Miscellanies 8.2.3

Summary: Inquiry should begin by stating clearly, in terms all agree on, what a word such as “demonstration” means; then one asks whether the thing exists and what its nature is.

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Greek text · Stählin 2

Τίς ἂν οὖν ἄλλη βελτίων ἢ ἐναργεστέρα μέθοδος εἰς ἀρχὴν τῆς τοιᾶσδε εἴη [ἂν] διδασκαλίας ἢ τὸ προταθὲν ὄνομα λόγῳ διελθεῖν οὕτω σαφῶς ὡς πάντας ἀκολουθῆσαι τοὺς ὁμοφώνους; ἆρʼ οὖν τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ἀποδείξεως, οἷόν περ τὸ βλίτυρι, φωνὴ μόνον οὐδὲν σημαίνουσα; καὶ πῶς οὔθʼ ὁ φιλόσοφος οὔθʼ ὁ ῥήτωρ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ὁ δικαστὴς ὡς ἄσημον ὄνομα προφέρεται τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οὔτε τις τῶν δικαζομένων ἀγνοεῖ τὸ σημαινόμενον, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει; αὐτίκα ὡς ὑποστατὸν πορίζονται τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ἄλλος ἄλλως. περὶ παντὸς τοίνυν τοῦ ζητουμένου εἴ τις ὀρθῶς διαλαμβάνοι, οὐκ ἂν ἐφʼ ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογουμένην μᾶλλον ἀναγάγοι τὸν λόγον ἢ τὸ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι τε καὶ ὁμοφώνοις ἐκ τῆς προσηγορίας ὁμολογούμενον σημαίνεσθαι. εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμηθέντα ζητεῖν ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὑπάρχει τὸ σημαινόμενον τοῦτο περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος εἴτε καὶ μή· ἐφεξῆς δέ, εἴπερ ὑπάρχειν δειχθείη, ζητητέον τούτου τὴν φύσιν ἀκριβῶς, ὁποία τίς ἐστιν καὶ μή ποτε ὑπερβαίνει τὴν δοθεῖσαν τάξιν.

English · Claude translation

What other method, then, could be better or clearer for the beginning of such teaching than to go through the term proposed by an account so clear that all who speak the same language follow? Is the name “demonstration,” then, like “blityri,” a mere sound signifying nothing? And how is it that neither the philosopher nor the orator, nor even the judge, brings forward demonstration as a name without meaning, and none of the litigants is ignorant of what it signifies, as though nothing answered to it? Indeed, the philosophers supply demonstration as something that really exists, each in his own way. Concerning everything under inquiry, then, if one would judge rightly, one would lead the argument back to no other agreed starting point than what all who share the same nation and language agree is signified by the term. Then, setting out from there, one must inquire whether the thing signified, which the argument concerns, exists or not; and next, if it should be shown to exist, one must inquire precisely into its nature, what sort it is, and whether it perhaps oversteps the order assigned to it.

About this passage

Source
Stählin 2 · Otto Stählin, ed., Clemens Alexandrinus, vol. 2, Stromata Buch I–VI, GCS 15 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906); vol. 3, Stromata Buch VII und VIII, GCS 17 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909) · Greek text: Otto Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus 2–3 (GCS 15, 17, 1906–1909), digitized by the Perseus Digital Library, CC BY-SA 4.0
Text
As printed in Stählin, GCS 15, 17. Manuscript variants and the editor's apparatus are not reproduced; no textual problem is noted in this passage.
Translation
Claude translation (claude-opus-5-5), 2026-09-27 · Translated by Claude from the Greek text of Stählin (1906–1909); made independently of existing English translations.
Compare
Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1885) (an older public-domain English translation, whole volume at CCEL; checked against ours only after ours was made) · Book 3 is left partly untranslated (in Latin) there.

Notes

Translation notes

  • “Blityri” (βλίτυρι) is the standard example in ancient logic of a sound that means nothing. The clause rendered “as though nothing answered to it” (ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει) is awkward in the Greek; the sense seems to be that no one treats demonstration as a nonexistent thing. “Account” renders λόγος, here a definition or explanatory statement.

Cite this passage

Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.2.3 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/2/3/).

Plain text
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.2.3 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/2/3/).

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