δὲ τὸ ὑποχείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἕν, εἴδει δὲ δύο. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθριοπος, καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς, καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὕλῃ, ἀριθμητή" τόδε γάρ τι μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον" ἢ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡἧ ἐναντίωσις συμδεθηχός. Ἔν δὲ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἡ τάξις, ἣ μουσικὴ, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν οὕτω χατηγορουμένων δι᾽ ὧν ἔστε μὲν ὡς δύο λεχτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς τρεῖς. Καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μουσιχὸν καὶ τὸ ἅμουσον, ἣ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, ἣ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον" ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ. Ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων γὰρ πάσχειν τὰ ἐναντία ἀδύνατον. Λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὁποχείμενον" τοῦτο γὰρ οὖχ ἐναντίον. Ὥστε οὔτε πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ ἀρκαὶ τρόπον τινὰ, ἀλλὰ δύο ὡς εἰπεῖν τῷ ἀριθμῷ- οὔτε αὖ παντελῶς δύο διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς. » Εἰ ἔστι τὸ ὑποχείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἕν, εἴδει δὲ δύο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν δεῖ ἕν τῷ ἑνὶ ὑποχεῖσθαι, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τὸ ὑποχείμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ὑποχείμενον; Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ εἴδει δύο εἶναι τὸ ὑποχείμενον; Ἔτι, εἰ δεῖ ὑποχεῖσθαί τι ἀεὶ τῶν γιγνομένων, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ὕλη, πῶς οὐχ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη ἀεὶ γενητή; ᾿Αεὶ γὰρ τῷ ἑνὶ τῶν ἐναντίων Ἢ γὰρ τῇ στερήσει ὑπόχειται. ἣ τῷ εἴδει, ἐναντίῳ ὄντι τῇ στερήσει" καὶ τῷ εἴδει μὲν γίνεται εὕὔμορφος, τῇ στερήσει δὲ ἄμορφος. Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἔστιν εὐσία γενητὴ ἡ ὕλη, ἀεὶ τὸ εἶναι γενητῶς ἔχουσα; Ἕτι, εἰ ἡ στέρησις οὐδέν ἔστιν ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος, ἔχουσα δὲ ταύτην ἡ ὕλη, πῶς οὐκ ἀνήρηται αὑτῆς καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ὕλην; Ἔτι, εἰ ἀπόντος τοῦ εἴδους τῆς ὕλης, ἄπεστιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὃν, οὐδαμοῦ ἄρα ἣ ὕλη ἀπόντος αὐτῆς τοῦ εἴδους. Ἔτι, εἰ ἀριθμητὴ ἡ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τὰ ταύτῃ συμδεθηχότα οὐχ ἀριθμητὰ, πῶς τρεῖς ἀρκαὶ, ἢ τε ὕλη καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ συμδεδηχότα; Εἰ οὐδὲν ὧν ἐν τῇ συστάσει τῶν φύσεων γιγνομένων θεωρούμενόν ἐστιν ἐχ τῆς ὕλης, οὐδὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ποσὸν, πῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται καθ᾽ αὑτά; Εἰ ἀδύνατόν τι εἶναι μὴ εἶναι καὶ τόδε τι ', πῶς διὰ τὴν στέρῆσιν τόδε τι μὴ οὖσα ἡ ὕλη, τὸ εἶναι ἔχει; Εἰ ἡ στέρησις καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῇ ὕλῃ τυμδέδηχεν, οὐσία δὲ οὐχ ἦστιν ἡ ὕλη, πῶς ταύτῃ συμδέθηχε τὰ ἐναντία; Τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ συμθαίνει τὰ συμδεδηκότα. Εἰ ὥσπερ ἡ τάξις ἐν τοῖς τεταγμένοις, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, πῶς τὰ μὲν ἄταχτα πρὸ τῆς τάξεως τὸ εἶναι τόδε τι ἔχει; ἡ γὰρ ὕλη πρὸ τοῦ εἴδους τὸ εἶναι οὐδε μὴ ἔχουσα, σώζεται ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἢ ἀναλογία τῆς τάξεως ὡς πρὸς τὸ εἶδος. Εἰ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει μὲν τῶν τονομένων δύο θεωροῦνται μόναι ἀρκαὶ, ἧ τε ὕλη αὶ τὸ εἶδος " χωρὶς δὲ συνθέσεως τρεῖς εἰσιν ἀρκαὶ, ἣ τε ὕλη καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ τὸ εἶδος " δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι, … ἀρκαὶ ὄντος δὲ τοῦ γιγνομένου, οὐ τρεῖς, ἀλλὰ ὄνο. Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἔστι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀπωλείας τῆς μιᾶς ἀρχῆς, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἀπώλετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐγίνετο τὸ γιγνόμενον; Εἰ ὥσπερ πάσχει ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὴ τοῦ μουσιχοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀμούσου, καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, καὶ ἡ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἁρμονίας τε χαι ἀναρμοστίας " οὕτω πάσχει ἡ ὕλη ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς στερήσεως " ἔστω ἡ ὕλη οὐσία, ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ σῶμα" ἢ συμδεδηχὸς, ὡς ἡ φωνὴ, ἵνα σωθῇ τὸ τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀχόλουθον. Εἰ δὲ οὔτε οὐσία ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη οὔτε συμδεδηχὸς, οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πάσχει ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. ### English translation (Claude) Of the same Aristotle, from the same book: “The underlying thing is one in number but two in form. For the man and the gold, and in general the matter, is countable; for it is more a ‘this,’ and what comes to be comes from it not accidentally; but the privation and the contrariety are accidental. The form is one, for instance the order, or the music, or any other of the things predicated in this way. Hence in one sense the principles must be said to be two, in another three; in one sense the contraries, as if one were to speak of the musical and the unmusical, or the hot and the cold, or the harmonized and the unharmonized; in another sense not, for it is impossible for contraries to be acted on by one another. This too is solved by the underlying thing being something else; for this is not a contrary. So the principles are, in a way, not more than the contraries, but two, so to speak, in number; nor again wholly two, because their being is different, but three.” If the underlying thing is one in number but two in form, of which one must underlie the other, how is the underlying thing not underlying itself? And if this is impossible, how is it not false that the underlying thing is two in form? Further, if something must always underlie the things that come to be, and this is matter, how is matter not always generated? For it always underlies one of the contraries: either the privation, or the form, which is contrary to the privation; and by the form it becomes well-shaped, by the privation shapeless. How then is matter not a generated substance, since it always has its being in a generated way? Further, if privation is nothing other than the removal of everything that is, and matter has this, how is its very being matter not removed? Further, if, when form is absent from matter, its being a substance, its being a “this,” and its being are absent from it, then matter is nowhere when form is absent from it. Further, if matter is countable, but the contraries that are accidents of it are not countable, how are there three principles, matter and its accidents? If nothing of what is seen in the constitution of the natures that come to be comes from matter, neither quality nor quantity, how do the things that come to be come to be from it of themselves? If it is impossible for something to be and not to be a “this,” how does matter, not being a “this” because of privation, have being? If privation and form are accidents of matter, but matter is not a substance, how do the contraries happen to it? For accidents happen to a substance. If, as order is in things ordered, so form is in matter, how do disordered things have their being a “this” before the order, while matter, not having being before the form, … the analogy of order to form is preserved in matter? If in the composition of things that come to be only two principles are seen, matter and form, but without composition there are three principles, matter, privation, and form, it is clear then that … of what comes to be the principles are not three but two. How then is what comes to be not the principle of the destruction of one principle, if what comes to be would not have come to be had it not perished? If, as the man is acted on by the musical and the unmusical, and the body by cold and hot, and the voice by harmony and disharmony, so matter is acted on by form and privation, let matter be a substance, like the man and the body, or an accident, like the voice, so that the consistency of the analogy may be kept. But if matter is neither substance nor accident, then it is not acted on by the contraries either. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.7, 190b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 190b. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 2 (PG 6:1494; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-2). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 3 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-3 - Source: PG 6:1494 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: On the number of the principles of natural things (Physics 1.7): if form makes matter formed by its presence, matter without form cannot be ungenerated. ### Greek text ὅ. Τοῦ αὑτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «ἰόγου. « Πόσαι μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρκαὶ τῶν περὶ γένεσιν φυσιχῶν, καὶ πῶς, εἴρηται. Καὶ δῆλόν ἔστιν ὅτι δεῖ ὑποχεῖσθαί τι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία δύο εἶναι" τρόπον δὲ τινα ἄλλον, οὐχ ἀναγχαῖον. ᾿Ικανὸν τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιεῖν τῇ παρουσίξ καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ τὴν μεταδολήν " ἡ δὲ ὑποχειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ χατὰ ἀναλογίαν. Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλχὸς, ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἣ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαθεῖν τὴν μορφὴν " οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει, καὶ τὸ πόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν. Μία μὲν οὖν ἀρχὶ; αὕτη, οὐχ οὕτω μία οὖσα, οὐδὲ ἕν ὡς τὸ τόδε τι, μἱα δὲ ἦλόγος" ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἡ στέρησις. Πότερον δὲ οὐσία τὸ εἶδος ἣ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὔπω δῆλον Εἰ τὸ εἶδος τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὑτοῦ εἰδοποιεῖ τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ αὑτοῦ ποιεῖ ἀνείδεον, εἰσὶ δὲ ἀρκαὶ δύο, τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἀνείδεον, ποιεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἧ στέρησις τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὑτῆς καὶ τῇ ἀπυυσίξ᾽ ἔσυνται ἄρα αἱ ἀρκαὶ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων γιγνόμεναί τε καὶ ἀναιρούμεναι, καὶ οὖκ ἀΐδιοι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀΐδιον παρουσίας τινὸς καὶ ἀπουσίας οὗ χρήζει πρὸς τὸ εἶναι. Εἰ τῇ παρουσίᾳ καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν ἐναντίων γίνεται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ μεταδολὴ, δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται ἡ μεταδολὴ ἐχ τοῦ εἶναι αὑτὰς ἀρχάς. Πῶς οὖν δύνανται μένειν ἀρκαὶ αἱ ἀποῦεδληκυῖαι τὸ εἶναι ἀρκαί; Εἰ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα, οὐχ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ, πῶς ἡ ὕλη, τοῦ μὲν εἶναι ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὴν στέρησιν, δύναται εἶναι ἀρχή; Τὸ φύσιν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ὑποχείμενον τῇ στερήσει, τὸ μήτε οὐσία ὄν, μήτε τόδε τι, μήτε ὃν, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι περιττόν; Εἰ ἀρκαὶ οὔτε ἐξ ἄλλων εἰοἷν οὔτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων᾽ ἔστι δὲ ἐχ τῆς ἀπουσίας τοῦ εἴδους ἡ στέρησις, καὶ ἐχ τῆς ἀπουσίας τῆς στερήσεως τὸ εἶδος" πῶς οὐχ εἰσὶν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀρκαὶ, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις; Τῇ γὰρ ἀπουσίᾳ ἀλλήλων ποιητικαὶ ἀλλή λων. Εἰ ὃν ἔχει λόγον ὁ χαλχὸς πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι ἀνδριάντα, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν οὐτέαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὃν, πῶς ὁ μὲν χαλχὸς, ἐὰν μὴ ἧ οὐσία, καὶ τόδε τι καὶ ὃν, λόγον ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἀνδριάντα οὐ δύναται ἡ δὲ ὕλη, μήτε οὐσία οὖσα, μῆτε τόδε τι, μήτε ὄν, ἀναλογίαν ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν χαλχὸν δύναται; Εὲ πάντα τὰ ἐν συστάσεσι τῶν ςυσιχῶν θεωρούμενα αἰσθήσει ἐστὶν ἐπιστητὰ, πῶς ἡ ὕλη, ἐξ ἧς τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀναλογίᾳ ἐστὶν ἐπιστητὴ, καὶ οὐχ αἰσθήσει" ἣ πῶς ὅλως ἐχ μὴ αἰσθητοῦ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τὰ αἰσθητά : Εἰ τόδε τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ μίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, πῶς ἡ ὕλη τὸ μὲν εἶναι μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτὴν τόδε τι οὐχ ἔχει; Καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶναι τόδε τι, καὶ τὸ τόδε τι μὴ εἶναι οὐσία ἐστὶ, πῶς ἡ ὕλη " τὸ μὲν τόδε τι μὴ εἶναί ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐχ ἔττι; πῶς δὲ δύναταί τις ἐχδάλλειν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἶναι ἕν "2, ὃ διελὼν αὐτὴν εἰς δύο εἴδη, εἴς τε τὸ ὑποχείμενον τῷ γιγνομένῳ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀντιχείμενον; Εἰ οὕπω δῆλον ἐχ τῶν εἰρημένων, εἰ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος ἣ τὸ ὑποχείμενον, πῶς ἀποφαντιχῶς εἴρηχε περὶ τῆς ὕλης, τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὑτὴν οὐσίαν μήτε τόδε τι, μήτε ὅν; Τὸ γὰρ ὑποχείμενον εἴρηχεν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην. Ποτὲ μὲν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, μήτε τόδε τι, μήτε ὄν" ποτὲ δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὐσία ἐστὶ, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τῶν οὐχ … ### English translation (Claude) Of the same, from the same book: “How many, then, are the principles of natural things concerned with generation, and in what way, has been said. And it is clear that something must underlie the contraries, and that the contraries are two; but in another way it is not necessary, for one of the contraries suffices to produce the change by its presence and absence. The underlying nature is knowable by analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, or wood to a bed, or matter and the formless to any of the other things that have form, before it takes the form, so this is to substance, to the ‘this,’ and to being. This, then, is one principle, though not one as the ‘this’ is one; one also is the formula; and contrary to this is the privation. Whether the form or the underlying thing is substance is not yet clear.” If form by its presence gives form to matter, and by its absence makes it formless, and the principles are two, form and the formless, and privation too makes these same things by its presence and absence, then the principles will come to be and be destroyed by one another, and are not eternal. For the eternal does not need any presence and absence in order to be. If the change of the principles comes about by the presence and absence of the contraries, it is clear that the change is from their being principles. How then can those remain principles that have lost their being principles? If a principle that has a principle is not a principle, how can matter, which has form as the principle of its being and privation as the principle of its not being, be a principle? To call “nature” what underlies privation, which is neither substance, nor a “this,” nor being — how is that not superfluous? If principles are neither from others nor from one another, but privation is from the absence of form, and form from the absence of privation, how are form and privation not principles from one another? For by their absence they produce one another. If the relation that bronze has to the statue that is to come from it, matter has to substance, to the “this,” and to being, how is it that bronze, unless it is a substance, a “this,” and a being, cannot have a relation to the statue, but matter, being neither substance nor “this” nor being, can have an analogy to bronze? If all things seen in the constitutions of natural things are knowable by sense, how is matter, from which sensible things come, knowable by analogy and not by sense? Or how at all is it possible for sensible things to come to be from what is not sensible? If being one principle is also a “this,” how does matter have being one principle but not have being a “this”? And if being a “this” and not being a “this” is substance, how is matter not being a “this,” yet not a substance? And how can one exclude matter from being one, when he has divided it into two forms, the underlying for what comes to be and the opposite? If it is not yet clear from what has been said whether form or the underlying thing is substance, how did he make a declarative statement about matter, that it is neither substance nor “this” nor being? For he said that the underlying thing is matter. Sometimes [he says] that it is neither substance nor “this” nor being; sometimes that it is unclear whether it is substance; how is this not among the things that … ? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.7, 191a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 191a. The refutation comes after Migne's Latin in the scan (removed), with a stray displaced phrase (“for it will be sufficient”); the last sentence breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 3 (PG 6:1494; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-3). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 4 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-4 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle on the early philosophers who denied all coming to be, as proof that the Greeks reasoned by conjecture rather than demonstration. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «λόγου. « Ζητήσαντες οἱ χατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλή-." ϑειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ὄντων, ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καί φασιν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν, οὔτε φθείρεσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἀναγχαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γνόμενον ἣ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐχ μὴ ὄντος" ἐχ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι " οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἂν γίγνεσθαι, εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη" ἔχ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐθὲν ἂν γενέσθαι, ὑποχεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖ. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες, οὐδὲ εἶναι πολλά φασιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὑτὸ τὸ ὅν. » Ἵχανὰ καὶ ταῦτα μαρτυρῆσαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τοῦ ὑφ᾽ ἡχῶν. ῥηθέντος περὶ τῶν παρ᾽ Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων, ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἀποδειχτιχὴν ἐπιστήμην περὶ τῶν ὄντων τοὺς λόγους μὴ πεποιηχότων, ἀλλ᾽ εἰχασμῷ τὸ ῃ ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “The first who sought the truth and the nature of things by philosophy turned aside, as it were, into another road, pushed off by inexperience, and say that none of the things that exist either comes to be or perishes, because what comes to be must come to be either from what is or from what is not, and from both of these it is impossible: for what is does not come to be (for it already is), and from what is not nothing could come to be (for something must underlie). And so, magnifying the consequence, they say that there are not even many things, but only being itself.” These words too suffice to bear witness to the truth of what we said about the philosophers among the Greeks: that they did not make their arguments about the things that exist according to demonstrative science, but [defined] what seemed good by conjecture … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.8, 191a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.8, 191a. The ref breaks off mid-sentence. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 4 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-4). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 5 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-5 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle's claim that things come to be from not-being only accidentally and argues that this abolishes generation as much as the early philosophers did, that matter cannot be ungenerated, and that his principles should be four, not three. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «όγου. « Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ μὴ ὄντος “ἵνεσθαι, ἣ τὸ μὴ ὃν, ἣ τὸ ὃν ποιεῖν τι ἣ πάσχειν, ἢ ὁτιοῦν τόδε γίγνεσθαι, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οὐδὲν διαφέρξι, ἣ τὸ τὸν ἰατρὸν ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν, ἣ τὸ ἐξ ἰατροῦ εἶναί τι ἣ γίνεσθαι. "Ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο διχῶς ἢ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὄντος, καὶ τὸ ὃν, ἣ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Οἰχοδομεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁἱατρὸς, οὐχ ἧ ἱατρὸς δὲ, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ οἰκοδόμος " καὶ λευχὺς γίνεται, οὐχ ἧ ἰατρὸς, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ μέλας. Ἰατρεύει δὲ " … καὶ ἀνίατρος γίνεται ἧ ἰατρός " ἐπειδὴ μάλιοτα λέγομεν τὸν ἰατρὸν χυρίως ποιεῖν τι ἢ πάσχειν, ἧ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἰατροῦ, ἐὰν ἧ ἰατρὸς ταῦτα ποιῇ ἣ κάσχῃ δηλονότι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο σημαίνει, τὸ ἧ μὴ ὄν. Ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὐ διελόντες. ἀπέστησαν᾽ καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοσοῦτον προσηγνόησαν, ὥστε μηθὲν οἴεσθαι γίγνεσθαι μέτ᾽ εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαμεν γίνεσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ἐχ μὴ ὄντος" ὅμως μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐχ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμδεδηχός. Ἐχ γὰἀρτῆς στερήσεως ὅ ἔστι χαθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ἐνυπάρχοντος γίνεται. θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοχεῖ, γίγνεσθαί τι ἐχ μὴ ὄντος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἐξ ὄντος, οὐδὲ τὸ ὃν Υίγνεσθαι, πλὴν χατὰ συμδεδηχός. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οἷον εἰ ἐχ ζώο" ζῶον ἂν γίνοιτο, καὶ εἰ ἔχ τινος ζώου τι ζῶον, οἷον εἰ χύων ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο " γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ μόνον ἔχ τινος ζώου ὁ χύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐχ ζώου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἧ ζῶον: ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο. Εἰ δέ τι μέλλοι γίγνεσθαι ζῶον μὴ κατὰ συμδεδηχὸς, οὐχ ἐχ ζώου ἔσται" καὶ εἴ τι ὃν, οὐκ ἐξ ὄντος, οὐδὲ ἐχ μὴ ὄντος. Τὸ γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἴρηται ἡμῖν τί σημαίνει, ὅτι ἤ μὴ ὅν " ἕτι δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἅπαν, ἣ μὴ εἶναι, οὐχ ἀναιροῦμεν. » Εἰ τὸ, Μήτε ἐχ τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὄντος, μήτε ἐχ τοῦ τῶν ἐξ ἀπειρίας τε καὶ ἀγνοίας ἀναιρούντων τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τούτου τοῦ τοὺς σφαλλομένους θωσαμένου, πῶς οὐχ ἀνήρηται ἡ γένεσις χατὲ τὸν διορθωσάμενον, ὡς ἀνήρηται χατὰ τοὺς σφαλλομένους; Εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἔστι γενέσθαι τι χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς ἐξ ὄντος καὶ ἐχ μὴ ὄντος, μὴ προεπινοουμένης τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ γιγνομένου “ οἷον ἀδύνατον τὸν ἰατρὸν γενέσθαι λευχὸν, μὴ τοῦ μέλανος λευχοῦ γιγνομένου, καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸν ἰατρὸν οἰχοδομεῖν μὴ τοῦ οἰχοδόμου οἰχοδομοῦντος, ἐὰν ἣ μέλας καὶ οἰκοδόμος ὁ ἰατρός " πῶς γίνεταί τι χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς ἐξ ὄντος καὶ ἐχ μὴ ὄντος, μηδενὸς προηγουμένως χαϑ᾽ αὑτὸ γιγνομένου; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ζῶον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ζῶον ἐχ ζώου, καὶ τό τι ζῶον ἔχ τινος ζώον᾽ καὶ … ἢ σπέρμα, τῇ δυνάμει μὲν ζῶον, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐ ζῶον, τῇ δὲ γενέσει τοῦ ἁπλῶς ζώου τὸ ὑποχείέμενον, οὐχ ἦν σπέρμα πῶς οὐχ ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν γιγνόμενον τὸ ζῶον ἐχ ζώου; Εἰ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἡ μὲν ὕλη ἦν, τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον ἐξ αὐτῆς οὐχ ἦν, τί ἣν ἡ ὕλη; Οἷον εἰ ὕλη ἦν τοῦ ἵππου πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν ἵππον, εἰ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἵπτο) θεωρούμενά ἐστι γενητὰ, πῶς ἦν ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν ἵππος; Εἰ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὔτε ἡ στέρησις ἔστιν οὔτε ἡ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ συμδεδηχὸς τῷ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ ὄντι συμδαίνει: πῶς κατὰ συμδεθηχὸς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι ἐχ τῆς στερήσεως, μήτε χαθ᾽ αὐτὸ, μήτε κατὰ τόν ἔστι γενέσθαι τι ἐξ οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν, τούτων οὔτε συμπεπλεγμένων δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι’ οἷον ἐχ τοῦ ὄντος ἁπλῶς οὐ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τι" ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐχ τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος, ἵνα ταῖς ᾿Αριστοτέλους χρησώμεθα φωναῖς. Πῶς ἀμφάτερα γέγονε δυνατὰ, καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐξ ὄντος, καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐχ μὴ ὄντος; Εἰ πὸ ὑποχείμενον ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται τὰ γιγνόμενον τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀνάγχη ὑποχεῖσθαι, οὐχ ἄρα γίγνεταί τι ἐχ «ἧς στερήσεως κατὰ συμδεδηχὸς τοῖς ἐναντίοις μὴ ὑποχειμένοις. Ὁ τὸ πᾶν μὴ ἀναιρῶν, μήτε τὸ εἷναι, μῆτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶν τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, καὶ μὴ εἶναι, πῶς δύναται ἀληθεύειν λέγων τὴν ὕλην μὴ εἶναι, μήτε οὐσίαν, μήτε τόδε τι, μήτε ἄν; Εἰ γίγνεται μὲν τὰ γιγνόμενον, οὐχ ἐξ ἁπλῶς δὲ μὴ ὄντος, οὔτε ἐξ ἀπλῶς ὄντος, ἀλλὰ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γίγνεται ἄρα καὶ ἐχ τῆς ὕλης ὡς ἐχ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἐχ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ ὡς ἐχ τοῦ τόδε τι ὄντος͵ καὶ τόδε τι μὴ ὄντος. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, ψευδὲς ἄρα τὸ ῥηθὲν περὶ τῆς ὕλης, τὸ μήτε αὐτὴν εἶναι οὐσίαν, μὴτε τόδε τι, μήτε ὄν. Ὥσπερ ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶν ἄμορφος, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδός ἐστιν ἄῦλον. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον αὐτῆς εἰσι δύο ἀρκαὶ, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἄῦθλον αὐτοῦ δύο ἔσονται ἀρκαί. Πῶς οὖν, τεσσάρων οὐσῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν, τρεῖς μόναι ἐτέθησαν ἀρκαί; ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “We say that coming to be from what is or from what is not, or what is not or what is doing or suffering something, or becoming this or that, is in one way no different from a doctor's doing or suffering something, or something's being or coming to be from a doctor. So, since this is said in two or more ways, it is clear that ‘from what is’ and ‘what is’ doing or suffering [are said so too]. The doctor builds a house, then, not as a doctor but as a builder, and becomes white not as a doctor but as dark. But he heals … and becomes a non-doctor as a doctor. Since we most properly say that the doctor does or suffers something, or that something comes to be from a doctor, if he does or suffers these things as a doctor, clearly ‘to come to be from what is not’ also means this: as what is not. This they failed to distinguish and gave up; and through this ignorance they were so far further ignorant as to think that nothing else comes to be or exists, but abolished all coming to be. We ourselves too say that nothing comes to be without qualification from what is not, but that things do come to be from what is not in a certain way, namely accidentally. For from the privation, which in itself is not-being, something comes to be, it not being present in it. This is wondered at, and it seems impossible that something should come to be thus from what is not. Likewise, neither does what is come to be from what is, except accidentally. And this too comes to be in the same way, as if animal were to come to be from animal, and some animal from some animal, as if a dog were to come to be from a horse; for the dog would come to be not only from some animal but also from animal, but not as animal, for that is already present. If anything is to become an animal not accidentally, it will not be from animal; and if something is to become a being, not from being, nor from not-being. For we have said what ‘from what is not’ means: as not-being. Further, we do not abolish that everything either is or is not.” If neither from what is simply, nor … of those who through inexperience and ignorance abolished generation, and of the one who corrected those who erred, how is generation not abolished by the one who corrected them, as it was abolished by those who erred? If it is impossible for anything to come to be accidentally from what is and from what is not, unless the coming to be of what comes to be in itself is conceived beforehand (for example, it is impossible for the doctor to become white unless the dark becomes white, and impossible for the doctor to build unless the builder builds, if the doctor is dark and a builder), how does anything come to be accidentally from what is and from what is not, when nothing comes to be in itself beforehand? If first there is animal, and later animal from animal, and some animal from some animal, and … the seed is potentially animal but not actually animal, while in the generation of animal simply the underlying thing was not seed, how is animal from animal not a coming to be contrary to nature? If before what comes to be came to be the matter existed, but what comes from it did not, what was the matter? For instance, if there was matter of the horse before the horse came to be, if everything seen in the substance of the horse is generated, how was the matter from which the horse came ungenerated? If neither privation nor matter is [something] in itself, and the accidental happens to what is in itself, how is it possible for something to come to be accidentally from privation, neither in itself nor … ? … it is possible for something to come to be from none of them, neither is it possible for something to come to be from them combined; for example, from what is simply nothing can come to be, and likewise from what is not simply, to use Aristotle's words. How then have both become possible, to come to be from what is and to come to be from what is not? If the underlying thing from which what comes to be comes to be must underlie the contraries, then nothing comes to be from privation accidentally when the contraries do not underlie. He who abolishes neither all being nor not-being, but grants that everything is and is not, how can he speak truly when he says that matter is neither substance nor “this” nor being? If what comes to be comes to be not from what is not simply nor from what is simply, but from both, then it comes to be from matter as from what is and from what is not, and as from what is a “this” and is not a “this.” But if this is so, what was said of matter is false, that it is neither substance nor “this” nor being. As matter is formless, so form is matterless. But if matter and its formlessness are two principles, then form and its matterlessness will also be two principles. How then, when the principles are four, were only three posited? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.8, 191b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.8, 191a–b. Lost or garbled words are marked “…”; Migne's Latin and note numbers interleaved by the scan are removed by logged corrections. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 5 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-5). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 6 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-6 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's distinction of matter and privation (Physics 1.9): matter that never is in itself cannot be an ungenerated principle beside God. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ἡμεῖς γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερον εἶναί φαμεν" καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐχ ὃν εἶναι χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καὶ χαθ᾽ αὑτήν’ καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Οἱ δὲ τὸ δὴ ὃν εἶναί φασι, τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μιχρὸν, ὁμοίως ἦν τὸ συναμφότερον, ἣ τὸ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον. “Ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος χἀάχεῖνος. » Εἰ κατὰ συμδεδηχὸς οὐκ ὃν εἶναι τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστὶ, δηλονότι χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς ἡ ὕλη οὔτε ὕλη ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀρχή. Ὄντος γάρ ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή. Καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμδεδηχὸς οὐχ ὃν εἶναι ἔστι τῇ ὕλῃ διὰ … … νὸ εἶδος. Ἔσται ἄρα ἡ ὕλη." χαθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὐδέποτε ὧν, χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς δὲ ἀεὶ ποτὲ μὲν οὐχ ὃν εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ ὃν εἶναι. Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ λέγειν ἐγγὺς εἶναι οὐσίας καὶ οὐσίαν πως τὸ μηδέποτε καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὅν; Εἰ ἄλλο τὸ ὕλην εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλο τὸ τινὸς εἷναι ὕλην καὶ στερεῖται μὲν ἡ ὕλη τοῦ τινὸς εἶναι ὕλην, τοῦ δὲ εἶναι αὐτὴν ὕλην οὐ στερεῖται" ἔσται ἄρα ἡ ὕλη ὃν καὶ οὐχ ὄν’ ὃν μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ὕλην, οὖχ ὧν δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν τινὸς ὕλην. ᾿Ἂλλ᾽ εἰ μηδενός ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη, οὐδὲ ἄρα τῆς ἀμορφίας ἐστὶν ἡ ὕχη. Εἰ δὲ τῆς ἀμορφίας ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, οὐδέμὲν τῆς ἀμορφίας, ποτὲ δὲ τῆς μορφῆς. Ὅτι δέ -. ἔστιν ἡ ἀμορφία, δῆλον ἐξ οὗ ἐτέθη ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῶν γιγνομένων. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδέποτε ἄρ! οὐχ ὃν εἶναι "} τὴν ὕλην ἀλλ᾽ εἰ "5 ὃν εἶναι, ποτὲ μὲν ἄμορφον, ποτὲ δὲ μεμορφωμένην᾽ διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ γενης:. Εἰ δύναται ἡ ὕλη τὴν συναΐδιον αὑτῆς ἀποβαλεῖν ἀμορφίαν, δύναται ἄρα καὶ τὴν συναΐδεον αὑτῆς ἀτι θαλεῖν ἀγενησίαν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ- δεύτερον, οὐδ᾽ ἄρα -. πρῶτον. Πῶς οὖν γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐχ τῆςς τῆς ὕλης τὴν συναΐδιον αὑτῆς ἀμορφίαν μὴ ἀποία)λομένης; Εἰ ὥσπερ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κατὰ τὸν τέλην τριάδος ἕτερός ἔστι παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς χει: Πλάτωνα τριάδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τριὰς ἑτέρα ταὺς «-: ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν γιγνομένων ἡ ἑξὰς, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τρες. ἕτερος; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “For we say that matter and privation are different, and that of these the one, matter, is not-being accidentally, but privation in itself; and that the one is near to substance and in a way substance, the other not at all. But they say that not-being is the great and the small alike, either both together or each separately. So this mode of the triad is wholly different from that one.” If not-being belongs to matter accidentally, clearly, accidentally, matter is neither matter nor principle. For being matter and being a principle belong to what is. And if not-being belongs to matter accidentally, through … the form. Matter, then, will never be [being] in itself, but accidentally always, sometimes not-being and sometimes being. How then is it not absurd to say that what never is in itself is near to substance and in a way substance? If being matter is one thing and being the matter of something is another, and matter is deprived of being the matter of something but not deprived of being matter, then matter will be both being and not-being: being because it is matter, not-being because it is not the matter of something. But if matter is of nothing, then matter is not of formlessness either. But if matter is of formlessness, … sometimes of formlessness, sometimes of form. That formlessness exists is clear from its having been posited as a principle of things that come to be. But if this is so, then matter is never not-being, but, if it is being, it is sometimes formless and sometimes formed, and therefore always generated. If matter can cast off the formlessness co-eternal with it, it can also cast off its co-eternal ungeneratedness. But if not the second, then not the first either. How then does what comes to be come to be from matter, when matter does not cast off its co-eternal formlessness? If, as the mode of the triad according to Aristotle is different from the mode of the triad according to Plato, so the triad too is different … the principle of things that come to be is the hexad, but the triad … ? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.9, 192a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Plato (Plato (works)): allusion, low confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a. The refutation continues after debris in the scan (not published). “According to Aristotle” reads τὸν τέλην (Ἀριστοτέλην, letters lost). Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 6 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/0/#p-6). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 7 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-7 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's matter as a joint cause and “mother” of what comes to be: matter that is ungenerated and imperishable would rival God. ### Greek text Ἴ. Ἔχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ « Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα συναιτία τῇ μορτῇ τῷ Ὑιγνομένων ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ᾽ ἣ δὲ ἑτέρα μα» τῆς ἐναντιώσεως, πολλάχις ἂν φαντασθεΐη τῷ τρὰ. τὸ χαχοποιὸν αὑτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοταν οὐδὲ εἰ ναι τὸ παράπαν. “Ὄντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαίε; καὶ ἐφετοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμεν εἶναε, τὸ ' πεφυχέναι ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ κατὰ τί. φύσιν αὑτοῦ. Τοῖς δὲ συμδαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ἐρὲ γεσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ φθορᾶς" καίτοι οὔτε αὑτοῦ οἷν τε ἐφίεσθαι τὸ εἶδος διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐνδεὲς, οὔτε τ ( ἐναντίον" φθαρτικὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία" ἀλλ᾿ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θῆλυ ἄῤῥενος, π' ᾿ αἰσχρὸν καλοῦ πλὴν οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ χαϑ συμδεδηχὸς, οὐδὲ θήλυ, ἀλλὰ χατὰ συμδεδηχός" ρεται δὲ καὶ γίνεται, ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὧς οὗ. Ἰ; μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ φθείρεται - τὸ γὰρ φθε: ρόμενον ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ στέρησις “ ὡς δὲ χατὰ ὃ ναμιν, οὐ χαθ᾽ αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητα ἀνάγχη αὐτὴν εἶναι. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐγίγνετο, ὑτ»χεῖσθαί τι δεῖ πρῶτον, τὸ ἐξ οὗ ἐνυπάρχοντος - τοῦτ! δέ ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις ’ ὥστ᾽ ἔσται πρὶν γενέ σθαι" λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποχείμενον ἔχ: στῳ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ σὺν δεδηχός. Εἴτε φθείρεταί τι, εἰς τοῦτο ἔσχατον ἀφ. ξεται. Ὥστε ἐφθαρμένη ἔσται πρὶν φθαρῆναι. » Εἰ, ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω καὶ ἡ στέρησις, πῶς ἡ μὲν ὕλη συν" τία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνομένων, ἡ δὲ στέρησις εὐ συναιτία: Εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀρχὴ τὸ εἶδος, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ αὖτοῦ τὸ εἶναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ, δηλονότι καὶ ἡ στέρηοι; διὰ τοῦτο ἀρχὴ, ἐπειδὴ δι᾿ αὐτὴν τὸ μὴ εἶναι τῷ γιγνομένῳ. Πῶς οὖν ἀρχὴ λέγεται τῶν γιγνομένων ἡ στέρησις; Εἰ, ὅτε πάρεστι τὸ εἶδος, τότε ἡ στέρησις ᾿ οὐχ ὑπομένει, δῆλον ὅτι, μὴ παρόντος τοῦ εἴδους, ὑπομένει ἡ στέρησις. Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἔστιν ἄτοπον τὸ : λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὑπομένον; "Ὄντος γάρ ἔστι τὸ : ὑπομένειν. Εἰ ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεώς ἐστιν ἡ. στέρησις, καὶ τὸ χαχοποιὸν ταύτης ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος ἀγαθόν τε καὶ χαχόν; ᾿Αγα- : θὸν μὲν τῇ ὕλῃ, ὡς δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ, οὐσία εἶναι" καχὸν δὲ τῇ στερήσει, ὡς δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀναιρουμένῃ. Εἰ ἔστι τι θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν, καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ οὐχ ἔστιν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε ἐφετόν ἔσται ἄρα τὸ θεῖον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ οὐχ ἀγαθὸν, ἐφετόν τε καὶ οὐχ ἐφετόν“ διὸ καὶ θεῖόν «πε καὶ οὐ θεῖον. Εἰ δὲ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, οὐχ ἄρα τὸ θεῖον τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ἐφετὸν, ἔχει τι ἐναντίον. Τὸ, γὰρ ἁπλῷς ἀγαθὸν πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν, οὔ τισι μόνον. Εἰ πὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐχ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ " φθορᾶς γὰρ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως ἐφίεται, εἰ ἐφίεται,. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ" καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἑαυτοῦ οὐχ ἐφίεται" ἀνενδεὲς γὰρ τὸ εἶδος " ἔστι δὲ τὸ θεῖον ἐφετόν τε καὶ ὀρεχτόν" τίνι δὲ ἔφετόν τε καὶ ὀρεχτὸν εἰ μὴ τῇ ὕλῃ; Ἔμψυχος ἄρα ἡ ὕλη. Ἐμψύχον γάρ ἔστι τὸ ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι. Εἰ δὲ ἔμψυχος ἡ ὕλη, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ οὐχ ὃν εἶναι χατὰ συμδεδηχὸς τὴν ὕλην; Ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ ὅν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ψυχὴν ἔχον ὃν ἐστιν. Εἰ, ὡς θῆλν ἐφίεται τοῦ ἄῤῥενος, καὶ ὡς αἰσχρὸν τοῦ γαλοῦ, ἡ ὕλη ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη καθ᾽ αὑτὸ θῆλυ καὶ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμθεβηχὸς, δηλονότι οὐδὲ χαθ' αὑτὸ ἐφίεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμδεδηχός. Ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τὸ θεῖον οὐ χαθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ἐφετὸν καὶ ὀρεχτὸν, ἀλλὰ χατὰ συμδεθτχός " ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον λέγειν, Εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη γενητὴ μὲν διὰ τὸ εἶδος, φθαρτὴ δὲ διὰ τὴν στέῥῆσιν, ἀγένητος δὲ δι᾽ ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτος" ἔσται ἄρα ἡ ὕλη ἀεὶ μὲν φθαρτὴ ἣ γενητὴ, ἄφθαρτος δὲ καὶ ἀγένητος οὐδέποτε. ᾿Αεὶ γὰρ ἣ στερήσει ὑπόχειται τῇ ἐν αὐτῇ φθειρομένῃ, ἣ τῷ εἴδει τῷ ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνομένῳ. Τὸ ἀγένητον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενητῶν τὴν στέρησιν σημαίνει γενέσεως δυναμένης ἔσεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων τὴν ἀπόφασιν πάσης σημαίνει γενέσεως, τῆς τε προγεγονυίας καὶ τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι“ οἷον ὁ χαλχὸς ὁ μέλλων ἔσεσθαι ἀνδριὰς, πρὶν γένηται ἀνδριὰς, ἀγένητος λέγεται χατὰ στέρηδιν, διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν γενέσθαι ἀνδριάντα " ἐπὶ δὲ Θεοῦ τὸ ἀγένητον πάσης ἀπόφασιν σημαίνει τῆς κατ᾽ οὐσίαν γενέσεως προγεγονυίας τε καὶ μελλούσης. Δύο τοίνυν ὄντων τῶν τῆς ἀγενησίας τρόπων, χατὰ ποῖόν ἔστιν ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη; Εἰ μὲν χατὰ στέρησιν, ἀγένητος ἄρα ἡ ὕλη, ὥσπερ ὁ χαλχός " εἰ δὲ χατὰ ἀπόφασίν ἐστιν ἢ ὕλη ἀγένητος, οὐδὲν ἄρα γίνεται ἣ ὕλη" οὔτε ὅν λόγον ἔχει ὁ χαλχὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀνδριάντα, τοῦτον δύναται ἔχειν ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν, καθὰ εἶπεν ᾿Αριστοτέλης. Εἰ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη ἀγένητος, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ δύναται ὁ Θεὸς ἐχ τοῦ ἀγενήτου ποιῆσαί τι, δῆλον ὡς δύναται ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ἐχ τοῦ ἀπλῶς μὴ ὄντος ποιῆσαί τι. Ἣν γὰρ ἔχει ἀνεπιτηδειότητα τὸ μὴ ὃν πρὰς τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τέχνην, τὴν αὑτὴν 1. καὶ τὸ ἀϊδίως ἀγένητον πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαέ τι ἐξ αὐτῷ χατὰ φύσιν καὶ χατὰ τέχνην. Πῶς οὖν ἔκ μὲν τῷ ἀϊδίως ἀγενήτου ἠδυνήθη ὁ Θεὸς ποεῃσαέ τι, ἔχ ἃ τοῦ ἁπλῶς μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἠδυνήθη; ᾿Αλλὰ προξέλια ἡ ἀπιστία τοῦ δύνασθαι τὸν Θεὸν ἐχ ξεὴ ὄντος σαί τι τοὺς μὲν πρώτους φιλοσόφους εἰς ἄρντειν πάσης τῶν ὄντων ἐχ τῆς ὕλης γενέσεως ἀπώσατι, ι τὸν δὲ τοῦτο διορθωσάμενον ᾿Αριστοτέλην εἰς ἀνα:ρεσιν τῆς γενέσεως τῆς ὕλης. Εἰ ἔστε τὸ γιγνόμε-. νον, καὶ ἔστι τι ὃ τοῦτο γίγνεται, καθὰ εἶπεν ἐν ποῖς ἀνωτέρω" οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλῃ, τὶ ἀγένητός ἐστι καὶ ἄφθαρτος. Εἰ ἀγέντ,τός ἔστιν ὧι καὶ ἄφθαρτος, ἐξ ἀνάγχης χαθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τὸν τ; ἀγενησίας τρόπον ἀγένητός ἐστιν" οὔτ᾽ ἄρα γίνετε: τι ἐξ αὐτῆς, οὔτε φθείρεται ἐν αὑτῇ. Πῶς οὖν φϑεΐ ρεται ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ ἡ στέρησις; Εἰ μία ἐστὶν ἢ ὥς. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ διάφορα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς γιγνόμενα, τὸς ἀνάγχη μένειν τὴν ὕλην ἀγένητον, τοῦ ἀεὶ διαιρετῦ αὐτῆς μὴ δυναμένου μένειν ἀδιαιρέτου; Εὲ ἀριϑῃῷ μὲν μία ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, εἴδει δὲ δύο, καὶ ἔστιν ἀγ:νητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος, ἣ ἄρα ὕλη ἐστὶν ἀγέντ,τος χὰ ἄφθαρτος, ἣ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ὕλῃ ἐς). ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος, δηλονότι καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῇ; ποιοῦτον᾽ εἰ δὲ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἀγένν τόν τε τὲ ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτῆς οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἔστε. ἄρα ἡ ἀντίφασις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀληθής “ ὅπερ ἀὲνατον. Εἰ τὰ δεχόμενον τὸ εἶδος ἣ ἐχεῖνο γίγνεται. ἃ ἐξ ἐκείνου γίγνεται, πῶς ἀγένητος ἢ ὕλη τὸ εἶδο; δεχομένη; Εἰ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγένητον εἶνα: χεὶ (, ἄφθαρτον, πῶς ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὃν οὐχ ἔστι, καὶ ἀγένηκ; καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν; Εἰ τὸ ἀγενήτως ὃν ἐν τῷ ἀτγενήτῳ ἀγένητον καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς ἡ ἀγένητος οὖσα ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ στέρησις γίνεται καὶ φθείρεται; Εἰ, χαϑὼ; εἴρηται, ἱκανὸν τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ παρουσίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπουσίᾳ ποιεῖν τὴν μεταδολὴν, τὶ τὸ μεταδαλλόμενον τῆς ὕλης ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτο, οὔσης; Εἰ τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον περὶ τὴν οὐσῶν θεωρεῖται τοῦ ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀφθάρτου ὄντος, ποῦ τὶ ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον τῆς ὕλης, οὐσίας μὴ οὔσε; τῆς ὕλης; Εἰ μὴ ἣν γενητὸς ὁ χαλχὸς χατὰ τὴν Ξρογεγονυῖαν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν, οὔτε ἀνδριὰς ἐγένετο. Πως τοίνυν γίνεται ἡ ὕλη ἣ ἐχ τῆς ὕλης τι, τῆς ὕλης μὴ προγεγονυίας; Εἰ μὴ ἐφθείρετο ὁ χαλχὸς,, οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἀφθάρτου οὔσης; Εἰ ἐχ τῶν ἀσωμάταν σῶμα οὐχ ἀποτελεῖται, πῶς γέγονε σῶμα ἐχ τί; ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἀσωμάτων ὄντων; Εἰ φυσιχῇ ἀνάγχῃ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτ:. τὸ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ τὸ ἄτρεπτον, πῶς ἐν τοὺς διτρτ μένοις κατὰ γένη εἴδεσίν ἔστιν ἡ ἀγένητος χ ἄφθαρτος ὕλη, καὶ πῶς κατὰ ἀλλοίωσιν γένεται τ) τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, χαθὼς ἐν τῇ ἐχβϑέπ: τῶν τῆς γενέσεως τρόπων διυρίσατο ἐν τοῖς ἀν. τέρω; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “For the [nature] that remains is a joint cause with the form of the things that come to be, like a mother; but the other part of the contrariety might often seem, to one who fixes his mind on its evil-working character, not to exist at all. For since there is something divine and good and desirable, we say that the one is contrary to it, and the other is of a nature to desire and yearn for it according to its own nature. But for them it follows that the contrary desires its own destruction; and yet neither can the form desire itself, because it is not deficient, nor can the contrary, for contraries are destructive of one another. But this is matter, as if the female should desire the male, and the ugly the beautiful; only not ugly in itself but accidentally, nor female, but accidentally. It perishes and comes to be in one sense, and in another not. For as that in which [the privation is], it perishes in itself, for what perishes in it is the privation; but as potentiality, not in itself, but it must be imperishable and ungenerated. For if it came to be, something must first underlie, that from which [it comes], present in it; but this is the very nature [of matter], so that it will be before it comes to be. For I call matter the first underlying thing for each, from which something comes to be, present in it, not accidentally. And if it perishes, it will come to this last; so that it will have perished before perishing.” If, as matter and form are a principle of things that come to be, so is privation, how is matter a joint cause with the form of the things that come to be, but privation not a joint cause? If form is a principle for this reason, that from it being belongs to what comes to be, clearly privation too is a principle for this reason, that because of it not-being belongs to what comes to be. How then is privation called a principle of things that come to be? If, when form is present, privation does not remain, it is clear that when form is not present, privation remains. How then is it not absurd to say that what remains does not exist? For remaining belongs to what exists. If privation is the other part of the contrariety, and form is what works evil on it, how is form not both good and evil? Good for matter, since through it matter has being a substance; evil for privation, since it is abolished by it. If there is something divine and good and desirable, and it has a contrary, which is neither good nor desirable, then the divine will be good and not good, desirable and not desirable, and therefore divine and not divine. But if this is absurd, then the divine, the good and desirable, has no contrary. For the simply good is good for all, not for some only. If the contrary of the good does not desire the good (for it desires the destruction of its own nature, if it desires the good), and form does not desire itself (for form is without need), and the divine is desirable and yearned for, for what is it desirable and yearned for, if not for matter? Matter, then, is ensouled; for to desire and yearn belongs to what is ensouled. But if matter is ensouled, how is it not false that matter is not-being accidentally? For soul is being, and what has soul is being. If, as the female desires the male, and as the ugly the beautiful, matter desires the good, and matter is not female and ugly in itself but accidentally, clearly it does not desire the good in itself either, but accidentally. The divine, too, then, will be good and desirable and yearned for not in itself but accidentally, which is absurd to say. If matter is generated because of the form, perishable because of the privation, but ungenerated and imperishable through itself, then matter will always be perishable or generated, and never imperishable and ungenerated. For it always underlies either the privation that perishes in it or the form that comes to be in it. “Ungenerated” in the case of generated things signifies the privation of a generation that can come to be; in the case of eternal things, the negation of all generation, both past and future. For example, bronze that is to become a statue is called ungenerated, before it becomes a statue, by privation, because it can become a statue; but in the case of God “ungenerated” signifies the negation of all generation in essence, past and future. Since there are, then, two modes of ungeneratedness, in which mode is matter ungenerated? If by privation, then matter is ungenerated as the bronze is; but if matter is ungenerated by negation, then matter becomes nothing; nor can matter have to substance the relation that bronze has to the statue, as Aristotle said. If matter is ungenerated as God is, and God can make something from the ungenerated, it is clear that God can also make something from what simply is not. For the unsuitability that what is not has for something's coming to be from it by nature and by art is the same that the eternally ungenerated has for something's coming to be from it by nature and by art. How then could God make something from the eternally ungenerated, but could not from what simply is not? But disbelief that God can make something from what is not drove the first philosophers to deny all generation of beings from matter, and Aristotle, who corrected this, to abolish the generation of matter. If there is what comes to be, and there is something that this becomes, as he said above, then matter is none of these, since it is ungenerated and imperishable. If it is ungenerated and imperishable, it is necessarily ungenerated in both modes of ungeneratedness; so nothing comes to be from it, nor does anything perish in it. How then does privation perish in what is imperishable? If matter is one, but the things that come to be from it are many and different, how can matter remain ungenerated, when what is always being divided in it cannot remain undivided? If matter is one in number but two in form, and is ungenerated and imperishable, then either matter is ungenerated and imperishable, or half of it. But if matter is ungenerated and imperishable, clearly half of it is such too; and if half of it is ungenerated and imperishable and half is not, then contradictory statements about the same thing are true, which is impossible. If what receives the form either becomes that or comes to be from that, how is matter, which receives the form, ungenerated? If being ungenerated and imperishable belongs to things that exist, how is matter both not existent and ungenerated and imperishable? If what exists ungeneratedly in the ungenerated is itself ungenerated, how does privation, which is ungenerated in matter, come to be and perish? If, as was said, one of the contraries suffices to produce change by its presence and absence, what is it that changes, if matter is ungenerated and imperishable? If ungenerated and imperishable are considered with regard to substance, since what is ungenerated and imperishable is [a substance], where is the ungenerated and imperishable of matter, since matter is not a substance? If the bronze had not been generated by its prior generation, the statue would not have come to be either. How then does matter come to be, or anything from matter, if matter has not previously come to be? If the bronze did not perish, neither … , matter being imperishable? If body is not produced from incorporeal things, how has body come to be from matter and form, which are incorporeal in themselves? If indivisibility and unchangeability follow by natural necessity on the ungenerated and imperishable, how is ungenerated and imperishable matter in the species divided according to genera, and how do things that change in respect of matter come to be by alteration, as he defined above in setting out the modes of generation? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 1.9, 192a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 7 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-7). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 8 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-8 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's definition of nature as the underlying matter of each thing (Physics 2.1). ### Greek text “Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον ἡ φύσις οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ ρώνστη ἑχάστῳ ὑποχειμένη ὕλη, τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν ὅτοϊς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταδολῆς " ἄλλον δὲ Οόττον ἣ μοῤφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Ὠσ΄“περ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ χατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ δ᾽ “πεχνιχὸν, οὗτω καὶ φύσις τὸ χάτὰ φύσιν λέγεται αὐὰ τὸ φυσιχόν. » ἜΓ οὖν ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸ χατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑλιὧν εἰ μὴ ὕλην; Εἰπὲ, τί ἕτερον; Εἰ δὲ ὕλην λέγοιἕν τοῦτο, ἔσται ἄρα τότε ὕλην εἶναι τὴν ὕλην, ὅτε τὸ πτττὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ὑλιχόν. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις τότε σις, ὅτε τὸ χατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ φυσικόν" ὡσαύτως Σ γεαὶ ἢ τέχνη. Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχφωγύ μενα, τὸν αὐτὸν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχει λόγον. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ ὅτε ἣ ὕλη ὑπάρχει, ὅτε τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ λερκὸν, οὐκ ἄρα ἀγένητος ἡ ὕλη. ### English translation (Claude) “In one way, then, nature is so called: the first underlying matter for each of the things that have in themselves a principle of motion and change; in another way, the shape and the form according to the formula. For as ‘art’ is said of what is according to art and the artistic, so ‘nature’ is said of what is according to nature and the natural.” What then would we call what is according to matter and the material, if not matter? Tell me, what else? But if we call this matter, then matter will be matter when there is what is according to matter and the material. For nature, too, is nature when there is what is according to nature and the natural; and likewise art. For things expressed in the same way have the same relation to one another. But if matter exists when what is according to matter and the material exists, then matter is not ungenerated. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 2.1, 193a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 193a. The heading is garbled in the scan. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 8 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-8). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 9 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-9 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle's statement that a man is not nature but exists by nature, and objects that by Aristotle's own definition a natural being should be called nature. ### Greek text Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «λόγου. « Ὥστε ἄλλον τρόξον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν τοῖς χινήσεως ἀρχὴν, ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ ωριστὸν ὃν, ἀλλ' ἢ χατὰ τὸν λόγον. Τὸ δὲ ἐχ τοὐὧν φύσις μὲν οὐχ ἔστι, φύσει δὲ, οἵον ἄνθῥωπος. » ἘΠῚ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπὸς, καὶ φυσιχόν τι ὥον, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι φύσις ὁ ἄνθρωπος; Διορισάμε- Ἂς γὰρ ἔλεγε εΦύσις λέγεται τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὸ ### English translation (Claude) Of the same, from the same book: “So that in another way nature would be, of the things that have in themselves a principle of motion, the shape and the form, which is not separable except in formula. What is from these is not nature, but by nature, as a man.” If the man is according to nature and a natural animal, how is the man not nature? For having defined it, he said, “Nature is said of what is according to nature and the …” ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 2.1, 193b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 193b. The ref breaks off mid-sentence. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 9 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-9). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 10 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-10 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's distinction of matter in art and in nature, the author argues that the first animal, made neither by art nor by nature, needs another account, without which natural science is incoherent. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «λόγου. « Ἕν μὲν οὖν τοῖς χατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν 'λὴν τοῦ ἔργον ἕνεχα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει ὅσα.» Ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἔργον ἕτερον τὸ μῆτε κατὰ φύσιν κῆτε κατὰ τέχνην, ποῦ τούτου τοῦ ἔργου τὴν ὕλην Ιετέον; Γίνεται γὰρ ζῶον ἐχ ζώου, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρῶ» Ὃν τὸ ζῶον, οὔτε ζῶον ἐκ ζώου. Καὶ χατὰ φύσιν μὲν "ἕνεται τὸ ἐκ ζώου ζῶον, οὐ κατὰ φύσιν δὲ τὸ ζῶον ἱπλῶς. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἢ ὕλη ἔξω- Ἰεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς χατὰ φύσιν ἢ ὕλη ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, 'Ἰηλονότι ἐν τοῖς μήτε χατὰ τέχνην μήτε κατὰ φύσιν ργοις ἣ ὕλη ἑτέρως ὑπάρχει " ἧς εἰ μὴ ποιήσεις ὧν διορισμὸν, ὁ περὶ τῶν φυσιχῶν τὴν πραγματείαν χων, ἀσύστατα ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ ἤδη διορισθέντα. Εἰ “ἀρ τότε οἰόμεθα εἰδέναι ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια “νωρίζωμεν τὰ πρῶτα, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας" τῶς ἂν γνωρίσειεν ἄν τις τὸ ἐκ ζώου ζῶον, ὁ τὸ ᾿ῶον ἀγνοῶν τὸ μὴ ἐκ ζώου; Ἐχεῖνο γὰρ τούτου ἐρχή τε καὶ αὕτιον. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “In things according to art we make the matter for the sake of the work, but in natural things it is present.” Since there is another work which is neither according to nature nor according to art, where is the matter of this work to be put? For animal comes to be from animal; and if the animal had not been first, there would not be animal from animal either. And animal from animal comes to be according to nature, but animal simply not according to nature. But if in things according to art the matter is from outside, and in things according to nature the matter is in the natural things, clearly in works that are neither according to art nor according to nature matter exists in another way; and if the one who writes the treatise on natural things makes no definition of this, he makes even what has already been defined incoherent. For if we think we know each thing when we know the first causes and the first principles, how could anyone know animal from animal, who does not know the animal that is not from animal? For that is the principle and cause of this. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 2.2, 194b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194b. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 10 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-10). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 11 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-11 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle's claim that mind and nature are prior causes to chance, even of the heaven, and charges him with contradicting his own claim elsewhere that the heaven is ungenerated. ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία ὧν ἐν νοῦς γένοιτο αἴτιος, ἣ φύσις, ὅταν κατὰ συμδεδηκὸς αἴτιόν τι γένηται τούτων αὐτῶν, οὐθὲν δὲ κατὰ ξυμδεθηχός ἔστι πρότερον τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ, δῆλον, ὅτι δὲ τὸ κατὰ συμδεδηκὸς αἴτιον πρότερον τοῦ χαθ᾽ αὐτό" ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ αὐτόματον καὶ ἢ τύχη καὶ … ρανοῦ αἴτιον. τὸ αὐτόματον, ἀνάγχη πρότερον νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν, καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.» Ἐν τούτοις οὐ μόνον τῶν πρώτων καὶ τῶν δευτέρὼν αἰτίων ἣν οὐχ ἐφύλαξεν εἶπε τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν, ὃν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ λόγῳ τῆς φυσιχῆς ᾿Αχροάσεως ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ὑπεξεῖετὸ τῆς αὐτομάτου γενέσεως, ἐνταῦθα ὑπέβαλε τῇ γενέσει οὐ μόνῃ τῇ αὐτομάτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ διὰ νοῦ τε καὶ φύσεως " ὅπερ ἐστὶ προδήλως ἄτοπον, τὸ τὸ» εἰληφότα διὰ νοῦ τε καὶ φύσεως τὴν κατ᾽ οὐσία" γένεσιν διὰ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων, τοῦτον πάλιν διὰ τῶν δευτέρων αἰτίων τὴν αὐτὴν λαθεῖν γένεσιν. Ἔτι δὲ πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων τὸ τὸν αὐτόν ποτε θάλλειν ταύτῃ" καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγένητον ὀνομάζειν, ποτὲ δὲ γενητὸν ὑπὸ φύσεως; Ποιήσομαι δὲ τῶ» φωνῶν τούτων τὴν ἔχθεσιν ἐν αἷς ταῦτα ποιεῖ, ἵν᾽ ἔχ παραλλήλου γνωσθῇ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιεχόμενον ψεῦδος. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “Since spontaneity and chance are causes of things of which mind or nature might be the cause, when something becomes the cause of these same things accidentally, and nothing accidental is prior to what is in itself, it is clear that the accidental cause is not prior to the cause in itself. Spontaneity and chance are therefore posterior to mind and nature. So that, if spontaneity were in the highest degree the cause of the heaven, mind and nature must be prior causes, both of many other things and of this universe.” In these words he not only failed to keep the order of first and second causes that he stated, but the heaven too, which he himself, above, in the second book of the Physics, excepted from spontaneous generation, he here subjected to generation, not only spontaneous, but also through mind and nature; which is plainly absurd, that what received its generation in essence through mind and nature, through the first causes, should again receive the same generation through the second causes. Further, how is it not among the most absurd things that the same man should sometimes … this, and sometimes call [the heaven] ungenerated, sometimes generated by nature? I will set out the passages in which he does this, so that the falsehood they contain may be known by comparing them side by side. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 2.6, 198a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 2.6, 198a. Migne's Latin interleaved by the scan is removed; one garbled phrase (θάλλειν ταύτῃ) is not translated. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 11 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-11). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 12 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-12 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against those who make spontaneity the cause of the heaven (Physics 2.4). ### Greek text Ἐκχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «Ἰόγου. « Εἰσὶ δὲ οἵ καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοῦδε, καὶ τῶν χοσμιχῶν πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ αὐτόματον ἀπὸ ταὺτομάτου γάρ φασι γενέσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν χίνῃσιν, τὴν διαχρίνασαν καὶ χαταστήσασαν εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν. Καὶ μάλα τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ θαυμάσ:: ἄξιον λέγοντας" τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὲν ζῶα καὶ τὰ τυτξ ἀπὸ τύχης μήτε εἶναι μήτε γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι φύσιν … ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτέρον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον (οὐ γὰο ὅτι ἔτυχεν ἐχ τοῦ σπέρματος ἑχάστου γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐχ μὲν τοῦ τοιουδὶ ἐλαίαν, ἐχ ὃΣ τοῦ τοτουζ. ἄνθρωπον)" τὰ δὲ θειότερα τῶν φανερῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι" τοιαύτην δὲ αἰτίαν μτδεμέαν εἶναι σΐῖαν τῶν ζώων ἢ τῶν φυτῶν. Καίτοι τὶ οὕτως ἔχει, τοῦτό Ὑ᾽ αὐτὸ αἴτιον εἴη ἄν ζητήσεως, καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λεχθῆναί τι περὶ αὑτοῦ τούτου. Πρὸς γὰρ τῷ καὶ ἄλλως ἄλογον εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, τι ἀτοπώτερον τὸ λέγειν ταῦτα, ὁρῶντας ἐν μὲν τῷ οὐρανῷ οὐθὲν ἀπὸ ταὐταμάτον γιγνόμενον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης πολλὰ συμδαίνοντα ἀπὸ τύχης ᾿ καί τοί γε εἶχός γε ἦν τὸ ἐναντίον. » Ὅτι μὲν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γεγονέναι τὸν οὐρανὸν, καὶ πάλιν μὴ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, δηλοῦσιν αἱ ὧν τὴν ἔχθεσιν πεποιήχαμεν ἐχ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγου τῆς Φυσιχῆς Ἀχροάσεως ἐν τοῖς δυσὶ χεφαλαΐοις, τῷ τε ἐνδεχάτῳ καὶ τῷ δωδεχάτῳ " ὅτι δὲ ἀγέντιτον. καὶ πάλιν γενητὸν ὑπὸ φύσεως λέγει αὐτὸν. ποιῇ μαι καὶ τούτων τῶν λέξεων τὴν ἔχθεσιν, ἐν αἷς τοῦτο πεποίηχεν. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “There are some who make spontaneity the cause even of this heaven and of all the things in the cosmos; for they say that from spontaneity arose the vortex and the motion that separated and set the universe in this order. And this very thing is well worth wondering at, that they say that animals and plants neither are nor come to be by chance, but that either nature … or some other such thing is the cause (for it is not any chance thing that comes to be from the seed of each, but from this kind an olive, from that kind a man), yet that the more divine of visible things come to be from spontaneity, and that there is no such cause for them as there is for animals or plants. And yet, if this is so, this very thing would be a cause for inquiry, and it is well that something be said about it. For besides being unreasonable in other respects, it is still more absurd to say these things when they see that in the heaven nothing comes to be from spontaneity, while among the things that do not come from chance many things happen by chance; and surely the contrary would have been likely.” That [he says] the heaven came to be from spontaneity, and again not from spontaneity, is shown by the passages we have set out from the second book of the Physics in the two chapters, the eleventh and the twelfth. That he says it is ungenerated and again generated by nature, I will show by setting out these words too, in which he has done this. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 2.4, 196a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 2.4, 196a–b. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 12 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-12). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 13 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-13 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Aristotle says the heaven came to be from spontaneity and again not from spontaneity, ungenerated and again generated by nature; the author sets out On the Heaven 2.1 to show it. ### Greek text ᾿Αριστοτέλους. εὍτι μὲν οὖν οὐ γέγονεν ὁ πᾶς οὐρανὸς, οὔτε ἐνδέχεται φθαρῆναι, καθάπερ τινές φασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν εἷς καὶ ἀΐδιος, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ τελευτὴν οὐχ ἔχων τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος, ἔχων δὲ καὶ περιέχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, ἔχ τε τῶν εἰρημένων ἐξέσται λαμ- Ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἀγενησίας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν ὁ ᾿Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅρα οἵα πάλιν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ λέγει ἐν ζῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ λόγῳ. ### English translation (Claude) From Aristotle: “That the whole heaven neither came to be nor can perish, as some say, but is one and eternal, having neither beginning nor end of its whole age, but having and containing in itself infinite time, one may [gather] both from what has been said …” Having said this about the ungeneratedness of the heaven, see what Aristotle says again about its generation in the first book On the Heaven. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.1, 283b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.1, 283b. “The eleventh and the twelfth” chapters are the author's own references (chapters 11 and 12 here). Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 13 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-13). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 14 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-14 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that nature rightly exempted the ungenerated and imperishable body from the contraries (On the Heaven 1.3). ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ « Καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔοιχεν ἡ φύσις τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, ἐξελέσθαι ἐχ τῶν ἐναντίων - ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γὰρ ἢ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορά: ν Εἰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἐστὶν, οὔτε ἔσεσθαι ξυνατόν ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι ἀγέγῆτον εἶναι ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ἔχον τὰ καὶ περιέχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον " ἔσται ἄρα ὁ ταῦτα λέγων δυνατοῦ τε καὶ ἀδυνάτου πράγματος ἀγνοῶν τὴν διαφοράν. ### English translation (Claude) From the first book On the Heaven: “And nature seems rightly to have exempted from the contraries what is to be ungenerated and imperishable; for generation and perishing are in contraries.” If, of impossible things, none either is or will be possible, and it is among impossible things that what is going to be should be ungenerated, without beginning or end, having and containing in itself infinite time, then the one who says these things is ignorant of the difference between a possible and an impossible thing. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.3, 270a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.3, 270a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 14 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-14). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 15 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-15 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against the claim that nothing that comes from spontaneity can be imperishable or ungenerated (On the Heaven 1.12). ### Greek text 1ὅ. Ἐχ τοῦ πρώτου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ «1όγου 'Ἄριστοἐλγεῦς, ἐν ἑῷ, Ἐξαδι τῦῦ ἀδηοῦ, «ὐθὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου οὔτε - ἄφθαρτον οὔτὲ ἀγένητον οἷόν τε εἶναι. » Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις πιστεύσειε τῷ ἀμφότερα λέγοντι περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; Ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐνδεχάτῳ χεφαλαίῳ τὸ αὐτόματον αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει τοῦ οὐῤανοῦ, ἐν δὲ τῷ τριδχαιδεκάτῳ ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι λέγεί. ### English translation (Claude) From the first book of Aristotle On the Heaven: “For nothing [that comes] from spontaneity can be either imperishable or ungenerated.” How then could anyone believe the one who says both things about the heaven? In the eleventh chapter he says that spontaneity is the cause of the heaven, but in the thirteenth that the heaven is without beginning and ungenerated. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.12, 283a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.12, 283a. A few garbled words after the heading are not translated. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 15 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-15). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 16 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-16 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's unmoved first mover, the author argues that a principle that is not natural cannot move naturally, and that a natural principle that has a principle of motion is not a principle. The author concludes that among eternal things nothing is first, so Aristotle's unmoved mover cannot be the first principle. ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου 1όγου τῆς Φυσικῆς Ἀχροάσεως. « Διτταὶ δὲ ἀῤκαὶ αἱ χινοῦφαι φυσικῶς " ὧν ἢ ἑτέρα οὗ φυσικῇ" ὁ γὰρ ἔχει χινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῇ. Τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν εἴ τι κινεῖ μὴ κινούμενον " ὥστε τό πε πα;τελῶς ἀχίνητον καὶ τὸ πάντων πρῶτον; » Πῶς; ἂν οὖν χινέσειε φυσιχῶς ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἡ μῆτε φυοσχὴ οὖσα, μήτε κατὰ φύσιν χινοῦσα; Τῇ γὰρ μόνῃ φυσιχῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν χινούσῃ ἀχόλουθόν ἔστι τὸ φυσιχῶς κινεῖν. Εἰ ἀρχὴ ἡ μὴ οὖσα φυσικὴ οὐχ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἀρχὴν χινήσεως, δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ φυσιχὴ ἀρχὴ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἀρχὴν χινήσεως. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα οὐχ ἔστιν ἀρχή. Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίως ἀγε- 15: ἙΝ τοῦ δευτέρου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ ᾿όγου … νήτοις οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς πρότερον ἥ ὕστερον εἶναι δύναται, πῶς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἀκίνητος, ἢ μὴ κινουμένη, κινοῦσα, πάντων πρῶτόν ἐστιν, ἢ ὅλως ἀρχή; ᾿ ### English translation (Claude) From the second book of the Physics: “The principles that move naturally are twofold, of which one is not natural; for it does not have a principle of motion in itself. Such is anything that moves without being moved, as that which is wholly unmoved and the first of all.” How then would a principle move naturally that is neither natural nor moves according to nature? For moving naturally follows only on a natural principle that moves according to nature. If the principle that is not natural does not have in itself a principle of motion, it is clear that the natural principle has in itself a principle of motion. But a principle that has a principle is not a principle. If among things eternally unge[nerated] … [From the second book On the Heaven] … [unoriginated] nothing can be prior or posterior to anything, how is the principle that is unmoved, or that moves without being moved, the first of all, or a principle at all? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 2.7, 198b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Phys. 2.7, 198b (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 2.7, 198a–b. The sentence continues after Migne's references and Latin in the scan (removed). The bracketed heading (“From the second book On the Heaven,” with a numeral) that interrupts a word is probably displaced in the scan. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 16 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-16). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 17 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-17 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle's grounds for believing in the infinite, including infinite time, and objects that time, which always comes to be, cannot be infinite. The author argues that if generation and perishing were infinite they would be without beginning like the ungenerated, which is impossible. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ τρίτου.1ό6γου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. «Τοῦ δὲ εἶναι ἄπειρον τὴν πίστιν λαμδάνουσιν ἔχ τε τοῦ χρόνου " οὗτος γὰρ ἄπειρός ἐστιν" ἔτι τῷ οὕτως ἂν μόνως μὴ ὑπολείπειν γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν δὲ ἄπειρόν εἴη, ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖται τὸ γινόμενον. » ΕῚ ὁ χρόνος ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναε ἔχει; τὸ δὲ γηνόμενον πρὸ τοῦ γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἦν, πῶς ἄπειρος ὁ δὴ Ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. … … ξία; καὶ γὰρ τὸ μήπω ὃν μέλλει παρεῖναι, καὶ τὸ μέλλον μέλλει παρελθεῖν, καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν ἔμελλε γίνεσθαι. Εἰ τῷ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φϑορὰν, ἀνάγχη ἄπειρον εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν, ἔσται ἄρα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ ἄναρχος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, οὐχ ἄρα ἄπειρος ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἢ φθορά. ### English translation (Claude) From the third book of the same treatise: “They derive their belief that there is something infinite from time (for this is infinite), and further from the fact that only so would generation and perishing not give out, if that from which what comes to be is taken were infinite.” If time always has its being in coming to be, and what comes to be did not exist before it came to be, how is it infinite, as Aristotle says? … for what is not yet is going to be present, and what is going to be is going to pass, and what has passed was going to come to be. If, because generation and perishing do not give out, generation and perishing must be infinite, then generation and perishing will also be without beginning, like the ungenerated and the imperishable. But if this is impossible, generation and perishing are not infinite. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 3.4, 203b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Phys. 3.4, 203b (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 203b. The argument continues after Migne's Latin and reference in the scan (removed). ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 17 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-17). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 18 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-18 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: From Aristotle's denial of an infinite number, the author infers that past time, being numerable, is finite. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸς οὕτως ὡς χεχωρισμένος καὶ ἄπειρος ἀριθμητὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἣ τὸ ἔχον ἀριθμόν. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἐνδέχεται ἀριθμῆσαι, καὶ τὸ διεξελθεῖν ἂν εἴη δυνατὸν τὸ ἄπειρον. » Εἰ τοῦ ἀριθμητοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἀρεθμὸν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπειρος ὁ ἀριθμὸς, ἀριθμητὸς δὲ ὁ γεγονὼς χρόνος, πεπερασμένος ἄρα ἂν εἴη ὁ γεγονὼς χρόνος. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “But neither is number, as separate, also infinite; for number is the numerable or what has number. If, then, the numerable can be numbered, it would also be possible to traverse the infinite.” If number, of what is numerable and has number, is not infinite, and past time is numerable, then past time would be finite. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 3.5, 204b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 204b. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 18 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-18). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 19 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-19 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author argues against Aristotle that time, which has come to be, must have a beginning, and that whatever is actual, like completed divisions or counted numbers, is finite and has a beginning. ### Greek text Ἔχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ όλγου. εὍτι δὲ εἰ μή ἐστιν ἄπειρον οὐδαμῶς πολλὰ ἀδύνατα συμδαίνει, δῆλον" τοῦ τε γὰρ “χρόνου ἔσται τις ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ, καὶ τὰ μεγέθη οὐ διαιρετὰ εἰς μέγεθος, καὶ ἀριθμὸς οὐχ ἔσται ἄπειρος. » Εἰ τοῦ ἀπείρον τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει" ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ νῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ὃν τοῦ ἀπείρου μὴ πρότερον εἶναι δυνάμει, ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ ἄπειρον ἀξὶ, τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει" ἀλλὰ εἰ πρότερον μὲν δυνάμει, ὕστερον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. Εἰ, ὥσπερ χατὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀτελεύτητος ὁ χρόνος, οὕτω καὶ χατὰ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄναρχος, ἕσται ἄρα ὁ χρόνος, ὥσπερ ἀγένητος χατὰ τὸ μέλλον, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὸ παρελῃ λυθός. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀγένητον εἶναι τὸν χρό" νον κατὰ τὸ μέλλον καθ᾽ ὃ οὔπω ἦν γεγονὼς, γεγονὼς δὲ κατὰ τὸ παρεληλυθός " οὐχ ἄρα ἄναρχος ὁ χρόνος. Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάρχου οὐχ ἔστι γένεσις, τοῦ δὲ χρόνου ἐστίν. Εἰ οὐδὲν δύναται ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναν ἄπειρον, οὐχ ἄρα αἱ ἤδη ληφθεῖσαι διχοτομίαι τοῦ μεγέθους ἄπειροί εἰσιν, οὔτε ὁ ἤδῃ ληφθεὶς ἀριθμός. ᾿Αμφότεροι γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσίν. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄπειροι, πεπερασμόνοι ἄρα᾽ εἰ δὲ πεπερασμένοι, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἄρα ἔχουτι, τὸ μὲν τοῦ διχοτομεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαε. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “That, if there is no infinite at all, many impossibilities follow, is clear: for there will be a beginning and an end of time, and magnitudes will not be divisible into magnitudes, and number will not be infinite.” If of the infinite one part is in actuality and another in potentiality, and it is impossible that what is now in actuality of the infinite was not first in potentiality, then it is impossible for the infinite always to be partly in actuality and partly in potentiality; rather, it is first in potentiality and later in actuality. If, as time is endless with respect to the future, so it is without beginning with respect to the past, then time will be ungenerated with respect to the past as well as with respect to the future. But if this is impossible — that time should be ungenerated with respect to the future, in which it has not yet come to be, but generated with respect to the past — then time is not without beginning. For of what is without beginning there is no generation, but of time there is. If nothing can be infinite in actuality, then the bisections of a magnitude already made are not infinite, nor is the number already reckoned; for both are in actuality. But if they are not infinite, they are finite; and if finite, they have a beginning, the one of being bisected, the other of being numbered. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 3.6, 206a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 19 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-19). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 20 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-20 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's infinite by addition and subtraction (Physics 3.6): what is infinite only potentially is not eternal in act. ### Greek text Ἐκχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «.ἰόγον. « Τὸ ἄπειρόν ἐστι μὲν προσθέσει, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει " τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ὅτι μὲν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ ἔστιν ἄπειρον, εἴρηται, διαιρέσει δέ ἐστι. Λείπεται οὖν δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ὅν λαμδάνειν, ὥσπερ, εἰ δυνατὸν τουτὶ ἀνδριάντα εἶναι, ὡς καὶ ἔσται τουτὶ ἀνδριάς - οὕτω τι καὶ ἄπειρον, ὁ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλμε γίνεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐστὶ καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὕτως … καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸ ἄπειρον, τῷ ἀεὶ “ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαμδάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ λαμδανόμενον μὲν ἀεὶ πεπερασμένον εἷναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον. ν Εὶ χατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ ἔστι τι ἄπειρον, δηλονότι πᾶν τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὃν ἀεὶ πεπερασμένον ἐστί " πεπερασμένον δὲ ὃν, ἐξ ἀνάγχης ἀρχὴν ἔχει" ἀρχὴν δὲ ἔχον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ γενητόν γενητὸν δὲ ὃν, ἦν ἄρα ποτὲ ὅτε οὐχ ἦν. Τοῦτο ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀπείρου προσθέσει τε καὶ ἀφαιρέσει, δυνάμει τε καὶ διαιρέσει λεγομένου. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “The infinite is by addition, and also by subtraction; that magnitude is not infinite in actuality has been said, but it is by division. It remains, then, that the infinite is in potentiality. But one must not take ‘in potentiality’ as when, if it is possible for this to be a statue, this will also be a statue, as though there were an infinite that will be in actuality. But since ‘being’ is said in many ways, as the day is and the contest is by one thing after another always coming to be, so too the infinite. For in these there is both potentiality and actuality. For in general … the infinite is in potentiality by one thing after another always being taken, and what is taken is always finite, but always other and other.” If nothing is infinite in actuality, clearly everything that is in actuality is always finite; and being finite, it necessarily has a beginning; and having a beginning, it is necessarily generated; and being generated, there was a time when it was not. This holds for every infinite that is spoken of by addition and subtraction, by potentiality and by division. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 3.6, 206a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206a. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 20 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-20). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 21 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-21 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against the claim that what has something outside it is not infinite: what grows by addition from outside cannot be infinite or eternal. ### Greek text « Οὐδ᾽ εἴ τι ἕξω ἐστὶ, τοῦτο ἄπειρόν ἐστιν " ἀλλὰ τὸ δεχόμενον τὸ ἔξωθεν μεῖζον γίνεται οὗ ἣν πρὸ τοῦ δέξασθαι τὸ ἔξωθεν, Τὸ δὲ τῇ προσθήχῃ τοῦ ἔξωθεν μεῖζον ἑαντοῦ γιγνόμενον, ἀεὶ πεπερασμένον ἐστίν. » Εἰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἀεὶ ἐν προσθήχῃ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει, δεὶ ἄρα ἐν γενέσε: τὸ ἄπειρον. Πῶς οὖν ἄναρχον τὸ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχον; Γενητὸν γὰρ ἄναρχον οὐχ ἔστιν. ### English translation (Claude) “Nor is it infinite if there is something outside; but what receives what is outside becomes greater than it was before receiving what is outside. What becomes greater than itself by the addition of what is outside is always finite.” If the infinite is always in addition and subtraction, the infinite is always in generation. How then is what always has its being in coming to be without beginning? For a generated thing is not without beginning. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 3.6, 207a (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - The quotation loosely reflects Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 21 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-21). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 22 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-22 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Since Aristotle says the infinite does not remain but comes to be, the author concludes that time and motion are generated and have a beginning. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «Ἰόγου. « Ἵπειροι αἱ διχοτομίαι τοῦ μεγέθους " ὥστε δυνυάμει μὲν ἔστιν, ἔνεργείᾳ δὲ οὔ " ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ὑπερδάλλει τὸ λαμδανόμενον παντὸς ὡρισμένου πλήθους " ἐλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁριστὸς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς, οὐδὲ μένει ἡ ἀπειρία, ἀλλὰ γίνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὁ ἀρι- Εἰ οὐ μένει ἡ ἀπειρία, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τοῦ χρόνου, οὐδὲν ἄρα ἄπειρον ἀγένητον. ΕἸ δὲ πᾶν ἄπειρον γενητὸν, γενητὰ ἄρα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἐν οἷς λέγεται εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον. Εἰ τὸ συμδαῖνον τῷ ἀπείρῳ ἐξ ἀνάγχης συμαίνει κἀχείνοις ἐν οἷς ἔστιν ἡ ἀπειρία " συμδαίνει δὲ τῷ ἀπείρῳ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἡργμένον " γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ χρόνος καὶ Ἡργμένος " ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ χίνησις, ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “The bisections of a magnitude are infinite; so that it is in potentiality but not in actuality; but what is taken always exceeds every determinate quantity; yet this number is not determinate, nor does the infinity remain, but it comes to be, as also time and the number …” If the infinity does not remain, but comes to be, as also time and the number of time, then nothing infinite is ungenerated. And if every infinite is generated, then all the other things in which the infinite is said to be are also generated. If what happens to the infinite necessarily happens also to the things in which infinity is, and it happens to the infinite to come to be and to have a beginning, then time is generated and has a beginning; and likewise motion, of which time is the number. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 3.7, 207b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 3.7, 207b. Migne's references and Latin interleaved by the scan are removed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 22 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-22). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 23 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-23 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: From Aristotle's saying that what is not is nowhere, the author asks how matter, which Aristotle says is nothing, can be anywhere. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ τετάρτου «όγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. « Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὃν οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι. ν Πῶς οὖν ἡ ὕλη, μηδὲν οὖσα, μήτε οὐσία μήτε ἕν, μήτε τόδε τι; ### English translation (Claude) From the fourth book of the same treatise: “For what is not is nowhere.” How then [is] matter [anywhere], being nothing, neither substance, nor one, nor a “this”? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.1, 208a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.1, 208a. The question is elliptical as printed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 23 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-23). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 24 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-24 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle's approval of Hesiod's making Chaos, a space for things, come first, since place would then be prior to all things. If everything is in place, as Aristotle agrees with Hesiod, then the heaven, being in place, cannot be ungenerated, for that would make the generated prior to the ungenerated. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «ἰόγου. « Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ Ἡσίοδος ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ποιήσας πρῶτον, τὸ χάος λέγει γοῦν" Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ᾽, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα Ὡς δέον τὲρῶτον ὑπάρξαι χώραν τοῖς οὖσι, διὰ τὸ τμίξειν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, πάντα εἶναί που καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. Εἰ δέ ἔστι τοιοῦτον, θαυμαστὴ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις, καὶ προτέρα πάντων. Οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάγχη πρῶτον εἶναι. … τόπῳ φυσιχῇ ἀνάγχῃ, χαθὼς εἶπεν ὁ Ἡσίοξος, καὶ ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης προσεμαρτύρησε τῇ τοῦ λόγου ὀρβδέτῆτι" πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, πὸ τὸν ὄντα ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὐρανὸν 'λέγειν ἀγένητον; Τοῦτο γλ9 ἴπν ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν, πρὸ τοῦ ἀγενήτου εἶναι τὸ γενητόν. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “Hesiod too would seem to speak rightly in making chaos first; at any rate he says, ‘First of all came Chaos, and then …,’ as if there had to be first a space for the things that are, because he thought, as most people do, that everything is somewhere and in a place. If it is such, the power of place would be something wonderful, and prior to all things. For that without which nothing else is must be prior to the others.” … [If all things are] in place by natural necessity, as Hesiod said, and Aristotle also bore witness to the rightness of the saying, how is it not impossible to say that the heaven, which is in place, is ungenerated? For this is the same as saying that the generated is prior to the ungenerated. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.1, 208b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Hesiod, Theog. 116 (Hesiod, Theogony): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Phys. 4.1, 208b (Aristotle (works)): allusion, medium confidence - Hesiod, Theog. 116 (Hesiod, Theogony): allusion, medium confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.1, 208b–209a, quoting Hesiod, Theogony 116. The argument continues after Migne's notes and Latin in the scan (removed); the opening words of the continuation are lost. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 24 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-24). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 25 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-25 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Since the heaven, on Aristotle's account, needs place in order to be and to move, it cannot be ungenerated. ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «όγου. « Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ χατανοῇσαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔξεπεῖτο δ᾽ τόπος, εἰ μὴ ἡ χίνησις ἦν ἡ κατὰ τὸν τόποι. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν οἰόμεθα μεάλεστα ἐν τῷ τόπῳ, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἐν χινήσει. » ΕἸ ἀδύνατόν ἔστι τὸ ἀγένητον πρὸς «ὃ εἶνα! τε ταὶ πρὸς τὸ κινηθῆναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ γενητοῦ, ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἀγένητον. Ἐπιδέεται γὰρ τοῦ τόπου πρὸς τὸ εἶναέ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸ χινηθῆναε. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “First, then, one must observe that place would not have been sought if there were no motion with respect to place. For this is why we think the heaven above all is in place, because it is always in motion.” If it is impossible for the ungenerated to need the generated in order to be and in order to be moved, then it is impossible for the heaven to be ungenerated. For it needs place in order to be and in order to be moved. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.4, 211a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 211a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 25 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-25). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 26 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-26 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that place has magnitude but no body (Physics 4.1). ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἔχει ὁ τόπος, σῶμα δὲ οὐθέν. ν Εἰ μὲν πεπερασμένα ἔχει ὁ τόπος τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ τόπος - εἰ δὲ ἄπειρα, ἣ ἄρα δυνάμει ἣ ἐνεργείᾳ. ᾿Αλλὰ εἰ μὲν δυνάμει, ἔστι γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ τόπος ὥσπερ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τοῦ χρόνου ἀριθμός" εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ψευδὴς ἄρα ὁ λόγος ὁ λέγων μηδὲν ἐνεργείᾳ δύνασθαι εἶναι ἄπεερον. Εἰ χατὰ μὲν πρόναιάν τινός ἔστιν ὁ τόπος ὅ ἐστι, καὶ ἔχει ὃ ἔχει, γενητὸς ἄρα ὁ τόπος, καὶ τῆς προνοίας δεύτερος " εἰ δὲ ἀγενήτως τε καὶ ἀνάρχως ἐστὶν ὁ τόπος ὃ ἔστι, καὶ ἔχει ὃ ἔχει, ἀγένητος ἄρα ὁ τόπος, καὶ πρῶτὸς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ πάντων, ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φαινόμενα. Οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἐκεῖνο δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάγκη πρῶτον εἶναι. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “For place has magnitude, but no body.” If place has finite dimensions and magnitude, then place is generated; if infinite, then either in potentiality or in actuality. But if in potentiality, place is generated, like time and the number of time; if in actuality, then the argument that says nothing can be infinite in actuality is false. If place is what it is, and has what it has, by someone's providence, then place is generated and second to providence; but if place is what it is, and has what it has, ungeneratedly and without beginning, then place is ungenerated and first of all things in place, among which are the heaven and the things that appear in the heaven. For that without which nothing else is must be first of the others. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.1, 209a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.1, 209a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 26 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-26). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 27 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-27 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's inference of place from replacement, as matter is inferred from alteration (Physics 4.1). ### Greek text ἱ 41. Ἐκ τοῦ αὑτοῦ « Ὡς γὰρ εἴ τι ἀλλοιοῦται, ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ νῦν μὲν λευχὸν, πάλαι δὲ μέλαν, διό φαμεν εἶναί τι τὴν ὕλην" οὕτω καὶ ὁ τόπος διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης τινὸς εἶναι δοχεῖ φαντασίας " πλὴν, ἐχεῖνο μὲν, διότι ὃ ἣν ἀὴρ, τοῦτο νῦν ὕδωρ " ἁ δὲ τόπας, ὅτι οὗ ἣν ὁ ἀὴρ, ἐνταῦθά ἐστι νῦν ὕδωρ. » ΕἸ ὃν ἔχει λόγον ὁ τόπος πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦτον ἔχει ἣ ὕλη πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ διὰ τῆς ὁμοίας φαντασίας " ἄληπτος δ᾽ ὁ τόπος, καὶ ἡ ὕλη" οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀλλοιουμένων τε καὶ γιγνοβένων, καὶ οὐχ οὐσία. Πῶς οὖν ἐτέθη ἡ ὕλη οὐφία ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “For as, if something alters, there is this which is now white but formerly black, for which reason we say that matter is something, so place too seems to be something through some such appearance; except that the former is because what was air is now water, but place because where air was, there now is water.” If the relation that place has to the things in it, matter has to the things in it, through a similar appearance, and place is ungraspable, and so is matter, then matter is none of the things that are altered and come to be in it, and it is not a substance. How then was matter posited as a substance … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.1, 208b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.1, 208b. The numeral is garbled in the scan. Migne's note at the end is removed; the ref breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 27 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-27). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 28 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-28 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that the heaven is not in place, the author argues that what moves by locomotion must be somewhere, and that the heaven's parts change place as it revolves. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ « Πᾶν φῶμα ἣ κατὰ φορὰν ἣ κατ᾽ αὔξησιν χινητὸν, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πού" ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ ποὺ ὅλως, οὐδὲ ἕν τινι τόπῳ ἐστὶν, εἴ γε μηδὲν αὐτὸν περιέχει σῶμα. » ᾿ Εἰ τὸ κατὰ φορὰν χινητὸν χαθ᾽ αὑτὸ ποὺ, χατὰ φορὰν δὲ χινητὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς, καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἄρα ἀνάγχη εἶναι ποὺ τὸν οὐρανόν. Εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ δεύτερον, οὐδ᾽ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον" ἀχώριστα γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ τῇ οὶ ρεσις. Εἰ οὐχ ἔστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν τόπῳ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ, πῶς, χυχλιχὴν φορὰν φερόμενος, τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄνω γίνεται χάτω, τὰ δὲ χάτω γίνεται ἄνω; λνω δὲ καὶ χάτω ὧν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι ψευδὲς τὸ λέγειν τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “Every body that is movable by locomotion or by growth is in itself somewhere; but the heaven, as has been said, is not somewhere as a whole, nor in any place, since no body contains it.” If what is movable by locomotion is somewhere in itself, and the heaven is movable by locomotion, then the heaven too must be somewhere in itself. But if not the second, then not the first either; for they are inseparable from one another … If the heaven is not in place in itself, how, as it moves in a circle, do some of its parts that are above come to be below, and those below come to be above? And if it is above and below in its own parts, how is it not false to say that the heaven is not in place? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.5, 212b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212b. A garbled phrase is marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 28 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-28). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 29 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-29 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's saying that a point has no place, the author argues that the point is a being and so must be somewhere and have a place. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «“όγου. « Στιγμῆς οὐχ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος. » Οὐχοῦν οὐχ ἔστι ποὺ ἥ στυγμὴ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. ἘῚ δὲ ψευδὲς τοῦτο, ὃν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ στιγμὴ, καὶ πού. Εἰ δὲ ποὺ, καὶ τόπον αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “Of a point there is no place.” So the point is not anywhere, like what is not. But if this is false, the point is a being, and somewhere. And if it is somewhere, it must also have a place. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.5, 212b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212b. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 29 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/7/#p-29). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 30 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-30 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author begins to quote Aristotle on how place itself is somewhere. The author presses contradictions in Aristotle's account of place: “somewhere” and “in place” differ yet are one category, place is both place and limit, and the heaven, a movable body, should be in place. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «Ἰόγου. « Καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος καὶ ποὺ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ δὲ, … ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ πέρας ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ τὸ ὃν, ἀλλὰ. τὸ χινητὸν σῶμα. » Εἰ πᾶν τὸ ἐν τόπῳ πού ἐστι, καὶ οὐ πᾶν τὸ ποὺ ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ, πλέον ἄρα τὸ ποὺ τοῦ ἐν τόπῳ. Πῶς οὖν μιᾶς χατηγορίας εἶναι λέγεται τὸ ποὺ καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ, τὰ τοτοῦτον ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα, ὥστε καὶ τὸν. τόπον λέγειν εἶναι μὲν ποὺ, οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ δέ; Καὶ εἰ τὸ πέρας τοῦ πεπερασμένου ἑτέρου μὲν πεπερασμένου ἐστὶ τόπος, ἑτέρου δὲ πέρας " πῶς οὐχ ἔστιν ἀνάγχη ἀεὶ τὸν τόπον εἶναι καὶ τόπον καὶ πέρας; Καὶ εἰ πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ, πῶς οὐ λέλ»- "αι ἡ ἀνάγχη τοῦ ἀεὶ τὸν τόπον εἶναι τόπον μὲν ἄλλου, πέρας δὲ ἄλλου; Καὶ εἰ τὸ μηδαμῶς ὃν οὐχ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ" εἴη γὰρ ἂν ποὺ, καθὼς εἶπε " πῶς οὐχ ἔστι ταὐτὸν τὸ ποὺ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ; Καὶ εἰ μὴ ἅπαν ἐν τόπῳ τὸ ὃν, πῶς οὐχ ἔσται ταὐτὰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τινὰ τῶν ὄντων, εἴγε τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ χοινόν ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρων; Καὶ εἰ τὸ χινητὸν σῶμα μόνον ἐν τόπῳ ἐστὶ, πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς, σῶμα ὃν χινητὸν, οὐχ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ; ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “And place is somewhere, not as in a place, … but as the limit is in the limited. For not [every] being is in place, but the movable body.” If everything in place is somewhere, but not everything somewhere is in place, then “somewhere” is wider than “in place.” How then are “somewhere” and “in place” said to belong to one category, when they differ so much from each other that he says that place is somewhere but not in place? And if the limit of the limited is the place of one limited thing and the limit of another, how is it not necessary that place always be both place and limit? And if place is prior to the things in place, how is the necessity not removed that place always be the place of one thing and the limit of another? And if what in no way is is not in place (for it would be somewhere, as he said), how is “somewhere” not the same as “in place”? And if not every being is in place, how will some beings not be the same as what is not, since not being in place is common to both? And if only the movable body is in place, how is the heaven, being a movable body, not in place? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.5, 212b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212b. The quotation continues after Migne's Latin and reference in the scan (removed). “[Every]” supplies a word lost in the scan, as the refutation shows (“if not every being is in place”). A column letter is removed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 30 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-30). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 31 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-31 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's doubts about the existence of time, the author argues that time, which came to be, has a beginning, is composed of actual and potential parts that exist, and must include the now as a part. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «Ἰόγου Περὶ τοῦ χρόνου. « Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἣ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν, ἣ μόλις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶνδε τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὖτοῦ γέγονε καὶ οὐχ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλει καὶ οὔπω ἐστίν" ἐχ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὃ ἀεὶ λαμθανόμενος γρόνος σύγχειται. Τὸ ὃὲ ἐχ μὴ ὄντων συγχείμενον ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξεις μετέχειν οὐσίας. Παντὸς γὰρ μεριπτοῦ, ἐάνπερ ἧ, ἀνάγχη, ὅτε ἐστὶν, ἤτοι ἔνια, ἣ πάντα τὰ μέρη εἶναι. Τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἔστι δὲ οὐθὲν, ὄντος μεριστοῦ. Τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος " μετρεῖν γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ συγχεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐχ τῶν μερῶν " ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐ δοχεῖ συγχεῖσθαι ἐχ τῶν νῦν. » Εἰ πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι οὐχ ἧν, οὐχ ἄρα ἀϊδιός τε καὶ ἄναρχος ὁ χρόνος " διὸ οὔτε ἡ χίνησἰς ἔστιν ἀϊδιός τε καὶ ἄναρχος, ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός. ΕΠ γὰρ τὸ μέλλον μέρος τοῦ χρόνον. οὔπω … τοῦ γενέσθαι μέλλον ἦν ἄρα ὅτε οὖκ ἦν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τοῦ χρόνου. Καὶ εἰ δεῖ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄναρχον εἶναι, οὐχ ἄρα ἄπειρος ὁ χρόνος, τὴν μεταδολὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔχων ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος νοῦ χρόνου ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ χρόνου, τὸ δὲ μέλλον δυνάμει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὖσιν ἣ ἐνέργεια καὶ δύναμις" οὐχ ἄρα ἐχ μὴ ὄντων σύγχειται ὁ ἐχ τοῦ γεγονότος καὶ μέλλοντος συγχείμενος χρόνος. Καὶ εἰ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ μετέχει ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τοῦ παραχεῖσθαι ταῖς οὐσίαις μετέχει" ὡς καὶ ἐχ τούτου φανερὸν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος. Καὶ εἰ τὸ γεγονὸς μέρης τοῦ χρόνου ἐν τοῖς γεγονόσι μέρεσι τοῦ μεριστοῦ θεωρεῖται, πῶς οὐθὲν μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ ε χρόνου, μεριστοῦ ὄντος; Καὶ εἰ τὸ νῦν οὐχ ἔστιν ἴση! ἄτομον καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ τοῦ χρόνου λεγόμενον; Πῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐχ μὲν τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεσθαι εἰς τὸ νῦν τὴν μεταβολὴν, ἐχ δὲ τοῦ νῦν εἰς τὸ παρεληλυθὸς, τοῦ νῦν μὴ ὄντος μέρους τοῦ χρόνου; Πάντα γὰρ μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, πρῶτον, μέλλον, ὕστερον, νῦν, ἔπει» ### English translation (Claude) From the same book, On time: “That it either does not exist at all, or barely and obscurely, one might suspect from the following. Part of it has been and is not, part is going to be and is not yet; and of these both infinite time and time as it is taken at any moment are composed. What is composed of things that are not would seem impossible to share in substance. Further, of every divisible thing, if it exists, it is necessary that, when it exists, either some or all of its parts exist. But of time some parts have been, some are going to be, and none is, though it is divisible. The now is not a part; for a part measures, and the whole must be composed of the parts; but time does not seem to be composed of nows.” If everything that comes to be did not exist before it came to be, then time is not eternal and without beginning; and therefore neither is motion eternal and without beginning, of which time is the number. For if the future part of time is not yet … before it came to be it was future; there was, then, a time when the past part of time was not. And if the infinite must be without beginning, then time is not infinite, since it has as the beginning of its being the change from what is future. And if the past part of time is time in actuality, and the future in potentiality, and actuality and potentiality are among the things that are, then time, composed of the past and the future, is not composed of things that are not. And if time does not share in substance, yet it does share in being attached to substances; so that from this too it is evident that time is among the things that are. And if the past part of time is seen in the past parts of what is divisible, how is no part of time [present], though it is divisible? And if the now is not … what is called the indivisible and the point of time? How is it possible for the change to come about from the future into the now, and from the now into the past, if the now is not a part of time? For all are parts of time: the first, the future, the later, the now, … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.10, 218a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.10, 217b–218a. Migne's Latin interleaved by the scan is removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. The ref breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 31 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-31). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 32 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-32 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: From Aristotle's link between time and motion, the author concludes that both time and motion are generated, have a beginning, and are finite. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τετάρτου «2όγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγ» ε Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὔτε χίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ χινήσεως ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶ, φανερόν. » ᾿Αλλ ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ χρόνος καὶ οὔκ ἀΐδιος, ἠργμένος καὶ οὐχ ἄναρχος, πεπερασμένος καὶ οὐχ ἄπειρος, φανερόν ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ ὁ χρόνος τοιοῦτος, ἐξ ἀνάγχης καὶ ἡ χίνησις, ἧς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος. ### English translation (Claude) From the same fourth book of the same treatise: “That time, then, is neither motion nor without motion, is evident.” But it is evident too that time is generated and not eternal, has a beginning and is not without beginning, is finite and not infinite. And if time is such, so necessarily is motion, of which time is the number. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.11, 219a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 32 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-32). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 33 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-33 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that time is as great as the motion (Physics 4.11): what has come to be cannot be eternal or infinite. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. λόγου. « Ὅση γὰρ ἡ χίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἂεὶ δοχεῖ γεγονέναι. » ᾿ Οἷς τὸ γενητὸν καὶ τὸ γεγονέναι πρόσεστι, τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγχης τὸ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄπεστιν. ᾿ ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “For as much as the motion is, so much time always seems to have passed.” From the things to which being generated and having come to be belong, being eternal, being without beginning, and being infinite are necessarily absent. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.11, 219b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219b. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 33 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-33). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 34 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-34 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's account of when we say time has passed: if time is perceived by before and after in motion, it has a beginning. ### Greek text « Τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρον ἐν τῇ χινήσει αἴσθησιν λάδωμεν. ζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαθεῖν αὐτὸ, καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν ἕτερογ. Ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄχρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν … εἶναι δοκεῖ. Ἔστι γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς χινήσεως χατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. Οὐχ ἄρα χίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις. Σημεῖον δέ" τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον χρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ" χίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττῳ χρόνῳ.. Ὁ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ χρόνου τῷ ἐν τῇ χινήδει πρώτῳ καὶ ὑστέρῳ ὁριζόμενος ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ ἄπειρον οὔτε τὸν χρόνον λέγει οὔτε τὴν χίνησιν. Εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, οὔτε ἀΐδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἄναρχον " καὶ εἰ τοῖς οἰχείοις ἄχροις ἐστὶ περατουμένη, ἄπειρος οὐχ ἔστιν. ### English translation (Claude) “We say that time has passed when we perceive the before and after in motion. We distinguish them by taking them to be one thing and another, and something between them different from them. For when we think of the extremes as different from the middle, and the soul says that the nows are two, one before and the other after, then we say this … seems to be [time]. For time is the number of motion with respect to before and after. Time, then, is not motion, but that by which motion has number. A sign of this: we judge more and less by number, and more and less motion by time.” He who defines the coming to be of time by the before and after in motion calls neither time nor motion eternal, without beginning, and infinite. For if it has come to be, it is neither eternal nor without beginning; and if it is bounded by its own extremes, it is not infinite. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.11, 219a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a. The heading is lost in the scan. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 34 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-34). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 35 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-35 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that the now measures time: if the now is not a part of time, it cannot measure it. ### Greek text Ἔχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Τὸ δὲ νῦν τὸν χρόνον μετρεῖ ἧ πρότερον καὶ ὗστε-, ρὸν καὶ ἀχολουθεῖ τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἣ χίνησις, ταύτῃ δὲ ὁ χρόνος. ι] Εἰ οὐχ ἔστι τὸ νῦν μέρος τοῦ χρόνου, καθὼς εἶπεν ἐν τῷ τριαχοστῷ τρίτῳ χεφαλαίῳ, πῶς μετρεῖ τὸν χρόνον; Ἢ ὅςα οὐ μετρεῖ τὸν χρόνον τὸ νῦν, ἢ μέρος αὐτὸ ἀνάγχη εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου" καὶ εἰ ἀχολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ χίνησις, ταύτῃ δὲ ὁ χρόνος, γενητὸν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος, ὥσπερ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος, τὰ ἐχείνῳ ἀχολουθοῦντα. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “The now measures time as before and after; and motion follows magnitude, and time follows motion.” If the now is not a part of time, as he said in the thirty-third chapter, how does it measure time? Either the now does not measure time, or it must itself be a part of time. And if motion follows magnitude, and time follows motion, then magnitude is generated, like motion and time, which follow it. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.11, 220a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219b–220a. “The thirty-third chapter” is as printed; the statement that the now is not a part of time is quoted in chapter 31 here (Physics 4.10). ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 35 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-35). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 36 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-36 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle on the least number: number and the line are bounded, and so are motion and time, which follow them. ### Greek text ι Τῆς γραμμῆς ἐλάχιστος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει μὲν ἔστι δύο ἣ μία, μεγέθει δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλάχιστος " ἐλάχιστος γὰρ κατὰ μὲν ἀριθμόν ἔστιν ὁ εἷς ἣ δύο, κατὰ δὲ μέγεθος οὐχ ἔστιν. » Εἰ μὴ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι μέρος, ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ μὲν ἡ στιγμὴ, ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ τὸ νῦν, τί ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ στιγμὴ ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ, καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ; Εἰ δὲ οὐχ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι μέρος, ἀλλὰ πέρας, πῶς οὖν χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ πεπερασμένου ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν εἶναι τὸ πέρας, χωρὶς δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς ἐνδέχοται εἶναι τὴν στιγμήν; Καὶ εἰ ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ἐν τούτοῖς οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον, χατὰ τί ἡ λοιπὴ διαφορὰ τῶν μερῶν, τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου ἀναιρουμέ- "ης τῆς διαφορᾶς; ### English translation (Claude) “The least number in multitude is two or one, but in magnitude there is no least; for the least in number is one or two, but in magnitude there is none.” If the point in the line and the now in time are not least parts, what else is the point in the line and the now in time? And if it is not a least part but a limit, how is it that the limit cannot be without the limited, but the point can be without the line? And if where there is no least there is no greatest either, in what does the remaining difference of the parts consist, when the difference of greatest and least is abolished? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.12, 220a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 220a. The heading is lost in the scan. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 36 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-36). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 37 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-37 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Aristotle says eternal things are not in time, yet calls motion eternal and time its number, which the author finds contradictory. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ « Ὥστε φανερὸν, ὅτι τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα ἣ τὰ ἀεὶ μὴ ὄντα οὐχ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ’ οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνον, οὐδὲ μετρεῖται τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνον. » Ὡς οὖν τὴν χίνηαιν εἴρηχας εἶναι ἀΐδιον, καὶ τὸν χρόνον ταύτης ἀριθμόν; Ὧν γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀχώριστος, ταῦτα οὐχ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ, ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “So it is evident that the things that always are, or always are not, are not in time; for they are not contained by time, nor is their being measured by time.” How then have you said that motion is eternal, and time its number? For the things from which time is inseparable cannot fail to be in time. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.12, 221b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 221b. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 37 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-37). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 38 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-38 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that what neither moves nor rests is not in time (Physics 4.12). ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ὅσα μήτε χινεῖται μήτε ἣρεμεῖ, οὐχ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι ἐστὶ τὸ μετρεῖσθαι χρόνῳ " ὁ δὲ χρόνος χινήσεως καὶ ἡρεμίας μέτρον. » Εἰ τὸ ὃν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ, ἐχεῖνο χινεῖται καὶ ἤρεμεῖ, χινεῖται δὲ ὁ. οὐρανὸς χατὰ τὸν λέγοντα, καὶ ἣρεμεζ ἡ γῇ ἐν χρόνῳ ἄρα ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ, καὶ ἡ τούτων χίνησίς τε καὶ ἣρεμία, Καὶ εἰ γενητὸς ὁ χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγχης. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “Whatever neither moves nor rests is not in time; for being in time is being measured by time, and time is the measure of motion and rest.” If what is in time moves and rests, and the heaven moves, according to the speaker, and the earth rests, then the heaven and the earth, and their motion and rest, are in time. And if time is generated, necessarily [so are they]. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 4.12, 221b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 221b. Migne's Latin and notes are removed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 38 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-38). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 39 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-39 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against the three kinds of change in Physics 5.1: if change is from subject to subject, what changes had a beginning. ### Greek text ὅ9. Ἐχ πέμπτου 2όγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. « Ὥστς ἀνάγχη ἐχ τῶν εἰρημένων τρεῖς εἶναι μετ … … τὴν ἐξ ὑποχειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποχεέμενον, καὶ τὰν ἐχ μὴ ὑποχειμένου εἰς ὑποχείμενον. Ἢ γὰρ ἐχ μὴ ὑτοχειμένου εἰς μὴ ὑποχείμενον οὐκ ἔτι μεταθολὴ, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι χατ᾽ ἀντίθεσιν" οὔτε γὰρ ἐναντία, οὗτε ἀντίφασίς ἐστιν. Ἧ μὲν οὖν ἐξ οὐχ ὑποχειμένου εἰς ὑποχείμενον μεταδολὴ χατ᾽ ἀντίφασιν γένεσίς ἐστιν’ ἡ δ᾽ ἐξ ὑποχειμένου εἰς οὐχ ὑποχείμενον φθορά. » Οὐδαμοῦ ἄρα ἡ ὕλη, ἣν εἶπες ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ὑποχειμένην τοῖς γινομένοις τε καὶ φθειρομένοις, τοῖς μὲν ὡς ἐξ οὗ, τοῖς δὲ ὡς εἰς ὅ. ### English translation (Claude) From the fifth book of the same treatise: “So that necessarily, from what has been said, there are three changes … the one from a subject to a non-subject, and the one from a non-subject to a subject. For the change from non-subject to non-subject is not a change, because it is not by opposition; for there are neither contraries nor contradiction. The change from non-subject to subject, by contradiction, is generation; that from subject to non-subject is perishing.” Matter, then, is nowhere — the matter you said above underlies the things that come to be and perish, for the one as that from which, for the other as that into which. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 5.1, 225a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 225a. The quotation continues after Migne's Latin and a note on a variant reading in the scan (removed). ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 39 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-39). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 40 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-40 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Since Aristotle says what is not a “this” cannot be moved, the author asks how substance can come from matter, which Aristotle says is not a “this.” ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «.Ἰόγου. « Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ λευχὸν ἣ μὴ ἀγαθὸν, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται χινεῖσθαι χατὰ συμδεθηχός “ εἴη γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὴ λευχόν᾽ τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς μὴ τόδε, οὐδαμῶς" ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὃν χινεῖσθαι. » Εἰ ἐχ τοῦ μὴ χίνουμένου ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς τόδε μὴ ὃν οὐδαμῶς χινεῖται (ἀδύγατον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὃν κινεῖσθαι)" πῶς γέγονεν ἐχ τῆς ὕλης οὐσία ἁπλῶς, τόδε τι οὐχ οὔσης; ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “For what is not white or not good can nevertheless be moved accidentally, for the not-white might be a man; but what is simply not a ‘this’ in no way; for it is impossible for what is not to be moved.” If substance cannot come to be from what is not moved, and what is simply not a “this” is in no way moved (for it is impossible for what is not to be moved), how has substance, simply, come to be from matter, which is not a “this”? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 5.1, 225a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 225a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 40 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-40). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 41 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-41 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's argument that time, and so motion, has no beginning, since there is no time without a now (Physics 8.1). ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ ἐννάτου «“1όγου τῆς αὐτῆς πραγματείας. « Εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι καὶ νοΐ σαι χρόνον ἄνευ «οὔ νῦν, τὸ δὲ νῦν μεσότης τις, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρχὴν μὲν τοῦ ἐσομένου χρόνου, τελευτὴν δὲ τοῦ παρελθόντος - ἀνάγχη ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν χρόνον. Τὸ γὰρ ἔσχατον τοῦ τελευταίου ληφθέντος χρόνου τὸ νῦν ἐστιν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστι λαθεῖν ἐν τῷ χρόνν παρὰ τὸ νῦν" ὥστε ἐπεί ἔστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ. ἀνάγχη ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα εἶναι χρόνον" ἀλλ᾽ εἰ χρ'νον, ἀνάγχη καὶ χίνησιν, εἶπερ ὁ χρόνος πάθος ἐπὶ χινήσεως. » Ἐν τούτοις χατασχευάζει ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἀΐδιον. Εἰ γὰρ μεσότης τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ, καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἀεὶ ἔχει χρόνον, ᾧ τεθέντι ἀναγκαίως ἕπεται τὸ τὸν χρόνον εἶναι ἀϊδιον" καὶ εἰ ὁ χρόνος ἀΐδιος, καὶ ἢ χίνησις ἐξ ἀνάγχτ: ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός " καὶ εἰ ἡ χίνησις ἀΐδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγχης καὶ τὸ χινούμενον σῶμα ἀϊδιόν ἐστι. Τοῦτο δὲ ἀτόπως ἔθηχε τὸ συναΐδιον εἶναι" καὶ ἐλεγχθήσεται οὕτως. Ὡς γὰρ γενήσετα! ὁ μέλλων γίνεσθαι χρόνος, οὕτως γέγονε καὶ ὁ παρελθών. ᾿Αλλ ὁ μέλλων γίνεσθαι χρόνος, ὥσπερ τὴν μέλλουσαν γενέσθαι ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἀρχήν᾽ καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲν τοῦ παρελθόντος ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ μᾶλοντι, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ μέλλοντός ἔστιν ἐν τῷ παοὀντι. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ τὸ νῦν ὄν ἐστι καὶ πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλον οὕπω ἐστὶν, οὔτε ὃν, οὔτε παρόν. οὐχ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ παρὸν νῦν ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι νῦν, ἐκεῖνό ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὃ οὔτε μεσότης τίς ἔστιν, ἔχον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα χρόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερον, οὔτε ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή " τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν νῦν, ἄλλου δὲ καὶ ἄλλου χρόνου " οἷον, ἀρχὴ μὲν τοῦ μέλλοντος, τελεντὴ δὲ τοῦ παρελθόντος " ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο μὲν νῦν ἀρχὴ, καὶ ἄλλο τελευτὴ, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ χρόνου. ὕλλλως δὲ, εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ νῦν εἶναι νῦν, ἐὰν μὴ πρόπτερὸν ἣ μέλλον καὶ οὐχ ὄν, ἀδύνατον ἄρα τὸ νῦν συν» αἴδιον εἶνα!. Εἰ γὰρ, πᾶν τὸ πρότερον οὐχ ὃν, ὕστερὸν δὲ, γενητὸν τοῦτο, τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν, γενητὸν ἄρα τὸ νῦν. Ἐὶ δὲ τὸ νῦν, ἐξ ἀνάγχης καὶ ὁ πᾶς χρόνος, οὗ ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ νῦν’ καὶ εἰ ὁ χρόνος, ἐξ ἀνάγχης καὶ ἡ χίνησις, ἧς ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἀριθμός “" καὶ εἰ ἡ χίνησις, ἐξ ἀνάγχης καὶ τὸ χινούμενον σῶμά ἔστι γενητόν. ### English translation (Claude) From the ninth book of the same treatise: “If it is impossible for time to be or to be thought without the now, and the now is a kind of middle, having both a beginning and an end, a beginning of time to come and an end of time past, then there must always be time. For the extremity of the last time taken is a now; for there is nothing to take in time besides the now; so that, since it is a beginning and an end, there must be time on both sides of it. But if there is time, there must also be motion, since time is an affection of motion.” In these words Aristotle builds his case that the heaven is eternal. For if [the now] is a kind of middle, and a beginning and an end, and always has time on either side, once this is posited it necessarily follows that time is eternal; and if time is eternal, the motion of which time is the number is necessarily eternal; and if motion is eternal, the moved body too is necessarily eternal. He posited this co-eternity absurdly, and it will be refuted as follows. As the time that is to come will come to be, so the past time too came to be. But the time that is to come, as it has the [now] that is going to come to be, so it also has its beginning; and as nothing of the past is in the future, so nothing of the future is in the present. But if the now is, and is present, and the future is not yet, neither being nor present, then the present now is not the beginning of the time to come; rather, the now that is going to be, that is the beginning of the future, which is neither a kind of middle having time on both sides, but only on one side, nor beginning and end, the same now, of one time and another (that is, beginning of the future and end of the past); but one now is the beginning, and another the end, of the same time. Again, if it is impossible for the now to be now unless it was first future and not being, then it is impossible for the now to be co-eternal. For if everything that first is not, but later is, is generated, and the now is such, then the now is generated. And if the now, then necessarily also the whole of time, whose beginning and end is the now; and if time, then necessarily motion too, of which time is the number; and if motion, then necessarily the moved body too is generated. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 8.1, 251b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251b; the scan's “ninth book” is the eighth of the modern numbering. Migne's Latin and column letters are removed by logged corrections. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 41 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-41). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 42 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-42 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's rejection of “it always is or comes to be so” as a sufficient principle (Physics 8.1). ### Greek text λ42. Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ε Ὅλως ὁὲ τὸ νομίζειν ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἱχανὴν, ὅτι ἀεί ἐστιν οὕτως ἣ γίνεται, οὐχ ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ὑπολαθεῖν - ἐφ᾽ ὃ Δημόκριτος ἀνάγει τὰς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, ὅτι οὕέως καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο. Τοῦ δ᾽ ἀεὶ οὐχ ἀξιοῖ ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, λέγων ἐπὶ τινῶν ὀρθῶς " ὅτι δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων, οὐχεὀρθῶς. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἀεὶ τὰς γωνίας ἴσας - ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐστί τι τῆς ἀϊδιότητος ταύτης ἕτερον αἴτιον ἀΐδιον " τῶν μέντοι ἀρχῶν οὐχ ἔστιν ἕτερον αἴτιον ἀϊδίων οὐσῶν. » Εἰ τοΐνυν ὡς τίνεται νῦν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο, οὐχ ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ὑπολαθεῖν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ἀεὶ χατὰ φύσιν γινομένων " ἐξ ἀνάγχης ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἔστιν ὑπολαθεῖν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν χατὰ φύσιν γινομένων τὸ μὴ οὕτω γεγονὸς, ὡς τὸ νῦν γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως - διὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ γινομένου ζητεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. [Αλλως γίνεται ζῶον ἐχ ζώου, καὶ ἄλλως γέγονε ζῶον ἐχ μὴ ζώου. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ζῶον ἐχ μὴ ζώου οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν γέγονεν, οὔτε ἀεὶ γίνεται" τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἐχ ζώου ἀεί τε καὶ χατὰ φύσιν γίνεται, ἐξ ὅτου ἔλαδεν ἀρχὴν τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐχ ζώου τὸ μὴ ἐχ ζώου. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀεὶ χατὰ φύσιν γυριομένων, οὐχ ἐπὶ τινῶν μόνον " ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῶν γενητῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν γένεσιν ἣν ἐσχήχατιν αἱ ἀρκαί. Ἢ ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς ἀϊδιότης ἄναρχος εἶναι οὐ δύναται. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τρίγωνον ἀεὶ ταῖς δυτ ἂν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας, ἀρχὴν ἔχον γενητὴν τὴν εὐθεῖαν, ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ γραμμὴ ἄχρως τεταμένη. Αὐτὴ γάρ ἔστιν αἰτία τοῦ τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας“ καὶ ταύτης υὲν οὐχ οὔσης, οὐχ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τρίγωνον " τριγώνου δὲ μὴ ὄντος, ἐνδέχεται εἶναι εὐθεῖαν. Αἱ ἀρκαὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ γινομένων ἀΐδιοι εἶναι οὐ δύνανκαι. Εἰ γὰρ ἣν ἔχουσι φύσιν ταύτην, μεταδιδόασι τοῖς ᾿ξ αὐτῶν γιγνομένοις " γενητὴ δὲ αὕτη “ γενητὴ ἄρα ταὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν φύσις, εἰ καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς γενεσέως ἐνήλλαχται, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερος τῆς τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῶν. ἔστί τις ἀϊδιότητος. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “In general, to think that this is a sufficient principle, that something always is or comes to be so, is not a right supposition. To this Democritus reduces the causes of nature, that it came to be so before as well; but he does not think it right to seek a principle of the ‘always,’ speaking rightly in some cases, but not rightly in that he says it of all. For the triangle always has its angles equal to two right angles; yet there is some other, eternal cause of this eternity; but of the principles there is no other cause, since they are eternal.” If, then, as things come to be now, so they came to be before, it is not right to suppose that there is a principle of the things that always come to be according to nature; it is necessarily right, then, to suppose that the principle of the things that come to be according to nature is what did not come to be as things come to be now, but otherwise; and therefore it is right to seek the principle of what always comes to be too. Animal comes to be from animal in one way, and animal came to be from what was not animal in another. And animal from non-animal neither came to be according to nature nor always comes to be; but animal from animal comes to be always and according to nature, from the time when what was not from an animal received the beginning of coming to be from animal. And this holds for all things that always come to be according to nature, not for some only; for it is impossible for what comes from generated principles to have the same generation that the principles had. Eternity in generated things cannot be without beginning. For the triangle always has its three angles equal to two right angles, having as its principle a generated thing, the straight line, whose definition is a line evenly extended. For this is the cause of the triangle's having its three angles equal to two right angles; and if this does not exist, a triangle cannot exist; but if a triangle does not exist, a straight line can exist. The principles of the things that always come to be according to nature cannot be eternal. For the nature they have, they impart to the things that come from them; but this is generated; generated, then, is the nature of the principles too, even if the mode of their generation is changed and differs from that of the things that come from the principles. There is some eternity … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 8.1, 252a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 252a–b. An opening square bracket printed before “Animal comes to be” is left as it stands. The ref breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 42 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-42). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 43 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-43 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's eternal first mover (Physics 8.6). ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « ᾿Ανάγχη εἶναί τι ὃν καὶ ἀΐδιον, τὸ πρῶτον χιν νοῦν " δέδειχται γὰρ, ὅτι ἀνάγχη ἀεὶ χίνησιν εἶναι " εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ, ἀνάγχη καὶ συνεχῇ εἶναι“ καὶ γὰρ τὲ ἀεὶ ὃν συνεχές " τὺ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς οὐ συνεχές. Ἢ δὲ συνεχὴς μία " μία δ᾽ εἰ ὑφ᾽ ἑνός τε χινοῦντος καὶ ἑνὸς «τοῦ κινουμένου. Εἰ γάρ τι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο χινῆσει, οὐ συνεχὴς ἢ ὅλη χίνησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφεξῆς. » ἘΠ τὸ πρῶτον χινοῦν τὴν κατὰ φορὰν κίνησιν, ἡ δὲ χατὰ φορὰν χίνησίς ἐστι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὁ δὲ οὐρανός ἔστι φυσιχὸν σῶμα, τὸ δὲ φυσιχὸν σῶμα ἐν ἑαυσῷ ἔχει φυσιχῶς τῆς κατὰ φύσιν χινήσεως τὴν ἀρχήν περιττῶς ἄρα χινεῖται ὁ οὐρανὸς τοῦ πρώτου χινοῦντος τὴν χατὰ φορὰν χίνησιν " ἣν καὶ εἰ μὴ τὸ πρῶτον χινοῦν ἐχίνει αὐτὸν, ἔχινεῖτο ἂν αὐτὸς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πέμσετον στοιχεῖον, μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχον χινοῦσαν αὑτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ χάτω, ἦτε χουφότητα χινοῦσαν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ ἑτέραν δύναμιν ἀνώνυμον κινοῦσαν αὐτὸν περὶ τὸ μέσον. Εὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν τὴν κατὰ φορὰν χίνηδιν «ὃν οὐρανὸν οὔτε χατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸν κινεῖ - περιττὸν γὰρ τὸ οὕτω χινεῖν " οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν - δευτέρα γάρ ἔστι χίνησις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τῆς χατὰ φύσιν χινήσεως" οὐχ ἄρα κινεῖ τι τὸν οὐρανόν. Εἰ πᾶσα χίνησις, ὡς γίνεται δὲ νῦν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο γίγεται δὲ νῦν χατὰ μεταδολὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος γένεσθα:" τὸ δὲ μέλλον γίνεσθαι πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι οὕπω ἣν" τὸ ο δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὐχ ὃν, ὕστερον δὲ, γενητὸν τοῦτα πᾶν" τὸ δὲ γενητὸν ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀΐδιον οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι" οὐχ ἄρα ἡ χίνησις ἀΐδιός τε καὶ ἄναρχος.. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “There must be something that is and is eternal, the first mover; for it has been shown that there must always be motion; and if always, it must also be continuous; for what always is is continuous, but what is successive is not continuous. And the continuous is one; and it is one if it is by one mover and of one moved. For if one thing and another move it, the whole motion is not continuous but successive.” If the first mover [moves] the motion of locomotion, and the motion of locomotion belongs to the heaven, and the heaven is a natural body, and a natural body has in itself, naturally, the principle of its natural motion, then the heaven is superfluously moved by the first mover with the motion of locomotion; for even if the first mover did not move it, it would be moved by itself, because it is a fifth element, having neither heaviness that moves it downward nor lightness that moves it upward, but another, nameless power that moves it around the center. If the first mover moves the heaven with the motion of locomotion neither according to nature (for to move it so is superfluous) nor contrary to nature (for motion contrary to nature is secondary to motion according to nature), then nothing moves the heaven. If every motion came to be before as it comes to be now, and it comes to be now by the change of what is going to be, and what is going to be did not yet exist before it came to be, and everything that first is not but later is is generated, and the generated cannot be without beginning and eternal, then motion is not eternal and without beginning. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 8.6, 259a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 8.6, 259a. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. The “fifth element” is Aristotle's ether. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 43 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-43). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 44 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-44 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against the primacy of locomotion (Physics 8.7): if circular motion is first and eternal, it cannot also be said to have a before and after. ### Greek text ἀά. Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «δγου. « Φανερὸν, ὅτι ἡ φορὰ πρώτη " τὸ γὰρ πρῶτὸν ὥσπερ ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ χινήσεως ἂν λέὕοιτο πλεοναχῶς. Λέγεται δὲ πρότερον, οὗ γε μὴ ὄντος, οὐχ ἔσται τὰ ἄλλα, ἐχεῖνο δὲ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων" καὶ τὸ χρόνῳ, καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν. “τι ἀνάγχη τὴν φορὰν εἶναι πρώτην. Οὐδὲ γὰρ μὲχ ἀνάγχη, οὔτε αὔξεσθαι, οὔτε ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὸ φερόμενον, οὐδὲ δὴ γίνεσθαι, ἢ φθείρεσθαι. Τούτων δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῆς συνεχοῦς μὴ οὔσης, ἣν χινεῖ τὸ πρῶτὸν χινοῦν. Ἔτι χρόνῳ πρώτη " τοῖς γὰρ ἀϊδίοις μόνὸν ἐνδέχεται χινεῖσθαι ταύτην, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς μὲν σωμα… ὑστάτην ἀναγχαῖον εἶναι τῶν χινήσεων. Μετὰ γὰρ τὸ γενέσθαι πρῶτον αὔξησις καὶ ἀλλοίωσις " φορὰ δὲ ἤδη πελειουμένων χίνησίς ἐστιν. ᾿Αλλὰ ἕτερον ἀνάγχη᾽ χινούμενον εἶναι χατὰ φορὰν πρότερον, ὃ καὶ τῆς; γενέσεως αἴτιον ἔσται τοῖς γιγνομένοις οὐ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὸ γεννῆσαν τοῦ γεννηθέντος - ἐπεὶ δόξειν ἂν ἡ γένεσις εἶναι πρώτη τῶν χινήσεων, διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι γενέσθαι δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα πρῶτον. Τὸ δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὸς μὲν ὁτουοῦν τῶν γιγνομένων οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἀναγχαῖον πρότερόν τι χινεῖσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων, ὃν αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τούτου ἕτερον πρότερον. » Εἰ τὸ αὐξανόμενον τοῦτό ἐστι γενητὸν, αὐξάνει δὲ ἢ φορὰ τῷ ποσῷ τῆς χινήσεως, οὐχ ἀΐδιος ἡ φορά. Τὸ γὰρ φερόμενον σῶμα ἔχει τόπους διαφόρους, ἐν οἷς χατατεῖνον τὴν μετάστασιν τῶν αὑτοῦ μέτρων "5, φερόμενον ποιεῖ χατὰ φορὰν χινήσεως τὴν αὔξησιν. Εἰ ἐν αὑτῇ ἔχει ἡ φορὰ τῷ ποσῷ τῆς χινήσεως τὴν αὔξησιν, πῶς λέγεται ἡ φορᾶ τῆς χατὰ αὔξησιν χυνήσεως εἶνας πρώτῃ; Εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἠργμένὸν καὶ πεπερασμένον δέξασθαι τῇ προσθήχῃ τὴν αὔξησιν, οὐχ ἄρα ἄναρχος ἡ φορὰ, τῷ ποσῷ τῆς χιγήσεως ἀεὶ μείζων οὖν ἣν γινομένη "". Εἰ ἡ φορὰ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, οὐχ ἄρα ἀΐδιος ἡ φορὰ, ἧς ἀεὶ προηγεῖται τοῦ εἶναι τὸ μὴ εἴναι. Πᾶσα γὰρ χίνησιξς χατὰ μεταθολὴν γίνεται τοῦ μήπω ὄντος, ἀλλὰ μέλλοντος. Εἰ πᾶσα φορὰ τῷ παρἐλθόντι πεπερασμένον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ πεπερασμένον πᾶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἠργμένον, τὸ δὲ ἡργμένον πᾶν γενητόν" γενητὴ ἄρα ἡ φορά. Καὶ εἰ ἡ φορὰ τοῦ φερυμένου σώματος οὐκ ἔστι προτέρα, γενητὸν ἄρα καὶ τὸ φερόμενον. Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τὸ μὲν μόνὸν χινεῖ, τὸ δὲ μόνον χινεῖται ἀϊδίως τὴν χατὰ φορὰν χίνησιν' πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ τὸν ἄναρχον ἢργμένην κινεῖσθαι χίνησιν; Εἰ τὸ οὗ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστι, τοῦτο οὐσίᾳ τε καὶ χρόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων πρῶτόν ἐστι’ πῶς οὐχ ἔστιν ἀγένῆτον; Ἑτέθη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον χινοῦν πάντων πρῶτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον" ἔτι δὲ ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φαινόμενά τε καὶ χινούμενα εἶναι ἀγένητα πάντα᾽ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον, τὸ λέγειν ἀγένητόν τι εἶναι πρὸ τινὸς ἀϊδίου ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις. ἘῚ τὸ πρῶτον χινοῦν τὴν συνεχομένην χίνησιν, χινεῖ δὲ οὔτε τὴν χατὰ φύσιν, οὔτε τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ἐχείνην μὲν ὡς περιττὴν χαθὼς ἐῤῥέθη, ταύτην δὲ ὡς δευτέραν οὖσαν τῆς χατὰ φύσιν χινήσεως" οὐχ ἄρα χινεῖ τὴν συνεχῆ χίγῃσιν οὐδέν. Εἰ τῶν ἀϊδίως κινουμένων οὔτε ἡ χίνησις προτέρα τῶν χινουμένων, οὔτε τὰ χινούμενα πρότερα τῆς χινήσεως, ἔστι δὲ ἡ χίνησις πᾶσα χατὰ μεταῦολὴν τοῦ μήπω ὄντος, ἀλλὰ μέλλοντος" ἔσται ἄρα τὰ Ὁ κινούμενα πάντα ἐχ μεταθολῇς τοῦ μήπω ὄντος, ἀλλὰ … καὶ ὕστερον, ἔσται ἄρα ὅτε τὸ ἀγένητον οὐκ ἀγένη- … ἡ φορὰ ὑστάτη τῶν χινήσεων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγχε Ἐ: ρον χινούμενον κατὰ φορὰν εἶναι πρότερον, ὃ καὶ “, γενέσεως αἴτιον ἀγένητον ὄν. πῶς ἐνδέχεται. τὸ Στῆς κατὰ φύσιν γενέφεως αἴτιον εἶναι, καὶ τῆς τῷ τὴν φύσιν γενέσεως; Ὁ γὰρ πρώτως γεννήτας τὰ ἐγεννήθη. Καίτοι τὸ πρότερον χινούμενον οὕτω; ἐν νεῖτο ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τοῦ πρώτως γινομένο. ὡς ὕστερον ἐχινήθη ἐπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἐξ ἐπεένω. Ἔ ἄρα οὐχ ἔστιν αἴτιον τῆς πάσης γενέσεως τὸ οὗτο ενούμενον ἀγενήτως, ἣ οὐ χινεῖ τὸ πρῶτον χενοῦν τῇ συνεχῆ χίνησιν, διαφορᾶς γενέσεως ἐν τοῖς γετνμς νοις θεωρουμένης, χαθ᾽ ἣν τὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ τὴν ςτγέγονε, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν. Εἰ ἔστιν ἀγένητον τὸ τον πτερὸν καὶ ὕστερον, ἔσται ἄρα ὅτε τὸ ἀγένητον τα ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “It is evident that locomotion is first; for ‘first,’ as in other things, may be said in many ways in the case of motion too. That is called prior without which the others will not be, but which is without the others; and what is prior in time, and in substance. … that locomotion must be first. For it is not necessary that what is moved locally should grow or alter, nor indeed come to be or perish; but none of these is possible if the continuous motion, which the first mover moves, does not exist. Further, it is first in time; for to eternal things alone is it possible to be moved with this motion; but in any one body … locomotion must be the last of motions. For after coming to be come first growth and alteration; locomotion is the motion of things already perfected. But there must be something else moved by locomotion before, which will also be the cause of generation for the things that come to be, not itself coming to be, as the begetter of the begotten; since generation might seem to be the first of motions for this reason, that the thing must first come to be. In the case of any one of the things that come to be this is so; but something else must be moved before the things that come to be, itself being and not coming to be, and before this another.” If what grows is generated, and locomotion grows by the quantity of motion, locomotion is not eternal. For the body that is carried has different places, in which, extending the change of its measures as it is carried, it produces growth of motion by locomotion. If locomotion has in itself growth by the quantity of motion, how is locomotion said to be prior to the motion of growth? If it is impossible for what has no beginning and limit to receive growth by addition, then locomotion is not without beginning, since it always becomes greater by the quantity of motion. If locomotion has its being in coming to be and ceasing to be, locomotion is not eternal, since its not being always precedes its being. For every motion comes about by the change of what is not yet but is going to be. If every locomotion is finite with respect to the past, and everything finite necessarily has a beginning, and everything that has a beginning is generated, then locomotion is generated. And if locomotion is not prior to the body that is carried, the body that is carried is generated too. If among eternal things one only moves and the other is only moved, eternally, with the motion of locomotion, how is it not impossible for what is without beginning to be moved with a motion that has a beginning? If that without which nothing else is is first of the others both in substance and in time, how is it not ungenerated? For the first mover was posited to be first of all and ungenerated; and further the heaven and the things that appear and move in the heaven to be all ungenerated; which is absurd, to say that something ungenerated is prior to something eternal among eternal things. If the first mover [moves] the continuous motion, but moves neither the motion according to nature nor that contrary to nature (the former as superfluous, as was said, the latter as being secondary to the motion according to nature), then nothing moves the continuous motion. If, among things eternally moved, neither is the motion prior to the things moved nor the things moved prior to the motion, and every motion is by change of what is not yet but is going to be, then all the things moved will be from the change of what is not yet but … and later; there will then be a time when the ungenerated was not ungenera[ted] … locomotion is the last of motions, but there must be something else, moved by locomotion, prior, which is also the cause of generation, being ungenerated. How is it possible for the same thing to be the cause of generation according to nature and of generation beyond nature? For the one first begotten … was begotten. Yet the prior moved thing was moved for the generation of what first came to be in the same way as it was later moved for the generation of the things that come from that. Either, then, what is thus moved ungeneratedly is not the cause of all generation, or the first mover does not move the continuous motion, since a difference of generation is seen in the things that come to be, by which some came to be beyond nature and others according to nature. If what is prior and later is ungenerated, there will be a time when the ungenerated … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 8.7, 260b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 260b–261a. The numeral is garbled in the scan. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 44 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-44). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 45 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-45 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle on the infinitely many halves in the continuous, present only potentially (Physics 8.8). ### Greek text 4ἀδ. Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ « Ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ ἕνεστι μὲν ἄπειρα ἡ μέσεα, δὼ οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. » Εἰ ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον, δηλονότι οὐξ ' κίνησις, οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἐστὶν ἄπειρος. Κινήσεώς τε σὲ χρόνου τῷ παρελθόντι πεπερασμένων ὄντων, ἐξ ἀνήτχης εἰσὶν ἢργμένοι" ἠῤγμένων δὲ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀνάγχτ; εἰσὶ καὶ γενητοί. Εἰ δὲ ἡ χίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος εἰ γενητοὶ, ἐξ ἀνάγχης ἄρα καὶ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα. … ληφθέντα χρόνον τούτου τὰ ἡμίσεα ἐνδέχεται ληφῖϊναι ἐχ τοῦ μέλλοντος, καὶ προστεθῖνα: τῷ παρελϑντο, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ οὕτως ἐνδέχεται: τὸν χρόνον τῷ παρε θόντι ἄπειρον εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ ποτέ. ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “In the continuous there are infinitely many halves, but not in actuality, only in potentiality.” If nothing is infinite in actuality, clearly neither motion nor time is infinite. Since motion and time are finite with respect to the past, they necessarily have a beginning; and having a beginning, they are necessarily generated. And if motion and time are generated, necessarily the moved body too. … [nor if,] of a time taken, its halves can be taken from the future and added to the past; not even so can time with respect to the past ever be infinite in actuality. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Phys. 8.8, 263b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, Physics 8.8, 263a–b. The numeral is garbled in the scan. The argument continues after Migne's reference and Latin in the scan (removed); the opening words of the continuation are lost. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 45 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-45). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 46 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-46 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: If the heavenly body moves in a circle by its own nature, as Aristotle says, the author asks what need there is of a first mover. ### Greek text ᾿Αριστοτέλους ἐκ τοῦ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ πρώτου ει ᾿Αναγχαῖον εἶναί τι σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ὃ πέφυχε τέ" ρεσθαι τὴν χύχλῳ χένησιν χατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν.» Τίς οὖν χρεία τοῦ πρώτως κινοῦντος κινεῖν τοιοῖτὸν σῶμα, τὸ χατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσυν τὴν χύχλῳ τ’ ### English translation (Claude) From Aristotle, from the first book On the Heaven: “There must be some simple body which is of a nature to move with circular motion according to its own nature.” What need, then, is there of the first mover to move such a body, which according to its own nature [moves] with circular motion … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.2, 269a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.2, 269a. The ref breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 46 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-46). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 47 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-47 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's divine fifth body, the author argues that a body that moves around the earth cannot be prior to the earth, and that if both are eternal it is not more honorable. ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. « Φανερῶν, ὅτι πέφυχέ τις οὐσία σώματος ἄλη παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα συσταθείσας, θειοτέρα ταὶ προτέρα τούτων ἁπάντων. » Εἰ τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα ἀϊδίως καὶ ἀνάρχως περὶ τὴν γὴν τὴν ἐνταῦθα οὖσαν οὐσίαν χινεῖται᾽ πῶς δύναται τ; γῆς εἶναι πρότερον, ἧς χωρὶς οὐχᾶν ἐχινεῖτο τὴν χύχιῳ χίνησιν; Καὶ εἰ τὸ ἀΐδιον, καὶ τὸ ἀγένητον, καὶ τὸ χρή: μὸν πρὸς σύστασιν τῶν ἐνταῦθα γιγνομένων, ὡς πρό ἐστι τῷ τοιούτῳ σώματι, οὕτως πρόσεστι τῇ γῇ. ἃ τί τὸ σῶμα ἐχεῖνο τιμιώτερον καὶ πρότερον τῆς Τῇ» ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “It is evident that there is by nature some other substance of body besides those constituted here, more divine than and prior to all of these.” If this body moves eternally and without beginning around the earth, the substance that is here, how can it be prior to the earth, without which it would not move in its circular motion? And if being eternal and ungenerated, and useful for the constitution of the things that come to be here, belongs to the earth just as it belongs to such a body, how is that body more honorable than the earth and prior to it? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.2, 269a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.2, 269a. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 47 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-47). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 48 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-48 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author objects that a heavenly body without weight or lightness could not be tangible or heat the air by its motion, as Aristotle claims. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «ἰόγου. « Τὸ δὲ χύχλῳ σῶμα φερόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔχε! βάρος ἣ κουφότητα. » Εἰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον βάρος καὶ χουφότητα οὐ δυνατὸν εἷναι ἁπτόν " ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσι βάρος καὶ χουφότητα ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπτόν' πῶς τὸ ἐχείνων ἄνευ μὴ δυνάμενον εἶναι ἔχει, ἐχεῖνα δὲ οὐχ ἔχει; Πῶς δὲ τῇ αὑτοῦ χινήσει θερμαντιχήν τινα δύναμιν ἀέρος ἀποτελεῖ, χαθἀπερ τὰ ἐνταῦθα σώματα τὰ ἔχοντα βαρύτητα καὶ χουφότητα, τὰ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν χινήσεσι θερμαντιχὰς ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “The body that moves in a circle cannot have heaviness or lightness.” If what has no heaviness and lightness cannot be tangible (for the tangible is among the things that have heaviness and lightness), how does it have what cannot be without those, and yet not have those? And how by its motion does it produce a heating power in the air, like the bodies here that have heaviness and lightness, which by their motions [produce] heating … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.3, 269b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.3, 269b. The ref breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 48 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-48). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 49 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-49 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Using Aristotle's saying that God and nature do nothing in vain, the author argues that the heavenly bodies are made by God and so cannot be ungenerated and eternal. ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Αἱ δὲ τῆς φορᾶς ἐναντιώσεις χατὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων εἰσὶν ἐναντιώσεις. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσαι ἧσαν, οὐχ ἂν ἣν χίνησις αὐτῶν εἰ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα χίνησις ἐπεχράπῆι, ἡ ἑτέρα οὐχ ἂν ἦν. Ὥστε, εἰ ἀμφότερος ἦν, μάτην ἂν ἦν θάτερον σῶμα, μὴ χινούμενον τὴν αὑτοῦ χίνησιν. Μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα τοῦτο λέγομεν οὗ μή ἔστιν ὑπόδεσις. Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. » Εἰ ἦσαν ἐν φορᾷ σωμάτων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἣ ἴσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀντιπερίστασιν χωλύουσαι τὰς ἀλλήλων κινήσεις, εἴτε ἄνισοι, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπιχράτειαν ποῦ θατέρου τὸ ἕτερον ἀκίνητον ἐγίνετο, τῇ βίᾳ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος τὸ χρατούμενον, τὴν αὑτοῦ χατὰ φύσιν μὴ ἀνύον χίνησιν" μάτην ἂν ἐγένετο τὰ οὕτω πρὸς τὰς οἰχείας τε καὶ χατὰ φύσιν χινήσεις ἐμπεποδισμένα, καὶ Θεοῦ οὐχ ἂν ἦν ἔργα ταῦτα, οὔτε φύσεως δηλονότι. Εἰ τῶν μάτην γινομένων, ὁ Θεὸς τούτῶν ποιητὴς οὐχ ἦν, οὔτε ἡ φύσις " τῶν οὐ μάτην ἄρα γιγνομένων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεμποδίστως τὰς χατὰ φύσιν αὑτῶν χινήσεις ἐχτελούντων, ὁ Θεὸς τούτων ἐστὶ ποιητὴς καὶ ἡ φύσις. Πῶς οὖν οὐχ ἔστι τῶν ἀτοπωκάτων τὸ ἀγένητα λέγειν, ἀϊΐδιά τε καὶ ἄναρχα ταῦτα, ὧν ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ ποιητής; Καὶ, εἰ ὑποδήματα ἔργα τεχνίτου ἐχεῖνα λέγομεν τὰ ἔχοντα ὑπόδεσιν, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ τὰ σώματα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν τὰς οἰχείας ἐχτελοῦντα χινήσεις, λέγομεν νοήματα Θεοῦ τε καὶ φύσεως; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “The contrarieties of locomotion correspond to the contrarieties of places. For if they were equal, there would be no motion of them; and if one motion prevailed, the other would not be. So if both existed, one body would be in vain, not moving with its own motion. For we call a sandal in vain when it is not worn. But God and nature do nothing in vain.” If in the locomotion of bodies there were contrary motions, either equal, hindering one another's motions by counter-pressure, or unequal, so that through the prevailing of one the other became motionless, the overpowered one being forced by the prevailing one and not completing its own natural motion, then the things so hindered in their own natural motions would have come to be in vain, and these would not be works of God, nor clearly of nature. If God is not the maker of the things that come to be in vain, nor is nature, then God and nature are the maker of the things that come to be not in vain but complete their natural motions unhindered. How then is it not most absurd to call these ungenerated, eternal, and without beginning, when God and nature are their maker? And if we call sandals that are worn works of a craftsman, why do we not also call the bodies that complete their own natural motions thoughts of God and nature? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.4, 271a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.4, 271a. “Thoughts” translates νοήματα as printed; “works” (ποιήματα) may be meant. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 49 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-49). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 50 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-50 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's distinction between the form apart from matter and the form in matter (On the Heaven 1.9). ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «Ἰόγου. « Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν λόγον τὸν ἄνεν τῆς ὕλης, καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τῆς μορφῆς, καλῶς τε λέγεται, καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ἀληθές " ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδεμία ἀνάγχη διὰ τοῦτο πλείους εἶναι χόσμους, οὐδὲ ἐνδέχεται πλείους γενέσθαι, ἐπείπερ οὗτος ἐκ πάσης ἐστὶ τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἐστίν. » Εἰ τὸ ἀύλως καὶ ἐνύλως ἐστὶ τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἡ διαφορὰ, δηλονότι ὕστερον τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀῦλου ὁ λόγος ὁ ἕνυλος. Πῶς οὖν ἀγένητος ὁ χόσμος, ἐχ τοῦ ὑστέρου λόγου τὴν σύστασιν ἐσχηχώς; Εἰ ἀνείδεος καὶ ἀνούσιος, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τόδε τι ἔστερη-μένη ἡ ὕλη πρὸ τοῦ λαδεῖν τὸ εἶδος, καὶ γενέσθαι οὐσία, καὶ τόδε τι " πῶς ἀγένητος ὁ χόσμος. ἐχ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης γεγονώς; Εἰ ὁ ἐσχηχὼς τὸν λόγον ποῦ ἑνὸς χόσωου, οὗτος καὶ πλειόνων χόσμων εἶχε τοὺς … τὴν ποίησιν χατὰ τὴν οἰχείαν βούλησιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ εἰ. πορίᾳ τῆς ὕλης ἴσχυσε ποιεῖν χόσμον ἕνα, καὶ τὶ ἀπορίᾳ αὐτῆς οὐχ ἴσχυσε ποιεῖν πλείονας χόσμοκ. πῶς οὐ δοκεῖ μάτην ἐσχηχέναι πλειόνων κόσμων τος λόγους, ὧν τὴν ποίησιν οὐχ ἴσχυσε διὰ τὴν ἀπορῶν «ἧς ὕλης; Εἰ ἐξ ἀγενήτου ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ἀγέντον, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος μὲν ἡ ὕλη, ἀγόνηγτος δὲ καὶ κα κόσμος, γίνεται οὗτος ἐξ ἐχείνης; Εἰ μὴ ὡς ἐποῖκεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ ἐχ τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐποξηει, οὐκ ἄρα ποιεῖ ὁ Θεὸς ὅσα βούλεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἔσχιει. Εἰ δὲ ἴσην τῇ βουλήσει ἔχει τὴν ἰσχὺν ἐν πᾶσι, τιατὴς ἄρα τῆς ὕλης ὁ Θεὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἐχ τς ὕλης. Εἰ ἡ ὕλη, ὑποχειμένη Θεῷ εἰς ποέησεν τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀνείδεος οὖσα καὶ ἀνούσιος͵ ἄποιός τε καὶ σος, ὑπὸ ἑῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως μετεδλέθη εἰς ταῦτα πάντα καὶ γέγονεν οὐσία πεποιωμένη καὶ πεποῦιμένη" πῶς οὐχ ηὐξήθη ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς τοῦ θεὼ δυνάμεως, τὰς τοσαύτας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐργασαμένης μεν δολὰς εἰς τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ πλείονας κόσμους γεν. σθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς γένεσιν ἑνὸς χόσμου ἀπλωθεῖσα, ἄχοντα τὸν Θεὸν ἔλαυσε τοῦ ποιεῖν τέλείσνας χόσμους; ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “That the formula without matter is different from the formula of the shape in matter is well said, and let this be true; but nonetheless there is no necessity on this account that there should be more worlds, nor is it possible that more should come to be, since this world is made from all the matter, as indeed it is.” If the difference of formula from formula is that one is without matter and the other in matter, clearly the formula in matter is later than the formula without matter. How then is the world ungenerated, when it has its constitution from the later formula? If matter is formless and without substance, and deprived of being a “this,” before it receives the form and becomes a substance and a “this,” how is the world ungenerated, when it has come to be from such matter? If the one who had the formula of one world also had the formulas of more worlds, … the making according to his own will, but by the abundance of matter was able to make one world and by its lack was not able to make more worlds, how does he not seem to have had the formulas of more worlds in vain, when he could not make them because of the lack of matter? If it is impossible for the ungenerated to come to be from the ungenerated, how, if matter is ungenerated and the world is ungenerated too, does the world come to be from matter? If God did not make matter as he made the things that come from matter, then God does not make whatever he wishes, but whatever he is able. But if he has power equal to his will in all things, then God is the maker of matter, as also of the things that come from matter. If matter, lying under God for the making of the things that come from it, formless and without substance, without quality and without quantity, was changed by God's power into all these things and became substance with quality and quantity, how was it not increased by the same power of God, which wrought such great changes in it, so far that more worlds too should come to be from it, but, being spread out for the generation of one world, prevented God against his will from making more worlds? ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.9, 278a–b. The refutation comes after Migne's references and Latin in the scan (removed). “By the abundance” reads εἰ. πορίᾳ as εὐπορίᾳ by sense. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 50 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-50). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 51 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-51 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that the heaven is a particular thing made of all matter: then it is composite and generated. ### Greek text ὅ1. Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ὁ δὲ οὐρανός ἔστι μὲν τῶν καθ᾽ Σχαστὰ χεὶ τῶν ἐχ τῆς ὕλης ' ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἐχ μοῤίου αὐτῆς συνίστηχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀπάσης, τὸ μὲν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε εἴη ἄν ἄλλος, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο γενέσθαι πλείους, διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν τὴν ὕλην περιειληφέναι τοῦτον. » τῆς ὕλης καὶ λόγου συγχειμένων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν αὐτῷ οὐρανῷ, τῷ ἀδλῳ δὲ λόγῳ εἶναι ἕτερον, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι γενητὸς, ἀρχὴν ἔχων τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας, τὶν σύνθεσιν ὕλης τε καὶ λόγου ἐξ ὧν ἐστίν; Εἰ ἡ ὅλ» χαθ' ἑαυτὴν οὔτε βαρύτητα ἔχει οὔτε χουφότητα (ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς γινομένων σωμάτων πάθη) εἰ ἐχ πάσης τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης γέγονεν ὁ οὐρανὸς ὁ μὴτε βαρύτητα ἔχων μήτε χουφόττητα θεν γέγονε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, τῆς ὕλης ἀναλευθείστ: πάσης εἰς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ποίησιν; Εἰ πρὸ τοῦ εἰδ᾽ ποιηθῆναι τὴν ὕλην τῷ εἴδει τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οὕτως οὐχ εἶχε βαρύτητα καὶ χουφότητα, ὡς νῦν οὖκ ἔχει μετὰ τὸ εἰδοποιηθῆναι αὐτήν’ πῶς οὐχ ἐχινεῖτο πρὸ τῆς εἰδοποιήσεως, ὡς νῦν χινεῖται μετὰ τὴν εἰδοποέησιν; Εἰ τὸ χινεῖσθαι οὐσίας ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητὰ καὶ χουφότητα ὕλης ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐκ οὐσίας, χινεῖται δὲ ὁ οὐρανὸς τὴν χύχλῳ κίνησιν, δεὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητα καὶ κουφότηνα " δηλονότι διὰ τὸν ὕλην τὸ κινεῖσθαι οὕτως ἔχει ὁ οὐρανὸς, καὶ οὐ διὰ τὸ εἶδος. Πῶς οὖν ἀχίνητος ἢ ὕλη πρὸ τοῦ εἶδον κατὰ τὴν χύχλῳ χίνησιν, οὔτε βαρύτητα ἔχουσα οὔτε, ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “The heaven is among the particular things and those that come from matter; but if it is constituted not from a part of matter but from all of it, then being heaven and being this heaven are different; yet there would not be another, nor could more come to be, because this one has embraced all the matter.” [If the heaven is] composed of matter and formula, so that being heaven is different from the immaterial formula, how is it not generated, when it has as the beginning of its own substance the composition of matter and formula from which it is? If matter by itself has neither heaviness nor lightness (for these are affections of the bodies that come to be from it), and if the heaven, which has neither heaviness nor lightness, came to be from all such matter, from where did all the other things come to be, when all the matter was used up in making the heaven? If, before matter was formed by the form of the heaven, it had no heaviness and lightness, just as now, after it has been formed, it has none, how was it not moved before the forming, as it is moved now after the forming? If being moved belongs to substance, and not having heaviness and lightness belongs to matter and not to substance, and the heaven moves with circular motion because it has no heaviness and lightness, clearly the heaven has its moving in this way because of the matter and not because of the form. How then was matter unmoved with circular motion before the form, having neither heaviness nor [lightness]? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 1.9, 278b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 1.9, 278b. The numeral is garbled in the scan. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 51 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/30/#p-51). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 52 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-52 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against “each thing that has a work is for the sake of the work” and God's activity as eternal motion (On the Heaven 2.3). ### Greek text .ὅ8. Ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου 2όγου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ. « Ἕκχαστόν ἐστιν ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον ἕνεκα τοῦ ἔργου. Θεοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία - τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι ζωὴ ἀΐδιος' ὥστε ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ χίνησιν ἀΐδιον ὑπάρχειν. τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ ἐγχύχλιον σῶμα, ὃ φύσει χινεῖται χύχλῳ ἀεί. ν Εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἀγενήτου καὶ ἀϊδίου οὐδέν ἐστι τοῦ εἴναι αἴτιον “ ὧν δὲ ἔστιν ἔργον, ταῦτα ἕνεχεν τοῦ ἔργου ἐστίν" οὐχ ἄρα ἀΐδια, ὧν τὰ ἔργα τοῦ εἶναί ἔστιν αἴτια. Εὲ ἀψύχων ἐστὶ τὸ τῇ παρουσίᾳ μόνον ἐνεργεῖν τὰς χατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας, λογιχῶν δὲ, τὸ τῇ βουλήσει" πῶς ἐστὶ Θεὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς, ὁ μὴ βουλήσει τὴν ἀθανασίαν ἐνεργῶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χινήσει τε καὶ τῇ μεταστάσει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν; Εἰ τὸ ἀγένητον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν χρῇζει τινὸς, ἥ τινων τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς συνεργείας" πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς, χλὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν χινητὸν χρήζων τῆς γῆς περὶ ἣν χινεῖται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν, τοῦ ἡλίου, καὶ τῆς σελήνης, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄστρων, ἐστὶν ἀγένητος; Εὲ τοῦ ἀγενήτου οὐχ ἔστι λόγος ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανὺς, ἔχει λόγον ἄῦλον ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, καὶ λόγον ἕνυλον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ δι᾿ ὃν ἕτερον τὸ οὐρανῷ εἶναι τῷ τόδε οὐρανὸν εἶναι; Εἰ οὐ δύναται ὁ οὐρανὸς ποιῆσαι τῇ βουλήσει ἃ ποιεῖ τῇ χινήσει, πῶς Θεὸς οὗτος ἀΐδιος, ἀΐδιον ἐνεργῶν ζωὴν ἀβδουλήτως; Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐχ ἐνεργεῖ ὁ οὐρανὸς τὴν αἰώνιον ζωῆν " ἔχουσι γὰρ ταύτην ἐχ τῆς οἱχείας φύσεως " τὰ γενητὰ δὲ καὶ φθαρτὰ αἰωνίως οὐ ζῶσι" ποῦ ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ, ἣν ἐνεργεῖ ὁ οὐρανός; Εἰ μὴ μόμὴν πρὸς γένεσιν τῶν γιγνομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν φθειρομένων 15 χρησίμη ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ χίνησις " πῶς Θεὸς ὁ οὐρανὸς, καὶ ἢ ἐνέργεια αὑτοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, δι ἧς φθείρεται τὰ φθαρτά; Εἰ ἐχ τῆς ὕλης συναγένητον τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι, πῶς ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανὸς, ὃ ὧν ἐχ τῆς ὕλης; Εἰ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, ὕστερον ἀμφοτέρων, πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς, ὁ ὧν ἐχ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, συναῖδιός ἐστιν ἀμφοτέροις; Εὲ τὸ εἶδος οὐχ ἐχ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλὰ ἐχ τοῦ ποιοῦντος, πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς, ἄλλοθεν ἔχων τὴν ὕλην καὶ ἑτέρωθεν τὸ εἶδος, ἀγένητός ἐστιν; Εἰ ὑλιχόν ἔστι σῶμα ὁ οὐραγὺς, καὶ σφαιριχὸν ἔχει τὸ σχῆμα, χαΐ ἐστιν ἀγένητος" πῶς οὐχ ἀμφότερα ἔχει ἐκ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὅ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἔχειν ὅ ἔχει; Εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη τὸ τοῖς καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς γιγνομένοις πρώτως ὑποχείμενον καὶ ἐνυπάρχον, πῶς ἀγένητος ὧν ὁ οὐρανὸς, ὡς τὰ γενητὰ τὴν ὕλην ἔχει ὑποχειμένην τε καὶ ἑνυπἄρχουσαν; : ### English translation (Claude) From the second book On the Heaven: “Each thing that has a work exists for the sake of its work. The activity of God is immortality, that is, eternal life; so that eternal motion must belong to God. … this the circular body has, which by nature always moves in a circle.” If nothing is the cause of the being of what is ungenerated and eternal, and the things that have a work exist for the sake of the work, then things whose works are the cause of their being are not eternal. If it belongs to inanimate things to perform their natural activities by their mere presence, but to rational beings to do so by will, how is the heaven God, when it does not perform immortality by will but by the motion and change of position of its parts? If the ungenerated needs the cooperation of nothing outside, either in order to be or in order to act, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it needs the earth, around which it moves, in order to be movable, and the sun, the moon, and the other stars in order to act? If there is no formula of the ungenerated in a maker, how, if the heaven is ungenerated, does it have an immaterial formula in the maker and a material formula in matter, because of which being heaven differs from being this heaven? If the heaven cannot do by will what it does by motion, how is it an eternal God, performing eternal life without willing it? If the heaven does not produce eternal life in eternal things (for they have this from their own nature), and generated and perishable things do not live eternally, where is the eternal life that the heaven performs? If the motion of the heaven is useful not only for the generation of the things that come to be, but also for [the perishing] of the things that perish, how is the heaven God, and its activity eternal life, when through it perishable things perish? If what comes from matter cannot be ungenerated together with matter, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it comes from matter? If what comes from two things is later than both, how is the heaven, which comes from matter and form, co-eternal with both? If the form comes not from the matter but from the maker, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it has its matter from one source and its form from another? If the heaven is a material body, and has a spherical shape, and is ungenerated, how does it not have both from matter, both its being what it is and its having what it has? If matter is what first underlies and is present in the things that come to be from it of themselves, how is the heaven ungenerated, when, like generated things, it has matter underlying it and present in it? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.3, 286a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.3, 286a. The numeral is garbled in the scan. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 52 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-52). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 53 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-53 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author quotes Aristotle on why the heaven's circular motion requires a body at rest in the middle. The author completes Aristotle's argument that a resting earth implies fire, the intermediate elements, generation, and further circular bodies, and objects that the heaven, said to move by its element, actually moves by its spherical shape, and that a weightless body should rest rather than move. The author argues that the heaven's spherical motion is not natural to its element, that a world whose parts depend on one another is the work of providence and so generated, and that Aristotle's chain of necessities (eternal motion, a fifth body, a resting earth, the elements, generation) proves the dependence of all these things. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. « Ἐπειδὴ ὁ οὐρανὸς σῶμά τι θεῖον, διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει: τὸ ἐγχύχλιον σῶμα ὃ φύσει χινεῖται χύχλῳ ἀεί" διὰ τί οὖν οὐχ ὅλον τὸ τῶμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τοιοῦτον; Ὅτι ἀνάγχη μένειν τι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ φερομένου χύχλῳ, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου" τούτου δ᾽ οὐδὲν οἷόν τε μένειν μόριον οὔθ᾽ ὅλως οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡ χατὰ φύσιν χίνησις ἣν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον (φύσει δὲ χύχλῳ χινεῖται)" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀΐδιος ἡ κίνησις. Οὐθὲν … … τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἔχστασίς τις ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ γενέσει τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. ᾿Ανάγχη τοίνυν γῆν εἶναι τοῦτο γὰρ ἢρεμεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ γῆν, ἀνάγχη καὶ πῦρ εἶναι. Τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων εἰ θάτερον φύσει, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερον εἕνει φύσει, ἐάνπερ ἐναντίον, καὶ τὸ εἶναί τινα αὐτῷ φύσιν. Ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὕλη τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τῆς στερήσεως προτέρα " λέγω δὲ οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ φυχροῦ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εἴπερ ἐστὶ πῦρ καὶ γῆ, ἀνάγχη καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν εἶναι σώματα. Ἐναντίωσιν γὰρ ἔχαστον ἔχει πρὸς ἕχαστον τῶν στοιχείων " τούτων ἃ ὑπαρχόντων, φανερὸν, ὅτι ἀνάγχη γένεσιν εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν οἷόν τ᾽ αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀΐδιον. Πάσχει γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, καὶ φθαρτιχὰ ἀλλήλων οὗ μὴ ἐνδέχεται κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὴν χίνησιν ἀΐδιον. Τούτων δ᾽ ἔστι χίνησις. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀναγχαΐον εἶναι γένεσιν, ἐχ τούτων δῆλον " εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, ἀναγχαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλην φθορὰν, ἣ μίαν, ἣ πλείους. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, ὡσαύτως ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων πρὸς ἄλληλα. Νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτόν ἔστι δῆλον διὰ τένα αἰτίαν πλείω τὰ ἐγχύχλιά ἔστι σώματα, ὅτι ἀνάγχη γένεσιν εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ πῦρ᾽ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν γῆν " τσύτην δὲ, ὅτι ἀνάγχη μὲν εἶναί ᾽ τι ἀεὶ, εἴπερ καὶ κινεῖσθαί τι ἀεί. » ἐστὶ σῶμα ἀεὶ χινητὸν περὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σῶμα" ἀνάγκη ἄρα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ χινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον" εἰ δὲ σῶμα μὲν τοιοῦτον ἔχει ὁ οὐρανὸς, χίνησιν δὲ τοιαύτην οὐχ ἔχει, δηλονότι παρὰ φύσιν κινεῖται. Εἰ περὶ τὸ μέσον χινεῖται τοῦ οὐρανοῦ θῶμα, οὐχ ὅλον δὲ χατὰ τὴν φορὰν τοῦ στοιχείου ἐξ οὗ εἶναι λέγεται τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ σφαιριχῶς χατὰ ἀντιμετάστασιν τῶν μερῶν " πῶς οὐχὶ ἢ σφαιοὐδαμῶς τοῖς ἐχ τῶν στοιχείων σώμασιν ἡ χίνησις κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖ:, ἐξ ὧν εἰσι" πῶς οὖν ἐχ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ σώματος ἡ ἀνάγχη τῆς χινήσεως ἐνήλλαχται; Σώματι μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχοντι, μήτε χούφοτητα, ἀναγκχαῖόν ἐστιν ἔχειν στάσιν ἀχίνητον μᾶλλον ἣ κίνησιν ἄστατον. Εἰ μένειν. γὰρ μήτε ὑκὸ βαρύτητός ἐστι χκατωφερὲς, μήτε ὑπὸ χουφότητος ἀνωφερὲς, ἀνάγχη μένειν αὐτὸ ἀχένητον. Εἰ ἐσχηματίζετο λίθος τῷ τῆς σφαίρας σχήματι, καὶ ἐτίθετο ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, ἐνεχθῆναι χάτω εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν, οὐκ ἂν ἐφέρετο κάτω χυλιόμενος διὰ τὸ σχῆμα, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βαρύτητα πῶς τὸ πέμπτον στοιχεῖον, …" εἴσθας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν βαρύτητα ἣ χουφότητα, οὐ Ἰατὰ τὴν οἰχείαν φύσιν ὅλον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι δέρεται περὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ σφαιριχῶς χατὰ ἀντικετάστασιν τῶν μερῶν χινεῖται͵ τὴν χίνησιν, οὐχ οὖτᾶεν τῆς τοῦ στοιχείου φύσεως, τοῦ σφαιριχοῦ γχήματος; Εἰ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν, οὔτε περιττὸν, οὔτε κἄττην ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, πῶς οὐχ ἔστιν ὃ οὐρανὸς ταιρὰ φύσιν χινούμενος, καὶ μάτην ἔχει τοῦ στοιἱἰεἔου τὴν φύσιν, καθ᾽ ἣν οὐ χινεῖται, καὶ περιττῶς ὑπτὸ τοῦ πρώτως χινοῦντος μὴ χινουμένου κινεῖται εἔνησιν, ἣν καὶ χωρὶς ἐχείνου ἠδύνατο κινηθῆναι; ΞῈ μὴ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἠρέμει ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, οὐκ ἂν τὸ χινούμενον ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον ἐχινεῖτο" πῶς οὐχ ἰστι ψευδὲς τὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν χινεῖσθαι ἀεὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει; Εἰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἣν ἔχει ἔσχεν ἡ γῆ, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς εἰ μὴ τὴν ρύσιν καὶ τὴν θέσιν ἣν ἔχει ἔσχεν, οὐχ ἂν τὸ χινούἅενον ἐχινεῖτο, οὔτ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἡρεμοῦν ἠρέμει" πῶς οὖν χίδια ταῦτα καὶ ἀγένητα, ὧν τὸ τὶ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πῶς εἶναί ἐστιν ἑχατέρου διὰ θάτερον" ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἴδιον τῶν γενητῶν; Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὔτε χατὰ πρόνοιάν Ἰατί τι, οὔτε τὸ αὐτόματον (τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πρόνοιαν δεύῦνερα τῆς προνοίας " καὶ τὸ χατ᾽ αὐτόματον ἣ παρὰ φύσιν ἢ συμδεδηχὸς, ἐν τοῖς χατὰ προαίρεσιν γιγνομένοις ἐστίν" ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν δεύτερόν ἐστι τοῦ χατὰ φύσιν" κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐχτροπὴν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν γίνεται τὸ καρὰ φύσιν" καὶ τὸ συμδαῖνον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν γινομένοις δεύτερόν ἔστι τῆς προαιρέσεως)" πῶς. ὑπάρχει ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τὸ εἶναι τόδε διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο τόδε τι: οἷον, ἐπειδὴ ὁ οὐρανός ἐστιν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὴν γῆν" εἰ δὲ Ὑῆ, καὶ οὐρανός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ προνοίας ἐστὶν ἔργον, τῆς τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐκ διαφόρων χατ᾽ οὐσίαν τε καὶ χρείαν μερῶν ποιησάσης. Ἢ ἄρα οὐχ ἀΐδια τε οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάντα, τὰ πρὸς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἀλλήλοις συντελοῦντα " ἃ εἰ ἀΐδια, οὐχ ἀνάγχη τόδε τόδε εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ τόδε τόδε ἐστίν. Μίαν ἀΐδιον ἀνάγχην ὑποθέμενος ὁ 'Ἄριστοτέλης, πολλὰς ἄλλας ἀϊδίους ἀνάγκας ἐχ τῆς ὑποτεθείσης ἐξήρτησεν. ᾿Ανάγχη, φησὶν, εἶναι χίνησιν ἀΐδιον " εἰ δὲ χίνησις, ἀνάγχη εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ἀΐδιον " ἀριθμὸς γὰρ κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος. Εἰ δὲ ἀΐδιος ἡ χίνησις, ἀνάγχη ταύτῃ εἶναι συνεχῇ. Εἰ δὲ συνεχὴς ἡ χίνησις, ἀνάγχη εἶναι σῶμα ἁπλοῦν παρὰ τὰ ἐνταῦθα σώματα, μήτε βαρύτητα μήτε χουφότητα ἔχον. Τὰ γὰρ βαρέα καὶ χοῦφα σώματα, ἐπειδὴ κατ᾽ εὐθεῖαν χινεῖται, συνεχῶς χινεῖσθαι οὐ δύναται " εἰ δὲ συνεχῶς χινεῖται, ἀνάγχη σφαιρικὸν ἔχειν σχῆμα" τούτῳ τὰρ τῷ σχήματι ἐνδέχεται μόνῳ τὴν σννεχῇ γενέσθαι χίνησιν. Εἰ δὲ σφαιριχῶς χινεῖται, ἀνάγχη τὴν γῆν εἶναι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἀεὶ ἠρεμοῦσαν, ἵνα περὶ αὐτὴν γίνηται τῆς σφαίρας ἡ χίνησις. Εἰ δὲ ἡ γῆ, ἀνάγχη καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ γῆς τε καὶ πυρὸς σώματα" εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἀνάγχη εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἀΐδια εἶναι οὐ δύναται οὐδὲ ἡ γένεσις, ἀνάγχη εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα ἐγκύκλια σώματα. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ τόδε τόδε ἐστὶν, ἀνάγκη τόδε τόδε εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς ἀγενήτοις τε καὶ ἀϊδίοις χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄρα ἀϊΐδιά τε καὶ ἀγένητα τὰ ῥηθέντα. Εἰ δὲ ἀΐδια ταῦτα καὶ ἀγένητα, οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο δι᾽ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἐκεῖνο διὰ τοῦτο. Ἐπειδὴ, εἰ ἡ γῇ ἔστιν, ἀνάγχη καὶ τὸ πῦρ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν σώματα, πῶς εἰ ἡ μὲν γῇ ἀγένητός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος, τὸ πῦρ οὐχ ἀΐδιον, τὸ ὑπάρχον χοῦφόν τε καὶ ἀνωφερές; Εἰ γὰρ, ὥς φησιν, ὧν ἐναντίων τὸ θάτερον φύσει, καὶ τὸ θάτερον ἀνάγχη φύσει εἶναι, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον τὸ τὴν γῆν εἶναι ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον, τὸ δὲ πῦρ μὴ εἶναι ἀΐδιον; ἣ τὸ πῦρ μὴ εἶναι " ἀΐδιον, τὴν δὲ γῆν εἶναι ἀΐδιον, τὰ δὶ ἄλληλα ὄντα; Εἰ διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἄλλα Β εγκόχλια σώματα, πῶς οὐχ ἡ γένεσίς ἔστιν αἰτία τῶν ἀϊδίων; ᾿Αἴδια γὰρ τὰ ἐγκύκλια σώματα καὶ ἡ σγένεσις κατὰ τὴν τούτων κίνησιν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄτοπων, οὐχ ἄρα τὰ ἐγχύχλια σώματα ἀγένητα. Ὧν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἄλλα γενέσθαι ἐστὶ, γενητὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐχ ἀΐδια. Εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς, τόδε ἀνάγχη εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τόδε ἐστὶ τόδε " οὐδὲν ἄρα διαφέρει τὰ ἀγένητα τῶν γενητῶν. Ἐν γὰρ, φησὶ, τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ εἶναι. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “Since the heaven is a divine body, for this reason it has the circular body, which by nature always moves in a circle. Why then is not the whole body of the heaven such? Because something of the body that moves in a circle must remain, namely that at the middle; but of this body no part can remain, either at all or at the middle. For then its natural motion would be toward the middle (but by nature it moves in a circle); for the motion would not be eternal. Nothing … than what is according to nature, and what is contrary to nature is a departure, in generation, from what is according to nature. There must then be earth; for this rests at the middle. But if there is earth, there must also be fire. For of contraries, if one is by nature, the other too must be by nature, if it is indeed a contrary and has some nature. For the same matter belongs to the contraries, and [the positive] is prior to the privation; I mean, for instance, the hot to the cold. But if there are fire and earth, there must also be the bodies between them; for each of the elements has a contrariety to each. These existing, it is evident that there must be generation, because none of them can be eternal; for contraries act on and are acted on by one another, and are destructive of one another … it is not possible for motion to be eternal according to nature; and of these there is motion. That there must therefore be generation is clear from these things; and if generation, there must also be other locomotion, either one or more. For according to that of the whole, the elements of bodies too must be so related to one another. For now this much is clear, for what cause there are more circular bodies: that there must be generation; and generation, if there is fire; and fire and the others, if there is earth; and earth, because something must always remain, if something is always moved.” [If] … the body of the heaven is a body always movable around the middle, then the whole body of the heaven must move around the middle; but if the heaven has such a body but does not have such motion, clearly it moves contrary to nature. If the body of the heaven moves around the middle, but not as a whole, according to the locomotion of the element of which its body is said to be, but spherically, by the exchange of positions of its parts, how is not the sphe[rical shape] … in no way does motion belong to the bodies made of the elements according to their form, but according to the elements from which they are; how then has the necessity of motion been altered in the body of the heaven? For a body that has neither heaviness nor lightness, it is necessary to have motionless rest rather than restless motion. If … [remain]. For if it is neither borne downward by heaviness nor upward by lightness, it must remain motionless. If a stone were shaped in the form of a sphere and placed in the air, to be carried down to its own place, it would not be carried down rolling because of its shape, but would be carried in a straight line according to its own heaviness. How does the fifth element, … because it has no heaviness or lightness, not move as a whole with its parts around the middle according to its own nature, but move spherically by the exchange of its parts, a motion that belongs not to the nature of the element but to the spherical shape? If in eternal things there is nothing contrary to nature, nothing superfluous, nothing in vain, how is the heaven not moved contrary to nature, and does it not have the nature of its element in vain, since it does not move according to it, and is it not superfluously moved by the first unmoved mover with a motion with which it could have been moved even without him? If the resting thing did not always rest at the middle, the moving thing would not always move around the middle; how is it not false that the heaven always moves by its own nature? If the earth had not had the nature and position it has, and likewise the heaven had not had the nature and position it has, the moving thing would not move nor the resting thing rest. How then are these eternal and ungenerated, when the what and the how of each is through the other, which is proper to generated things? If in eternal things nothing is by providence or by spontaneity (for things that are by providence are secondary to providence; and the spontaneous, being either contrary to nature or accidental, is found among the things that come to be by choice; but what is contrary to nature is secondary to what is according to nature, for the contrary to nature comes to be by a turning aside from what is according to nature; and what happens accidentally in the things that come to be by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it belong to eternal things that this is because that other is? For example: since the heaven is, the earth too must be; and if the earth, the heaven too is. This is the work of providence, which made this universe from parts differing in substance and use. Either, then, the heaven and the earth and all that is in them, which contribute to one another's being, acting, and being acted on, are not eternal; or, if they are eternal, it is not necessary that this be because that is. Aristotle, having supposed one eternal necessity, hung many other eternal necessities from the one he supposed. There must, he says, be eternal motion; and if motion, there must also be eternal time, for time is the number of motion. And if motion is eternal, it must be continuous. And if motion is continuous, there must be a simple body besides the bodies here, having neither heaviness nor lightness; for heavy and light bodies, since they move in a straight line, cannot move continuously. And if it moves continuously, it must have a spherical shape; for only with this shape can continuous motion take place. And if it moves spherically, the earth must be in the middle, always at rest, so that the motion of the sphere may take place around it. And if the earth, there must also be the bodies between earth and fire; and if these, there must be generation; and since these cannot be eternal, nor generation, there must also be other circular bodies. But if “since this is this, that must be that” has no place among ungenerated and eternal things, then the things mentioned are not eternal and ungenerated. And if these are eternal and ungenerated, then neither is this because of that, nor that because of this. Since, if earth is, there must also be fire and the bodies between them, how, if the earth is ungenerated and eternal, is fire not eternal, which is light and moves upward? For if, as he says, of contraries, if one is by nature, the other must also be by nature, how is it not absurd that the earth should be eternal and ungenerated, but fire not eternal; or fire not eternal, but the earth eternal, when they exist through one another? If because of generation there must be other circular bodies, how is generation not the cause of eternal things? For the circular bodies are eternal, and generation takes place according to their motion. But if this is absurd, then the circular bodies are not ungenerated. For things whose being is because other things come to be are generated and not eternal. If what belongs to generated things, that this must be because that is, can belong to eternal things, then the ungenerated differ in nothing from the generated. For in eternal things, he says, the possible differs in nothing from being. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.3, 286a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Cael. 2.3, 286b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence - Aristotle, Cael. 2.3, 286b (Aristotle (works)): allusion, high confidence - Aristotle, Phys. 3.4, 203b (Aristotle (works)): allusion, low confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.3, 286a–b. The quotation and the refutation continue across Migne's notes and Latin in the scan (removed). “Other locomotion” follows Aristotle (φοράν); the scan prints φθοράν (“perishing”). The opening word of the last part is lost. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 53 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-53). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 54 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-54 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle on the two directions of motion on the circle (On the Heaven 2.5). ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. « Ἐπειδὴ ἔστι διχῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ κύχλου χινηθῆναι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι αὗται, ἀλλὰ εἰ μηθὲν ὡς ἔτυχε μηδ᾽ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου ἐνξέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις εἶναι" ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς ἀΐδιος καὶ ἡ χύχλῳ φορά" διὰ τίνα τοὶ αἰτίαν ἐπὶ θάτερα φέρεται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἐπὶ θάτερα; ᾿Ανάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ἢ εἶναι αὑτοῦ ἀρχήν. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ποιεῖ «τῶν ἕνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον " ἔστι δὲ καθάπερ τῶν ἐπὶ «ἧς εὐθείας φορῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον τιμιωτέρα (θειότερος γὰρ ὁ τόπος ὁ ἄνω τοῦ χάτω), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τῆς εἰς τὸ ὅπισθεν ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν᾽ μαρτυρεῖ δ᾽ ἡ ῥηθεῖσα ἀπορία, ὅτι τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον" αὕτη γὰρ ἡ αἰτία λύει τὴν ἀπορίαν. Εἰ γὰρ ἔχει ὡς ἐνδέχεται βέλτιστα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη αἰτία καὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου. Βέλτιστον γὰρ κινεῖσθαι ἁπλῆν τε χίνήσιν καὶ ἄπαυστον, καὶ ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον." Εἰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε χινηθῆναι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ μὴ εἰς τὸ ὀπίσω, ἡ ἀεὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομέ-νων τὸ βέλτιστον ποιουμένη πῶς ἀΐδιος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ τούτου φορὰς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γεγενημένος, καὶ τὸ τὴν βελτίστην χινηθῆναι χίνησιν ἔχων; ΕἸ τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει ὁ ἄνω τόπος πρὸς τὸν χάτω, ταύτην ἔχει ἡ εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν χένησις πρὸς τὴν εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν χίνησιν χατὰ τὸ τιμιώτερον καὶ θειότερον καὶ βέλτιστον" πῶς οὖχ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι αἱ κινήσεις αὗτα:, τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσαι; Εἰ τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων ἥ χίνησις ἀπλῆ οὐ χατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ χατὰ τὸ ἀναγχαῖον, πῶς διχῶς χινηθῆναι δύναται ὁ οὐρανὸς ἁπλοῦν σῶμα ἔχων, καὶ χινεῖται ἐνδεχομένως; Εἰ πανταχόθεν ἐστὶν ὁ οὐρανὸς ἴσος ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἴσα ἔχων τὰ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσι, καὶ ὡς ἐὰν χινηθῇ, τὴν σφαιριχὴν τε καὶ ἔγχυχλον σώζει χίνησιν" δύναται ἄρα καὶ ἀπὸ μεσημόρίας χινηθῆναι εἰς ἄρχτον, καὶ ἀπὸ ἄρχτου εἰς μεσημόρίαν, ὡς δύναται χινηθῆναι ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς εἰς δύσιν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως εἰς ἀνατολήν. Πῶς οὖν οὐ μάτην ἡ φύσις τῷ σώματι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐνέθηχε τοσούτων χινήσεων τὰς δυνάμεις, εἰ τετραχῶς μὲν ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις, μοναχῶς δὲ ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “Since it is possible to move on the circle in two directions, and these are not contrary, but if nothing can be among eternal things by chance or from spontaneity, and the heaven and its circular locomotion are eternal, for what cause does it move in one direction and not in the other? For this too must either be a principle or have a principle. For if nature always does the best of the things possible, and as, of the motions in a straight line, that toward the upper place is more honorable (for the upper place is more divine than the lower), in the same way the forward motion stands to the backward, if indeed there are right and left; and the difficulty mentioned bears witness that there is prior and posterior; for this cause solves the difficulty. For if it is as well as it can be, this would be the cause of what was said too. For it is best to move with a simple and unceasing motion, and this toward the more honorable.” If nature, which always does the best of the things possible, made the heaven move forward and not backward, how is the heaven and its locomotion eternal, when it has been brought to be by nature and has its moving with the best motion? If the difference that the upper place has from the lower, the forward motion has from the backward in being more honorable, more divine, and best, how are these motions not contrary, when they differ so much from each other? If the motion of simple bodies is simple not by possibility but by necessity, how can the heaven, having a simple body, move in two ways, and move contingently? If the heaven is everywhere equal to itself, and has its parts equal to its parts, and preserves its spherical and circular motion however it is moved, then it can also be moved from south to north and from north to south, as it can be moved from east to west and from west to east. How then did nature not place in vain in the body of the heaven the powers of so many motions, if it has the powers four ways but moves in one … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.5, 288a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.5, 288a. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 54 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-54). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 55 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-55 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: On what the stars are made of and how they move (On the Heaven 2.7): the author argues that this too implies their generation. ### Greek text χιδ. Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «Περὶ δὲ τῶν χαλουμένων ἄστρων ἑπόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν, ἐχ τίνων συνεστᾶσι καὶ τίνες αἱ χινήσεις αὑτῶν. Εὐλογώτατον δὲ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἱἐπόμενον τὸ ἔχαστον τῶν ἄστρων ποιεῖν ἐχ τούτου τοῦ σώματος, ἐν ᾧ τυγχάνει τὴν φορὰν ἔχον, ἐπειδὴ ἔφαμέν τι εἶναι ὃ χύχλῳ φέρεσθαι πέφυκεν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πύρινα φάσχοντες εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ἄνω σῶμα πῦρ εἶναι φασὶν, ὡς εὕλογον ὃν ἕχαστον συνεστάναι ἐχ τούτων ἐν οἷς ἔχαστόν ἐστιν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν. Ἡ δὲ θερμότῆς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ φῶς γίνεται παρατριδομένου τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐχείνων φορᾶς. Πέφυχε γὰρ ἡ χίνησις ἐχπυροῦν καὶ λίθους, καὶ ξύλα, καὶ σίδηρον. Εὐλογώτερον οὖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ πυρός " ἐγγύτερον δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων βελῶν " ταῦτα γὰρ ἐχπυροῦται οὕτως, ὥστε τήχεσθαι τὰς μολιδδίδας" καὶ ἐπείπερ αὐτὰ ἐχπυροῦται, -ἀνάγχη καὶ τὸν χύχλῳ αὐτῶν ἀέρα τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτὰ ἐχθερμαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι φέρεσθαι, ὃς διὰ τὴν πληγὴν τῇ κινήσει γίνεται πῦρ. Τῶν δὲ ἄνω ἔχαστον ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ φέρεται, ὥστε αὐτὰ μὲν μὴ ἐχπυροῦσθαι: τοῦ δὲ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ. χυχλικοῦ σώματος αφαῖραν ὄντος, ἀνάγχη, φερομένης ἐχείνης, θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ ταύτην μάλιστα ἧ ὁ ἥλιος τυγχάνει ἐνδεδεμένος " διὸ δὴ πλησιάζοντός τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνίσχοντος, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ὄντος, γίνεται θερμότης. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε πύρινά ἔστιν, οὔτε ἐν τῷ πυρὶ φέρεται, ταῦτα ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ αὐτῶν. » ἷ ΕἸ ἐχ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης ἐξ ἧς ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς, ἐκ ταύτης ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἄστρα, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι ψευδὲς, τὸ, Ἐκ πάσης γέγονε τῆς ὕλης ὁ οὐρανὸς, καὶ τὸ, Πᾶσαν τὴν ὕλην περιείληρεν; Ἐὲ τὸ χινούμενον καὶ τῇ χινήσει θερμαντιχὸν ἑτέρου γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν μὴ προηγουμένως αὐτὸ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ χινήσει θερμανθῇ, θερμαντιχὸν ἑτέρου γενέσθαι οὐ δύναται" πῶς ὁ σφαῖρα καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἄστρα θερμαίνουσι τῇ ἑαυτῶν χινήσει τὸν ἀέρα, αὐτὰ μὴ θερμαινόμενα; Εἰ τὸ τῇ ἀνάγχη τοῦτο ἣ βαρύτητα ἔχειν ἢ χουφότητα᾽ πῶς ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄστρα, μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχοντα, μὴτε χουφότητα, τὰς θερμαντιχὰς ἐχτελεῖ ἐνεργείας; Εἰ τὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα χινητὴν οὐσίαν, τούτοις ἀνάγχη τὴν αὐτὴν χαθ᾽ αὑτὸ χινεῖσθαι χίνησιν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμδεδηχός" πῶς οὐχ ἔστιν ὁ ἥλιος κατὰ συμδεδηχὸς χινούμενος, εἰ τῇ σφαίρχ ἐνδέδεται; Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, εἰ μὴ δι᾿ ἑαυτῶν χινοῦνται τὰς κατὰ φύσιν αὖὑτῶν χινήσεις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν σφαιρῶν αἷς εἰσιν ἔνδεδεμένα. Εἰ ἐχ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης ἐστὶν ὁ ἥλιος ἧς ἐστιν ὁ. οὐρανὸς, τῆς μήτε βαρύτητα μήτε χουφότητα ἐχούαης, καὶ σφαιρικὸν ἔχει τὸ σχῆμα; ὥσπερ ἔχει καὶ ὁ οὐρανός " διὰ τί μὴ ὡσαύτως χινοῦνται ἀμφότεροι, ἢ κατὰ ἀντιμετάστασιν τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ χινεῖται ὁ ἥλιος; Εἰ οὐδὲν παρὰ φύσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ τὴν χίνησιν ἣν ἔχει τις χατὰ φύσιν, ταύτην μὴ δι' ἑαυτοῦ χινεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἑτέρου; Κινοῦνται γὰρ ὃ τε ἥλιος καὶ τὰ ἄστρα, οὗ δι᾿ ἐαντῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν σφαιρῶν ἐν αἷς εἶσιν ἐνδεδεμέναοι. ΕΓ, ὥσπερ τὰ γενητὰ χατὰ λόγον ἐστὶν ὃ γέγονεν, ὕστερᾳ ἄρα τοῦ λόγου τὰ γενητά 33, Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ λόγον ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγένητα. Μὴ ὄντων δὲ αὐτῶν χατὰ λάγον, πῶς ἔγαστον αὐτῶν χρειωδῶς ἔστιν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ ἔχει ὃ ἔχει,, καὶ ποιεῖ ὃ ποιεῖ; τὰ γὰρ χρειωδῶς ὄντα, λάγου τε καὶ προνοίας ἐστὶν ἔργα. Εἰ ἀχολουθεῖ τοῖς γενητοῖς τὸ ἐχ λόγου εἶναι καὶ ὕλης, οὐχ ἄρα ἐχ λόγου καὶ ὕλης τὰ ἀγέγητα. Πῶς οὖν ἀγένητα ὅ τε οὐρανὸς, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα, καὶ ἔστιν ἐχ λόγου καὶ ὕλης; Εἰ, χαθὰ εἶπεν ὁ ᾿Αριστοτέλης, ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐδὲν μάτην οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν" πῶς ἀφ᾽ ὧν εἶπε περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου χινήσεως συμδαίνει τῷ ἡλίῳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ μάτὴν καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν; Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἡλίου τῇ κινούσῃ αὐτὸν σφαίρᾳ μὴ ἐνδεδεμένου τὴν αὐτὴν χατὰ φύσιν ἐχινεῖτο χίνησιν ἣν νῦν χινεῖται - πῶς οὐ μάτὴν ἐνεδέθη τῇ σφαίρᾳ; Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτην ἐχινεῖτο χατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν παρὰ ταύτην, εἴτε τῷ ποσῷ εἴτε τῷ ποιῷ πῶς οὐ παρὰ φύσιν χινεῖται γῆν; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “About the so-called stars it would follow to say of what they are composed and what their motions are. Most reasonable and consistent with what has been said is to make each of the stars of that body in which it has its locomotion, since we said that there is something that is of a nature to move in a circle. For as those who say the stars are fiery say so because they say the upper body is fire, it being reasonable that each thing be composed of the things in which each is, so do we too say. Heat and light come from them as the air is rubbed by their locomotion. For motion is of a nature to set on fire even stones, and wood, and iron. More reasonable, then, is it that what is nearer to fire [is set on fire], and the air is nearer; as also with missiles in flight, for these are so set on fire that their leaden balls melt; and since they themselves are set on fire, the air around them must also suffer the same. These, then, are heated because they are carried in air, which becomes fire through the blow of the motion. But each of the upper bodies is carried in its sphere, so that they themselves are not set on fire; but since the air lies under the sphere of the circular body, it must be heated as that sphere is carried round, and most of all where the sun happens to be fastened; therefore, when the sun approaches and rises and is above us, heat comes about. That they are neither fiery nor carried in fire, let this be said by us about them.” If the stars are from the same matter as the heaven, how is it not false to say, “The heaven came to be from all the matter,” and, “It has embraced all the matter”? If what is moved, and by its motion becomes a heater of another, cannot become a heater of another unless it is first heated itself by its own motion, how do the sphere and the stars in it heat the air by their motion without being heated themselves? If … necessarily this has either heaviness or lightness, how do the heaven and the stars in it, having neither heaviness nor lightness, perform heating activities? If things that have the same movable substance must move with the same motion of themselves and not accidentally, how is the sun not moved accidentally, if it is fastened to the sphere? And the same argument holds for the other stars, if they do not move their natural motions through themselves but through the spheres to which they are fastened. If the sun is of the same matter as the heaven, which has neither heaviness nor lightness, and has a spherical shape, as the heaven also has, why do they not both move in the same way, or [both] by the exchange of their parts, as the sun moves? If there is nothing contrary to nature in eternal things, how is it not contrary to nature for a thing not to move through itself with the motion it has by nature, but through another? For the sun and the stars move not through themselves but through the spheres in which they are fastened. If, as generated things are what they have come to be according to a formula, generated things are later than the formula, [then ungenerated things according to a formula would be later than it]. But if this is impossible, ungenerated things are not according to a formula. And if they are not according to a formula, how is each of them usefully what it is, and has what it has, and does what it does? For things that exist usefully are works of formula and providence. If being from formula and matter follows on generated things, then ungenerated things are not from formula and matter. How then are the heaven and all things in it ungenerated, and yet from formula and matter? If, as Aristotle said, there is nothing in vain or contrary to nature in eternal things, how, from what he said about the motion of the sun, do both befall the sun, the in-vain and the contrary to nature? For if the sun, not fastened to the sphere that moves it, would move by nature with the same motion with which it now moves, how was it not fastened to the sphere in vain? But if it would not move with this motion by nature, but with another besides this, either in quantity or in quality, how does it not now move contrary to nature? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.7, 289a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.7, 289a. The numeral is garbled in the scan. Lost or garbled words are marked “…” or supplied in brackets by sense. The last word reads γῆν, translated as νῦν (“now”). ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 55 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-55). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 56 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-56 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: If the stars rest fixed in their circles, they are there either in vain or by force, which Aristotle denies of eternal things; and stars called gods would be gods dragged along by gods. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ «όγου. « Τοὺς μὲν χύχλους χινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄστρα ἦρεμεῖν, καὶ ἐνδεδεμένα τοῖς χύχλοις φέρεσθαι. » Εἰ μὲν χατὰ φύσιν ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τοῖς χύχλοις τὰ ἄστρα, μάτην ἐνδέδεται τοῖς χύκλοις" εἰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἣρεμεῖ, δηλονότι βίᾳ ἢρεμεῖ. ᾿Αλλὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐθὲν οὔτε μάτην οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν. Οὐκ ἄρα εὗρεν ὁ Ἄριστοτέλης τὸν περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως λόγον᾽ ἀΐδια γὰρ λέγει τὰ ἄστρα καὶ ἐν οἷς εἶπε περὶ τῆς ἃ αὐτῶν χινήσεως, ἀμφότερα φαίνεται, τὸ μάτην καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. Εὶ ἀΐδια μὲν τὰ ἄστρα, ἀΐδιος δὲ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄστρα δεδεμένα, καὶ θεὸς ἔχαστον αὐτῶν προσηγόρευται" πῶς οὔχ. εἰσὶ θεοὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν συρόμενος; Τὰ γὰρ τῷ κινουμένῳ. ἐνδεδεμένα συρομένως χινεῖται. Εἰ ἄλλη ἡ σύνθεσις οὐσίας (ἐξ ὕλης γὰρ καὶ εἴδους), καὶ ἄλλη ἡ σύνθεσις ἡ ἐχ τῶν οὐσίαν ἐχόντων μερῶν " πῶς ἀΐδια ταῦτα λέγεται, τὰ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχοντα τὰς σύνθεσεις - Ὁ γὰρ οὐρανὸς, ἔχων τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄστρα ἐνδεδεμένα μέρη, σύνθετος ἐξ αὑτῶν ἐστιν’ ἔχων γὰρ ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανός. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “That the circles move, but the stars rest and are carried fastened to the circles.” If the stars rest in the circles according to nature, they are fastened to the circles in vain; but if they rest contrary to nature, clearly they rest by force. But among eternal things nothing is in vain or contrary to nature. Aristotle, then, did not find the account of the motion of the stars; for he calls the stars eternal, and in what he said about their motion both appear, the in-vain and the contrary to nature. If the stars are eternal, and the heaven in which the stars are bound is eternal too, and each of them is called a god, how are they not gods dragged along by gods? For things fastened to what moves are moved by being dragged. If the composition of a substance (from matter and form) is one thing, and the composition from parts that have substance is another, how are these things called eternal, which have both compositions? For the heaven, having the sun and the stars fastened in it as parts, is composed of them; for the heaven is the heaven by having these in itself. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.8, 289b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.8, 289b. The jibe at star-gods is translated as written. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 56 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-56). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 57 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-57 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's claim that nature gave the stars no organ of motion (On the Heaven 2.8). ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «“Ἰόγου. « Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄλογον τὸ μηθὲν ὄργανον αὑτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, οὐδὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων φροντίσαι, τῶν δὲ οὕτω τιμίων ὑπεριδεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔοιχεν ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀφελεῖν πάντα δι’ ὧν ἐνδέχεται προϊέναε καθ᾽ αὑτά. » Εἰ τῶν ἀϊδίων τε καὶ ἀγενήτων οὐδείς ἐστι ποιητῆς, οὐδὲ φροντίδι τινός εἰσιν ἅ εἰσιν, ἢ ἔχουσιν ἃ ἔχουσι κατὰ φύσιν" πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητός ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ φαινόμενα συναγένητα ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ, τὴν φύσιν ἔχει ποιητήν τε καὶ φροντιστὴν τῶν πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν τελουμένων; ΕΓἥρμοττε τῷ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν ἀϊδίων τὸν λόἴον ποιουμένῳ τὸ λέγειν τὴν φύσιν μηδὲν ὡς ἔτυχε ποιεῖν "πῶς οὐχ ἔστι δῆλον, ὅτι ἔργα εἰσὶ τῆς φύσεως ὃ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν. οὐρανῷ φαινόμενα, τῆς ἀφελούσης αὐτῶν τὰ ὄργανα τῆς κινήσεως -, ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “Besides, it is unreasonable that nature should have given them no organ for motion. For nature does nothing at random, nor would it take thought for animals but overlook things so honorable; rather, it seems to have purposely removed everything by which they might move forward of themselves.” If there is no maker of eternal and ungenerated things, and they neither are what they are nor have what they have by nature through anyone's care, how, if the heaven is ungenerated and the things that appear in the heaven exist ungenerated together with it, does it have nature as the maker and provider of the things done for their constitution? If it fitted one who gave an account of the motion of eternal things to say that nature does nothing at random, how is it not clear that the heaven and the things that appear in the heaven are works of nature, which removed their organs of motion? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.8, 290a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.8, 290a. Migne's Latin and column letters are removed; a lost phrase is marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 57 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-57). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 58 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-58 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against the spherical shape of the heaven and stars argued from their motion (On the Heaven 2.8). ### Greek text ὅ8. Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ἐπεὶ οὖν δεῖ τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν χινεῖσθαι τὴν ἑαντοῦ χίνησιν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἄστρα μὴ προϊέναι δὴ αὑτῶν, εὐλόγως ἂν ἑχάτερον εἴη σφαιροειδές. Οὕτω. γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τὸ μὲν χινηθήσεται, τὸ Εἰ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἐχεῖνο λέγεται "τὸ δυνάμενον χινηθῆναι τὴν κίνησιν ἐχείνην ἀφ᾽ ἧς ἠρεμεῖ, πῶς μεῖ τὰ. ἄστρα, ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔχοντα κίνησιν χαθ᾽ ἣν χιεἶσθαι ἐχρῆν : ΕἸ δὲ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, κωλύεται δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐνδεδέσθαι τῇ σφαίρᾳ" πῶς οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχει τὸ χινεῖσθαι ἀεί; Εἰ τοῖς ἀεὶ χινουμένοις ὡς ἁρμόδιον ἐδόθη τὸ σφαιρικὸν σχῇμα, πῶς τῶν ἐχόντων τὸ σφαιριχὸν σχῆμα τὸ μὲν κινεῖται ἀεὶ ὡς ὁ οὐρανὸς, τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ἠρεμεῖ, ὡς τὰ ἄστρα; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “Since, then, the heaven must move with its own motion, but the other stars must not move forward of themselves, it is reasonable that each should be spherical. For so the one would most of all be moved, and the other …” If that is said to rest which can be moved with the motion from which it rests, how do the stars rest, having no proper motion according to which they ought to be moved? But if they have the power of moving, but are hindered by being fastened to the sphere, how is their always being moved not contrary to nature? If the spherical shape was given as fitting to things that are always moved, how, of the things that have the spherical shape, does one always move, as the heaven does, and another always rest, as the stars do? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.8, 291a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.8, 291a. The numeral is garbled in the scan. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 58 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-58). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 59 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-59 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author begins to quote Aristotle on nature's providing that the heavenly motion keeps things here unchanged. If the heavenly motion is arranged by nature's providence for the sake of things on earth, the heaven and stars are secondary to providence and serve generated things, and so cannot be eternal. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ “όγου. « Ὥστε ἐπείπερ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο ἀεὶ συμβαῖνον, οὔτε ἂν ἔμψυχον οὔτε βίαιον φέροιτο: φορὰν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐχούσης τῆς … … ὁμοίως ἔχον. » Πῶς οὖν ἀΐδια καὶ ἀγένητα τὰ χατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως τὸ εἶναι τοιάδε, καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τουυσδς εἰληφότα; Τὰ γὰρ κατὰ πρόνοιαν δεύτερα τῆς πρενοίας καὶ τὰ ἀΐδια οὐδενός ἐστι δεύτερα. Εἰ τὸ μέλον ἔσεσθαι πρὸ τοῦ εἶναι οὐκ ἦν, πῶς ἐνδέχεται κερὶ «οὔ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄστρων, καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν χινέσεως ἀμφότερα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀγένητα αὐτὰ εἶναι; Τὸ γὰρ μέλλον οὔτω ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἀγένητον ἕνεστιν. Εἰ ἕνεχα τοῦ τὰ περὶ τὸν δεῦρο τόπον ὡς ἔσχεν ὁμοίως ἔχειν, τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον τῆςς χινήσεως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡ φύσις προενόησεν εἶναι - πῶς ἀϊδιά τε καὶ ἀγένητα ταῦτα, ἃ ἕνεχεν τῶν γενητῶν ἔστιν ὥς ἐστιν, καὶ χινεῖται ὡς χινεῖται; ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “So that, since this does not appear to happen always, none of them would move with an animate or a forced motion, as if nature were providing for what was going to be, that, if [the motion] did not have this manner, [nothing in the region here would remain] … would be in the same state.” How then are those things eternal and ungenerated which have received their being such and their moving thus according to the providence of nature? For things according to providence are secondary to providence, and eternal things are secondary to nothing. If what is going to be did not exist before it is, how is it possible for both to be true about the heaven and the stars and their motion: that it is going to be, and that they are eternal and ungenerated? For what is going to be is not yet, but the eternal and ungenerated is present. If nature provided that the motion of the heaven should be of the stated kind for the sake of the things around the region here remaining as they were, how are these things eternal and ungenerated, which are as they are and move as they move for the sake of generated things? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.9, 291a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.9, 291a; the quotation ends after Migne's notes and reference in the scan (removed). A column letter is removed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 59 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-59). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 60 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-60 - Source: PG 6:1501 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author argues that stars made of the same element and shape as the heaven yet kept at rest have their nature in vain or contrary to nature, and that their shaping by nature's providence shows they are not ungenerated. ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δέδεικται, ὅτι οὐ πεφύκασι χιγεῖσθαι δι᾽ αὑτῶν, ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν ἀλόγως οὐξὲ μάτην ποιεῖ" δηλονότι καὶ σχῆμα τοσοῦτον ἀποξέδωχε τοῖς ἀχινήτοις ὃ ἤχιστά ἐστι χινητιχόν. Ἥνχιστα δὲ χινητιχὸν ἡ σφαῖρα διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν ὄργανον πρὸς τὴν χίνησιν. "Ὥστε δηλονότι σφαιροειδῇ ἂν εἴη τὸν ὄγχον. » Εἰ ἡ φύσις δέδωχε τοῖς ἀεὶ χινητοῖς τὸ σφαιεριχὰν σχῆμα ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὴν εὐχινησίαν, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι τὰ ἄστρα μάτην εἰληφότα σχῆμα τοιοῦτον, ἐνδεδεμένα τοῖς χύχλοις, καὶ τὴν κατὰ φύώσιν αὑτῶν μὴ δυνάμενα ἐκτελεῖν χίνησιν; Εἰ οὐ πεφύχασι τὰ ἄστρα δι' αὑτῶν χινεῖσθαι, οὐχ ἄρα ἔχουσι χατὰ τσιν τὴν ἀΐδιον κίνησιν. Πῶς οὖν εἰσιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στοιχείου ἐξ οὗ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς, τοῦ μήτε βαρύτητα ἔχοντος μήτε χουφότητα; Εἰ ὁ μὲν οὐρανὸς. διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἐχ τοιούτου στοιχείου καὶ δεὰ τὸ σφαιριχὸν ἔχειν τὸ σχῆμα, πέφυχε περὶ τὸ μέσον χινεῖσθαι ἀεὶ δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ" τὰ δὲ ἄστρα, ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὄντα στοιχείον, καὶ τὸ αὑτὸ ἔχοντα σχῆμα, οὐ πεφῦχασι χινεῖσθαι δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν" μάτην, ὡς ἔοικε, δέδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἡ φύσις οὐσίαν τε καὶ σχῆμα πρὸς τὴν ἀεὶ χίνησιν ἐπιτήδειον, εἰ στάσιν ἔχουσιν ἀχένητον. Τὸ οὐσίαν ἔχειν καὶ σχῆμα ἀειχίνητον τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ στάσιν ἀχίνητον, πῶς οὐχ ἔστι δεῖγμα τῆς ἀλόγου τε καὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὰ ἄστρα; Εἰ τῶν ἀγενήτων τε καὶ ἀϊδίων αἱ οὐσίαι πάσης ποιήσεως τῆς τε χατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἀνώτεραί εἰσι, πῶς, εἰ ἀγένττος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἄστρα, χατὰ πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως τῆς μηθὲν ἀλόγως μήτε ματαίως ποιούσης εἰσὶν ὃ εἰσι, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἃ ἔχουσιν; Εἰ οὐχ ἐχρῆν χινεῖσθαι τὰ ἄστρα, διὰ τί ὅλως χινοῦνται δι᾽ ἑτέρων; Εἰ δὲ ἐχρῆν χινεῖσθαι, διὰ τί μὴ δι᾿ ἑαυτῶν κινοῦνται, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἑτέρων, δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως ποιεῖν αὐτὰ χινεῖσθαι δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν τὴν χίνησιν ἣν νῦν κινοῦνται δι" ἑτέρων, τῆς ἐν εὐχινητοτάτῃ αὐτῶν οὐσίᾳ πεποιηχυίας αὐτὰ ἀχίνητα χαθ᾽ αὑτά; Εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐἂν παρὰ φύσιν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τὸ οὐσίαν μὲν καὶ σχῆμα ἔχειν ἀειχίνητον, στάσιν δὲ ἀκίνητον" ἄρα οὐχ ἀΐδια τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, ἣ ψευδὲς τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐδὲν παρὰ φύσιν. Εἰ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀγενήτων, οὔτε ὃ ἔχει οὔτε ὃ μὴ ἔχει, χατὰ πρόνοιάν τινος ἔχει ἣ οὐχ ἔχει" πῶς, εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἄττρα, χατὰ πρόνοιαν τῆς φύσεως ὄργανον μὲν οὐχ ἔχει χινήσεως, σχῆμα δὲ ἔχει σφαιριχκὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου, πρὸς τὴν συνεχῆ κίνησιν ἐπιτηδειότερον ὃν ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “Since it has been shown that they are not of a nature to move of themselves, and nature does nothing without reason or in vain, clearly it has also given the unmoved things such a shape as is least fit for motion. And the sphere is least fit for motion, because it has no organ for motion. So that clearly they would be spherical in bulk.” If nature has given to the things that always move the spherical shape, which is suitable for easy motion, how have the stars not received such a shape in vain, when they are fastened to the circles and unable to perform their natural motion? If the stars are not of a nature to move of themselves, then they do not have eternal motion by nature. How then are they from the same element as the heaven, which has neither heaviness nor lightness? If the heaven, because it is of such an element and has a spherical shape, is of a nature always to move around the middle of itself, while the stars, though of the same element and having the same shape, are not of a nature to move of themselves, then nature, it seems, gave them in vain a substance and a shape suitable for perpetual motion, if they have motionless rest. That the stars have a substance and shape always in motion and yet motionless rest — how is this not proof of the irrational … that the stars rest? If the substances of ungenerated and eternal things are above all making, both that by reason and that contrary to reason, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, are they what they are and have what they have by the providence of nature, which does nothing irrationally or in vain? If the stars ought not to be moved, why are they moved at all through others? But if they ought to be moved, why are they not moved through themselves but through others, when nature could have made them move through themselves with the motion with which they are now moved through others, she who made them unmoved in themselves in a most easily movable substance? If in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature, and it is contrary to nature to have a substance and shape always in motion but motionless rest, then either the things in which the contrary to nature is found are not eternal, or it is false that in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature. If none of the ungenerated has, or does not have, what it has or does not have by anyone's providence, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, do they, by the providence of nature, have no organ of motion, but have instead of the organ a spherical shape, which is better suited to continuous motion … ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.11, 291b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.11, 291b. A column letter is removed; one phrase is lost (marked “…”). The ref breaks off. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 60 (PG 6:1501; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-60). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 61 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-61 - Source: PG 6:1503 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle on the first motion moving many divine bodies (On the Heaven 2.12). ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ « Ἡ μὲν πρώτη, μία οὖσα πολλὰ χινεῖ τῶν σωμάτων θείων αἱ δὲ, πολλαὶ οὖσαι, ἕν μόνον ἐχάστη. Τῶν γὰρ πλανωμένων ἕν ὁτιοῦν πλείους φέρεται φοράς. Ταύτῃ τε οὖν ἀνισάζει ἡ φύσις, καὶ ποιεῖ τινα τάξιν, τῇ μὲν μιᾷ φορᾷ πολλὰ ἀποδιδοῦσα σώματα, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ σώματι πολλὰς φοράς. Ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ σφαίραις ἡ μία σφαῖρα ἐνδεδεμένη φέρεται " ἰχάστη δὲ σφαῖρα σῶμα τυγχάνει ὄν. » Εἰ τῶν ἀγενήτων τε καὶ ἀϊδίων οὐσιῶν ποιητὴς οὐδὴς, πῶς ἀϊδιά τε καὶ ἀγένητα ταῦτα, ὧν ἡ φύσις τῆς τἀξεώς ἐστι ποιητὴς, τῇ μὲν μιᾷ ἀποδιδοῦσα πολλὰ σώματα, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ σώματι πολλὰς φορὰς, τὰ πλήϑη τῶν τοῦ ἑνὸς σώματος φορῶν ἰσάζουσα τῷ πλήει τῶν σωμάτων. Εἰ τὰ ἀγένητα ταῦτα καὶ ἀποίητα, κῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐν τοῖς ἀγενήτοις πεποιημένην εἶναι άξιν φυσικήν;Σφαῖρα σφαίρᾳ ἐνδεδεμένη. τὴν αὖτὴν ἔχουσα οὐσίαν ἣν ἔχει ἡ σφαῖρα ἧ ἐνδέδεται - πῶς ᾿ὺ φαίνεται ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα τὰς ἀτοπίας ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μἢ ὑπαρχούσας, τὸ μάτην ἔχειν τὴν χινητὴν ἡσίαν καθ᾽ ἣν οὐ χινεῖται, καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν χινεῖ… ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “The first [motion], being one, moves many of the divine bodies, but the others, being many, each move only one. For any one of the planets is carried with several motions. In this way, then, nature equalizes and produces a certain order, assigning to the one motion many bodies, and to the one body many motions. For the one sphere is carried fastened in many spheres; and each sphere happens to be a body.” If there is no maker of ungenerated and eternal substances, how are these eternal and ungenerated, of whose order nature is the maker, assigning to the one [motion] many bodies and to the one body many motions, and equalizing the number of the motions of one body with the number of the bodies? If these things are ungenerated and unmade, how can there be a natural order made among the ungenerated? [If] a sphere fastened to a sphere has the same substance as the sphere to which it is fastened, how does it not appear to have both absurdities that are not found among eternal things: to have in vain the movable substance by which it is not moved, and to be moved contrary to nature? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 2.12, 293a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 2.12, 293a. Migne's Latin and notes interleaved by the scan are removed; lost or garbled words are marked “…”. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 61 (PG 6:1503; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-61). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 62 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-62 - Source: PG 6:1503 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against Aristotle's division of natural things into substances and their works and affections (On the Heaven 3.1). ### Greek text Ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου.1όγου Περὶ οὐρανοῦ. « Τῶν φύσει γενομένων τὰ μέν εἰσιν οὐσίαι, τὰ δὲ ἔργα καὶ πάθη τούτων. Λέγω δὲ οὐσίας μὲν τά τε ἰπλᾶ σώματα͵, οἷον πῦρ, καὶ γῆν, καὶ τὰ σύποιχα τούτοις, καὶ ἐχ τούτων, οἷον τόν τε σύνολον οὐρανὸν, καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτου, καὶ πάλιν τά τε ζῶα, τὰ φυτὰ, καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων. » Ὁ εἰρηκὼς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἶναι ἐξ ἁπλοῦ τινος στοι- (εἰου ἑτέρου ὄντος παρὰ τὰ ἐνταῦθα στοιχεῖα, καὶ τι οὐχ ἐνδέχεται οὐρανὸν ἄλλον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ τοῦ- Ὧν πᾶσαν περιειληφέναι τὴν ὕλην " πῶς νῦν λέγει ἰχ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι στοιχείων τὸν οὐρανὸν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτά; ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἄλλον οὐρανὸν λέ- (ὃν ἐξ ἄλλων στοιχείων γενέσθαι, πῶς οὐ ψεύδεται ἔγων, Οὐχ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλον οὐρανὸν εἶναι πλὴν ἑνός; … οτέρου στοιχείου παρὰ τὰ ἐνταῦθα, ποτὲ δὲ ἐκ νῷ αὐτῶν στοιχείων’ πῶς οὐχ ἔστι θατέρως ### English translation (Claude) From the third book On the Heaven: “Of the things that come to be by nature, some are substances, others are works and affections of these. I call substances the simple bodies, such as fire and earth and the things of the same series as these, and the things that come from these, such as the whole heaven and its parts, and again the animals and the plants and their parts.” He who said that the heaven is from a simple element different from the elements here, and that it is not possible for another heaven to come to be, because this one has embraced all the matter, how does he now say that the heaven is from the same elements as the animals and the plants? But if he says that another heaven came to be from other elements, how does he not lie when he says, “It is not possible for there to be another heaven besides one”? … sometimes from an element other than those here, sometimes from the same elements; how is not one or the other [false]? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 3.1, 298a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 3.1, 298a. The numeral is garbled in the scan. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 62 (PG 6:1503; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-62). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 63 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-63 - Source: PG 6:1503 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Against the claim that the first element is ungenerated and imperishable (On the Heaven 3.1). ### Greek text θὅ. Ἔκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «όγου. « Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου τῶν στοιχείων εἴριται, καὶ ποῖόν τι τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον. » Εἰ στοιχεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται τὸ Ὑιγνόμεννν ἐνυπάρχον αὐτῷ, πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ σταχεῖον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον; Εἰ πρῶτον τὸ στοιχεῖον. καὶ ὕστερον τὸ ἐχ τοῦ στοιχείου, πῶς ἀγένητον τὸ στοιχεῖον ἐξ οὗ ὁ οὐρανὸς, καὶ συναγένητος αὐτῷ ὁ οὐρανός; Εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἀγένητον τὸ στοιχεῖον, ὅτι ὧχ ἐχ στοιχείου, πῶς ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανὸς ὁ ὧν ἐχ σταχείον; : ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “About the first of the elements, then, it has been said both what it is like in nature and that it is imperishable and ungenerated.” If an element is that from which what comes to be comes to be, being present in it, how can the same thing be both an element and ungenerated? If the element is first and what is from the element later, how is the element from which the heaven is ungenerated, and the heaven ungenerated together with it? If the element is ungenerated for this reason, that it is not from an element, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it is from an element? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 3.1, 298b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 3.1, 298b. The numeral is garbled in the scan. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 63 (PG 6:1503; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/52/#p-63). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 64 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/64/#p-64 - Source: PG 6:1503 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: Aristotle says the elements are generated and perishable, yet calls the earth co-eternal with the heaven, which the author calls inconsistent. ### Greek text Ἐχ τοῦ αὑτοῦ « ᾿Αἴδια μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἀδύνατον - ὁρῶμεν γὰρ χε ᾿ πῦρ, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἕχαστον τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων διαλυόμενον, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγχη γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ εἶαι τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων.» Εἰ στοιχεῖον τῶν σωμάτων ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ γῆ, πῶς τὴν μὲν γῆν συναΐδιόν τε καὶ συναγένητον εἴρηχας ! τῷ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα στοιχεῖα γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτί; ### English translation (Claude) From the same: “That they are eternal is impossible; for we see fire and water and each of the simple bodies being dissolved, so that the elements of bodies must be generated and perishable.” If earth too is an element of bodies, how have you said that the earth is co-eternal and co-ungenerated with the heaven, but the other elements generated and perishable? ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 3.6, 304b (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 3.6, 304b. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 64 (PG 6:1503; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/64/#p-64). ## Refutation of Certain Aristotelian Doctrines 65 - URL: https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/64/#p-65 - Source: PG 6:1503 - Translation: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 Summary: The author questions how the elements can come to be from one another, as Aristotle says, if they must already exist in order to change. ### Greek text ᾿Εχ τοῦ αὐτοῦ «.ἰόγου. «ε Τῶν στοιχείων ἣ γένεσις ἐξ ἀλλήλων. » ' Πῶς γίνεται ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὰ στοιχεῖα πρῶτον μὲ γινομένων χατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ταὺγενέσεως. "Ὄντων γὰρ αὐτῶν, μεταδάλλεται εἰς ἄλλη λα, καὶ γίνονται ἐξ ἀλλήλων. ### English translation (Claude) From the same book: “The generation of the elements is from one another.” How do the elements come to be from one another … first … coming to be according to the generation from one another? … of generation. For they exist, and change into one another, and come to be from one another. ### Extrabiblical texts - Aristotle, Cael. 3.6, 305a (Aristotle (works)): quotation, high confidence ### Translation notes - Aristotle, On the Heaven 3.6, 305a. The refutation is garbled in the scan (marked “…”); the end of the work is lost. Migne's reference at the end is removed. ### Citation (SBL) Ps.-Justin, Confut. 65 (PG 6:1503; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/ps-justin-confutatio/64/#p-65).