The Teacher 5–7

A. You have paid good attention: now see whether signs are found that signify each other, so that as this is signified by that, so that is signified by this. For this four-syllable word, when we say “conjunction,” and the things signified by it, when we say “if,” “or,” “for,” “for indeed,” “unless,” “therefore,” “since,” and the like, are not so related to each other; for these are signified by that one word, but that one four-syllable word is signified by none of them. Ad. I see, and I want to know which signs signify each other. A. Do you not know, then, that when we say “name and word,” we say two words? Ad. I know. A. Well, do you not know that when we say “name and word,” we say two names? Ad. I know that too. A. So you know that “name” is signified by “word” just as “word” is signified by “name.” Ad. I agree. A. Can you say how they differ from each other, apart from the fact that they are written and sound differently? Ad. Perhaps I can; for I see that it is what I said a little while ago. For when we say “words,” we signify everything uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning; so every name, and the very word “name” when we say it, is a word: but not every word is a name, although “word” is a name when we say it. A. What if someone affirmed and proved to you that, as every name is a word, so every word is a name? Could you find how they differ, apart from the different sound of their letters? Ad. I could not, and I think they do not differ at all. A. What if all things uttered by an articulate voice with some meaning are both words and names, yet they are words for one reason and names for another? Will there be no difference between name and word? Ad. I do not understand how that could be. A. You understand this at least: that everything colored is visible and everything visible is colored, although these two words signify distinctly and differently. Ad. I understand. A. What if, then, in the same way every word is a name and every name a word, although these two names, or two words, that is, “name” and “word,” have different meanings? Ad. Now I see that this can happen; but I wait for you to show how it happens. A. You notice, I think, that everything that bursts forth with some meaning from an articulate voice both strikes the ear, so that it can be perceived, and is committed to memory, so that it can be known. Ad. I notice it. A. So two things happen when we utter something with such a voice. Ad. That is so. A. What if words (verba) are named from one of these two and names (nomina) from the other: words from striking (verberare), names from knowing (noscere), so that the first has deserved its name from the ears, the second from the mind? Ad. I will grant it when you have shown how we can rightly call all words names. A. That is easy: for I believe you have learned and remember that a pronoun is so called because it stands for a name itself, though it denotes a thing with a less full meaning than the name. For, I think, the man whose lessons you recited to your grammar teacher defined it thus: “A pronoun is a part of speech which, put in place of a name itself, signifies the same thing, though less fully.” Ad. I remember and approve. A. You see, then, that according to this definition pronouns serve only names and can be put in place of them alone, as when we say “this man,” “the king himself,” “the same woman,” “this gold,” “that silver”: “this,” “himself,” “the same,” “this,” “that” are pronouns; “man,” “king,” “woman,” “gold,” “silver” are names, by which the things are signified more fully than by those pronouns. Ad. I see and agree. A. Now, then, say a few conjunctions for me, any you like. Ad. And, and (-que), but, and also. A. All these that you have said, do they not seem to you to be names? Ad. Not at all. A. Did I at least seem to you to speak correctly when I said, “All these that you have said”? Ad. Quite correctly; and now I understand how wonderfully you have shown that I uttered names: for otherwise it could not rightly have been said of them, “all these.” But I am still afraid that you seemed to me to speak correctly because I do not deny that these four conjunctions are also words; so that it could rightly be said of them, “all these,” because it is rightly said, “all these words.” But if you ask me what part of speech “words” is, I will answer nothing but “a name.” So perhaps the pronoun was joined to this name, so that your expression was correct. A. You are acutely mistaken; but so that you may stop being mistaken, attend more acutely to what I say, if only I can say it as I wish: for to deal with words by words is as entangled as to interlace and rub fingers with fingers, where it is hard for anyone but the one doing it to tell which fingers itch and which help the itching ones. Ad. Look, I am here with all my mind, for this comparison has made me most attentive. A. Words certainly consist of sound and letters. Ad. That is so. A. So, to use above all the authority that is dearest to us, when the apostle Paul says, “In Christ there was not Is and Is not, but Is was in him,” we must not think, I believe, that those three letters which we pronounce when we say est (“is”) were in Christ, but rather what is signified by those three letters. Ad. You are right. A. You understand, then, that he who said, “Is was in him,” said nothing else than, “What was in him is called Is”; just as, if he had said, “Virtue was in him,” he would surely be taken to have said nothing else than, “What was in him is called virtue”; lest we should think that those two syllables we pronounce when we say virtus, and not what is signified by those two syllables, were in him. Ad. I understand and follow. A. Well, do you not also understand that it makes no difference whether someone says, “It is called virtue,” or “It is named virtue”? Ad. That is plain. A. So it is equally plain that it makes no difference whether one says that what was in him “is called Is” or “is named Is.” Ad. I see that here too there is no difference. A. Do you now see what I want to show? Ad. Not yet, really. A. Do you not see that a name is that by which some thing is named? Ad. I see nothing more certain than this. A. So you see that “is” is a name, since what was in him is named “Is.” Ad. I cannot deny it. A. But if I asked you what part of speech “is” is, you would say, I think, not a name but a verb, though reason has shown that it is also a name. Ad. It is exactly as you say. A. Do you still doubt that the other parts of speech too are names in the same way that we have shown? Ad. I do not doubt it, since I admit that they signify something. But if you ask what each of the things they signify is called, that is, named, I can answer only with those very parts of speech which we do not call names, but, as I see, are proved bound to call them. A. Are you not troubled lest someone arise who might shake our reasoning by saying that authority must be ascribed to the Apostle in matters, not in words; and that therefore the foundation of this conviction is not as firm as we think? For it may be that Paul, although he lived and taught most rightly, yet spoke less correctly when he said, “Is was in him”; especially since he himself admits that he is unskilled in speech. How do you think he should be refuted? Ad. I have nothing to say against it, and I beg you to find someone among those to whom the highest knowledge of words is granted, by whose authority you may rather accomplish what you want. A. Does reason itself, apart from authorities, seem to you less adequate, by which it is shown that something is signified by all the parts of speech, and that they are called by it; and if called, then named; and if named, then named by a name? And this is very easily judged in different languages. For who does not see that if you ask what the Greeks name what we name quis, the answer is τίς; what the Greeks name what we name volo, the answer is θέλω; what the Greeks name what we name bene, the answer is καλῶς; what the Greeks name what we name scriptum, the answer is τὸ γεγραμμένον; what the Greeks name what we name et, the answer is καί; what the Greeks name what we name ab, the answer is ἀπό; what the Greeks name what we name heu, the answer is οἴ; and that in all these parts of speech I have just listed, the one who asks in this way speaks correctly, which could not be unless they were names? Since, then, by this reasoning we can establish that the apostle Paul spoke correctly, apart from the authority of all the eloquent, what need is there to look for someone in whose person our view may be supported?

But lest someone slower or more impudent should not yet yield, and should assert that he will by no means yield except to those authors to whom the laws of words are granted by common consent: what can be found more excellent in the Latin language than Cicero? Yet in his most famous speeches, which are called the Verrines, he called coram, a preposition, or in that place perhaps an adverb, a name. However, since it may be that I understand that passage less well, and it may be explained otherwise by me or by someone else, there is something to which I think no answer can be made. For the most distinguished masters of logic teach that a complete sentence, which can be affirmed or denied, consists of a name and a verb, a kind of sentence which the same Tullius somewhere calls a “proposition”; and they say that when the verb is in the third person, the name with it must be in the nominative case; and they are right. If you consider this with me, as when we say, “The man sits,” “The horse runs,” you recognize, I think, that these are two propositions. Ad. I recognize it. A. You see that in each there is one name, in one “man,” in the other “horse”; and one verb each, in one “sits,” in the other “runs”? Ad. I see. A. So if I said only “sits” or only “runs,” you would rightly ask me “who” or “what,” so that I might answer “the man,” or “the horse,” or “the animal,” or anything else by which a name given to the verb may complete the proposition, that is, the sentence that can be affirmed and denied. Ad. I understand. A. Attend to the rest, and suppose that we see something rather far off and are uncertain whether it is an animal or a stone or something else, and I say to you, “Because it is a man, it is an animal”: would I not speak rashly? Ad. Rashly indeed; but you would plainly not speak rashly if you said, “If it is a man, it is an animal.” A. You are right. So in your statement “if” pleases me, and it pleases you too; but in mine “because” displeases us both. Ad. I agree. A. Now see whether these two sentences are complete propositions: “If pleases,” “Because displeases.” Ad. Quite complete. A. Come, now tell me which are the verbs there, which the names. Ad. I see that the verbs there are “pleases” and “displeases”; and what are the names but “if” and “because”? A. So it has been sufficiently proved that these two conjunctions are also names. Ad. Quite sufficiently. A. Can you yourself show the same thing, by the same rule, for the other parts of speech? Ad. I can.

A. Let us pass on, then, and now tell me whether, just as we found that all words are names and all names words, so all names seem to you to be terms (vocabula) and all terms names. Ad. I plainly see no difference between them except the different sound of their syllables. A. Nor do I resist for the moment, although there are some who distinguish them in meaning too, whose view we need not consider now. But surely you notice that we have now come to those signs which signify each other with no difference but sound, and which signify themselves along with all the other parts of speech. Ad. I do not understand. A. Do you not understand, then, that “name” is signified by “term” and “term” by “name,” and in such a way that there is no difference but the sound of the letters, as far as the general sense of “name” is concerned: for we also speak of “name” in the special sense in which it is among the eight parts of speech so as not to include the other seven. Ad. I understand. A. But this is what I said: that “term” and “name” signify each other. Ad. I grasp that, but I ask what you meant by “since they also signify themselves along with the other parts of speech.” A. Did not the earlier reasoning teach us that all parts of speech can be called both names and terms, that is, can be signified both by “name” and by “term”? Ad. That is so. A. Well, if I asked you what you call “name” itself, that is, this sound expressed in two syllables, would you not rightly answer me, “a name”? Ad. Rightly. A. Does the sign we pronounce in four syllables when we say “conjunction” signify itself in this way? For this name cannot be counted among the things it signifies. Ad. I take that rightly. A. That is what was meant by saying that “name” signifies itself along with the other things it signifies; and you may understand the same of “term” by yourself. Ad. Now it is easy: but it now occurs to me that “name” is used both in a general and in a special sense, while “term” is not counted among the eight parts of speech: so I think they differ in this too, besides the different sound. A. Well, do you think nomen and ὄνομα differ in anything except the sound, by which the Latin and Greek languages too are distinguished? Ad. Here indeed I understand nothing else. A. So we have come to those signs which both signify themselves, and are signified each by the other, and whatever is signified by one is signified by the other, and which differ in nothing but sound: for we have just found this fourth kind; the three earlier ones are understood of both “name” and “word.” Ad. We have quite come to it.

A. Now I would like you to review what we have found in our conversation. Ad. I will do it as well as I can. For first of all I remember that we inquired for some time why we speak, and found that we speak in order to teach or to remind, since even when we ask questions we do nothing but let the person asked learn what we want to hear; and in singing, which we seem to do for delight, it is not proper to speech; in praying to God, whom we cannot think is taught or reminded, words serve either to remind ourselves or so that others may be reminded or taught through us. Then, when it was well established that words are nothing but signs, and that things which do not signify something cannot be signs, you proposed a line, the meaning of whose single words I was to try to show; it was: “If it pleases the gods that nothing be left of so great a city.” Its second word, though very well known and very plain, we could not find what it signified. And when it seemed to me that we do not insert it in speaking in vain, but in order to teach the hearer something by it, perhaps the very state of the mind when it finds, or thinks it has found, that the thing it seeks does not exist, is indicated by this word; you indeed answered, but, avoiding by a joke some depth or other of the question, you put off its explanation to another time: and do not think I have forgotten that you owe me this. Then, when I was busy explaining the third word in the line, I was pressed by you to show, not another word of the same force, but rather the very thing signified by the words. And when I had said that this could not be done while we were conversing, we came to the things that are pointed out with the finger to those who ask. I thought these were all bodily things, but we found they were only visible things. From there somehow we came to the deaf and to actors, who signify by gesture without voice not only things that can be seen but many others besides, almost all that we speak of; yet we found that those gestures are signs. Then again we began to ask how we could show the very things that are signified by signs without any signs, since that wall, and color, and everything visible that is shown by pointing the finger, was proved to be shown by a sign. Here, going astray, I said that nothing of the kind could be found; at last we agreed that those things can be shown without a sign which we are not doing when we are asked about them and can do after the inquiry; yet speech is not of that kind: for it was clear enough that even when we are asked while speaking what speech is, it is easy to show it by itself.

From this we were reminded that either signs are shown by signs, or other things that are not signs are shown by signs, or even, without a sign, things we can do after being asked; and of these three we undertook to consider and discuss the first more carefully. By this discussion it was made clear that there are some signs which cannot in turn be signified by the signs they signify, such as this four-syllable word when we say “conjunction”; and some which can, as when we say “sign” we also signify “word,” and when we say “word” we also signify “sign”; for “sign” and “word” are both two signs and two words. In this class, in which signs signify each other, it was shown that some are not equal in force, some equal in force, and some even the same in meaning. For this two-syllable word that sounds when we say “sign” signifies absolutely everything by which anything is signified; but when we say “word,” it is not a sign of all signs, but only of those uttered by an articulate voice. From this it is plain that, although “word” is signified by “sign” and “sign” by “word,” that is, these two syllables by those and those by these, yet “sign” extends further than “word,” that is, these two syllables signify more things than those. But the general “word” and the general “name” are equal in force. For reason taught that all parts of speech are also names, since pronouns can be added to them, and it can be said of all that they name something, and there is none of them which, with a verb added, cannot complete a proposition. But although “name” and “word” are equal in force, because all things that are words are also names, they do not mean the same thing. For it was argued quite plausibly that they are called words for one reason and names for another. Since it was found that one of them is meant to mark the striking of the ear, the other the reminding of the mind, this can be understood even from the fact that in speaking we say very correctly, “What is the name of this thing?” when we want to commit the thing to memory, but we do not usually say, “What is the word for this thing?” And we found that the signs which signify not only an equal range but altogether the same thing, between which there is no difference but the sound of the letters, are nomen and ὄνομα. I had quite forgotten that in this class, in which signs signify each other, we found no sign that does not also signify itself among the other things it signifies. This is what I could remember. Now you will judge, since I think you have said nothing in this conversation except with knowledge and certainty, whether I have set these things out well and in order.