Retractations 1.7–1.11

In the same city I wrote a dialogue in which many questions about the soul are raised and discussed: that is, where it comes from, what it is like, how great it is, why it was given to the body, what it becomes when it has come to the body, and what when it has departed. But since the question how great it is was discussed most carefully and subtly, so that we might show, if we could, that it has no bodily quantity and yet is something great, the whole book took its name from this one inquiry, so as to be called On the Greatness of the Soul. In that book, what I said, that it seems to me that the soul brought all the arts with it, and that what is called learning is nothing other than remembering and recalling, is not to be taken as though it were thereby approved that the soul once lived either in another body or elsewhere, whether in a body or outside a body, and that what it answers when questioned, though it has not learned it here, it learned before in another life. For it can be, as we have already said above in this work, that it can do this because it is an intelligible nature and is connected not only with intelligible but also with unchangeable things, being made in such an order that when it moves itself toward those things with which it is connected, or toward itself, it answers truly about them to the extent that it sees them. Nor indeed did it bring all the arts with it in that way, or have them with it; for of the arts that belong to the senses of the body, such as much of medicine and all of astrology, it can say nothing except what it has learned here. But those things which intelligence alone grasps it answers, for the reason I gave, when it has been well questioned and reminded either by itself or by another. In another place I said: “I would like to say more on this and to bind myself, while as it were instructing you, to do nothing else than to be restored to myself, to whom I am most indebted.” Here it seems that I ought rather to have said “to be restored to God, to whom I am most indebted.” But because a man must first be restored to himself, so that, having made a step there, as it were, he may rise from there and be lifted up to God, as that younger son first came back to himself and then said, “I will arise and go to my father,” therefore I spoke thus. Indeed I soon added, “and so to become a friendly servant to the Lord.” So what I said, “to whom I am most indebted,” I referred to human beings; for I am more indebted to myself than to other people, though more to God than to myself. This book begins thus: “Since I see that you abound in leisure…”

While we were still staying at Rome, we wished to inquire by discussion where evil comes from; and we discussed it in such a way that, if we could, reason, carefully considered and examined, might bring also to our understanding what we believed about this matter in submission to divine authority, as far as we could manage it by discussion with God's help. And since it was agreed among us, after reason had diligently examined the matter, that evil arose only from the free choice of the will, the three books which this discussion produced were called On Free Choice. Of these I finished the second and third in Africa, after I had already been ordained presbyter at Hippo Regius, as well as I could then. In these books so many things were discussed that some questions which came up, which I either could not unravel or which required a long discourse at the time, were deferred in such a way that, from either side, or from all sides, of those questions where it was not clear what agreed better with the truth, our reasoning nevertheless reached this conclusion: whichever of them was true, God was to be believed, or even shown, to be worthy of praise. For that discussion was undertaken because of those who deny that the origin of evil is derived from the free choice of the will and contend that, if that is so, God, the creator of all natures, is to be blamed; wishing in this way, according to the error of their ungodliness (for they are Manichaeans), to introduce a certain unchangeable nature of evil, coeternal with God. But concerning the grace of God, by which he has so predestined his elect that he himself also prepares the wills of those among them who already use free choice, nothing was discussed in these books, because of the question set before us. Where, however, the occasion arose for this grace to be mentioned, it was mentioned in passing, not defended with laborious reasoning, as though that were the subject. For it is one thing to inquire where evil comes from, and another to inquire how one returns to the former good or arrives at a greater good. Therefore let the new heretics, the Pelagians, who assert the free choice of the will in such a way as to leave no place for the grace of God, since they assert that it is given according to our merits, not exalt themselves as though I had pleaded their cause, because in these books I said many things on behalf of free choice which the purpose of that discussion demanded. For in the first book I said that evil deeds are punished by the justice of God, and I added: “For they would not be justly punished unless they were done by the will.” Again, when I was showing that a good will itself is so great a good that it is rightly preferred to all bodily and external goods, I said: “You see, then, I think, that it lies in our will whether we enjoy or lack so great and so true a good; for what is so much in the will as the will itself?” And in another place: “What reason is there, then,” I said, “why we should think it doubtful that, even if we were never wise before, nevertheless by the will we merit and lead a praiseworthy and happy life, and by the will a shameful and miserable one?” And likewise in another place: “From this it follows,” I said, “that whoever wishes to live rightly and honorably, if he wills to will this above fleeting things, attains so great a thing with such ease that for him to have what he willed is nothing other than to will it.” And likewise elsewhere I said: “For that eternal law, to the consideration of which it is now time to return, has established with unchangeable firmness that merit lies in the will, while reward and punishment lie in happiness and misery.” And in another place: “It has been agreed,” I said, “that what each person chooses to pursue and embrace lies in the will.” And in the second book: “For man himself,” I said, “insofar as he is man, is something good, because he can live rightly when he wills.” And in another place I said that “one cannot act rightly except by this same free choice of the will.” And in the third book: “What need is there,” I said, “to inquire where this movement comes from by which the will is turned away from the unchangeable good to a changeable good, since we acknowledge that it is only of the soul, and voluntary, and therefore blameworthy; and all useful teaching on this matter has this value, that, having disapproved and restrained that movement, we may turn our will from its fall into temporal things to the enjoyment of the everlasting good?” And in another place: “Truth cries out to you obscurely,” I said; “for you could not think that anything is in our power except what we do when we will. Therefore nothing is so much in our power as the will itself. For it is present at once, with no interval whatever, as soon as we will.” Likewise in another place: “For if you are praised,” I said, “for seeing what you ought to do, though you do not see it except in him who is unchangeable truth, how much more he who commanded you to will, and supplied the power, and did not permit unwillingness to go unpunished.” Then I went on, saying: “For if each one owes what he has received, and man was so made that he necessarily sins, then he owes it to sin. When, therefore, he sins, he does what he ought; but if it is wicked to say this, no one is compelled by his nature to sin.” And again: “What, after all, can be the cause of the will before the will?” I said. “For either it is itself a will, and one does not depart from this root of the will; or it is not a will, and it has no sin. Either, then, the will itself is the first cause of sinning, or no sin is the first cause of sinning. Nor is there anyone to whom sin may be imputed except the one who sins. There is no one, then, to whom it may rightly be imputed except the one who wills.” And a little later: “Who,” I said, “sins in what he can in no way avoid? But sin is committed; therefore it can be avoided.” Pelagius used this testimony of mine in a certain book of his; and when I replied to that book, I chose On Nature and Grace as the title of my book. In these and similar words of mine, because the grace of God was not mentioned, which was not then the subject, the Pelagians think, or can think, that we held their opinion. But they think so in vain. For the will, by which one both sins and lives rightly, which is what we discussed in these words, unless it is set free by the grace of God from the slavery by which it has been made a slave of sin, and is helped to overcome vices, mortals cannot live rightly and devoutly. And this divine benefit by which it is set free, unless it went before the will, would then be given to its merits and would not be grace, which is certainly given freely. We have dealt with this sufficiently in other works of ours, refuting these enemies of this grace, the new heretics; although in these books On Free Choice, which were written not at all against them (for they did not yet exist) but against the Manichaeans, we did not keep altogether silent about this grace of God, which they try with abominable ungodliness to take away. For in the second book we said that not only great but even the least goods can exist only from him from whom are all goods, that is, God. And a little later: “The virtues,” I said, “by which one lives rightly, are great goods; the beauties of any bodies, without which one can live rightly, are the least goods; the powers of the soul, without which one cannot live rightly, are intermediate goods. No one uses the virtues badly; but the other goods, that is, the intermediate and the least, anyone can use not only well but also badly. And no one uses virtue badly because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can also use not well; and no one uses badly by using well. Therefore the abundance and greatness of God's goodness has provided not only the great but also the intermediate and least goods. His goodness is more to be praised in the great than in the intermediate, and more in the intermediate than in the least of these goods; but more in all of them than if he had not bestowed them all.” And in another place: “Only hold fast unshaken piety,” I said, “so that no good may occur to you, whether you perceive it by sense or understand it or think of it in any way, which is not from God.” And likewise in another place I said: “But since man cannot rise of his own accord as he fell of his own accord, let us hold with firm faith the right hand of God stretched out to us from above, that is, our Lord Jesus Christ.” And in the third book, after I had said the thing which, as I mentioned, Pelagius also used from my works, “For who sins in what he can in no way avoid? But sin is committed; therefore it can be avoided,” I immediately went on to add: “And yet some things done even through ignorance are disapproved and judged to need correction, as we read in the divine authorities. For the apostle says, ‘I obtained mercy because I acted in ignorance’; and the prophet says, ‘Do not remember the sins of my youth and of my ignorance.’ There are also things done of necessity which are to be disapproved, when a man wishes to act rightly and cannot. For where do these words come from: ‘I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, this I do’; and this: ‘To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good is not’; and this: ‘The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to one another, so that you do not do what you will’? But all these belong to human beings who come from that condemnation of death. For if this is not man's punishment but his nature, none of these things are sins. For if he does not depart from the way in which he was naturally made, such that he cannot be better, he does what he ought when he does these things. But if man were good, he would be otherwise; as it is, because he is so, he is not good and does not have it in his power to be good, either by not seeing what he ought to be, or by seeing it and not being able to be what he sees he ought to be. Who would doubt that this is a punishment? But every punishment, if it is just, is a punishment of sin and is called a penalty. If, however, it is an unjust punishment (since no one doubts that it is a punishment), it has been imposed on man by some unjust ruler. But further, since it is madness to doubt the omnipotence and justice of God, this punishment is just and is paid for some sin. For no unjust ruler could either steal man away, as if from a God unaware, or wrest him from an unwilling God, as if from one weaker, either by terrifying or by confounding him, so as to torment man with an unjust punishment. It remains, therefore, that this just punishment comes from the condemnation of man.” And in another place: “To approve false things as true,” I said, “so that one errs against one's will, and to be unable to refrain from lustful deeds because of the resistance and torment of the pain of the fleshly bond, is not the nature of man as he was established, but the punishment of man as condemned. When, however, we speak of the will to act rightly, we speak of that will, of course, in which man was made.” See how long before the Pelagian heresy appeared we argued as though we were already arguing against them. For since all goods were said to be from God, that is, the great, the intermediate, and the least, the free choice of the will is found among the intermediate goods, because we can also use it badly; but it is nevertheless such that we cannot live rightly without it. Its good use, however, is already virtue, which is found among the great goods, which no one can use badly. And because all goods, as has been said, the great, the intermediate, and the least, are from God, it follows that the good use of free will, which is virtue and is counted among the great goods, is also from God. Then it was said from what misery, most justly inflicted on sinners, the grace of God sets free, because man could fall of his own accord, that is, by free choice, but could not also rise. To this misery of just condemnation belong the ignorance and difficulty which every man suffers from the beginning of his birth, and no one is set free from this evil except by the grace of God. The Pelagians, denying original sin, will not have this misery descend from a just condemnation; although, even if ignorance and difficulty were man's natural beginnings, God would not on that account be blamed but praised, as we argued in that same third book. That discussion is to be held against the Manichaeans, who do not accept the holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, in which original sin is narrated, and who contend with detestable impudence that whatever is read about it in the apostolic letters was inserted by corrupters of the Scriptures, as though it had not been said by the apostles. Against the Pelagians, however, what must be defended is what both Scriptures set forth, which they profess to accept. This work begins thus: “Tell me, please, whether God is not the author of evil.”

When I had settled in Africa, I wrote two books On Genesis against the Manichaeans. For although in the earlier books, in whatever I argued to show that God, supremely good and unchangeable, is the creator of all changeable natures, and that no nature or substance, insofar as it is a nature and substance, is evil, our attention was watchful against the Manichaeans, these two books were published quite openly against them in defense of the old law, which they attack with the vehement zeal of their insane error. In the first book I went from what is written, “In the beginning God made heaven and earth,” until the seven days are completed, where we read that God rested on the seventh day; in the second, from what is written, “This is the book of the creation of heaven and earth,” until Adam and his wife were sent out of paradise and a guard was set over the tree of life. Then at the end of the book I set the faith of Catholic truth against the error of the Manichaeans, summarizing briefly and clearly what they say and what we say. As for what I said: “But that light does not feed the eyes of irrational birds, but the pure hearts of those who believe God and turn from love of visible and temporal things to fulfilling his commandments; which all men can do if they will”: let the new heretics, the Pelagians, not think it was said in their sense. For it is altogether true that all men can do this if they will. But the will is prepared by the Lord and is so increased by the gift of charity that they can. This was not said here because it was not necessary for the question at hand. As for what is read there, that the Lord's blessing, of which it was said, “Increase and multiply,” is to be believed to have been turned into fleshly fruitfulness after sin: if it cannot be seen to have been said in any other way than that those first human beings would not have had human children had they not sinned, I do not approve it at all. Nor does it follow that, because in the books of Genesis green plants and fruit-bearing trees are given as food to every kind of beast and to all birds and all serpents, this is to be understood only allegorically, on the ground that there are four-footed creatures and birds which seem to live on flesh alone. For it could have been that they were fed by human beings with the fruits of the earth too, if, because of the obedience by which those human beings would serve God without any wickedness, they had merited to have all beasts and birds serving them in every way. Likewise, one may be troubled by how I said of the people of Israel: “That people still served the law by bodily circumcision and sacrifices, as if in the sea of the nations”; since among the nations it could not sacrifice, just as we now see that they have remained without sacrifices, unless perhaps their sacrificing a sheep at the Passover is counted as a sacrifice. In the second book, too, what I set down, that life can be signified by the name of “fodder” (the copies of the better translation do not have “fodder” but “hay”), does not seem to have been said fittingly enough. For the name “hay” does not suit the signification of life as “fodder” does. Likewise I do not seem to have been right to call prophetic the words in which it is written, “Why are earth and ashes proud?” since it is not read in a book which we are certain should be called a prophet. Nor did I understand that saying of the apostle, where he brings in a testimony from Genesis, saying, “The first man Adam was made a living soul,” as he wished it to be explained, when I explained what is written: “God breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul,” or “into a soul living.” For the apostle brought in that testimony in order to prove that there is an animal body; but I thought it should be shown from it that the first man was made animal, not only the man's body. As for my saying that sins harm no nature but their own, I said it because whoever harms a just man does not truly harm him, since he increases his reward in heaven; but by sinning he truly harms himself, since because of the very will to harm he will receive back the harm he did. The Pelagians can certainly draw this statement to their own dogma and say on that account that the sins of others have not harmed little children, because I said that sins harm no nature but their own; not observing that little children, who certainly belong to human nature, contract original sin because human nature sinned in the first human beings, and thus no sins harmed human nature except its own. For “through one man, in whom all sinned, sin entered the world.” For I did not say that sins harm no man but their own, but no nature. Likewise, in what I said a little later, that there is no natural evil, they can look for a similar hiding place, unless this statement is referred to nature such as it was first created without fault. For that is truly and properly called the nature of man; but we use the word in a transferred sense, so as to call nature also what man is as he is born, according to which way of speaking the apostle said, “For we too were once by nature children of wrath, like the rest.” This work begins thus: “If the Manichaeans chose whom they would deceive…”

Then, as I mentioned above, I wrote six books On Music. Of these the sixth has become especially well known, because a subject worth knowing is treated in it: how one arrives from bodily and spiritual, but changeable, numbers at the unchangeable numbers which are already in unchangeable truth itself, and so “the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made.” Those who cannot do this and yet live by the faith of Christ come after this life to behold those things more surely and happily; but those who can, if they lack the faith of Christ, who is the one “mediator between God and men,” perish with all their wisdom. In this book, what I said, “For bodies are the better the more harmonious they are with such numbers; but the soul becomes better by lacking those which it receives through the body, when it turns away from the fleshly senses and is reformed by the divine numbers of wisdom,” is not to be taken as though there will be no bodily numbers in incorruptible and spiritual bodies, since those bodies will be more beautiful and more seemly, or as though the soul will not perceive them when it is at its best, in the way that here it becomes better by lacking them. For here it needs to turn away from the fleshly senses in order to grasp intelligible things, because it is weak and less fit to direct its attention to both at once; and in these bodily things the allurement must now be guarded against as long as the soul can be enticed to shameful delight. Then, however, it will be firm and perfect, so that it is not turned away from the contemplation of wisdom by bodily numbers, and will perceive them in such a way as not to be enticed by them, nor will it become better by lacking them; but it will be so good and upright that they can neither escape it nor take possession of it. Likewise what I said, “But this health will be most firm and most certain when this body has been restored to its former stability in its own fixed time and order,” is not to be thought to have been said as though bodies after the resurrection will not be better than those of the first human beings in paradise were, since those will no longer need to be nourished by bodily food, by which these were nourished; but “former stability” is to be understood only in this sense, that those bodies will suffer no sickness, just as these too could not have suffered any before sin. In another place I said: “The love of this world is more laborious. For what the soul seeks in it, namely constancy and eternity, it does not find, since the lowest beauty is completed by the passing of things, and what in it imitates constancy is conveyed by the supreme God through the soul; since the form that is changeable only in time is prior to that which is changeable in both time and place.” If these words can be taken in such a way that the lowest beauty is understood only in the bodies of human beings and of all animals with which we live by bodily sense, clear reason defends them. For what imitates constancy in that beauty is that the same bodies remain in their structure, as far as they remain; and this is conveyed into them by the supreme God through the soul. For the soul holds the structure together so that it does not dissolve and flow apart, which we see happen in the bodies of animals when the soul departs. If, however, that beauty is understood in all bodies, this statement compels us to believe that the world itself is an animal, so that what in it imitates constancy is conveyed into it too by the supreme God through a soul. But that this world is an animal, as Plato and very many other philosophers thought, I have neither been able to find out by certain reasoning nor known that one can be persuaded of it by the authority of the divine Scriptures. Hence, when I said something of the kind, which can be so taken, in the book On the Immortality of the Soul as well, I noted that it was said rashly; not because I assert that it is false, but because I do not grasp that it is true that the world is an animal. This, however, I do not doubt must be held unshaken: that this world is not God to us, whether it has some soul or none; for if it has some, he who made it is our God; but if it has none, this world can be the god of nothing, how much less ours. Yet it is most rightly believed that there is a spiritual and living power, even if the world is not an animal, which power in the holy angels serves God in adorning and administering the world, even by those who do not understand it. By the name of holy angels I would now mean every holy spiritual creature set in God's secret and hidden service. But holy Scripture is not accustomed to signify angelic spirits by the name of souls. Accordingly, in what I said near the end of this book, “The rational and intellectual numbers of blessed and holy souls, receiving the very law of God, without which a leaf does not fall from a tree and by which our hairs are numbered, with no nature intervening, transmit it down to earthly and infernal jurisdictions,” I do not see how the word “souls” could perhaps be justified according to the holy Scriptures, since here I wished only the holy angels to be understood, whom I do not recall ever having read in the canonical divine oracles to have souls. This book begins thus: “Long enough, almost…”

During the same time I wrote a book whose title is On the Teacher. In it there is discussion and inquiry, and it is found that there is no teacher who teaches man knowledge except God, in accordance also with what is written in the Gospel: “One is your teacher, Christ.” This book begins thus: “What do we seem to you to want to do when we speak?”