City of God 19.15–19.22

Chapter 15. On natural freedom and on slavery, whose first cause is sin; because a man of evil will, even if he is not the chattel of another man, is the slave of his own lust.

This the natural order prescribes; so God created man. For he says: “Let him have dominion over the fish of the sea and the birds of the sky and all creeping things that creep upon the earth.” He did not will that the rational being made in his image should have dominion except over irrational beings; not man over man, but man over beast. Hence the first righteous men were set up as shepherds of flocks rather than as kings of men, so that God might suggest in this way too what the order of creatures requires and what the desert of sinners demands. For the condition of slavery is understood to have been rightly imposed on the sinner. Accordingly we nowhere read in the Scriptures of a slave before the righteous Noah punished his son's sin with this word. So it was guilt that earned this name, not nature. The origin of the word for slaves in the Latin language is believed to be drawn from this: that those who by the law of war could be killed became slaves, servi, when they were preserved, servabantur, by the victors, being named from preserving; which itself is not without the desert of sin. For even when a just war is waged, the other side fights for sin; and every victory, even when it falls to the wicked, humbles the conquered by divine judgment, either correcting or punishing sins. The man of God Daniel is witness, when, placed in captivity, he confesses to God his own sins and the sins of his people, and testifies with pious grief that this was the cause of that captivity.

The first cause of slavery, then, is sin, so that man was subjected to man by the bond of that condition; which does not happen except by the judgment of God, with whom there is no injustice, and who knows how to distribute different punishments according to the deserts of offenders. But as the supreme Lord says, “Everyone who commits sin is the slave of sin”; and so many religious men serve unjust masters, yet not free ones: “For by whom a man is overcome, to him he is also given over as a slave.” And certainly it is a happier thing to be a slave to a man than to a lust, since, to pass over others, the very lust for domination lays waste the hearts of mortals with a most savage dominion. But among men, in that order of peace by which some are subject to others, as humility benefits those who serve, so pride harms those who rule. No one, however, by nature, in which God first created man, is the slave of man or of sin. Yet penal slavery too is ordered by that law which commands the natural order to be preserved and forbids it to be disturbed; for if nothing had been done against that law, there would be nothing to be restrained by penal slavery. And therefore the apostle also admonishes slaves to be subject to their masters and to serve them from the heart with good will; so that, if they cannot be made free by their masters, they may themselves make their slavery in a way free, by serving not with deceitful fear but with faithful love, until iniquity passes away and all human rule and power is made void and God is all in all.

Chapter 16. On just rule.

Therefore, although our righteous fathers had slaves, they so administered domestic peace as to distinguish the lot of their children from the condition of the slaves in regard to these temporal goods; but in regard to worshipping God, in whom eternal goods are to be hoped for, they cared for all the members of their household with equal love. This the natural order so prescribes that the name of father of a family arose from it and became so widely current that even those who rule unjustly rejoice to be so called. But those who are true fathers of families care for all in their family as for children, that they may worship and deserve God, desiring and longing to come to the heavenly home, where the duty of commanding mortals will not be necessary, because the duty of caring for those already happy in that immortality will not be necessary; until that is reached, fathers ought to bear it more that they rule than slaves that they serve.

But if anyone in the house opposes domestic peace by disobedience, he is corrected by word or by blow or by any other kind of just and lawful punishment, as far as human society allows, for the benefit of the one corrected, so that he may be fitted again to the peace from which he had broken away. For as it is not beneficence to help so as to cause a greater good to be lost, so it is not innocence to spare so as to allow one to fall into a graver evil. It belongs, then, to the duty of the innocent man not only to do evil to no one, but also to restrain from sin or to punish sin, so that either the one punished may be corrected by experience or others deterred by example. Since, then, a man's house ought to be the beginning or a small part of the city, and every beginning is referred to some end of its own kind and every part to the integrity of the whole of which it is a part, it is plain enough that domestic peace is to be referred to civic peace, that is, that the ordered concord of those who live together in commanding and obeying is to be referred to the ordered concord of citizens in commanding and obeying. So it comes about that the father of a family ought to take from the law of the city the precepts by which he so rules his house that it may be fitted to the peace of the city.

Chapter 17. From what source the heavenly society has peace with the earthly city, and from what source discord.

But the household of men who do not live by faith seeks earthly peace from the things and advantages of this temporal life; while the household of men who live by faith awaits the things promised as eternal in the future, and uses earthly and temporal things like a pilgrim, not so as to be captured by them and turned aside from where it is tending, towards God, but so as to be sustained by them in order more easily to bear, and not at all to increase, the burdens of the corruptible body, which weighs down the soul. Therefore the use of the things necessary for this mortal life is common to both kinds of men and both households; but the end of using them is proper to each and very different. So also the earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks earthly peace, and fixes in it the concord of citizens in commanding and obeying, so that there may be among them a certain agreement of human wills about the things that pertain to mortal life. But the heavenly city, or rather the part of it which is a pilgrim in this mortality and lives by faith, must also use this peace, until this mortality itself, for which such peace is necessary, passes away; and therefore, while it leads the life of its pilgrimage as a captive, as it were, in the earthly city, having already received the promise of redemption and the spiritual gift as a pledge, it does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city by which those things are administered which are suited to sustaining mortal life; so that, since mortality itself is common to both, concord may be preserved between both cities in the things that pertain to it.

But because the earthly city has had certain wise men of its own, whom the divine teaching rejects, who, either through their own conjecture or deceived by demons, believed that many gods were to be won over to human affairs, to whose different offices, in a way, different things were subject: to one the body, to another the mind; and in the body itself to one the head, to another the neck, and each of the other parts to each god; likewise in the mind to one natural ability, to another learning, to another anger, to another desire; and in the very things that belong to life, to one cattle, to another wheat, to another wine, to another oil, to another forests, to another money, to another navigation, to another wars and victories, to another marriages, to another childbirth and fertility, and to others other things; while the heavenly city knew that the one God alone was to be worshipped, and held with faithful piety that he alone was to be served with that service which in Greek is called latreia and is owed only to God: it came about that it could not have laws of religion in common with the earthly city, and because of these had to dissent from it and be a burden to those who thought differently, and to endure their anger and hatred and the assaults of persecution, except when at times it drove back the minds of its adversaries by the fear of its own numbers, and always by divine help.

This heavenly city, then, while it is a pilgrim on earth, calls out citizens from all nations and gathers a pilgrim society in all languages, not caring about whatever is different in the customs, laws, and institutions by which earthly peace is gained or kept, rescinding or destroying none of them, but rather preserving and following whatever, though different in different nations, is directed to one and the same end of earthly peace, provided it does not hinder the religion by which the one supreme and true God is taught to be worshipped. The heavenly city too, then, in this its pilgrimage uses earthly peace, and guards and seeks the agreement of human wills about the things that pertain to the mortal nature of men, as far as piety and religion allow, and refers that earthly peace to heavenly peace; which is truly peace, so that it alone should be held and called the peace of the rational creature, namely the most ordered and most harmonious fellowship of enjoying God and one another in God. When that is reached, life will not be mortal, but fully and certainly living; nor will the body be animal, which, while it is being corrupted, weighs down the soul, but spiritual, without any want, in every part subject to the will. This peace it has, while it is a pilgrim, in faith, and by this faith it lives justly, when it refers to the attainment of that peace whatever good actions it does towards God and neighbour; since the life of the city is certainly social.

Chapter 18. How different the doubt of the New Academy is from the steadfastness of the Christian faith.

As regards that distinction which Varro applied from the New Academics, to whom all things are uncertain, the city of God utterly detests such doubt as madness, having about the things which it grasps with mind and reason a knowledge which, though small because of the corruptible body, which weighs down the soul (since, as the apostle says, “we know in part”), is yet most certain; and it believes the senses in the evidence of each thing, which the mind uses through the body, since he is more wretchedly deceived who thinks they are never to be believed. It believes also the holy Scriptures, both old and new, which we call canonical, from which faith itself was conceived, by which the righteous lives; through which we walk without doubting as long as we are pilgrims away from the Lord. While this faith is safe and sure, we may doubt without just reproach about certain things which we have perceived neither by sense nor by reason, and which have not been made clear to us through canonical Scripture, nor come to our knowledge through witnesses whom it is absurd not to believe.

Chapter 19. On the dress and customs of the Christian people.

It does not matter at all to this city in what dress or manner of living anyone follows the faith by which one comes to God, if it is not contrary to the divine precepts; hence it does not compel even the philosophers themselves, when they become Christians, to change their dress or habits of diet, which do not hinder religion at all, but their false doctrines. Hence it does not care at all about that distinction which Varro applied from the Cynics, provided nothing is done shamefully and intemperately. As to those three kinds of life, the leisured, the active, and that composed of both, though anyone, with faith kept safe, can lead his life in any of them and come to the everlasting rewards, yet it matters what one holds by love of truth and what one spends in the duty of love. No one ought to be so leisured as not to think in his leisure of his neighbour's benefit, nor so active as not to seek the contemplation of God. In leisure what should delight him is not idle vacancy, but the searching out or the finding of truth, so that each may advance in it and not grudge another what he has found. In action, however, what is to be loved is not honour or power in this life, since all things are vanity under the sun, but the work itself which is done through that honour or power, if it is done rightly and usefully, that is, so as to serve that salvation of those under one's authority which is according to God; as we have already discussed above. For this reason the apostle says: “He who desires the office of bishop desires a good work.” He wished to explain what the episcopate is, because it is the name of a work, not of an honour. For it is a Greek word, derived from the fact that he who is set over those over whom he is set oversees them, that is, takes care of them; for skopos is attention; so episkopein, if we wish, we can say in Latin superintendere, “to oversee,” so that he may understand that he is not a bishop who loves to preside rather than to profit.

And so no one is forbidden the pursuit of knowing the truth, which belongs to praiseworthy leisure; but the higher place, without which a people cannot be ruled, even if it is held and administered as is fitting, is unfittingly sought. Therefore the love of truth seeks holy leisure; the necessity of love takes up just business. If no one imposes this burden, one should be free for perceiving and contemplating truth; but if it is imposed, it must be taken up because of the necessity of love; but not even so is the delight of truth to be altogether abandoned, lest that sweetness be withdrawn and this necessity overwhelm.

Chapter 20. That the fellow citizens of the saints are happy in hope in the time of this life.

Therefore, since the supreme good of the city of God is eternal and perfect peace, not that through which mortals pass by being born and dying, but that in which immortals remain, suffering nothing adverse at all, who is there who would deny that that life is most happy, or would not judge that this life which is lived here, however full it may be of the goods of mind and body and of external things, is in comparison with it most wretched? Yet whoever so holds it as to refer its use to the end of that life which he loves most ardently and hopes for most faithfully may not absurdly be called happy even now, by that hope rather than by this reality. But this reality without that hope is a false happiness and a great misery; for it does not use the true goods of the mind, since that is not true wisdom which, in the things which it prudently discerns, bravely does, temperately restrains, and justly distributes, does not direct its intention to that end where God will be all in all, in certain eternity and perfect peace.

Chapter 21. Whether, according to the definitions of Scipio in Cicero's dialogue, there was ever a Roman commonwealth.

Therefore this is now the place to set out, as briefly and clearly as I can, what I promised in the second book of this work to show: that, according to the definitions which Scipio uses in Cicero's books On the Commonwealth, there never was a Roman commonwealth. For he briefly defines a commonwealth as “the affair of a people.” If this definition is true, there never was a Roman commonwealth, because it was never the affair of a people, which he wished to be the definition of a commonwealth. For he defined a people as “an assembly of a multitude associated by agreement about right and by community of interest.” What he means by agreement about right he explains in the discussion, showing by it that a commonwealth cannot be carried on without justice; where, then, there is no true justice, neither can there be right. For what is done by right is surely done justly; but what is done unjustly cannot be done by right. For the unjust institutions of men are not to be called or thought rights, since they themselves say that that is right which has flowed from the fountain of justice, and that what some who think wrongly are wont to say, that that is right which is useful to him who is more powerful, is false. Therefore, where there is no true justice, there cannot be an assembly of men associated by agreement about right, and therefore not a people according to that definition of Scipio or Cicero; and if not a people, then not the affair of a people, but of some sort of multitude which is not worthy of the name of a people. And so, if a commonwealth is the affair of a people, and there is no people which is not associated by agreement about right, and there is no right where there is no justice, it is without doubt concluded that where there is no justice there is no commonwealth.

Justice, moreover, is that virtue which gives to each his own. What kind of justice of man is it, then, which takes man himself away from the true God and subjects him to unclean demons? Is this to give to each his own? Or is he unjust who takes away a farm from the man who bought it and hands it over to one who has no right to it, and is he just who takes himself away from the ruling God by whom he was made and serves malignant spirits? Certainly in those same books On the Commonwealth there is a very keen and very strong argument for justice against injustice. And since, when earlier the case was argued on the side of injustice against justice, and it was said that a commonwealth could not stand and grow except through injustice, this had been set down as the strongest point, that it is unjust that men should serve men who rule them, which injustice nevertheless an imperial city, whose commonwealth is great, must follow, or else it cannot rule provinces: it was answered on the side of justice that it is just for this reason, that slavery is useful for such men, and is done for their benefit when it is done rightly, that is, when licence for wrongdoing is taken away from the wicked, and they will be better off when subdued because they were worse off when not subdued; and to confirm this reasoning a noble example was added, as though taken from nature, and it was said: “Why, then, does God rule man, the mind the body, reason lust and the other vicious parts of the mind?” Plainly by this example it is taught clearly enough that slavery is useful for some, and that to serve God is useful for all. And the mind that serves God rightly rules the body, and in the mind itself reason, subject to God the Lord, rightly rules lust and the other vices. Therefore, where man does not serve God, what justice is to be thought to be in him? Since the mind that does not serve God can in no way justly rule the body, nor human reason the vices. And if there is no justice in such a man, without doubt neither is there in an assembly of men which consists of such men. Here, then, there is not that agreement about right which makes a multitude of men a people, whose affair is said to be a commonwealth.

For what shall I say of interest, by community of which too an assembly of men is called a people, as that definition has it? For though, if you attend carefully, there is no interest at all for those who live ungodly, as everyone lives who does not serve God but serves demons, who are the more ungodly the more they wish, though they are most unclean spirits, that sacrifice should be offered to them as to gods: yet what we have said of agreement about right is, I think, enough to make it plain that by this definition there is no people, whose affair can be said to be a commonwealth, in which there is no justice. For if they say that the Romans in their commonwealth served not unclean spirits but good and holy gods, must the same things be repeated so often which we have already said enough, indeed more than enough? For who has come through the earlier books of this work to this place who can still doubt that the Romans served evil and impure demons, unless he is either too stupid or most shamelessly contentious? But, to say nothing of what sort those were whom they worshipped with sacrifices, in the law of the true God it is written: “He who sacrifices to gods shall be rooted out, except to the Lord only.” So he who gave this command with so great a threat wished sacrifice to be offered neither to good nor to bad gods.

Chapter 22. Whether the God whom the Christians serve is the true God, to whom alone sacrifice ought to be offered.

But it may be answered: “Who is this God, or from what is he proved worthy, that the Romans ought to have obeyed him so as to worship none of the gods with sacrifices except him?” It is great blindness still to ask who this God is. He is the God whose prophets foretold these things which we see. He is the God from whom Abraham received the answer: “In your seed all nations shall be blessed.” That this is done in Christ, who according to the flesh sprang from that seed, even those very enemies of this name who have remained acknowledge, whether they will or not. He is the God whose divine Spirit spoke through those whose predictions, fulfilled through the church which we see spread over the whole world, I have set down in the preceding books. He is the God whom Varro, the most learned of the Romans, thinks to be Jupiter, though not knowing what he says; which I have thought worth mentioning because a man of such great knowledge could not think this God either nothing or worthless. For he believed him to be the one whom he thought the supreme god. Finally, he is the God whom Porphyry, the most learned of the philosophers, though the fiercest enemy of the Christians, confesses to be a great God, even through the oracles of those whom he thinks gods.