Letters 132.1–133.1

When I wrote to you, my brother Jerome, honoured in Christ, asking about the human soul (if new souls are made one by one for each person born even now, where they contract the bond of sin which we do not doubt must be loosed through the sacrament of Christ's grace even in newborn infants), since that grew into a volume of no small size, I did not wish to burden it with any other question. But what presses more sharply must be neglected much less. Therefore I ask, and I beg you by the Lord, to explain to me, as I think will benefit many, or, if you already have it explained either by yourself or by someone else, to send us, how we should understand what is in the letter of the apostle James: 'For whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty of all.' This matter is of such a kind and so great that I greatly regret not having written to you about it long ago.

For this question concerns how to conduct our present life so as to reach eternal life, not the investigation of the past, which forgetfulness has buried deep, such as the question I thought should be asked about the soul. There is a neat story told which fits this matter well enough. When a man had fallen into a well where there was enough water to catch him so that he did not die, but not so much as to choke him so that he could not speak, another came up and, seeing him, said in pity, 'How did you fall in here?' But he said, 'Please, ask how you can get me out of here, not how I fell in.' So, since we confess and hold by the catholic faith that the soul even of a little infant must be freed by the grace of Christ from the guilt of sin as from a well, it is enough for it that we know the way by which it is saved, even if we never know how it came into that evil. But I thought the question should be asked so that we might not incautiously hold some one of those opinions about the soul's incarnation which would contradict altogether that the little child's soul must be freed, denying that it is in that evil. Holding this most firmly, then, that the little child's soul must be freed from the guilt of sin, and freed in no other way than by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, if we can also know the cause and origin of that evil, we resist empty talkers, who are not debaters but wranglers, with better preparation and instruction; but if we cannot, the duty of mercy ought not to grow slack because the beginning of misery is hidden. Against those who think they know what they do not know, we are the safer in this, that we are not ignorant of our ignorance. For it is one thing not to know what it is bad not to know, another not to know what either cannot be known, or need not be known, or is indifferent for the life we seek. But what I now ask about the letter of the apostle James concerns the very conduct by which we live and strive to please God so that we may live for ever.

How then, I beg you, is it to be understood: 'Whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty of all'? Is it so, that whoever has committed theft, or indeed whoever has said to a rich man, 'Sit here,' but to a poor man, 'You stand there,' is guilty of murder and adultery and sacrilege? And if he is not, how has he who offends in one point become guilty of all? Or does what I said about the rich and the poor man not belong to those things in which, if anyone offends in one, he will become guilty of all? But we must recall where this sentence came from, what preceded and produced it, and with what it is connected and depends. 'My brothers,' he says, 'do not hold the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons. For if a man with a gold ring and in fine clothing comes into your assembly, and a poor man in shabby clothing also comes in, and you pay attention to the one who wears the fine clothing and say, "You sit here in a good place," but say to the poor man, "You stand there," or, "Sit under my footstool," have you not made distinctions among yourselves and become judges with evil thoughts? Listen, my beloved brothers: has not God chosen the poor in this world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which God has promised to those who love him? But you have dishonoured the poor man,' namely, him to whom it was said, 'You stand there,' when it had been said to the man with the gold ring, 'You sit here in a good place.' And then there follows, developing and explaining that very sentence more fully: 'Do not the rich oppress you by their power, and themselves drag you into court? Do they not blaspheme the good name which has been called upon you? If indeed you fulfil the royal law according to the Scriptures, "You shall love your neighbour as yourself," you do well; but if you show respect of persons, you commit sin, being convicted by the law as transgressors.' See how he calls transgressors of the law those who say to the rich man, 'Sit here,' and to the poor, 'Stand there.' Then, so that they would not think it a contemptible sin to transgress the law in this one matter, he went on to add: 'But whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty of all. For he who said, "You shall not commit adultery," said also, "You shall not kill." If you do not kill but commit adultery, you have become a transgressor of the law,' because of what he had said, 'convicted by the law as transgressors.' This being so, it seems to follow (unless it is shown that it must be understood in another way) that whoever says to the rich man, 'Sit here,' and to the poor, 'Stand there,' paying greater honour to the one than to the other, must be judged an idolater, a blasphemer, an adulterer, a murderer, and (not to list everything, which would be long) guilty of all crimes; for by offending in one point he has become guilty of all.

But, it is said, whoever has one virtue has all, and whoever lacks one has none. If this is true, the sentence is confirmed. But I want it explained, not confirmed; for with us it is firmer in itself than all the authorities of the philosophers. And even if that saying about the virtues and vices is true, it does not follow from it that all sins are equal. For that saying about the inseparability of the virtues, though perhaps I am mistaken, yet, if I remember rightly (and I hardly remember), was held by all the philosophers who said that the same virtues are necessary for conducting life. But this about the equality of sins only the Stoics dared to maintain, against all the sense of the human race. That folly of theirs you refuted most clearly from the holy Scriptures in that Jovinian, who was a Stoic in this opinion, but an Epicurean in hunting after and defending pleasures. In that most delightful and brilliant disputation of yours it appeared plainly enough that our authors, or rather the Truth itself which spoke through them, did not hold that all sins are equal. But how it can be that, even if this is true of the virtues, we are not therefore forced to confess the equality of all sins, I will try to show, as far as I can, with the Lord's help. If I succeed, you will approve; where I fall short of the case, you will supply it.

Certainly those who hold that whoever has one virtue has all, and whoever lacks one lacks all, argue from this: that prudence cannot be cowardly, or unjust, or intemperate; for if it were any of these, it would not be prudence. Further, if it is prudence only when it is also brave, just, and temperate, then wherever it is, it has the others with it. So too fortitude cannot be imprudent, or intemperate, or unjust; so temperance must be prudent, brave, and just; so justice does not exist unless it is prudent, brave, and temperate. Thus, where any one of them is true, the others are likewise present; but where the others are lacking, that one is not true, even if in some way it seems like it.

For there are, as you know, some vices opposed to the virtues by an open difference, as imprudence to prudence. But there are some that are opposed only because they are vices, yet are like the virtues in a certain deceptive appearance, as, to that same prudence, not imprudence but cunning. For I now mean by cunning what is more usually understood and so called in the malicious, not as our Scripture customarily speaks, which often uses cunning in a good sense; hence, 'cunning as serpents,' and, 'to give cunning to the innocent.' And yet among them too, the most eloquent writer of the Roman tongue said, 'Nor did he lack guile or cunning to be on his guard,' using cunning in a good sense; but among them this is very rare, among ours very frequent. Likewise, among the parts of temperance, extravagance is most openly opposed to thrift; but what is commonly called stinginess is indeed a vice, yet like thrift, not in nature but in a most deceptive appearance. Likewise, injustice is opposed to justice by manifest unlikeness; but the lust for revenge usually imitates justice, as it were, and it is a vice. Cowardice is plainly opposed to fortitude, but hardness differs from it in nature and deceives by likeness. Constancy is a certain part of virtue; inconstancy is far removed from it and stands undoubtedly opposed, but obstinacy wants to be called constancy and is not, because the one is a virtue, the other a vice.

So that I need not repeat the same things again, let us set down an example from which the rest can be understood. Catiline, as those who could know him wrote of him, could bear cold, thirst, and hunger, and was patient of fasting, cold, and sleeplessness beyond what anyone would believe; and for this reason he seemed to his followers and to himself endowed with great fortitude. But this fortitude was not prudent, for he chose evil instead of good; it was not temperate, for he was defiled by the basest corruptions; it was not just, for he had conspired against his country. And therefore it was not fortitude either, but hardness gave itself the name of fortitude in order to deceive fools. For if it had been fortitude, it would have been not a vice but a virtue; and if it had been a virtue, it would never have been abandoned by the other virtues, its inseparable companions, as it were.

Therefore, when it is asked also about the vices whether they too, likewise, are all present where one is, or none where one is not, it is laborious to show, because two vices are usually opposed to one virtue: one that is openly contrary, and one that is shadowed by an appearance of likeness. Hence it was easier to see that Catiline's quality was not fortitude, since it did not have the other virtues with it; but it can hardly be made persuasive that it was cowardice, where there was practice in suffering and enduring any most grievous hardships beyond what anyone would believe. But perhaps to those who look more sharply the hardness itself appears as cowardice, because he had neglected the labour of good pursuits by which true fortitude is acquired. However, since there are bold men who are not timid, and again timid men far from boldness, while both are vices (for one who is brave with true virtue neither dares rashly nor fears without reason), we are forced to confess that the vices are more numerous than the virtues.

Hence sometimes one vice is removed by another, as the love of money by the love of praise; sometimes one gives way so that several may take its place, as when one who was a drunkard learns to drink moderately through stinginess and ambition. So vices can give way even to other vices succeeding them, not to virtues, and therefore they are more numerous. But where one virtue has entered, since it brings the others with it, surely all the vices that were present will give way; for not all were present, but sometimes the same number, sometimes more succeeded fewer, or fewer more.

Whether these things are so must be examined more carefully. For this too is not a divine sentence, which says, 'Whoever has one virtue has all, and he who lacks one has none'; rather, it seemed so to men, very gifted, studious, and at leisure, but still men. For my part I do not know how I could say (I do not say of a man, from whom virtue is said to take its name, but even of a woman) who keeps the faith of the marriage bed to her husband, if she does this for the sake of God's command and promise and is faithful to him first of all, that she does not have chastity, or that it is no virtue or a small one; and so also of the husband who keeps the same faith to his wife. And yet there are very many such people, none of whom I would say is without some sin; and certainly that sin, whatever it is, comes from some vice. Hence, though conjugal chastity in devout men and women is without doubt a virtue (for it is neither nothing nor a vice), yet it does not have all the virtues with it. For if all were there, there would be no vice; if no vice, no sin at all; but who is without some sin? Who then is without some vice, that is, some tinder or root, as it were, of sin, when he who reclined on the Lord's breast cries out, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us'? Nor need I argue this at length with you; I say it for the sake of others who may read this. For you in that same splendid work against Jovinian proved this too carefully from the holy Scriptures; where you also set down from this very letter, whose words we now seek to understand, what is written: 'For in many things we all offend.' For he does not say, 'you offend,' but 'we offend,' since he was speaking as an apostle of Christ; and while he says in this place, 'But whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty of all,' there he said that not in one but in many things, and not some but all offend.

Far be it that any believer should think that so many thousands of Christ's servants, who truly say that they have sin, lest they deceive themselves and the truth not be in them, have no virtue, when wisdom is a great virtue. And he said to man, 'Behold, piety is wisdom.' Far be it that we should say that so many and such great faithful and godly people of God do not have piety, which the Greeks call either eusebeia or, more expressly and fully, theosebeia. And what is piety but the worship of God? And by what is he worshipped but by charity? For charity out of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned is a great and true virtue, because it is also the end of the commandment. It is rightly called strong as death, either because no one conquers it, as no one conquers death, or because in this life the measure of charity is up to death, as the Lord says, 'Greater charity than this no one has, that one lay down his life for his friends'; or rather because, as death tears the soul away from the senses of the flesh, so charity tears it away from fleshly desires. Knowledge serves it when it is useful; for without it knowledge puffs up. But where charity has filled by building up, knowledge will find nothing empty there to puff up. And he showed what useful knowledge is by defining it, when, having said, 'Behold, piety is wisdom,' he added at once, 'but to abstain from evil is knowledge.' Why then do we not say that whoever has this virtue has all, since charity is the fullness of the law? Or is it that the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue, and the less it is in him, the less virtue is in him, because it is itself virtue; and the less virtue is in him, the more vice? Where it is full and perfect, then, nothing of vice will remain.

Accordingly, the Stoics seem to me to be mistaken in this: that they refuse to allow that a man who is making progress in wisdom has any wisdom at all, but only that he has it when he has become entirely perfect in it. Not that they deny his progress; but unless he suddenly shoots up, emerging as from some depth into the free air of wisdom, he is in no part wise. For as it makes no difference to a man's drowning whether he has water many stades deep above him or a single palm or finger, so they say that those who strive toward wisdom do indeed make progress, like men rising from the bottom of a whirlpool toward the air; but unless by progressing, as by emerging, they have escaped all folly, like water pressing on them, they do not have virtue and are not wise; but when they have escaped, they at once have it whole, and nothing of folly remains from which any sin at all could arise.

This comparison, in which folly is set as water and wisdom as air, so that the mind, as it were emerging from the drowning of folly into wisdom, suddenly breathes, does not seem to me well enough suited to the authority of our Scriptures; rather that one is, in which vice or folly is compared to darkness and virtue or wisdom to light, as far as these likenesses can be carried from bodily to intelligible things. So it is not like one rising from the waters into the air, who, when he has passed their surface, suddenly breathes in as much as he needs, but like one going out of darkness into light, who is enlightened little by little as he goes forward. Until this happens most fully, we still say of him, as of one coming out of a very deep cave, that he is touched by the nearness of the light the more, the closer he comes to the exit; so that what shines in him is certainly from the light toward which he is going, while what is still dark is from the darkness from which he is coming out. So both 'no one living will be justified in the sight of God,' and yet 'the righteous lives by faith.' And the saints are clothed with righteousness, one more, another less; and no one lives here without sin, and this too one more, another less; but he is best who sins least.

But what am I doing? As if forgetting to whom I am speaking, I have become like a teacher, when I set out what I wished to learn from you. But since I had decided to put forward my opinion for your examination on the equality of sins, which is where the question arose in what I was treating, let me at last conclude it. Even if it is true that whoever has one virtue has all, and whoever lacks one has none, sins are not therefore equal; because where there is no virtue, nothing indeed is upright, yet it does not follow that one crooked thing is not more crooked than another, or one distorted thing more distorted. But if (as I think is truer and more in keeping with the sacred writings) the intentions of the soul are like the members of the body, not in that they are seen in places but in that they are felt in the affections, and one is enlightened more, another less, another lacks light altogether and is shaded by a dark obstacle, then surely, as each person is affected by the illumination of godly charity more in one act, less in another, in another not at all, so it can be said that he has one virtue, lacks another, and has another more or less. For we can rightly say both that charity is greater in this man than in that, and that there is some in this man and none in that, as far as the charity that is piety is concerned; and, in one and the same man, that he has greater chastity than patience, and greater today than yesterday if he is making progress, and does not yet have self-restraint and has no small mercy.

And to sum up generally and briefly the notion I have of virtue, as it concerns living rightly: virtue is charity, by which what ought to be loved is loved. This is greater in some, less in others, in others none at all; but most full, so that it can no longer be increased, in no one as long as he lives here. And as long as it can be increased, whatever is less than it should be comes from vice. Because of this vice 'there is no righteous man on earth who will do good and not sin.' Because of this vice 'no one living will be justified in the sight of God.' Because of this vice, 'if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.' Because of this too, however far we have advanced, we must say, 'Forgive us our debts,' although everything said, done, and thought has already been forgiven in baptism. So he who sees rightly sees where, when, and from where that perfection is to be hoped for, to which nothing could be added. And if there were no commandments, there would certainly be nowhere a man could look into himself more surely and see what to turn from, what to strive for, what to give thanks for, what to pray for. Great then is the usefulness of the commandments, if only so much is granted to free will that the grace of God may be honoured the more.

If these things are so, how does one who has kept the whole law become guilty of all if he offends in one point? Is it perhaps because charity is the fullness of the law, by which God and neighbour are loved, and on these commandments of charity the whole law and the prophets hang, that he who acts against that on which all hang rightly becomes guilty of all? And no one sins except by acting against it; for 'You shall not commit adultery, you shall not kill, you shall not steal, you shall not covet,' and any other commandment there is, is summed up in this word: 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself. Love of neighbour works no evil; and charity is the fullness of the law.' And no one loves his neighbour unless he loves God, so as to spend on his neighbour, whom he loves as himself, all he can, that the neighbour too may love God; if he himself does not love God, he loves neither himself nor his neighbour. And so whoever has kept the whole law, if he offends in one point, becomes guilty of all, because he acts against charity, on which the whole law hangs. So he becomes guilty of all by acting against that on which all things hang.

Why then should sins not be called equal? Perhaps because he who sins more gravely acts more against charity, he who sins more lightly less; and by this very fact it admits more and less. So one does become guilty of all, but he who sins more gravely or in more things is more guilty, he who sins more lightly or in fewer things less guilty; the guilt is greater the more he has sinned, and less the less; yet, even if he has offended in one point, he is guilty of all, because he acts against that on which all things hang. If this is true, then that saying too of a man of apostolic grace is resolved: 'For in many things we all offend.' For we do offend, but one more gravely, another more lightly; the more or less anyone has sinned, the greater he is in committing sin, the less in loving God and neighbour; and again, the less in committing sin, the greater in the love of God and neighbour; and so the fuller of iniquity, the emptier of charity; and he is then most perfect in charity when nothing of weakness remains.

Nor, I think, should it be thought a light sin to hold the faith of the Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons, if we refer that difference between sitting and standing to the honours of the church. For who could bear a rich man to be chosen for a seat of honour in the church while a poor man, better instructed and holier, is passed over? But if he is speaking of everyday assemblies, who does not sin here, if indeed one sins, except when one judges inwardly in oneself that one man seems the better to him the richer he is than another? For this seems to be what he meant by saying, 'Have you not made distinctions among yourselves and become judges with evil thoughts?'

The law of liberty, then, is the law of charity, of which he says, 'If indeed you fulfil the royal law according to the Scriptures, "You shall love your neighbour as yourself," you do well; but if you show respect of persons, you commit sin, being convicted by the law as transgressors.' And after that sentence, so very hard to understand, about which I have said what I thought should be said, recalling the same law of liberty he says, 'So speak and so act as those who are to be judged by the law of liberty.' And since he knows what he said a little before, that 'in many things we all offend,' he suggests the Lord's medicine, daily, as it were, for daily though lighter wounds: 'For judgment is without mercy to him who has shown no mercy.' Hence the Lord too says, 'Forgive, and you will be forgiven; give, and it will be given to you.' 'But mercy exults over judgment.' It is not said, 'Mercy conquers judgment' (for it is not opposed to judgment), but 'exults over,' because more are gathered in through mercy; but those who have shown mercy. 'For blessed are the merciful, for God will have mercy on them.'

And this is certainly just, that they be forgiven because they have forgiven, and that it be given to them because they have given. For in God there is both mercy when he judges and judgment when he shows mercy; that is why it is said to him, 'Of mercy and judgment I will sing to you, O Lord.' For whoever, as if too righteous, awaits judgment without mercy as though secure provokes the most just wrath, fearing which the other says, 'Do not enter into judgment with your servant.' Hence it is said to a stubborn people, 'Why do you wish to contend with me in judgment?' For 'when the righteous king sits on his throne, who will boast that he has a chaste heart? Or who will boast that he is clean from sin?' What hope is there, then, unless mercy exults over judgment, but toward those who have shown mercy, saying truly, 'Forgive us, as we also forgive,' and giving without murmuring? For 'God loves a cheerful giver.' In short, holy James from this point on speaks of the works of mercy, in order to console those whom that sentence had greatly frightened, when he advises how even the daily sins, without which no one lives here, may be expiated by daily remedies; lest a man, who becomes guilty of all when he offends in one point, by offending in many (since in many things we all offend) should bring a great heap of his guilt, collected little by little, before the tribunal of so great a Judge, and not find the mercy he has not shown; but rather, by forgiving and giving, he may deserve to have his debts forgiven and the promises given to him.

I have said a great deal, with which I may perhaps have wearied you, who do not expect to learn these things, which you nevertheless approve, since you are accustomed to teach them. But if there is anything in them, as far as the substance is concerned (for I do not much care in what style they are set out), if there is anything in them that offends your learning, I beg you to warn me in your reply and not to be reluctant to correct me. For unhappy is he who does not worthily honour the great and holy labours of your studies and give thanks for them to the Lord our God, by whose gift you are what you are. So, since I ought more gladly to learn from anyone what I am unprofitably ignorant of than readily to teach anyone what I know, how much more justly do I demand this debt of charity from you, by whose learning, in the name and with the help of the Lord, the church's literature in the Latin tongue has been helped as much as it never could be before! Above all, however, if your love knows any better way in which that sentence can be explained, 'Whoever keeps the whole law but offends in one point has become guilty of all,' I beg you by the Lord to share it with us.

It was not boldly, as you wrongly think, but lovingly and zealously that you sent me a new question drawn from an old one, which before your letter deceived many in the East, so that through feigned humility they learned pride and said with the devil, 'I will ascend into heaven, I will set my throne above the stars of heaven, I will be like the Most High.' For what greater rashness can there be than to claim for oneself, I will not say likeness to God, but equality, and to sum up in one short sentence the poisons of all the heretics, which have flowed from the fountain of the philosophers, and especially of Pythagoras and Zeno, the chief of the Stoics? For they assert that what the Greeks call pathē, and we can call perturbations (namely grief and joy, hope and fear, two of which concern the present and two the future), can be rooted out of minds, and that by meditation and constant exercise of the virtues no fibre or root of the vices at all remains in a man. Against them both the Peripatetics, who descend from the fountain of Aristotle, argue most forcefully, and the New Academics, whom Tully follows; and they overthrow, I will not say their realities (which are none), but their shadows and wishes. For this is to take man out of man, and to be without a body while set in a body, and to wish rather than to teach, when the apostle says, 'Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from the body of this death?' And since the brevity of a letter cannot include everything, I will briefly describe for you what is to be avoided. Hence too that line of Virgil: 'Hence they fear and desire, grieve and rejoice, and do not see the air, shut up in darkness and a blind prison.' For who can either not leap for joy, or not be contracted by grief, or not be lifted up by hope, or not be terrified by fear? For this reason the weightiest poet Flaccus writes in a satire: 'For no one is born without vices; he is best who is burdened by the least.'