On Free Choice of the Will 2.7–2.10

A. I will. But first I ask whether my bodily sense is the same as yours, or whether mine is only mine and yours only yours; if it were not so, I could not see anything with my eyes that you did not see. E. I fully grant that, though they are of the same kind, we each have our own senses, of seeing or hearing or any of the others. For a person can not only see but also hear what another does not hear, and perceive by any other sense something that another does not perceive. Hence it is evident that your sense is only yours and mine only mine. A. Will you give the same answer about that inner sense too, or a different one? E. No different one, surely. For my inner sense perceives my sense, and yours perceives yours. That is why I am often asked by someone who sees something whether I see it too: because it is I who perceive that I see or do not see, not the one who asks. A. Well, does not each of us have his own reason? For it can happen that I understand something when you do not understand it, and you cannot know whether I understand, while I know. E. It is evident that each of us has his own rational mind. A. Can you also say that each of us has his own suns that we see, or moons, or morning stars, or other such things, although each sees them with his own sense? E. In no way would I say that. A. So many of us can see one thing at once, although each of us has his own senses, by all of which we perceive that one thing which we see at once; so that although my sense is one and yours another, it can still be that what we see is not one thing that is mine and another that is yours, but that one thing is present to each of us and is seen by both at once. E. That is most evident. A. We can also hear one voice at once, so that, although my hearing is one and yours another, the voice that we hear at once is not one voice that is mine and another that is yours, nor is one part of it caught by my hearing and another by yours, but whatever has sounded is present whole and one, to be heard by both at once. E. That too is evident. A. Now you may also notice about the other senses of the body what we are saying: that, as regards this matter, they are neither entirely like those two of the eyes and ears, nor entirely unlike them. For you and I can fill our breath from one air and perceive the quality of that air by smell; and likewise we can both taste from one honey, or any other food or drink, and perceive its quality by taste, although it is one while our senses are each our own, yours to you and mine to me. So, when we both perceive one odor or one flavor, you do not perceive it with my sense, nor I with yours, nor with any one sense that could be common to us both; my sense is wholly mine and yours yours, even if one odor or flavor is perceived by both. In this respect these senses are found to have something like those two, sight and hearing; but they are unlike in this, as regards what we are now dealing with, that although we both draw one air through our nostrils, or take one food in tasting, yet I do not draw the same part of the air as you, nor take the same part of the food as you, but I take one part and you another. So when I breathe, I draw from the whole air the part that is enough for me, and you likewise draw from the whole another part, as much as is enough for you. And although one whole food is consumed by both, it cannot be consumed whole by me and whole by you, in the way that I hear a whole word and you hear the whole at the same time, and see any appearance just as large as I see it at the same time. With food or drink, one part must pass into me and another into you. Or do you not understand this well enough? E. On the contrary, I agree that it is most plain and certain. A. Do you think the sense of touch is to be compared with the senses of the eyes and ears in the matter now in question, since we can both perceive by touching not only one body, but you can also touch the same part that I have touched, so that we can both perceive by touch not only the same body but also the same part of the body? For it is not with touching as with some food set before us, which you and I cannot each take whole when we both eat it; one whole thing that I have touched you can touch too, so that we both touch it, not each a separate part, but each the whole. E. I admit that in this way the sense of touch is very like those two earlier senses; but I see that it is unlike them in this, that we can both see and hear one whole thing at once, that is, at the same time, whereas we can both touch some whole thing at the same time only with separate parts, and the same part only at separate times. For I cannot bring my touch to any part that you are holding by touch unless you have taken yours away. A. You have answered most alertly. But you must also see this. Of all the things that we perceive, some we perceive both together and others each alone, while our senses themselves each of us perceives as his own, so that I do not perceive your sense nor you mine. Of the things perceived by us through the senses of the body, that is, of bodily things, the only thing that we cannot both perceive, but only each alone, is what so becomes ours that we can turn it into ourselves and change it, as food and drink are; no part of which that I have taken in can you take in as well. For even if nurses give chewed food back to infants, what the taste has seized from it and changed into the body of the one chewing can in no way be called back to be poured out again as the infant's food. When the palate enjoys some flavor, it claims for itself a part, small but irrecoverable, and makes it become what suits the nature of the body; if this were not so, no flavor would remain in the mouth after the chewed food had been given back and spat out. The same can rightly be said of the parts of the air that we draw through our nostrils. Even if you can breathe some air that I have breathed out, you cannot also breathe that part of it which has gone into my nourishment, because it cannot be given back. For physicians teach that we take nourishment even through the nostrils; and this nourishment I alone can perceive by breathing in, and cannot restore by breathing out so that it may be perceived also by you when you draw it in. As for the other sensible things, which we perceive without changing them by perceiving, corrupting them into our body, we can both perceive them, either at one time or at separate times in turn, so that either the whole or the very part that I perceive is perceived by you too; such are light, or sound, or bodies that we touch without damaging them. E. I understand. A. It is evident, then, that the things which we do not change and yet perceive by the senses of the body do not belong to the nature of our senses, and are therefore more common to us, because they are not turned and changed into what is our own and, as it were, private. E. I fully agree. A. So by “one's own” and, as it were, private, we must understand what belongs to each of us alone, which he alone perceives in himself, and which belongs properly to his own nature; by “common” and, as it were, public, what is perceived by all who perceive it without any corruption or change of itself. E. So it is.

A. Come now, pay attention, and tell me whether anything can be found that all who reason see in common, each with his own reason and mind; something such that what is seen is present to all, and is not changed for the use of those to whom it is present, as food or drink is, but remains uncorrupted and whole whether they see it or not. Or do you perhaps think there is nothing of this kind? E. On the contrary, I see there are many such things, of which it is enough to mention one: the rule and truth of number is present to all who reason, so that every calculator tries to grasp it, each with his own reason and understanding. One can do it more easily, another with more difficulty, another not at all, though it offers itself equally to all who are able to take it in. When anyone perceives it, it is not turned and changed into a kind of nourishment for the one who perceives it; and when anyone is mistaken about it, it does not fail, but while it remains true and whole, he is the more in error the less he sees it. A. Quite right. I see that, as one not unfamiliar with these matters, you have quickly found what to say. Yet if someone told you that these numbers were impressed on our mind not from some nature of their own but from the things that we touch by the bodily sense, as images, so to speak, of visible things, what would you answer? Or do you think so too? E. I would in no way think so. For even if I perceived numbers by the bodily sense, I could not therefore also perceive by the bodily sense the rule of dividing or joining numbers. It is by this light of the mind that I refute anyone who, in calculating, reports a false total, whether in adding or in subtracting. And whatever I touch by the bodily sense, such as this sky and this earth and whatever other bodies I perceive in them, I do not know how long it will last; but seven and three are ten, and not only now but always; and there has never been a time when seven and three were not ten, nor will there ever be a time when seven and three are not ten. So I have said that this incorruptible truth of number is common to me and to anyone who reasons. A. I do not resist you, since your answer is most true and certain. But you will easily see that numbers themselves too were not drawn in through the senses of the body, if you consider that any number is called by as many units as it contains. For example, if it contains one twice, it is called two; if three times, three; and if they contain one ten times, then they are called ten; and absolutely any number has its name from the number of times it contains one, and is called so many. But whoever thinks most truly about one surely finds that it cannot be perceived by the senses of the body. For whatever is touched by such a sense is shown to be not one but many; for it is a body, and therefore has countless parts. Not to pursue the tiny and less distinct parts, however small that little body may be, it certainly has one part on the right and another on the left, one above and another below, one farther and another nearer, or parts at the ends and a part in the middle; for we must admit that these are present in any body, however small its measure. And so we grant that no body is truly and purely one; yet so many things could not be counted in it unless they were distinguished by knowledge of that one. For when I look for one in a body and have no doubt that I do not find it, I certainly know what I am looking for there and what I do not find, and that it cannot be found there, or rather that it is not there at all. So where I know that a body is not one, I know what one is; for if I did not know one, I could not count many in a body. And wherever I know one, I surely do not know it through the sense of the body; for through the sense of the body I know only body, which we have shown is not truly and purely one. Further, if we have not perceived one by the sense of the body, we have perceived no number by that sense, at least of those numbers that we discern by understanding. For there is none of them that is not called by as many units as it contains, and one is not perceived by the sense of the body. The half of any little body, of which two make up the whole, itself has its own half. So those two parts are in the body in such a way that they are not simply two. But the number called two contains twice that which is simply one; and its half, that is, that very thing which is simply one, cannot in turn have a half or a third or any fraction, since it is simple and truly one. Then, keeping the order of numbers, we see two after one, and this number, compared with one, is found to be double. The double of two is not added next, but with three in between, four follows, which is the double of two. And this rule extends through all the other numbers by a most certain and unchangeable law: after one, that is, after the first of all numbers, leaving itself aside, the first number is the one that is its double, for two follows. After the second, that is, after two, leaving itself aside, the second is the one that is its double; for after two the first is three, the second four, the double of the second. After the third, that is, three, leaving itself aside, the third is its double; for after the third, that is, after three, the first is four, the second five, the third six, which is double the third. And so after the fourth, leaving itself aside, the fourth is its double; for after the fourth, that is, four, the first is five, the second six, the third seven, the fourth eight, which is double the fourth. And so through all the rest you will find what was found in the first pair of numbers, one and two: that whatever place a number has from the very beginning, the number that same distance after it is its double. This, then, which we see to be unmoved, firm, and incorrupt through all numbers: from where do we see it? For no one touches all numbers by any sense of the body, since they are innumerable. How, then, do we know that this holds through all of them? By what image or phantasm is so certain a truth of number seen so confidently through innumerable instances, unless it is seen in an inner light of which the bodily sense knows nothing? By these and many such proofs, those to whom God has given ability in argument, and whom obstinacy does not cover with darkness, are compelled to confess that the rule and truth of numbers does not belong to the senses of the body, that it stands unchangeable and pure, and that it is common to all who reason, for them to see. Therefore, although many other things could occur to one that are present in common and, as it were, publicly to those who reason, and are seen by them with the mind and reason of each one who discerns them, while remaining inviolate and unchangeable, I am not displeased that this rule and truth of number occurred to you above all when you wanted to answer what I had asked. For not in vain is number joined to wisdom in the holy books, where it is said: “I went round, I and my heart, to know and to consider and to seek wisdom and number.”

But, I ask you, what do you think we should judge about wisdom itself? Do you think that each human being has his own wisdom? Or is one wisdom present in common to all, so that the more anyone shares in it, the wiser he is? E. I do not yet know what wisdom you mean; for I see that people hold different views about what is done or said wisely. Those who serve as soldiers think they act wisely; those who despise military service and spend their care and effort on farming praise this rather and attribute it to wisdom; those who are clever at devising ways of getting money think themselves wise; those who neglect or reject all these and all such temporal things, and give their whole effort to searching out the truth, so as to know themselves and God, judge this to be the great gift of wisdom; those who do not want to give themselves to this leisure of seeking and contemplating truth, but rather busy themselves with most laborious cares and duties in order to look after people, and are occupied in the work of justly managing and governing human affairs, think that they are wise; and those who do both, and live partly in the contemplation of truth and partly in the dutiful labors that they think are owed to human society, think that they hold the palm of wisdom. I leave aside countless sects, none of which does not prefer its own followers to the rest and want them alone to be wise. So, since what we are now doing is answering not what we believe but what we hold by clear understanding, I can in no way answer what you have asked unless, besides holding it by belief, I also come to know by contemplating and discerning with reason what wisdom itself is. A. Do you think that wisdom is anything other than the truth in which the highest good is discerned and held? For all those you mentioned, pursuing different things, seek good and flee evil; but they pursue different things because one thing seems good to some and another to others. Whoever, then, seeks what he should not have sought, even though he would not seek it unless it seemed good to him, nevertheless errs. But neither he who seeks nothing nor he who seeks what he ought to seek can err. Insofar, then, as all people seek the happy life, they do not err. But insofar as anyone does not keep to that way of life which leads to happiness, though he admits and professes that he wants nothing but to arrive at happiness, to that extent he errs. For error is when we follow something that does not lead to where we want to arrive. And the more anyone errs in the way of life, the less wise he is; for he is so much farther from the truth in which the highest good is discerned and held. When the highest good has been reached and attained, each becomes happy, which we all, beyond dispute, want. So, as it is agreed that we want to be happy, so it is agreed that we want to be wise; for no one is happy without wisdom. For no one is happy except by the highest good, which is discerned and held in that truth which we call wisdom. So, just as before we are happy the notion of happiness is nevertheless impressed on our minds (for through it we know, and say confidently and without any doubt, that we want to be happy), so also, before we are wise, we have the notion of wisdom impressed on our mind, through which each of us, if asked whether he wants to be wise, answers without any shadow of doubt that he does. So if it is now agreed between us what wisdom is (which perhaps you could not explain in words; for if you did not in any way discern it in your mind, you would in no way know both that you want to be wise and that you ought to want it, which I do not think you will deny), I want you to tell me now whether you think that wisdom too, like the rule and truth of number, offers itself in common to all who reason; or whether, since there are as many human minds as there are human beings, so that I discern nothing of your mind nor you of mine, you think there are also as many wisdoms as there can be wise men. E. If the highest good is one for all, the truth in which it is discerned and held, that is, wisdom, must also be one and common to all. A. But do you doubt that the highest good, whatever it is, is one for all human beings? E. I do doubt it, because I see different people rejoicing in different things as their highest goods. A. I wish that no one doubted about the highest good, just as no one doubts that, whatever it is, a human being can become happy only by attaining it. But since it is a great question and perhaps needs a long discussion, let us suppose that there are altogether as many highest goods as there are different things sought by different people as highest goods. Does it follow that wisdom itself is not one and common to all, because the goods that people discern and choose in it are many and different? If you think so, you can also doubt that the light of the sun is one, because the things we see in it are many and different. From these many things each chooses at will what to enjoy through the sense of the eyes: one gladly gazes at the height of some mountain and rejoices in that sight; another at the flatness of a plain, another at the hollows of valleys, another at the green of woods, another at the moving level of the sea; another brings all these, or some of them, together for the delight of seeing. So, just as these things which people see in the light of the sun and choose to enjoy are many and different, and yet the light itself is one, in which the gaze of each beholder sees and holds what it enjoys; so, even if there are many and different goods, from which each chooses what he wants, and, seeing and holding it for enjoyment, rightly and truly makes it his highest good, it can still be that the very light of wisdom, in which these things can be seen and held, is one and common to all the wise. E. I admit that it can be, and that nothing prevents one wisdom from being common to all, even if there are many and different highest goods; but I would like to know whether it is so. For when we grant that it can be so, we do not at once grant that it is so. A. We hold meanwhile that wisdom exists; but whether it is one and common to all, or each wise man has his own, as he has his own soul or mind, we do not yet hold. E. So it is.

A. Well, this that we hold, that wisdom or wise men exist and that all people want to be happy: where do we see it? For I would in no way doubt that you see this and that it is true. Do you see this truth as you see your own thought, of which I know nothing unless you tell me? Or do you see it so that you understand that this truth can be seen by me too, even if you do not tell it to me? E. Rather so that I do not doubt that it can be seen by you too, even against my will. A. Then the one truth that we both see, each with his own mind, is it not common to both of us? E. Most evidently. A. Likewise, I believe you do not deny that one should pursue wisdom, and you grant that this is true. E. I have no doubt at all. A. Can we deny, likewise, that this truth is one and is common to all who know it, for them to see, although each beholds it not with my mind or yours or anyone else's but with his own, since what is beheld is present in common to all who behold it? E. In no way. A. Likewise, that one should live justly, that worse things should be subjected to better, that equals should be compared with equals, and that to each his own should be given: will you not admit that this is most true, and present in common to me as to you and to all who see it? E. I agree. A. Can you deny that the incorrupt is better than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal, the inviolable than the violable? E. Who can? A. Can anyone, then, call this truth his own, when it is present, unchangeably, to be contemplated by all who are able to contemplate it? E. No one would truly say that it is his own, since it is as much one and common to all as it is true. A. Likewise, who denies that the mind should be turned away from corruption and turned toward incorruption, that is, that not corruption but incorruption should be loved? Or who, admitting that this is true, does not also understand that it is unchangeable, and see that it is present in common to all minds able to behold it? E. Most true. A. Well, will anyone doubt that the life which no adversities move from a sure and honorable resolve is better than one that is easily broken and overturned by temporal troubles? E. Who would doubt it? A. I will not ask more of this kind now. It is enough that you see with me, and grant as most certain, that these, as rules and certain lights of the virtues, are true and unchangeable, and that, singly or all together, they are present in common to be contemplated by those who are able to behold them, each with his own reason and mind. But I do ask whether these seem to you to belong to wisdom. For I believe you think that one who has attained wisdom is wise. E. I certainly do. A. Well, could one who lives justly live so unless he saw which lower things to subject to which better ones, which equals to join with one another, and which things to distribute as their own to each? E. He could not. A. Will you deny, then, that one who sees these things sees wisely? E. I do not deny it. A. Well, does not one who lives prudently choose incorruption and decide that it is to be preferred to corruption? E. Most evidently. A. When, then, he chooses that to which to turn his mind, which no one doubts should be chosen, can it be denied that he chooses wisely? E. I would in no way deny it. A. When, then, he turns his mind to what he wisely chooses, he surely turns it wisely. E. Most certainly. A. And one who is driven by no terrors or penalties from what he wisely chooses and to which he wisely turns himself acts wisely beyond doubt. E. Absolutely beyond doubt. A. It is most evident, then, that all these, which we have called rules and lights of the virtues, belong to wisdom; since the more anyone uses them in leading his life, and leads his life according to them, the more wisely he lives and acts; and nothing that is done wisely can rightly be said to be separated from wisdom. E. That is altogether so. A. As true and unchangeable, then, as are the rules of numbers, whose rule and truth, you said, are present unchangeably and in common to all who discern it, so true and unchangeable are the rules of wisdom. A few of these you were asked about just now, one by one, and you answered that they are true and evident, and you grant that they are present in common to be contemplated by all who are able to behold them.