City of God 11.22–11.30

Latin text: Hoffmann, CSEL 40 (Latin text: Dombart and Hoffmann, De civitate dei (CSEL 40, 1899-1900), digitized by Open Greek and Latin (csel-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0). Compare: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 2 (1887).

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Chapter 11

11.22CSEL 40:542–544

CAPUT XXII. De his, quibus in uniuersitate rerum a bono Creatore bene conditarum quaedam displicent, et putant nonnullam malam esse naturam. Hanc tamen causam, id est ad bona creanda bonitatem Dei, hanc, inquam, causam tam iustam adque idoneam, quae diligenter considerata et pie cogitata omnes controuersias quaerentium mundi originem terminat, quidam haeretici non uiderunt, quia egenam carnis huius fragilemque mortalitatem iam de iusto supplicio uenientem, dum ei non conueniunt, plurima offendunt, sicut ignis aut frigus aut fera bestia aut quid eius modi; nec adtendunt, quam uel in suis locis naturisque uigeant pulchroque ordine disponantur, quantumque uniuersitati rerum pro sui portione decoris tamquam in communem rem publicam conferant uel nobis ipsis, si eis congruenter adque scienter utamur, commoditatis adtribuant, ita ut uenena ipsa, quae per inconuenientiam perniciosa sunt, conuenienter adhibita in salubria medicamenta uertantur; quamque a contrario etiam haec, quibus delectantur, sicut cibus et potus et ista lux, inmoderato et inopportuno usu noxia sentiantur. Unde nos admonet diuina prouidentia non res insipienter uituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere, et ubi nostrum ingenium uel infirmitas deficit, ita credere occultam, sicut erant quaedam, quae uix potuimus inuenire; quia et ipsa utilitatis occultatio aut humilitatis exercitatio est aut elationis adtritio; cum omnino natura nulla sit malum nomenque hoc non sit nisi priuationis boni. Sed a terrenis usque ad caelestia et a uisibilibus usque ad inuisibilia sunt aliis alia bona meliora, ad hoc inaequalia, ut essent omnia; Deus autem ita est artifex magnus in magnis, ut minor non sit in paruis; quae parua non sua granditate (nam nulla est), sed artificis sapientia metienda sunt; sicut in specie uisibilis hominis, si unum radatur supercilium, quam propemodum nihil corpori, et quam multum detrahitur pulchritudini, quoniam non mole constat, sed parilitate ac dimensione membrorum! Nec sane multum mirandum est, quod hi, qui nonnullam malam putant esse naturam suo quodam contrario exortam propagatamque principio, nolunt accipere istam causam creationis rerum, ut bonus Deus conderet bona, credentes eum potius ad haec mundana molimina rebellantis aduersum se mali repellendi extrema necessitate perductum suamque naturam bonam malo cohercendo superandoque miscuisse, quam turpissime pollutam et crudelissime captiuatam et obpressam labore magno uix mundet ac liberet; non tamen totam, sed quod eius non potuerit ab illa inquinatione purgari, tegmen ac uinculum futurum hostis uicti et inclusi. Sic autem Manichaei non desiperent uel potius insanirent, si Dei naturam, sicuti est, incommutabilem adque omnino incorruptibilem crederent, cui nocere nulla res possit; animam uero, quae uoluntate mutari in deterius et peccato corrumpi potuit adque ita incommutabilis ueritatis luce priuari, non Dei partem nec eius naturae, quae Dei est, sed ab illo conditam longe inparem Conditori Christiana sanitate sentirent.

Chapter 22. Of those who are displeased with certain things in the universe, well made by the good Creator, and think there is some evil nature.

Yet this cause, that is, God's goodness in creating good things, this cause, I say, so just and fitting, which, when carefully considered and piously reflected upon, ends all the disputes of those who inquire into the origin of the world, certain heretics have not seen. For the needy and fragile mortality of this flesh, which already comes from just punishment, is offended by very many things that do not suit it, such as fire or cold or a wild beast or the like. They do not notice how these things flourish in their own places and natures and are arranged in beautiful order, and how much they contribute, each in its measure, to the beauty of the universe, as to a common commonwealth, or how much convenience they supply to ourselves if we use them fittingly and knowingly; so that poisons themselves, which are deadly when unsuitably used, are turned into wholesome medicines when suitably applied; and how, on the contrary, even those things they delight in, such as food and drink and this light, are felt to be harmful through immoderate and untimely use. Hence divine providence admonishes us not to find fault with things foolishly but to inquire diligently into their usefulness, and where our wit or weakness fails, to believe that it is hidden, as some things were which we could scarcely discover; for the very hiding of their usefulness is either an exercise of humility or a wearing down of pride; since no nature at all is evil, and this name is nothing but the privation of good. But from earthly to heavenly things and from visible to invisible there are some goods better than others, and they are unequal to this end, that all might exist; and God is so great an artificer in great things that he is not less in small ones; and these small things are to be measured not by their own greatness (for they have none) but by the wisdom of the artificer. So in the appearance of the visible human form, if one eyebrow is shaved off, how almost nothing is taken from the body, and how much from its beauty, since that is made up not of bulk but of the evenness and proportion of the members!

Nor indeed is it much to be wondered at that those who think there is some evil nature, arisen and propagated from a certain opposing principle of its own, will not accept this cause of the creation of things, that the good God made good things. They believe rather that he was driven to these works of the world by extreme necessity, to repel the evil that rebelled against him, and that he mixed his own good nature with the evil to restrain and overcome it; and that this nature, most foully polluted and most cruelly captured and oppressed, he scarcely cleanses and frees with great labor; and yet not all of it, but whatever of it could not be purged from that defilement is to become the covering and chain of the conquered and imprisoned enemy. But the Manichees would not be so foolish, or rather so mad, if they believed the nature of God to be, as it is, unchangeable and altogether incorruptible, a nature which nothing can harm; and if with Christian soundness they held that the soul, which could be changed for the worse by the will and corrupted by sin and so deprived of the light of unchangeable truth, is not a part of God nor of that nature which is God's, but created by him and far unequal to its Creator.

Notes and citation

Summary: Things harmful to us are good in their place; evil is only the privation of good, and the Manichees err in making evil a nature and the soul a part of God.

  • The Manichaean myth described: God's substance mixed with the realm of darkness, the world made to liberate it, and the unredeemed remainder used to bind the conquered enemy.

Topics: Heresy

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.22 (CSEL 40:542–544; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-22). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.23CSEL 40:544–547

CAPUT XXIII. De errore, in quo Origenis doctrina culpatur. Sed multo est mirandum amplius, quod etiam quidam, qui unum nobiscum credunt omnium rerum esse principium, ullamque naturam, quae non est quod Deus est, nisi ab illo conditore esse non posse, noluerunt tamen istam causam fabricandi mundi tam bonam ac simplicem bene ac simpliciter credere, ut Deus bonus conderet bona et essent post Deum quae non essent quod est Deus, bona tamen, quae non faceret nisi bonus Deus; sed animas dicunt, non quidem partes Dei, sed factas a Deo, peccasse a Conditore recedendo et diuersis progressibus pro diuersitate peccatorum a caelis usque ad terras diuersa corpora quasi uincula meruisse, et hunc esse mundum eamque causam mundi fuisse faciendi, non ut conderentur bona, sed ut mala cohiberentur. Hinc Origenes iure culpatur. In libris enim, quos appellat περὶ ἀρχῶν, id est de principiis, hoc sensit, hoc scripsit. Ubi plus quam dici potest miror hominem in ecclesiasticis litteris tam doctum et exercitatum non adtendisse, primum quam hoc esset contrarium scripturae huius tantae auctoritatis intentioni, quae per omnia opera Dei subiungens: Et uidit Deus, quia bonum est, conpletisque omnibus inferens: Et uidit Deus omnia, quae fecit, et ecce bona ualde, nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intellegi uoluit, nisi ut bona fierent a bono Deo. Ubi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset mundus ornatus et plenus; et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt inpleta peccatis, cum bonorum longe maior numerus in caelestibus suae naturae ordinem seruet; nec mala uoluntas, quia naturae ordinem seruare noluit, ideo iusti Dei leges omnia bene ordinantis effugit; quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro loco suo posito, ita uniuersitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra est, quamuis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet. Deinde uidere debuit Origenes et quicumque ita sapiunt, si haec opinio uera esset, mundum ideo factum, ut animae pro meritis peccatorum suorum tamquam ergastula, quibus poenaliter includerentur, corpora acciperent, superiora et leuiora quae minus, inferiora uero et grauiora quae amplius peccauerunt, daemones, quibus deterius nihil est, terrena corpora, quibus inferius et grauius nihil est, potius quam homines etiam bonos habere debuisse. Nunc uero, ut intellegeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum esse pensanda, aerium pessimus daemon, homo autem, et nunc licet malus longe minoris mitiorisque malitiae, et certe ante peccatum, tamen luteum corpus accepit. Quid autem stultius dici potest, quam isto sole, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis uel etiam saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum, sed hoc potius euenisse, quia una anima sic peccauerat, ut tali corpore mereretur includi? ac per hoc si contigisset, ut non una, sed duae; immo non duae, sed decem uel centum similiter aequaliterque peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus? Quod ut non fieret, non opificis prouisione mirabili ad rerum corporalium salutem decoremque consultum est, sed contigit potius tanta unius animae progressione peccantis, ut sola corpus tale mereretur. Non plane animarum, de quibus nesciunt quid loquantur, sed eorum ipsorum, qui talia sapiunt multum longe a ueritate, [et] merito est cohercenda progressio. Haec ergo tria, quae superius commendaui, cum in unaquaque creatura requirantur, quis eam fecerit, per quid fecerit, quare fecerit, ut respondeatur Deus, per Verbum, quia bona est, utrum altitudine mystica nobis ipsa trinitas intimetur, hoc est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, an aliquid occurrat, quod hoc loco scripturarum id accipiendum esse prohibeat, multi sermonis est quaestio, nec omnia uno uolumine ut explicemus urgendum est.

Chapter 23. Of the error for which the teaching of Origen is blamed.

But it is much more to be wondered at that some who believe with us that there is one principle of all things, and that no nature which is not what God is can exist except from him as creator, nonetheless have not been willing to believe well and simply this cause of making the world, so good and simple, that the good God made good things, and that after God there should be things which were not what God is, yet good, which only a good God would make. Instead they say that souls, not indeed parts of God but made by God, sinned by departing from the Creator, and by various descents, according to the diversity of their sins, from the heavens down to the earth, deserved various bodies as chains; and that this is the world, and that the cause of making the world was not that good things should be established but that evil ones should be restrained. For this Origen is rightly blamed. For in the books which he calls Peri Archōn, that is, On First Principles, he thought this and wrote this. And here I am more astonished than I can say that a man so learned and practiced in the church's literature did not notice, first, how contrary this was to the intent of this Scripture of such great authority, which, adding to all God's works, “And God saw that it was good,” and when all were finished, “And God saw all that he had made, and behold, it was very good,” meant no other cause of making the world to be understood than that good things should be made by a good God. Here, if no one had sinned, the world would have been adorned and filled with good natures only; and though sin has occurred, not all things are therefore filled with sins, since by far the greater number of the good in heaven keep the order of their nature; nor has the evil will, because it would not keep the order of nature, therefore escaped the laws of the just God, who orders all things well; since, as a picture with the color black set in its place, so the universe, if one could see it whole, is beautiful even with sinners, although, considered in themselves, their own deformity disfigures them.

Next, Origen and all who think so ought to have seen that, if this opinion were true that the world was made so that souls, according to the deserts of their sins, received bodies as prisons in which to be shut up as punishment, the higher and lighter bodies for those who sinned less, the lower and heavier for those who sinned more, then the demons, than whom nothing is worse, ought to have had earthly bodies, than which nothing is lower and heavier, rather than men, even good men. But as it is, that we might understand that the deserts of souls are not to be weighed by the qualities of bodies, the worst demon received an aerial body, while man, though now evil, of far less and milder malice, and certainly before sin, nonetheless received a body of clay. What can be said more foolish than that, in the case of this sun, so that there might be one in the one world, God the artificer did not consult the beauty of the whole or even the welfare of bodily things, but that this came about rather because one soul had so sinned as to deserve to be enclosed in such a body? And so, if it had happened that not one but two, indeed not two but ten or a hundred, had sinned similarly and equally, this world would have a hundred suns? That this did not happen was not provided for by the wonderful foresight of the maker for the welfare and beauty of bodily things, but came about rather through the so great descent of one sinning soul, so that it alone deserved such a body. Plainly it is not the descent of souls, of which they do not know what they are saying, but of these men themselves, whose thoughts are so far from the truth, that should rightly be restrained.

As to these three things, then, which I commended above, which are to be asked of every creature, who made it, through what he made it, why he made it, so that the answer is “God,” “through the Word,” “because it is good”: whether the Trinity itself, that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is intimated to us by a mystical depth, or whether something occurs that forbids us to take it so in this passage of the Scriptures, is a question requiring long discussion; nor need we be pressed to explain everything in one volume.

Textual problem in this passage: see the notes.

Gen 1:4 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 1:31 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Augustine rejects Origen's view that the world was made to imprison souls fallen from God, since Scripture calls creation very good and bodies do not match the deserts of souls.

  • Origen, On First Principles (Peri Archōn), esp. 1.8 and 2.9, is meant. Gen 1:31 quoted. The Latin prints the Greek title corruptly (“nep2 ἀρχω̄ν”); corrected to περὶ ἀρχῶν. The edition's square brackets around “et” (“[et] merito”) mean the editor deletes it; it is left out. The aerial bodies of demons were a common ancient belief.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR corruption of the Greek title (marked sic in the digital text); stray hyphen): nep2 ἀρχω̄ν → περὶ ἀρχῶν; mundum- ideo → mundum ideo.

Extrabiblical texts: Origen, Princ. (Origen, On First Principles; allusion)

Topics: Heresy

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.23 (CSEL 40:544–547; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-23). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.24CSEL 40:547–548

CAPUT XXIIII. De trinitate diuina, quae per omnia opera sua significationis suae sparsit indicia. Credimus et tenemus et fideliter praedicamus, quod Pater genuerit Verbum, hoc est sapientiam, per quam facta sunt omnia, unigenitum Filium, unus unum, aeternus coaeternum, summe bonus aequaliter bonum; et quod Spiritus sanctus simul et Patris et Filii sit Spiritus et ipse consubstantialis et coaeternus ambobus; adque hoc totum et trinitas sit propter proprietatem personarum et unus Deus propter inseparabilem diuinitatem, sicut unus Omnipotens propter inseparabilem omnipotentiam; ita tamen, ut etiam cum de singulis quaeritur unusquisque eorum et Deus et omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum uero de omnibus simul, non tres di uel tres omnipotentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens; tanta ibi est in tribus inseparabilis unitas, quae sic se uoluit praedicari. Utrum autem boni Patris et boni Filii Spiritus sanctus, quia communis ambobus est, recte bonitas dici possit amborum, non audeo temerariam praecipitare sententiam; uerum tamen amborum eum dicere sanctitatem facilius ausus fuero, non amborum quasi qualitatem, sed ipsum quoque substantiam et tertiam in trinitate personam. Ad hoc enim me probabilius ducit, quod, cum sit et Pater spiritus et Filius spiritus, et Pater sanctus et Filius sanctus, proprie tamen ipse uocatur Spiritus sanctus tamquam sanctitas substantialis et consubstantialis amborum. Sed si nihil est aliud bonitas diuina quam sanctitas, profecto et intellegentia rationis est, non praesumtionis audacia, ut in operibus Dei secreto quodam loquendi modo, quo nostra exerceatur intentio, eadem nobis insinuata intellegatur trinitas, unamquamque creaturam quis fecerit, per quid fecerit, propter quid fecerit. Pater quippe intellegitur Verbi, qui dixit ut fiat; quod autem illo dicente factum est, procul dubio per Verbum factum est; in eo uero quod dicitur: Vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est, quia bonum est; quod ideo postea quam factum est dicitur, ut res, quae facta est, congruere bonitati, propter quam facta est, indicetur. Quae bonitas si Spiritus sanctus recte intellegitur, uniuersa nobis trinitas in suis operibus intimatur. Inde est ciuitatis sanctae, quae in sanctis angelis sursum est, et origo et informatio et beatitudo. Nam si quaeratur unde sit: Deus eam condidit; si unde sit sapiens: a Deo inluminatur; si unde sit felix: Deo fruitur; subsistens modificatur, contemplans inlustratur, inhaerens iucundatur; est, uidet, amat; in aeternitate Dei uiget, in ueritate Dei lucet, in bonitate Dei gaudet.

Chapter 24. Of the divine Trinity, which has scattered indications of itself throughout all its works.

We believe and hold and faithfully proclaim that the Father begot the Word, that is, the wisdom through which all things were made, the only-begotten Son, one begetting one, eternal begetting coeternal, supremely good begetting one equally good; and that the Holy Spirit is at once the Spirit both of the Father and of the Son, and is himself consubstantial and coeternal with both; and that this whole is both a Trinity because of the distinctness of the persons and one God because of the inseparable divinity, as it is one Almighty because of the inseparable omnipotence; yet so that, when the question is asked of each one singly, the answer is that each of them is both God and almighty; but when of all together, not three gods or three almighties, but one God almighty; so great is the inseparable unity in the three, which willed to be proclaimed in this way. But whether the Holy Spirit of the good Father and the good Son, because he is common to both, can rightly be called the goodness of both, I do not dare to put forward a rash opinion; yet I would more readily dare to call him the holiness of both, not as if a quality of both, but himself also a substance and the third person in the Trinity. What leads me to this as more probable is that, although the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, yet he himself is properly called the Holy Spirit, as the substantial holiness of both, consubstantial with both. But if divine goodness is nothing other than holiness, then it is surely an understanding of reason, not the boldness of presumption, that in God's works, by a certain hidden manner of speaking by which our attention is exercised, the same Trinity is understood to be intimated to us: who made each creature, through what he made it, and for what he made it. For the Father of the Word is understood as the one who said, “Let it be”; and what was made when he spoke was without doubt made through the Word; and in the words, “God saw that it was good,” it is sufficiently signified that God made what was made by no necessity, by no need of any advantage of his own, but by goodness alone, that is, because it is good; which is said after it was made in order to indicate that the thing made agrees with the goodness for the sake of which it was made. If this goodness is rightly understood as the Holy Spirit, the whole Trinity is intimated to us in its works.

Thence comes the origin, the formation, and the happiness of the holy city which is above in the holy angels. For if it is asked whence it is: God founded it; whence it is wise: it is enlightened by God; whence it is happy: it enjoys God. Subsisting, it is given its measure; contemplating, it is illuminated; cleaving, it is gladdened. It is, it sees, it loves. In God's eternity it flourishes, in God's truth it shines, in God's goodness it rejoices.

John 1:3 (allusion, high confidence) · John 1:14 (allusion, medium confidence) · John 4:24 (echo, medium confidence) · Gen 1:4 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Augustine states the faith in the Trinity and suggests that the Father, the Word, and the Spirit as goodness are signified in every work of creation and in the holy city's being, wisdom, and joy.

  • Augustine offers the identification of the Spirit with divine goodness or holiness tentatively (“I do not dare”). John 1:3 alluded to; John 4:24 (God is spirit) echoed.

Topics: Trinity

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.24 (CSEL 40:547–548; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-24). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.25CSEL 40:548–550

CAPUT XXV. De tripertita totius philosophiae disciplina. Quantum intellegi datur, hinc philosophi sapientiae disciplinam tripertitam esse uoluerunt, immo tripertitam esse animaduertere potuerunt (neque enim ipsi instituerunt ut ita esset, sed ita esse potius inuenerunt), cuius una pars appellaretur physica, altera logica, tertia ethica (quarum nomina Latina iam multorum litteris frequentata sunt, ut naturalis, rationalis moralisque uocarentur; quas etiam in octauo libro breuiter strinximus); non quo sit consequens, ut isti in his tribus aliquid secundum Deum de trinitate cogitauerint, quamuis Plato primus istam distributionem repperisse et commendasse dicatur, cui neque naturarum omnium auctor nisi Deus uisus est neque intellegentiae dator neque amoris, quo bene beateque uiuitur, inspirator. Sed certe cum et de natura rerum et de ratione indagandae ueritatis et de boni fine, ad quem cuncta quae agimus referre debemus, diuersi diuersa sentiant: in his tamen tribus magnis et generalibus quaestionibus omnis eorum uersatur intentio. Ita cum in unaquaque earum quid quisque sectetur multiplex discrepantia sit opinionum, esse tamen aliquam naturae causam, scientiae formam, uitae summam nemo cunctatur. Tria etiam sunt, quae in unoquoque homine artifice spectantur, ut aliquid efficiat: natura, doctrina, usus; natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, usus fructu diiudicandus est. Nec ignoro, quod proprie fructus fruentis, usus utentis sit, adque hoc interesse uideatur, quod ea re frui dicimur, quae nos non ad aliud referenda per se ipsa delectat; uti uero ea re, quam propter aliud quaerimus (unde temporalibus magis utendum est, quam fruendum, ut frui mereamur aeternis; non sicut peruersi, qui frui uolunt nummo, uti autem Deo; quoniam non nummum propter Deum inpendunt, sed Deum propter nummum colunt); uerum tamen eo loquendi modo, quem plus obtinuit consuetudo, et fructibus utimur et usibus fruimur; nam et fructus iam proprie dicuntur agrorum, quibus utique omnes temporaliter utimur. Hoc itaque more usum dixerim, in his tribus, quae in homine spectanda commonui, quae sunt natura, doctrina, usus. Ex his propter obtinendam beatam uitam tripertita, ut dixi, a philosophis inuenta est disciplina, naturalis propter naturam, rationalis propter doctrinam, moralis propter usum. Si ergo natura nostra esset a nobis, profecto et nostram nos genuissemus sapientiam, nec eam doctrina, id est aliunde discendo, percipere curaremus; et noster amor a nobis profectus et ad nos relatus et ad beate uiuendum sufficeret, nec bono alio quo frueremur ullo indigeret; nunc uero quia natura nostra, ut esset, Deum habet auctorem, procul dubio ut uera sapiamus ipsum debemus habere doctorem, ipsum etiam ut beati simus suauitatis intimae largitorem.

Chapter 25. Of the threefold division of all philosophy.

As far as it is given to understand, it is for this reason that the philosophers wanted the discipline of wisdom to be threefold, or rather were able to observe that it is threefold (for they did not themselves arrange that it should be so, but rather discovered that it is so): one part was called physics, another logic, the third ethics (their Latin names, natural, rational, and moral, are now common in the writings of many, and we touched on them briefly in the eighth book). Not that it follows that in these three they thought anything about a trinity in God, although Plato is said to have been the first to discover and commend this division, and to him it seemed that none but God is the author of all natures, the giver of understanding, and the inspirer of the love by which one lives well and happily. But certainly, though different men hold different views about the nature of things, about the method of investigating truth, and about the end of the good to which we ought to refer all that we do, yet all their effort is concerned with these three great and general questions. So, though in each of them there is a manifold disagreement of opinion as to what each follows, yet no one hesitates that there is some cause of nature, some form of knowledge, some sum of life.

There are also three things which are looked for in every human craftsman if he is to accomplish anything: nature, training, and use; nature is to be judged by talent, training by knowledge, use by fruit. I am not unaware that, properly speaking, fruit belongs to the one who enjoys and use to the one who uses; and the difference seems to be this: we are said to enjoy a thing which delights us in itself, not as referred to something else; to use a thing which we seek for the sake of something else. (Hence temporal things are to be used rather than enjoyed, so that we may deserve to enjoy eternal things; not like the perverse, who want to enjoy money but use God, since they do not spend money for God's sake but worship God for money's sake.) Yet in the manner of speaking which custom has more commonly established, we both use fruits and enjoy uses; for the produce of the fields too is now properly called fruits, and we all certainly use it in this temporal life. It is in this customary sense, then, that I have spoken of use among the three things I pointed out as to be looked for in a man, namely nature, training, and use. From these, for the sake of attaining the happy life, the threefold discipline, as I said, was found by the philosophers: natural because of nature, rational because of training, moral because of use. If, then, our nature were from ourselves, we would surely have begotten our own wisdom too, and would not take pains to acquire it by training, that is, by learning from elsewhere; and our love, proceeding from ourselves and referred to ourselves, would suffice for living happily and would need no other good to enjoy. But as it is, since our nature has God as its author in order to exist, beyond doubt we must have him as our teacher in order to know true things, and him also as the giver of inward sweetness in order to be happy.

Notes and citation

Summary: The philosophers' division into physics, logic, and ethics mirrors our dependence on God for being, wisdom, and happiness; Augustine distinguishes enjoying from using.

  • The attribution of the threefold division to Plato goes back to the eighth book (8.4). A final stray mark in the Latin is ignored.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (period misread for comma; stray mark; stray period): ut ita esset. sed ita → ut ita esset, sed ita; quoniam. non nummum → quoniam non nummum; suauitatis intimae largitorem._ → suauitatis intimae largitorem..

Extrabiblical texts: Plato (Plato (works); allusion)

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.25 (CSEL 40:548–550; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-25). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.26CSEL 40:550–551

CAPUT XXVI De imagine summae trinitatis, quae secundum quendam modum in natura etiam necdum beatificati hominis inuenitur. Et nos quidem in nobis, tametsi non aequalem, immo ualde longeque distantem, neque coaeternam et, quo breuius totum dicitur, non eiusdem substantiae, cuius Deus est, tamen qua Deo nihil sit in rebus ab eo factis natura propinquius, imaginem Dei, hoc est illius summae trinitatis, agnoscimus, adhuc reformatione perficiendam, ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus et nos esse nouimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus, quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas ueri similis turbat. Non enim ea sicut illa, quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, uelut colores uidendo, sonos audiendo, odores olfaciendo, sapores gustando, dura et mollia contrectando sentimus, quorum sensibilium etiam imagines eis simillimas nec iam corporeas cogitatione uersamus, memoria tenemus et per ipsas in istorum desideria concitamur; sed sine ulla phantasiarum uel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria mihi esse me idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his ueris Academicorum argumenta formido dicentium: Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest: ac per hoc sum, si fallor. Quia sum ergo si fallor, quo modo esse me fallor, quando certum est me esse, si fallor? Quia igitur essem qui fallerer, etiamsi fallerer, procul dubio in eo, quod me noui esse, non fallor. Consequens est autem, ut etiam in eo, quod me noui nosse, non fallar. Sicut enim noui esse me, ita noui etiam hoc ipsum, nosse me. Eaque duo cum amo, eundem quoque amorem quiddam tertium nec inparis aestimationis eis quas noui rebus adiungo. Neque enim fallor amare me, cum in his quae amo non fallar; quamquam etsi illa falsa essent, falsa me amare uerum esset. Nam quo pacto recte reprehenderer et recte prohiberer ab amore falsorum, si me illa amare falsum esset? Cum uero et illa uera adque certa sint, quis dubitet quod eorum, cum amantur, et ipse amor uerus et certus est? Tam porro nemo est qui esse se nolit, quam nemo est qui non esse beatus uelit. Quo modo enim potest beatus esse, si nihil sit?

Chapter 26. Of the image of the supreme Trinity, which is found in a certain way even in the nature of man not yet made blessed.

And we indeed recognize in ourselves an image of God, that is, of that supreme Trinity, though not equal to it, indeed very far removed from it, nor coeternal, and, to say it all more briefly, not of the same substance as God, yet nearer to God in nature than anything else among the things he has made; an image still to be perfected by reformation, so that it may also be most near in likeness. For we both are, and know that we are, and love this being and knowing. And in these three things of which I have spoken no falsehood that looks like truth disturbs us. For we do not touch them, as we do things outside us, by any bodily sense, as we perceive colors by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft things by handling; of these sensible things we also turn over in thought images very like them, no longer bodily, hold them in memory, and are roused by them to desire the things themselves. But without any deceptive imagining of fancies or phantoms, it is most certain to me that I am, and that I know and love this. In these truths I have no fear of the arguments of the Academics, who say: “What if you are deceived?” For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not cannot be deceived either; and so I am, if I am deceived. Since, then, I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am, when it is certain that I am if I am deceived? Since, therefore, I who was deceived would be, even if I were deceived, beyond doubt I am not deceived in knowing that I am. It follows that I am not deceived either in knowing that I know. For as I know that I am, so I know this too, that I know. And when I love these two, I add to the things I know this same love as a third thing of no less value. For I am not deceived that I love, since I am not deceived in the things I love; though even if they were false, it would be true that I loved false things. For how could I rightly be blamed and rightly forbidden to love false things, if it were false that I loved them? But since they are true and certain, who doubts that, when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and certain? Further, there is no one who does not wish to be, just as there is no one who does not wish to be happy. For how can one be happy if one is nothing?

Gen 1:26 (allusion, high confidence) · 2 Cor 3:18 (echo, low confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: The human mind bears an image of the Trinity in being, knowing, and loving, of which it is certain even against the skeptics: if I am deceived, I am.

  • The Academics were the skeptical successors of Plato's Academy, whom Augustine had answered in Against the Academics. Gen 1:26–27 is in view.

Topics: Trinity

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.26 (CSEL 40:550–551; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-26). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.27CSEL 40:551–554

CAPUT XXVII. De essentia et scientia et utriusque amore. Ita uero ui quadam naturali ipsum esse iucundum est, ut non ob aliud et hi qui miseri sunt nolint interire et, cum se miseros esse sentiant, non se ipsos de rebus, sed miseriam suam potius auferri uelint. Illis etiam, qui et sibi miserrimi apparent et plane sunt et non solum a sapientibus, quoniam stulti, uerum et ab his, qui se beatos putant, miseri iudicantur, quia pauperes adque mendici sunt, si quis inmortalitatem daret, qua nec ipsa miseria moreretur, proposito sibi quod, si in eadem miseria semper esse nollent, nulli et nusquam essent futuri, sed omni modo perituri, profecto exultarent laetitia et sic semper eligerent esse quam omnino non esse. Huius rei testis est notissimus sensus illorum. Unde enim mori metuunt et malunt in illa aerumna uiuere, quam eam morte finire, nisi quia satis apparet quam refugiat natura non esse? Adque ideo cum se nouerint esse morituros, pro magno beneficio sibi hanc inpendi misericordiam desiderant, ut aliquanto productius in eadem miseria uiuant tardiusque moriantur. Procul dubio ergo indicant, inmortalitatem, saltem talem quae non habeat finem mendicitatis, quanta gratulatione susciperent. Quid? animalia omnia etiam inrationalia, quibus datum non est ista cogitare, ab inmensis draconibus usque ad exiguos uermiculos nonne se esse uelle adque ob hoc interitum fugere omnibus quibus possunt motibus indicant? Quid? arbusta omnesque frutices, quibus nullus est sensus ad uitandam manifesta motione perniciem, nonne ut in auras tutum cacuminis germen emittant, aliud terrae radicis adfigunt, quo alimentum trahant adque ita suum quodam modo esse conseruent? Ipsa postremo corpora, quibus non solum sensus, sed nec ulla saltem seminalis est uita, ita tamen uel exiliunt in superna uel in ima descendunt uel librantur in mediis, ut essentiam suam, ubi secundum naturam possunt esse, custodiant. Iam uero nosse quantum ametur quamque falli nolit humana natura, uel hinc intellegi potest, quod lamentari quisque sana mente mauult quam laetari in amentia. Quae uis magna adque mirabilis mortalibus praeter hominem animantibus nulla est, licet eorum quibusdam ad istam lucem contuendam multo quam nobis sit acrior sensus oculorum; sed lucem illam incorpoream contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodam modo radiatur, ut de his omnibus recte iudicare possimus. Nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus. Verum tamen inest in sensibus inrationalium animantium, etsi scientia nullo modo, at certe quaedam scientiae similitudo; cetera autem rerum corporalium, non quia sentiunt, sed quia sentiuntur, sensibilia nuncupata sunt. Quorum in arbustis hoc simile est sensibus, quod aluntur et gignunt. Verum tamen et haec et omnia corporalia latentes in natura causas habent; sed formas suas, quibus mundi huius uisibilis structura formosa est, sentiendas sensibus praebent, ut pro eo, quod nosse non possunt, quasi innotescere uelle uideantur. Sed nos ea sensu corporis ita capimus, ut de his non sensu corporis iudicemus. Habemus enim alium interioris hominis sensum isto longe praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus, iusta per intellegibilem speciem, iniusta per eius priuationem. Ad huius sensus officium non acies pupulae, non foramen auriculae, non spiramenta narium, non gustus faucium, non ullus corporeus tactus accedit. Ibi me et esse et hoc nosse certus sum, et haec amo adque amare me similiter certus sum.

Chapter 27. Of being and knowledge and the love of both.

Being itself is so pleasant by a certain natural force that for no other reason do even those who are wretched not wish to perish, and when they feel that they are wretched, they wish not themselves to be removed from the world but rather their wretchedness. Take even those who both seem most wretched to themselves and plainly are so, and who are judged wretched not only by the wise, because they are foolish, but also by those who think themselves happy, because they are poor and beggars: if someone were to give them an immortality in which even their wretchedness would not die, on the terms that, if they did not wish to be always in the same wretchedness, they would be nothing and nowhere but would perish utterly, they would certainly leap for joy and would choose to be forever thus rather than not to be at all. Their well-known feeling is a witness to this. For why do they fear to die and prefer to live in that misery rather than end it by death, unless it is quite plain how nature shuns not being? And so, when they know that they are going to die, they long for this mercy to be shown them as a great benefit, that they may live somewhat longer in the same misery and die later. Beyond doubt, then, they show with what thankfulness they would receive immortality, even one that would not put an end to their begging. What of all the animals, even the irrational ones, to whom it is not given to think of these things, from huge serpents to tiny worms? Do they not show, by every movement they can, that they wish to exist and therefore flee destruction? What of shrubs and all bushes, which have no sense to avoid harm by visible motion? Do they not, in order to send the tip of their crown safely into the air, fix another part, the root, in the earth, to draw nourishment from it, and so in a way preserve their being? Finally, bodies themselves, which have not only no sense but not even any seminal life, either leap upward or descend downward or are balanced in the middle, so as to preserve their being where they can exist according to their nature.

And how much knowing is loved and how human nature does not wish to be deceived may be understood from this, that everyone of sound mind would rather grieve than be glad in madness. This great and wonderful power belongs to no mortal living creature except man, although some of them have a far sharper sense of sight than we for beholding this light; but they cannot reach that incorporeal light by which our mind is in some way irradiated, so that we can judge rightly of all these things. For in so far as we receive it, in so far can we do this. Yet in the senses of irrational animals there is, if in no way knowledge, at least a certain likeness of knowledge; but the other bodily things are called sensible not because they sense but because they are sensed. Among these, what is like the senses in shrubs is that they are nourished and reproduce. Yet both these and all bodily things have their causes hidden in nature; but they offer their forms, by which the structure of this visible world is beautiful, to the senses to be perceived, so that, in place of the knowing which they cannot do, they seem as it were to wish to be known. But we so take them in by the bodily sense that we do not judge of them by the bodily sense. For we have another sense, of the inner man, far more excellent than this, by which we perceive just and unjust things: the just by an intelligible form, the unjust by its privation. To the working of this sense no keenness of the pupil, no opening of the ear, no nostrils, no taste in the throat, no bodily touch contributes. There I am certain both that I am and that I know this; and I love these things and am likewise certain that I love them.

Rom 7:22 (echo, low confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: All creatures cling to being, and the human mind loves knowledge more than happiness in delusion; by an inner sense it judges justice and knows that it is, knows, and loves.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip; period misread for comma): ut essentiam suam. ubi → ut essentiam suam, ubi; praeter homini animantibus → praeter hominem animantibus.

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.27 (CSEL 40:551–554; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-27). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.28CSEL 40:554–556

CAPUT XXVIII. An etiam ipsum amorem, quo et esse et scire diligimus, diligere debeamus, quo magis diuinae trinitatis imagini propinquemus. Sed de duobus illis, essentia scilicet et notitia, quantum amentur in nobis, et quem ad modum etiam in ceteris rebus, quae infra sunt, eorum reperiatur, etsi differens, quaedam tamen similitudo, quantum suscepti huius operis ratio uisa est postulare, satis diximus; de amore autem, quo amantur, utrum et ipse amor ametur, non dictum est. Amatur autem; et hinc probamus, quod in hominibus, qui rectius amantur, ipse magis amatur. Neque enim uir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit. Quur ergo et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quidquid boni amamus? Est enim et amor, quo amatur et quod amandum non est, et istum amorem odit in se, qui illum diligit, quo id amatur quod amandum est. Possunt enim ambo esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est homini, ut illo proficiente quo bene uiuimus, iste deficiat quo male uiuimus, donec ad perfectum sanetur et in bonum commutetur omne quod uiuimus. Si enim pecora essemus, carnalem uitam et quod secundum sensum eius est amaremus idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum et secundum hoc, cum esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentiente motu amare possemus, uerum tamen id quasi adpetere uideremur, quo feracius essemus uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides aut fluctus aut uentus aut flamma uel quid huius modi, sine ullo quidem sensu adque uita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum adque ordinis adpetitus. Nam uelut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, siue deorsum grauitate siue sursum leuitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri creatoris imaginem creati, cuius est uera aeternitas, aeterna ueritas, aeterna et uera caritas, estque ipse aeterna et uera et cara trinitas neque confusa neque separata: in his quidem rebus, quae infra nos sunt, quoniam et ipsa nec aliquo modo essent nec aliqua specie continerentur nec aliquem ordinem uel adpeterent uel tenerent, nisi ab illo facta essent, qui summe est, qui summe sapiens est, qui summe bonus est, tamquam per omnia, quae fecit mirabili stabilitate, currentes quasi quaedam eius alibi magis, alibi minus inpressa uestigia colligamus; in nobis autem ipsis eius imaginem contuentes tamquam minor ille euangelicus filius ad nosmet ipsos reuersi surgamus et ad illum redeamus, a quo peccando recesseramus. Ibi esse nostrum non habebit mortem, ibi nosse nostrum non habebit errorem, ibi amare nostrum non habebit offensionem. Nunc autem tria ista nostra quamuis certa teneamus nec aliis ea credamus testibus, sed nos ipsi praesentia sentiamus adque interiore ueracissimo cernamus aspectu, tamen, quamdiu futura uel utrum numquam defutura et quo si male, quo autem si bene agantur peruentura sint, quoniam per nos ipsos nosse non possumus, alios hinc testes uel quaerimus uel habemus: de quorum fide quur nulla debeat esse dubitatio, non est iste, sed posterior erit diligentius disserendi locus. In hoc autem libro de ciuitate Dei, quae non peregrinatur in huius uitae mortalitate, sed inmortalis semper in caelis est, id est de angelis sanctis Deo cohaerentibus, qui nec fuerunt umquam nec futuri sunt desertores, inter quos et illos, qui aeternam lucem deserentes tenebrae facti sunt, Deum primitus diuisisse iam diximus, illo adiuuante quod coepimus ut possumus explicemus.

Chapter 28. Whether we ought also to love the very love by which we love both being and knowing, so as to come nearer to the image of the divine Trinity.

But about those two, being and knowing, how much they are loved in us, and how a certain likeness of them, though different, is found also in the other things that are below us, we have said enough, as far as the plan of this work seemed to require. But about the love by which they are loved, whether this love itself is loved, nothing has been said. It is loved, however; and we prove it from this, that in men who are loved more rightly, it is love itself that is loved more. For he is not rightly called a good man who knows what is good, but who loves it. Why then do we not perceive in ourselves too that we love the very love by which we love whatever good we love? For there is also a love by which what ought not to be loved is loved; and whoever loves that love by which what ought to be loved is loved hates this other love in himself. For both can exist in one man; and this is good for a man, that as the love by which we live well advances, the love by which we live badly may fail, until our whole life is healed to perfection and changed into good. For if we were cattle, we would love the carnal life and what accords with its sense, and this would be our sufficient good, and when it was well with us in this respect we would seek nothing else. Likewise, if we were trees, we could indeed love nothing by a sentient movement, yet we would seem as it were to seek that by which we might be more fertile and bear fruit more abundantly. If we were stones, or waves, or wind, or flame, or anything of that kind, without any sense or life, we would still not lack a kind of seeking of our own places and order. For the movements of weights are, as it were, the loves of bodies, whether they strive downward by heaviness or upward by lightness. For a body is carried by its weight, as the soul by its love, wherever it is carried.

Since, then, we are men created in the image of our Creator, whose is true eternity, eternal truth, eternal and true love, and who is himself the eternal, true, and beloved Trinity, neither confused nor separated: in the things that are below us, since they too would not exist in any way, nor be held together by any form, nor seek or keep any order, unless they had been made by him who supremely is, who is supremely wise, who is supremely good, let us, running as it were through all the things he has made with wonderful stability, gather up his traces, as it were, more deeply impressed in one place and less in another; but beholding his image in ourselves, let us, like that younger son in the Gospel, come back to ourselves, rise, and return to him from whom we had departed by sinning. There our being will have no death, our knowing no error, our loving no offense. But now, though we hold these three of ours as certain, and do not believe them on the word of other witnesses but perceive them ourselves as present and discern them with the most truthful inner sight, yet, since we cannot know by ourselves how long they will last, or whether they will never fail, and where they will come to if we act badly and where if we act well, we seek or have other witnesses on this; and why there should be no doubt about their trustworthiness is not to be discussed here, but more carefully later. In this book, however, about the city of God that is not a pilgrim in the mortality of this life but is always immortal in the heavens, that is, about the holy angels who cleave to God, who never have been and never will be deserters, and between whom and those who, forsaking the eternal light, became darkness, God, as we have said, first divided, let us with his help go on to explain, as we can, what we have begun.

Gen 1:27 (allusion, high confidence) · Luke 15:17 (allusion, high confidence) · Luke 15:18 (allusion, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: We also love the love by which we love; all things seek their place as by a love, and man, as God's image, should return like the prodigal son to God, in whom being, knowing, and loving will be perfected.

  • Luke 15:17–20 (the prodigal son) alluded to. “A body is carried by its weight, as the soul by its love” echoes Confessions 13.9.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip sine for siue; missing period): sed qui diligit Quur → sed qui diligit. Quur; grauitate sine sursum → grauitate siue sursum.

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.28 (CSEL 40:554–556; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-28). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.29CSEL 40:556–557

CAPUT XXVIIII. De sanctorum angelorum scientia, qua trinitatem in ipsa eius deitate nouerunt et qua operum causas prius in operantis arte quam in ipsis operibus artificis intuentur. Illi quippe angeli sancti non per uerba sonantia Deum discunt, sed per ipsam praesentiam inmutabilis ueritatis, hoc est Verbum eius unigenitum, et ipsum Verbum et Patrem et eorum Spiritum sanctum, eamque esse inseparabilem trinitatem singulasque in ea personas esse substantiam, et tamen omnes non tres deos esse, sed unum Deum, ita nouerunt, ut eis magis ista, quam nos ipsi nobis cogniti simus. Ipsam quoque creaturam melius ibi, hoc est in sapientia Dei, tamquam in arte, qua facta est, quam in ea ipsa sciunt; ac per hoc et se ipsos ibi melius quam in se ipsis, uerum tamen et in se ipsis. Facti sunt enim et aliud sunt quam ille qui fecit. Ibi ergo tamquam in diurna cognitione, in se ipsis autem tamquam in uespertina, sicut iam supra diximus. Multum enim differt, utrum in ea ratione cognoscatur aliquid, secundum quam factum est, an in se ipso; sicut aliter scitur rectitudo linearum seu ueritas figurarum, cum intellecta conspicitur, aliter cum in puluere scribitur; et aliter iustitia in ueritate incommutabili, aliter in anima iusti. Sic deinde cetera, sicut firmamentum inter aquas superiores et inferiores, quod caelum uocatum est; sicut deorsum aquarum congeries terraeque nudatio et herbarum institutio adque lignorum; sicut solis ac lunae stellarumque conditio; sicut ex aquis animalium, uolucrum scilicet adque piscium beluarumque natantium; sicut quorumque in terra gradientium adque repentium et ipsius hominis, qui cunctis in terra rebus excelleret. Omnia haec aliter in Verbo Dei cognoscuntur ab angelis, ubi habent causas rationesque suas, id est secundum quas facta sunt, incommutabiliter permanentes, aliter in se ipsis; illa clariore, hac obscuriore cognitione, uelut artis adque operum; quae tamen opera cum ad ipsius Creatoris laudem uenerationemque referuntur, tamquam mane lucescit in mentibus contemplantium.

Chapter 29. Of the knowledge of the holy angels, by which they know the Trinity in its very Godhead, and by which they behold the causes of works in the art of the worker before they see them in the works of the artist themselves.

For those holy angels learn God not through sounding words but through the very presence of the unchangeable truth, that is, his only-begotten Word; and they know the Word himself, and the Father, and their Holy Spirit, and that this is an inseparable Trinity, and that each of the persons in it is substance, and yet that all are not three gods but one God, in such a way that these things are better known to them than we are to ourselves. The creation itself, too, they know better there, that is, in the wisdom of God, as in the art by which it was made, than in the creation itself; and so they know themselves also better there than in themselves, yet in themselves too. For they were made, and are other than he who made them. There, then, they know as in daytime knowledge, but in themselves as in evening knowledge, as we said above. For it makes a great difference whether something is known in the reason according to which it was made or in itself; just as the straightness of lines or the truth of figures is known one way when it is beheld by the understanding, another when it is drawn in the dust; and justice one way in the unchangeable truth, another in the soul of a just man. So then with the rest: as the firmament between the upper and lower waters, which was called heaven; as the gathering of the waters below and the laying bare of the land and the making of plants and trees; as the creation of the sun and moon and stars; as that of the animals from the waters, namely birds and fishes and swimming monsters; as that of all things that walk and creep on the earth and of man himself, who was to excel all things on earth. All these are known by the angels one way in the Word of God, where they have their causes and reasons, that is, according to which they were made, abiding unchangeably, and another way in themselves: by that knowledge more clearly, by this more dimly, as the knowledge of the art and of the works; and yet when these works are referred to the praise and veneration of the Creator himself, it dawns, as it were, like morning in the minds of those who contemplate.

Gen 1:6 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 1:9 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 1:16 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 1:20 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 1:24 (allusion, high confidence) · Gen 1:26 (allusion, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: The holy angels know God and all creatures in the Word as in a “day” knowledge, more clearly than in the creatures themselves, their “evening” knowledge.

  • Recalls 11.7. The works of Gen 1:6–27 are listed.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip sen for seu): rectitudo linearum sen ueritas → rectitudo linearum seu ueritas.

Topics: Trinity

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.29 (CSEL 40:556–557; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-29). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).

11.30CSEL 40:557–559

CAPUT XXX. De senarii numeri perfectione, qui primus partium suarum quantitate conpletur. Haec autem propter senarii numeri perfectionem eodem die sexiens repetito sex diebus perfecta narrantur, non quia Deo fuerit necessaria mora temporum, quasi qui non potuerit creare omnia simul, quae deinceps congruis motibus peragerent tempora; sed quia per senarium numerum est operum significata perfectio. Numerus quippe senarius primus conpletur suis partibus, id est sexta sui parte et tertia et dimidia, quae sunt unum et duo et tria, quae in summam ducta sex fiunt. Partes autem in hac consideratione numerorum illae intellegendae sunt, quae quotae sint dici potest; sicut dimidia, tertia, quarta et deinceps ab aliquo numero denominatae. Neque enim exempli gratia quia in nouenario numero quattuor pars aliqua eius est, ideo dici potest quota eius sit; unum autem potest, nam nona eius est: et tria potest, nam tertia eius est. Coniunctae uero istae duae partes eius, nona scilicet adque tertia, id est unum et tria, longe sunt a tota summa eius, quod est nouem. Itemque in denario quaeternarius est aliqua pars eius; sed quota sit dici non potest; unum autem potest; nam decima pars eius est. Habet et quintam, quod sunt duo; habet et dimidiam, quod sunt quinque. Sed hae tres partes eius, decima et quinta et dimidia, id est unum et duo et quinque, simul ductae non conplent decem; sunt enim octo. Duodenarii uero numeri partes in summam ductae transeunt eum; habet enim duodecimam, quod est unum; habet sextam, quae sunt duo; habet quartam, quae sunt tria; habet tertiam, quae sunt quattuor; habet et dimidiam, quae sunt sex; unum autem et duo et tria et quattuor et sex non duodecim, sed amplius, id est sedecim, fiunt. Hoc breuiter commemorandum putaui ad commendandam senarii numeri perfectionem, qui primus, ut dixi, partibus suis in summam redactis ipse perficitur; in quo perfecit Deus opera sua. Unde ratio numeri contemnenda non est, quae in multis sanctarum scripturarum locis quam magni aestimanda sit elucet diligenter intuentibus. Nec frustra in laudibus Dei dictum est: Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere deposuisti.

Chapter 30. Of the perfection of the number six, which is the first to be completed by the sum of its parts.

These works are said to have been completed in six days, the same day being repeated six times, because of the perfection of the number six; not because God needed a delay of time, as though he could not create all things at once, which would thereafter complete the times by fitting motions, but because the perfection of the works is signified by the number six. For six is the first number that is completed by its parts, that is, by its sixth, its third, and its half, which are one, two, and three, and these added together make six. And in this consideration of numbers those are to be understood as parts of which it can be said what fraction they are, as a half, a third, a quarter, and so on, named from some number. For example, although in the number nine four is some part of it, it cannot therefore be said what fraction of it it is; but one can, for it is its ninth, and three can, for it is its third. But these two parts of it joined together, the ninth and the third, that is, one and three, are far short of its whole sum, which is nine. Likewise in ten, four is some part of it, but it cannot be said what fraction; but one can, for it is its tenth part. It also has a fifth, which is two, and a half, which is five. But these three parts of it, the tenth, the fifth, and the half, that is, one, two, and five, added together do not make up ten; they are eight. But the parts of the number twelve, added together, exceed it; for it has a twelfth, which is one, a sixth, which is two, a fourth, which is three, a third, which is four, and a half, which is six; but one and two and three and four and six make not twelve but more, namely sixteen. I thought I should mention this briefly to commend the perfection of the number six, which, as I said, is the first to be completed by its own parts brought into a sum; and in it God completed his works. Hence the reason of number is not to be despised; how highly it is to be valued shines out in many passages of the holy Scriptures to those who look carefully. Nor was it said in vain in the praises of God: “You have ordered all things in measure and number and weight.”

Notes and citation

Summary: The six days signify perfection, since six is the first number equal to the sum of its divisors.

  • Wis 11:20 quoted. Six is the first “perfect number” of ancient arithmetic.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (stray period): primus partium. suarum → primus partium suarum.

Extrabiblical texts: Wis 11:20 (Wisdom of Solomon [in RC, EO, ETH canons]; quotation)

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Civ. 11.30 (CSEL 40:557–559; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-civitate-dei/11-22/#p-11-30). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-civitate-dei-11-30) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude from Hoffmann's Latin text (CSEL 40, 1899–1900); compared afterwards with the NPNF¹ 2 translation (Dods, 1887).