Miscellanies 8.4.9
Summary: Every inquiry starts from some prior knowledge, of a thing's substance or of its activities; the first step is to see what kind of problem is being asked, as in the question whether an unborn child is an animal.
Greek text · Stählin 2
Πᾶσα γὰρ ζήτησις ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης εὑρίσκεται γνώσεως· εἶναι δὲ δυνατὸν τὴν γνῶσιν τὴν προϋπάρξασαν τοῦ ζητουμένου παντὸς ποτὲ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ψιλῶς ἀγνοουμένων [δὲ] τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς. οἷον λίθων, φυτῶν, ζῴων, ὧν τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἢ παθῶν ἢ δυνάμεων ἢ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν [ἓν] τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς οὖσιν· ἐνίοτε δὲ γιγνώσκεσθαι μέν τι τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἢ παθῶν ἤ τινα τούτων, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰ πάθη, ἀγνοεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ζητεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν· ἐν πολλοῖς δέ, τῆς νοήσεως αὐτῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας ὑποτιθεμένης ἑαυτῇ ταῦτα πάντα, τὴν ζήτησιν εἶναι. τίνι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν οὕτω μὲν ὑπάρχῃ· ἀμφοτέρων γάρ, τῆς τε οὐσίας τῆς τε ἐνεργείας, τὰς ἐπινοίας ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ λαβόντες οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ἐρχόμεθα. ἔστιν δὲ ὧν καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας εἰδότες ἅμα ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀγνοοῦμεν τὰ παθήματα. Ἔστιν οὖν ἡ μέθοδος τῆς εὑρέσεως τοιαύτη· ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ γνωρίζειν τὰ προβλήματα. πολλάκις γοῦν ἐξαπατᾷ τὸ τῆς λέξεως σχῆμα καὶ συγχεῖ καὶ ταράττει τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥστε μὴ ῥᾳδίως εὑρίσκειν ἐκ ποίας ἐστὶ διαφορᾶς, οἷον εἰ [μὴ] ζῷον τὸ κυούμενον· ἔχοντες γὰρ καὶ ζῴου τι νόημα καὶ κυουμένου ζητοῦμεν εἰ τῷ κυουμένῳ ζῴῳ εἶναι ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστίν, εἰ τῇ κυουμένῃ οὐσίᾳ τό τε κινεῖσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἔτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπάρχει. ὥστε ἐνεργειῶν ἐστι καὶ παθῶν ἡ ζήτησις ἐπὶ προγινωσκομένης οὐσίας.
English · Claude translation
For every inquiry finds its answer on the basis of knowledge that already exists; and the knowledge that exists beforehand of any object of inquiry may sometimes be of the substance alone, while its works are unknown, as with stones, plants, and animals whose activities we do not know, or their affections or powers, or, in a word, the attributes that belong to beings; sometimes one of these powers or affections, or some of them, is known, as the desires and passions of the soul, while the substance is unknown and is the object of inquiry; and in many cases, when our own thought sets all these before itself, the inquiry is to which of the substances it might belong in this way. For having taken the notions of both, the substance and the activity, into the mind, we thus come to the inquiry. And there are cases in which, knowing the activities together with the substances, we are ignorant of the affections. The method of discovery, then, is as follows: we must begin by recognizing the problems themselves. For often the form of the expression deceives, confuses, and disturbs the mind, so that it does not easily find to what kind the problem belongs; for example, whether what is conceived in the womb is an animal. For, having some notion both of “animal” and of “what is conceived,” we inquire whether being an animal belongs to what is conceived, that is, whether the power to move, and further to perceive, belongs to the conceived substance. So the inquiry concerns activities and affections, the substance being known beforehand.
About this passage
Notes
Translation notes
- “Animal” renders ζῷον, a living being with sensation and self-motion; the question is whether the embryo already has perception and motion by impulse. “Substance” renders οὐσία; “affections” πάθη; “activities” ἐνέργειαι.
Cite this passage
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.4.9 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/4/9/).
Plain text
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 8.4.9 (trans. Sophia Scriptura, https://sophiascriptura.com/fathers/clement-stromata/8/4/9/).
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