On the Catholic Way of Life and On the Manichaean Way of Life 1.1–1.11
Latin text: Migne, PL 32 (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0). Compare: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 4 (1887).
Chapter 1
1.1PL 32:1310–1311
In aliis libris satis opinor egisse nos quemadmodum Manielneorum invectionibus, quibus in Legem, quod Velus Testamentum vocatur, imperite atque im pie feruntur, seseque inter imperitorum plausus, inani jactatione ventilant, possimus occurrere: quod breviter ctiam hic commemorari a me pote. Quis enim mediocriter sanus non facile intelligat, Scriptu rarum expositionem ab iis petendam esse, qui earum doctores se esse profitentur; fierique posse, imo id semper accidere, ut multa indoctis videantur ab surda, quae cum a doctioribus exponuntur, eo lau danda videantur, et eo accipiantur aperta dulcius, quo clausa difficilius aperiebantur? Hoc fere in san ctis Veleris Testamenti libris evenit, si modo ille qui eis offenditur, doctorem potius eorum pium, quam impium laceratorem requirat, priusque studio quae. rentis, quam temeritate reprehendentis imbuatur. Nec, si ea discere cupiens, in aliquos forte inciderit vel episcopos vel presbyteros, vel cujuscemodi Ec clesiae catholicae antistites ct ministros, qui aut pas sim caveant nudare mysteria, aut contenti simplici fide, altiora cognoscere non curarint, desperet ibi scientiam esse veritatis, ubi neque omnes a quibus quæritur docere possunt, neque omnes qui quærunt discere digni sunt. Et diligentia igitur et pietas adhi benda est: allero fiet ut scientes inveniamus; altero, ut scire mereamur. Sed quoniam duae maxime sunt illecebrae Mani chaeorum, quibus decipiuntur incauti, ut eos velint habere doctores; una, cum Scripturas reprehendunt, vel quas male intelligunt vel quas male intelligi vo lunt; altera, cum vitæ castae et memorabilis cunt! nentiæ imaginem praferunl: hic liber congruentem catholic:e disciplinæ sententiam nostram de vita et moribus continebit, in quo fortasse intelligetur et quam sit facile simulare, et quam diflicile habere virtulem. Ello. sane modum tenebo, si potero, ut neque in illorum morbos, qui mihi sunt notissimi, tam graviler invehar, quam illi in ea quae ignorant; sanari enim eos potius, si fieri potest, quam op pugnari volo. Et ca de Scripturis assumam testimo nia, quibus cos necesse sit credere, de Novo scilicet Testamento, de quo tamen nihil proferam eorum quas solent immissa esse dicere, cum magnis angustiis coarctantur; sed ea dicam, quæ et approbare et lau dare coguntur. Nec omnino ullam relinquam testem sententiam productam de apostolica disciplina, cui non de Veteri Testamento similem comparem; ut si evigilare tandem, deposita pertinacia somniorum suo rum, et in christianæ fidei lucem aspirare valuerint v animadvertant et qnam non sit christiana vita quam ostentant, et quam sit Christi Scriptura quam la cerant.
In other books, I think, we have done enough to show how we can meet the attacks of the Manichaeans, which they launch ignorantly and impiously against the Law, that is, the so-called Old Testament, while they parade themselves with empty boasting amid the applause of the ignorant; and I can briefly recall it here too. For who of even moderately sound mind would not readily understand that the explanation of the Scriptures must be sought from those who profess to be their teachers; and that it can happen, indeed always does happen, that many things seem absurd to the untaught which, when explained by the more learned, seem all the more praiseworthy, and are received with all the more delight once opened, the harder they were to open while closed? This is generally what happens with the holy books of the Old Testament, provided that one who takes offense at them seeks a devout teacher of them rather than an impious mangler, and is filled with the eagerness of one who inquires before the rashness of one who finds fault. Nor, if in his desire to learn these things he happens to meet some bishops or presbyters, or prelates and ministers of the catholic Church of any kind, who either take care not to lay bare the mysteries indiscriminately, or, content with simple faith, have not troubled to learn deeper things, should he despair of finding the knowledge of the truth there, where neither can all who are asked teach, nor are all who ask worthy to learn. So both diligence and devotion must be applied: by the one we shall find people who know; by the other we shall deserve to know.
But the Manichaeans have two chief lures by which the unwary are deceived into wanting them as teachers: one, when they find fault with the Scriptures, which they either misunderstand or want to be misunderstood; the other, when they display the appearance of a chaste life and remarkable self-control. This book, therefore, will contain our view of life and morals, in keeping with catholic teaching; and in it, perhaps, it will be understood how easy it is to feign virtue and how hard to have it. I will certainly keep this measure, if I can: not to attack their diseases, which are very well known to me, as fiercely as they attack what they do not know; for I want them healed, if it can be done, rather than fought. And I will take from the Scriptures testimonies which they must believe, namely from the New Testament; yet from it I will bring forward nothing of what they are accustomed to say was interpolated when they are hard pressed, but I will cite what they are compelled both to approve and to praise. Nor will I leave any statement of the apostolic teaching that I bring forward as a witness without setting beside it a similar one from the Old Testament; so that, if they can at last wake up, lay aside the obstinacy of their dreams, and aspire to the light of Christian faith, they may notice both how far from Christian is the life they parade, and how truly the Scripture they mangle is Christ's.
Notes and citation
Summary: Augustine explains that this book answers the two Manichaean lures, their attacks on the Scriptures and their show of chastity, by setting out the catholic teaching on life and morals from both Testaments.
- “In other books”: probably the two books On Genesis against the Manichaeans, written about the same time (uncertain).
Topics: Heresy, Scripture and canon, Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.1 (PL 32:1310–1311; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-1). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-1) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.2PL 32:1311
Unde igitur exondiar? ab auctoritate, an a ra tione? Naturæ quidem ordo ita se habet, ut cum ali quid discimus, rationem præcedat auctoritas. Nam infinna ratio vidcri potest, quæ cum reddita fuerit, auctoritatem postea, per quam firmetur, assumit. Sed quia caligantes hominum mentes consuetudine tene hrarum, quibus in nocte peccatorum vitiorumque velantur, perspicuitati sinceritatique rationis aspe ctum idoneum intendere nequeunt; saluberrime com paratum cst, ut rn lucem vcritntis aciem titunantem veluti ramis humanitatis opacata inducat auctoritas. Sed quoniam cum iis nobis res est, qui omnia contra ordinem et sentiunt, et loquuntur, et gerunt, nibil que aliud maxime dicunt, nisi rationem prius esse reddendam, morcm illis gcrain; quod fateor in dis putando vitiosum esse, suscipiam. Delectat enim me imitari, quantum valeo, mansuetudinem Domini mei Jesu Christi, qui etiam ipsius mortis malo, quo nos exuere vellIt, indutus est.
Where then shall I begin? With authority, or with reason? The order of nature is such that when we learn anything, authority comes before reason. For a reason may seem weak which, after it has been given, takes on authority afterwards to confirm it. But because the minds of men, darkened by long familiarity with the shadows in which they are veiled in the night of sins and vices, cannot fix a fitting gaze on the clearness and purity of reason, it has been arranged most wholesomely that authority, shaded as it were by the boughs of humanity, should lead the faltering eye into the light of truth. But since we are dealing with people who think, speak, and act against order in everything, and who say nothing more insistently than that reason must be given first, I will humor them and take up a method which I admit is faulty in argument. For I delight in imitating, as far as I can, the gentleness of my Lord Jesus Christ, who clothed himself even with the evil of death itself, of which he wished to strip us.
Notes and citation
Summary: Augustine notes that authority naturally precedes reason, but to meet the Manichaeans on their own terms he will begin with reason.
Topics: Heresy
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.2 (PL 32:1311; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-2). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-2) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.3PL 32:1311
Ratione igitur quaeramus quemadmodum sit ho mini vivendum. Beate certe omnes vivere volumus; neque quisquam est in hominum genere, qui non huic sententiae, antequam plene sit emissa, consen tiat. Beatus autem, quantum existimo, neque ille dici potest, qui non habet quod amat, qualecumque sit; neque qui habet quod amat, si noxium sit; neque qui non amat quod habet, etiamsi optimum sit. Nam et qui appetit quod adipisci non potest, cruciatur; ct qui adeptus est quod appetendum non est, fallitur; et qui non appetit quod adipiscendum esset, aegrotat. Nihil autem istorum animo contingit siue miseria; nec miseria et beatitudo in homine uno simul habi tare consueverunt: nullus igitur illorum beatus est. Quartum restat, ut video, ubi beata vita inveniri queat; cum id quod est hominis optimum, et amatur, et habetur. Quid enim est aliud quod dicimus frui, nisi praesto habere quod diligis? Neque quisquam bea tus est, qui non fruitur eo quod est hominisopti mum; nec quisquam, qui eo fruitur, non est beatus. Praesto ergo esse nobis debet optimum nostrum, si beate vivere cogitamus. Sequitur ut quæramus quid sit hominis opti mum, quod profecto deterius esse quam ipse homo non potest. Quisquis enim quod seipso est deterius, sequitur, fit et ipse deterior. Oportet autem omnem hominem id quod optimum est sequi. Non est igitur homine deterius hominis optimum. Fortasse tale ali quid erit, quale ipse homo est? Ita sit sane, si nihil est homine melius, quo perfrui possit. Si autem in venimus aliquid quod et homine sit excellentius, ct praesto esse amanti sese homini possit; quis dubita verit homini ad id nitendum esse ut beatus sit, quod eo ipso qui nititur, manifestum est esse præstan tius? Nam si id est beatum esse, ad tale bonum per venisse quo amplius non potest, id est autem quod dicimus optimum; quo tandem pacto potest in ea de finitione includi, qui ad summum honum suum nondum pervenerit? aut quomodo summum est, si cst aliquid melius quo pervenire possimus? Hoc ig tur si est, tale esse debet quod non amittat invitus. Quippe nemo potest confidere de tali bono, quod sibi eripi posse sentit, etiamsi retinere id ample ctique voluerit. Quisquis autcm de bono quo fruitur non collidit, in tanto timore amittendi beatus esse qui potest?
Let us then inquire by reason how a human being ought to live. We certainly all want to live happily; and there is no one in the human race who does not assent to this statement even before it is fully uttered. But in my judgment no one can be called happy who does not have what he loves, whatever it may be; nor one who has what he loves if it is harmful; nor one who does not love what he has, even if it is the best. For one who desires what he cannot obtain is tormented; one who has obtained what ought not to be desired is deceived; and one who does not desire what ought to be obtained is sick. None of these things happens to the mind without misery; and misery and happiness do not usually dwell together in one person: so none of these is happy. A fourth case remains, as I see it, where the happy life can be found: when that which is best for a human being is both loved and possessed. For what else is it that we call enjoying, but having at hand what you love? And no one is happy who does not enjoy what is best for a human being; nor is anyone who enjoys it not happy. Our best, then, must be at hand for us if we intend to live happily.
It follows that we should ask what is best for a human being; and that certainly cannot be inferior to the human being himself. For whoever follows what is inferior to himself becomes inferior himself. But every human being ought to follow what is best. Therefore what is best for a human being is not inferior to a human being. Will it perhaps be something such as the human being himself is? Let it be so indeed, if there is nothing better than a human being which he can enjoy. But if we find something that is both more excellent than a human being and can be at hand for the person who loves it, who would doubt that, to be happy, a human being must strive toward that which is plainly superior to the very one who strives? For if being happy is having attained a good beyond which there is nothing greater, which is what we call the best, how can anyone who has not yet attained his highest good be included in that definition? Or how is it highest, if there is something better that we can attain? If this is so, then, it must be such that one does not lose it against one's will. For no one can be confident about a good which he senses can be snatched from him, even if he wishes to keep and embrace it. And whoever is not confident about the good he enjoys, how can he be happy in such fear of losing it?
Notes and citation
Summary: Everyone wants to be happy, and happiness means loving and possessing what is best for a human being, which must be better than a human being and impossible to lose against one's will.
- “which is what we call the best”: the digital text has “4d est”, read as “id est” (sense clear).
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (OCR slip (4 for i)): 4d est → id est.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.3 (PL 32:1311; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-3). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-3) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.4PL 32:1313
Quæramus igitur quid sit homine melius. Quod profecto invenire difficile est, nisi prius considcrato atque discusso quid sit ipse homo. Nec nunc defini tionem hominis a me postulandam puto. Illud est magis quod mihi hoc loco quærendum videtur, cum inter omnes pene constet, aut certc, id quod satis est, inter me atque illos cum quibus nunc agitur hoc con veniat, ex anima et corpore nos esse compositos, quid est ipse homo, utrumque horum quæ nominavi, an corpus tantummodo, an tantummodo anima. Quanquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neu trum vocaretur homo, si non esset alterum nam neque corpus homo esset, si anima non esset; nee rursus anima homo, si ea corpus non animaretur); fieri tamen potest ut unum horum et habeatur homo et vocetur. Quid ergo hominem dicimus? animam et corpus, tanquam bigas vel centaurum? an corpus tantum, quod sit in usu animæ se regentis; tanquam lucernam, non ignem simul et testam, sed testam solam, tamen propter ignem appellamus? an nihil aliud hominem quam an imam dicimus, scd propter corpus quod regit, veluti equitem non simul equum et hominem, scd hominem solum, ex co tamen quod regendo equo sit accommodamus, vocamus? Difficile est istam controversiam dijudicare; aut si ratione facile, oratione longum est: quem laborem ac moram suscipere ac subire non opus est. Sive enim utrum que, sive anima sola nomcn hominis teneat, non est hominis optimum quod oplimum est corporis; sed quod aut corpori simul et animæ, aut soli animae optimum est, id est optimum hominis.
Let us ask, then, what is better than a human being. This is certainly hard to find unless we first consider and examine what a human being himself is. I do not think I must now be asked for a definition of man. What seems to me rather to need asking here, since almost everyone agrees, or at least, which is enough, it is agreed between me and those with whom I am now dealing, that we are composed of soul and body, is this: what is the human being himself? Is he both of the things I have named, or only the body, or only the soul? For although there are two things, soul and body, and neither would be called a human being if the other did not exist (for the body would not be a human being if there were no soul, nor again would the soul be a human being if a body were not animated by it), yet it may be that one of them is both regarded as and called a human being. What then do we call a human being? Soul and body, like a pair of horses or a centaur? Or the body only, as being at the service of the soul that rules it, as we call a lamp not the flame and the vessel together but the vessel alone, though on account of the flame? Or do we call nothing else a human being than the soul, but on account of the body it rules, as we call a horseman not the horse and the man together but the man alone, yet because he is fitted to ruling the horse? It is hard to settle this controversy; or, if it is easy by reason, it is long to explain in words; and there is no need to undertake and endure that labor and delay. For whether both, or the soul alone, bears the name of man, what is best for the body is not what is best for the human being; but what is best either for body and soul together or for the soul alone, that is the best for the human being.
Notes and citation
Summary: Without deciding whether a human being is soul and body or soul alone, Augustine argues that a human being's highest good is not the body's highest good.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.4 (PL 32:1313; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-4). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-4) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.5PL 32:1313
Corporis autem si quaerimus quid optimum sit, id certa ratio cogit fateri, per quod fit ut sese corpus quam optime habeat. Nihil est autem omnium quæ vegetant corpus, anima melius atque praestantius. Est crgo summum corporis bonum, non voluptas ejus, non indoloria, non vires, non pulchritudo, non velocitas. et si quid aliud in bonis corporis numerari solet, sed omnino aninia. Nam et ista quae commemorata sunt, præsentia sui exhibet corpori, et quod antecellit om nibus, vitam. Quamobrem non videtur mihi anima esse summum hominis bonam, sive animam simul et corpus, sive animam solam hominem dicimus. Ut enim corporis summum bonum id invenit ratio, quod est corpore mclius, et quo ei vigor et vita praebetur: ita sive corpus et anima, sive anima ipsa per se homo sit, inveniendum est, si quid animam praecedit ipsam, quod cum anima sequitur, fit in suo genere quam potest optima. Quod si reperire potuerimus, id crit profecto quod ambagibus remotis omnibus, summum hominis bonum jure meritoque nominandum est. Aut si corpus est homo, quin hominis optimum anima ipsa sit, recusare non possum. Sed certe cum de moribus agitur, cum quærimus quinam vitae modus tcnendus sit ut beatitudinem possimus adipisci, non corpori præcepta dantur, non corporis investiganda est disciplina. Postremo bonos mores ea nostra pars actura est, quae inquirit, et discit; et hæc animae sunt propria: non igitur de corpore, cum de virtuto obtinenda satagimus, quæstio est. Quod si est conse quens, sicuti est, ut ipsum corpus cum ab anima re gitur, quæ virtutis compos cst, inulto ct melius re gatur et honestius, coque optime sese habeat# quo est optima illa, quue sibi justa lege dominatur: id crit hominis optimum quod animam optimam facit, etiamsi hominem corpus vocemus. An vero, si milii auriga obtemperans, cquos, quibus pracst, alit1 ac regit commodissime, atquc ipse quo mihi est obedien tior, mea liberalitate perfruitur, negare quisquam potest non solum quod auriga, verum etiam quod equi sese optime habent, mihi deberi? Itaque sive tantum corpus, sivc tantum anima, sive utrumque homo sit, non mihi mæxime quærendum videtur, nisi quid animam faciat optimam: nam eo percepto, non potest homo non aut optime, aut certe multo melius sese habere, quam si hoc unum defuisset.
If we ask what is best for the body, sound reason compels us to admit that it is that through which the body is in the best condition. But of all the things that give vigor to the body, nothing is better or more excellent than the soul. So the highest good of the body is not its pleasure, not freedom from pain, not strength, not beauty, not swiftness, nor anything else usually counted among the goods of the body, but simply the soul. For by its presence the soul supplies the body with all the things just mentioned, and with what surpasses them all, life. Hence the soul does not seem to me to be the highest good of a human being, whether we call the human being soul and body together or the soul alone. For just as reason found the highest good of the body to be what is better than the body and supplies it with vigor and life, so, whether a human being is body and soul or the soul by itself, we must find whether there is anything that is above the soul itself which, when the soul follows it, makes the soul as good as it can be in its kind. If we can find it, that will certainly be what, setting aside all evasions, is rightly and deservedly to be called the highest good of a human being. Or if the human being is the body, I cannot deny that the best for a human being is the soul itself. But certainly when we are dealing with morals, when we ask what manner of life must be held to so that we can obtain happiness, it is not to the body that precepts are given, and it is not the body's training that must be investigated. In short, good conduct will be the work of that part of us which inquires and learns; and these belong to the soul: so when we strive to obtain virtue, the question is not about the body. And if it follows, as it does, that the body itself, when it is ruled by a soul possessed of virtue, is ruled much better and more honorably, and is in the best condition when the soul that rules itself by a just law is at its best, then what makes the soul best will be the best for the human being, even if we call the body the human being. If my charioteer, obeying me, feeds and manages most suitably the horses in his charge, and himself enjoys my generosity the more obedient he is to me, can anyone deny that not only the charioteer's good condition but also the horses' is owed to me? So whether the human being is only body, or only soul, or both, the chief thing to be sought, it seems to me, is what makes the soul best: for once that is grasped, a human being cannot fail to be either in the best condition, or at least in a much better condition than if this one thing were lacking.
Notes and citation
Summary: Since the soul is the body's highest good, a human being's highest good must be whatever makes the soul best, and morals concern the soul.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.5 (PL 32:1313; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-5). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-5) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.6PL 32:1313–1315
Ncmo autem dubitaverit quin virtus animam fa ciat optimam. Sed rectissime quaeri potest utrum ista virtus etiam per scse, an nisi in anima esse non pos sit. Oboritur iterum altissima -et longissimi sermonis indigens quæstio: sed hoc bene utar fortasse com pendio; spero Deum adfuturum, ut quantum imbe cillitas nostra patitur, de tantis rebus non modo dilu cide, sed etiam breviter doceamus. Quodlibet enim eorum sit, sive etiam per sese esse possit virtus sine anima, sive nisi animæ inesse non possit, procul dubio aliquid anima sequitur ut virtutem assequatur: id erit aut ipsa anima, aut virtus, aut aliquid tertium. At si scipsam sequitur ut virtutem adipiscatur, stultum nescio quid sequitur: stulta est enim ante adeptam virtutem. Summa sunt autem vota sequentium, ut id quod quisque sequitur, assequatur. Aut igitur optabit non assequi quod sequitur anima, quo nibil absurdius et perversius dici potest: aut cum se sequitur stulta. eamdem stultitiam quam vitat assequitur. Si autcm virtutem sequitur, hanc assequi cupiens, quomodo sequitur id quod non est? aut quomodo assequi cupit quod habet? Aut igitur virtus est præter animam; aut si non placet vocare virtulem, nisi habitum ipsum et quasi sapientis animæ qualitatem, quæ nisi ia anima esse non potest, oportet ut aliquid aliud sequatur anima, ot ei virtus possit innasci: quia noque nihil sequendo, neque stultitiam sequendo potest, quantum ratio mea fert, ad sapientiam pervenire. Hoc igitur aliud, quod sequende anima virtutis atque sapientiae compos fit, aut homo sapiens est, aut Deus. Sed supra dictum est, tale quiddam esse debere quod inviti amittere nequeamus. Quis vere cunctan dum putet, hominem sapientem, si eum sequi satis pulaverimus, auferri nobis non modo recusantibus, sed etiam repugnantibus posse? Deus igitur restat quem si sequimur, bene; si asseqnimur, non tantum bene, sed etiam beate vivimus. Quem si qui esse negant, quid ego cogitem quo illis sermone suaden dum sit, cum quibus utrum omnino sermocinandum sii, nescio? Quod tamen si videbitur, longe aliud principium, alia ratio, alius ingressus ineundus est, quam impræsentiarum suscepimus. Nunc itaque cum illis milii res est, qui Dcum esse non negant: neque id tantum, sed etiam non ab eo negligi res humanas falcniur. Nullum enim arbitror aliquo religionis no mine teneri, qui non saltem animis nostris divina providentia consuli existimet.
No one will doubt that virtue makes the soul best. But it may very properly be asked whether this virtue can exist even by itself, or only in a soul. Here again arises a very deep question needing a very long discussion; but perhaps I can make good use of a shortcut, and I hope God will be with us, so that, as far as our weakness allows, we may teach about such great matters not only clearly but also briefly. For whichever it is, whether virtue can exist by itself without a soul or can exist only in a soul, beyond doubt the soul follows something in order to attain virtue; this will be either the soul itself, or virtue, or some third thing. But if the soul follows itself in order to acquire virtue, it follows something foolish; for it is foolish before it has acquired virtue. Now the highest wish of those who follow is to reach what each follows. So either the soul will wish not to reach what it follows, than which nothing more absurd or perverse can be said; or, when in its folly it follows itself, it reaches the very folly it shuns. But if it follows virtue, desiring to reach it, how does it follow what does not exist? Or how does it desire to reach what it has? So either virtue exists apart from the soul; or, if one prefers not to call anything virtue except the habit itself and, as it were, the quality of the wise soul, which can exist only in a soul, the soul must follow something else so that virtue may be born in it; for neither by following nothing nor by following folly can it, as far as my reason shows, attain wisdom. This other thing, then, by following which the soul becomes possessed of virtue and wisdom, is either a wise man or God. But it was said above that it must be something we cannot lose against our will. Who would hesitate to think that a wise man, if we were content to follow him, can be taken from us not only when we are unwilling but even when we resist? It remains, then, that it is God: if we follow him, we live well; if we reach him, we live not only well but happily. As for those who deny that he exists, why should I consider with what argument they are to be persuaded, when I do not know whether one should talk with them at all? Even if it seems right, however, a quite different beginning, method, and approach must be taken from the one we have undertaken now. Now my business is with those who do not deny that God exists, and who moreover admit that human affairs are not neglected by him. For I think no one holds to any form of religion who does not believe at least that our souls are cared for by divine providence.
Notes and citation
Summary: The soul gains virtue by following something above it, which cannot be a wise man, who can be lost, but only God; following God is living well, and reaching him is living happily.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.6 (PL 32:1313–1315; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-6). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-6) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.7PL 32:1315
Sed quo pacto sequimur quem non videmus; aut quomodo videmus, qui non solum homines, sed etiam insipientes homines sumus? Quanquam enim nen oculis, sed mente cernatur, quæ tandem mens idonea reperiri potest, quæ cum stultitiae nube obte gatur, valeat illam lucem vel etiam conetur haurire? Confugiendum est igitur ad corum praecepta, quos sapientes fuisse probabile cst. Hactenus potuit ratio perduci. Versabatur namque, non veritate certior, sed consuetudine securior, in rebus humanis. At ubi ad divina perventum cst, avertit sese: intueri non potest, palpitat, æstuat, inhiat amore, reverberatur luce veritatis, et ad familiaritatem tenebrarum sua rum, non electione, sed fatigatione convertitur. Quam hic formidandum est, quam tremendum, ne majorem inde concipiat anima imbecillitatem, ubi quictem fessa conquirit. Ergo refugere in tenebrosa cupientibus per dispensationem ineffabilis Sapientiæ, nobis illa opacitas auctoritatis occurrat, et mirabilibus rerum, vocibusqne librorum veluti signis temperatio ribus veritatis, umbrisque blandiatur. Quid potuit pro salute nostra fieri amplius? Quid beneficentius, quid libernlius divina providentia dici potest, quæ a legibns suis hominem lapsum, et propter cupiditatem rerum mortalium jure ac merito mertalem sobolem propagantem, non omnino dese mit? Habet enim potestas illa justissima, miris et in comprebensibilibus modis, per quasdam secretissimns successiones rerum sibi servientium quas creavit, et severitatem vindicandi, et clementiam liberandi. Quod quidem quam sit pulchrum. quam magnum, quam Deo dignum, quam postremo id quod quæritur verum, ne quaquam intelligere poterimus, nis! ab humanis et proximis incipi. ptes, verae religionis fide, præceptis que servatis, non deseruerimns viam quam nobis Deus, et Patriarcharum segregatione, et Legis vin colo, et Prophetarum presagio, et suscepti Hominis sacramento, et Apostolorum lestitnonio, et Martyrum sanguine, et Gentium occupatione munivit. Quare deinceps nemo ex me quærat sententiam meam, sed potins audiamus oracula, nostrasque ratiunculas divi nis submittamus affatibus.
But how do we follow one whom we do not see? Or how do we see, we who are not only human beings but foolish human beings? For although he is perceived not with the eyes but with the mind, what mind can be found fit, while it is covered by the cloud of folly, to drink in that light, or even to try? We must take refuge, then, in the precepts of those who were probably wise. This far reason could be brought. For it moved among human things, not more certain of the truth, but more secure through familiarity. But when it came to divine things, it turned away: it cannot gaze, it trembles, it is in turmoil, it gapes with love, it is beaten back by the light of truth, and turns back to the familiarity of its own darkness, not by choice but by exhaustion. How much is it to be feared here, how much dreaded, that the soul may contract greater weakness there where, worn out, it seeks rest! So, when we long to flee back into the darkness, let that shade of authority meet us, through the dispensation of the ineffable Wisdom, and let it soothe us with wonderful deeds and the words of books, as with gentler signs and shadows of the truth. What more could have been done for our salvation? What more beneficent, what more generous, can be said of divine providence, which did not wholly abandon man when he fell from its laws and, through desire for mortal things, justly and deservedly propagated a mortal offspring? For that most just power has, in wonderful and incomprehensible ways, through certain most secret successions of the things it created and which serve it, both the severity to punish and the mercy to set free. How beautiful this is, how great, how worthy of God, and finally how true, which is what we are seeking, we shall never be able to understand unless, beginning from human and near things, keeping the faith and precepts of the true religion, we do not abandon the way which God has fortified for us by the setting apart of the patriarchs, the bond of the Law, the foretelling of the prophets, the mystery of the Man assumed, the testimony of the apostles, the blood of the martyrs, and the winning of the nations. Therefore from now on let no one ask me for my own opinion, but let us rather listen to the oracles, and submit our petty reasonings to the divine utterances.
Notes and citation
Summary: Reason cannot gaze on God unaided, so God in his providence provides the authority of Scripture and the history of salvation, to which Augustine now submits his own reasoning.
- “the mystery of the Man assumed”: suscepti Hominis sacramento, the incarnation, in which the Word took on a human being.
Topics: Scripture and canon, Christology
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.7 (PL 32:1315; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-7). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-7) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.8PL 32:1315
Videamus quemadmodum ipse Dommus in Evangelio nobis præceperit esse vivendum; quomodo etiam Paulus apostolus: has enim Scripturas illi con demnare non audent. Audiamus ergo quem ftnem bonorum nobis, Christe, praescribas; nec dubium est quin is crit finis, quo nos summo amore tendere ja bes: Diliges, inquit, Dominum Deum tuum. Dic mihi etiam, quæso te, qni sit diligendi modus: vereor cnini ne plus minusve quam oportet, inflammer desiderio et amore Domini mei. Ex toto, inquit, corde tuo. Nou est satis. Ex tota anima tua. Ne id quidem satis est. Ex tota mente tua ( Matth. SUI, 57). Quid vis am plius? Vellem fortasse, si viderem quid posset esse amplius Quid ad hæc Paulus? Scimus, inquit, quoniam diligentibus Deam omnia procedunt in bonum. Dicat etiam ipse dilectionis modum. Quis ergo, inquit, nos separabit a charitate Christi? Tribulatio? an angustia? an persecutio? an fames? an nuditas? an periculum? an gladius? (Rom. vm, 28). Audivimus quid dili gere, et quantum diligere debeamus: eo est omnino tendendum, ad id omnia consilia nostra referenda. Bonorum summaDeus nobis est. Deus est nobis sum mum bonum. Neque infra remanendum nobis est, De que ultra quaerendum: alterum enim periculosum, alterum nuUum est.
Let us see how the Lord himself in the Gospel has taught us to live, and how the apostle Paul has too; for they do not dare to condemn these Scriptures. Let us hear, then, O Christ, what end of goods you prescribe for us; and there is no doubt that the end will be that toward which you bid us strive with the highest love. “You shall love,” he says, “the Lord your God.” Tell me also, I beg you, what is the measure of loving; for I fear to be inflamed with desire and love for my Lord more or less than I ought. “With all your heart,” he says. That is not enough. “With all your soul.” Not even that is enough. “With all your mind.” What more do you want? I might perhaps want more, if I saw what more there could be. What does Paul say to this? “We know,” he says, “that for those who love God all things work together for good.” Let him also state the measure of love. “Who then,” he says, “shall separate us from the love of Christ? Tribulation? Or distress? Or persecution? Or famine? Or nakedness? Or danger? Or the sword?” We have heard what we ought to love and how much we ought to love it: toward this we must strive with all our might, and to this all our plans must be referred. The end of goods for us is God. God is for us the highest good. We must neither stay below it nor seek beyond it: the one is dangerous, the other is nothing.
Matt 22:37 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:28 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:35 (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: From Christ's command to love God with all one's heart, soul, and mind, and from Paul's words in Romans 8, Augustine concludes that God is the highest good.
- Matt 22:37 and Rom 8:28, 35. Migne's reference “Rom. 8, 28” covers both Pauline quotations.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.8 (PL 32:1315; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-8). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-8) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.9PL 32:1315–1317
Age, nune investigemus, vel potius attendamus, praesto enim est et facillime videtur, utrum bis senten tiis ex Evangelio atque Apostolo prolatis, etiam Te stamenti Veteris auctoritas congruat. Quid dicam de superiore sententia, cum manifestum sit omnibus, eant de lege quae per Moysen data est, esse deprom ptam? Ibi enim scriptum est, Diliges Domimum Deum tuum, ex toto corde tuo, et ex tota anima tua, ei ex tola mente tua ( Deut. VI, 5). Quid autem illi quod ab Apostolo dictum est, comparare de Veteri Testamento possim, ne diutius quærerem ipse subjecit. Cum enim dixisset nulla trihulatione, nulla angustia, nulla per secutione, nulla necessitate inopiae corporalis, nullo periculo, nullo gladio nos a charitate Christi sepa rari; statim subjunxit: Sicut scriptum eat, Quia pro pter te afficimur tota die, æstimati sumus ut oves occasio nis. Hæc illisolent a corruptoribus Scripturarum immissa esse dicere, usque adeo nibil habent quod contradicant, ut hæc miseri respondere cogamur. Sed quis non intelligat convicto rum hominum aliam uon esse potuisse ultimam voccm? A quibus tamen quæro, utrum istam sententiam in Veteri Testamento esse negent, an non congrnere sententiæapostolicae afArtnent? At illud primum libria docebo: in hoc autem altero tergiversantes ho mines, et per abrupta fugientes, aut in pacem revo cabo, si voluerint respicere aliquantum, et considerare quid dictum sit; aut eos intelligentia caeterorum, qui sinc cupiditate judicant, insectabor. Quid enim potest amicius quam ista sibi consonare sententiae? Nam tri bulatio, angustia, persecutio, fames, nuditas, pericu lum, hominem in bac vita constitutum graviter afficiunt. Haec itaque omnia verba illo uno concludun tur testimonio veleris Legis, quo dictum est, Propter te afficimur. Gladius restabat, qui non aerumnosam vitam affert, sed quam invenerit adimit. Huic ergo respondet, Æstimati sumus ut oves occisionis. Charitas vero ipsa nen potuit significari expressius, quam quo dictum est, Propter te. Fac ergo non in Paulo apostolo compertum istud testimonium, sed a me esse prola tum. Numquidnam tibi demonstrandum est, haeretice, nisi aut scriptum in vetere Lege non esse, aut Apo stolo non convenire? Quoram si nibil dicere audes urgeris enim cum et codex legitur, quo planum sit scriptum esse, et homines intelligunt ad id qupd Apostolus dixit, nihil posse aptius convenire), cur ergo valere aliquid putas, quod Scripturas corruptas esse insimulare audes? Postremo quid responsurus es ei qui tibi dicat: Ego sic intelligo, Ege sic accipio, sic credo; nec ob aHud lego illos Libros, nisi quod ibi omnia christianae fidei concinere video. Illud po lius dic, si audes et adversus me dicere cogitas, non esse credendum quod Apostoli et martyres propter Christum affecti gravibus ærumnis dicuntur, quod a persecutoribus ut oves occisionis aestimati sunt. Quod si non potes dicere, quid calumniaris in quo libro in veniam t, quod me oportere credere confiteris?
Come now, let us investigate, or rather let us notice, for it is at hand and very easily seen, whether the authority of the Old Testament also agrees with these statements brought from the Gospel and the Apostle. What shall I say of the first statement, when it is plain to all that it was drawn from the law given through Moses? For there it is written, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.” And as for what the Apostle said, so that I need not search longer for something from the Old Testament to compare with it, he added it himself. For when he had said that no tribulation, no distress, no persecution, no want of bodily needs, no danger, no sword separates us from the love of Christ, he at once went on: “As it is written, ‘For your sake we are afflicted all the day long; we are reckoned as sheep for the slaughter.’” They are accustomed to say that this was inserted by corrupters of the Scriptures; so completely have they nothing to say against it that we are forced, poor men, to answer such things. But who does not understand that men who have been refuted could have no other last word? I ask them, however, whether they deny that this statement is in the Old Testament, or affirm that it does not agree with the apostle's statement. The first I will show from the books; in the second, as they twist about and flee over precipices, I will either call them back to peace, if they are willing to look back a little and consider what was said, or I will pursue them with the understanding of others who judge without partisanship. For what can be more harmonious than the agreement of these statements? Tribulation, distress, persecution, famine, nakedness, danger, all grievously afflict a person set in this life. All these words, then, are summed up in that one testimony of the old Law, in which it is said, “For your sake we are afflicted.” The sword remained, which does not bring a life of hardship but takes away the life it finds. To this, then, corresponds, “We are reckoned as sheep for the slaughter.” And love itself could not be signified more expressly than by the words, “For your sake.” Suppose, then, that this testimony had not been found in the apostle Paul but brought forward by me. What would you have to show, heretic, except either that it is not written in the old Law or that it does not suit the Apostle? And if you dare say neither (for you are pressed, since the book is read in which it is plain that it is written, and people understand that nothing could suit what the Apostle said better), why then do you think there is any force in your daring to accuse the Scriptures of being corrupted? Finally, what will you answer someone who says to you: “This is how I understand it, this is how I take it, this is what I believe; and I read those books for no other reason than that I see everything in them in harmony with the Christian faith”? Say rather, if you dare and intend to speak against me, that one must not believe what is said of the apostles and martyrs, that they suffered grievous hardships for Christ's sake, that they were reckoned by their persecutors as sheep for the slaughter. If you cannot say this, why do you quibble about the book in which I find what you admit I ought to believe?
Deut 6:5 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:35 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 8:36 (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 44:22 (43:23 LXX) (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Augustine shows that the command to love God and Paul's text on being reckoned as sheep for slaughter both come from the Old Testament, and rebukes the Manichaean claim that such passages are interpolations.
- Deut 6:5; Rom 8:35–36 quoting Ps 44:22 (LXX 43:23).
- “with all your mind”: Augustine's Latin of Deut 6:5 (cf. Matt 22:37).
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (Migne's paragraph number (15) leaked into the text): t5. A quibus → A quibus.
Topics: Scripture and canon, Heresy
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.9 (PL 32:1315–1317; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-9). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-9) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.10PL 32:1317
An illud dicis, concedere te quidem Deum esse diligendum, sed non illum Deum quem colunt ii qui Testamenti Veteris auctoritatem recipiunt? Non ergo Illum Deum colendum esse dicitis, qui fecit caelum et terram. Iste namque per omnes partes illorum volu minum prædicatur: vos autem fatemini universum istum mundum, qui nomine caeli et terrae significatur, babere auctorem et fabricatorem Deum, et Deum bo num. Cum exceptione quippe vobiscum loquendum est, quando Deus nominatur. Duos enim deos, unum bonum, alterum malum esse perhibetis. Quod si diri tis colere vos et colendum arbitrari Deum a quo factus est mundus, non tamen eum esse quem Veleris Testa menti commendat auctoritas; impudenter facitis, qni alienum animum atque sententiam quam bene atque utiliter acceperimus, male interpretari cortamini, frustra omnino. Neque enim vestræ stultae atque im piæ disputationes ullo modo cum piorum doctissimorumque bominum sermonibus, per quos hi Ecclesia catholica Scripturae illae volentibus dignisque aperiun tur, comparari queunt. Longe prorsus aliter quam putatis Lex et Prophetae intelliguntur a nobis. Desi nite errare; non colimus poenitentem Deum, non invidum, non indigum, non crudelem, non quaerentem de bominum vel pecorum sanguine voluptatem, non cui flagitia et scelera placeant, non possessionem suam terrae quadam particula terminantem. In has enim atque hujusmodi nugas graviter copioseque in vehi soletis. Quare nos invectio vestra non tangit; sed aniles quasdam, vel etiam pueriles opiniones, eo inepttore, quo vehementiore oratione oervellitis. Qua quisquis movetur et ad vos transit, non Ecclesise nostrae damnat disciplinam, sed eam se ignorare de monstrat. Quamobrem si quid humani corde geritis, si curae vobis vosmetipsi estis, quaerite potius diligenter et pie quomodo ilia dicantur. Quaerite, miseri: nam talem fidem, qua Deo inconveniens aliquid creditur, nos vehementius et uberius accusamus; nam et in illis quas dicta sunt, cuin sic intelligentur ut littera sonat, et simplicitatem corrigimus, et pertinaciam deridemus. Ei alia multa, quæ vos intelligere non pot estis, vetat eos credere catholica disciplina, qui non annis, sed studio atque intellectu excedentes quam dam mentis pueritiam, in canos sapientiae promoven tur. Nam et credere Deuni loco aliquo quamvis infi nito, per quantitatis quaecumque spatia contineri, quam sit stultum docetur: et de loco in locum, vel ipsum, vel aliquam ejus partem movcri atque trans ire, arbitrari nefas habetur, Jam vero aliquid ejus substantiæ atque naturae commutationem vel conver aionem quolibet modo pali posse si quis opinetur, miræ dementiae impietatisque damnabitur: ita fit ut apud nos inveniantur pueri quidam, qui humana forma Deum cogitent, atque ita se habere suspicentur; qua opinione nihil est abjectius: sed inveniantur item multi senes, qui ejus majestatem, non solum super humanum corpus, sed etiam super ipsam mentem ma. nere inviolabilem atque incommutabilem, eadem ipsa mente conspiciant. Quas aetates, non tempore, sed virtute atque prudentia discernendas esse jam dictum est. Apud vos autem nemo quidem reperitur qui Dei substantiam humani corporis figuratione describat: sed rursus, nemo qui ab humani erroris labe sejun gat!. Itaque illi quos quasi vagientes Ecclesiae catho licae ubera sustentant, si ab ha reticis nun fuerint de praedati I, pro suo quisque captu viribusque nutriuntur, perducunturque ajius sic, alius autem sic, primum in virum perfectum; deinde ad maturitatem canitiemque sapientiae perveniunt, ut eis quantum volant, vivere ac beatissime vivcre liceat.
Or do you say that you grant indeed that God is to be loved, but not that God whom those worship who accept the authority of the Old Testament? Then you say that the God who made heaven and earth is not to be worshiped. For he is proclaimed throughout every part of those volumes; and you admit that this whole world, which is signified by the name of heaven and earth, has God as its author and maker, and a good God. For we must speak with you with a qualification whenever God is named, since you hold that there are two gods, one good and the other evil. But if you say that you worship and think worthy of worship the God by whom the world was made, but that he is not the one whom the authority of the Old Testament commends, you act shamelessly, trying in vain to misinterpret another's mind and meaning, which we have received rightly and profitably. For your foolish and impious disputations can in no way be compared with the discourses of devout and most learned men, through whom in the catholic Church those Scriptures are opened to those who are willing and worthy. The Law and the Prophets are understood by us quite otherwise than you think. Stop erring: we do not worship a God who repents, nor an envious one, nor a needy one, nor a cruel one, nor one who seeks pleasure from the blood of men or cattle, nor one who is pleased by shameful deeds and crimes, nor one who limits his possession to some little patch of earth. For against these and similar trifles you are accustomed to declaim weightily and at length. So your invective does not touch us; but you tear at certain old wives' or even children's opinions, with speech that is the more inept the more vehement it is. Whoever is moved by it and goes over to you does not condemn the teaching of our Church but shows that he does not know it.
Therefore, if you have anything humane in your hearts, if you care at all for yourselves, inquire rather diligently and devoutly how these things are said. Inquire, wretched men: for a faith by which anything unfitting to God is believed we condemn more vehemently and more fully than you; and in those things which have been said, when they are understood as the letter sounds, we both correct simplicity and laugh at obstinacy. And many other things which you cannot understand the catholic teaching forbids those to believe who, going beyond a certain childhood of mind, not in years but in study and understanding, are advanced to the white hairs of wisdom. For it teaches how foolish it is to believe that God is contained in some place, however infinite, by any extents of quantity; and it holds it wicked to think that he himself or any part of him moves and passes from place to place. And if anyone should think that anything of his substance and nature can suffer change or alteration in any way, he will be condemned for extraordinary madness and impiety. So it happens that among us there are found some children who think of God in human form and suppose he is so, than which opinion nothing is lower; but there are also found many old men who see with the mind itself that his majesty abides inviolable and unchangeable, not only above the human body but even above the mind itself. These ages, as has already been said, are to be distinguished not by time but by virtue and prudence. Among you, on the other hand, no one indeed is found who describes the substance of God by the shape of a human body; but again, no one who separates it from the stain of human error. So those whom, as it were still crying infants, the breasts of the catholic Church sustain, if they are not carried off by heretics, are nourished each according to his capacity and strength, and are led on, one in this way and another in that, first to the perfect man, and then they come to the maturity and white hairs of wisdom, so that they may live as they wish, and live most happily.
Eph 4:13 (echo, medium confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Augustine replies that the catholic Church does not read the Old Testament as describing a repenting, envious, cruel, or bodily God, and that it leads believers from childish to mature understanding of God.
- “the perfect man”: echo of Eph 4:13.
- “separates it from the stain of human error”: the Manichaeans held that a part of the divine substance was mixed with evil and suffered in the world.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (Migne's paragraph number (17) leaked into the text): i7. Quamobrem → Quamobrem.
Topics: Heresy, Scripture and canon
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.10 (PL 32:1317; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-10). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-10) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).
1.11PL 32:1319
Secutio igitur Dei, beatitatis appetitus est: consecutio autem, ipsa beatitas. At eum sequimur diligendo, consequimur vero, non cum hoc omnino efficimur quod est ipse, sed ei proximi, eumque miri fico et intelligibili modo contingentes, ejusque veritate cl sanctitate penitus illustrati atque comprehensi. Ille namque ipsum lumen est; nobis autem ab eodem illu minari licet Maximum ergo quod ad beatam vitam ducit, primumque mandatum est, Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et anima et mente. Diligentibus enim Deum omnia procedunt in bonum. Quamobrem paulo post idem Paulus: Certus sum, inquit, quod neque mors, neque vita, neque Angeli, neque virtus, neque instantia, neque futura, neque altitudo, neque profundunt neque creatura alia poterit noa separare a charitate Dei, quæ eat in Christo Jesu Domino nostro. Si igitur diligentibus Deum omnia procedunt in bonum; et summum bonum, quod etiam optimum dicitur, non modo diligendum esse nemo ambigit, sed ita diligen dum ut nihil amplius diligere debeamus; idque signi ficatur el exprimitur quod dictum est, Ex tota anima, et ex toto corde, et ex tota mente: quis, quaeso, dubi taverit, his omnibus constitutis, et firmissime cre ditis, nihil nobis aliud esse optimum, ad quod adipi scendum postpositis cæteris festinare oporteat, quam Deum? Item si nulla res ab ejus charitate nos separat, quid esse non solum melius, sed etiam certius hoc bono potest? Sed singula breviter attendamus. Nemo nos inde separat, minando mortem. Id ipsum enim quo dii igimus Deum t, mori non potest, nisi dum non di ligit Deum; cum mors ipsa sit non diligere Deum, quod nihil est aliud quam ei quidquam in diligendo atque sequendo præponere. Nemo inde separat polli cendo vilam: nemo enim ab ipso fonte separat polii cendo aquam. Non separat angelus: non enim est angelus, cum inhæremus Deo, nostra mente potentior. Non separat virtus: Ham si virtus hic illa nominata est, quæ aliquam potestatem in hoc mundo habet, toto mundo cet omnino sublimior mens inhærens Deo. Sin virtus illa dicta est, qua: ipsius animi nostri rectissima affectio est: si in alio est, favet ut conjungamur Deo; si iti nobis est, ipsa conjungit. Non separant instantes molestiae: hoc enim leviores cas sentimus, quo ei unde nos scparare moliuntur, arctius inhæremus. Non separat promissio futurorum: nam et quidquid boni futurum est, certius promittit Deus; et nihil est ipso Deo melius, qui jam profecto bene sibi inhærentibus praesens est. Non separat altitudo neque profundum: etenim si h:ec verba scientiæ forte altitudinem vel pro fundum significant, non cro curiosus, ne scjungar a Deo; nec cujusquam doctrina me ab eo separat, ut quasi depellat errorem, a quo nemo prorsus nisi se paratus erraret. Si vero altitudine et profundo superna et inferna hujus mundi significantur, quis mihi cœlum polliceatur, ut a cœli fabricatore sejungar? Aut quis terreat infernus, ut Deum deseram, quem si nunquam deseruissem, inferna nescirem? Postremo, quis me locus ab ejus cbaritate divellet, qui non ubique totus esset, si ullo contineretur loco?
Following God, then, is the desire for happiness; reaching him is happiness itself. We follow him by loving; and we reach him not when we become entirely what he is, but when we come near him and touch him in a wonderful and intelligible way, and are thoroughly lit up and embraced by his truth and holiness. For he is light itself; and it is granted to us to be lit up by him. The greatest thing, then, that leads to the happy life, and the first commandment, is, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and soul and mind.” For “for those who love God all things work together for good.” Hence the same Paul says a little later: “I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor power, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.” If, then, for those who love God all things work together for good, and no one doubts that the highest good, which is also called the best, is not only to be loved but to be loved so that we ought to love nothing more, and this is what is signified and expressed by the words, “with all your soul, and with all your heart, and with all your mind,” who, I ask, would doubt, once all this is established and most firmly believed, that nothing else is best for us, to obtain which we must hasten, putting all else after it, but God? Again, if nothing separates us from his love, what can be not only better but also more certain than this good?
But let us look briefly at each item. No one separates us from it by threatening death. For that by which we love God cannot die except while it does not love God, since death itself is not to love God, which is nothing other than to prefer anything to him in loving and following. No one separates us from it by promising life: for no one separates us from the spring itself by promising water. An angel does not separate us: for no angel is more powerful than our mind when we cleave to God. Power does not separate us: for if the power named here is one that has some authority in this world, the mind that cleaves to God is far higher than the whole world. But if the power meant is the most right disposition of our own mind, then if it is in another, it helps us to be joined to God; if it is in us, it joins us itself. Present troubles do not separate us: for we feel them the lighter, the more closely we cleave to him from whom they strive to separate us. The promise of things to come does not separate us: for God promises more surely whatever good is to come, and nothing is better than God himself, who is surely present already to those who cleave to him rightly. Height and depth do not separate us: for if these words perhaps mean the height or depth of knowledge, I will not be curious, lest I be cut off from God; nor does anyone's teaching separate me from him by dispelling error, as it were, since no one would err at all unless he were separated from him. But if the heights and depths of this world are meant, who could promise me heaven so that I would be cut off from the maker of heaven? Or what hell could terrify me into deserting God, when, had I never deserted him, I would know nothing of hell? Finally, what place will tear me from his love, when he would not be wholly everywhere if he were contained in any place?
Matt 22:37 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:28 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:38–39 (quotation, high confidence)
Notes and citation
Summary: Following God by love is the desire for happiness and reaching him is happiness itself; Augustine explains phrase by phrase why nothing in Rom 8:38–39 can separate us from God's love.
- Matt 22:37; Rom 8:28; Rom 8:38–39.
Notes on the original text
- Digital text corrected (footnote digit read in place of the question mark): quam Deum 3 Item → quam Deum? Item.
Topics: Ethics
Cite (SBL): Augustine, Mor. 1.11 (PL 32:1319; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-moribus/1-1/#p-1-11). (abbreviation not yet checked)
BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-moribus-1-11) · Report an error
Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of R. Stothert in NPNF¹ 4 (1887).