On the Trinity 13.5–13.13

Latin text: Migne, PL 42 (Latin text: Migne, Patrologia Latina, digitized by Open Greek and Latin (patrologia_latina-dev, University of Leipzig), CC BY-SA 4.0).English: Claude (claude-opus-5-5), public domain (CC0). Compare: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series 1, vol. 3 (1887).

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Chapter 13

13.5PL 42:1006

An forte illud est quod nos ab his angustiis possit eruere, ut quoniam diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam vitam quod eos maxime delectavit, ut voluptas Epicurum, virtus Zenonem; sic alium aliquid aliud, nihil dicamus esse beate vivere, nisi vivere sccundum delectationem suam, et ideo falsum non esse quod omnes beate vi­ vere velint, quia omnes iIa volunt ut quemque de­ lectat? Nam et boc populo si pronuntiatum esset ill theatro, omnes id in suis voluntatibus invenirent. Sed boc quoque Cicero cum sibi ex adverso proposuisset, ila redarguit, ut qui hoc sentiunt, erubescant. Ait enim: Ecce autem non philolophi quidem, aed prompti tamen ad disputandum, omnes aiunt eue beatos, qui vivant ut ipsi velint: hoc est quod noa dilunus, Ut quosque delectat. Sed mox ille subjecit: Faslum id quidem. Velle enim quod non deceat, idipaun. miserrimum eat: nec tam miserum eat non adipisci quod velis, quam adipisci velle quod non oporteat. Præclarissime omnino atque verissime. Quis namque ita sit mente cæcus,et ab omni luce decoris alienus ac tenebris dedecoris involutus, ut eum qui nequiter vivit ac turpiter, et nullo prohibente, nullo ulciscente, et nullo saltem reprehendere audente, insuper et lau­ dantibus plurimis, quoniam sicut ait Scriptura divina, Laudatur peccator in desideriis animœ suœ; et qui ini­ qua gerit, benedicitur, implet omnes suas facinorosissimas et flagiosissimas voluntates I, ideo beatum dicat, quia vivit ut vult: cum profecto quamvis et sic miser esset, minus tamen esset, si nihil eorum quae perperam voluisset, habere potuisset? Etiam mala enim voluntate vel sola quisque miser effcitur: sed miserior potestate, qua desiderium malae voluntatis impletur. Qua propter, quoniam ve­ rum est quod omnes homines esse beati velint, idquo unum ardentissimo amore appetant, et propter hoc caetera quæcumque appetunt; nec quisquam potest amare quod omnino quid vel quale sit nescit, nec potest nescire quid sit quod velle'se scit; sequitur ut omnes beatam vitam sciant. Omnes autem beati habent quod volunt, quamvis non omnes habent qui qnod volunt continuo sint beati: continuo autem miseri, qui vel non habent quod voluntvel id habent quod non recte volunt. Beatus igitur non est, nisi qui et habetomnia quas vult, et nihil vult male.

Or perhaps this is what can rescue us from these straits: since we said that each placed the happy life in what most delighted him, as pleasure delighted Epicurus and virtue Zeno, and something else others, let us say that to live happily is nothing but to live according to one's own delight, and therefore that it is not false that all want to live happily, because all want to live as each is delighted? For if this too had been announced to the people in the theater, all would have found it in their own wills. But Cicero too, having set this against himself as an objection, refuted it in such a way that those who think so are put to shame. For he says: “But see, people who are not philosophers indeed, but ready to argue, all say that those are happy who live as they themselves wish”; this is what we have called “as each is delighted.” But he soon added: “That indeed is false. For to wish what is not fitting is itself most wretched; nor is it so wretched not to obtain what you wish as to wish to obtain what you ought not.” Most excellently, and most truly. For who is so blind of mind, so estranged from all light of seemliness and wrapped in the darkness of disgrace, as to call happy, because he lives as he wishes, one who lives wickedly and shamefully, and, with no one forbidding, no one punishing, no one even daring to reprove him, and, moreover, with very many praising him, since, as divine Scripture says, “The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and he who does wicked things is blessed,” fulfills all his most criminal and most shameful wishes; whereas certainly, although he would be wretched even so, he would yet be less so if he could have had none of the things he had wrongly wished? For anyone is made wretched even by an evil will alone; but more wretched by the power by which the desire of the evil will is fulfilled. Therefore, since it is true that all men want to be happy, and desire this one thing with the most ardent love, and for its sake whatever else they desire; and since no one can love what he does not know at all, what or of what kind it is, nor can he not know what it is that he knows he wants: it follows that all know the happy life. And all who are happy have what they want, although not all who have what they want are thereby happy; but those are thereby wretched who either do not have what they want or have what they do not rightly want. No one, then, is happy except one who both has all that he wants and wants nothing badly.

Ps 10:3 (9:24 LXX) (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Following Cicero, Augustine rejects the idea that happiness is living as one wishes and concludes that only one who has all he wants and wants nothing wrongly is happy.

  • The two quotations are from Cicero's lost Hortensius. “The sinner is praised ...”: Ps 10:3 (9:24 LXX), in the Old Latin wording.
  • Epicurus and Zeno (founder of the Stoics) are named as types of those who placed happiness in pleasure and in virtue.

Extrabiblical texts: Cicero, Hort. frag. (Cicero; quotation); Epicurus (Epicurus (sayings and fragments); echo); Zeno of Citium, Zeno (Zeno of Citium; echo)

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.5 (PL 42:1006; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-5). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.6PL 42:1006

Cum ergo ex his duobus beata vita constetatqae omnibus nota, omnibus chara sit; quid putamus esse causæ cur horum duorum, quando utrumque non possunt magis eligant homines, ut omnia quae volunt habeant, quam ut omnia bene velint etiamsi non habeant? An ipsa est pravitas generis humani, ut cum eos non latrat, nec ilium beaturo esse qui quod vult non habet, nec illum qui quod male vult habet; sed illum gui et babet quaecumque vult bona, et nulla vult mala, ex his duobus quibus beata vita perficitur, quando utrumque non datur, id eligatur potius, unde magis a beata vita receditur Iongius quippe ab illa est quicumque adipiscitur male concupita, quam qui non adipiscitur concupita ); cum palius eligi debuerit voluntas bona, atque præponi etiam non adepta quae appetit? Pr9pinquat enim beato, qui bene vult quaecumque vult, et quae adepms cum fuerit beatus erit. Et utique non mala, sed bona beatum faciunt, quando faciunt: quorum bo­ norum habet aliquid jam, idque non parvi æstimandum, eam ipsam scilicet voluntatem bonam qui de, bonis quorum capax est humana natura, non de ul­ lius maIi perpetratione vel adeptione gaudere deside­ rat; et bona, qualia et in hac misera vita esse pos­ sunt, prudenti, temperanti, forti, et justa mente sectatur, et quantum datur assequitur; ut etiam in malis sit bonus, et linitis malis omnibus atque impletis bonis omnibus sit beatus:

Since, then, the happy life consists of these two things, and is known to all and dear to all, what do we think is the reason why, of these two, when they cannot have both, men would rather choose to have all that they want than to want all things well even if they do not have them? Is it the very depravity of the human race that, although it is not hidden from them that neither he is happy who does not have what he wants, nor he who has what he wants badly, but he who both has whatever good things he wants and wants no evil ones, yet of these two by which the happy life is completed, when both are not granted, that is chosen rather by which one departs further from the happy life (for whoever obtains what he wickedly desired is further from it than one who does not obtain what he desired), whereas a good will ought rather to have been chosen and preferred, even when it has not obtained what it seeks? For he comes near to being happy who wills well whatever he wills, and wills things which, when he has obtained them, will make him happy. And certainly it is not evil things but good that make one happy, when they do; and of these goods he already has something, and that not to be lightly esteemed, namely that very good will which desires to rejoice in the goods of which human nature is capable, not in the committing or obtaining of any evil; and which pursues with a prudent, temperate, courageous, and just mind such goods as can exist even in this miserable life, and attains them as far as is granted; so that even among evils he is good, and when all evils are ended and all goods fulfilled he will be happy.

Notes and citation

Summary: Men perversely prefer having what they want to wanting rightly, though a good will brings one nearer to happiness.

  • The opening words of the digital text are a fragment of Migne's chapter summary (“... rather that by which one departs from it”), removed by logged correction.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary): potius, quo ab ea receditur. → .

Topics: Ethics

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.6 (PL 42:1006; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-6). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-trinitate-13-6) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.7PL 42:1006–1007

Ac per boc in ista mortali vita erroribus ærum- Disque plenissima, præcipue fides est necessaria, qua in Deum creditur. Non enim quaecumque bona, maximeque illa quibus quisque fit bonus, et illa qni­ bus fiet beatus, unde nisi a Deo in hominem veniant, et homini accedant, inveniri potest. Cum autem ex hac vita ab eo qui in his miseriis fidelis et bonus eat, ventum fuerit ad beatam, tunc erit vcre quod nunc esse nullo modo potest, ut sic bono vivat quomodo vult. Non enim volet male vivere in illa felicitate, aut volet aliquid quod decrit, aut decrit quod voluent. Quidquid atnabitur, adcrit: nee desiderabitur quod non aderit. Omne quo ibi erit, bonum erit, et summus Deus summum bonum crit, atque ad fruen­ dum amantibus præsto erit; et quod est omnino bcatissimum, ita semper roro certum erit. Nunc vero fecerunt quidem' sibi pbilosophi, sicut eorum cui­ que placuit, vitas beatas suas, ut quasi propria vir­ tute possent, quod communi mortalium conditione non poterant, sic scilicet vivere ut vellent. Sentiobant enim aliter beatum esse neminem posse, nisi habendo quod vellet, et nihil patiendo quod nollet. Quis autem non qualemcumque vitam qua dcleclatur, et. ideo beatam vocaL, vellet sic esse in sua potestate, ut eam posset habere perpetuam? Et tamen quis ita est? Quis vult pati molestias quas fortiter toleret, quamvis eas vclit possitque tolerare si patitur? Quis velit in tormentis vivere, etiam qui potest in eis per patientiam tenendo justitiam laudabiliter vivere? Transitura cogitaverunt hæc mala, qui ea pertulerunt, vel cupiendo habere, vel timendo amittere quod amabant, sive nequiter sive laudabiliter. Nam multi per transitoria mala, ad bona permanbura fortiter tetenderunt. Qui profecto spe beati sunt, etiam cum sunt in transitoriis malis, per quae ad bona non transitura perveniunt. Sed qui spe beatus est, nondum beatus est: exspectat namque per pltieDtiam beatitudinem quam nondum tenet. Qui vero sine ulla spe tali, sine ulla tali mercede cruciatur, quantamlibet adhibeat tolerantiam, non est beatus veracher, sed miser fortiter. Neque enim propterea miser non est, quia miserior esset, si etiam impatienter miseriam sustineret. Porro si ista non patitur, quæ nollet pati in suo corpore, nec tunc quidem beatus habendus est, quoniam non vivit ut vult. Ut enim alia omittam, quae corpore illæso ad animi pertinent offensiones, sine quibus vivere vellemus, ei sunt innumerabilia; vellet utique si posset ita salvum atque incolume habere corpus, et nullas ex eo pati moleslias, utid haberet in potestate, aut in ipsius incor­ ruptione corporis: quod quia non habet, ac pendet in incerto2, profecto non vivit ut vult. Quamvis enim per fortitudinem sit paratus excipere, et æquo ferre animo quidquid adversitatis acciderit; mavult tamen ut non accidat, et si possit facit; atque ita paratus est in utrumque, ut quantum in ipso est altcrum optet, alterum vitet, et si quod vitai, incurrerit, ideo volens ferat, quia fieri non potuit quod volcbat. Ne opprimatur ergo sustinet: sed premi nollet. Quomodo ergo vivit ut vult? An quia volens furtis est ad ferenda quae nollet illata? Ideo igitur id vult quod potest, quoniam quod vult non potest. Hæc est tota, utrum ridenda, an potius miseranda, superbo­ rum beatitudo mortalium, gloriantium se vivere ut volunt, quia volentes patienter ferunt quæ accidere sibi nolunt. Hoc est enim, aiunt, quod sapienter dixit Terentius, Quoniam non potest a.id Ueri quod vis, Id velis qUod possis Commode hoc dictum esse, quis negat? Sed consi­ lium est datum misero, ne esset miserior. Beato autem, quales se esse omnes volunt, non recte ntc vere dicitur, Non potest fieri quod vis. Si enim bea­ tus est, quidquid vult Geri potest; quia non vult quod fieri non potest. Sed non est mortalitatis hujus hæc vita, nec erit nisi quando et immortalitas erit. Quæ si nullo modo dari homini posset, frustra etiam bea­ titudo quæreretur; quia sine immortalitate non po­ test esse.

And for this reason, in this mortal life, so full of errors and troubles, faith is above all necessary, by which one believes in God. For it cannot be found from where else any good things, and especially those by which each becomes good and those by which he will become happy, come to man and are added to him, except from God. But when the one who is faithful and good amid these miseries has come from this life to the happy one, then there will truly be what now can in no way be, that he lives as he wills. For he will not will to live badly in that happiness, nor will he will anything that will be lacking, nor will anything be lacking that he wills. Whatever is loved will be present; nor will what is not present be desired. All that is there will be good, and the supreme God will be the supreme good, and will be at hand for those who love him to enjoy; and, what is most happy of all, it will be certain that it will always be so. But now the philosophers have indeed made for themselves their own happy lives, as each of them pleased, as if by their own virtue they could do what by the common condition of mortals they could not, namely live as they willed. For they felt that no one could be happy otherwise than by having what he willed and suffering nothing that he did not will. And who would not wish any life whatever in which he delights, and which he therefore calls happy, to be so in his own power that he could have it forever? And yet who is in that state? Who wants to suffer troubles which he may bear bravely, even though he wants and is able to bear them if he suffers them? Who would want to live in torments, even one who can live praiseworthily in them by holding to justice through patience? Those who have endured these evils thought of them as passing, whether by desiring to have or by fearing to lose what they loved, whether wickedly or praiseworthily. For many have bravely pressed on through passing evils to lasting goods. These are certainly happy in hope, even while they are in the passing evils through which they come to goods that will not pass. But he who is happy in hope is not yet happy; for he waits with patience for a happiness which he does not yet hold. But he who is tortured without any such hope, without any such reward, however much endurance he shows, is not truly happy but bravely wretched. For he is not therefore not wretched because he would be more wretched if he bore his wretchedness impatiently as well. Further, if he does not suffer the things he would not want to suffer in his body, not even then is he to be considered happy, since he does not live as he wills. For, to pass over other things, which concern injuries of the mind without harm to the body, which we would wish to live without, and which are innumerable, he would certainly wish, if he could, to have his body so safe and unharmed, and to suffer no troubles from it, as to have this in his power, or in the incorruption of the body itself; and since he does not have this, and hangs in uncertainty, he certainly does not live as he wills. For although by courage he is ready to receive and bear with an even mind whatever adversity befalls, yet he would rather it did not befall, and he acts so if he can; and so he is ready for both, in such a way that, as far as lies in him, he wishes for the one and avoids the other; and if he meets what he avoids, he bears it willingly because what he willed could not come about. He endures, then, so as not to be crushed; but he would not wish to be pressed at all. How, then, does he live as he wills? Because he is willingly brave in bearing what he would not wish to have brought upon him? He wills what he can, therefore, because he cannot do what he wills. This is the whole happiness, whether to be laughed at or rather pitied, of proud mortals who boast that they live as they will because they willingly bear with patience what they do not will to happen to them. For this, they say, is what Terence wisely said: “Since what you will cannot be done, will what you can.” Who denies that this was aptly said? But the advice was given to a wretched man, so that he might not be more wretched. To a happy man, such as all wish to be, it is not rightly or truly said, “What you will cannot be done.” For if he is happy, whatever he wills can be done, because he does not will what cannot be done. But this life does not belong to this mortality, nor will it exist except when immortality also exists. And if this could in no way be given to man, happiness too would be sought in vain, because it cannot exist without immortality.

Rom 8:25 (echo, medium confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: In this life faith is needed, for only in the life to come will the good live as they will; the philosophers' boast of living as they will is pitiable, and happiness requires immortality.

  • Quotation from Terence, Andria 305–306. The waiting in hope with patience echoes Rom 8:24–25.
  • The opening words of the digital text are a fragment of Migne's chapter summary (“... will attain only in the future life. The laughable and pitiable happiness of proud philosophers”), removed by logged correction, as are Migne's verse reference to Terence.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary; Migne's inserted reference to Terence): nonnisi in jutura vita consequetur. Philosophorum superborum ridenda et miseranda bea­ titudo. → ; qUod Andreia, i, 5, 6. possis 9, (In act. scen, vers. ) → qUod possis.

Extrabiblical texts: Terence, Andr. 305 (Terence; quotation)

Topics: Eschatology, Ethics

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.7 (PL 42:1006–1007; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-7). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.8PL 42:1007–1008

Cum ergo beati esse omnes homines velint, si vere volunt,proiecto et esse immortales volunt: aliter enim beati esse non possent. Denique et de immortalitate interrogati, sicut et de bealiLudine, omnes eam se velle respondent. Sed qualis­ cumque beatitudo, quæ potius vocetur quam sit, in hac vita quaeritur, imo vero fingitur, dum immorta­ litas desperatur, sine qua vera beatitudo esse non potest. Ille quippe beate vivit, quod jam superius diximus, et astruendo satis fiximus, qui vivit ut vult, nec male aliquid vult. Nemo autem male vult immor­ talitatem, si ejus humana capax est Deo donante na­ tura:cujus si non capax est, nec beatitudinis capax est. Ut enim horno beate vivat, oportet ut vivat. Quem porro morientem vita ipsa deserit, beata vita cum illo manere qui potest? Cum autem deserit, aut nolentem deserit procul dubio, aut volentem, aut neutrum. Si nolentem, quomodo beata vita est, quae ita cst in voluntate, ut non sit in potestate? Cumque beatus nemo sit aliquid volendo nec habendo, quanto minus est beatus qui non honore, non possessione, non qualibet alia re, sed ipsa beata vita nolens deseritur, quando ei nulla vita erit? Unde etsi nullus sensus relinquitur, quo sit misera (propterea enim beata vita discedit, quoniam tota vita discedit), miser est talnen, quamdiu sentit, quia scit se nolente2 consumi propter quod caetera et quod prae cæteris diligit. Non igitur potest vita et beata esse, et nolen­ tem deserere.: quia beatus nolens nemo fit; ac per hoc quanto magis nolentem deserendo miserum facit, quae si nolenti praesto esset miserum iaceret? Si au­ tem volentem deserit, etiam sic quomodo beata vita erat, quam perire 4 voluit qui habebat? Restat ut dicant neutrum esse in animo beati; id est, eum deseri a beata vita, cum per mortem deserit tota vita, nec nolle nec velle, ad utrumque enim parato et aequo corde I consistere. Sed nec ista bcala cst vita, quae talis est, ut quem beaturo facit, amore ejus indigna sit. Quomodo enim est beata vita, quam non amat beatus? Aut quomodo amatur, quod utruM vigeat, an pereat, indifferenter accipitur?Nisi forto virtutes, quas propter solam beatitudinem sic ama­ mus, persuadere nobis audent, ut ipsam beatitudinen, non amemus. Quod si faciunt, etiam ipsas uti­ qne amare desistimus, quando illam propter quam solam istas amavimns, non amamus. Deinde quomodo crit vera tam ilia perspecta 1 tam examinata, tam eliquata, tam certa sententia, beatos esse omnes Iro­ mines velle, si ipsi qui jam beali sunt, beati esse nee nolunt, nec volunt? Aut si volunt, ut veritas clamat, ut natura compellit, cui summe bonus et immutabi­ liter beatus Creator indidit hoc; si volont, inqoam, heati esse qui beati sunt, beati non esse utique no­ lunt. Si autem beati non esse nolunt, procul dubio nolunt consumi et perire quod beati sunt. Nee nisi viventes beati esse possunt: nolunt igitur perire quod vivunt. Immortales ergo esse volunt, quicumque vere beati vel sunt vel esse cupiunt. Non autem vivit beate, cui nun adest quod vult: nullo modo. igitur esae poterit vila veraciter beata, nisi fuerit sempi­ terna.

Since, then, all men want to be happy, if they want it truly, they certainly want to be immortal as well; for otherwise they could not be happy. Finally, when asked about immortality, as about happiness, all answer that they want it. But some sort of happiness, which is called so rather than being so, is sought in this life, or rather is feigned, while immortality is despaired of, without which there can be no true happiness. For he lives happily, as we have already said above and sufficiently established by argument, who lives as he wills and wills nothing badly. But no one wills immortality badly, if human nature is capable of it by God's gift; and if it is not capable of it, neither is it capable of happiness. For in order that a man may live happily, he must live. And when life itself abandons him in dying, how can a happy life remain with him? And when it abandons him, it abandons him either unwilling, without doubt, or willing, or neither. If unwilling, how is it a happy life, which is so within his will that it is not within his power? And since no one is happy by willing something and not having it, how much less is he happy who is abandoned against his will, not by honor, not by possession, not by any other thing, but by the happy life itself, when he will have no life at all? Hence, even if no sense is left by which he may be wretched (for the happy life departs precisely because all life departs), he is nevertheless wretched as long as he perceives, because he knows that against his will that is being consumed for whose sake he loves all else and which he loves above all else. Life, then, cannot both be happy and abandon a man against his will; because no one becomes happy against his will; and so how much more does it make him wretched by abandoning him against his will, when, if it were present to him against his will, it would make him wretched? But if it abandons him willing, even so, how was it a happy life, which the one who had it willed to perish? It remains for them to say that neither is in the mind of the happy man; that is, that when he is abandoned by the happy life, when through death all life abandons him, he neither wills nor does not will it, for he stands ready for both with an even heart. But neither is that a happy life which is such that it is unworthy of the love of the one it makes happy. For how is it a happy life which the happy man does not love? Or how is that loved whose flourishing or perishing is received with indifference? Unless perhaps the virtues, which we love in this way only for the sake of happiness, dare to persuade us not to love happiness itself. But if they do this, we certainly cease to love them as well, when we do not love that for whose sake alone we loved them. Then, how will that opinion be true, so thoroughly seen, so examined, so sifted, so certain, that all men want to be happy, if those who are already happy neither do not want nor want to be happy? Or if they want it, as truth cries out, as nature compels, in which the supremely good and unchangeably happy Creator has implanted this; if, I say, those who are happy want to be happy, they certainly do not want not to be happy. And if they do not want not to be happy, without doubt they do not want that by which they are happy to be consumed and to perish. And they cannot be happy except as living; they do not want, then, their living to perish. All, then, who either truly are happy or desire to be, want to be immortal. But he does not live happily who does not have what he wants; in no way, then, could a life be truly happy unless it were everlasting.

Notes and citation

Summary: Since no one can be happy who loses life against his will or is indifferent to losing it, true happiness must be everlasting.

Topics: Eschatology

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.8 (PL 42:1007–1008; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-8). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-trinitate-13-8) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.9PL 42:1008

Hanc utrum capiat humana natura, quam tamen desiderabilem confitetur, non parva quæstio est. Sed si fides adsit, quae inest eis qnibus dcdit potestatem Jesus filios Dei fieri, nulla quapstio est. Humanis quippe argumentationibus haec invenire conantes, vix pauci magno præditi ingenio, abundantes otio, doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi, ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem per­ venire potuerunt. Cui tamen animæ beatam vitam non invenerunt stabilem, id est veram: ad miserias eam quippe vitæ hujus etiam post beatitudinem red­ ire dixerunt. Et qui eorum de hac erubuerunt sen­ tentia, et animam purgatam in sempiterna beatitu­ dine ' sine corpore collocandam putaverunt, talia de mundi retrorsus aeternitate sentiunt, ut hanc de anima sententiam suam ipsi rcdarguant: quod hic longam est demonstrare, sed in libro duodecimo de Civitate Dei, satis a nobis est, quantum arbitror, explicatum. Fides autem ista totum homi­ nem immorta!cm futurum, qui utique constat ex anima et corpore, et ob hoc vere beatum, non argu­ mentatione humana, sed divina auctoritatepromittit. Et ideo cum dictum esset in Evangelio, quod Jesus dederit potestatem folios Dei fieri ii, qui eum recepe­ runt; et quid sit recepisse eum, breviter fuisset expo­ situm, dicendo, Credentibus ill nomine ejus; quoque modo filii Dei fierent, esset adjunctum, Qui non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex vo­ luntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt: ne ista hominum qnam videmus et gestamus infirmitas tantam exce!­ lentiam desperaret, illico annexum est, Et Verbum caro factum eat, et habitavit in nobis; ut a rontrario suaderetur quod incredibile videbatur. Si enim natura Dci Filius propter filios hominum misericordia factus est hominis filius; hoc est enim, Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit ill nobis hominibcs: quanto est credibilius, natura filios hominis gratia Dei filios Dei fieri, et habitare in Dco, in quo solo et de quo solo esse possunt beati part!c!pes im­ mortalitatis ejus effecti; propter quod persuaden­ dum Dei Filius particeps nostrae mortalitatis effe­ ctus est?

Whether human nature can receive this, which it nevertheless confesses to be desirable, is no small question. But if faith is present, which is in those to whom Jesus gave power to become sons of God, there is no question. For of those who try to find these things by human arguments, scarcely a few, endowed with great ability, abounding in leisure, and trained in the subtlest learning, have been able to arrive at investigating the immortality of the soul alone. Yet for this soul they did not find a stable, that is, a true, happy life; for they said it returns to the miseries of this life even after happiness. And those of them who were ashamed of this opinion, and thought that the purified soul was to be placed in everlasting happiness without a body, hold such views about the eternity of the world in the past that they themselves refute this opinion of theirs about the soul: which it would be long to show here, but it has been explained sufficiently by us, I think, in the twelfth book of the City of God. But this faith promises, not by human argument but by divine authority, that the whole man, who certainly consists of soul and body, will be immortal, and for this reason truly happy. And so, when it had been said in the Gospel that Jesus gave power to become sons of God to those who received him, and what it is to have received him had been briefly explained by saying, “to those who believe in his name,” and it had been added in what way they would become sons of God, “who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God,” then, lest this weakness of men, which we see and bear, should despair of so great an excellence, it was at once joined, “And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,” so that what seemed incredible might be made persuasive from its opposite. For if the Son of God by nature, out of mercy for the sons of men, was made the son of man (for this is “The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us” men), how much more credible is it that the sons of man by nature should by the grace of God become sons of God and dwell in God, in whom alone and from whom alone they can be happy, made partakers of his immortality; for the sake of persuading us of which the Son of God was made a partaker of our mortality?

John 1:12 (quotation, high confidence) · John 1:13 (quotation, high confidence) · John 1:14 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Philosophers barely reached the soul's immortality, but faith promises immortality to the whole man, made credible by the Word becoming flesh.

  • Quotations: John 1:12–14. Augustine refers to his City of God, Book 12, where he argues against cyclical returns of the soul.
  • The philosophers who taught that the soul returns to the miseries of this life are Platonists; those who taught a final bodiless happiness include Porphyry. Neither is named here.
  • The opening words of the digital text are Migne's chapter summary, removed by logged correction.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary): i2. Nou humanis, argumentationibus, sed fidei auxilio dicimus beatitudinem futuram esse vere sempiternam. Ex Filii Del incarnatione credibilis fit immortalitas beatitudinis. → .

Extrabiblical texts: Augustine, Civ. 12.14 (City of God; allusion)

Topics: Eschatology, Christology

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.9 (PL 42:1008; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-9). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-trinitate-13-9) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.10PL 42:1008–1009

Eos itaque qui dicunt, Itane defuit Deo modus alus quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis hujus ut unigenitum Filium Deum sibi coæternum, hom!­ nem fieri vellet, induendo humanam animam et car­ nem, mortalemque factum mortem perpeti? parum est sic refellere, ut istum modum quo nos per Me­ diatorem Dei et hominum hominem Christum Jesum Deus liberare dignatur, asseramus bonum et divinæ congruum dignitati: verum etiam ut ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo defuisse, cujus pote. stati cuncta æqualiter subjacent; sed sanandae no­ stræ miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non fuisse, nec esse oportuisse. Quid enim tam nccesM­ rium fuit ad erigendam spem nostram, mentesque mortalium conditione ipsius mortalitatis abjectas, ab immortalitatis desperatione liberandas, quam ut de­ monstraretur nobis quanti nos penderet Deus, quan­ tumque diligeret? Quid vero hujus rei tanto isto in­ dicio manifestius atque præclarius, quam ut Dei Filius immutabiliter bonus, in se manens quod erat, et a nobis pro nobis accipiens quod non erat, præter suæ naturae detrimentum *, nostrae dignatus inire consortium, prius sine ullo malo suo merito mala nostra perferret; ac sic jam credentibus quantum nos diligat Deus, et quod desperabamus jam sperantibus, dona in nos sua sine ullis bonis meritis nostris, imo præcedentibus et malis meritis nostris, indebita Jargitate conferret? Quia et ea quæ dicuntur merita nostra, dona sunt ejus. Ut enim fides per dilectionem operetur, chana Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus eat nobis. Tunc est autem datus, quando est Jesus resurrectione clarificatus. Tunc enim eum se missurum esse pro­ misit et misit: quia tunc, sicut de illo scriptum est, et ante praedictum, Ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus. Hæc dona sunt merita nostra, quibus ad summum bonum immortalis beatitudinis ' pervenimus. Commendat au­ tem, inquit Aposto!us, charitatem suam Deua in nobis, quoniam cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Multo magis justificati nunc in san­ guine ipsius, salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum. Adhuc ad­ dit, et d!Ctt, Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii ejus; multo magis recon­ ciliati, salvi erimus ill vita ipsius. Quos peccatorcs dixit prius, hos posterius inimicos Dei; et quos prius justificatos in sanguine Jesu Christi, cos posterius reconciliatos per mortem p'ilii Dei; et Quos prius salvos ab ira per ipsum, eos postea salvos in vita Ipsius. Non ergo ante istam gratiam quoquo modo peccatores, sed in tatibus peccatis fuimus, ut inimici essemus Dei. Superius autem idcm apostolus nos peccatores et inimicos Dei, duobus identidem nOlui. nibus appellavit, uno velut mitissimo, alio plane atrocissimo, dicens, Si enim Christ, CuM infirmi essemus adhuc, juxta tenivus pro impiis mortus est. Quos infirmos, eosdem impios nun­ cupavit. Leve aliquid videtnr infirmitas; sed ali­ quando talis est, ut impietas nominetur, Nisi tamen infirmitas esset, medicum necessarium non haberet: qui est hebraice Jesus, græce ∑ωτήρ, nostra autem locutione Salvator. Quod verbutn lalina lingua antea non habebat, sed habere poterat, sicut potuit quando voluit. Hæe autem Apostoli sententia praecedens, ubi ait, Adhauc cum infirmi essemus, juxta tempus pro im­ piis mortuus eat, cobaeret his duabus sequentibus, quarum in una dixit peccatores, in alia inimicos Dei, tanquam illis singulis reddiderit singula,pec­ catores ad infirmos, inimicos Dei referens ad im­ pios.

As for those, then, who say, “Did God lack any other way of freeing men from the misery of this mortality, that he should will his only-begotten Son, God coeternal with himself, to become man by putting on a human soul and flesh, and, made mortal, to suffer death?”, it is too little to refute them by asserting that this way, by which God deigns to free us through the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is good and befitting the divine dignity; we must also show, not that no other way was possible to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there was no other way more fitting for healing our misery, nor ought there to have been. For what was so necessary for raising our hope, and for freeing the minds of mortals, cast down by the condition of mortality itself, from despair of immortality, as that it should be shown to us how much God valued us and how much he loved us? And what is more manifest and more glorious as a proof of this than that the Son of God, unchangeably good, remaining in himself what he was, and receiving from us and for us what he was not, deigning to enter into fellowship with our nature without loss of his own, should first bear our evils without any evil desert of his own; and so, to us who now believe how much God loves us, and now hope for what we despaired of, should confer his gifts upon us with an undeserved generosity, without any good deserts of ours, indeed with our evil deserts going before? For even the things that are called our merits are his gifts. For in order that faith may work through love, the love of God has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. And he was given when Jesus was glorified by the resurrection. For then he promised that he would send him, and he sent him; because then, as was written of him and foretold before, “He ascended on high, he led captivity captive, he gave gifts to men.” These gifts are our merits, by which we arrive at the supreme good of immortal happiness. “But God commends his love toward us,” says the apostle, “in that, while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.” He adds further, and says, “For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved in his life.” Those whom he first called sinners he afterward called enemies of God; and those he first called justified in the blood of Jesus Christ he afterward called reconciled through the death of the Son of God; and those he first called saved from wrath through him he afterward called saved in his life. So before this grace we were not sinners in just any way, but in such sins that we were enemies of God. And a little earlier the same apostle called us sinners and enemies of God by two names, one as it were very mild, the other plainly very harsh, saying, “For if Christ, when we were still weak, at the right time died for the ungodly.” Those he called weak he likewise named ungodly. Weakness seems something slight; but sometimes it is such that it is called ungodliness. Yet unless it were weakness, it would not need a physician, who in Hebrew is Jesus, in Greek Σωτήρ, and in our speech Salvator (“Savior”). This word the Latin language did not have before, but it could have it, as it could when it wished. And this preceding sentence of the apostle, where he says, “When we were still weak, at the right time he died for the ungodly,” coheres with the two that follow, in one of which he said “sinners” and in the other “enemies of God,” as though he matched each to each, referring sinners to the weak and enemies of God to the ungodly.

1 Tim 2:5 (allusion, high confidence) · Gal 5:6 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 5:5 (quotation, high confidence) · John 7:39 (allusion, medium confidence) · Eph 4:8 (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 68:18 (67:19 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:8 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:9 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:10 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 5:6 (quotation, high confidence) · Matt 9:12 (echo, medium confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: No way of freeing humanity was more fitting than the incarnation and death of the Son, which shows God's love; even our merits are God's gifts.

  • Allusions and quotations: 1 Tim 2:5; Gal 5:6; Rom 5:5; John 7:39 and 16:7 (the Spirit sent after Jesus was glorified); Eph 4:8, quoting Ps 68:18 (67:19 LXX); Rom 5:8–10; Rom 5:6; Matt 9:12 (the physician).
  • The opening words of the digital text are Migne's chapter summary, removed by logged correction, with Migne's Scripture references.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary; Migne's inserted Scripture reference): i5. Incarnatione Verbi convenientior non fuit modus alius liberandi hominis a mortalitatis miseria. Merita quæ dicuntur nostra, dona Mn< Dei. → ; nobis (Rom. v; 5). → nobis.; hominibus (Ephes. tV, 8, et Psal. LXVII, i9). → hominibus..

Topics: Christology

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.10 (PL 42:1008–1009; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-10). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-trinitate-13-10) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.11PL 42:1009

Sed quid est, justificati in sanguine ipsius? Quæ vis est sanguinis hujus, obsecro, ut in eo justificentur credentes? Et quid est, reconciliati per morti Filii ejus? Itane vero, cum irascerentur nobis Deus Pater, vidit mortem Filii sui pro nobis, et pla­ catus est nobis? Numquid ergo Filius ejus usque adeo nubis jam placatus erat, ut pro nobis ctiam dignare­ tur mori: Pater vero usque adeo adhuc irascebatur, ut nisi Filius pro nobis moreretur, non placaretur? Et quid est quod alio loco idem ipse doctor Gentium: Quid, inquit, ergo dicemus ad hæc? Si Deus pro nobis, quis contra nos? Qui proprio Filio auo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum; quomodo non etiam cum illo omnia nobis donavit? Numquid nisi jam placatus esset Pater, proprio Filio non parcens pro nobis eum traderet? Nonne videtur hæc illi vclut ad versa esse sententia?!n ilia moritur pro nobis Filius, et reconciliatur nobis Pater per mortem ejus: in hac autem tanquam prior nos dile­ xerit Pater, ipse propter nos Filio non parcit, ipse pro nobis eum u adit ad mortem. Sed video quod et antea Pater dilexit nos, non solum antequam pro nobis Filius morcretur, sed antequam conderet mundum, ipso teste Apostolo qui dicit: Sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem. Nec Filius Patre sibi non paccentc pro nobis velut invitus est tradhus, quia et de ipso dictum est, Qui me ditexit, ct tradidit semet­ ipsum pro me. Omnia ergo simu! et Pater ct Filius et amborum Spiritus pariter et concorditer operantur: tamen justificati sunus in Christi san­ guine, et reconciliati snmus Deo per mortem Filii ejus; et quomodo id factum sit, ut potero, eliam hic quantum salis videbitur explicabo.

But what is “justified in his blood”? What is the power of this blood, I ask, that believers are justified in it? And what is “reconciled through the death of his Son”? Is it really so, that when God the Father was angry with us, he saw the death of his Son for us and was appeased toward us? Was his Son, then, already so far appeased toward us that he even deigned to die for us, while the Father was still so far angry that unless the Son died for us he would not be appeased? And what of what the same teacher of the Gentiles says in another place: “What then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who is against us? He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, how has he not also with him given us all things?” Unless the Father had already been appeased, would he, not sparing his own Son, have given him up for us? Does not this statement seem, as it were, contrary to that one? In that one the Son dies for us, and the Father is reconciled to us through his death; but in this one, as though the Father loved us first, he himself does not spare the Son for our sake, he himself gives him up to death for us. But I see that the Father loved us even before, not only before the Son died for us, but before he founded the world, as the apostle himself testifies, saying, “As he chose us in him before the foundation of the world.” Nor was the Son given up for us as though unwilling, the Father not sparing him; for it was said of him too, “Who loved me and gave himself up for me.” All things, then, the Father and the Son and the Spirit of both work together, equally and in harmony; yet we have been justified in the blood of Christ, and we have been reconciled to God through the death of his Son; and how that was done I will explain here too, as I can, as far as seems enough.

Rom 5:9 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 5:10 (allusion, high confidence) · Rom 8:31 (quotation, high confidence) · Rom 8:32 (quotation, high confidence) · Eph 1:4 (quotation, high confidence) · Gal 2:20 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Augustine raises the question how we are justified by Christ's blood if the Father already loved us before the world was made, and affirms that Father, Son, and Spirit act together.

  • Quotations: Rom 5:9–10; Rom 8:31–32; Eph 1:4; Gal 2:20.
  • Augustine poses, in order to reject it, the picture of an angry Father appeased by a willing Son.
  • The opening words of the digital text are Migne's chapter summary, removed by logged correction, with Migne's Scripture references.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary; Migne's inserted Scripture reference): i 5. Difficultas, quomodo justificati sumus in sanguine Filii Dei. → ; donavit (/<<. VIII, 3i, 32)? → donavit?; pro me (Galat, n, 20). → pro me..

Topics: Christology, Trinity

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.11 (PL 42:1009; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-11). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.12PL 42:1009

Quadam justitia Dei in potestatem diaboli tradnum est genus humanum, peccato primi hominis in omnes utriusque sexus commixtone nascentes originaliter transeunte, et parentum primorum debito universos posteros obii­ gante. Hæc traditio prius in Genesi significata est, ubi cum serpenti dictum esset, Terram manducabis; ho­ mini dictum est, Terra ea, et in terram ibis. Eoquod dictum est, in terram ibis; mors corporis prænuntiata est, quia nec ipsam fuerat ex­ perturus, si permansisset ut tactus est rectus: quod vero viventi ait, Terra es; ostendit totum hominem in deterius commutatum. Tale est enim, ''erra ea; quale istud, Non permanedit Spiritus meus in hominibus istis quoniam coro sunt. Tunc ergo demonstra­ vit eum ei traditum, cui dictum fuerat, Terram man­ ducabis. Apostulus autem apertius hoc praedicat, ubi dicit: Et vos cum essetis mortui delicti, et peccatis ve­ atria, in quibus aliquando ambulastis secundum sæculum mundi hujus, secundum principem pOtestatis aeris, spiri­ tu, hujus qui nUlle operatur in filis diffidentiæ, ill quibus et nos omnes aliquando conversati sumus in desideriis carnis nostræ, facientes voluntates carnis et affectionum: et eramus natura filii iræ, sicut et cæteri. Filii dnudenUaB sunt infideles; et quis hoc non est antequam fidelis fiat? Quocirca omnes homines ab origine sub principe sunt potestatis aeris, qui ope­ ratur in filii, diffidentiæ. Et quod dixi, Ab origine, boc est quod dicit Apostolus, natura et se fuisse sicut caeteros: natura scilicet ut est depravata peccato, non ut recta creata est ab initio. Modus autem iste quo traditus est homo in diaboli potestatem, non ita debet intelligi, tanquam hoc Deus fecerit, aut fieri jusserit: sed quod tantum permiserit, juste tamen. Illo cnim deserente peccantem, peccati auctor illico invasit. Nec ita sane Deus deseruit creaturam suam, ut non se illi exhiberet Deum creantem et vivitican­ tem, et inter poenalia mala eliam bona malis multa praestantem. Non enim continuit in in sua miseratio­ nes suas. Nec hominem a lege suae potestatis amisit, quando in diaboli potestate esse permisit: quia nee ipse diabolus a potestate Omni­ potentis alienus est, sicut neque a bonitate. Nam et maligni angeli unde qualicumque subsisterent vita, nisi per eum qui vivificat omnia? Si ergo commissio peccatorum per iram Dei justam hominem subdidit diabolo. profecto remissio peccatorum per reconci­ liationem Dei benignam eruit hominem a diabolo.

By a certain justice of God the human race was handed over into the power of the devil, the sin of the first man passing originally into all who are born through the union of the two sexes, and the debt of the first parents binding all their descendants. This handing over was first signified in Genesis, where, when it had been said to the serpent, “You shall eat earth,” it was said to the man, “You are earth, and to earth you shall go.” By what was said, “to earth you shall go,” the death of the body was foretold, because he would not have experienced even that if he had remained as he was made, upright; but what he said to him while still living, “You are earth,” shows that the whole man was changed for the worse. For “You are earth” is like this: “My Spirit shall not remain in these men, because they are flesh.” Then, therefore, he showed that he was handed over to the one to whom it had been said, “You shall eat earth.” But the apostle proclaims this more plainly, where he says: “And you, when you were dead in trespasses and sins, in which you once walked according to the age of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, of the spirit who now works in the sons of unbelief, among whom we all also once lived in the desires of our flesh, doing the wishes of the flesh and of the affections; and we were by nature children of wrath, as the rest also.” The sons of unbelief are the unbelievers; and who is not this before he becomes a believer? Therefore all men from their origin are under the prince of the power of the air, who works in the sons of unbelief. And what I have said, “from their origin,” is what the apostle says, that he too was “by nature” as the rest: by nature, that is, as it has been depraved by sin, not as it was created upright from the beginning. But this manner in which man was handed over into the power of the devil ought not to be understood as though God did this or commanded it to be done, but that he only permitted it, yet justly. For when he forsook the sinner, the author of sin at once invaded. Nor indeed did God so forsake his creature as not to show himself to it as God creating and giving life, and, amid the penal evils, granting many good things even to the evil. For he did not shut up his compassions in his anger. Nor did he let man go from the law of his power when he permitted him to be in the devil's power; because not even the devil himself is outside the power of the Almighty, any more than outside his goodness. For by what means would even the evil angels subsist with any kind of life, except through him who gives life to all things? If, then, the committing of sins through the just anger of God subjected man to the devil, certainly the remission of sins through the kind reconciliation of God rescued man from the devil.

Gen 3:14 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 3:19 (quotation, high confidence) · Gen 6:3 (quotation, high confidence) · Eph 2:1 (quotation, high confidence) · Eph 2:2 (quotation, high confidence) · Eph 2:3 (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 77:9 (76:10 LXX) (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: Through the sin of the first man God justly permitted the human race to fall under the devil's power, yet without letting it go from his own power and goodness.

  • Quotations: Gen 3:14, 19; Gen 6:3; Eph 2:1–3; Ps 77:9 (76:10 LXX), “he did not shut up his compassions in his anger” (the digital text's “in in sua” is a slip for in ira sua, translated by sense).
  • This chapter states Augustine's teaching on original sin as he gives it.
  • The opening words of the digital text are Migne's chapter summary, removed by logged correction, with Migne's Scripture references.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary; Migne's inserted Scripture reference): Adæ peccatum traditi in potestatem diaboli. → ; ibis (Gen. III, i4, i9). → ibis.; cæteri (Ephes. II, i- 3). → cæteri..

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.12 (PL 42:1009; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-12). (abbreviation not yet checked)

BibTeX · RIS (whole work; this passage's key: sophiascriptura-augustine-trinitate-13-12) · Report an error

Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).

13.13PL 42:1009–1010

Non autem dia­ bolus potentia Dei, sed justitia superandus fuit. Nam quid Omnipotente potentius? Aut cujus creaturæ po­ testas potestati Creatoris comparari potesL? Sed cum diabolus vitio perversitatis suæ factus SiL amator po. tentae, et desertor oppugnatorque justitiæ; sic enim et homines eum tanto magis imitantur, quanto ma­ gis neglecta, vet eliam perosa justitia, pitentiæ stu­ dem, cjusque vel adeptione laetamur, vel inflammantur cupiditate: ptacnit Deo, ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate, non potentia diabolus, sed justitia vinceretur; atque ita et homines imitan­ tes Christum, justitia quærerent diabolum vincere, non potentia. Non quod potentia quasi mali aliquid fugienda sit; sed ordo servandus est, quo prior est justitia. Nam quanta potentia potest esse mortalium? Teneant ergo mortales justitiam, potentia immorta­ libus dabitur. Cui comparata quanatibet eorum ho­ minum qui potentes vocantur in terra, ridicula infir­ mitas invenitur, et ibi foditur peccatori fovea, ubi videntur mali plurimum posse. Cantat autem justus et dicit: BeM holo quem tu erudieris, Domine, et de lege <Ma docueris eum f ut mitiges ei a diebus mali­ gnis, donec fodiatur peccatori fovea. Quoniam non re­ pellet Dominus plebem suam, et hæreditatem suam non derelinquet: quoaduaque justitia convertatur in judi­ cium, et qui habent eam, omnes recto sunt corde. Hoc ergo tempore quo differtur poten­ tia pupuli Dei, non repellet Dominus plebem suam, et hæreditatem suam non derelinquet; quantalibet acerba <'t indigna ipsa humilis atque infirma patiatur, quoad­ usque justitia qnam nunc habet infirmitas piorum, convertatur in judiCiuM, hoc cst, judicandi accipiat potestatem: quod justis in fine servatur, cum præce­ dentem justitiam ordine suo fuerit potentia subsecuta. Potentia quippe adjuncta justitiæ, vel justitia acce­ dens potentiæ 1, judiciariam potestatem facit. Perti­ nee autem justitia ad voluntatem bonam: unde di­ ctum cst ab Angelis nato Christo, Gloria in excelsis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bonæ voluntati,, Potentia vero sequi debet justitiam, non praeire: ideo et in rebus secundis ponitur, id est prosperis: secundae autem a sequendo sunt dictae. Cum enim beatum faciant, sicut superius disputa vimus, duæ res, bene velle, et posse qnod vclis, non debet esse illa perversitas, quae ill eadem disputatione notata est, ut ex duabus rebus quæ faciunt beatum, posse quod velit bomo cligat, et velle quod oportet neg!!­ gat; cum prius debeat habere voluntatem bonam, magnam vero postea potestatem. Bona porro volun­ tas purganda est a vitiis, a quibus si vincitur homo, ad hoc vincitur ut male velit, et bona jam voluntas ejus quomodo erit? Optandum est itaqueut potestas nunc detur, sed contra vitia, propter quæ vincenda potentes nolunt esse homines, et volunt propter vin­ cendos homines; utquid hoc, nisi ut vere victi falso vincant, nec sint veritate, sed opinione victores? Velit homo prudens esse, velit fortis, velit temperans, velit justus, atque ut hæc veraciter possit, potentiam plane optet, atque appetat ut potens sit in seipso, et miro modo adversus se ipsum pro se ipso. Caetera vcro qua; bene vult, et tamen non potest, sicut est immortalitas, et vera ac plena felicitas, desiderare non cesset, et patienter exspectet.

But the devil was to be overcome not by the power of God but by his justice. For what is more powerful than the Almighty? Or the power of what creature can be compared to the power of the Creator? But since the devil, by the fault of his own perversity, became a lover of power and a deserter and assailant of justice (for so men too imitate him the more, the more they neglect or even hate justice and pursue power, and either rejoice in obtaining it or are inflamed with desire for it), it pleased God that, in order to rescue man from the devil's power, the devil should be overcome not by power but by justice; and so that men too, imitating Christ, should seek to overcome the devil by justice, not by power. Not that power is to be shunned as something evil; but the order must be kept by which justice comes first. For how great can the power of mortals be? Let mortals, then, hold to justice; power will be given to the immortal. Compared with that, the power of those men who are called powerful on earth, however great, is found to be a ridiculous weakness; and there a pit is dug for the sinner where the wicked seem able to do most. But the righteous man sings and says: “Blessed is the man whom you instruct, O Lord, and teach him out of your law, so that you may give him rest from the evil days, until a pit is dug for the sinner. For the Lord will not cast off his people, nor will he forsake his inheritance, until justice is turned into judgment; and all who have it are upright in heart.” In this time, then, in which the power of the people of God is deferred, the Lord will not cast off his people, nor will he forsake his inheritance, however bitter and undeserved the things it suffers, humble and weak as it is, until the justice which the weakness of the godly now has is turned into judgment, that is, receives the power of judging; which is reserved for the just at the end, when power has followed in its order upon the justice that went before. For power joined to justice, or justice added to power, makes judicial power. And justice belongs to good will; whence it was said by the angels when Christ was born, “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men of good will.” Power ought to follow justice, not go before it; and so it is placed among “second,” that is, prosperous, things; and “second” things are named from following. For since two things make one happy, as we argued above, to will well and to be able to do what you will, there ought not to be that perversity, which was noted in the same discussion, that of the two things that make one happy a man should choose to be able to do what he wills and neglect to will what he ought; since he ought first to have a good will, and great power afterward. Moreover, the good will must be cleansed from vices; and if a man is overcome by them, he is overcome so as to will badly, and how then will his will be good? It is to be wished, then, that power be given now, but against the vices, for the conquering of which men do not want to be powerful, though they want it for the conquering of men; and why this, unless so that, truly conquered, they may falsely conquer, and be conquerors not in truth but in opinion? Let a man will to be prudent, will to be brave, will to be temperate, will to be just; and so that he may truly be able to do these things, let him plainly wish for power, and seek to be powerful in himself, and, in a wonderful way, against himself for himself. But the other things which he wills well and yet cannot do, such as immortality and true and full happiness, let him not cease to desire, and let him wait for them with patience.

Ps 94:12 (93:12 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 94:14 (93:14 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Ps 94:15 (93:15 LXX) (quotation, high confidence) · Luke 2:14 (quotation, high confidence)

Notes and citation

Summary: God chose to overcome the devil by justice rather than power, setting the order that justice comes first and power follows at the judgment.

  • Quotations: Ps 94:12–15 (93:12–15 LXX); Luke 2:14, in the Latin form “to men of good will”.
  • Augustine plays on secundus, “second” and “prosperous”, as derived from sequor, “follow”.
  • The opening words of the digital text are a fragment of Migne's chapter summary, removed by logged correction, with Migne's Scripture reference.

Notes on the original text

  • Digital text corrected (Migne's chapter summary; Migne's inserted Scripture reference): justitia eruendus homo fuit a diaboli potestate. → ; corde (Psal. xcn!, 12-15). → corde..

Topics: Ethics, Christology

Cite (SBL): Augustine, Trin. 13.13 (PL 42:1009–1010; trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/augustine-trinitate/13-5/#p-13-13). (abbreviation not yet checked)

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Translation: Translated by Claude (Opus) from the Latin of Migne's Patrologia Latina (digital text of the Open Greek and Latin project); each batch compared afterwards with the public-domain translation in NPNF¹ 3 (1887).