Soliloquies 2.20

Latin text: Migne, PL 32 (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0). Compare: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 7 (1888).

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Chapter 2

2.20PL 32:901–903

A. Ita est ut dicis, et obtempero praeceptis tuis libens. Sed illud saltem impetrem, antequam termi­ num volumini statuas, ut quid intersit inter veram figuram, quæ intelligentia continetur, et eam quam sibi fingit cogitatio, quæ graece sive phantasia sive phantasma dicitur, breviter exponas. R. Hoc quæris quod videre nisi mundissimus non potest, et ad cujus rei visionem parum es exercitatus; neque nunc per istos circuitus aliud quam exercitationem tuam, ut il­ lud videre sis idoneus, operamur: tamen interesse plu­ rimum quomodo possit doceri, fortasse breviter pla­ num facio. Fac enim te aliquid esse oblitum, aliosque te velle quasi in memoriam revocare. Dicunt ergo illi: Numquidnam hoc est, aut illud? diversa velut si­ milia proferentes. Tu vero nec illud vides quod recor­ diri cupis, et tamen vides non hoc esse quod dicitur. Numquidnam tibi cum hoc evenit, omni modo videtur oblivio? Nam ipsa discretio, qua non admittitur quod falso admoneris, pars quædam recordationis est. A. Ita videtur. R. Tales ergo nondum verum vident; falli tamen decipique non possunt; et quid quaerant, satis norunt. At si tibi quispiam dicat te post paucos dies risisse quam natus es, non audes dicere falsum esse: et si auctor sit cui fides habenda est, non recordatu­ rus, sed crediturus es; totum enim tempus illud validissima oblivione tibi sepultum est: an aliter putas? A. Prorsus consentio. R. Hæc igitur ab illa oblivione plurimum differt, sed illa media est. Nam est aliud re­ cordationi revisendæque veritati propior atque vici­ nior: cui simile est quando videmus aliquid, certoque recognoscimus id nos vidisse aliquando, atque nosse affirmamus; sed ubi, aut quando, aut quomodo, aut apud quem nobis in notitiam venerit, satagimus re­ petere atque recolere. Ut si de homine nobis contige­ rit, etiam quaerimus ubi eum noverimus: quod cum ille commemoraverit, repente tota res memoriæ quasi lumen infunditur, nihilque amplius, ut reminiscamur, laboratur. An hoc genus ignotum tibi est, aut obscu­ rum? A. Quid hoc planius? aut quid crebrius mihi ac­ cidere solet? R. Tales sunt qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eruditi; siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione ob­ rutas eruunt discendo, et quodammodo refodiunt: nec tamen contenti sunt, nec se tenent donec totam faciem veritatis, cujus quidam in illis artibus splendor jam subrutilat, latissime atque plenissime intuean­ tur. Sed ex his quidam falsi colores atque formæ, velut in speculum cogitationis se fundunt, falluntque inqui­ rentes sæpe, ac decipiunt putantes illud totum esse quod norunt vel quod inquirunt. Ipsæ sunt illæ ima­ ginationes magna cautione vitandæ; quæ deprehen­ duum fallaces, cum cogitationis variato quasi speculo variantur, cum illa facies veritatis una et immutabilis maneat. Tum enim alterius atque alterius magnitudi­ nis quadratum sibi cogitatio depingit, et quasi ante oculos præfert; sed mens interior quai vult verum vi­ dcre, ad illud se potius convertat, si potest, secundum quod judicat illa omnia esse quadrata. A. Quid, si nobis quispiam dicat secundum id eam judicare, quod videre oculis solet? R. Quare ergo judicat, si tamen bene erudita est, quantamvis pilam veram vera pla­ nitie puncto tangi? Quid tale unquam oculus vidit, aut videre potest, cum ipsa imaginatione cogitationis fingi quidquam hujusmodi non potest? Annon hoc probamus, cum etiam minimum circulum imaginando animo describimus, et ab eo lineas ad centrum duci­ mus? Nam cum duas duxerimus, inter quas quasi acu vix pungi possit, alias jam in medio non possumus ipsa cogitatione imaginaria ducere, ut ad centrum sine ulla commixtione perveniant; cum clamet ratio innu­ merabilcs posse duci, nec sese in illis incredibilibus angustiis nisi centro posse contingere, ita ut in omni earum intervallo scribi etiam circulus possit. Hoc cum illa phantasia implere non possit, magisque quam ipsi oculi, deficiat, siquidem per ipsos est animo inflicta, manifestum est et multum eam differre a veritate, et illam, dum hæc videtur, non videri. Hæc dicentur operosius atque subtilius, cum de intelligendo disserere cœperimus, quæ nobis pars proposita est, cum de animæ vita quidquid sollicitat, fuerit quantum valemus enucleatum atque discussum. Non enim credo te parum formidare ne mors humana, etiamsi non interimat animam, rerum tamen omnium, et ipsius, si qua comperta fuerit, veritatis oblivionem inferat. A. Non potest satis dici quantum hoc malum metuendum sit. Qualis enim erit illa aeterna vita, vel quae mors non ei præponenda est, si sic vivit anima, ut videmus eam vivere in puero mox nato? ut de illa vita nihil dicam quæ in utero agitur; non enim puto esse nullam. R. Bono animo esto; Deus aderit, ut jam sentimus, quærentibus nobis, qui beatissimum quid­ dam post hoc corpus, et veritatis plenissimum sine ullo mendacio pollicetur. A. Fiat ut speramus.

A. It is as you say, and I gladly obey your precepts. But let me obtain at least this before you set an end to the volume: that you briefly explain the difference between the true figure, which is contained in the intelligence, and that which thought forms for itself, which in Greek is called phantasia or phantasma. R. You are asking about what no one can see unless most pure, and for the sight of which you are too little exercised; and by these roundabout ways we are now working at nothing else than your exercise, so that you may become fit to see it. Yet perhaps I can briefly make plain how it can be taught that the difference is very great. Suppose you have forgotten something, and others wish to recall it, as it were, to your memory. They say: Is it this, or that?, bringing forward different things as if similar. And you do not see what you wish to remember, and yet you see that it is not what is said. When this happens to you, does it seem to be complete forgetting? For that very discernment, by which what you are wrongly reminded of is not admitted, is a certain part of remembering. A. So it seems. R. Such people, then, do not yet see the truth; yet they cannot be misled and deceived, and they know well enough what they are seeking. But if someone tells you that you laughed a few days after you were born, you do not dare to say it is false; and if the source is one to be trusted, you will not remember but believe; for that whole time is buried for you in the deepest forgetfulness. Or do you think otherwise? A. I agree entirely. R. This forgetfulness, then, differs greatly from that one; but that one is in the middle. For there is another, nearer and closer to remembering and seeing the truth again; like it is when we see something and recognize with certainty that we saw it at some time and affirm that we knew it, but take pains to recover and recall where, or when, or how, or through whom it came into our knowledge. As if it happens with a man, we even ask where we knew him; and when he has reminded us, suddenly the whole thing pours into memory like light, and no more labor is needed to remember. Or is this kind unknown or obscure to you? A. What is plainer than this? Or what usually happens to me more often? R. Such are those who are well educated in the liberal disciplines; for in learning they undoubtedly dig out these things, buried in forgetfulness within them, and in a way unearth them; yet they are not content, nor do they stop until they behold most widely and most fully the whole face of truth, of which a certain splendor already gleams in those arts. But from these some false colors and forms pour themselves, as it were, into the mirror of thought, and often mislead the inquirers, and deceive them into thinking that this is the whole of what they know or what they seek. These are the very imaginations which must be avoided with great caution; they are detected as deceptive when they vary as the mirror of thought varies, while that face of truth remains one and unchangeable. For then thought paints for itself a square of now one size, now another, and holds it as it were before its eyes; but the inner mind, which wishes to see the true, should turn rather, if it can, to that according to which it judges that all these are squares. A. What if someone tells us that it judges according to what it is accustomed to see with the eyes? R. Why then does it judge, if it is well educated, that a true sphere of any size touches a true plane at a point? What eye has ever seen anything such, or can see it, when nothing of the kind can be formed even by the imagination of thought? Do we not prove this when we describe in imagination even the smallest circle in the mind, and draw lines from it to the center? For when we have drawn two, between which a needle could scarcely prick, we can no longer draw others in the middle by imaginary thought so that they reach the center without any merging; though reason cries out that countless lines can be drawn, and that they cannot touch one another in those incredible narrows except at the center, so that in every interval between them a circle could even be drawn. Since that phantasy cannot accomplish this, and fails more than the eyes themselves, since it is through them that it was imprinted on the mind, it is clear both that it differs greatly from truth and that, while it is seen, truth is not seen. These things will be discussed more laboriously and subtly when we begin to treat of understanding, which is the part we have set before us, once whatever troubles us about the life of the soul has been explained and discussed as far as we are able. For I believe you are not a little afraid that human death, even if it does not kill the soul, may still bring forgetfulness of all things, and of truth itself, if any has been found. A. It cannot be said enough how much this evil is to be feared. For what kind of eternal life will that be, or what death is not to be preferred to it, if the soul lives as we see it live in a newborn child? Not to speak of that life which is lived in the womb; for I do not think there is none. R. Be of good courage; God will be present, as we already feel as we seek, who promises something most blessed after this body, and most full of truth, without any falsehood. A. May it be as we hope.

Notes and citation

Summary: Reason explains the difference between true figures known by the intelligence and the images formed by thought, using the kinds of forgetting and remembering, and closes by promising that God will grant a blessed life full of truth after this body.

  • The comparison of learning with recovering what is buried in forgetfulness recalls Plato's doctrine of recollection; Augustine later qualified this passage (Retractations 1.4.4).

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (OCR slip; stray mark): inter.veram → inter veram; quoe intelligentia → quæ intelligentia; aliqnid → aliquid; falsuin → falsum; scd crediturus → sed crediturus; valL. dissima → validissima; Ilacc igitur → Hæc igitur; scd illa media → sed illa media; est alid → est aliud; rccognoscimus → recognoscimus; nosSes → nosse; quandQ → quando; ubi cum noverimus → ubi eum noverimus; commemopaverit → commemoraverit; libcralibus → liberalibus; tutaM → totam; fornix, vclut → formæ, velut; suut illæ → sunt illæ; dcpiugil → depingit; ant videre → aut videre; ab co lineas → ab eo lineas; eliam circulus → etiam circulus; Iloc cum → Hoc cum; possit., magisque → possit, magisque; carn differre → eam differre; dnm hæc → dum hæc; intericiatanimam → interimat animam; fucrit → fuerit; vivcre → vivere; mox Datu? → mox nato?; iila viia → illa vita; agiLur → agitur; R, Bono → R. Bono; at jam sentimus → ut jam sentimus; qni beatissimum → qui beatissimum.

Topics: Eschatology

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Sol. 2.20 (PL 32:901–903; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-soliloquia/2-20/#p-2-20). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation of C. C. Starbuck in NPNF¹ 7 (1888).