Divine Institutes

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Divine 1, chapter 1

1.1.1CSEL 19:1–2

Magno et excellenti ingenio uiri cum se doctrinae penitus edidissent quicquid laboris poterat impendi contemptis omnibus et priuatis et publicis actionibus ad inquirendae ueritatis studium contulerunt, existimantes multo esse praeclarius humanarum diuinarumque rerum inuestigare ac scire rationem quam struendis opibus aut cumulandis honoribus inhaerere:

Men of great and outstanding ability, when they had given themselves wholly to learning, set at nothing all business, private and public alike, and devoted whatever labour could be spent to the pursuit of searching out the truth. They judged it far more excellent to investigate and to know the principle of human and divine things than to cling to piling up wealth or heaping up honours,

1.1.2CSEL 19:2

quibus rebus, quoniam fragiles terrenaeque sunt et ad solius corporis pertinent cultum, nemo melior, nemo iustior effici potest.

for by such things, since they are fragile and earthly and pertain only to the care of the body, no one can be made better or more just.

1.1.3CSEL 19:2

erant illi quidem ueritatis cognitione dignissimi, quoniam scire tanto opere cupiuerunt atque ita, ut eam rebus

Those men were indeed most worthy of knowing the truth, since they desired so greatly to know it, and did so in such a way that they preferred it to

1.1.4CSEL 19:2

omnibus anteponerent — nam et abiecisse quosdam res familiares suas et renuntiasse uniuersis uoluptatibus constat, ut solam nudamque uirtutem nudi expeditique sequerentur, (et) tantum apud eos uirtutis nomen et auctoritas ualuit, ut in

all things. For it is well known that some even cast away their property and renounced every pleasure, so that, stripped and unencumbered, they might follow virtue alone and unadorned; and the name and authority of virtue counted for so much among them that

1.1.5CSEL 19:2

ipsa esse summi boni praemium iudicarent —, sed neque adepti sunt id quod uolebant et operam simul atque industriam perdiderunt, quia ueritas id est arcanum summi dei, qui fecit omnia, ingenio ac propriis sensibus non potest conprehendi: alioquin nihil inter deum hominemque distaret, si consilia et dispositiones illius maiestatis aeternae cogitatio adsequeretur humana.

they judged the reward of the highest good to lie in virtue itself. Yet they did not attain what they wished, and they lost their effort and industry together, because the truth, that is, the secret of the supreme God who made all things, cannot be grasped by ability and by one's own senses. Otherwise there would be no difference between God and man, if human thought could reach the counsels and ordinances of that eternal majesty.

1.1.6CSEL 19:2

quod quia fieri non potuit ut homini per se ipsum ratio diuina notesceret, non est passus hominem deus lumen sapientiae requirentem diutius errare ac sine ullo laboris effectu uagari per tenebras inextricabiles: aperuit oculos eius aliquando et notionem ueritatis munus suum fecit, ut et humanam sapientiam nullam esse monstraret et erranti ac uago uiam consequendae inmortalitatis ostenderet.

And because it could not be that the divine plan should become known to man by his own efforts, God did not allow man, as he sought the light of wisdom, to wander any longer and roam without any fruit of his labour through darkness from which there was no way out. At length he opened his eyes and made the knowledge of the truth his own gift, so as both to show that human wisdom is nothing and to point out to the wandering and straying man the way to gain immortality.

1.1.7CSEL 19:2–3

uerum quoniam pauci utuntur hoc caelesti beneficio ac munere, quod obuoluta in obscuro ueritas latet eaque uel contemptui doctis est, quia idoneis adsertoribus eget, uel odio indoctis ob insitam sibi austeritatem, quam natura hominum procliuis in uitia pati non potest — nam quia uirtutibus amaritudo permixta est, uitia uero uoluptate condita sunt, illa offensi, hac deleniti feruntur in praeceps et bonorum specie falsi mala pro bonis amplectuntur —, succurrendum esse his erroribus credidi, ut et docti ad ueram sapientiam dirigantur et indocti ad ueram religionem.

But few make use of this heavenly kindness and gift, because the truth lies hidden, wrapped in obscurity. The learned despise it because it lacks competent champions; the unlearned hate it for the severity that belongs to it, which human nature, prone to vice, cannot bear. For since bitterness is mixed with the virtues, while the vices are seasoned with pleasure, men are repelled by the one and charmed by the other; they rush headlong and, deceived by the appearance of good things, embrace evils in place of goods. I have therefore believed that I must come to the help of these errors, so that the learned may be directed to true wisdom and the unlearned to true religion.

1.1.8CSEL 19:3

quae professio multo melior utilior gloriosior putanda est quam illa oratoria, in qua diu uersati non ad uirtutem, sed plane ad argutam malitiam iuuenes erudiebamus, multoque nunc rectius de praeceptis caelestibus disseremus, quibus ad cultum uerae maiestatis mentes hominum instituere possimus,

This profession is to be judged far better, more useful, and more glorious than that of oratory, in which I was long engaged, training young men not to virtue but plainly to clever wickedness. Much more rightly shall I now discourse on the heavenly precepts, by which I may be able to form the minds of men for the worship of the true majesty.

1.1.9CSEL 19:3

nec tam de rebus humanis bene meretur qui scientiam bene dicendi adfert quam qui pie atque innocenter docet uiuere. idcirco apud Graecos maiore in gloria philosophi quam oratores fuerunt. illi enim recte uiuendi doctores sunt existimati, quod est longe praestabilius, quoniam bene dicere ad paucos pertinet, bene autem uiuere ad omnes.

Nor does one who imparts the skill of speaking well deserve as well of the human race as one who teaches how to live piously and innocently. That is why among the Greeks the philosophers were held in greater glory than the orators: they were regarded as teachers of right living, which is far more excellent, since speaking well concerns few, but living well concerns all.

1.1.10CSEL 19:3

multum tamen nobis exercitatio illa fictarum litium contulit, ut nunc maiore copia et facultate dicendi causam ueritatis peroremus. quae licet possit sine eloquentia defendi, ut est a multis saepe defensa, tamen claritate ac nitore sermonis inlustranda et quodammodo adserenda est, ut potentius in animos influat et ui sua instructa et luce orationis ornata. de religione itaque nobis rebusque diuinis instituitur disputatio.

Still, that practice in fictitious lawsuits has been of great use to me, so that I can now plead the cause of truth with greater fullness and fluency of speech. Although the truth can be defended without eloquence, as it often has been defended by many, yet it ought to be made illustrious, and in a manner championed, by clarity and elegance of language, so that it may flow more powerfully into men's minds, both equipped with its own force and adorned with the light of speech. So I undertake a discussion of religion and of divine things.

1.1.11CSEL 19:3–4

nam si quidam maximi oratores professionis suae quasi ueterani decursis operibus actionum suarum postremo se philosophiae tradiderunt eamque sibi requiem laborum iustissimam putauerunt, si animos suos in earum rerum quae inueniri non poterant inquisitione torquerent, ut non tam otium sibi quam negotium quaesisse uideantur et quidem multo molestius quam in quo fuerant ante uersati, quanto iustius ego me ad illam piam ueram diuinam sapientiam quasi ad portum aliquem tutissimum conferam, in qua omnia dictu prona sunt, auditu suauia, facilia intellectu, honesta susceptu?

For if certain very great orators, like veterans having finished the campaigns of their pleading, at last gave themselves to philosophy and thought it the most just rest from their labours, and yet tortured their minds in searching for things that could not be found, so that they seem to have sought for themselves not leisure but business, and indeed far more troublesome business than that in which they had been occupied before, how much more justly shall I betake myself, as to a most secure harbour, to that pious, true, and divine wisdom, in which all things are ready to be said, pleasant to hear, easy to understand, and honourable to undertake?

1.1.12CSEL 19:4

et si quidam prudentes et arbitri aequitatis institutiones ciuilis iuris conpositas ediderunt, quibus ciuium dissidentium lites contentionesque sopirent, quanto melius nos et rectius diuinas institutiones litteris persequemur, in quibus non de stillicidiis aut aquis arcendis aut de manu conserenda, sed de spe, de uita, de salute, de inmortalitate, de deo loquemur, ut superstitiones mortiferas erroresque turpissimos sopiamus?

And if certain wise men, arbiters of equity, composed and published institutes of civil law to settle the quarrels and disputes of citizens at variance, how much better and more rightly shall we set out in writing divine institutes, in which we shall speak not of eaves-drip, or of warding off rainwater, or of joining hands in a claim at law, but of hope, of life, of salvation, of immortality, of God, so that we may put to rest deadly superstitions and most shameful errors?

1.1.17CSEL 19:4

Omissis ergo terrenae huiusce philosophiae auctoribus nihil certi adferentibus adgrediamur uiam rectam. quos equidem si putarem satis idoneos ad bene uiuendum duces esse, et ipse sequerer et alios ut sequerentur hortarer:

Leaving aside, then, the teachers of this earthly philosophy, who offer nothing certain, let us take the right road. If I thought them adequate guides to living well, I would follow them myself and urge others to follow them;

1.1.18CSEL 19:4–5

sed cum inter se magna concertatione dissideant secumque ipsi plerumque discordent, apparet eorum iter nequaquam esse directum, siquidem sibi quisque ut est libitum proprias uias inpresserunt confusionemque magnam quaerentibus ueritatem reliquerunt.

but since they disagree among themselves in great contention and are very often at odds with themselves, it is plain that their road is by no means straight. Each of them has marked out his own paths as he pleased, and they have left great confusion for those who seek the truth.

1.1.19CSEL 19:5

nobis autem qui sacramentum uerae religionis accepimus cum sit ueritas reuelata diuinitus, cum doctorem sapientiae ducemque uirtutis deum sequamur, uniuersos sine ullo discrimine uel sexus uel aetatis ad caeleste pabulum conuocamus:

But we, who have received the sacrament of the true religion, since the truth has been revealed by God, and since we follow God as the teacher of wisdom and the guide of virtue, call all people without any distinction of sex or age to the heavenly food;

1.1.20CSEL 19:5

nullus enim suauior animo cibus est quam cognitio ueritatis. cui adserendae atque inlustrandae septem uolumina destinavimus, quamuis ea res infiniti sit paene operis et inmensi, ut si quis haec dilatare atque exsequi plenissime uelit, tanta illi rerum copia exuberet, ut nec libri modum nec finem reperiat oratio.

for no food is sweeter to the soul than the knowledge of the truth. To asserting and illustrating it I have devoted seven volumes, although the subject is a task almost without end and without measure, so that if anyone wished to expand and pursue these things in full, such an abundance of matter would pour out on him that his speech would find neither limit for books nor end.

1.1.21CSEL 19:5

sed nos idcirco breviter omnia colligemus, quod ea quae adlaturi sumus tam clara sunt et lucida, ut magis mirum esse uideatur tam obscuram uideri hominibus ueritatem et iis praecipue qui sapientes uulgo putantur, uel quod tantummodo instituendi nobis homines erunt hoc est ab errore quo sunt implicati ad rectiorem uiam reuocandi.

But we shall gather everything together briefly, because the things we are going to set forth are so clear and bright that it seems more wonderful that the truth should seem so obscure to men, and especially to those who are commonly thought wise; or because we shall have only to instruct men, that is, to call them back from the error in which they are entangled to a more correct road.

1.1.22CSEL 19:5

quod si fuerimus ut spero adsecuti, mittemus eos ad ipsum doctrinae uberrimum ac plenissimum fontem, cuius haustu atque potu conceptam uisceribus sitim sedent ardoremque restinguant, eruntque illis omnia facilia prona manifesta, modo ne pigeat ad percipiendam sapientiae disciplinam legendi uel audiendi patientiam commodare.

If we succeed in this, as I hope, we shall send them to the very fountain of teaching, most abundant and most full, so that by drinking from it they may quench the thirst they have conceived within and extinguish its burning; and everything will be easy, ready, and plain to them, provided they are not reluctant to lend patience to reading or hearing, so as to take in the discipline of wisdom.

1.1.23CSEL 19:5–6

multi enim superstitionibus uanis pertinaciter inhaerentes obdurant contra manifestam ueritatem, non tam de suis religionibus quas praue adserunt bene meriti quam de se male. qui cum habeant iter rectum, deuios secuntur anfractus, planum deserunt, ut per praecipitium labantur, lucem relinquunt, ut in tenebris caeci ac debiles iaceant.

For many, clinging stubbornly to vain superstitions, harden themselves against the manifest truth, deserving well not so much of their religions, which they wrongly defend, as ill of themselves. Though they have a straight road, they follow winding byways; they desert the level ground to slip down the precipice; they leave the light to lie blind and helpless in darkness.

1.1.24CSEL 19:6

his consulendum est, ne contra se pugnent uelintque se tandem ab inueteratis erroribus liberari: quod utique facient, si quare sint nati aliquando peruiderint.

We must take thought for these people, that they may not fight against themselves but may at last be willing to be freed from their inveterate errors; and this they will surely do, if they ever come to see clearly for what purpose they were born.

1.1.25CSEL 19:6

haec enim prauitatis est causa, ignoratio sui: quam si quis cognita ueritate discusserit, sciet quo referenda et quemadmodum sibi uita degenda sit. cuius scientiae summam breuiter circumscribo, ut neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda sit nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia.

For this is the cause of perversity: ignorance of oneself. If anyone dispels it by coming to know the truth, he will know to what end his life must be directed and how it must be lived. The sum of this knowledge I briefly define thus: no religion is to be taken up without wisdom, and no wisdom approved without religion.

Divine 1, chapter 2

1.2.1CSEL 19:6

Suscepto igitur inlustrandae ueritatis officio non putaui adeo necessarium ab illa quaestione principium sumere, quae uidetur prima esse natura, sitne prouidentia quae rebus omnibus consulat an fortuito vel facta sint omnia uel gerantur.

Having undertaken, then, the task of illustrating the truth, I did not think it so necessary to begin from that question which seems by nature to come first: whether there is a providence that takes thought for all things, or whether all things were made or are carried on by chance.

1.2.2CSEL 19:6

cuius sententiae auctor est Democritus, confirmator Epicurus. sed et antea Protagoras qui deos in dubium uocauit et postea Diagoras qui exclusit et alii nonnulli qui non putauerunt deos esse quid aliud effecerunt nisi ut nulla esse prouidentia putaretur? quos tamen ceteri philosophi ac maxime Stoici acerrime rettuderunt docentes nec fieri mundum sine diuina ratione potuisse nec constare, nisi summa ratione regeretur.

The author of that opinion is Democritus, its confirmer Epicurus. But earlier Protagoras, who called the gods into doubt, and later Diagoras, who shut them out altogether, and some others who thought the gods do not exist, what else did they achieve than that there should be thought to be no providence? Yet the other philosophers, and especially the Stoics, beat them back most vigorously, teaching that the world could neither have come into being without divine reason nor hold together unless it were governed by the highest reason.

1.2.3CSEL 19:6

sed et Marcus Tullius quamuis Academicae disciplinae defensor esset, de prouidentia gubernatrice rerum et multa et saepe disseruit Stoicorum argumenta confirmans et noua ipsa adferens plurima: quod facit cum in omnibus philosophiae suae libris tum maxime in iis qui sunt de natura deorum.

Marcus Tullius too, although he was a defender of the Academic school, discussed providence as the governor of things often and at length, confirming the arguments of the Stoics and bringing forward very many new ones himself. He does this in all his philosophical books, but above all in those On the Nature of the Gods.

1.2.4CSEL 19:6–7

nec difficile sane fuit. paucorum hominum praua sentientium redarguere mendacia testimonio populorum atque gentium in hac una re non dissidentium.

Nor was it difficult indeed to refute the lies of a few men who held perverse views by the testimony of peoples and nations, which do not disagree on this one matter.

1.2.5CSEL 19:7

nemo est enim tam rudis, tam feris moribus quin oculos suos in caelum tollens, tametsi nesciat cuius dei prouidentia regatur hoc omne quod cernitur, aliquam tamen esse intellegat ex ipsa rerum magnitudine motu dispositione constantia utilitate pulchritudine temperatione nec posse fieri quin id quod mirabili ratione constat consilio maiore aliquo sit instructum.

For no one is so rude and so savage in character that, lifting his eyes to heaven, even if he does not know by the providence of which god all this that is seen is ruled, he does not nevertheless understand from the very greatness of things, their motion, arrangement, constancy, usefulness, beauty, and balance, that there is some providence, and that it cannot be but that what is constituted with wonderful order has been arranged by some greater design.

1.2.6CSEL 19:7

et nobis utique facillimum est exsequi hanc partem quamlibet copiose: sed quia multum inter philosophos agitata res est et prouidentiam tollentibus satis responsum uidetur ab hominibus argutis et eloquentibus et de sollertia diuinae prouidentiae per totum hoc opus quod suscepimus sparsim dicere nos necesse est, omittamus in praesenti hanc quaestionem, quae cum ceteris sic cohaeret, ut nihil a nobis uideatur disseri posse, ut non simul de prouidentia disseratur.

And it would certainly be very easy for us to pursue this subject as fully as we liked. But since the matter has been much debated among philosophers, and those who deny providence seem to have been answered sufficiently by acute and eloquent men, and since we must in any case speak here and there throughout this whole work that we have undertaken about the skill of divine providence, let us pass over this question for the present. It is so bound up with the others that nothing, it seems, can be discussed by us without providence being discussed at the same time.

Divine 1, chapter 3

1.3.1CSEL 19:7

Sit ergo nostri operis exordium quaestio illa consequens ac secunda, utrum potestate unius dei mundus regatur anne multorum. nemo, qui quidem sapiat rationemque secum putet, non unum esse intellegat, qui et condiderit omnia et eadem qua condidit uirtute moderetur.

Let the beginning of our work, then, be the question that follows as the second: whether the world is governed by the power of one God or of many. No one who is wise and reckons the matter within himself fails to understand that there is one who both founded all things and governs them by the same power by which he founded them.

1.3.2CSEL 19:7–8

quid enim multis opus est ad mundi regimen sustinendum? nisi forte arbitrabimur, si plures sint, minus habere singulos neruorum atque uirium:

For what need is there of many to sustain the government of the world? Unless perhaps we shall think that, if there are several, each has less strength and power;

1.3.3CSEL 19:8

quod quidem faciunt ii qui esse multos uolunt, quia necesse est inbecillos esse, siquidem singuli sine auxilio reliquorum tantae molis gubernaculum sustinere non possunt. deus autem, qui est aeterna mens, ex omni utique parte perfectae consummataeque uirtutis est:

and this is what those who want there to be many do in fact imply, since they must be weak, if each one without the help of the rest cannot hold the helm of so vast a mass. But God, who is eternal Mind, is certainly of perfect and complete power in every respect;

1.3.4CSEL 19:8

quod si uerum est, unus sit necesse est. potestas enim uel uirtus absoluta retinet suam propriam firmitatem. id autem solidum existimandum est, cui nihil decedere, id perfectum, cui nihil possit accedere.

and if this is true, he must be one. For absolute power or might keeps its own proper firmness. That is to be judged solid from which nothing can be taken away, and that perfect to which nothing can be added.

1.3.5CSEL 19:8

quis dubitet potentissimum esse regem qui totius orbis habeat imperium? neque inmerito. cum illius sint Quae ubique sunt omnia cum ad eum solum omnes undique copiae congerantur.

Who would doubt that a king who holds the rule of the whole world is most powerful? And rightly, since all things everywhere are his, and all resources from every side are gathered to him alone.

1.3.6CSEL 19:8

at si plures partiantur orbem, minus certe opum, minus uirium singuli habebunt, cum intra praescriptam portionem se quisque contineat.

But if several divide the world, each will certainly have less wealth and less strength, since each keeps within the portion assigned to him.

1.3.7CSEL 19:8

eodem modo etiam dii, si plures sint, minus ualebunt, aliis tantundem in se habentibus. uirtutis autem perfecta natura in eo potest esse in quo totum est quam in eo in quo pars exigua de toto est. deus uero si perfectus est, ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia.

In the same way the gods also, if there are several, will be less strong, since others have just as much in themselves. But the perfect nature of power can exist in the one in whom the whole is, rather than in one who has only a small part of the whole. God, if he is perfect, as he must be, cannot be other than one, so that all things may be in him.

1.3.8CSEL 19:8

deorum igitur uirtutes ac potestates infirmiores sint necesse est, quia tantum singulis deerit, quantum in ceteris fuerit: ita quanto plures tanto minores erunt.

The powers and might of the gods, then, must be weaker, since each will lack as much as is in the others; so the more there are, the less they will be.

1.3.9CSEL 19:8–9

quid quod summa illa rerum potestas ac diuina uis ne semel quidem diuidi potest? quidquid enim capit diuisionem, et interitum capiat necesse est. si autem interitus procul est a deo, quia incorruptibilis est et aeternus, consequens est ut diuidi potestas diuina non possit.

What of the fact that that supreme power over things, the divine might, cannot be divided even once? For whatever admits of division must also admit of destruction. But if destruction is far from God, because he is incorruptible and eternal, it follows that the divine power cannot be divided.

1.3.10CSEL 19:9

deus ergo unus est, si nihil esse aliut potest quod tantundem capiat potestatis: et ii tamen qui multos esse arbitrantur officia inter se dicunt esse partitos. de quibus omnibus suo loco disputabimus.

God is therefore one, if nothing else can exist that has as much power. And yet those who think there are many say that they have divided their offices among themselves. We shall discuss all these in their place.

1.3.11CSEL 19:9

illud interim quod ad praesentem locum pertinet teneo: si partiti sunt inter se officia, eodem reuoluitur res, ut ex iis quilibet sufficere omnibus nequeat. perfectus igitur non erit qui cessantibus ceteris non potest omnia gubernare. ita fit ut ad regendum mundum unius perfecta uirtute opus sit quam inbecillitate multorum.

Meanwhile I hold to what concerns the present point: if they have divided their offices among themselves, the matter comes back to the same place, that none of them can suffice for all things. He will therefore not be perfect who cannot govern all things if the rest are idle. So it follows that to rule the world there is need of the perfect power of one rather than the weakness of many.

1.3.12CSEL 19:9

qui autem putat hanc tantam magnitudinem non posse ab uno regi, fallitur neque quanta sit uis ac potestas diuinae maiestatis intellegit, si existimat singularem deum qui facere mundum potuit, eundem regere non posse quem fecit.

Whoever thinks that so great a magnitude cannot be ruled by one is mistaken and does not understand how great is the force and power of the divine majesty, if he supposes that the one God who could make the world cannot rule what he made.

1.3.13CSEL 19:9

at si concipiat animo quanta sit diuini huius operis inmensitas (eamque) cum antea nihil esset, tamen uirtute atque consilio dei ex nihilo esse conflatam, quod opus nisi ab uno inchoari perficique non potuit, iam intelleget multo facilius esse ab uno regi quod est ab uno constitutum.

But if he conceives in his mind how great is the immensity of this divine work, and that, although before there was nothing, it was nevertheless brought together out of nothing by the power and counsel of God, a work that could not have been begun and completed except by one, he will now understand that what was established by one is much more easily ruled by one.

1.3.14CSEL 19:9

dicat fortasse aliquis ne fabricari quidem tam inmensum opus mundi nisi a pluribus potuisse. quamlibet multos, quamlibet magnos faciat, quidquid in multis magnitudinis potestatis uirtutis maiestatisque posuerit, id totum in unum confero et in uno esse dico, ut tantum in eo sit istarum rerum, quantum nec cogitari nec dici potest.

Someone may perhaps say that so immense a work as the world could not even have been fashioned except by several. Let him make them as many and as great as he likes: whatever greatness, power, might, and majesty he places in the many, I gather all of it into one and say that it is in one, so that there is as much of these things in him as can neither be thought nor spoken.

1.3.15CSEL 19:9–10

qua in re quoniam et sensu deficimur et uerbis, quia neque tantam intellegentiae lucem pectus humanum neque explanationem tantarum rerum capit lingua mortalis, id ipsum intellegere nos oportet ac dicere.

And since in this we fail both in understanding and in words, because the human breast cannot contain so great a light of understanding, nor mortal tongue an explanation of such great things, we ought to understand and to say that very thing.

1.3.16CSEL 19:10

uideo rursus quid e contrario dici possit, tales esse illos plures qualem nos uolumus unum. at hoc fieri nullo pacto potest, quod singulorum potestas progredi longius non ualebit occurrentibus sibi potestatibus ceterorum. necesse est enim ut suos quisque limites aut transgredi nequeat aut si transgressus fuerit, suis alterum finibus pellat.

Again I see what can be said on the other side: that those many are such as we want the one to be. But this cannot possibly happen, because the power of each will not be able to advance further when it meets the powers of the others. For each must either be unable to pass his own boundaries, or, if he has passed them, must drive another from his territory.

1.3.17CSEL 19:10

non uident qui deos multos esse credunt fieri posse ut aliquid diuersum uelint, ex qua re disceptatio inter eos et certamen oriatur; sicut Homerus bellantes inter se deos finxit, cum alii Troiam capi uellent, alii repugnarent.

Those who believe there are many gods do not see that it could happen that they wish different things, from which dispute and conflict would arise among them; just as Homer imagined the gods warring among themselves, some wishing Troy to be taken and others opposing it.

1.3.18CSEL 19:10

unius igitur arbitrio mundum regi necesse est. nisi enim singularum partium potestas ad unam prouidentiam referatur, non poterit summa ipsa constare, uno quoque nihil curante amplius quam quod ad eum proprie pertinet, sicut ne res quidem militaris nisi unum habeat ducem atque rectorem.

The world must therefore be ruled by the will of one. For unless the power over the several parts is referred to one providence, the whole itself cannot hold together, each caring for nothing beyond what properly belongs to him; just as not even military affairs can stand unless they have one commander and director.

1.3.19CSEL 19:10

quodsi in uno exercitu tot fuerint imperatores quot legiones, quot cohortes, quot cunei, quot alae, primum nec instrui poterit acies uno quoque periculum recusante nec regi facile aut temperari, quod suis propriis consiliis utantur omnes, quorum diuersitate plus noceant quam prosint: sic in hoc rerum naturae imperio nisi unus fuerit ad quem totius summae cura referatur, uniuersa soluentur et conruent.

If in one army there were as many generals as there are legions, cohorts, wedges, and squadrons, first, the battle line could not be drawn up, each one refusing the danger; nor could it easily be ruled or controlled, because all would follow their own counsels, and by their diversity they would do more harm than good. So in this empire of nature, unless there were one to whom the care of the whole was referred, all things would be dissolved and would collapse.

1.3.20CSEL 19:10–11

dicere autem multorum arbitrio regi mundum tale est, quale si quis adfirmet in uno corpore multas esse mentes, quoniam multa et uaria sint ministeria membrorum, ut singulos corporis sensus singulae mentes regere credantur, item multi adfectus, quibus commoueri solemus uel ad iram uel ad cupiditatem uel ad laetitiam uel ad metum uel ad miserationem, ut in his omnibus totidem mentes putentur operari. quod si quis profecto dicat, ne ipsam quidem quae una est habere uideatur.

To say that the world is ruled by the will of many is as if someone were to assert that in one body there are many minds, because the functions of the limbs are many and various, so that each sense of the body is believed to be ruled by its own mind; and likewise the many emotions by which we are usually moved, to anger or desire or joy or fear or pity, so that in all these as many minds are supposed to be at work. If anyone did say this, he would seem not to have even the one mind that there is.

1.3.21CSEL 19:11

quodsi in uno corpore tantarum rerum gubernationem mens una possidet et uniuersis simul intenta est, cur aliquis existimet mundum non posse ab uno regi, a pluribus posse? quod quia intellegunt isti adsertores deorum, ita eos praeesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tamen unus sit rector eximius.

But if in one body one mind has the government of so many things and attends to all of them at once, why should anyone think that the world cannot be ruled by one but can be ruled by many? Because these champions of the gods understand this, they say that the gods preside over particular things and parts in such a way that there is nevertheless one supreme ruler.

1.3.22CSEL 19:11

iam ergo ceteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus maximus ac potens omnium iis officiis praefecerit, ut ipsi eius imperio ac nutibus seruiant. si uniuersi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt: nec enim potest hoc idem esse quod seruit et quod dominatur.

Then the others will no longer be gods but attendants and ministers, whom that one, the greatest and mighty over all, has set over those offices, so that they serve his command and nod. If they are not all equal, then they are not all gods: for what serves and what rules cannot be the same.

1.3.23CSEL 19:11

nam si deus nomen est summae potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus inpassibilis nulli rei subiectus. ergo dii non sunt quos parere uni maximo deo necessitas cogit.

For if "god" is the name of the highest power, he must be incorruptible, perfect, impassible, subject to nothing. Those, therefore, whom necessity compels to obey the one greatest God are not gods.

1.3.24CSEL 19:11

sed quia non frustra falluntur qui hoc ita putant, causam huius erroris paulo post aperiemus. nunc unitatem diuinae potestatis testimoniis conprobemus.

But since those who think so are not deceived without cause, we shall disclose the cause of this error a little later. Now let us prove the unity of the divine power by testimonies.

Divine 1, chapter 4

1.4.1CSEL 19:11

Prophetae, qui fuerunt admodum multi, unum deum praedicant, unum locuntur, quippe qui unius dei spiritu pleni quae futura essent pari et consona uoce praedixerint.

The prophets, who were very many, proclaim one God and speak of one, since, being filled with the Spirit of the one God, they foretold what was to come with a like and harmonious voice.

1.4.2CSEL 19:11–12

at enim ueritatis expertes non putant his esse credendum: illas enim non diuinas, sed humanas fuisse uoces aiunt: uidelicet quia de uno deo praeconium faciunt, aut insani aut fallaces fuerunt.

But those who have no share in the truth think they should not be believed. They say those were not divine but human voices; evidently, because they proclaim one God, they were either mad or deceivers.

1.4.3CSEL 19:12

atquin inpleta esse inplerique cottidie illorum uaticinia uidemus et in unam sententiam congruens diuinatio docet non fuisse furiosos. quis enim mentis emotae non modo futura praecinere, sed etiam cohaerentia loqui possit?

Yet we see that their prophecies have been fulfilled and are being fulfilled daily, and their divination, agreeing in one meaning, shows that they were not raving. For who with a disordered mind could not only foretell the future but also speak coherently?

1.4.4CSEL 19:12

num ergo fallaces erant qui talia loquebantur? quid ab his tam longe alienum quam ratio fallendi, cum ceteros ab omni fraude cohiberent? idcirco enim a deo mittebantur, ut et praecones essent maiestatis eius et correctores prauitatis humanae.

Were they, then, deceivers who spoke such things? What was so foreign to them as the design of deceiving, when they restrained others from all fraud? For this is why they were sent by God: to be heralds of his majesty and correctors of human wickedness.

1.4.5CSEL 19:12

praeterea uoluntas fingendi ac mentiendi eorum est qui opes adpetunt, qui lucra desiderant: quae res procul ab illis sanctis uiris afuit.

Moreover, the will to feign and lie belongs to those who seek riches and desire gain; and this was far from those holy men.

1.4.6CSEL 19:12

ita enim delegato sibi officio functi sunt, ut derelictis omnibus ad tutelam uitae necessariis non modo in futurum, sed ne in diem quidem laborarent contenti extemporali cibo quem deus subministrasset. et hi non modo quaestum nullum habuerunt, sed etiam cruciatus atque mortem.

For they discharged the office entrusted to them in such a way that, leaving behind everything needed to sustain life, they took no trouble not only for the future but not even for the day, content with the food of the moment which God supplied. And they not only had no gain, but even tortures and death.

1.4.7CSEL 19:12

amara sunt enim uitiosis ac male uiuentibus praecepta iustitiae. itaque ii quorum peccata et arguebantur et prohibebantur excruciatos eos acerbissime necauerunt. ergo a quibus afuit studium lucri, afuit etiam uoluntas et causa fallendi.

For the precepts of justice are bitter to the vicious and to those who live evilly. So those whose sins were exposed and forbidden tortured them most cruelly and killed them. Those, therefore, who had no love of gain had no will or reason to deceive.

1.4.8CSEL 19:12–13

quid quod aliqui eorum principes aut etiam reges fuerunt, in quos cadere non potest suspicio cupiditatis ac fraudis, et tamen praeconium dei singularis eadem qua ceteri diuinatione fecerunt?

What of the fact that some of them were princes or even kings, on whom no suspicion of greed or fraud can fall, and yet they proclaimed the one God with the same inspiration as the rest?

Divine 1, chapter 5

1.5.1CSEL 19:13

Sed omittamus sane testimonia prophetarum, ne minus idonea probatio uideatur esse de his quibus omnino non creditur.

But let us by all means leave aside the testimonies of the prophets, lest the proof seem less adequate if drawn from those who are not believed at all.

1.5.2CSEL 19:13

ueniamus ad auctores et eos ipsos ad ueri probationem testes citemus, quibus contra nos uti solent, poetas dico ac philosophos. ex his unum deum probemus necesse est, non quod illi habuerint cognitam ueritatem, sed quod ueritatis ipsius tanta uis est, ut nemo possit esse tam caecus, quin uideat ingerentem se oculis diuinam claritatem.

Let us come to authorities, and call as witnesses to prove the truth the very men whom they are accustomed to use against us: I mean the poets and philosophers. From these we must prove that God is one, not because they had knowledge of the truth, but because the force of truth itself is so great that no one can be so blind as not to see the divine brightness forcing itself upon his eyes.

1.5.3CSEL 19:13

poetae igitur quamuis deos carminibus ornauerint et eorum res gestas amplificauerint summis laudibus, saepissime tamen confitentur spiritu uel mente una contineri regique omnia.

The poets, then, although they adorned the gods in their songs and magnified their deeds with the highest praises, yet very often confess that all things are held together and ruled by one spirit or mind.

1.5.4CSEL 19:13

Orpheus, qui est uetustissimus poetarum et aequalis ipsorum deorum, siquidem traditur inter Argonautas cum Tyndaridis et Hercule nauigasse, deum uerum et magnum πρωτόγονον appellat, quod ante ipsum nihil sit genitum, sed ab ipso sint cuncta generata. eundem etiam Φάνητα nominat, quod cum adhuc nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit et extiterit.

Orpheus, who is the most ancient of the poets and a contemporary of the gods themselves, since he is said to have sailed among the Argonauts with the sons of Tyndareus and Hercules, calls the true and great God Protogonos, "first-born," because nothing was born before him, but all things were begotten from him. He also names him Phanes, "the one who appears," because when as yet nothing existed he first appeared and came forth from the infinite.

1.5.5CSEL 19:13–14

cuius originem atque naturam quia concipere animo non poterat, ex aere inmenso natum esse dixit: πρωτόγονος Φαέθων περιμήϰεος ἠέρος υἱός.

Because he could not conceive in his mind his origin and nature, he said he was born of the boundless air: "First-born Phaethon, son of the far-stretching air."

1.5.6CSEL 19:14

aliut enim amplius quod diceret non habebat. hunc ait esse omnium deorum parentem, quorum causa caelum condiderit liberisque prospexerit, ut haberent habitaculum sedemque communem: ἔϰτισεν ἀθανάτοις δόμον άϕθιτον. natura igitur et ratione ducente intellexit esse praestantissimam potestatem, caeli ac terrae conditricem.

For he had nothing further to say. He says that he is the parent of all the gods, for whose sake he founded heaven and provided for his children, that they might have a dwelling and a common home: "He built for the immortals an imperishable house." So under the guidance of nature and reason he understood that there is a most excellent power, the founder of heaven and earth.

1.5.7CSEL 19:14

non poterat enim dicere Iouem esse principem rerum, qui erat Saturno genitus, neque ipsum Saturnum, qui caelo natus ferebatur; caelum autem tamquam deum primum constituere non audebat, quod uidebat elementum esse mundi, quod ipsum eguerit auctore. haec eum ratio perduxit ad deum illum primogenitum, cui adsignat et tribuit principatum.

For he could not say that Jupiter was the first principle of things, since he was begotten of Saturn; nor Saturn himself, who was said to have been born of Heaven; and he did not dare to set up Heaven as the first god, because he saw that it was an element of the world and itself needed an author. This reasoning led him to that first-begotten God, to whom he assigns and grants the primacy.

1.5.8CSEL 19:14

Homerus nihil nobis dare potuit quod pertineat ad ueritatem: qui humana potius quam diuina conscripsit. potuit Hesiodus, qui deorum generationem unius libri opere conplexus est: sed tamen nihil dedit non a deo conditore sumens exordium, sed a chao, quod est rudis inordinataeque materiae confusa congeries, cum explanare ante debuerit chaos ipsum unde quando quomodo esse aut constare coepisset.

Homer could give us nothing that pertains to the truth, since he wrote of human rather than divine things. Hesiod could have, since he embraced the generation of the gods in the work of one book; but he gave nothing, taking his beginning not from God the Creator but from Chaos, which is a confused heap of raw and disordered matter, whereas he ought first to have explained from where, when, and how Chaos itself began to be or to exist.

1.5.9CSEL 19:14–15

nimirum sicut ab aliquo artifice disposita ordinata effecta sunt omnia, sic ipsam materiam fictam esse ab aliquo necesse est. quis igitur hanc nisi deus fecit, cuius potestati subiacent omnia?

Clearly, just as all things were arranged, ordered, and made by some craftsman, so matter itself must have been made by someone. Who then made it but God, to whose power all things are subject?

1.5.10CSEL 19:15

sed refugit hoc ille, dum horret incognitam ueritatem. non enim Musarum instinctu sicut uideri uolebat in Helicone carmen illut effudit, sed meditatus uenerat ac paratus.

But he shrank from this, shuddering at the unknown truth. For he did not pour out that song on Helicon by the inspiration of the Muses, as he wished to appear, but came having thought it out and prepared it.

1.5.11CSEL 19:15

nostrorum primus Maro non longe afuit a ueritate, cuius de summo deo, quem mentem ac spiritum nominauit, haec uerba sunt: principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra spiritus intus alit totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet.

The first of our own poets, Maro, was not far from the truth. Of the supreme God, whom he called mind and spirit, these are his words: "In the beginning the heaven and the lands, and the watery plains, the shining globe of the moon, and the Titanian stars, a spirit within nourishes; and mind, poured through all the limbs, moves the whole mass and mingles with the great body."

1.5.12CSEL 19:15

ac ne quis forte ignoraret, quisnam esset ille spiritus qui tantum haberet potestatis, declarauit alio loco dicens: deum namque ire per omnis terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum; hinc pecudes armenta uiros genus omne ferarum, quemque sibi tenuis nascentem accersere uitas.

And lest anyone should perhaps not know who that spirit was which had so much power, he made it plain in another place, saying: "For God goes through all lands, and the tracts of the sea, and the deep heaven; from him flocks, herds, men, every kind of wild beast, each at birth draws its slender life."

1.5.13CSEL 19:15

Ouidius quoque in principio praeclari operis sine ulla nominis dissimulatione a deo, quem fabricatorem mundi, quem rerum opificem uocat, mundum fatetur instructum.

Ovid also, at the beginning of his famous work, without any concealment of the name, confesses that the world was set in order by God, whom he calls the fabricator of the world, the maker of things.

1.5.14CSEL 19:15–16

quodsi uel Orpheus uel hi nostri quae natura ducente senserunt in perpetuum defendissent, eandem quam nos sequimur doctrinam conprehensa ueritate tenuissent.

If either Orpheus or these poets of ours had consistently defended what they perceived under the guidance of nature, they would have grasped the truth and held the same doctrine that we follow.

1.5.15CSEL 19:16

Sed hactenus de poetis. ad philosophos ueniamus, quorum grauior est auctoritas certiusque iudicium, quia non rebus commenticiis, sed inuestigandae ueritati studuisse creduntur.

But enough about the poets. Let us come to the philosophers, whose authority is weightier and judgment more certain, because they are believed to have devoted themselves not to fictions but to searching out the truth.

1.5.16CSEL 19:16

Thales Milesius, qui unus e septem sapientium numero fuit quique primus omnium quaesisse de causis naturalibus traditur, aquam esse dixit ex qua nata sint omnia, deum autem esse mentem quae ex aqua cuncta formauerit. ita materiam rerum posuit in umore, principium causamque nascendi constituit in deo.

Thales of Miletus, who was one of the number of the Seven Wise Men and who is said to have been the first of all to inquire into natural causes, said that water is that from which all things were born, but that God is the mind that formed all things from water. So he placed the matter of things in moisture and set the principle and cause of birth in God.

1.5.17CSEL 19:16

Pythagoras ita definiuit quid esset deus: animus per uniuersas mundi partes omnemque naturam commeans atque diffusus, ex quo omnia quae nascuntur animalia uitam capiunt.

Pythagoras defined what God is thus: a soul passing through and spread through all the parts of the world and all nature, from which all living things that are born receive life.

1.5.18CSEL 19:16

Anaxagoras deum esse dicit infinitam mentem quae per se ipsam moueatur: Antisthenes multos quidem esse populares deos, unum tamen naturalem id est summae totius artificem.

Anaxagoras says that God is infinite mind, which moves of itself. Antisthenes says that there are indeed many gods of the people, but one of nature, that is, the maker of the whole universe.

1.5.19CSEL 19:16–17

Cleanthes et Anaximenes aethera esse dicunt summum deum, cui opinioni poeta noster adsensit: tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus aether coniugis in gremium laetae descendit et omnis magnus alit magno permixtus corpore fetus.

Cleanthes and Anaximenes say that the aether is the supreme God, and our poet agreed with that opinion: "Then the almighty father Aether descends with fruitful showers into the lap of his glad spouse, and, great himself, mingled with her great body, nourishes all offspring."

1.5.20CSEL 19:17

Chrysippus naturalem uim diuina ratione praeditam, interdum diuinam necessitatem deum nuncupat, item Zenon naturalem diuinamque legem.

Chrysippus calls God a natural force endowed with divine reason, sometimes a divine necessity; likewise Zeno calls him the natural and divine law.

1.5.21CSEL 19:17

horum omnium sententia quamuis sit incerta, eodem tamen spectat, ut prouidentiam unam esse consentiant. siue enim natura siue aether siue ratio siue mens siue fatalis necessitas siue diuina lex siue quid aliut dixeris, idem est quod a nobis dicitur deus. nec obstat appellationum diuersitas, cum ipsa significatione ad unum omnia reuoluantur.

The view of all these men, although it is uncertain, yet looks to the same point: they agree that there is one providence. For whether you call it nature or aether or reason or mind or fated necessity or divine law or anything else, it is the same as what we call God. Nor does the diversity of names stand in the way, since in their meaning they all come back to one.

1.5.22CSEL 19:17

Aristoteles quamuis secum ipse dissideat ac repugnantia sibi et dicat et sentiat, in summum tamen unam mentem mundo praeesse testatur.

Aristotle, although he disagrees with himself and both says and thinks things contradictory to one another, nevertheless testifies in sum that one Mind presides over the world.

1.5.23CSEL 19:17

Plato, qui omnium sapientissimus iudicatur, monarchian plane aperteque defendit nec aethera aut rationem aut naturam, sed ut est deum nominat: ab eo mundum hunc perfectum atque mirabilem esse fabricatum.

Plato, who is judged the wisest of all, plainly and openly defends monarchy, the rule of one; and he names him neither aether nor reason nor nature but, as he is, God, and says that this perfect and wonderful world was fashioned by him.

1.5.24CSEL 19:17

quem Cicero secutus atque imitatus in plurimis frequenter deum confitetur ac supremum uocat in iis libris quos de legibus scripsit; ab eoque regi mundum argumentatur, cum disputat de natura deorum, hoc modo: nihil est praestantius deo. ab eo igitur mundum regi necesse est. nulli igitur est naturae oboediens aut subiectus deus. omnem ergo regit ipse naturam.

Cicero, following and imitating him in very many things, frequently confesses God and calls him supreme in the books he wrote On the Laws; and he argues that the world is ruled by him when he discusses the nature of the gods, in this way: "Nothing is more excellent than God; therefore the world must be ruled by him. Therefore God is obedient or subject to no nature; therefore he himself rules all nature."

1.5.25CSEL 19:17–18

quid autem sit deus, in Consolatione definit: nec uero deus ipse, qui intellegitur a nobis, alio modo intellegi potest nisi mens soluta quaedam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens

And what God is he defines in the Consolation: "Nor can God himself, as he is understood by us, be understood in any other way than as a mind unbound and free, separated from every mortal compound, perceiving all things

1.5.26CSEL 19:18

et mouens. Annaeus quoque Seneca, qui ex Romanis uel acerrimus Stoicus fuit, quam saepe summum deum merita laude prosequitur! nam cum de inmatura morte dissereret, non intellegis inquit auctoritatem ac maiestatem iudicis tui, rectoris orbis terrarum caelique et deorum omnium dei, a quo ista numina quae singula adoramus et colimus suspensa sunt?

and moving all things." Annaeus Seneca too, who was the keenest Stoic among the Romans, how often he honours the supreme God with deserved praise! For when he was discussing untimely death, he said: "Do you not understand the authority and majesty of your judge, the ruler of the world and of heaven, and the God of all the gods, on whom those divinities that we worship and honour one by one depend?"

1.5.27CSEL 19:18

item in Exhortationibus: hic cum prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimae iaceret et hoc ordiretur quo neque maius quicquam nouit natura nec melius, ut omnia sub ducibus suis irent, quamuis ipse per totum se corpus intenderat, tamen ministros regni sui deus genuit.

Likewise in the Exhortations: "When he was laying the first foundations of this most beautiful mass and beginning this work, than which nature has known nothing greater or better, so that all things might go under their own leaders, although he had extended himself through the whole body, yet God begot ministers of his kingdom."

1.5.28CSEL 19:18

et quam multa alia de deo nostris similia locutus est! quae nunc differo, quod aliis locis opportuniora sunt. nunc satis est demonstrare summo ingenio uiros attigisse ueritatem ac paene tenuisse, nisi eos retrorsus infucata prauis opinionibus consuetudo rapuisset, qua et deos esse alios opinabantur et ea quae in usum hominis deus fecit, tamquam sensu praedita essent, pro diis habenda et colenda credebant.

And how many other things like ours he said about God! These I defer now, because they are more suitable in other places. For now it is enough to show that men of the highest ability touched the truth and almost held it, had not custom, stained with perverse opinions, snatched them back; by which custom they both supposed that there were other gods and believed that the things God made for man's use were to be held and worshipped as gods, as if they were endowed with sense.

Divine 1, chapter 6

1.6.1CSEL 19:18–19

Nunc ad diuina testimonia transeamus. sed prius unum proferam, quod est simile diuino et ob nimiam uetustatem et quod is quem nominabo ex hominibus in deos relatus est. apud Ciceronem

Now let us pass to divine testimonies. But first I shall bring forward one that is like a divine one, both because of its very great antiquity and because the man I shall name was transferred from among men to the gods. In Cicero,

1.6.2CSEL 19:19

Cotta pontifex disputans contra Stoicos de religionibus et uarietate opinionum quae solent esse de diis, ut more Academicorum omnia faceret incerta, quinque fuisse Mercurios ait et enumeratis per ordinem quattuor quintum fuisse eum a quo sit Argus occisus; ob eamque causam in Aegyptum profugisse atque Aegyptiis leges ac litteras tradidisse.

the pontiff Cotta, disputing against the Stoics about religion and the variety of opinions usually held about the gods, in order to make everything uncertain after the manner of the Academics, says that there were five Mercuries; and having listed four in order, he says the fifth was the one by whom Argus was killed, and that for this reason he fled into Egypt and gave the Egyptians their laws and letters.

1.6.3CSEL 19:19

hunc Aegyptii Thoyth appellant, a quo apud eos primus anni sui mensis id est September nomen accepit. idem oppidum condidit, quod etiam nunc graece uocatur Mercurii ciuitas, et Pheneatae colunt eum religiose. qui tametsi homo fuit, antiquissimus tamen et instructissimus omni genere doctrinae adeo, ut ei multarum rerum et artium scientia Trismegisto cognomen inponeret.

The Egyptians call him Thoth, and from him the first month of their year, that is, September, took its name. He also founded a town which is still called in Greek the city of Mercury, and the people of Pheneus worship him devoutly. Although he was a man, he was yet most ancient and so thoroughly instructed in every kind of learning that his knowledge of many things and arts gave him the surname Trismegistus.

1.6.4CSEL 19:19

hic scripsit libros et quidem multos ad cognitionem diuinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus maiestatem summi ac singularis dei asserit isdemque nominibus appellat quibus nos dominum et patrem. ac ne quis nomen eius requireret, άνώνυμον esse dixit, eo quod nominis proprietate non egeat, ob ipsam scilicet unitatem. ipsius haec uerba sunt: ὁ δὲ θεὸς εἷς, ὁ δὲ είς όνόματος οὐ προσδέεται· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ὢν ὰνώνυμος.

He wrote books, and indeed many, pertaining to the knowledge of divine things, in which he asserts the majesty of the supreme and only God and calls him by the same names as we do, Lord and Father. And lest anyone should ask his name, he said he was "nameless," because he does not need the distinction of a name, by reason, namely, of his very oneness. These are his own words: "God is one, and the one has no need of a name; for he who is, is nameless."

1.6.5CSEL 19:19–20

deo igitur nomen (non) est, quia solus est, nec opus est proprio uocabulo, nisi cum discrimen exigit multitudo, ut unam quamque personam sua nota et appellatione designes. deo autem, quia semper unus est, proprium nomen est deus.

God therefore has no name, because he is alone; nor is a proper name needed, except when a multitude requires a distinction, so that you may mark each person by his own sign and title. But for God, because he is always one, his proper name is God.

1.6.6CSEL 19:20

Superest de responsis sacrisque carminibus testimonia quae sunt multo certiora proferre. nam fortasse ii contra quos agimus nec poetis putent esse credendum tamquam uana fingentibus nec philosophis, quod errare potuerint, quia et ipsi homines fuerint.

It remains to bring forward testimonies from oracles and sacred verses, which are much more certain. For perhaps those against whom we are arguing think that neither the poets should be believed, as inventing vain things, nor the philosophers, since they could have erred, because they too were men.

1.6.7CSEL 19:20–21

M. Varro, quo nemo umquam doctior ne apud Graecos quidem uixit, in libris rerum diuinarum quos ad C. Caesarem pontificem maximum scripsit, cum de quindecimuiris loqueretur, Sibyllinos libros ait non fuisse unius Sibyllae, sed appellari uno nomine Sibyllinos, quod omnes feminae uates Sibyllae sint a ueteribus nuncupatae uel ab unius Delphidis nomine uel a consiliis deorum enuntiandis. σιοὺς enim deos, non θεούς, et consilium non βουλήν, sed βούλλαν appellabant Aeolico genere sermonis. itaque Sibyllam dictam esse quasi θεοβούλην.

Marcus Varro, than whom no more learned man ever lived, not even among the Greeks, in the books on divine things that he wrote to Gaius Caesar, the chief pontiff, when speaking of the Fifteen Men, says that the Sibylline books were not the work of one Sibyl but were called by one name "Sibylline" because all women prophets were called Sibyls by the ancients, either from the name of the one at Delphi or from their announcing the counsels of the gods. For in the Aeolic dialect they called the gods "sioi," not "theoi," and counsel not "boulē" but "bulla"; and so the Sibyl was so called as if "Theoboulē" (divine counsel).

1.6.8CSEL 19:21

ceterum Sibyllas decem numero fuisse, easque omnes enumerauit sub auctoribus qui de singulis scriptitauerint. primam fuisse de Persis, cuius mentionem fecerit Nicanor, qui res gestas Alexandri Macedonis scripsit; secundam Libyssam, cuius meminerit Euripides in Lamiae prologo;

He says further that there were ten Sibyls, and he listed them all, with the authors who wrote about each. The first was from Persia, mentioned by Nicanor, who wrote the deeds of Alexander of Macedon; the second the Libyan, whom Euripides mentions in the prologue of the Lamia;

1.6.9CSEL 19:21

tertiam Delphida, de qua Chrysippus loquatur in eo libro quem de diuinatione conposuit; quartam Cimmeriam in Italia, quam Naeuius in libris belli Punici, Piso in annalibus nominet; quintam Erythraeam, quam Apollodorus Erythraeus adfirmet suam fuisse ciuem eamque Grais Ilium petentibus uaticinatam et perituram esse Troiam et Homerum mendacia scripturum; sextam Samiam, de qua scribat Eratosthenes in antiquis annalibus Samiorum repperisse se scriptum;

the third the Delphic, of whom Chrysippus speaks in the book he composed on divination; the fourth the Cimmerian in Italy, whom Naevius names in his books on the Punic War and Piso in his annals; the fifth the Erythraean, whom Apollodorus of Erythrae asserts was his fellow citizen, and who prophesied to the Greeks as they sailed for Ilium both that Troy would perish and that Homer would write lies; the sixth the Samian, of whom Eratosthenes writes that he found her mentioned in the ancient annals of the Samians;

1.6.10CSEL 19:21–22

septimam Cumanam nomine Amaltheam, quae ab aliis Herophile uel Demophile nominetur, eamque nouem libros attulisse ad regem Tarquinium Priscum ac pro iis trecentos philippeos postulasse regemque aspernatum pretii magnitudinem derisisse mulieris insaniam; illam in conspectu regis tris combussisse ac pro reliquis idem pretium poposcisse; Tarquinium multo magis insanire mulierem putauisse;

the seventh the Cumaean, named Amalthea, who is called by others Herophile or Demophile. She brought nine books to King Tarquinius Priscus and asked three hundred gold pieces for them; the king scorned the greatness of the price and laughed at the woman's madness. In the king's sight she burned three and asked the same price for the rest; Tarquinius thought the woman much madder still.

1.6.11CSEL 19:22

quae denuo tribus aliis exustis cum in eodem pretio perseueraret, motum esse regem ac residuos trecentis aureis emisse; quorum postea numerus sit auctus, Capitolio refecto, quod ex omnibus ciuitatibus et Italicis et Graecis praecipueque Erythraeis coacti adlatique sunt Romam cuiuscumque Sibyllae nomine fuerunt;

When she burned three more and still held to the same price, the king was moved and bought the remaining books for three hundred gold pieces. Their number was later increased, after the Capitol was rebuilt, because the verses of any Sibyl whatever were collected from all the cities, Italian and Greek, and especially from Erythrae, and brought to Rome.

1.6.12CSEL 19:22

octauam Hellespontiam in agro Troiano natam, uico Marmesso circa oppidum Gergithium, quam scribat Heraclides Ponticus Solonis et Cyri fuisse temporibus; nonam Phrygiam, quae uaticinata sit Ancyrae; decimam Tiburtem nomine Albuneam, quae Tiburi colatur ut dea iuxta ripas amnis Anienis, cuius in gurgite simulacrum eius inuentum esse dicitur tenens in manu librum.

The eighth was the Hellespontine, born in the territory of Troy, in the village of Marmessus near the town of Gergithium, whom Heraclides of Pontus writes lived in the times of Solon and Cyrus; the ninth the Phrygian, who prophesied at Ancyra; the tenth the Tiburtine, named Albunea, who is worshipped as a goddess at Tibur beside the banks of the river Anio, in whose depths her statue is said to have been found holding a book in its hand.

1.6.13CSEL 19:22–23

harum omnium Sibyllarum carmina et teruntur et habentur, praeterquam Cymaeae, cuius libri a Romanis occultantur nec eos ab ullo nisi a quindecimuiris inspici fas habent. et sunt singularum singuli libri: quos, quia Sibyllae nomine inscribuntur, unius esse credunt, suntque confusi nec discerni ac suum cuique adsignari potest nisi Erythraeae, quae et nomen suum uerum carmini inseruit et Erythraeam se nominatum iri praelocuta est, cum esset orta Babylone.

The verses of all these Sibyls are both in circulation and possessed, except those of the Cumaean, whose books are kept secret by the Romans, and they hold it unlawful for anyone but the Fifteen Men to look into them. Each Sibyl has her own book; but because they are inscribed with the name "Sibyl," they are believed to be the work of one, and they are mixed together and cannot be distinguished and assigned each to its own author, except that of the Erythraean, who both inserted her true name into her poem and foretold that she would be called Erythraean, though she was born at Babylon.

1.6.14CSEL 19:23

sed et nos confuse Sibyllam dicemus, sicubi testimoniis earum fuerit abutendum. omnes igitur hae Sibyllae unum deum praedicant, maxime tamen Erythraea, quae celebrior inter ceteras ac nobilior habetur, siquidem Fenestella diligentissimus scriptor de quindecim uiris dicens ait restituto Capitolio rettulisse ad senatum C. Curionem consulem, ut legati Erythras mitterentur, qui carmina Sibyllae conquisita Romam deportarent: itaque missos esse P. Gabinium M. Otacilium L. Valerium, qui descriptos a priuatis uersus circa mille Romam deportarunt. idem dixisse Varronem supra ostendimus.

But we too shall speak of "the Sibyl" without distinction wherever we have to use their testimonies. All these Sibyls, then, proclaim one God, and above all the Erythraean, who is held more celebrated and noble among the rest. For Fenestella, a most careful writer, speaking of the Fifteen Men, says that after the Capitol was restored the consul Gaius Curio proposed to the senate that envoys be sent to Erythrae to seek out the Sibyl's verses and bring them to Rome; and so Publius Gabinius, Marcus Otacilius, and Lucius Valerius were sent, who brought to Rome about a thousand verses copied out by private persons. That Varro said the same we have shown above.

1.6.15CSEL 19:23–24

in his ergo uersibus quos Romam legati adtulerunt de uno deo haec sunt testimonia: εἷς θεός, ὂς μόνος ἄρχει, ὐπερμεγέθης ἀγένητος. hunc esse solum summum deum, qui caelum fecerit luminibusque distinxerit: ἀλλὰ θεὸς μόνος εἶς πανυπέρτατος, ὃς πεποίηκεν οὐρανὸν ἡέλιὸν τε καὶ ἀστέρας, ἠδέ σελήνην, καρποφόρον γαῖαν τε καὶ ὕδατος οἴδματα πόντου.

In these verses, then, which the envoys brought to Rome, there are these testimonies about one God: "One God, who alone rules, exceedingly great, unbegotten." That this one is the only supreme God, who made heaven and adorned it with lights: "But God alone is one, highest over all, who made heaven and sun and stars and moon, the fruitful earth and the swelling waters of the sea."

1.6.16CSEL 19:24–25

qui quoniam solus sit aedificator mundi et artifex rerum uel quibus constat uel quae in eo sunt, solum coli oportere testatur: αὐτὸν τὸν μόνον ὄντα σέβεσθ᾽ ἡγήτορα κόσμου. ὃς μόνος εἰς αἰῶνα καὶ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἐτύχθη. item alia Sibylla quaecumque est cum perferre se ad homines uocem dei diceret, sic ait: μοῦνος γὰρ θεὸς εἰμὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς ἄλλος.

And since he alone is the builder of the world and the maker of things, both those of which it consists and those which are in it, she testifies that he alone ought to be worshipped: "Worship him who alone is, the ruler of the world, who alone was made from age to age." Likewise another Sibyl, whichever she is, when she said that she was carrying to men the voice of God, speaks thus: "For I alone am God, and there is no other God."

1.6.17CSEL 19:25

Exequerer nunc testimonia ceterarum, nisi et haec sufficerent et illa opportunioribus locis reseruarem. sed cum defendamus causam ueritatis aput eos qui aberrantes a ueritate falsis religionibus seruiunt, quod genus probationis aduersus eos magis adhibere debemus quam ut eos deorum suorum testimoniis reuincamus?

I would now go through the testimonies of the others, were not these enough and were I not reserving those for more suitable places. But since we are defending the cause of truth before those who have strayed from the truth and serve false religions, what kind of proof ought we to use against them rather than to refute them by the testimonies of their own gods?

Divine 1, chapter 7

1.7.1CSEL 19:25–26

Apollo enim, quem praeter ceteros diuinum maximeque fatidicum existimant, Colophone residens, quo Delphis credo migrauerat amoenitate Asiae ductus, quaerenti cuidam quis aut quid esset omnino deus, respondit uiginti et uno uersibus, quorum hoc principium est: αὺτοϕυὴς ἀδίδαϰτος ὰμήτωρ ἀστυϕέλιϰτος, οὔνομα μηδὲ λόγῳ χωρούμενός, ἐν πυρὶ ναίων, τοῦτο θεὸς, μικρὰ δὲ θεοῦ μερὶς ἄγγελοι ἥμεῖς,

For Apollo, whom they consider divine beyond the rest and the greatest prophet, residing at Colophon, where I suppose he had moved from Delphi, drawn by the pleasantness of Asia, when someone asked him who or what God was at all, replied in twenty-one verses, of which this is the beginning: "Self-grown, untaught, motherless, unshaken, not contained in a name, not even in reason, dwelling in fire: this is God; and we angels are a small portion of God."

1.7.2CSEL 19:26

num quis potest suspicari de Ioue esse dictum, qui et matrem habuit et nomen? quid quod Mercurius ille Termaximus, cuius supra feci mentionem, non modo ἀμήτορα ut Apollo, sed ἀπάτορα quoque appellat deum, quod origo illi non sit aliunde?

Can anyone suspect that this was said of Jupiter, who had both a mother and a name? What of the fact that that Mercury Thrice-Greatest, whom I mentioned above, calls God not only "motherless," as Apollo does, but also "fatherless," because he has no origin from elsewhere?

1.7.3CSEL 19:26

nec enim potest ab ullo esse generatus qui ipse uniuersa generauit. Satis ut opinor et argumentis docui et testibus confirmaui quod per se satis clarum est, unum esse regem mundi, unum patrem, unum dominum.

For he who himself begot all things cannot have been begotten by anyone. I have, I think, sufficiently taught by arguments and confirmed by witnesses what is in itself clear enough: that there is one King of the world, one Father, one Lord.

1.7.4CSEL 19:26

sed fortasse quaerat aliquis a nobis idem illut quod aput Ciceronem quaerit Hortensius, si deus unus est, quae esse beata solitudo queat. tamquam nos quia unum dicimus, desertum ac solitarium esse dicamus. habet enim ministros, quos uocamus nuntios.

But perhaps someone may ask of us the same thing Hortensius asks in Cicero: if God is one, what blessed solitude can there be? As if, because we say he is one, we were saying he is deserted and alone. For he has ministers, whom we call messengers.

1.7.5CSEL 19:26

et est illut uerum quod dixisse in Exhortationibus Senecam supra rettuli, genuisse regni sui ministros deum. uerum hi neque dii sunt neque deos se uocari aut coli uolunt, quippe qui nihil faciant praeter iussum ac uoluntatem dei. nec tamen illi sunt qui uulgo coluntur, quorum et exiguus et certus est numerus.

And that is true which I reported above that Seneca said in the Exhortations, that God begot ministers of his kingdom. But these are not gods, nor do they wish to be called or worshipped as gods, since they do nothing except by the command and will of God. Nor are they those who are commonly worshipped, whose number is both small and fixed.

1.7.6CSEL 19:26

quodsi cultores deorum eos ipsos colere se putant, quos summi dei ministros appellamus, nihil est quod nobis faciant inuidiam, qui unum deum dicamus, multos negemus.

But if the worshippers of the gods think that they worship those very beings whom we call ministers of the supreme God, there is no reason for them to raise ill will against us, who say there is one God and deny that there are many.

1.7.7CSEL 19:26–27

si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus aut trecentos sexaginta quinque ut Orpheus, sed innumerabiles esse. arguimus errores eorum in diuersum, qui tam paucos putant. sciant tamen quo nomine appellari debeant, ne uiolent uerum deum, cuius nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt.

If a multitude delights them, we do not say there are twelve, or three hundred and sixty-five as Orpheus did, but that they are innumerable. We charge them with error in the opposite direction, for thinking there are so few. Yet let them know by what name these ought to be called, lest they wrong the true God, whose name they expose while they assign it to many.

1.7.8CSEL 19:27

credant Apollini suo, qui eodem illo responso ut Ioui principatum, sic etiam ceteris diis abstulit nomen. tertius enim uersus ostendit ministros dei non deos, uerum angelos appellari oportere.

Let them believe their own Apollo, who in that same response took away the chief rule from Jupiter and the name from the other gods as well. For the third verse shows that the ministers of God ought to be called not gods but angels.

1.7.9CSEL 19:27

de se quidem ille mentitus est, qui cum sit e numero daemonum, angelis se dei adgregauit: denique in aliis responsis daemonem se esse confessus est. nam cum interrogaretur quomodo sibi supplicari uellet, ita respondit: πάνσοφε παντοδίδακτε πολύστροφε κέκλυθι, δαῖμον. item rursus cum precem in Apollinem Sminthium rogatus expromeret, ab hoc uersu exorsus est: ἁρμονίη, ϰόσμοιο, ϕαεσϕόρε, πάνσοϕε δαῖμον.

About himself, indeed, he lied: though he is of the number of the demons, he enrolled himself among the angels of God. In fact, in other responses he confessed that he was a demon. For when he was asked how he wished to be prayed to, he answered thus: "All-wise, all-taught, many-turning, hear, O daemon." And again, when he was asked to compose a prayer to Apollo Smintheus, he began with this verse: "Harmony of the world, light-bearer, all-wise daemon."

1.7.10CSEL 19:27–28

quid ergo superest nisi ut sua confessione uerberibus dei ueri ac poenae subiaceat sempiternae? nam et in alio responso ita dixit: δαίμονες οἳ ϕοιτῶσι περὶ χθόνα ϰαὶ περὶ πόντον ἀϰαμάτου δαμνῶνται ὑπαὶ μάστιγι θεοῖο. de utrisque generibus in secundo libro disseremus.

What then remains but that by his own confession he lies subject to the scourges of the true God and to eternal punishment? For in another response he said: "Daemons who roam about the earth and about the sea are subdued under the tireless scourge of God." We shall discuss both kinds in the second book.

1.7.11CSEL 19:28

nunc interim nobis satis est quod dum honorare se uult et in caelo conlocare, confessus est, id quod res habet, quomodo sint appellandi qui deo semper adsistunt.

Meanwhile it is enough for us that, while he wished to honour himself and place himself in heaven, he confessed, as the fact is, how those who always stand beside God ought to be called.

1.7.12CSEL 19:28

retrahant ergo se homines ab erroribus et abiectis religionibus prauis parentem suum dominumque cognoscant, cuius nec uirtus aestimari potest nec magnitudo perspici nec principium conprehendi. cum ad illum mentis humanae intentio et acumen et memoria peruenerit, quasi subductis et consumptis omnibus uiis subsistit haeret deficit nec est aliquid ulterius quo progredi possit.

Let men, then, draw themselves back from their errors and, casting away perverse religions, acknowledge their Parent and Lord, whose power cannot be estimated, whose greatness cannot be seen through, whose beginning cannot be grasped. When the effort, sharpness, and memory of the human mind have reached him, as though all roads had been cut off and used up, it halts, sticks, and fails, and there is nothing further to which it can advance.

1.7.13CSEL 19:28–29

uerum quia fieri non potest quin id quod sit aliquando esse coeperit, consequens est ut quoniam nihil ante illum fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso sit procreatus, ideoque ab Apolline αὐτοϕυής, a Sibylla αὺτογενής et ἀγένητος et ἀποίητος nominatur. quod Seneca homo acutus in Exhortationibus uidit. nos inquit aliunde pendemus. itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui quod est optimum in nobis debeamus. alius nos edidit, alius instruxit: deus ipse se fecit..

But since it cannot be that what exists did not at some time begin to exist, it follows that, since nothing was before him, he was brought forth from himself before all things; and therefore he is called by Apollo "self-grown," and by the Sibyl "self-begotten," "unbegotten," and "unmade." Seneca, an acute man, saw this in the Exhortations: "We," he says, "depend on another. So we look to someone to whom we owe what is best in us. Another brought us forth, another furnished us; God made himself."

Divine 1, chapter 8

1.8.1CSEL 19:29

His igitur tot ac tantis testibus conprobatur unius dei potestate ac prouidentia mundum gubernari, cuius uim maiestatemque tantam esse dicit in Timaeo Plato, ut eam neque mente concipere neque uerbis enarrare quisquam possit ob nimiam et inaestimabilem potestatem.

By so many and such great witnesses, then, it is proved that the world is governed by the power and providence of one God, whose force and majesty Plato in the Timaeus says is so great that no one can either conceive it in mind or tell it in words, because of its exceeding and inestimable power.

1.8.2CSEL 19:29

dubitet uero aliquis an quicquam difficile aut inpossibile sit deo, qui tanta tamque mirifica opera prouidentia excogitauit, uirtute constituit, ratione perfecit, nunc autem spiritu sustentet, potestate moderetur, inexcogitabilis ineffabilis et nulli alii satis notus quam sibi?

Can anyone doubt whether anything is difficult or impossible for God, who devised such great and wonderful works by his providence, established them by his power, completed them by his reason, and now sustains them by his spirit and governs them by his might, inconceivable, ineffable, and sufficiently known to none but himself?

1.8.3CSEL 19:29

unde mihi de tanta maiestate saepius cogitanti qui deos colunt interdum uideri solent tam caeci, tam incogitabiles, tam excordes, tam non multum a mutis animalibus differentes, qui credant eos qui geniti sint maris ac feminae coitu aliquid maiestatis diuinaeque uirtutis habere potuisse, cum Sibylla Erythraea dicat: οὐ δύνατ ἀνδρὸς ἑϰ μηρῶν μήτρας τε θεὸς τετυπωμένος εἶναι.

So when I think often about such great majesty, those who worship the gods sometimes seem to me so blind, so thoughtless, so senseless, so little different from dumb animals, that they believe that beings born from the union of male and female could have had anything of majesty and divine power, when the Erythraean Sibyl says: "God cannot be fashioned from the thighs of a man and from a womb."

1.8.4CSEL 19:29–30

quod si est uerum, sicuti est, apparet Herculem Apollinem Liberum Mercurium Iouemque ipsum cum ceteris homines fuisse, quoniam sunt ex duobus sexibus nati.

If this is true, as it is, it is plain that Hercules, Apollo, Liber, Mercury, and Jupiter himself, with the rest, were men, since they were born of the two sexes.

1.8.5CSEL 19:30

quid est autem a deo tam remotum quam id opus, quod ipse ad propagandam subolem mortalibus tribuit et quod sine substantia corporali nullum potest esse? dii ergo si sunt inmortales et aeterni, quid opus est altero sexu — nimirum ut generent? ipsa progenie quid opus est, cum successione non egeant qui semper sunt futuri?

What is so far removed from God as that work which he himself gave to mortals for propagating offspring, and which cannot exist without bodily substance? If the gods are immortal and eternal, what need is there of the other sex? Evidently, so that they may beget? What need of offspring itself, when those who will always exist do not need succession?

1.8.6CSEL 19:30

nam profecto in hominibus ceterisque animantibus diuersitas sexus et coitio et generatio nullam habet aliam rationem nisi ut omnia genera uiuentium, quoniam sunt condicione mortalitatis obitura, mutua possint successione seruari, deo autem, qui est sempiternus, neque alter sexus neque successio necessaria est.

For certainly among men and the other animals the difference of sex, and union, and generation have no other purpose than that all kinds of living things, since by their mortal condition they will die, may be preserved by mutual succession; but God, who is everlasting, needs neither another sex nor succession.

1.8.7CSEL 19:30

dicet aliquis ut habeat uel ministros uel in quos possit ipse dominari. quid igitur sexu opus est feminino, cum deus, qui est omnipotens ut uocatur, sine usu et opera feminae possit.

Someone will say: so that he may have either ministers or those over whom he may rule. What need is there, then, of the female sex, when God, who is almighty as he is called, can without the use and work of a woman

1.8.8CSEL 19:30–31

filios procreare? nam si quibusdam minutis animalibus id praestitit, ut sibi e foliis natos et suauibus herbis ore legant, cur existimet aliquis ipsum deum nisi ex permixtione sexus alterius non posse generare? illos igitur quos inperiti et insipientes tamquam deos et nuncupant et adorant, nemo est tam inconsideratus quin intellegat fuisse mortales. quomodo ergo inquiet aliquis dii crediti sunt? nimirum quia reges maximi ac potentissimi fuerunt, ob merita uirtutum suarum aut munerum aut artium repertarum, cum cari fuissent iis quibus inperitauerant, in memoriam sunt consecrati. quod si quis dubitat, res eorum gestas et facta consideret, quae uniuersa tam poetae quam historici ueteres prodiderunt.

beget sons? For if he granted to certain tiny creatures that they gather their young with their mouths from leaves and sweet herbs, why should anyone think that God himself cannot beget except by union with another sex? Those, then, whom the ignorant and foolish both name and adore as gods, no one is so thoughtless as not to understand were mortals. How then, someone will say, were they believed to be gods? Evidently because they were very great and powerful kings, and because of the merit of their virtues or gifts or the arts they discovered, since they had been dear to those over whom they ruled, they were consecrated in memory. If anyone doubts this, let him consider their deeds and actions, which both the poets and the ancient historians have all handed down.

Divine 1, chapter 9

1.9.1CSEL 19:31

Hercules, qui ob uirtutem clarissimus et quasi Africanus inter deos habetur, nonne orbem terrae, quem peragrasse ac purgasse narratur, stupris adulteriis libidinibus inquinauit? nec mirum, cum esset adulterio genitus Alcimenae. quid tandem potuit in eo esse diuini, qui suis ipse uitiis mancipatus et mares et feminas contra omnes leges infamia flagitio dedecore adfecit?

Hercules, who is held most famous for his virtue and, as it were, the Africanus among the gods, did he not pollute with debauchery, adultery, and lusts the world which he is said to have travelled through and cleansed? No wonder, since he was begotten of Alcmena in adultery. What divinity, after all, could there be in one who, himself enslaved to his own vices, inflicted infamy, outrage, and disgrace on both males and females against all laws?

1.9.2CSEL 19:31

sed ne illa quidem quae magna et mirabilia gessit talia iudicanda sunt, ut uirtutibus diuinis tribuenda uideantur. quid enim tam magnificum, si leonem aprumque superauit, si aues deiecit sagittis, si regium stabulum egessit, si uiraginem uicit cingulumque detraxit, si equos feroces cum domino interemit? opera sunt ista fortis uiri, hominis tamen.

But not even his great and wonderful deeds are to be judged such that they seem to belong to divine powers. For what is so magnificent if he overcame a lion and a boar, if he shot down birds with arrows, if he cleared out a king's stable, if he conquered a warrior-maiden and took away her girdle, if he killed fierce horses together with their master? These are the works of a brave man, but of a man.

1.9.3CSEL 19:31

illa enim quae uicit fragilia et mortalia fuerunt. nulla est enim quod ait orator tanta uis, quae non ferro ac uiribus debilitari frangique possit:

For the things he conquered were fragile and mortal. For there is no force so great, as the orator says, that it cannot be weakened and broken by iron and strength.

1.9.4CSEL 19:31–32

animum uincere, iracundiam cohibere fortissimi est: quae ille nec fecit umquam nec potuit. haec qui faciat, non ego eum cum summis uiris comparo, sed simillimum deo iudico. uellem adiecisset de libidine luxuria cupiditate insolentia, ut uirtutem eius inpleret, quem deo similem iudicabat.

"But to conquer one's mind, to restrain anger, is the mark of the bravest man": these things Hercules never did and never could do. "Whoever does these things I do not compare with the greatest men, but judge him most like God." I wish Cicero had added something about lust, luxury, greed, and insolence, to complete the virtue of the one he judged like God.

1.9.5CSEL 19:32

non enim fortior putandus est qui leonem quam qui uiolentam et in se ipso inclusam feram superat, iracundiam, aut qui rapacissimas uolucres deiecit quam qui cupiditates auidissimas cohercet, aut qui Amazonem bellatricem quam qui libidinem uincit pudoris ac famae debellatricem, aut qui fimum (de) stabulo quam qui uitia de corde suo egerit, quae magis sunt perniciosa quia domestica et propria mala sunt, quam illa quae et uitari poterant et caueri.

For he is not to be thought braver who overcomes a lion than he who overcomes the violent beast shut up within himself, anger; or he who shot down the most rapacious birds than he who restrains the most greedy desires; or he who conquers the warlike Amazon than he who conquers lust, the destroyer of modesty and good name; or he who cleared the dung from a stable than he who has cleared the vices from his own heart, which are more destructive because they are domestic and personal evils, than those which could have been avoided and guarded against.

1.9.6CSEL 19:32

ex quo fit ut ille solus uir fortis debeat iudicari, qui temperans et moderatus et iustus est. quodsi cogitet aliquis quae sint dei opera, iam haec omnia quae mirantur homines ineptissimi ridicula iudicabit. illa enim non diuinis uirtutibus, quas ignorant, sed infirmitate suarum uirium metiuntur.

From this it follows that he alone ought to be judged a brave man who is temperate, moderate, and just. And if anyone considers what the works of God are, he will at once judge ridiculous all these things that the most foolish men admire. For they measure them not by divine powers, of which they are ignorant, but by the weakness of their own strength.

1.9.7CSEL 19:32

nam illut quidem nemo negauit, Herculem non Eurystheo tantum seruisse regi, quod aliquatenus honestum uideri potest, sed etiam inpudicae mulieri Omphalae, quae illum uestibus suis indutum sedere ad pedes suos iubebat pensa facientem. detestabilis turpitudo!

For no one has denied that Hercules served not only King Eurystheus, which may seem honourable to some extent, but also the shameless woman Omphale, who used to order him, dressed in her clothes, to sit at her feet doing his task of spinning. Detestable baseness!

1.9.8CSEL 19:32

sed tanti erat uoluptas. quid tu? inquiet aliquis poetisne credendum putas? quidni putem? non enim Lucilius ista narrat aut Lucianus, qui diis et hominibus non pepercit, set ii potissimum, qui deorum laudes canebant.

But pleasure was worth that much to him. "What?" someone will say. "Do you think the poets should be believed?" Why should I not? For it is not Lucilius who tells these things, or Lucian, who spared neither gods nor men, but above all those who sang the praises of the gods.

1.9.9CSEL 19:32–33

quibus igitur credemus, si fidem laudantibus non habemus? qui hos mentiri putat, proferat alios quibus credamus auctores, qui nos doceant qui sint isti dii, quomodo, unde orti, quae sit uis eorum, qui numerus, quae potestas, quid in iis admirabile, quid cultu dignum, quod denique certius ueriusque mysterium. nullos dabit.

Whom then shall we believe, if we do not trust those who praise them? Whoever thinks these poets lie, let him bring forward other authorities for us to believe, who may teach us who these gods are, how and from where they arose, what their force is, what their number, what their power, what is admirable in them, what worthy of worship, and finally what mystery is more certain and truer. He will produce none.

1.9.10CSEL 19:33

credamus igitur istis, qui non ut reprehenderent sunt locuti, sed ut praedicarent. nauigauit ergo cum Argonautis expugnauitque Troiam iratus Laomedonti ob negatam sibi pro filiae salute mercedem. unde quo tempore fuerit apparet. idem furore atque insania percitus uxorem suam cum liberis interemit.

Let us therefore believe these men, who spoke not to find fault but to proclaim. Hercules sailed, then, with the Argonauts and stormed Troy, angry with Laomedon because the reward promised him for saving his daughter was refused. From this it is clear at what time he lived. The same man, driven by fury and madness, killed his wife together with his children.

1.9.11CSEL 19:33

hunc homines deum putant! sed Philocteta heres eius non putauit, qui facem supposuit arsuro, qui artus eius ac neruos cremari ac diffluere uidit, qui ossa eius et cineres in Oetaeo monte sepeliuit, pro quo munere sagittas eius accepit.

Men think this man a god! But Philoctetes his heir did not think so: he put the torch to him when he was about to burn, he saw his limbs and sinews burned and melted, he buried his bones and ashes on Mount Oeta, and for this service he received his arrows.

Divine 1, chapter 10

1.10.1CSEL 19:33

Aesculapius et ipse non sine flagitio Apollinis natus quid fecit aliud diuinis honoribus dignum nisi quod sanauit Hippolytum? mortem sane habuit clariorem, quod a deo meruit fulminari.

Aesculapius, himself born of Apollo not without disgrace, what did he do worthy of divine honours except that he healed Hippolytus? His death, indeed, was more famous, in that he deserved to be struck by lightning by a god.

1.10.2CSEL 19:33–34

hunc Tarquitius de inlustribus uiris disserens ait incertis parentibus natum, expositum et a uenatoribus inuentum, canino lacte nutritum, Chironi traditum didicisse medicinam; fuisse autem Messenium, sed Epidauri moratum. Tullius etiam Cynosuris ait sepultum.

Tarquitius, discussing famous men, says that he was born of uncertain parents, exposed, found by hunters, nursed on dog's milk, handed over to Chiron, and learned medicine; that he was a Messenian but lived at Epidaurus. Tullius also says he was buried at Cynosura.

1.10.3CSEL 19:34

quid Apollo pater eius? nonne ob amorem, quo flagrabat, turpissime gregem pauit alienum et muros Laomedonti extruxit mercede conductus, quae illi negari potuit inpune? ab eoque primo rex perfidus quidquid cum diis pepigisset didicit abnegare. idem formonsum puerum et dum amat, uiolauit et dum ludit, occidit.

What of Apollo his father? Did he not, for the love with which he burned, most shamefully pasture another man's flock, and build walls for Laomedon, hired for a wage which could be refused him with impunity? From him first the treacherous king learned to deny whatever he had agreed with the gods. The same Apollo, while he loved a beautiful boy, violated him, and while he played with him, killed him.

1.10.4CSEL 19:34

homicida Mars et per gratiam caedis crimine ab Atheniensibus liberatus, ne uideretur nimis ferus et inmanis, adulterium cum Venere commisit.

Mars was a murderer, freed by the Athenians from the charge of killing by favour; and lest he seem too fierce and savage, he committed adultery with Venus.

1.10.5CSEL 19:34

Kastor et Pollux dum alienas sponsas rapiunt, esse gemini desierunt. nam dolore iniuriae concitatus Idas alterum gladio transuerberauit: et eosdem poetae alternis uiuere, alternis mori narrant, ut iam sint non deorum tantum, sed omnium mortalium miserrimi, quibus semel mori non licet.

Castor and Pollux, while carrying off other men's brides, ceased to be twins; for Idas, stirred by the pain of the injury, ran one of them through with a sword. And the poets relate that they live and die by turns, so that they are now the most wretched not only of the gods but of all mortals, since they are not allowed to die once for all.

1.10.6CSEL 19:34–35

aus tamen Homerus ambos simpliciter, non ut poetae solent, mortuos esse testatur. nam cum faceret in muris adsidentem Priamo Helenam cunctos Graeciae principes recognoscere, solos autem se fratres suos requirere, subiecit orationi eius huiusmodi uersum: haec ait, ast illos retinebat terra sepultos.

Yet Homer testifies simply, not as poets usually do, that both were dead. For when he made Helen, sitting beside Priam on the walls, recognize all the chiefs of Greece and look in vain only for her own brothers, he added to her speech a verse of this kind: "So she spoke; but the earth already held them, buried."

1.10.7CSEL 19:35

fur ac nebulo Mercurius quid ad famam sui reliquit nisi memoriam fraudum suarum? caelo scilicet dignus, quia palaestram docuit et lyram primus inuenit.

Mercury, thief and scoundrel, what did he leave to his fame except the memory of his frauds? Worthy of heaven, no doubt, because he taught wrestling and was the first to invent the lyre.

1.10.8CSEL 19:35

Liberum patrem necesse est in senatu deorum summae auctoritatis primaeque esse sententiae, quia. praeter Iouem solus omnium triumphauit, exercitum duxit, Indos debellauit. sed inuictus ille imperator Indicus maximus ab amore ac libidine turpissime uictus est.

Father Liber must be of the highest authority and the first to speak in the senate of the gods, because apart from Jupiter he alone of all celebrated a triumph, led an army, and subdued the Indians. But that unconquered commander, conqueror of India, was most shamefully conquered by love and lust.

1.10.9CSEL 19:35

delatus enim Cretam cum semiuiro comitatu nanctus est inpudicam mulierem in litore ac fiducia uictoriae Indicae uir esse uoluit, ne nimium mollis uideretur, atque illam patris proditricem, fratris interemptricem, ab alio relictam et repudiatam in coniugium sibi uindicauit ac Liberam fecit et cum ea pariter ascendit in caelum.

For, carried to Crete with his half-man retinue, he found a shameless woman on the shore; and, confident from his Indian victory, he wished to be a man, so as not to seem too soft, and claimed as his wife her who had betrayed her father, caused her brother's death, and been abandoned and rejected by another; he made her Libera and ascended into heaven together with her.

1.10.10CSEL 19:35

quid horum omnium pater Iuppiter, qui in sollemni precatione Optimus Maximus nominatur? nonne a prima sua pueritia inpius ac paene parricida deprehenditur, cum patrem regno expulit ac fugauit nec expectauit mortem decrepiti senis cupiditate regnandi? et cum paternum solium per uim, per arma cepisset, bello est a Titanibus lacessitus, quod humano generi principium fuit malorum: quibus uictis et pace in perpetuum conparata reliquam suam uitam in stupris adulteriisque consumsit.

What of the father of all these, Jupiter, who in solemn prayer is named Best and Greatest? Is he not found from his earliest boyhood impious and almost a parricide, when he drove his father from the kingdom and put him to flight, and in his lust to reign did not wait for the death of a decrepit old man? And when he had seized his father's throne by violence and arms, he was attacked in war by the Titans, which was the beginning of evils for the human race; and when they had been conquered and peace secured forever, he spent the rest of his life in debauchery and adultery.

1.10.11CSEL 19:35–36

omitto uirgines quas imminuit: id enim tolerabile iudicari solet. Amphitryonem ac Tyndarum praeterire non possum, quorum domos dedecore atque infamia plenissimas reddidit.

I pass over the virgins whom he dishonoured, for that is usually judged tolerable. I cannot pass over Amphitryon and Tyndareus, whose houses he filled to the full with disgrace and infamy.

1.10.12CSEL 19:36

illut uero summae inpietatis ac sceleris, quod regium puerum rapuit ad stuprum. parum enim uidebatur, si in expugnanda feminarum pudicitia maculosus esset ac turpis, nisi etiam sexui suo faceret iniuriam: hoc est uerum adulterium, quod ut contra naturam.

But that was of the highest impiety and wickedness, that he carried off a royal boy for sexual abuse. For it seemed too little to be stained and base in assaulting the chastity of women, unless he also did injury to his own sex. This is true adultery, since it is against nature.

1.10.13CSEL 19:36

haec qui facit, uiderimus an Maximus, certe Optimus non est: quod nomen a corruptoribus ab adulteris ab incestis abest, nisi forte nos erramus homines, qui talia facientes sceleratos uocamus ac perditos: omnibusque poenis dignissimos iudicamus.

Whoever does these things, we may see whether he is "Greatest"; "Best" he certainly is not. That name is far from seducers, adulterers, and the incestuous, unless perhaps we men are wrong, who call those who do such things wicked and abandoned and judge them most deserving of every punishment.

1.10.14CSEL 19:36

stultus autem Marcus Tullius, qui Gaio Verri adulteria obiecit: eadem enim Iuppiter quem colebat admisit; qui Publio Clodio sororis incestum: at illi Optimo Maximo eadem fuit et soror et coniunx.

Foolish, then, was Marcus Tullius, who reproached Gaius Verres with adulteries, for Jupiter, whom he worshipped, committed the same; and Publius Clodius with incest with his sister, for to that "Best and Greatest" the same woman was both sister and wife.

Divine 1, chapter 11

1.11.1CSEL 19:36

Quis est igitur tam excors qui hunc regnare in caelo putet, qui ne in terra quidem debuit? non insulse quidam poeta triumphum Cupidinis scripsit, quo in libro non modo potentissimum deorum Cupidinem, sed etiam uictorem facit.

Who then is so senseless as to think that he reigns in heaven who ought not to reign even on earth? Not without wit did a certain poet write a Triumph of Cupid, in which book he makes Cupid not only the most powerful of the gods but even their conqueror.

1.11.2CSEL 19:36

enumeratis enim amoribus singulorum, quibus in potestatem Cupidinis dicionemque uenissent, instruit pompam, in qua Iuppiter cum ceteris diis ante currum triumphantis ducitur catenatus. eleganter id quidem a poeta figuratum, sed tamen non multum distat a uero.

For having listed the loves of each, by which they had come into Cupid's power and dominion, he arranges a procession in which Jupiter with the other gods is led in chains before the chariot of the one triumphing. This was elegantly imagined by the poet, yet it is not far from the truth.

1.11.3CSEL 19:36

qui enim uirtutis est expers, qui cupiditate ac libidinibus malis uincitur, non Cupidini ut ille finxit, sed morti subiectus est sempiternae.

For whoever has no share in virtue and is conquered by desire and evil lusts is subject not to Cupid, as that poet imagined, but to eternal death.

1.11.4CSEL 19:36–37

sed omittamus de moribus dicere, rem consideremus, ut intellegant homines in quibus miseri uersentur erroribus.

But let us leave off speaking of morals and consider the facts, so that men may understand in what errors they wretchedly move.

1.11.5CSEL 19:37

regnare in caelo Iouem uulgus existimat: id et doctis pariter et indoctis persuasum est, quod et religio ipsa et precationes et hymni et delubra et simulacra demonstrant.

The common people think that Jupiter reigns in heaven: learned and unlearned alike are persuaded of this, as religion itself, prayers, hymns, shrines, and images show.

1.11.6CSEL 19:37

eundem tamen Saturno et Rhea genitum confitentur. quomodo potest deus uideri aut, ut ait poeta, hominum rerumque repertor, ante cuius ortum infinita hominum milia fuerunt? eorum scilicet, qui Saturno regnante uixerunt et priores luce quam Iuppiter sunt potiti.

Yet they confess that the same Jupiter was begotten of Saturn and Rhea. How can he seem a god, or, as the poet says, "the discoverer of men and things," when before his birth there were countless thousands of men, namely those who lived while Saturn reigned and enjoyed the light earlier than Jupiter?

1.11.7CSEL 19:37

uideo alium deum regem fuisse primis temporibus, alium consequentibus. potest ergo fieri ut alius postea sit futurus. si enim prius regnum mutatum est, cur desperemus etiam posterius posse mutari? nisi forte Saturnus generare potuit fortiorem, Iuppiter non potest.

I see that one god was king in the first times, another in the times that followed. It can happen, then, that there will be yet another later. For if the former kingdom was changed, why should we despair that the latter too can be changed? Unless perhaps Saturn could beget one stronger than himself, and Jupiter cannot.

1.11.8CSEL 19:37

atquin diuinum imperium aut semper inmutabile est aut si est mutabile, quod fieri non potest, semper utique mutabile est. potest ergo Iuppiter regnum amittere, sicut pater eius amisit? ita plane.

But divine rule is either always unchangeable, or, if it is changeable, which cannot be, it is certainly always changeable. Can Jupiter, then, lose his kingdom, as his father lost it? Plainly so.

1.11.9CSEL 19:37

nam cum idem neque uirginibus neque maritatis umquam pepercisset, abstinuit se tamen una Thetide, quod responsum fuit maiorem patre suo futurum quisquis ex illa natus esset.

For although he never spared virgins or married women, he nevertheless kept away from Thetis alone, because an oracle had declared that whoever was born of her would be greater than his father.

1.11.10CSEL 19:37

et primum inprudentia in eo non dei, cui nisi Themis futura dixisset, ipse nesciret; si autem diuinus non sit, ne deus quidem sit, unde ipsa diuinitas nominatur, ut ab homine humanitas;

And first there was in him an ignorance of the future unworthy of a god: had Themis not told him the future, he himself would not have known it. But if he is not divine, he is not even a god, since divinity itself is named from god, as humanity from man.

1.11.11CSEL 19:37–38

deinde conscientia inbecillitatis, qui timuit utique maiorem. quod qui facit, scit profecto non esse se maximum, quandoquidem potest aliquid maius existere.

Next, there was the consciousness of weakness in one who feared someone greater. Whoever does this surely knows that he is not the greatest, since something greater can exist.

1.11.12CSEL 19:38

idem per Stygiam paludem sanctissime iurat, una superstitio superis quae reddita diuis. quae ista superstitio est aut a quo reddita? est ergo aliqua potestas maxima quae perierantes deos puniat? quae tanta formido est paludis infernae, si sunt inmortales? quid metuant eam, quam uisuri non sunt nisi quos mori necesse est?

He also swears most solemnly by the Stygian marsh, "the one object of dread appointed for the gods above." What dread is that, or by whom appointed? Is there, then, some supreme power to punish gods who perjure themselves? What is this great fear of the infernal marsh, if they are immortal? Why should they fear what none are to see except those who must die?

1.11.13CSEL 19:38

quid igitur homines oculos suos in caelum tollant? quid per superos deierent, cum ipsi superi ad inferos reuoluantur ibique habeant quod uenerentur et adorent? illut uero quale est, esse

Why then do men lift their eyes to heaven? Why do they swear by the gods above, when the gods above themselves turn back to the gods below and have there something to venerate and adore? And what of the saying that there are

1.11.14CSEL 19:38

fata quibus dii omnes et ipse Iuppiter pareant? si Parcarum tanta uis est, ut plus possint quam caelestes uniuersi quamque ipse rector ac dominus, cur non illae potius regnare dicantur, quarum legibus et statutis parere omnes deos necessitas cogit? num cui dubium est quin is qui alicui rei obsequitur maximus non sit?

Fates whom all the gods and Jupiter himself obey? If the power of the Parcae is so great that they can do more than all the heavenly gods and than their very ruler and lord, why should they not rather be said to reign, since necessity compels all the gods to obey their laws and decrees? Can anyone doubt that he who submits to anything is not the greatest?

1.11.15CSEL 19:38

nam si sit, non accipiat fata, sed faciat. — nunc ad illud quod omiseram redeo. in una itaque sola fuit continentior, cum eam deperiret, non uirtute aliqua, sed metu successoris.

For if he were, he would not receive the fates but make them. Now I return to what I had omitted. In the case of one woman alone, then, he was more restrained, though he was madly in love with her, not from any virtue but from fear of a successor.

1.11.16CSEL 19:38–39

quae formido utique eius est qui sit et mortalis et inbecillus et nihili, quippe qui potuit et tunc cum nasceretur extingui, sicut frater eius ante genitus extinctus est, qui si uiuere potuisset, numquam minori concessisset imperium. ipse autem furto seruatus furtimque nutritus Zεύς siue Zήν appellatus est, non ut isti putant a feruore caelestis ignis uel quod uitae sit dator et animantibus inspiret animas, quae uirtus solius dei est — quam enim possit inspirare animam qui ipse accepit aliunde? —, sed quod primus ex liberis Saturni maribus uixerit.

That fear surely belongs to one who is mortal, weak, and of no account, since he could have been done away with at the very time of his birth, as his brother born before him was done away with; and had that brother been able to live, he would never have yielded the rule to a younger. But Jupiter himself, saved by stealth and nourished in secret, was called Zeus or Zēn, not, as these people think, from the heat of heavenly fire, or because he is the giver of life and breathes souls into living things, a power that belongs to God alone (for how could he breathe a soul into others who himself received it from elsewhere?), but because he was the first of Saturn's male children to live.

1.11.17CSEL 19:39

potuerunt igitur homines alium deum habere rectorem, si Saturnus non fuisset ab uxore delusus at enim poetae ista finxerunt. errat quisquis hoc putat. illi enim de hominibus loquebantur, sed ut eos ornarent quorum memoriam laudibus celebrabant, deos esse dixerunt. itaque illa potius ficta sunt quae tamquam de diis, non illa quae tamquam de hominibus sunt locuti: quod clarum fiet exemplo quod inferemus.

So men could have had another god as their ruler, had Saturn not been deceived by his wife. "But the poets invented these things." Whoever thinks this is mistaken. For they spoke about men, but in order to adorn those whose memory they celebrated with praises, they said they were gods. So it is rather what they said about them as gods that is invented, not what they said about them as men; and this will become clear from an example I shall bring forward.

1.11.18CSEL 19:39

Danaen uiolaturus aureos nummos largiter in sinum eius infudit, haec stupri merces fuit. at poetae, qui quasi de deo loquebantur, ne auctoritatem creditae maiestatis infringerent, finxerunt ipsum in aureo imbre delapsum eadem figura qua imbres ferreos dicunt, cum multitudinem telorum sagittarumque describunt.

When he was about to violate Danae, he poured gold coins generously into her lap: this was the price of her dishonour. But the poets, speaking as if of a god, so as not to weaken the authority of his supposed majesty, invented the story that he himself came down in a shower of gold, using the same figure by which they speak of showers of iron when describing a multitude of darts and arrows.

1.11.19CSEL 19:39

rapuisse dicitur in aquila Catamitum: poeticus color est. sed aut per legionem rapuit cuius insigne aquila est aut nauis in qua est inpositus tutelam habuit in aquila figuratam, sicut taurum, cum rapuit et transvexit Europam.

He is said to have carried off Catamitus by an eagle: that is poetic colouring. But either he carried him off by means of a legion whose standard is an eagle, or the ship in which the boy was placed had a protecting emblem shaped like an eagle, just as it had a bull when he carried off Europa and took her across the sea.

1.11.20CSEL 19:39–40

eodem modo conuertisse in bouem traditur Io Inachi filiam, quae ut iram Iunonis effugeret, ut erat iam saetis obsita, iam bos, tranasse dicitur mare in Aegyptumque uenisse atque ibi recepta pristina specie dea facta quae nunc Isis uocatur.

In the same way he is said to have turned Io, the daughter of Inachus, into a cow; and she, to escape Juno's anger, just as she was, covered with bristles and now a cow, is said to have swum across the sea and come into Egypt, and there, having recovered her former appearance, to have become the goddess now called Isis.

1.11.21CSEL 19:40

quo igitur argumento probari potest nec Europam in tauro sedisse nec Io bouem factam? quod certus dies habetur in fastis quo Isidis nauigium celebratur: quae res docet non tranasse illam, sed nauigasse.

By what argument, then, can it be proved that Europa did not sit on a bull and that Io was not made a cow? Because a fixed day is kept in the calendar on which the Voyage of Isis is celebrated, which shows that she did not swim across but sailed.

1.11.22CSEL 19:40

igitur qui sapere sibi uidentur, quia intellegunt uiuum terrenumque corpus in caelo esse non posse, totam Ganymedeam fabulam pro falso repudiant nec sentiunt in terra id esse factum, quia res ac libido ipsa terrena est.

So those who seem wise to themselves, because they understand that a living earthly body cannot be in heaven, reject the whole story of Ganymede as false, and do not perceive that it was done on earth, because the deed and the lust itself are earthly.

1.11.23CSEL 19:40

non ergo res ipsas gestas finxerunt poetae, quod si facerent, essent uanissimi, sed rebus gestis addiderunt quendam colorem. non enim obtrectantes illa dicebant, sed ornare cupientes.

The poets, then, did not invent the deeds themselves (had they done so they would be utterly worthless), but they added a certain colouring to what was done. For they said these things not to disparage but wishing to adorn.

1.11.24CSEL 19:40

hinc homines decipiuntur, maxime quod dum haec omnia ficta esse a poetis arbitrantur, colunt quod ignorant. nesciunt enim qui sit poeticae licentiae modus, quousque progredi fingendo liceat, cum officium poetae in eo sit, ut ea quae uere gesta sunt in alias species obliquis figurationibus cum decore aliquo conuersa traducat.

Hence men are deceived, especially because, while they think all these things invented by the poets, they worship what they do not know. For they do not know what the limit of poetic licence is, how far one may go in inventing, since the poet's task is to take things that really happened and, with a certain grace, turn and carry them over into other forms by indirect figures.

1.11.25CSEL 19:40

totum autem quod referas fingere, id est ineptum esse et mendacem potius quam poetam.

But to invent the whole of what you relate is to be foolish and a liar rather than a poet.

1.11.26CSEL 19:40

sed finxerint ista quae fabulosa creduntur: num etiam illa quae de diis feminis deorumque conubiis dicta sunt? cur igitur sic figurantur, sic coluntur? nisi forte non tantum poetae, sed pictores etiam fictoresque imaginum mentiuntur.

But suppose they invented those things that are believed to be fables; did they also invent what is said about goddesses and the marriages of the gods? Why then are they so represented and so worshipped? Unless perhaps not only the poets but also painters and sculptors are lying.

1.11.27CSEL 19:40–41

si enim hic est Iuppiter qui a uobis dicitur deus, si non is est qui ex Saturno et Ope natus est, non oportuit nisi solius simulacrum in templis omnibus conlocari.

For if this is the Jupiter whom you call god, if he is not the one born of Saturn and Ops, no image but his alone ought to have been placed in all the temples.

1.11.28CSEL 19:41

quid sibi mulierum effigies uolunt? quid sexus infirmus? in quem si cecidit hic Iuppiter, eum uero ipsi lapides hominem fatebuntur.

What do images of women mean? What of the weaker sex? If this Jupiter fell to it, the very stones will confess him a man.

1.11.29CSEL 19:41

mentitos esse poetas aiunt et his tamen credunt: immo uero non esse mentitos re ipsa probant. ita enim deorum simulacra confingunt, ut ex ipsa diuersitate sexus appareat uera esse quae dicunt poetae. nam quod aliud argumentum habet imago Catamiti et effigies aquilae, cum ante pedes Iouis ponuntur in templis et cum ipso pariter adorantur, nisi ut nefandi sceleris ac stupri memoria maneat in aeternum?

They say the poets lied, and yet they believe them; indeed, by the fact itself they prove that they did not lie. For they so shape the images of the gods that from the very difference of sex it appears that what the poets say is true. For what other meaning has the image of Catamitus and the figure of the eagle, when they are placed at Jupiter's feet in the temples and worshipped equally with him, than that the memory of an unspeakable crime and debauchery should remain forever?

1.11.30CSEL 19:41

nihil igitur a poetis in totum fictum est, aliquid fortasse traductum et obliqua figuratione obscuratum, quo ueritas inuoluta tegeretur, sicut illut de sortitione regnorum. aiunt enim Ioui caelum optigisse, Neptuno mare, inferna Plutoni. cur non terra potius in sortem tertiam uenit? nisi quod in terra gesta res est.

Nothing, then, was wholly invented by the poets; something perhaps was transferred and obscured by indirect figure, so that the truth was wrapped up and covered, as in the story of the allotment of kingdoms. For they say heaven fell to Jupiter, the sea to Neptune, and the underworld to Pluto. Why did the earth not rather come as the third lot? Only because the event took place on earth.

1.11.31CSEL 19:41

ergo illud in uero est, quod regnum orbis ita partiti sortitique sunt, ut orientis imperium Ioui cederet, Plutoni, cui cognomen Agesilao fuit, pars occidentis optingeret, eo quod plaga orientis, ex qua lux mortalibus datur, superior, occidentis autem inferior esse uideatur. sic ueritatem mendacio uelarunt, ut ueritas ipsa persuasioni publicae nihil derogaret.

This, then, is the truth: that they divided and allotted the kingdom of the world in such a way that the empire of the east fell to Jupiter, and the part of the west to Pluto, who had the surname Agesilaus, because the region of the east, from which light is given to mortals, seems to be higher, and that of the west lower. So they veiled the truth with a falsehood in such a way that the truth itself took nothing away from the public belief.

1.11.32CSEL 19:41–42

de Neptuni sorte manifestum est: cuius regnum tale fuisse dicimus, quale Marci Antoni fuit infinitum illud imperium, cui totius orae maritimae potestatem senatus decreuerat, ut praedones persequeretur ac mare omne pacaret. sic Neptuno maritima omnia cum insulis obuenerunt.

About Neptune's lot it is clear: we say his kingdom was like that unlimited command of Marcus Antonius, to whom the senate had decreed power over the whole sea coast, so that he might pursue the pirates and pacify the whole sea. So all the coastal regions, with the islands, fell to Neptune.

1.11.33CSEL 19:42

quomodo id probari potest? nimirum ueteres historiae docent. antiquus auctor Euhemerus, qui fuit ex ciuitate Messene, res gestas Iouis et ceterorum qui dii putantur collegit historiamque contexuit ex titulis et inscriptionibus sacris quae in antiquissimis templis habebantur maximeque in fano Iouis Triphylii, ubi auream columnam positam esse ab ipso Ioue titulus indicabat, in qua columna sua gesta perscripsit, ut monumentum posteris esset rerum suarum.

How can this be proved? The ancient histories teach it, of course. The ancient author Euhemerus, who was from the city of Messene, collected the deeds of Jupiter and of the others who are thought gods and wove a history from the titles and sacred inscriptions kept in the most ancient temples, and especially in the shrine of Triphylian Jupiter, where an inscription showed that a golden column had been set up by Jupiter himself, on which he wrote out his deeds, so that there might be a record of his achievements for posterity.

1.11.34CSEL 19:42

hanc historiam et interpretatus est Ennius et secutus. cuius haec uerba sunt: ubi Iuppiter Neptuno imperium dat maris et insulis omnibus et quae secundum mare loca essent omnibus regnaret. uera sunt ergo quae locuntur poetae, sed optentu aliquo specieque uelata.

Ennius both translated and followed this history. These are his words: "Where Jupiter gives Neptune command of the sea, that he might reign over all the islands and all the places that were beside the sea." So what the poets say is true, but veiled with some covering and appearance.

1.11.35CSEL 19:42

potest et mons Olympus figuram poetis dedisse, ut Iouem dicerent caeli regnum esse sortitum, quod Olympus ambiguum nomen est et montis et caeli. in Olympo autem Iouem habitasse docet eadem historia, quae dicit: ea tempestate Iuppiter in monte Olympo maximam partem uitae colebat et eo ad eum in ius ueniebant, si quae res in controuersia erant. item si quis quid noui inuenerat quod ad uitam humanam utile esset, eo ueniebant atque Ioui ostendebant.

Mount Olympus too may have given the poets their figure, so that they said Jupiter was allotted the kingdom of heaven, because Olympus is an ambiguous name for both the mountain and heaven. That Jupiter lived on Olympus the same history teaches, which says: "At that time Jupiter spent the greatest part of his life on Mount Olympus, and people came to him there for judgment, if any matters were in dispute. Likewise, if anyone had discovered anything new that was useful for human life, they came there and showed it to Jupiter."

1.11.36CSEL 19:42–43

multa in hunc modum poetae transferunt, non ut in deos mentiantur, quos colunt, sed ut figuris uersicoloribus uenustatem ac leporem carminibus suis addant. qui autem non intellegunt quomodo aut quare quidque figuretur, poetas uelut mendaces et sacrilegos insecuntur.

The poets transfer many things in this way, not to lie against the gods whom they worship, but to add charm and grace to their poems with many-coloured figures. But those who do not understand how or why each thing is figured attack the poets as liars and blasphemers.

1.11.37CSEL 19:43

hoc errore decepti etiam philosophi, quod ea quae de Ioue feruntur minime conuenire in deum uidebantur, duos Ioues fecerunt, unum naturalem alterum fabulosum.

Deceived by this error, even the philosophers, because the things told of Jupiter seemed not at all fitting for a god, made two Jupiters, one natural and the other fabulous.

1.11.38CSEL 19:43

uiderunt ex parte quod erat uerum, eum scilicet de quo poetae loquantur hominem fuisse, in illo autem naturali Ioue uulgari consuetudine religionis inducti errauerunt, quod in deum nomen hominis transtulerunt, qui ut supra diximus quia solus est, non indiget nomine. Iouem autem illum esse qui sit ex Ope Saturnoque natus, negari non potest.

They saw in part what was true, namely that the one the poets speak of was a man; but about that natural Jupiter, led by the common habit of religion, they erred, in that they transferred the name of a man to God, who, as we said above, because he is alone, needs no name. And that Jupiter is the one born of Ops and Saturn cannot be denied.

1.11.39CSEL 19:43

uana igitur persuasio est eorum qui nomen Iouis summo deo tribuunt. solent enim quidam errores suos hac excusatione defendere: qui conuicti de uno deo cum id negare non possunt, ipsum se colere adfirmant, uerum hoc sibi placere ut Iuppiter nominetur. quo quid absurdius? Iuppiter enim sine contubernio coniugis filiaeque coli non solet. unde qui sit apparet, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri ubi nec Minerua est ulla nec Iuno. quid quod huius nominis proprietas non diuinam uim exprimit,

Vain, then, is the persuasion of those who give the name Jupiter to the supreme God. For some are accustomed to defend their errors with this excuse: convinced about the one God, since they cannot deny it, they declare that they worship him, but that they are pleased to call him Jupiter. What could be more absurd? For Jupiter is not usually worshipped without the companionship of his wife and daughter. From this it is clear who he is; nor is it right for that name to be carried over to where there is no Minerva and no Juno. What of the fact that the proper meaning of this name expresses not a divine power,

1.11.40CSEL 19:43–44

sed humanam? Iouem enim Iunonemque a iuuando esse dictos Cicero interpretatur et Iuppiter quasi iuuans pater dicitur: quod nomen in deum minime congruit, quia iuuare hominis est opis aliquid conferentis in eum qui sit alienus, et exigui beneficii.

but a human one? For Cicero explains that Jupiter and Juno are named from "helping" (iuvare), and Jupiter is called as it were "helping father": a name that does not suit God at all, since to help belongs to a man who brings some aid to someone not his own, and is a small kindness.

1.11.41CSEL 19:44

nemo sic deum precatur, ut se adiuuet, sed ut seruet, ut uitam salutemque tribuat: quod multo plus ac maius est quam iuuare. et quoniam de patre loquimur, nullus pater dicitur filios iuuare, cum eos generat aut educat. illud enim leuius est quam ut eo uerbo magnitudo paterni beneficii exprimatur.

No one prays to God to help him, but to save him and grant him life and safety, which is much more and greater than helping. And since we are speaking of a father, no father is said to help his children when he begets or rears them; that word is too slight to express the greatness of a father's kindness.

1.11.42CSEL 19:44

quanto id magis inconueniens est deo, qui uerus pater est, per quem sumus et cuius toti sumus, a quo fingimur animamur inluminamur, qui nobis uitam inpertit, salutem tribuit, uictum multiplicem sumministrat.

How much more unfitting is it for God, who is the true Father, through whom we exist and whose we wholly are, by whom we are formed, given life, and enlightened, who imparts life to us, grants salvation, and supplies manifold food.

1.11.43CSEL 19:44

non intellegit beneficia diuina qui se tantummodo iuuari a deo putat. ergo non inperitus modo, sed etiam inpius est qui nomine Iouis uirtutem summae potestatis imminuit.

Whoever thinks that he is only helped by God does not understand God's kindnesses. Therefore he who diminishes the power of the supreme majesty by the name of Jupiter is not only ignorant but also impious.

1.11.44CSEL 19:44

quare si Iouem et ex rebus gestis et ex moribus hominem fuisse in terraque regnasse deprehendimus, superest ut mortem quoque eius inuestigemus.

So if we find from both his deeds and his character that Jupiter was a man and reigned on earth, it remains for us to investigate his death as well.

1.11.45CSEL 19:44

Ennius in Sacra Historia descriptis omnibus quae in uita sua gessit ad ultimum sic ait: deinde Iuppiter postquam quinquies terras circuiuit omnibusque amicis atque cognatis suis imperia diuisit reliquitque hominibus leges mores frumentaque parauit multaque alia bona fecit, inmortali gloria memoriaque adfectus sempiterna monumenta sui reliquit.

Ennius in the Sacred History, having described everything he did in his life, says at the end: "Then Jupiter, after he had gone around the lands five times and divided rule among all his friends and relatives, and left laws and customs to men, and provided grain, and did many other good things, being honoured with immortal glory and memory, left everlasting monuments of himself.

1.11.46CSEL 19:44–45

aetate pessum acta in Creta uitam commutauit et ad deos abiit eumque Curetes filii sui curauerunt decoraueruntque eum; et sepulchrum eius est in Creta in oppido Gnosso et dicitur Vesta hanc urbem creauisse; inque sepulchro eius est inscriptum antiquis litteris Graecis ΖΑΝ ΚΡΟΝΟΥ id est Latine Iuppiter Saturni.

When his life had run its course, he exchanged life in Crete and departed to the gods; and the Curetes, his sons, cared for him and honoured him; and his tomb is in Crete, in the town of Gnossus, and Vesta is said to have founded this city; and on his tomb is inscribed in ancient Greek letters ZAN KRONOU, that is, in Latin, Jupiter son of Saturn."

1.11.47CSEL 19:45

hoc certe non poetae tradunt, sed antiquarum rerum scriptores. quae adeo uera sunt, ut ea Sibyllinis uersibus confirmentur, qui sunt tales: δαίμονας ἀψύχους, νεϰύων εἶδωλα ϰαμόντων, ὧν Κρήτη ϰαύχημα τάϕους ἡ δύσμορος ἕξει.

This, certainly, is handed down not by the poets but by writers of ancient history. And it is so true that it is confirmed by the Sibylline verses, which run: "Lifeless daemons, images of the dead who have perished, whose tombs ill-fated Crete will hold as its boast."

1.11.48CSEL 19:45

Cicero de deorum natura cum tres loues a theologis enumerari diceret, ait tertium fuisse Cretensem Saturni filium, cuius in illa insula sepulchrum ostenditur.

Cicero, in On the Nature of the Gods, when he says that three Jupiters are counted by the theologians, says that the third was the Cretan, son of Saturn, whose tomb is shown on that island.

1.11.49CSEL 19:45

quomodo igitur potest alibi deus esse uiuus alibi mortuus, alibi habere templum alibi sepulchrum? sciant ergo Romani Capitolium suum id est summum caput religionum publicarum nihil esse aliud quam inane monumentum.

How then can a god be alive in one place and dead in another, have a temple in one place and a tomb in another? Let the Romans know, then, that their Capitol, that is, the supreme head of their public religion, is nothing but an empty monument.

1.11.50CSEL 19:45

Veniamus nunc ad eius patrem, qui ante regnauit et qui fortasse plus habeat in se, quod ex coitu tantorum elementorum genitus esse dicatur.. uideamus quid in eo fuerit deo dignum, in primis illud quod aureum saeculum narratur habuisse, quod iustitia sub eo fuerit in terra.

Let us come now to his father, who reigned before him and who perhaps has more in him, because he is said to have been begotten from the union of such great elements. Let us see what in him was worthy of a god: first of all, that he is said to have had a golden age, because under him there was justice on earth.

1.11.51CSEL 19:45–46

teneo aliquid in hoc, quod in eius filio non fuit. quid enim tam conueniens deo quam iustum regimen ac pium saeculum?

I grant something in this that was not in his son. For what is so fitting for a god as a just government and a pious age?

1.11.52CSEL 19:46

sed cum eadem ratione natum esse cogito, non possum putare deum summum quo uideam esse aliquid antiquius, caelum scilicet atque terram. at ego deum quaero ultra quem nihil sit omnino, qui fons et origo sit rerum: hic sit necesse est qui caelum ipsum condidit terramque fundauit.

But when I consider that he was born in the same way, I cannot think him the supreme God, since I see that something is older than he, namely heaven and earth. But I seek a God beyond whom there is nothing at all, who is the fountain and origin of things: he must be the one who founded heaven itself and established the earth.

1.11.53CSEL 19:46

Saturnus autem si ex his natus est ut putatur, quemadmodum potest deus esse principalis qui aliis ortum suum debet aut quis praefuit mundo, priusquam Saturnus gigneretur?

But if Saturn was born of these, as is thought, how can he be the first God, who owes his origin to others? Or who presided over the world before Saturn was begotten?

1.11.54CSEL 19:46

sed hoc poeticum est ut dicebam paulo ante figmentum. nec enim fieri poterat ut elementa insensibilia tantoque interuallo separata in unum coirent ac filium procrearent aut is qui natus esset non potissimum genitoribus similis existeret, sed eam formam gereret quam parentes sui non habebant.

But this, as I said a little before, is a poetic fiction. For it could not be that senseless elements separated by so great a distance should come together and beget a son, or that the one born should not be most like his parents but should bear a form his parents did not have.

1.11.55CSEL 19:46

quaeramus ergo quid ueritatis sub hac figura lateat. Minucius Felix in eo libro qui Octauius inscribitur sic argumentatus est: Saturnum, cum fugatus esset a filio in Italiamque uenisset, Caeli filium dictum, quod soleamus eos quorum uirtutem miremur aut eos qui repentino aduenerint, de caelo cecidisse dicere, Terrae autem, quod ignotis parentibus natos terrae filios nominemus.

Let us ask, then, what truth lies hidden under this figure. Minucius Felix, in the book entitled Octavius, argued thus: that Saturn, when he had been driven out by his son and come to Italy, was called son of Heaven because we are accustomed to say that those whose virtue we admire, or those who have arrived suddenly, have fallen from heaven; and son of Earth, because we call those born of unknown parents sons of the earth.

1.11.56CSEL 19:46

sunt haec quidem similia ueri, non tamen uera, quia constat etiam tum cum regnaret ita esse habitum.

These things are indeed like the truth, but not true, because it is well known that he was regarded so even while he reigned.

1.11.57CSEL 19:46

potuit sic argumentari, Saturnum, cum potentissimus rex esset, ad retinendam parentum suorum memoriam nomina eorum caelo terraeque indidisse, cum haec prius aliis uocabulis appellarentur: qua ratione et montibus et fluminibus nomina scimus inposita.

He could have argued this way: that Saturn, being a most powerful king, to preserve the memory of his parents gave their names to heaven and earth, when these had before been called by other words; in the same way we know names were given to mountains and rivers.

1.11.58CSEL 19:46–47

neque enim cum dicunt poetae de progenie Atlantis aut Inachi fluminis, id potissimum dicunt, homines ex rebus sensu carentibus potuisse generari, sed eos utique significant qui nati sunt ex iis hominibus qui uel uiui uel mortui nomina montibus aut fluminibus indiderunt.

For when the poets speak of the offspring of Atlas or of the river Inachus, they do not mean above all that men could be begotten from things lacking sense, but they certainly mean those who were born of the men who, living or dead, gave their names to mountains or rivers.

1.11.59CSEL 19:47

nam id apud ueteres maximeque Graecos fuit usitatum. sic maria eorum traxisse nomen accipimus qui deciderant in ea, ut Aegaeum Icarium Hellespontum, et in Latio Auentinus uocabulum monti dedit in quo sepultus est, Tiberinus uel Thybris amni quo mersus est.

For this was customary among the ancients and especially the Greeks. So we learn that seas took their names from those who had fallen into them, like the Aegean, the Icarian, and the Hellespont; and in Latium Aventinus gave his name to the hill on which he was buried, and Tiberinus or Thybris to the river in which he was drowned.

1.11.60CSEL 19:47

non ergo mirandum si nomina eorum caelo terraeque attributa essent, qui reges genuerant potentissimos.

It is not surprising, then, if the names of those who had begotten very powerful kings were given to heaven and earth.

1.11.61CSEL 19:47

apparet ergo non ex caelo esse natum, quod fieri non potest, sed ex eo homine cui nomen Urano fuit. quod esse uerum Trismegistus auctor est, qui cum diceret admodum paucos extitisse in quibus esset perfecta doctrina, in his Uranum Saturnum Mercurium nominauit cognatos suos. haec ille quia ignorauit, alio traduxit historiam:

It is clear, then, that Saturn was born not of heaven, which cannot be, but of the man whose name was Uranus. That this is true Trismegistus is the authority: when he said that very few had existed in whom there was perfect learning, he named among them his kinsmen Uranus, Saturn, and Mercury. Because Minucius did not know this, he took the story in another direction.

1.11.62CSEL 19:47

qui quomodo argumentari potuerit, ostendi. nunc dicam quomodo, ubi, a quo sit hoc factum: non enim Saturnus hoc, sed Iuppiter fecit. in Sacra Historia sic Ennius tradit:

How he could have argued, I have shown. Now I shall say how, where, and by whom this was done; for it was not Saturn who did it, but Jupiter. In the Sacred History Ennius relates thus:

1.11.63CSEL 19:47–48

deinde Pan eum deducit in montem, qui uocatur Caeli stela. postquam eo ascendit, contemplatus est late terras ibique in monte aram creat Caelo primusque in ea ara Iuppiter sacrificauit. in eo loco suspexit in caelum quod nunc nos nominamus, eique quod supra mundum erat, quod aether uocabatur, de sui aui nomine caelum nomen indidit idque Iuppiter quod aether uocatur placans primus caelum nominauit eamque hostiam quam ibi sacrificauit, totam adoleuit. nec hic tantum sacrificasse Iuppiter inuenitur.

"Then Pan leads him to the mountain which is called the Pillar of Heaven. After he had climbed it, he surveyed the lands far and wide, and there on the mountain he built an altar to Caelus, and Jupiter was the first to sacrifice on that altar. In that place he looked up to the sky, which we now so name, and to what was above the world, which was called aether, he gave the name caelum from the name of his grandfather; and Jupiter, propitiating what is called aether, was the first to name it caelum, and he burned whole the victim he sacrificed there." Nor is this the only place where Jupiter is found to have sacrificed.

1.11.64CSEL 19:48

Caesar quoque in Arato refert Aglaosthenen dicere, Iouem cum ex insula Naxo aduersus Titanas proficisceretur et sacrificium faceret in litore, aquilam ei in auspicium aduolasse, quam uictor bono omine acceptam tutelae suae subiugarit.

Caesar also, in his Aratus, reports that Aglaosthenes says that when Jupiter was setting out from the island of Naxos against the Titans and was sacrificing on the shore, an eagle flew to him as an omen, which, after his victory, he took as a good sign and placed under his protection.

1.11.65CSEL 19:48

Sacra uero Historia etiam ante consedisse illi aquilam in capite atque ei regnum portendisse testatur. cui ergo sacrificare Iuppiter potuit nisi Caelo auo, quem dicit Euhemerus in Oceania mortuum et in oppido Aulacia sepultum?

The Sacred History testifies that even earlier an eagle had settled on his head and foretold his kingdom. To whom, then, could Jupiter have sacrificed except to Caelus his grandfather, who Euhemerus says died in Oceania and was buried in the town of Aulacia?

Divine 1, chapter 12

1.12.1CSEL 19:48

Quoniam reuelauimus mysteria poetarum ac Saturni parentes inuenimus, ad uirtutes eius et facta redeamus. iustus in regno fuit.

Since we have unveiled the mysteries of the poets and found out the parents of Saturn, let us return to his virtues and deeds. He was just in his reign.

1.12.2CSEL 19:48

primum ex hoc ipso iam deus non est, quod fuit: deinde, quod ne iustus quidem fuit, sed impius non modo in filios, quos necauit, uerum etiam in patrem, cuius dicitur abscidisse genitalia, quod forsitan uere acciderit.

First, from this very fact he is no longer a god, because he was (that is, he is in the past); next, because he was not even just, but impious, not only toward his sons, whom he killed, but also toward his father, whose genitals he is said to have cut off, which perhaps really happened.

1.12.3CSEL 19:48

sed homines respectu elementi quod dicitur caelum totam fabulam explodunt tamquam ineptissime fictam, quam tamen Stoici ut solent ad rationem physicam conantur traducere. quorum sententiam Cicero de natura deorum disserens posuit.

But men, thinking of the element that is called heaven, hiss the whole story off the stage as most foolishly invented; yet the Stoics, as usual, try to turn it into a theory of nature. Cicero set out their view when discussing the nature of the gods.

1.12.4CSEL 19:48–49

caelestem inquit altissimam aetheriamque naturam id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, uacare uoluerunt ea parte corporis, quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum. quae ratio in Vestam potuit conuenire, si mas diceretur.

"The heavenly, highest, ethereal nature," he says, "that is, the fiery one, which generates all things by itself, they held to be without that part of the body which needs union with another to procreate." This reasoning could have suited Vesta, if she were said to be male.

1.12.5CSEL 19:49

idcirco enim uirginem putant Vestam, quia ignis inuiolabile sit elementum nihilque nasci possit ex eo, quippe qui omnia quae arripuerit absumat.

For this reason they think Vesta a virgin, because fire is an inviolable element and nothing can be born from it, since it consumes everything it seizes.

1.12.6CSEL 19:49

Ouidius in Fastis: nec tu aliud Vestam quam uiuam intellege flammam nataque de flamma corpora nulla uides. iure igitur uirgo est, quae semina nulla remittit nec capit, et comites uirginitatis amat.

Ovid in the Fasti: "Understand Vesta to be nothing else than living flame, and you see no bodies born of flame. Rightly then is she a virgin, who gives back no seeds and takes none, and she loves companions of her virginity."

1.12.7CSEL 19:49

Vulcano quoque id potuit adscribi, (qui) quidem putatur ignis, et tamen eum poetae non absciderunt. potuit et Soli, in quo est natura et causa gignentium. nam sine Solis igneo calore neque nasci quicquam neque augeri potest, ut nulli alii elemento minus opus sit genitalibus quam calori, cuius fotu concipiuntur nascuntur sustentantur omnia.

It could also have been ascribed to Vulcan, who indeed is thought to be fire, and yet the poets did not castrate him. It could also have been ascribed to the Sun, in which is the nature and cause of things that are born. For without the fiery heat of the Sun nothing can be born or grow, so that no element has less need of genitals than heat, by whose warmth all things are conceived, born, and sustained.

1.12.8CSEL 19:49

postremo etiamsi ita sit ut uolunt, qui magis abscisum esse Caelum putemus quam omnino sine genitalibus natum? nam si per se gignit, non indigebat utique genitalibus, cum Saturnum ipsum procrearet: si uero habuit et a filio abscisa sunt, ortus rerum et natura omnis interisset.

Finally, even if it is as they wish, why should we think Caelus castrated rather than born altogether without genitals? For if he generates by himself, he certainly did not need genitals, since he begot Saturn himself; but if he had them and they were cut off by his son, the origin of things and all nature would have perished.

1.12.9CSEL 19:49–50

quid quod ipsi Saturno non diuinum modo sensum, sed humanum quoque adimunt, cum adfirmant eum esse Saturnum, qui cursum et conuersionem spatiorum ac temporum continet eumque Graece id ipsum nomen habere? Κρόνος enim dicitur, qui est idem χρόνος id est spatium temporis, Saturnus autem est appellatus, quod saturetur annis.

What of the fact that they take from Saturn himself not only divine but even human sense, when they affirm that he is Saturn who holds the course and revolution of periods and times, and that he has that very name in Greek? For he is called Kronos, which is the same as chronos, that is, a span of time; and he was called Saturn because he is sated (saturetur) with years.

1.12.10CSEL 19:50

haec Ciceronis uerba sunt exponentis sententiam Stoicorum; quae quam uana sit, cuiuis intellegere promptissimum est. si enim Saturnus Caeli est filius, quomodo potuit aut tempus e Caelo gigni aut Caelum a tempore abscidi aut postea tempus imperio spoliari a filio Ioue? aut quomodo Iuppiter natus ex tempore est? aut quibus annis saturari possit aeternitas, cui nullus est finis?

These are Cicero's words setting out the view of the Stoics; how empty it is, anyone can see at once. For if Saturn is the son of Caelus, how could time be begotten from heaven, or heaven be castrated by time, or time afterwards be stripped of rule by its son Jupiter? Or how was Jupiter born of time? Or with what years could eternity, which has no end, be sated?

Divine 1, chapter 13

1.13.1CSEL 19:50

Si ergo uanae sunt istae rationes philosophorum, quid superest nisi ut uere factum esse credamus, id est hominem ab homine abscisum? nisi forte aliquis existimat deum fuisse qui timuit coheredem, cum si quid diuinitatis habuisset, non patris genitalia debuerit amputare, sed propria, ne Iuppiter nasceretur, qui eum regni possessione priuauit.

If, then, these reasonings of the philosophers are empty, what remains but that we believe it really happened, that is, that a man was castrated by a man? Unless perhaps someone thinks he was a god who feared a co-heir, when, if he had had any divinity, he ought not to have cut off his father's genitals but his own, so that Jupiter would not be born, who deprived him of possession of the kingdom.

1.13.2CSEL 19:50

idem sororem suam Rheam quam latine Opem dicimus cum haberet uxorem, responso uetitus esse dicitur mares liberos educare, quod futurum esset ut a filio pelleretur. quam rem metuens natos sibi filios non utique deuorabat ut ferunt fabulae, sed necabat, quamquam scriptum sit in Historia Sacra Saturnum et Opem ceterosque tunc homines humanam carnem solitos esitare: uerum primum Iouem leges hominibus moresque condentem edicto prohibuisse, ne liceret eo cibo uesci.

When he had his sister Rhea, whom in Latin we call Ops, as wife, he is said to have been forbidden by an oracle to rear male children, because he would be driven out by a son. Fearing this, he did not actually devour the sons born to him, as the fables say, but killed them; although it is written in the Sacred History that Saturn and Ops and the other men of that time were accustomed to eat human flesh, but that Jupiter first, when he established laws and customs for men, forbade by edict the eating of that food.

1.13.3CSEL 19:50–51

quod si uerum est, quae potest in eo fuisse iustitia? sed fictum sane putemus Saturnum filios deuorasse, modo cum aliqua ratione: num idcirco, quod ait uulgus comedisse filios suos eum qui extulerit sepulturaeque mandauerit? Ops autem cum Iouem peperisset, subtraxit infantem eumque nutriendum furtim misit in Cretam.

If this is true, what justice can there have been in him? But let us suppose it an invention that Saturn devoured his sons, only with some reason: was it because the common people say that one who has carried out his sons and committed them to burial has eaten them? Ops, when she had borne Jupiter, took the infant away and secretly sent him to Crete to be nursed.

1.13.4CSEL 19:51

rursus inprudentiam reprehendam necesse est. cur enim responsum ab alio potius accepit? cur in caelo constitutus in terra non uidebat?

Again I must criticize his lack of foresight. Why did he receive an oracle from another rather than know himself? Why, placed in heaven, did he not see what happened on earth?

1.13.5CSEL 19:51

cur eum Corybantes cymbalis fefellerunt? postremo cur extitit uis aliqua maior quae illius uinceret potestatem? nimirum senex a iuuene facile uictus est ac spoliatus imperio.

Why did the Corybantes deceive him with their cymbals? Finally, why did some greater force arise to overcome his power? Clearly an old man was easily overcome by a young one and stripped of his rule.

1.13.6CSEL 19:51

fugit igitur expulsus et in italiam nauigio uenit, cum errasset diu, sicut Ouidius in Fastorum libris refert: causa ratis superest. Tuscum rate uenit ad amnem ante pererrato falcifer orbe deus. hunc errantem atque inopem Ianus excepit:

So, driven out, he fled and came to Italy by ship after long wandering, as Ovid relates in the books of the Fasti: "The reason for the ship remains. The sickle-bearing god came by ship to the Tuscan river, after wandering over the world." Janus received him, wandering and needy.

1.13.7CSEL 19:51

cuius rei argumenta sunt nummi ueteres, in quibus est cum duplici fronte Ianus et in altera parte nauis, sicut idem poeta subiecit: at bona posteritas puppem formauit in aere hospitis aduentum testificata dei.

Evidence for this are the old coins, on which is Janus with a double face and on the other side a ship, as the same poet added: "But good posterity shaped a ship's stern on the bronze, bearing witness to the arrival of the guest god."

1.13.8CSEL 19:51

omnes ergo non tantum poetae, sed historiarum quoque ac rerum antiquarum scriptores hominem fuisse consentiunt, qui res eius in Italia gestas memoriae prodiderunt, Graeci Diodorus et Thallus, Latini Nepos et Cassius et Varro.

All, then, agree that he was a man, not only the poets but also the writers of history and antiquities who handed down to memory his deeds in Italy: among the Greeks Diodorus and Thallus, among the Latins Nepos, Cassius, and Varro.

1.13.9CSEL 19:51–52

nam cum agresti quodam more in Italia uiueretur, is genus indocile ac dispersum montibus altis composuit legesque dedit Latiumque uocari maluit, his quoniam latuisset tutus in oris. censetne aliquis deum esse qui pulsus est, qui fugit, qui latuit?

For since men in Italy lived in a rustic way, he "brought together the unteachable race, scattered on the high mountains, and gave them laws, and chose that it be called Latium, since he had lain hidden safe on these shores." Does anyone think him a god who was driven out, who fled, who lay hidden?

1.13.10CSEL 19:52

nemo tam stultus est. qui enim fugit aut latet, et uim et mortem timeat necesse est.

No one is so foolish. For whoever flees or hides must fear force and death.

1.13.11CSEL 19:52

Orpheus, qui a temporibus eius fuit recentior, aperte Saturnum in terra et apud homines regnasse commemorat: πρώτιστος μὲν ἄναξεν ἐπιχθονίων Κρόνος ὰνδρῶν ἐκ δὲ Κρόνου γένετ αὐτὸς ἄναξ μέγας εὐρυόπα Ζεύς.

Orpheus, who lived later than his times, plainly records that Saturn reigned on earth and among men: "First of all Kronos ruled over men on the earth, and from Kronos was born the great lord himself, far-seeing Zeus."

1.13.12CSEL 19:52

item noster Maro: aureus hanc uitam in terris Saturnus agebat. et alio loco: aurea quae perhibent illo sub rege fuere saecula: sic placida populos in pace regebat.

Likewise our Maro: "Golden Saturn led this life on earth." And in another place: "The ages which they call golden were under that king: so he ruled the peoples in quiet peace."

1.13.13CSEL 19:52

neque superius dixit in caelo egisse uitam neque inferius superos in pace rexisse. unde apparet illum regem fuisse terrenum: quod alibi apertius declarat: aurea condet saecula qui rursus Latio regnata per arua Saturno quondam.

He did not say in the first passage that he lived in heaven, nor in the second that he ruled the gods above in peace. So it is clear he was an earthly king, which he declares more openly elsewhere: "He will found again the golden ages in Latium, through the fields once ruled by Saturn."

1.13.14CSEL 19:52–53

Ennius quidem in Euhemero non primum dicit regnasse Saturnum, sed Uranum patrem. initio inquit primus in terris imperium summum Caelus habuit. is id regnum una cum fratribus suis sibi instituit atque parauit.

Ennius indeed, in his Euhemerus, says that it was not Saturn who reigned first but his father Uranus. "In the beginning," he says, "Caelus first held supreme rule on earth. He established and prepared that kingdom for himself together with his brothers."

1.13.15CSEL 19:53

non magna dissensio, siquidem maximorum auctorum de filio ac patre dubitatio est. sed tamen utrumque fieri potest, ut primus Uranus eminere inter ceteros potentia coeperit et principatum habere, non regnum, postea Saturnus maiores sibi opes comparauerit ac regium nomen adsciuerit.

The disagreement is not great, since the doubt among the greatest authors concerns only son and father. Yet both can be true: that Uranus first began to stand out among the rest in power and to hold the leadership, not a kingdom, and that later Saturn gained greater wealth for himself and took the royal title.

Divine 1, chapter 14

1.14.1CSEL 19:53

Nunc, quoniam ab iis quae rettuli aliquantum Sacra Historia dissentit, aperiamus ea quae ueris litteris continentur, ne poetarum ineptias in accusandis religionibus sequi ac probare uideamur.

Now, since the Sacred History differs somewhat from what I have related, let us disclose what is contained in the true records, so that we may not seem to follow and approve the follies of the poets in accusing their religions.

1.14.2CSEL 19:53

haec Ennii uerba sunt: exim Saturnus uxorem duxit Opem. Titan, qui maior natu erat, postulat ut ipse regnaret. ibi Vesta mater eorum et sorores Ceres atque Ops suadent Saturno, uti de regno ne concedat fratri.

These are Ennius' words: "Then Saturn married Ops. Titan, who was elder by birth, demands that he himself should reign. Then Vesta their mother and their sisters Ceres and Ops urge Saturn not to yield the kingdom to his brother.

1.14.3CSEL 19:53

ibi Titan, qui facie deterior esset quam Saturnus, idcirco et quod uidebat matrem atque sorores suas operam dare uti Saturnus regnaret, concessit ei ut is regnaret. itaque pactus est cum Saturno, uti si quid liberum uirile secus ei natum esset, ne quid educaret. id eius rei causa fecit, uti ad suos gnatos regnum rediret.

Then Titan, who was less handsome than Saturn, both for that reason and because he saw that his mother and sisters were working for Saturn to reign, yielded to him that he should reign. So he made a pact with Saturn that if any male child were born to him, he would not rear it. He did this so that the kingdom might return to his own sons.

1.14.4CSEL 19:53

tum Saturno filius qui primus natus est, eum necauerunt. deinde posterius nati sunt gemini, Iuppiter atque Iuno. tum Iunonem Saturno in conspectum dedere atque Iouem clam abscondunt dantque eum Vestae educandum celantes Saturnum.

Then the son who was first born to Saturn, him they killed. Next twins were born, Jupiter and Juno. Then they showed Juno to Saturn and secretly hid Jupiter and gave him to Vesta to be reared, concealing him from Saturn.

1.14.5CSEL 19:53–54

item Neptunum clam Saturno Ops parit eumque clanculum abscondit. ad eundem modum tertio partu Ops parit geminos Plutonem et Glaucam. Pluto Latine est Dis pater, alii Orcum uocant. ibi filiam Glaucam Saturno ostendunt, at filium Plutonem celant atque abscondunt. deinde Glauca parua emoritur.

Likewise Ops bears Neptune without Saturn's knowledge and hides him secretly. In the same way at a third birth Ops bears twins, Pluto and Glauca. Pluto in Latin is Dis Pater; others call him Orcus. Then they show the daughter Glauca to Saturn, but conceal and hide the son Pluto. Then Glauca dies as a little child.

1.14.6CSEL 19:54

haec, ut scripta sunt, Iouis fratrumque eius stirps atque cognatio: in hunc modum nobis ex sacra scriptione traditum est.

This, as it is written, is the lineage and kinship of Jupiter and his brothers; in this way it has been handed down to us from the sacred writing."

1.14.7CSEL 19:54

item paulo post haec infert: deinde Titan postquam resciuit Saturno filios procreatos atque educatos esse clam se, seducit secum filios suos qui Titani uocantur, fratremque suum Saturnum atque Opem conprehendit eosque muro circumegit et custodiam iis apponit.

Likewise a little later he adds this: "Then Titan, after he learned that sons had been begotten and reared by Saturn without his knowledge, took with him his sons, who are called Titans, seized his brother Saturn and Ops, enclosed them with a wall, and set a guard over them."

1.14.8CSEL 19:54

haec historia quam uera sit, docet Sibylla Erythraea eadem fere dicens, nisi quod in paucis quae ad rem non attinent discrepat.

How true this history is, the Erythraean Sibyl shows, saying nearly the same things, except that she differs in a few points which do not affect the matter.

1.14.9CSEL 19:54

liberatur ergo Iuppiter summi sceleris crimine, quod patrem uinxisse compedibus perhibetur. id enim Titan patruus fecit, quod ille contra pactionem iusque iurandum mares liberos sustulisset.

Jupiter, then, is cleared of the charge of the greatest crime, that he is said to have bound his father in fetters. For it was his uncle Titan who did it, because Saturn, against the pact and his oath, had raised male children.

1.14.10CSEL 19:54–55

reliqua historia sic contexitur: Iouem adultum, cum audisset patrem atque matrem custodiis circumsaeptos atque in uincula coniectos, uenisse cum magna Cretensium multitudine Titanumque ac filios eius pugna uicisse, parentes uinculis exemisse, patri regnum reddidisse atque ita in Cretam remeasse.

The rest of the history is woven together thus: that Jupiter, grown up, having heard that his father and mother were shut in by guards and thrown into chains, came with a great multitude of Cretans, defeated Titan and his sons in battle, freed his parents from their chains, restored the kingdom to his father, and so returned to Crete.

1.14.11CSEL 19:55

post haec deinde Saturno sortem datam, ut caueret ne filius cum regno expelleret; illum eleuandae sortis atque effugiendi periculi gratia insidiatum Ioui, ut eum necaret; Iouem cognitis insidiis regnum sibi denuo uindicasse ac fugasse Saturnum.

After this an oracle was given to Saturn to beware lest his son drive him from the kingdom; to weaken the oracle and escape the danger, he plotted against Jupiter to kill him; Jupiter, learning of the plot, claimed the kingdom for himself again and put Saturn to flight.

1.14.12CSEL 19:55

qui cum iactatus esset per omnes terras persequentibus armatis, quos ad eum conprehendendum uel necandum Iuppiter miserat, uix in Italia locum in quo lateret inuenit.

Saturn, tossed about through all lands, pursued by armed men whom Jupiter had sent to seize or kill him, barely found a place in Italy where he might hide.

Divine 1, chapter 15

1.15.1CSEL 19:55

Quibus ex rebus cum constet illos homines fuisse, non est obscurum qua ratione dii coeperint nominari.

Since it is established from these facts that they were men, it is not obscure how they began to be called gods.

1.15.2CSEL 19:55

si enim nulli reges ante Saturnum uel Uranum fuerunt propter hominum raritatem, qui agrestem uitam sine ullo rectore uiuebant, non est dubium quin illis temporibus homines regem ipsum totamque gentem mactare summis laudibus ac nouis honoribus coeperint, ut etiam deos appellarent siue ob miraculum uirtutis — hoc uere putabant rudes adhuc et simplices — siue, ut fieri solet, in adulationem praesentis potentiae siue ob beneficia quibus erant ad humanitatem conpositi.

For if there were no kings before Saturn or Uranus, because men were few and lived a rustic life without any ruler, there is no doubt that in those times men began to honour the king himself and his whole family with the highest praises and new honours, so that they even called them gods, whether from wonder at their virtue (this they truly thought, being still rude and simple), or, as usually happens, in flattery of present power, or because of the benefits by which they had been brought to civilized life.

1.15.3CSEL 19:55

deinde ipsi reges cum cari fuissent iis quorum uitam composuerant, magnum sui desiderium mortui reliquerunt.

Then the kings themselves, since they had been dear to those whose life they had ordered, left behind them at their death a great longing.

1.15.4CSEL 19:55

itaque homines eorum simulacra finxerunt, ut haberent aliquod ex imaginum contemplatione solacium, progressique longius per amorem memoriam defunctorum colere coeperunt, ut et gratiam referre bene meritis uiderentur et successores eorum adlicerent ad bene imperandi cupiditatem.

So men made images of them, to have some comfort from looking at their likenesses; and going further out of love, they began to honour the memory of the dead, so that they might seem to repay those who had deserved well and might stir their successors to the desire of ruling well.

1.15.5CSEL 19:55–56

quod Cicero de natura deorum docet dicens: suscepit autem uita hominum consuetudoque communis, ut beneficiis excellentis uiros in caelum fama ac uoluntate tollerent. hinc Hercules, hinc Castor, hinc Pollux, hinc Aesculapius, hinc Liber.

Cicero teaches this in On the Nature of the Gods, saying: "The life of men and common custom have adopted the practice of raising to heaven, by fame and goodwill, men outstanding for their benefits. Hence Hercules, hence Castor, hence Pollux, hence Aesculapius, hence Liber."

1.15.6CSEL 19:56

et alio loco: atque in plerisque ciuitatibus intellegi potest acuendae uirtutis gratia aut quo libentius rei publicae causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, uirorum fortium memoriam honore deorum inmortalium consecratam. hac scilicet ratione Romani Caesares suos consecrauerunt et Mauri suos reges.

And in another place: "And in most cities it can be seen that, to sharpen virtue, or so that all the best men might more willingly face danger for the state, the memory of brave men has been consecrated with the honour of the immortal gods." For this reason, of course, the Romans consecrated their Caesars and the Moors their kings.

1.15.7CSEL 19:56

sic paulatim religiones esse coeperunt, dum illi primi qui eos nouerant eo ritu suos liberos ac nepotes, deinde omnes posteros imbuerunt, et hi tandem summi reges ob celebritatem nominis in prouinciis omnibus colebantur.

So little by little religions began, while those first who had known them instructed their children and grandchildren in that rite, and then all their descendants; and at length these greatest kings, because of the fame of their name, were worshipped in all the provinces.

1.15.8CSEL 19:56

priuatim uero singuli populi gentis aut urbis suae conditores, seu uiri fortitudine insignes erant seu feminae castitate mirabiles, summa ueneratione coluerunt, ut Aegyptus Isidem, Mauri Iubam, Macedones Cabirum, Poeni Uraniam, Latini Faunum,

Privately, however, individual peoples worshipped with the highest veneration the founders of their nation or city, whether men distinguished for bravery or women admirable for chastity: as Egypt Isis, the Moors Juba, the Macedonians Cabirus, the Carthaginians Urania, the Latins Faunus,

1.15.9CSEL 19:56

Sabini Sancum, Romani Quirinum, eodem utique modo Athenae Mineruam, Samos Iunonem, Paphos Venerem, Vulcanum Lemnos, Liberum Naxos, Apollinem Delos.

the Sabines Sancus, the Romans Quirinus; in just the same way Athens Minerva, Samos Juno, Paphos Venus, Lemnos Vulcan, Naxos Liber, Delos Apollo.

1.15.10CSEL 19:56

sic per populos atque regiones uaria sacra suscepta sunt, dum homines grati esse in suos principes cupiunt et quos alios honores uita carentibus deferant, inuenire non possunt.

So various rites were taken up among peoples and regions, while men wished to be grateful to their leaders and could find no other honours to confer on those who were without life.

1.15.11CSEL 19:56–57

praeterea pietas eorum qui successerant plurimum contulit ad errorem: qui ut diuina stirpe nati uiderentur, diuinos honores parentibus detulerunt deferrique iusserunt.

Besides, the dutiful affection of those who succeeded them contributed very greatly to the error: so that they might seem born of divine stock, they conferred divine honours on their parents and ordered them to be conferred.

1.15.12CSEL 19:57

an potest aliquis dubitare, quomodo religiones deorum sint institutae, cum apud Maronem legat Aeneae uerba sociis imperantis: nunc pateras libate Ioui precibusque uocate Anchisen genitorem —? cui non tantum immortalitatem, uerum etiam uentorum tribuit potestatem: poscamus uentos, atque haec me sacra quotannis urbe uelit posita templis sibi ferre dicatis.

Or can anyone doubt how the religions of the gods were established, when he reads in Maro the words of Aeneas commanding his companions: "Now pour libations to Jupiter and call on my father Anchises in prayer"? To him he assigns not only immortality but even power over the winds: "Let us ask for winds, and may he wish me to bring him these rites every year in a city founded, in temples dedicated to him."

1.15.13CSEL 19:57

idem scilicet de Ioue Liber et Pan et Mercurius et Apollo fecerunt ac postea de his ipsis successores eorum. accesserunt etiam poetae et compositis ad uoluptatem carminibus in caelum eos sustulerunt, sicut faciunt qui apud reges etiam malos panegyricis mendacibus adulantur.

The same, no doubt, Liber and Pan and Mercury and Apollo did for Jupiter, and afterwards their successors for them. The poets also joined in and, composing songs for pleasure, raised them to heaven, as do those who flatter even wicked kings with lying panegyrics.

1.15.14CSEL 19:57

quod malum a Graecis ortum est, quorum leuitas instructa dicendi facultate et copia incredibile est quantas mendaciorum nebulas excitauerit. itaque admirati eos et susceperunt primi sacra illorum et uniuersis gentibus tradiderunt.

This evil arose from the Greeks, whose levity, equipped with the power and abundance of speech, has raised incredible clouds of lies. So, admiring these men, they were the first to take up their rites and hand them on to all nations.

1.15.15CSEL 19:57–58

ob hanc uanitatem Sibylla sic eos increpat: Ἑλλὰς δὴ, τί πέποιθας ἐπ᾽ ἀνδράσιν ἡγεμόνεσσι; πρὸς τί δὲ δῶρα μάταια καταφθιμένοις πορίζεις; θύεις εἰδώλοις; τίς σοι πλάνον ἐν φρεσὶ θῆκεν ταῦτα τελεῖν προλιπόντα θεοῦ μεγάλοιο πρόσωπον.

For this vanity the Sibyl rebukes them thus: "Hellas, why do you trust in men as leaders? Why do you offer vain gifts to the dead? You sacrifice to idols. Who put error in your mind, to do these things, forsaking the face of the great God?"

1.15.16CSEL 19:58

M. Tullius, qui non tantum perfectus orator, sed etiam philosophus fuit, siquidem solus extitit Platonis imitator, in eo libro quo se ipse de morte filiae consolatus est, non dubitauit dicere deos qui publice colerentur homines fuisse.

Marcus Tullius, who was not only a perfect orator but also a philosopher, since he alone arose as an imitator of Plato, in the book in which he consoled himself on the death of his daughter, did not hesitate to say that the gods publicly worshipped were men.

1.15.17CSEL 19:58

quod ipsius testimonium eo debet grauissimum iudicari, quod et augurale habuit sacerdotium et eosdem se colere uenerarique testatur.

His testimony ought to be judged the weightier because he both held the priesthood of augur and testifies that he worships and venerates these same gods.

1.15.18CSEL 19:58

itaque intra paucos uersiculos duas res nobis dedit. nam dum imaginem filiae eodem se modo consecraturum esse profitetur quo illi a ueteribus sint consecrati, et illos mortuos esse docuit et originem uanae superstitionis ostendit.

So within a few short lines he gave us two things. For while he declares that he will consecrate the image of his daughter in the same way as those were consecrated by the ancients, he both taught that they were dead and showed the origin of vain superstition.

1.15.19CSEL 19:58

cum uero inquit et mares et feminas complures ex hominibus in deorum numero esse uideamus et eorum in urbibus atque agris augustissima delubra ueneremur, adsentiamur eorum sapientiae quorum ingeniis et inuentis omnem uitam legibus et institutis excultam constitutamque habemus.

"Since," he says, "we see many from among men, both male and female, in the number of the gods, and venerate their most august shrines in cities and countryside, let us assent to the wisdom of those by whose talents and discoveries we have our whole life cultivated and ordered with laws and institutions.

1.15.20CSEL 19:58–59

quod si ullum umquam animal consecrandum fuit, illud profecto fuit. si Cadmi progenies aut Amphitryonis aut Tyndari in caelum tollenda fama fuit, huic idem honos certe dicandus est. quod quidem faciam teque omnium optimam doctissimam adprobantibus diis inmortalibus ipsis in eorum coetu locatam ad opinionem omnium mortalium consecrabo.

And if any living being ever deserved to be consecrated, it was surely she. If the offspring of Cadmus or Amphitryon or Tyndareus was to be raised to heaven by fame, the same honour must certainly be dedicated to her. And this indeed I will do: you, the best and most learned of all, placed in the company of the immortal gods with their own approval, I will consecrate in the belief of all mortals."

1.15.21CSEL 19:59

fortasse dicat aliquis prae nimio luctu delirasse Ciceronem. atquin illa omnis oratio et doctrina et exemplis et ipso loquendi genere perfecta non aegri, sed constantis animi ac iudicii fuit et haec ipsa sententia nullum praefert indicium doloris.

Perhaps someone will say that Cicero raved from excessive grief. But that whole speech, perfect in learning, examples, and style itself, was the work not of a sick mind but of a steady mind and judgment; and this very sentence shows no sign of grief.

1.15.22CSEL 19:59

neque enim puto illum tam uarie, tam copiose, tam ornate scribere potuisse, nisi luctum eius et ratio ipsa et consolatio amicorum et longitudo temporis mitigasset.

For I do not think he could have written so variously, so fully, so elegantly, had not reason itself, the consolation of friends, and the length of time softened his grief.

1.15.23CSEL 19:59

quid quod idem dicit in libris de re publica, idem de gloria? nam de legibus, quo in opere Platonem secutus leges uoluit ponere, quibus putaret usuram esse iustam et sapientem ciuitatem, de religione ita sanxit: diuos et eos qui caelestes semper habiti sunt colunto et ollos quos endo caelo merita locauerunt, Herculem Liberum Aesculapium Castorem Pollucem Quirinum.

What of the fact that he says the same in the books On the Republic and in On Glory? For in On the Laws, a work in which, following Plato, he wished to set down the laws he thought a just and wise state would use, he enacted this about religion: "Let them worship the gods and those who have always been held heavenly, and those whom their merits have placed in heaven: Hercules, Liber, Aesculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirinus."

1.15.24CSEL 19:59

item in Tusculanis, cum diceret totum paene caelum humano genere conpletum, si uero inquit scrutari uetera et ex illis ea quae scriptores Graeciae prodiderunt eruere coner, ipsi illi maiorum gentium di qui habentur hinc a nobis profecti in caelum reperientur.

Likewise in the Tusculans, when he said that almost the whole of heaven is filled with the human race, he says: "If I were to try to search out antiquity and dig out from it what the writers of Greece have handed down, the very gods held to be of the greater families will be found to have gone from us to heaven.

1.15.25CSEL 19:59–60

quare quoniam demonstrantur sepulchra in Graecia, reminiscere, quoniam es initiatus, quae tradantur mysteriis: tum denique quam hoc late pateat intelleges.

Ask whose tombs are shown in Greece; remember, since you are initiated, what is taught in the mysteries; then at last you will understand how widely this extends."

1.15.26CSEL 19:60

testatus est uidelicet Attici conscientiam, ex ipsis mysteriis intellegi posse quod omnes illi homines fuerint qui coluntur, et cum de Hercule Libero Aesculapio Castore Polluce incunctanter fateretur, de Apolline ac Ioue patribus eorum, item de Neptuno Uulcano Marte Mercurio, quos maiorum gentium deos appellauit, timuit aperte coner.

He evidently appealed to the knowledge of Atticus, that it could be understood from the mysteries themselves that all those who are worshipped were men; and though he confessed it without hesitation about Hercules, Liber, Aesculapius, Castor, and Pollux, he was afraid to say it openly about Apollo and Jupiter, their fathers, and likewise about Neptune, Vulcan, Mars, and Mercury, whom he called gods of the greater families.

1.15.27CSEL 19:60

et idcirco ait late hoc patere, ut idem de Ioue ceterisque antiquioribus diis intellegamus, quorum memoriam si eadem ratione ueteres consecrauerunt, qua se imaginem nomenque filiae consecraturum esse dicit, ignosci maerentibus potest, credentibus non potest. quis enim tam

And for this reason he says that this extends widely, so that we may understand the same of Jupiter and the other more ancient gods. If the ancients consecrated their memory in the same way that he says he will consecrate the image and name of his daughter, those who mourn can be pardoned; those who believe cannot. For who is so

1.15.28CSEL 19:60

demens, qui consensu et placito innumerabilium stultorum aperiri caelum mortuis arbitretur aut aliquem quod ipse non habeat dare alteri posse? apud Romanos deus Iulius, quia hoc scele-

mad as to think that heaven is opened to the dead by the consent and decree of countless fools, or that anyone can give another what he himself does not have? Among the Romans Julius is a god because it pleased that wicked

1.15.29CSEL 19:60

rato homini placuit Antonio, deus Quirinus, quia hoc pastoribus uisum est, cum alter gemini fratris extiterit, alter patriae parricida. quodsi non consul fuisset Antonius, Gaius Caesar pro

man Antony; Quirinus is a god because shepherds thought so, though the one proved to be the murderer of his twin brother and the other the parricide of his country. And if Antony had not been consul, Gaius Caesar, for

1.15.30CSEL 19:60

suis in rem publicam meritis etiam defuncti hominis honore caruisset, et quidem consilio Pisonis soceri et Lucii Caesaris propinqui, qui uetabant funus ei fieri, et Dolabellae consulis, qui columnam in foro id est tumulum eius euertit ac forum expiauit. nam Romulum desiderio suis fuisse declarat Ennius, apud quem populus amissum regem dolens haec loquitur:

all his services to the state, would have lacked even the honour due to a dead man, by the counsel of Piso his father-in-law and Lucius Caesar his kinsman, who forbade his funeral, and of the consul Dolabella, who overturned the column in the forum, that is, his memorial, and purified the forum. As for Romulus, Ennius shows that he was longed for by his people; in his poem the people, grieving for their lost king, say this:

1.15.31CSEL 19:60–61

o Romule, Romule die, qualem te patriae custodem di genuerunt! tu produxisti nos intra luminis oras, o pater, o genitor, o sanguen dis oriundum.

"O Romulus, divine Romulus, what a guardian of the fatherland the gods begot in you! You brought us forth into the shores of light, O father, O begetter, O blood sprung from the gods."

1.15.32CSEL 19:61

ob hoc desiderium facilius creditum est Iulio Proculo mentienti, qui subornatus a patribus est, ut nuntiaret plebi uidisse se regem humano habitu augustiorem eumque mandasse ad populum, ut sibi delubrum fieret, se deum esse et Quirinum uocari.

Because of this longing, Julius Proculus was more easily believed when he lied. He was put up by the senators to announce to the people that he had seen the king in more than human majesty, and that he had commanded the people that a shrine be made to him, that he was a god and was to be called Quirinus.

1.15.33CSEL 19:61

quo facto et ipsi populo persuasit Romulum ad deos abisse et senatum suspicione caedis regiae liberauit.

By this he both persuaded the people that Romulus had gone away to the gods and freed the senate from suspicion of killing the king.

Divine 1, chapter 16

1.16.1CSEL 19:61

Poteram iis quae rettuli esse contentus, sed supersunt adhuc multa suscepto operi necessaria.

I could have been content with what I have related, but many things still remain necessary to the work I have undertaken.

1.16.2CSEL 19:61

nam quamuis ipso religionum capite destructo uniuersas sustulerim, libet tamen persequi cetera et redarguere plenius inueteratam persuasionem, ut tandem homines suorum pudeat ac paeniteat errorum.

For although by destroying the very head of these religions I have done away with them all, yet I wish to pursue the rest and refute more fully the inveterate persuasion, so that men may at last be ashamed of their errors and repent of them.

1.16.3CSEL 19:61

magnum hoc opus et homine dignum, religionum animos nodis exsoluere pergo, ut ait Lucretius, qui quidem hoc efficere non poterat, quia nihil ueri adferebat. nostrum est hoc officium, qui et uerum deum adserimus et falsos refutamus.

This is a great work and worthy of a man: "I go on to free minds from the knots of religions," as Lucretius says, who indeed could not accomplish it, because he brought nothing true. This task is ours, who both assert the true God and refute the false ones.

1.16.4CSEL 19:61–62

illi ergo qui poetas finxisse de diis fabulas opinantur (et tamen) deas feminas et esse credunt et colunt, reuoluuntur inprudentes ad id quod negauerant, coire illos ac parere.

So those who think the poets invented fables about the gods, and yet believe that there are goddesses and worship them, fall back unawares into what they had denied, that the gods have intercourse and bear children.

1.16.5CSEL 19:62

nec enim fieri potest quin duo sexus generandi causa sint instituti. recepta uero sexuum diuersitate non intellegunt consequens esse ut concipiant: quod in deum cadere non potest. sed isti putant: nam et Iouis esse filios dicunt et ceterorum deorum.

For it cannot be that two sexes were established except for the purpose of generation. Once the difference of sexes is admitted, they do not understand that it follows that they conceive, which cannot apply to God. But these people think so: for they say there are sons of Jupiter and of the other gods.

1.16.6CSEL 19:62

nascuntur ergo et cotidie quidem dii noui: nec enim uincuntur ab hominibus fecunditate. igitur deorum innumerabilium plena sunt omnia, nullo scilicet moriente.

New gods, then, are born, and indeed daily; for they are not outdone by men in fertility. Therefore everything is full of countless gods, since, of course, none dies.

1.16.7CSEL 19:62

nam cum hominum uis incredibilis, numerus sit inaestimabilis, quos tamen sicuti nascuntur mori necesse est, quid deorum esse tandem putemus, qui tot saeculis nati sunt inmortalesque manserunt?

For since the multitude of men is incredible and their number beyond reckoning, who yet must die as they are born, what must we think is the number of gods, born over so many ages and remaining immortal?

1.16.8CSEL 19:62

cur ergo tam pauci coluntur? nisi forte arbitramur non generandi causa, sed tantummodo capiendae uoluptatis duos esse sexus deorum et ea exercere quae homunculos et facere et pati pudet.

Why then are so few worshipped? Unless perhaps we think the two sexes of the gods exist not for the sake of begetting but only for taking pleasure, and that they practise what puny men are ashamed both to do and to undergo.

1.16.9CSEL 19:62

cum uero dicantur aliqui ex aliquibus nati, consequens est ut semper nascantur, siquidem aliquando sunt nati, uel si nasci desierunt, scire nos conuenit cur aut quando desierint.

But since some are said to be born from others, it follows that they are always being born, if they were once born; or, if they have ceased to be born, we should know why or when they ceased.

1.16.10CSEL 19:62

non inlepide Seneca in libris moralis philosophiae quid ergo est inquit quare apud poetas salacissimus Iuppiter desierit liberos tollere? utrum sexagenarius factus est et illi lex Papia fibulam inposuit? an impetrauit ius trium liberorum? an tandem illi uenit in mentem ab alio expectes alteri quod feceris

Not without wit Seneca says in his books of moral philosophy: "What then is the reason why in the poets Jupiter, most lustful of all, has stopped raising children? Has he turned sixty, and has the Papian law put a clasp on him? Or has he obtained the right of three children? Or has it at last occurred to him, 'Expect from another what you have done to another,'

1.16.11CSEL 19:62–63

et timet ne quis sibi faciat quod ipse Saturno? at isti qui deos adserunt, uideant quomodo respondeant huic argumento quod inferemus: si duo sunt sexus deorum, sequitur concubitus, si coeunt, et domos habeant necesse est; nec enim carent uirtute ac pudore, ut hoc promisce aut in propatulo faciant, sicut muta facere uidemus animalia.

and does he fear that someone may do to him what he did to Saturn?" But let those who assert gods see how they will answer this argument which we shall bring: if there are two sexes of gods, intercourse follows; if they have intercourse, they must also have houses; for they do not lack virtue and modesty so as to do this promiscuously or in the open, as we see dumb animals do.

1.16.12CSEL 19:63

si domos habent, consequens est ut et urbes habeant, et quidem auctore Nasone, qui ait: plebs habitat diuersa locis, a fronte potentes caelicolae clarique suos posuere penates. si habent urbes, et agros igitur habebunt.

If they have houses, it follows that they also have cities, and indeed on the authority of Naso, who says: "The common folk live apart in various places; in front the powerful and famous heaven-dwellers have set up their households." If they have cities, then they will have fields too.

1.16.13CSEL 19:63

iam quis non uideat quae sequantur? arare illos et colere, quod uictus causa fit: ergo mortales sunt. quod argumentum retrouersus idem ualet.

Now who does not see what follows? That they plough and cultivate, which is done for the sake of food: therefore they are mortal. The same argument holds equally in reverse.

1.16.14CSEL 19:63

si enim agros non habent, ne urbes quidem, si urbes non (habent), ne domos quidem, si domibus carent, ergo et concubitu, si concubitus ab iis abest, et sexus igitur femininus. in diis autem uidemus et feminas esse: ergo dii non sunt. dissoluat hoc argumentum si quis potest.

For if they have no fields, they have no cities either; if they have no cities, they have no houses either; if they lack houses, they lack intercourse too; if intercourse is absent from them, so then is the female sex. But we see that among the gods there are also females: therefore they are not gods. Let anyone refute this argument if he can.

1.16.15CSEL 19:63

ita enim res rem sequitur, ut haec ultima necesse sit confiteri.

For one thing follows so closely from another that these last conclusions must be admitted.

1.16.16CSEL 19:63

sed ne illud quidem dissoluet aliquis: ex duobus sexibus alter fortior est, alter infirmior; robustiores enim mares sunt, feminae inbecilliores. inbecillitas autem non cadit in deum, ergo nec feminae sexus.

But no one will refute this either: of the two sexes one is stronger, the other weaker; for males are more robust, females weaker. But weakness does not apply to God; therefore neither does the female sex.

1.16.17CSEL 19:63

huic additur superioris argumenti extrema illa conclusio, ut dii non sint, quoniam in diis et feminae sunt.

To this is added that final conclusion of the former argument: that they are not gods, since among the gods there are also females.

Divine 1, chapter 17

1.17.1CSEL 19:63–64

Ob has rationes Stoici aliouersus deos interpretantur, et quia non peruident quid sit in uero, conantur eos cum rerum naturalium ratione coniungere. quos Cicero secutus de diis ac religionibus eorum hanc sententiam tulit:

For these reasons the Stoics interpret the gods in another way, and because they do not see through to what is true, they try to join them with a theory of natural things. Following them, Cicero gave this verdict about the gods and their religions:

1.17.2CSEL 19:64

uidetisne igitur, ut a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inuentis tracta ratio est ad commenticios ac fictos deos? quae res genuit falsas opiniones erroresque turbulentos et superstitiones paene aniles. et formae enim nobis deorum et aetates et uestitus ornatusque noti sunt, genera praeterea, coniugia cognationes omniaque traducta ad similitudinem inbecillitatis humanae.

"Do you see, then, how reasoning has been drawn from natural things, well and usefully discovered, to fictitious and invented gods? This has given birth to false opinions, turbulent errors, and superstitions almost worthy of old women. For the forms of the gods, their ages, dress, and adornment are known to us, and moreover their families, marriages, kinships, and everything has been carried over to the likeness of human weakness."

1.17.3CSEL 19:64

quid planius, quid uerius dici potest? Romanae philosophiae princeps et amplissimo sacerdotio praeditus commenticios ac fictos deos arguit, quorum cultus superstitiones paene aniles esse testatur, falsis opinionibus erroribusque turbulentis implicatos esse homines queritur.

What could be said more plainly, more truly? The chief of Roman philosophy, holding a most distinguished priesthood, exposes fictitious and invented gods, testifies that their worship is superstition almost worthy of old women, and complains that men are entangled in false opinions and turbulent errors.

1.17.4CSEL 19:64

nam totus liber tertius de natura deorum omnes funditus religiones euertit ac delet. quid ergo a nobis expectatur amplius? num eloquentia superare possumus Ciceronem? minime id quidem, sed fiducia illi defuit ignoranti ueritatem, quod ipse simpliciter in eodem opere confitetur. ait enim facilius posse se dicere quid non sit quam quid sit, hoc est falsa se intellegere, uera nescire.

For the whole third book On the Nature of the Gods overturns and destroys all religions from the foundations. What more then is expected of us? Can we surpass Cicero in eloquence? Not at all; but confidence failed him, since he did not know the truth, which he himself simply confesses in the same work. For he says that he can more easily say what is not than what is; that is, he understands what is false but does not know what is true.

1.17.5CSEL 19:64

clarum est igitur homines fuisse illos qui dii putantur et eorum memoriam post mortem consecratam. ideo et aetates diuersae sunt et certae imagines singulorum, quod in eo habitu et aetate simulacra eorum configurata sunt, in qua quemque mors deprehendit.

It is clear, then, that those thought to be gods were men and that their memory was consecrated after death. That is why their ages differ and each has a fixed likeness: their images are shaped in the dress and at the age in which death overtook each.

1.17.6CSEL 19:64–65

consideremus si placet aerumnas infelicium deorum. Isis filium perdidit, Ceres filiam, expulsa et per orbem terrae iactata Latona uix insulam paruam in qua pareret inuenit.

Let us consider, if you please, the troubles of these unhappy gods. Isis lost her son, Ceres her daughter; Latona, driven out and tossed through the whole world, barely found a small island in which to give birth.

1.17.7CSEL 19:65

Deum Mater et amauit formosum adulescentem et eundem cum paelice deprehensum exsectis uirilibus semiuirum reddidit et ideo nunc sacra eius a Gallis sacerdotibus celebrantur. Iuno paelices acerrime persecuta est, quia parere ipsa non potuit ex fratre.

The Mother of the Gods both loved a handsome young man and, catching him with a mistress, cut off his genitals and made him half a man; and that is why her rites are now celebrated by the Galli, her priests. Juno most bitterly persecuted her husband's mistresses, because she herself could not bear children by her brother.

1.17.8CSEL 19:65

insulam Samum scribit Varro prius Partheniam nominatam, quod ibi Iuno adoleuerit ibique etiam Ioui nupserit. itaque nobilissimum et antiquissimum templum eius est Sami et simulacrum in habitu nubentis figuratum et sacra eius anniuersaria nuptiarum ritu celebrantur. si ergo adoleuit, si fuit uirgo primo, postea mulier, hominem fuisse qui non intellegit, pecudem se fatetur.

Varro writes that the island of Samos was earlier named Parthenia, because Juno grew up there and there married Jupiter. So her most famous and ancient temple is on Samos, with a statue shaped in the dress of a bride, and her yearly rites are celebrated with the ritual of a wedding. If then she grew up, if she was first a virgin and afterwards a woman, whoever does not understand that she was a human being confesses himself a beast.

1.17.9CSEL 19:65

quid loquar obscenitatem Veneris omnium libidinibus prostitutae non deorum tantum, sed et hominum? haec enim ex famoso Martis stupro genuit Harmoniam, ex Mercurio Hermaphroditum, qui est natus androgynus, ex Ioue Cupidinem, ex Anchise Aenean, ex Bute Erycem; ex Adonio quidem nullum potuit, quod etiamtum puer ab apro ictus occisus est.

Why should I speak of the obscenity of Venus, prostituted to the lusts of all, not only of gods but also of men? For by her notorious debauchery with Mars she bore Harmonia; by Mercury, Hermaphroditus, who was born androgynous; by Jupiter, Cupid; by Anchises, Aeneas; by Butes, Eryx. By Adonis indeed she could have none, because while still a boy he was struck and killed by a boar.

1.17.10CSEL 19:65–66

quae prima, ut in Historia Sacra continetur, artem meretriciam instituit auctorque mulieribus in Cypro fuit, uti uulg(at)o corpore quaestum facerent: quod idcirco imperauit, ne sola praeter alias mulieres inpudica et uirorum adpetens uideretur.

She first, as the Sacred History records, instituted the art of the harlot and taught the women of Cyprus to make money by making their bodies common. She ordered this so that she alone might not seem unchaste and eager for men beyond other women.

1.17.11CSEL 19:66

etiamne haec habet aliquid numinis, cuius plura numerantur adulteria quam partus? sed ne illae quidem uirgines inlibatam castitatem seruare potuerunt. unde enim putemus Erichthonium esse natum? an ex terra, ut poetae uideri uolunt?

Does even she have anything of divinity, whose adulteries outnumber her childbirths? But not even those virgin goddesses could keep their chastity untouched. For from where are we to think Erichthonius was born? From the earth, as the poets wish it to seem?

1.17.12CSEL 19:66

at res ipsa clamat. nam cum Vulcanus diis arma fecisset eique Iuppiter optionem dedisset praemii quod uellet postulandi iurassetque ut solebat per infernam paludem se nihil negaturum, tum faber claudus Mineruae nuptias postulauit.

But the thing itself cries out. For when Vulcan had made arms for the gods and Jupiter had given him the choice of asking whatever reward he wished, and had sworn, as he used to, by the infernal marsh that he would refuse nothing, then the lame smith asked for marriage with Minerva.

1.17.13CSEL 19:66

hic Iuppiter Optimus Maximus tanta religione constrictus abnuere non potuit, Mineruam tamen monuit repugnare pudicitiamque defendere. tum in illa conluctatione Vulcanum in terram effudisse aiunt, unde sit Erichthonius natus, idque illi nomen inpositum ὰπὸ τη̃ς ἒριδος καὶ χθονός id est ex certamine atque humo.

Here Jupiter Best and Greatest, bound by so solemn an oath, could not refuse, but he warned Minerva to resist and defend her chastity. Then in that struggle, they say, Vulcan spilled his seed on the ground, from which Erichthonius was born, and that name was given him from eris and chthōn, that is, from strife and soil.

1.17.14CSEL 19:66

cur igitur uirgo eum puerum cum dracone conclusum et obsignatum tribus uirginibus Cecropidis commendauit? euidens ut opinor incestum, quod nullo modo possit colorari.

Why then did the virgin shut up that boy with a serpent, seal the chest, and entrust it to the three virgin daughters of Cecrops? A plain case of unchastity, I think, which cannot be disguised in any way.

1.17.15CSEL 19:66–67

altera cum paene amatorem suum perdidisset, qui erat turbatis distractus equis, praestantissimum medicum Asclepium curando iuueni aduocauit eumque sanatum secretis alma recondit sedibus et nymphae Egeriae nemorique relegat, solus ubi in siluis Italis ignobilis aeuum exigeret uersoque ubi nomine Virbius esset. quid sibi uult haec tam diligens, tam sollicita curatio?

Another, when she had almost lost her lover, who "was torn apart by his frightened horses," called in the most excellent physician Asclepius to cure the young man; and when he was healed, "the kindly goddess hid him in secret dwellings and banished him to the nymph Egeria and her grove, where alone in the Italian woods, unknown, he might pass his life, and where, his name changed, he would be Virbius." What does this so diligent, so anxious care mean?

1.17.16CSEL 19:67

quid secretae sedes? quid relegatio uel tam longe uel ad mulierem uel in solitudinem? quid deinde nominis commutatio? postremo quid equorum tam pertinax abominatio? quid significant haec omnia nisi conscientiam stupri et amorem minime uirginalem?

Why the secret dwellings? Why banishment so far, or to a woman, or into solitude? Why then the change of name? Finally, why so stubborn an aversion to horses? What do all these signify but consciousness of debauchery and a love by no means virginal?

1.17.17CSEL 19:67

erat plane cur tantum laborem pro tam fideli iuuene susciperet, qui amanti nouercae obsequium pernegarat.

She plainly had reason to undertake so much labour for so faithful a young man, who had refused compliance to his stepmother's love.

Divine 1, chapter 18

1.18.1CSEL 19:67

Hoc loco refellendi sunt etiam ii qui deos ex hominibus esse factos non tantum fatentur, sed ut eos laudent, etiam gloriantur, aut uirtutis gratia ut Herculem aut munerum ut Cererem ac Liberum aut artium repertarum ut Aesculapium ac Mineruam.

At this point we must also refute those who not only admit that gods were made from men, but even glory in it in order to praise them, whether for virtue, like Hercules, or for gifts, like Ceres and Liber, or for arts discovered, like Aesculapius and Minerva.

1.18.2CSEL 19:67

haec uero quam inepta sint quamque non digna propter quae homines inexpiabili se scelere contaminent hostesque uero deo fiant, quo contempto mortuorum sacra suscipiunt, ex singulis rebus ostendam.

How foolish these reasons are, and how unworthy of men's defiling themselves with an inexpiable crime and becoming enemies of the true God, whom they despise while they take up the rites of the dead, I shall show point by point.

1.18.3CSEL 19:67

uirtutem esse dicunt quae hominem tollat in caelum, non illam de qua philosophi disserunt, quae posita est in bonis animi, sed hanc corporalem quae dicitur fortitudo: quae quoniam praecipua in Hercule fuit, inmortalitatem meruisse creditur.

They say that it is virtue which raises a man to heaven: not the virtue that philosophers discuss, which consists in goods of the soul, but this bodily kind which is called strength; and since it was pre-eminent in Hercules, he is believed to have earned immortality.

1.18.4CSEL 19:67–68

quis tam stulte ineptus est, ut corporis uires diuinum uel etiam humanum bonum iudicet, cum sint et maiores pecudibus adtributae et uno morbo saepe frangantur uel senectute ipsa minuantur et corruant?

Who is so foolishly absurd as to judge bodily strength a divine or even a human good, when greater strength has been given to cattle, and it is often broken by a single illness or diminished and collapses with old age itself?

1.18.5CSEL 19:68

itaque idem ille cum deformari ulceribus toros suos cerneret, nec sanari se uoluit nec senem fieri, ne quando se ipso minor aut deformior uideretur.

So that same Hercules, when he saw his muscles disfigured with sores, wished neither to be healed nor to grow old, lest he should ever appear less than himself or more deformed.

1.18.6CSEL 19:68

hunc a rogo quo uiuum se ipse combusserat escendisse in caelum putauerunt eaque ipsa quae stultissime sunt admirati simulacris et imaginibus expressa et consecrata posuerunt, ut in perpetuum uanitatis illorum monumenta perstarent qui ob necem bestiarum deos fieri credidissent.

They thought he ascended into heaven from the pyre on which he had burned himself alive, and the very things they most foolishly admired they set up, portrayed and consecrated in statues and images, so that there might stand forever monuments to the folly of those who believed that gods were made by the killing of beasts.

1.18.7CSEL 19:68

sed haec fortasse Graecorum culpa sit, qui res leuissimas pro maximis semper habuerunt.

But perhaps this may be the fault of the Greeks, who always held the most trivial things to be the greatest.

1.18.8CSEL 19:68

quid nostri? num sapientiores? qui athleticam quidem uirtutem contemnunt, quia nihil obest, sed regiam, quia late solet nocere, sic admirantur, ut fortes ac bellicosos duces in deorum coetu locari arbitrentur; nec esse ullam aliam ad inmortalitatem uiam quam exercitus ducere, aliena uastare, delere urbes, oppida excindere, liberos populos aut trucidare aut subicere seruituti.

What of our own people? Are they any wiser? They despise the virtue of the athlete, because it does no harm, but they so admire the virtue of kings, because it usually harms widely, that they think brave and warlike generals are placed in the assembly of the gods, and that there is no other road to immortality than to lead armies, lay waste others' lands, destroy cities, raze towns, and either slaughter free peoples or subject them to slavery.

1.18.9CSEL 19:68

uidelicet quo plures homines adflixerint spoliarint occiderint, eo se nobiliores et clariores putant et inanis gloriae specie capti sceleribus suis nomen uirtutis inponunt.

Evidently, the more men they have afflicted, plundered, and killed, the nobler and more famous they think themselves; and, captivated by the appearance of empty glory, they give the name of virtue to their crimes.

1.18.10CSEL 19:68

iam mallem ut a ferarum caedibus deos sibi fingerent quam inmortalitatem tam cruentam probarent. si quis unum hominem iugulauerit, pro contaminato ac nefario habetur nec ad terrenum hoc domicilium deorum admitti eum fas putant. ille autem qui infinita hominum milia trucidarit, cruore campos inundauerit, flumina infecerit, non modo in templum, sed etiam in caelum admittitur.

I would rather they made gods for themselves from the slaughter of wild beasts than approve so bloody an immortality. If anyone has killed one man, he is held polluted and wicked, and they think it unlawful for him to be admitted to this earthly dwelling of the gods. But he who has slaughtered countless thousands of men, flooded the plains with blood, and stained the rivers, is admitted not only into the temple but even into heaven.

1.18.11CSEL 19:68–69

aput Ennium sic loquitur Africanus: si fas endo plagas caelestum ascendere cuiquam est, mi soli caeli maxima porta patet, scilicet quia magnam partem generis humani extinxit ac perdidit.

In Ennius, Africanus speaks thus: "If it is lawful for anyone to ascend into the regions of the heavenly ones, for me alone the greatest gate of heaven lies open"; evidently because he destroyed and ruined a great part of the human race.

1.18.12CSEL 19:69

o in quantis tenebris, Africane, uersatus es uel potius o poeta, qui per caedes et sanguinem patere hominibus ascensum in caelum putaueris! cui uanitati etiam Cicero adsensit.

O Africanus, in what darkness you moved, or rather, O poet, you who thought that the ascent to heaven lies open to men through slaughter and blood! Cicero too assented to this vanity.

1.18.13CSEL 19:69

est uero inquit Africane: nam et Herculi eadem ista porta patuit; tamquam ipse plane, cum id fieret, ianitor fuerit in caelo.

"It is so indeed, Africanus," he says, "for that same gate lay open to Hercules too"; as if he himself had plainly been the doorkeeper in heaven when it happened.

1.18.14CSEL 19:69

equidem statuere non possum dolendumne potius an ridendum putem, cum uideam graues et doctos et ut sibi uidentur sapientes uiros in tam miserandis errorum fluctibus uolutari.

For my part, I cannot decide whether to think it more a matter for grief or for laughter, when I see serious and learned men, and wise ones as they think themselves, tossed about in such pitiable waves of error.

1.18.15CSEL 19:69

si haec est uirtus quae nos inmortales facit, mori equidem malim quam exitio esse quam plurimis.

If this is the virtue that makes us immortal, I for one would rather die than be the destruction of as many as possible.

1.18.16CSEL 19:69

si aliter inmortalitas parari non potest nisi per sanguinem, quid fiet, si omnes in concordiam consenserint? quod certe fieri poterit, si pernicioso et impio furore proiecto innocentes esse ac iusti uelint. num igitur nemo erit caelo dignus?

If immortality cannot be gained except through blood, what will happen if all agree together in concord? This could certainly happen, if they cast away their destructive and impious fury and were willing to be innocent and just. Will no one, then, be worthy of heaven?

1.18.17CSEL 19:69–70

num peribit uirtus, quia hominibus in homines saeuire non dabitur? sed isti qui euersiones urbium populorumque summam gloriam conputant, otium publicum non ferent, rapient saeuient et iniuriis insolenter inlatis humanae societatis foedus inrumpent, ut habere hostem possint, quem (non) sceleratius deleant quam lacessierint.

Will virtue perish because men will not be allowed to rage against men? But these people, who count the overthrow of cities and peoples the highest glory, will not bear public peace. They will plunder and rage and, insolently inflicting wrongs, break the bond of human society, so that they may have an enemy to destroy, no more wickedly than they provoked him.

1.18.18CSEL 19:70

Nunc ad reliqua pergamus. nomen deorum Cereri ac Libero traditio munerum fecit. possum diuinis docere litteris uinum atque fruges ante progeniem Caeli atque Saturni fuisse in usu hominum, sed ab his sane inuenta esse fingamus.

Now let us go on to the rest. The handing on of gifts gave Ceres and Liber the name of gods. I could show from the divine writings that wine and grain were in use among men before the offspring of Caelus and Saturn; but let us suppose that they were indeed discovered by them.

1.18.19CSEL 19:70

num potest plus aut maius uideri collegisse fruges iisque fractis panem facere docuisse aut uuas de uitibus lectas expressisse uinumque fecisse quam fruges ipsas aut uites generasse ac protulisse de terra?

Can it seem more or greater to have gathered grain and taught how to grind it and make bread, or to have pressed grapes picked from the vines and made wine, than to have produced grain itself or the vines and brought them forth from the earth?

1.18.20CSEL 19:70

reliquerit haec sane deus humanis ingeniis eruenda, tamen fieri non potest quin ipsius sint omnia, qui et sapientiam tribuit homini ut inueniret et illa ipsa quae possent inueniri.

Granted that God left these things to be discovered by human ingenuity, it still cannot be but that all things are his, who gave man both the wisdom to discover them and the very things that could be discovered.

1.18.21CSEL 19:70

artes quoque inuentoribus suis inmortalitatem peperisse dicuntur, ut Aesculapio medicina, Volcano fabrica. colamus igitur et illos qui fullonicam sutrinamue docuerunt. cur autem figulinae repertori honos non habetur? an quia isti diuites uasa Samia contemnunt?

The arts too are said to have won immortality for their inventors, as medicine for Aesculapius and smithcraft for Vulcan. Let us then worship also those who taught fulling and shoemaking. And why is no honour paid to the inventor of pottery? Is it because these rich men despise Samian ware?

1.18.22CSEL 19:70

sunt et aliae artes quarum repertores humanae uitae plurimum profuerunt: cur non et illis adtributa sunt templa?

There are other arts too whose inventors did very great service to human life: why have temples not been assigned to them as well?

1.18.23CSEL 19:70

sed nimirum Minerua est quae omnes repperit, ideoque illi opifices supplicant. ergo ab his sordibus Minerua ascendit in caelum.

But of course it is Minerva who discovered them all, and so the craftsmen pray to her. So from these menial things Minerva ascended into heaven.

1.18.24CSEL 19:70–71

est uero cur quisquam derelinquat eum qui terram cum animantibus, caelum cum astris et luminibus exorsus est, ut eam ueneretur quae telam docuit ordiri.

There is good reason, surely, for anyone to abandon him who began the earth with its living things and the heaven with its stars and lights, in order to venerate her who taught how to begin a web on the loom!

1.18.25CSEL 19:71

quid ille qui uulnera in corporibus sanare docuit? num potest esse praestantior quam qui corpora ipsa formauit, sentiendi ac uiuendi rationem dedit, herbas denique ipsas et cetera quibus medendi ars constat excogitauit ac protulit?

What of him who taught how to heal wounds in bodies? Can he be more excellent than he who formed bodies themselves, gave the power of perceiving and living, and finally devised and produced the very herbs and other things of which the art of healing consists?

Divine 1, chapter 19

1.19.1CSEL 19:71

At enim dicet aliquis et huic summo qui fecit omnia et illis qui partim profuerunt suam uenerationem esse tribuendam.

But someone will say that their own veneration should be given both to this Supreme One who made all things and to those who were of service in part.

1.19.2CSEL 19:71

primum nec factum est umquam ut qui hos coluit, etiam deum coluerit, neque fieri potest, quoniam si honos idem tribuitur aliis, ipse omnino non colitur, cuius religio est illum esse unum ac solum deum credere.

First, it has never happened that anyone who worshipped these also worshipped God, nor can it happen; for if the same honour is given to others, he is not worshipped at all, since his religion is to believe that he is the one and only God.

1.19.3CSEL 19:71

clamat summus poeta eos omnes qui inuentas uitam excoluere per artes aput inferos esse ipsumque illum repertorem medicinae talis et artis ad Stygias undas fulmine detrusum, ut intellegamus quantum ualeat pater omnipotens, qui etiam deos fulminibus exstinguat.

The greatest poet cries out that all those "who adorned life with the arts they discovered" are among the dead below, and that the very "discoverer of such medicine and art" was "thrust down by a thunderbolt to the Stygian waters," so that we may understand how great is the power of the Almighty Father, who even extinguishes gods with thunderbolts.

1.19.4CSEL 19:71

sed homines ingeniosi hanc secum habebant fortasse rationem: quia deus fulminari non potest, apparet non esse factum. immo uero quia factum est, apparet hominem fuisse, non deum.

But clever men perhaps reasoned with themselves thus: since a god cannot be struck by lightning, it is clear that it did not happen. On the contrary: since it did happen, it is clear that he was a man, not a god.

1.19.5CSEL 19:71

mendacium poetarum non in facto est, sed in nomine: metuebant enim malum, si contra publicam persuasionem faterentur quod erat uerum.

The lie of the poets is not in the fact but in the name; for they feared harm if they confessed what was true against public belief.

1.19.6CSEL 19:71–72

quodsi hoc constat inter ipsos, ex hominibus deos factos, cur ergo non credunt poetis, si quando illorum fugas et uulnera et mortes et bella et adulteria describunt?

But if it is agreed among them that gods were made from men, why then do they not believe the poets when they describe their flights, wounds, deaths, wars, and adulteries?

1.19.7CSEL 19:72

quibus de rebus intellegi datur non potuisse ullo pacto fieri deos, quia ne homines quidem probi fuerunt eaque in uita sua gesserunt quae mortem pariunt sempiternam.

From these things it can be understood that they could in no way have become gods, since they were not even good men, and in their lives they did things that bring forth eternal death.

Divine 1, chapter 20

1.20.1CSEL 19:72

Venio nunc ad proprias Romanorum religiones, quoniam de communibus dixi. Romuli nutrix Lupa honoribus est adfecta diuinis, et ferrem, si animal ipsum, cuius figuram gerit.

I come now to the religions peculiar to the Romans, since I have spoken of those they share with others. Romulus' nurse, the She-wolf, has been given divine honours; and I would bear it if it were the animal itself whose figure she bears.

1.20.2CSEL 19:72

sed auctor est Liuius Larentinae esse simulacrum et quidem non corporis, sed mentis ac morum. fuit enim Faustuli uxor et propter uulgati corporis uilitatem lupa inter pastores id est meretrix nuncupata est; unde etiam lupanar dicitur.

But Livy is the authority that it is an image of Larentina, and indeed not of her body but of her mind and character. For she was the wife of Faustulus, and because of the cheapness of her body, made common to all, she was called among the shepherds "lupa," that is, a harlot; from which also a brothel is called lupanar.

1.20.3CSEL 19:72

exemplum scilicet Atheniensium in ea figuranda Romani secuti sunt, apud quos meretrix quaedam nomine Leaena cum tyrannum occidisset, quia nefas erat simulacrum constitui meretricis in templo, animalis effigiem posuerunt cuius nomen gerebat.

In representing her, the Romans evidently followed the example of the Athenians, among whom a certain harlot named Leaena had killed a tyrant; because it was unlawful for a statue of a harlot to be set up in a temple, they set up the image of the animal whose name she bore.

1.20.4CSEL 19:72

itaque ut illi monumentum ex nomine, sic isti ex professione fecerunt. huius nomini etiam dies festus dicatus est et Larentinalia constituta.

So as the Athenians made her memorial from her name, the Romans made theirs from her profession. A festal day was also dedicated to her name, and the Larentinalia were established.

1.20.5CSEL 19:72

nec hanc solam Romani meretricem colunt, sed Faulam quoque, quam Herculis scortum fuisse Verrius scribit. iam quanta ista inmortalitas putanda est, quam etiam meretrices adsecuntur?

Nor is this the only harlot the Romans worship, but also Faula, who Verrius writes was Hercules' mistress. How great must this immortality be thought, which even harlots attain?

1.20.6CSEL 19:72–73

Flora cum magnas opes ex arte meretricia quaesiuisset, populum scripsit heredem certamque pecuniam reliquit, cuius ex annuo faenore suus natalis dies celebraretur editione ludorum, quos appellant Floralia.

Flora, having gained great wealth from the harlot's trade, made the people her heir and left a fixed sum of money, from the annual interest of which her birthday was to be celebrated by the presentation of games, which they call the Floralia.

1.20.7CSEL 19:73

quod quia senatui flagitiosum uidebatur, ab ipso nomine argumentum sumi placuit, ut pudendae rei quaedam dignitas adderetur. deam finxerunt esse quae floribus praesit eamque oportere placari, ut fruges cum arboribus aut uitibus bene prospereque florescerent.

Because this seemed disgraceful to the senate, they decided to take an argument from the name itself, so that some dignity might be added to a shameful thing. They invented a goddess who presides over flowers and must be appeased so that crops, trees, and vines might flower well and prosperously.

1.20.8CSEL 19:73

eum colorem secutus in Fastis poeta non ignobilem nympham fuisse narrauit quae sit Chloris uocitata eamque Zephyro nuptam quasi dotis loco id accepisse muneris a marito, ut haberet florum omnium potestatem.

Following that colouring, the poet in the Fasti related that she was a nymph of good standing called Chloris, and that, married to Zephyrus, she received from her husband as a kind of dowry the gift of power over all flowers.

1.20.9CSEL 19:73

honeste quidem ista dicuntur, sed inhoneste turpiterque creduntur nec debent, cum ueritas quaeritur, huiusmodi nos uelamenta decipere.

These things are said decently, but believed indecently and shamefully; and when the truth is sought, coverings of this kind ought not to deceive us.

1.20.10CSEL 19:73

celebrantur ergo illi ludi conuenienter memoriae meretricis cum omni lasciuia. nam praeter uerborum licentiam, quibus obscenitas omnis effunditur, exuuntur etiam uestibus populo flagitante meretrices, quae tunc mimarum funguntur officio et in conspectu populi usque ad satietatem inpudicorum luminum cum pudendis motibus detinentur.

So those games are celebrated, as befits the memory of a harlot, with every kind of lewdness. For besides the licence of words, in which all obscenity is poured out, harlots are also stripped of their clothes at the people's demand; they then play the part of mime actresses and are kept in the sight of the people, with shameful movements, until the shameless eyes are sated.

1.20.11CSEL 19:73

Cloacinae simulacrum in Cloaca Maxima repertum Tatius consecrauit et quia cuius esset effigies ignorabat, ex loco illi nomen inposuit. Pauorem Palloremque Tullus Hostilius figurauit et coluit.

Tatius consecrated a statue of Cloacina found in the Great Sewer, and because he did not know whose likeness it was, he named her after the place. Tullus Hostilius represented Fear and Pallor and worshipped them.

1.20.12CSEL 19:73

quid de hoc dicam nisi dignum fuisse qui semper deos suos, sicut optari solet, praesentes haberet? ab hoc illut Marci Marcelli de consecratione Honoris atque Virtutis honestate nominum differt, re congruit.

What shall I say of this man, except that he deserved always to have his gods present with him, as people usually pray? From him Marcus Marcellus' consecration of Honour and Virtue differs in the decency of the names, but agrees in substance.

1.20.13CSEL 19:73–74

eadem uanitate Mentem quoque inter deos senatus conlocauit, quam profecto si habuisset, eiusmodi sacra numquam suscepisset.

With the same vanity the senate placed Mind too among the gods; had it possessed a mind, it would never have taken up such rites.

1.20.14CSEL 19:74

magnum Cicero audaxque consilium suscepisse Graeciam dicit, quod Cupidinum et Amorum simulacra in gymnasiis consecrasset: adulatus est uidelicet Attico et inrisit hominem familiarem.

Cicero says that Greece adopted a great and bold plan in consecrating images of Cupids and Loves in the gymnasia: evidently he flattered Atticus and mocked his friend.

1.20.15CSEL 19:74

non enim magnum illut aut omnino consilium dicendum fuit, sed inpudicorum hominum perdita et deplorata nequitia, qui liberos suos, quos erudire ad honestatem deberent, prostituerunt libidini iuuentutis: a quibus flagitiorum deos et in illis potissimum locis, ubi nuda corpora corruptorum luminibus patent, et in illa coli aetate uoluerunt, quae simplex et inprouida prius inretiri et in laqueos potest cadere quam cauere.

For that was not to be called a great plan, or a plan at all, but the desperate and deplorable wickedness of shameless men, who prostituted their own children, whom they ought to have trained to decency, to the lust of youth. They wished gods of disgrace to be worshipped by these children, and above all in those places where naked bodies lie open to the eyes of corrupters, and at that age which, simple and unwary, can be ensnared and fall into traps before it can be on guard.

1.20.16CSEL 19:74

quid mirum si ab hac gente uniuersa flagitia manarunt, aput quam uitia ipsa religiosa sunt eaque non modo non uitantur, uerum etiam coluntur? et ideo huic sententiae, tamquam Graecos prudentia uinceret, adiecit: uirtutes enim oportere, non uitia consecrari.

What wonder if all disgraces have flowed from this nation, among whom vices themselves are sacred, and are not only not avoided but even worshipped? And so to this statement, as if he surpassed the Greeks in prudence, he added: "For virtues, not vices, ought to be consecrated."

1.20.17CSEL 19:74

quod si recipis, o Marce Tulli, non uides fore ut inrumpant uitia cum uirtutibus, quia mala bonis adhaerent, et in animis hominum potentiora sunt? quae si uetas consecrari, respondebit tibi eadem illa Graecia se alios deos colere ut prosint, alios uero ne noceant. haec enim semper excusatio est eorum qui mala sua pro diis habent, ut Romani robiginem ac febrem.

But if you accept this, Marcus Tullius, do you not see that vices will burst in along with virtues, because evils cling to goods and are more powerful in the minds of men? If you forbid them to be consecrated, that same Greece will answer you that it worships some gods to do it good and others to keep them from doing it harm. For this is always the excuse of those who treat their own evils as gods, as the Romans do Blight and Fever.

1.20.18CSEL 19:74–75

si ergo uitia consecranda non sunt, in quo tibi adsentior, ne uirtutes quidem. non enim per se sapiunt aut sentiunt neque intra parietes aut aediculas luto factas, sed intra pectus collocandae sunt et interius conprehendendae, ne sint falsae, si extra hominem fuerint collocatae.

If, then, vices are not to be consecrated, in which I agree with you, neither are virtues. For they do not have understanding or sense in themselves, nor are they to be placed within walls or little shrines made of clay, but within the breast, and to be held inwardly, lest they be false if placed outside man.

1.20.19CSEL 19:75

itaque praeclaram illam legem tuam derideo quam ponis his uerbis: ast olla, propter quae datur homini ascensus in caelum, Mentem Virtutem Pietatem Fidem: earumque laudum delubra sunto. atquin haec separari ab homine non possunt. si enim colenda sunt, in homine ipso sint necesse est.

So I laugh at that fine law of yours which you set down in these words: "But those things on account of which ascent to heaven is granted to man, Mind, Virtue, Piety, Faith: let there be shrines of these praises." Yet these cannot be separated from man. If they are to be worshipped, they must be in man himself.

1.20.20CSEL 19:75

si autem sint extra hominem, quid opus est ea colere quibus careas? uirtus enim colenda est, non imago uirtutis, et colenda est non sacrificio aliquo aut ture aut precatione sollemni, sed uoluntate sola atque proposito.

But if they are outside man, what need is there to worship things you lack? For it is virtue that must be cultivated, not the image of virtue, and it must be cultivated not by any sacrifice or incense or solemn prayer, but by will and purpose alone.

1.20.21CSEL 19:75

nam quid est aliut colere uirtutem nisi eam conprehendere animo ac tenere? quod unus quisque simulac coepit uelle, consequitur. hic solus uirtutis est cultus: nam religio ac ueneratio nulla alia nisi unius dei tenenda est.

For what else is it to cultivate virtue than to grasp it with the mind and hold it fast? And each one attains this as soon as he begins to will it. This alone is the cultivation of virtue; for no other religion and veneration is to be held but that of the one God.

1.20.22CSEL 19:75

quid igitur opus est, o uir sapientissime, superuacuis extructionibus loca occupare quae possint humanis usibus cedere? quid sacerdotes constituere uana et insensibilia culturos? quid immolare uictimas? quid tantos sumptus uel fingendis uel colendis imaginibus inpendere?

What need is there then, O wisest of men, to fill places with superfluous buildings which could yield to human uses? Why appoint priests to serve empty and senseless things? Why sacrifice victims? Why spend such great sums on making or worshipping images?

1.20.23CSEL 19:75

firmius et incorruptius templum est pectus humanum: hoc potius ornetur, hoc ueris illis numinibus inpleatur.

A firmer and more incorruptible temple is the human breast: let this rather be adorned, let this be filled with those true divinities.

1.20.24CSEL 19:75–76

has ergo falsas consecrationes sequitur quod necesse est. qui enim sic uirtutes colunt id est qui umbras et imagines uirtutum consectantur, ea ipsa quae uera sunt tenere non possunt.

What must follow, then, follows these false consecrations. For those who worship the virtues in this way, that is, who pursue the shadows and images of virtues, cannot hold the very things that are true.

1.20.25CSEL 19:76

itaque nulla in quoquam uirtus est, uitiis ubique dominantibus, nulla fides, omnia pro se quoque rapiente, nulla pietas, nec consanguineis nec parentibus parcente auaritia et cupiditate in uenena et in ferrum ruente, nulla pax, nulla concordia, publice bellis saeuientibus, priuatim uero inimicitiis usque ad sanguinem furentibus, nulla pudicitia, libidinibus effrenatis omnem sexum et omnes corporis partes contaminantibus.

So there is no virtue in anyone, vices ruling everywhere; no faith, each seizing everything for himself; no piety, avarice and greed sparing neither kin nor parents and rushing to poison and the sword; no peace, no concord, with wars raging publicly and private enmities raging even to bloodshed; no chastity, unbridled lusts defiling every sex and every part of the body.

1.20.26CSEL 19:76

nec tamen desinunt ea colere quae fugiunt et oderunt. colunt enim ture ac summis digitis quae sensibus intimis horrere debuerunt: qui error omnis ex illius principalis ac summi boni ignoratione descendit.

Yet they do not cease to worship the very things they flee and hate. For they worship with incense and with the tips of their fingers what they ought to shudder at in their inmost feelings; and all this error comes down from ignorance of that principal and supreme good.

1.20.27CSEL 19:76

urbe a Gallis occupata obsessi in Capitolio Romani cum ex mulierum capillis tormenta fecissent, aedem Veneri Caluae consecrarunt.

When the city was taken by the Gauls, the Romans besieged on the Capitol, having made engines from women's hair, dedicated a temple to Bald Venus.

1.20.28CSEL 19:76

non igitur intellegunt, quam uanae sint religiones uel ex eo ipso, quod eas his ineptiis cauillantur.

They do not understand, then, how empty their religions are, even from the very fact that they make fun of them with such absurdities.

1.20.29CSEL 19:76

a Lacedaemoniis fortasse didicerant deos sibi ex euentis fingere. qui cum Messenios obsiderent et illi furtim deceptis obsessoribus egressi ad diripiendam Lacedaemonem cucurrissent, a Spartanis mulieribus fusi fugatique sunt.

Perhaps they had learned from the Lacedaemonians to invent gods for themselves from events. When the Lacedaemonians were besieging the Messenians, and the Messenians, secretly slipping past the besiegers, had run to plunder Lacedaemon, they were routed and put to flight by the Spartan women.

1.20.30CSEL 19:76

cognitis autem dolis hostium Lacedaemonii sequebantur. his armatae mulieres obuiam longius exierunt. quae cum uiros suos cernerent parare se ad pugnam, quod putarent Messenios esse, corpora sua nudauerunt.

When the Lacedaemonians learned of the enemy's trick, they followed. The armed women went out a long way to meet them; and when they saw their husbands preparing for battle, because they thought they were Messenians, they bared their bodies.

1.20.31CSEL 19:76–77

at illi uxoribus cognitis et aspectu in libidinem concitati, sicuti erant armati permixti sunt, utique promisce —

And the men, recognizing their wives and roused to lust by the sight, lay with them armed as they were, indeed promiscuously,

1.20.32CSEL 19:77

nec enim uacabat discernere — sicut iuuenes ab isdem antea missi cum uirginibus, ex quibus sunt Partheniae nati. propter huius facti memoriam aedem Veneri Armatae simulacrumque posuerunt: quod tametsi ex causa turpi uenit, tamen honestius uidetur armatam Venerem consecrasse quam caluam.

for there was no time to tell them apart, just as the young men earlier sent by the same people had lain with the virgins, from whom the Partheniae were born. In memory of this deed they set up a temple and statue to Armed Venus; and although it came from a shameful cause, it seems more decent to have consecrated Venus armed than bald.

1.20.33CSEL 19:77

eodem tempore Ioui quoque Pistori ara posita est, quod eos in quiete monuisset, ut ex omni frumento quod habebant panem facerent et in hostium castra iactarent: eoque facto soluta esset obsidio desperantibus Gallis inopia subigi posse Romanos. quae ista religionum derisio est?

At the same time an altar was also set up to Jupiter the Baker, because he had warned them in a dream to make bread from all the grain they had and throw it into the enemy camp; and when this was done the siege was lifted, the Gauls despairing that the Romans could be subdued by want. What mockery of religions is this?

1.20.34CSEL 19:77

si earum defensor essem, quid tam grauiter queri possem quam deorum numen in tantum uenisse contemptum, ut turpissimis nominibus ludibrio habeatur?

If I were their defender, what could I complain of more seriously than that the divinity of the gods had come into such contempt that it is made a laughing-stock with the most shameful names?

1.20.35CSEL 19:77

quis non rideat Fornacem deam uel potius doctos uiros celebrandis Fornacalibus operari? quis cum audiat deam Mutam, tenere risum queat? hanc esse dicunt ex qua sint Lares nati et ipsam Laram nominant uel Larundam. quid praestare colenti potest quae loqui non potest?

Who would not laugh at the goddess Oven, or rather at learned men busying themselves with celebrating the Fornacalia? Who, hearing of the goddess Muta, can hold back laughter? They say she is the one from whom the Lares were born, and they name her Lara or Larunda. What can she offer her worshipper who cannot speak?

1.20.36CSEL 19:77–78

colitur et Caca, quae Herculi fecit indicium de furto boum, diuinitatem consecuta quia prodidit fratrem, et Cunina, quae infantes tuetur in cunis ac fascinum submouet, et Stercutus, qui stercorandi agri rationem primus induxit, et Tutinus, in cuius sinu pudendo nubentes praesident, ut illarum pudicitiam prior deus delibasse uideatur, et mille alia portenta, ut iam uaniores qui haec colenda susceperint quam Aegyptios esse dicamus, qui monstruosa et ridicula quaedam simulacra uenerantur.

Caca too is worshipped, who informed Hercules of the theft of his cattle and gained divinity because she betrayed her brother; and Cunina, who guards infants in their cradles and wards off the evil eye; and Stercutus, who first introduced the method of manuring fields; and Tutinus, on whose shameful lap brides sit, so that the god may seem to have tasted their chastity first; and a thousand other monstrosities, so that we must now say those who took up the worship of these things are more foolish than the Egyptians, who venerate certain monstrous and ridiculous images.

1.20.37CSEL 19:78

et haec tamen habent aliquam imaginem. quid qui lapidem colunt informem ac rudem cui nomen est Terminus? hic est quem pro Ioue Saturnus dicitur deuorasse nec inmerito illi honos tribuitur.

And these at least have some image. What of those who worship a shapeless rough stone called Terminus? This is the one Saturn is said to have swallowed in place of Jupiter, and not without reason is honour paid to him.

1.20.38CSEL 19:78

nam cum Tarquinius Capitolium facere uellet atque in eo loco multorum deorum sacella essent, consuluit eos per auguria utrum Ioui cederent, et cedentibus ceteris solus Terminus mansit. unde illum poeta Capitoli inmobile saxum uocat.

For when Tarquinius wished to build the Capitol and there were shrines of many gods on that site, he consulted them by augury whether they would yield to Jupiter; and when the rest yielded, Terminus alone remained. Hence the poet calls him "the immovable rock of the Capitol."

1.20.39CSEL 19:78

Iam ex hoc ipso quam magnus Iuppiter inuenitur, cui non cessit lapis, ea fortasse fiducia, quod illum de paternis faucibus liberauerat.

From this very fact it is found how great Jupiter is, to whom a stone did not yield, perhaps trusting in the fact that it had freed him from his father's jaws.

1.20.40CSEL 19:78

facto itaque Capitolio supra ipsum Terminum foramen est in tecto relictum, ut quia non cesserat, libero caelo frueretur: quo ne ipsi quidem fruebantur qui lapidem frui putauerunt..

So when the Capitol was built, an opening was left in the roof above Terminus himself, so that, because he had not yielded, he might enjoy the open sky: which those who thought a stone could enjoy it did not enjoy themselves.

1.20.41CSEL 19:78

huic ergo publice supplicatur quasi custodi finium deo, qui non tantum lapis, sed etiam stipes interdum est.

To him, then, public prayers are made as a god guarding boundaries, who is sometimes not only a stone but even a stake.

1.20.42CSEL 19:78

quid de iis dicas qui colunt talia nisi ipsos potissimum lapides ac stipites esse?

What would you say of those who worship such things, except that they themselves above all are stones and stakes?

Divine 1, chapter 21

1.21.1CSEL 19:78

Diximus de diis ipsis qui coluntur: nunc de sacris ac mysteriis eorum pauca dicenda sunt. aput Cyprios humanam hostiam Ioui Teucrus immolauit idque sacrificium posteris tradidit; quod est nuper Hadriano imperante sublatum.

We have spoken of the gods themselves who are worshipped; now a few things must be said about their rites and mysteries. Among the Cypriots Teucer sacrificed a human victim to Jupiter and handed that sacrifice down to posterity; it was abolished only recently, in the reign of Hadrian.

1.21.2CSEL 19:78–79

erat lex aput Tauros inhumanam et feram gentem, ut Dianae hospites immolarentur, et id sacrificium multis temporibus celebratum est.

There was a law among the Taurians, an inhuman and savage people, that strangers should be sacrificed to Diana, and that sacrifice was celebrated for a long time.

1.21.3CSEL 19:79

Galli Esum atque Teutaten humano cruore placabant. ne Latini quidem huius immanitatis expertes fuerunt, siquidem Latiaris Iuppiter etiamnunc sanguine colitur humano. quid ab his boni precantur qui sic sacrificant?

The Gauls appeased Esus and Teutates with human blood. Not even the Latins were free of this savagery, since Jupiter Latiaris is even now worshipped with human blood. What good do they ask from these gods, who sacrifice in this way?

1.21.4CSEL 19:79

aut quid tales dii praestare hominibus possunt, quorum poenis propitiantur? sed de barbaris non est adeo mirandum, quorum religio cum moribus congruit: nostri uero qui semper mansuetudinis et humanitatis sibi gloriam uindicauerunt, nonne sacrilegis his sacris immaniores reperiuntur?

Or what can such gods offer men, who are propitiated by men's sufferings? But with barbarians it is not so surprising, whose religion agrees with their character; but our own people, who have always claimed the glory of gentleness and humanity, are they not found more savage in these sacrilegious rites?

1.21.5CSEL 19:79

ii enim potius scelerati sunt habendi, qui cum sint liberalium disciplinarum studiis expoliti, ab humanitate desciscunt, quam qui rudes et inperiti ad mala facinora bonorum ignoratione labuntur.

For those are rather to be held wicked who, though polished by the study of liberal learning, fall away from humanity, than those who, rude and unskilled, slip into evil deeds through ignorance of good things.

1.21.6CSEL 19:79

apparet tamen antiquum esse hunc immolandorum hominum ritum, siquidem Saturnus in Latio eodem genere sacrificii cultus est, non quidem ut homo ad aram immolaretur, sed ut in Tiberim de ponte Muluio mitteretur.

It is clear, however, that this rite of sacrificing men is ancient, since Saturn was worshipped in Latium with the same kind of sacrifice, not indeed by a man being slain at the altar, but by his being thrown into the Tiber from the Mulvian bridge.

1.21.7CSEL 19:79

quod ex responso quodam factitatum Varro auctor est: cuius responsi ultimus uersus est talis: ϰαὶ ϰεϕαλὰς Ἀίδῃ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ πέμπετε φῶτα. [id est hominem] quod quia uidetur ambiguum, et fax illi et homo iaci solet.

Varro is the authority that this was done because of a certain oracle, of which the last verse is this: "And send heads to Hades, and to the father a man (phōta)." Because this seems ambiguous, both a torch and a man are usually thrown to him.

1.21.8CSEL 19:79–80

uerum id genus sacrificii ab Hercule, cum ex Hispania rediret, dicitur esse sublatum, ritu tamen permanente ut pro ueris hominibus imagines iacerentur e scirpo, ut Ouidius in Fastis docet: donec in haec uenit Tirynthius arua, quotannis tristia Leucadio sacra peracta modo. illum stramineos in aquam misisse Quirites, Herculis exemplo corpora falsa iaci.

But that kind of sacrifice is said to have been abolished by Hercules when he returned from Spain, the rite nevertheless remaining, so that images made of rushes were thrown in place of real men, as Ovid teaches in the Fasti: "Until the Tirynthian came to these fields, every year the grim rites were performed in the Leucadian manner. He threw Quirites of straw into the water; now, after Hercules' example, false bodies are thrown."

1.21.9CSEL 19:80

haec sacra Vestales uirgines faciunt, ut ait idem: tum quoque priscorum uirgo simulacra uirorum mittere roboreo scirpea ponte solet. nam de infantibus qui eidem Saturno immolabantur propter odium Iouis quid dicam non inuenio.

The Vestal virgins perform these rites, as the same poet says: "Then also the virgin is wont to throw rush likenesses of men of old from the oaken bridge." As for the infants who were sacrificed to the same Saturn out of hatred of Jupiter, I cannot find what to say.

1.21.10CSEL 19:80

tam barbaros, tam immanes fuisse homines, ut parricidium suum id est taetrum atque exsecrabile humano generi facinus sacrificium uocarent, cum teneras atque innocentes animas, quae maxime est aetas parentibus dulcior, sine ullo respectu pietatis extinguerent immanitatemque omnium bestiarum, quae tamen fetus suos amant, feritate superarent!

That men were so barbarous, so savage, as to call their own parricide, that is, a crime foul and accursed to the human race, a sacrifice, when they destroyed tender and innocent lives, at the age which is sweetest to parents, without any regard for natural affection, and surpassed in ferocity the savagery of all beasts, which at least love their young!

1.21.11CSEL 19:80

o dementiam insanabilem! quid illis isti dii facere amplius possent, si essent iratissimi, quam faciunt propitii, cum suos cultores parricidiis inquinant, orbitatibus mactant, humanis sensibus spoliant?

O incurable madness! What more could these gods do to them if they were most angry than they do when propitious, when they pollute their worshippers with parricides, strike them with childlessness, and strip them of human feeling?

1.21.12CSEL 19:80–81

quid potest esse his hominibus sancti? aut quid in profanis locis faciant qui inter aras deorum summa scelera committunt?

What can be holy to these men? Or what would they do in unconsecrated places, who commit the greatest crimes among the altars of the gods?

1.21.13CSEL 19:81

Pescennius Festus in libris historiarum per saturam refert Karthaginienses Saturno humanas hostias solitos immolare et cum uicti essent ab Agathocle rege Siculorum, iratum sibi deum putauisse; itaque ut diligentius piaculum soluerent, ducentos nobilium filios immolasse.

Pescennius Festus, in the books of his history in miscellany form, relates that the Carthaginians were accustomed to sacrifice human victims to Saturn, and that when they had been defeated by Agathocles, king of the Sicilians, they thought the god was angry with them; and so, to pay the expiation more carefully, they sacrificed two hundred sons of their nobles.

1.21.14CSEL 19:81

tantum religio potuit suadere malorum, quae peperit saepe scelerosa atque inpia facta.

"So great the evils religion could persuade," "which has often brought forth wicked and impious deeds."

1.21.15CSEL 19:81

cui ergo dementissimi homines illo sacrificio consulebant, cum tantam partem ciuitatis occiderent, quantam fortasse ne Agathocles quidem uictor occiderat?

For whom, then, were these utterly mad men providing by that sacrifice, when they killed so great a part of the city as perhaps not even Agathocles had killed as victor?

1.21.16CSEL 19:81

ab isto genere sacrorum non minoris insaniae iudicanda sunt publica illa sacra, quorum alia sunt Matris, in quibus homines suis ipsi uirilibus litant — amputato enim sexu nec uiros se nec feminas faciunt — alia Virtutis, quam eandem Bellonam uocant, in quibus ipsi sacerdotes non alieno, sed suo cruore sacrificant.

From this kind of rite, those public rites are to be judged of no less madness, some of which belong to the Mother, in which men make offering of their own genitals (for having cut off their sex they make themselves neither men nor women), others to Virtus, whom they also call Bellona, in which the priests themselves sacrifice not with another's blood but with their own.

1.21.17CSEL 19:81

sectis namque umeris et utraque manu destrictos gladios exerentes currunt ecferuntur insaniunt. optime igitur Quintilianus in Fanatico istud inquit si deus cogit, iratus est.

For having cut their shoulders and brandishing drawn swords in both hands, they run, they are carried away, they rave. Excellently, then, Quintilian says in his Fanatic: "If a god compels this, he is angry."

1.21.18CSEL 19:81

etiamne haec sacra sunt? non satius est pecudum modo uiuere quam deos tam inpios, tam profanos, tam sanguinarios colere?

Are these, too, sacred rites? Is it not better to live like cattle than to worship gods so impious, so profane, so bloodthirsty?

1.21.19CSEL 19:81

sed unde isti errores et haec tanta flagitia manauerint, suo loco disseremus. interim uideamus et cetera, quae carent scelere, ne studio insectandi uideamur eligere peiora.

But from where these errors and such great outrages have flowed we shall discuss in its place. Meanwhile let us look at the other rites too, which are free of crime, so that we may not seem, from eagerness to attack, to choose the worse.

1.21.20CSEL 19:81–82

Isidis Aegyptiae sacra sunt, quatenus filium paruulum uel perdiderit uel inuenerit. nam primo sacerdotes eius deglabrato corpore pectora sua tundunt lamentantur, sicut ipsa cum perdidit fecerat; deinde puer producitur quasi inuentus et in laetitiam luctus ille mutatur. ideo Lucanus: numquamque satis quaesitus Osiris.

The rites of Egyptian Isis concern how she lost and found her little son. For first her priests, with shaven bodies, beat their breasts and lament, as she herself had done when she lost him; then the boy is brought out as if found, and that mourning is changed into joy. Hence Lucan: "and Osiris never sought enough."

1.21.21CSEL 19:82

semper enim perdunt, semper inueniunt. refertur ergo in sacris imago rei quae uere gesta est, quae profecto si quid sapimus declarat mortalem mulierem fuisse ac paene orbam, nisi unicum repperisset. quod illum ipsum poetam minime fugit, apud quem Pompeius adulescens morte patris audita haec loquitur: euoluam busto iam numen gentibus Isim et tectum lino spargam per uulgus Osirim.

For they always lose him and always find him. So in the rites there is represented an image of something that really happened, which, if we have any sense, shows that she was a mortal woman and almost bereaved, had she not found her only son. This did not escape that very poet, in whom the young Pompey, hearing of his father's death, says: "I will turn Isis, now a deity for the nations, out of her tomb, and scatter Osiris, covered in linen, among the crowd."

1.21.22CSEL 19:82

hic est Osiris, quem Serapim [uel Serapidem] uulgus appellat. solent enim mortuis consecratis nomina immutari, credo ne quis eos putet homines fuisse.

This is the Osiris whom the common people call Serapis. For the names of the dead who are consecrated are usually changed, I suppose so that no one may think they were men.

1.21.23CSEL 19:82

nam et Romulus post mortem Quirinus factus est et Leda Nemesis et Circe Marica. et Ino postquam se praecipitauit, Leucothea materque Matuta et Melicertes filius eius Palaemon atque Portunus.

For Romulus too after death became Quirinus, Leda Nemesis, and Circe Marica; and Ino, after she threw herself into the sea, became Leucothea and Mother Matuta, and her son Melicertes Palaemon and Portunus.

1.21.24CSEL 19:82–83

sacra uero Cereris Eleusinae non sunt his dissimilia. nam sicut ibi Osiris puer planctu matris inquiritur, ita hic ad incestum patrui matrimonium rapta Proserpina: quam quia facibus ex Aetnae uertice accensis quaesisse in Sicilia Ceres dicitur, idcirco sacra eius ardentium taedarum iactatione celebrantur.

The rites of Eleusinian Ceres are not unlike these. For as there the boy Osiris is sought with his mother's wailing, so here Proserpina is carried off to an incestuous marriage with her uncle; and because Ceres is said to have sought her in Sicily with torches lit from the summit of Etna, her rites are celebrated by tossing burning torches.

1.21.25CSEL 19:83

aput Lampsacum Priapo litabilis uictima est asellus, cuius sacrificii ratio in Fastis haec redditur. cum dii omnes ad festum Matris Magnae conuenissent epulisque satiati noctem lusibus ducerent, quieuisse humi Vestam somnumque cepisse; ibi Priapum somno eius ac pudicitiae insidiatum, sed illam intempestiuo clamore aselli quo Silenus uehebatur excitatam, libidinem uero insidiatoris esse deceptam;

At Lampsacus the acceptable victim for Priapus is an ass, and the reason for this sacrifice is given thus in the Fasti: when all the gods had gathered for the feast of the Great Mother and, full from the banquet, were spending the night in games, Vesta lay down on the ground and fell asleep; there Priapus plotted against her sleep and chastity, but she was woken by the untimely braying of the ass on which Silenus rode, and the lust of the plotter was foiled;

1.21.26CSEL 19:83

hac de causa Lampsacenos asellum Priapo quasi in ultionem mactare consuesse, aput Romanos uero eundem Vestalibus sacris in honorem pudicitiae conseruatae panibus coronari.

for this reason the people of Lampsacus were accustomed to sacrifice an ass to Priapus as if in revenge, while among the Romans the same animal, in the rites of Vesta, is crowned with loaves in honour of the chastity it preserved.

1.21.27CSEL 19:83

quid turpius, quid flagitiosius, quam si Vesta beneficio asini uirgo est? at poeta fabulam finxit.

What is more shameful, more disgraceful, than that Vesta is a virgin thanks to an ass? "But the poet invented the story."

1.21.28CSEL 19:83

num ergo illut est uerius quod referunt ii qui Phaenomena conscripserunt, cum de duabus Cancri stellis locuntur quas Graeci ο̌νους uocant, asellos fuisse qui Liberum patrem transuexerint, cum amnem transire non posset, quorum alteri hoc praemium dederit, ut humana uoce loqueretur? itaque inter eum Priapumque ortum esse certamen de obsceni magnitudine: Priapum uictum et iratum interemisse uictorem.

Is that story truer, then, which is told by those who wrote the Phaenomena, when they speak of the two stars of Cancer which the Greeks call "the asses": that they were asses who carried Father Liber across when he could not cross a river, and that to one of them he gave this reward, that it should speak with a human voice? And so a contest arose between it and Priapus about the size of the obscene member, and Priapus, defeated and angry, killed the victor.

1.21.29CSEL 19:83–84

hoc uero multo magis ineptum est, sed poetis licet quidquid uelint. non excutio tam deforme mysterium nec Priapum denudo, ne quid appareat risu dignum. finxerint haec sane poetae, sed necesse est maioris alicuius turpitudinis tegendae gratia ficta sint.

This is much more absurd still, but poets may do whatever they like. I do not shake out so ugly a mystery, nor strip Priapus, lest anything worthy of laughter appear. Let the poets have invented these things, by all means; but they must have been invented to cover some greater baseness.

1.21.30CSEL 19:84

quae sit ergo quaeramus. at ea profecto manifesta est. nam sicut Lunae taurus mactatur, quia similia habet cornua, et placat equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum, ne detur celeri uictima tarda deo, ita in hoc quia magnitudo membri uirilis enormis est, non potuit ei monstro aptior uictima reperiri quam quae posset ipsum cui mactatur imitari.

Let us ask, then, what it is. And surely it is plain. For just as a bull is sacrificed to the Moon because it has similar horns, and "Persia appeases Hyperion, girt with rays, with a horse, lest a slow victim be given to the swift god," so here, because the size of the male member is enormous, no more fitting victim could be found for that monster than one that could imitate the very one to whom it is sacrificed.

1.21.31CSEL 19:84

aput Lindum, quod est oppidum Rhodi, Herculis sacra sunt, quorum a ceteris longe diuersus est ritus, siquidem non εὺϕημία̣ ut Graeci appellant, sed maledictis et execratione celebrantur, eaque pro uiolatis habent, si quando inter sollemnes ritus uel inprudenti alicui exciderit bonum uerbum.

At Lindus, a town of Rhodes, there are rites of Hercules whose ritual is very different from the others, since they are celebrated not with "euphēmia," as the Greeks call it, but with curses and execration; and they consider them violated if at any time during the solemn rites a good word has escaped anyone, even unintentionally.

1.21.32CSEL 19:84

cuius rei haec ratio redditur, si tamen ulla esse ratio in rebus uanissimis potest.

This reason is given for it, if there can be any reason in things so utterly empty.

1.21.33CSEL 19:84

Hercules eo cum delatus esset famemque pateretur, aratorem quendam conspexit operantem ab eoque petere coepit, ut sibi unum bouem uenderet. enimuero ille negauit fieri posse, quod spes sua omnis colendae terrae duobus illis iuuencis niteretur.

When Hercules had been carried there and was suffering from hunger, he saw a ploughman at work and began to ask him to sell him one ox. The man said it could not be done, because all his hope of tilling the land rested on those two bullocks.

1.21.34CSEL 19:84

Hercules solita uiolentia usus, quia unum accipere non potuit, utrumque sustulit. at ille infelix cum boues suos mactari uideret, iniuriam suam maledictis ultus est, quod homini eleganti et urbano gratissimum fuit.

Hercules, using his usual violence, since he could not get one, took both. And the unhappy man, when he saw his oxen being slaughtered, avenged his wrong with curses, which was most pleasing to that elegant and witty man.

1.21.35CSEL 19:84–85

nam dum comitibus suis epulas apparat dumque alienos boues deuorat, illum sibi amarissime conuiciantem cum risu et cachinnis audiebat.

For while he prepared a feast for his companions and devoured another man's oxen, he listened with laughter and guffaws to the man abusing him most bitterly.

1.21.36CSEL 19:85

sed postquam Herculi diuinos honores ob admirationem uirtutis deferri placuit, a ciuibus ara ei posita est, quam de facto βούζυγον nominauit, ad quam duo iuncti boues immolarentur sicut illi quos abstulerat aratori, eumque ipsum sibi constituit sacerdotem ac praecepit, ut isdem maledictis semper in celebrandis sacrificiis uteretur, quod negaret se umquam epulatum esse iucundius.

But after it was decided to give Hercules divine honours out of admiration for his virtue, the citizens set up an altar to him, which from the deed he named "Bouzygos" (the ox-yoke), at which two yoked oxen should be sacrificed, like those he had taken from the ploughman; and he appointed that very man as his priest and commanded him always to use the same curses in celebrating the sacrifices, because he said he had never feasted more pleasantly.

1.21.37CSEL 19:85

haec iam non sacra sunt, sed sacrilegia, in quibus id sanctum ducitur, quod in aliis si fiat, etiam seuerissime uindicatur.

These are no longer rites but sacrileges, in which what is counted holy would be punished most severely if it were done in other rites.

1.21.38CSEL 19:85

ipsius autem Cretici Iouis sacra quid aliut quam quomodo sit aut subtractus patri aut nutritus ostendunt? capella est Amaltheae nymphae; quae uberibus suis aluit infantem: de qua Germanicus Caesar in Arateo carmine sic ait: illa putatur nutrix esse Iouis, si uere Iuppiter infans ubera Cretaeae mulsit fidissima caprae, sidere quae claro gratum testatur alumnum.

And the rites of Cretan Jupiter himself, what do they show but how he was stolen away from his father or how he was nursed? There is the she-goat of the nymph Amalthea, which fed the infant at her udders; of which Germanicus Caesar says in his poem on Aratus: "She is thought to be the nurse of Jupiter; if truly the infant Jupiter sucked the udders of the most faithful Cretan goat, who by her bright star bears witness to her grateful nursling."

1.21.39CSEL 19:85–86

huius capellae corio usum esse pro scuto Iouem contra Titanas dimicantem Musaeus auctor est, unde a poetis αὶγίοχος nominatur. ita quidquid est gestum in abscondendo puero, id ipsum per imaginem geritur in sacris.

Musaeus is the authority that Jupiter used the hide of this goat as a shield when fighting the Titans, from which the poets call him "aigiochos" (aegis-bearing). So whatever was done in hiding the boy is itself performed in image in the rites.

1.21.40CSEL 19:86

sed et matris eius mysterium idem continet; quod Ouidius exponit in Fastis: ardua iam dudum resonat tinnitibus Ide, tutus ut infanti uagiat ore puer. pars clipeos sudibus, galeas pars tundit inanes, hoc Curetes habent, hoc Corybantes opus. res latuit priscique manent imitamina facti, aera deae comites raucaque terga mouent. cymbala pro galeis, pro scutis tympana pulsant, tibia dat Phrygios ut dedit ante modos.

And the mystery of his mother contains the same thing, which Ovid explains in the Fasti: "Lofty Ida has long been ringing with clashing, so that the boy may wail safely with his infant mouth. Some beat shields with staves, some empty helmets: this is the Curetes' work, this the Corybantes'. The thing was hidden, and imitations of the ancient deed remain: the goddess's companions shake bronzes and hoarse hides. They beat cymbals for helmets, drums for shields; the flute gives Phrygian measures, as it gave before."

1.21.41CSEL 19:86

hanc totam opinionem quasi a poetis fictam Sallustius respuit uoluitque ingeniose interpretari, cur altores Iouis dicantur fuisse Curetes, et sic ait, quia principes diuini intellegendi fuerunt, uetustatem ut cetera in maius componentem altores Iouis celebrauisse.

Sallust rejects this whole opinion as invented by the poets and wished to explain ingeniously why the Curetes are said to have been the nurturers of Jupiter; and he says this: because they were the first to understand the divine, antiquity, magnifying things as it does everything else, celebrated them as nurturers of Jupiter.

1.21.42CSEL 19:86

quantum errauerit homo eruditus, iam res ipsa declarat. si enim princeps est Iuppiter et deorum et religionum, si ante illum nulli dii uulgo colebantur, quia nondum nati fuerant qui coluntur, apparet Curetas ex diuerso principes fuisse diuini non intellegendi, per quos error omnis inductus est et dei ueri memoria sublata.

How far the learned man went astray the fact itself now shows. For if Jupiter is the first of both gods and religions, if before him no gods were commonly worshipped because those who are worshipped had not yet been born, it is clear that the Curetes were, on the contrary, the first not to understand the divine: through them all error was brought in and the memory of the true God taken away.

1.21.43CSEL 19:86

ex ipsis itaque mysteriis et caerimoniis intellegere debuerunt hominibus se mortuis supplicare.

From these very mysteries and ceremonies, then, they ought to have understood that they were praying to dead men.

1.21.44CSEL 19:86–87

non igitur exigo, ut aliquis poetarum fictionibus credat: qui hos mentiri putat, pontificum ipsorum scripta consideret et quidquid est litterarum ad sacra pertinentium reuoluat: plura fortasse quam nos adferimus inueniet, ex quibus intellegat inania inepta commenticia esse omnia quae pro sanctis habentur.

I do not require, then, that anyone should believe the fictions of the poets. Whoever thinks they lie, let him consider the writings of the pontiffs themselves and turn over whatever literature concerns the sacred rites. He will perhaps find more than we bring forward, from which he may understand that all that is held sacred is empty, foolish, and invented.

1.21.45CSEL 19:87

si quis autem percepta sapientia deposuerit errorem, profecto ridebit ineptias hominum paene dementium, illos dico qui uel inhonesto saltatu tripudiant uel qui nudi uncti coronati aut personati aut luto obliti currunt. quid de scutis uetustate iam putribus dicam?

But whoever has laid aside error on receiving wisdom will surely laugh at the follies of men who are nearly mad: I mean those who either leap in an indecent dance, or who run naked, anointed, garlanded, or masked, or smeared with mud. What shall I say of the shields now rotten with age?

1.21.46CSEL 19:87

quae cum portant, deos ipsos se gestare umeris arbitrantur.

When they carry them, they think they are bearing the gods themselves on their shoulders.

1.21.47CSEL 19:87

nam Furius Bibaculus inter praecipua pietatis exempla numeratur: qui cum praetor esset, tamen lictoribus praeeuntibus ancile portauit, cum haberet magistratus beneficio muneris eius uacationem.

For Furius Bibaculus is counted among the chief examples of piety, who, though he was praetor, still carried a sacred shield with his lictors going before him, though by the privilege of his office he was exempt from that duty.

1.21.48CSEL 19:87

non ergo ille Furius, sed plane furiosus fuit, qui praeturam hoc ministerio se putauit ornare. merito igitur, cum haec a uiris non inperitis ac rudibus fiant, Lucretius exclamat: o stultas hominum mentes, o pectora caeca! qualibus in tenebris uitae quantisque periclis degitur hoc aeui quodcumque est!

He was not Furius, then, but plainly furious, who thought he adorned his praetorship with this service. Rightly, then, since these things are done by men not unskilled and rude, Lucretius exclaims: "O foolish minds of men, O blind hearts! In what darkness of life and in how great dangers this little span of time is spent!"

1.21.49CSEL 19:87–88

quis haec ludibria non rideat qui habeat aliquid sanitatis, cum uideat homines uelut mente captos ea serio facere, quae si quis faciat in lusum nimis lasciuus et ineptus esse uideatur?

Who that has any sanity would not laugh at these mockeries, when he sees men, as if out of their minds, doing seriously what, if anyone did it in play, he would seem too wanton and foolish?

Divine 1, chapter 22

1.22.1CSEL 19:88

Harum uanitatum aput Romanos auctor et constitutor Sabinus ille rex fuit, qui maxime animos hominum rudes atque inperitos nouis superstitionibus implicauit: quod ut faceret aliqua cum auctoritate, simulauit cum dea Egeria nocturnos se habere congressus.

The author and founder of these vanities among the Romans was that Sabine king who above all entangled the rude and ignorant minds of men in new superstitions; and to do this with some authority, he pretended that he held nightly meetings with the goddess Egeria.

1.22.2CSEL 19:88

erat spelunca quaedam peropaca in nemore Aricino, unde riuus perenni fonte manabat. huc se remotis arbitris inferre consueuerat, ut mentiri posset monitu deae coniugis ea sacra populo se tradere, quae acceptissima diis essent.

There was a very dark cave in the grove of Aricia, from which a stream flowed from a perpetual spring. He used to go in there with witnesses sent away, so that he could lie that, at the prompting of the goddess his wife, he was handing on to the people the rites most acceptable to the gods.

1.22.3CSEL 19:88

uidelicet astutiam Minois uoluit imitari, qui se in antrum Iouis recondebat et ibi diu moratus leges tamquam sibi a Ioue traditas adferebat, ut homines ad parendum non modo imperio, sed etiam religione constringeret.

Evidently he wished to imitate the cunning of Minos, who used to hide himself in the cave of Jupiter and, after staying there a long time, brought laws as if handed to him by Jupiter, so as to bind men to obey not only by command but also by religion.

1.22.4CSEL 19:88

nec difficile sane fuit persuadere pastoribus. itaque pontifices flamines Salios augures creauit, deos per familias discripsit: sic noui populi feroces animos mitigauit et ad studia pacis a rebus bellicis auocauit.

Nor was it difficult to persuade shepherds. So he created pontiffs, flamens, Salii, and augurs, and distributed the gods among families. Thus he softened the fierce spirits of a new people and called them away from war to the pursuits of peace.

1.22.5CSEL 19:88–89

sed cum alios falleret, se ipsum tamen non fefellit. nam post annos plurimos Cornelio et Baebio consulibus in agro scribae Petili sub Ianiculo arcae duae lapideae sunt repertae a fossoribus, quarum in altera corpus Numae fuit, in altera septem Latini libri de iure pontificio, item Graeci totidem de disciplina sapientiae scripti, quibus religiones non eas modo quas ipse instituerat, sed omnes praeterea dissoluit. qua re ad senatum delata decretum est, ut hi libri abolerentur.

But though he deceived others, he did not deceive himself. For many years later, in the consulship of Cornelius and Baebius, two stone chests were found by diggers in the field of the scribe Petilius below the Janiculum. In one was the body of Numa, in the other seven Latin books on pontifical law and the same number of Greek books on the discipline of wisdom, in which he dissolved not only the religions he himself had instituted but all others besides. When this was reported to the senate, it was decreed that these books be destroyed.

1.22.6CSEL 19:89

ita eos Quintus Petilius praetor urbanus in contione populi concremauit.

So Quintus Petilius, the city praetor, burned them in an assembly of the people.

1.22.7CSEL 19:89

insipienter id quidem: quid enim profuit libros esse combustos, cum hoc ipsum, quod sunt ideo combusti, quia religionibus derogabant, memoriae sit traditum?

Foolishly, indeed: for what good was it that the books were burned, when this very fact, that they were burned because they disparaged the religions, has been handed down to memory?

1.22.8CSEL 19:89

nemo ergo tunc in senatu non stultissimus: potuerunt enim et libri aboleri et tamen res in memoriam non exire. ita dum uolunt etiam posteris adprobare quanta pietate defenderint religiones, auctoritatem religionum ipsarum testando minuerunt.

Everyone in the senate then was most foolish: for the books could have been destroyed and yet the matter not have passed into memory. So while they wished to prove to posterity too with what piety they had defended religion, they diminished the authority of religion itself by their testimony.

1.22.9CSEL 19:89

sed ut Pompilius aput Romanos institutor ineptarum religionum fuit, sic ante Pompilium Faunus in Latio, qui et Saturno auo nefaria sacra constituit et Picum patrem inter deos honorauit et sororem suam Fentam Faunam eandemque coniugem consecrauit; quam Gauius Bassus tradit Fatuam nominatam, quod mulieribus fata canere consuesset ut Faunus uiris.

But as Pompilius was the founder of foolish religions among the Romans, so before Pompilius was Faunus in Latium, who established impious rites for his grandfather Saturn, honoured his father Picus among the gods, and consecrated his sister Fenta Fauna, who was also his wife; Gavius Bassus reports that she was named Fatua because she used to foretell fates to women, as Faunus did to men.

1.22.10CSEL 19:89

eandem Varro scribit tantae pudicitiae fuisse, ut nemo illam quoad uixerit praeter suum uirum mas uiderit nec nomen eius audierit.

Varro writes that she was of such modesty that no male but her husband saw her as long as she lived, or heard her name.

1.22.11CSEL 19:89–90

idcirco illi mulieres in operto sacrificant et Bonam Deam nominant. et Sextus Clodius in eo libro quem Graece scripsit, refert Fauni hanc uxorem fuisse; quae quia contra morem decusque regium clam uini ollam ebiberat et ebria facta erat, uirgis myrteis a uiro ad mortem usque caesam; postea uero cum eum facti sui paeniteret ac desiderium eius ferre non posset, diuinum illi honorem detulisse; idcirco in sacris eius obuolutam uini amphoram poni.

For this reason women sacrifice to her in secret and name her the Good Goddess. And Sextus Clodius, in the book he wrote in Greek, relates that she was the wife of Faunus; and because, against custom and royal decency, she had secretly drunk a jar of wine and become drunk, she was beaten to death by her husband with myrtle rods; but afterwards, when he regretted his deed and could not bear his longing for her, he conferred divine honour on her; and that is why in her rites a covered jar of wine is set out.

1.22.12CSEL 19:90

reliquit ergo posteris Faunus quoque non parum erroris, quem tamen prudentes quique perspiciunt.

Faunus too, then, left posterity no small amount of error, which, however, all prudent people see through.

1.22.13CSEL 19:90

nam Lucilius eorum stultitiam, qui simulacra deos putant esse, deridet his uersibus: terriculas Lamias, Fauni quas Pompiliique instituere Numae, tremit has, hic omnia ponit. ut pueri infantes credunt signa omnia aena uiuere et esse homines, sic isti omnia ficta uera putant, credunt signis cor inesse in aenis. pergula pictorum, ueri nihil, omnia ficta!

For Lucilius mocks the folly of those who think images are gods in these verses: "The bogey Lamias, which the Fauni and Numa Pompilius set up, he trembles at these, he rests everything on them. As infant children believe all bronze statues live and are men, so these think all fictions true; they believe a heart is in the bronze statues. A painters' gallery, nothing true, all fiction!"

1.22.14CSEL 19:90

poeta quidem stultos homines infantibus conparauit, at ego multo inprudentiores esse dico. illi enim simulacra homines putant esse, hi deos; illos aetas facit putare quod non est, hos stultitia; illi utique breui desinent falli, horum uanitas et durat.

The poet compared foolish men to infants; but I say they are much more senseless. For the children think the images are men, these think they are gods; age makes the children think what is not, folly makes these; the children will certainly soon cease to be deceived, while the vanity of these both lasts

1.22.15CSEL 19:90

semper et crescit. sacra Liberi patris primus Orpheus induxit in Graecia primusque celebrauit in monte Boeotiae Thebis ubi Liber natus est proximo; qui cum frequenter citharae cantu personaret, Cithaeron appellatus est.

forever and grows. Orpheus first introduced the rites of Father Liber into Greece and first celebrated them on a mountain of Boeotia very near Thebes, where Liber was born; and because it often resounded with the song of his lyre, it was called Cithaeron.

1.22.16CSEL 19:90–91

ea sacra etiamnunc Orphica nominantur, in quibus ipse postea dilaceratus et carptus est; et fuit per eadem fere tempora quibus Faunus.

Those rites are still called Orphic, in which he himself was afterwards torn apart and plucked to pieces; and he lived at about the same time as Faunus.

1.22.17CSEL 19:91

sed quis aetate praecesserit dubitari potest, siquidem per eosdem annos Latinus Priamusque regnarunt, item patres eorum Faunus et Laomedon, quo regnante Orpheus cum Argonautis ad Iliensium litus accessit.

But which preceded in age may be doubted, since Latinus and Priam reigned in the same years, and likewise their fathers Faunus and Laomedon, in whose reign Orpheus came with the Argonauts to the shore of Ilium.

1.22.18CSEL 19:91

procedamus igitur ulterius et quaeramus, quis omnino colendorum deorum primus auctor extiterit.

Let us go further, then, and ask who at all was the first author of worshipping gods.

1.22.19CSEL 19:91

Didymus in libris ἐξηγήσεως Πινδαριϰη̆ς ait Melissea Cretensium regem primum diis sacrificasse ac ritus nouos sacrorumque pompas introduxisse; huius duas fuisse filias, Amaltheam et Melissam, quae Iouem puerum caprino lacte ac melle nutrierint —

Didymus, in his books of Commentary on Pindar, says that Melisseus, king of the Cretans, was the first to sacrifice to the gods and introduced new rites and processions of sacred things; that he had two daughters, Amalthea and Melissa, who fed the boy Jupiter with goat's milk and honey

1.22.20CSEL 19:91

unde poetica illa fabula originem sumpsit apes aduolasse atque os pueri melle complesse —; Melissam uero a patre primam sacerdotem Matri Magnae constitutam, unde adhuc eiusdem Matris antistites Melissae nuncupentur.

(from which that poetic tale took its origin, that bees flew to the boy and filled his mouth with honey); and that Melissa was appointed by her father as the first priestess of the Great Mother, from which the priestesses of that same Mother are still called Melissae.

1.22.21CSEL 19:91

Historia uero Sacra testatur ipsum Iouem postquam rerum potitus sit, in tantam uenisse insolentiam, ut ipse sibi fana in multis locis constituerit.

But the Sacred History testifies that Jupiter himself, after he gained power, came to such insolence that he set up shrines to himself in many places.

1.22.22CSEL 19:91

nam cum terras circumiret, ut in quamque regionem uenerat, reges principesue populorum hospitio sibi et amicitia copulabat et cum a quoque digrederetur, iubebat sibi fanum creari hospitis sui nomine, quasi ut posset amicitiae ac foederis memoria conseruari.

For as he went around the lands, whenever he came into any region he joined the kings or leaders of the peoples to himself by hospitality and friendship; and when he departed from each, he ordered a shrine to be made to himself in his host's name, as if so that the memory of their friendship and alliance might be preserved.

1.22.23CSEL 19:91–92

sic constituta sunt templa Ioui Ataburio, Ioui Labryandio: Ataburus enim et Labryandus hospites eius atque adiutores in bello fuerunt; item Ioui Laprio, Ioui Molioni, Ioui Casio et quae sunt in eundem modum. quod ille astutissime excogitauit, ut et sibi honorem diuinum et hospitibus suis perpetuum nomen adquireret cum religione coniunctum.

So temples were established to Jupiter Atabyrius and Jupiter Labryandius, for Atabyrus and Labryandus were his hosts and helpers in war; likewise to Jupiter Laprius, Jupiter Molion, Jupiter Casius, and others of the same kind. He devised this most cunningly, so as to gain divine honour for himself and a perpetual name, joined with religion, for his hosts.

1.22.24CSEL 19:92

gaudebant ergo illi et huic imperio eius libenter obsequebantur et nominis sui gratia ritus annuos et festa celebrabant.

So they were glad and willingly obeyed this command of his, and for the sake of their own name they celebrated yearly rites and festivals.

1.22.25CSEL 19:92

simile quiddam in Sicilia fecit Aeneas, cum conditae urbi Acestae hospitis nomen inposuit, ut eam postmodum laetus ac libens Acestes diligeret augeret ornaret.

Aeneas did something similar in Sicily, when he gave the city he founded the name of his host Acestes, so that Acestes might afterwards gladly and willingly love, enlarge, and adorn it.

1.22.26CSEL 19:92

hoc modo religionem cultus sui per orbem terrae Iuppiter seminauit et exemplum ceteris ad imitandum dedit.

In this way Jupiter sowed the religion of his own worship throughout the world and gave the others an example to imitate.

1.22.27CSEL 19:92

siue igitur a Melisseo, sicut Didymus tradidit, colendorum deorum ritus effluxit siue ab ipso Ioue, ut Euhemerus, de tempore tamen constat quando dii coli coeperint.

So whether the rite of worshipping gods flowed from Melisseus, as Didymus reported, or from Jupiter himself, as Euhemerus says, it is at any rate agreed at what time gods began to be worshipped.

1.22.28CSEL 19:92

Melisseus quidem multum antecessit aetate, quippe qui educauerit Iouem pro nepote. et idcirco fieri potest ut uel ante uel adhuc puero Ioue deos colere instituerit id est alumni sui matrem (Opem) et auiam Tellurem, quae fuit Urani coniunx, patremque Saturnum et ipse hoc exemplo atque instituto Iouem ad tantam superbiam prouexerit, ut postea sibi diuinos honores auderet assumere.

Melisseus indeed was much earlier in age, since he reared Jupiter as a grandson. So it can be that, either before Jupiter or while he was still a boy, he instituted the worship of gods, that is, of his foster child's mother Ops, his grandmother Tellus, who was the wife of Uranus, and his father Saturn; and by this example and institution he himself led Jupiter to such pride that he afterwards dared to take divine honours for himself.

Divine 1, chapter 23

1.23.1CSEL 19:92–93

Nunc, quoniam uanarum superstitionum originem deprehendimus, superest ut etiam tempora colligamus, per quae fuerint illi quorum memoria colitur.

Now, since we have found the origin of vain superstitions, it remains for us also to gather the times in which those lived whose memory is worshipped.

1.23.2CSEL 19:93

Theophilus in libro de temporibus ad Autolycum scripto ait in historia sua Thallum dicere quod Belus, quem Babylonii et Assyrii colunt, antiquior Troiano bello fuisse inueniatur annis trecentis uiginti duobus, Belum autem Saturni aequalem fuisse et utrumque uno tempore adoleuisse. quod adeo uerum est, ut ratione ipsa colligi possit.

Theophilus, in the book On the Times written to Autolycus, says that Thallus says in his history that Belus, whom the Babylonians and Assyrians worship, is found to have been three hundred and twenty-two years older than the Trojan War, and that Belus was a contemporary of Saturn and both grew up at the same time. This is so true that it can be gathered by reason itself.

1.23.3CSEL 19:93

nam et Agamemnon, qui gessit Troicum bellum, Iouis abnepos fuit et Achilles Aiaxque pronepotes, et Ulixes eodem gradu proximus, Priamus quidem longa serie.... sed auctores quidam tradunt Dardanum et Iasium Corythi filios fuisse, non Iouis: nec enim si ita fuisset, ad usus inpudicos Ganymeden pronepotem suum habere potuisset.

For Agamemnon, who waged the Trojan War, was the great-great-grandson of Jupiter, and Achilles and Ajax his great-grandsons, and Ulysses next in the same degree, Priam indeed by a long line.... But some authors report that Dardanus and Iasius were sons of Corythus, not of Jupiter; for if it had been so, he could not have had his own great-grandson Ganymede for shameful uses.

1.23.4CSEL 19:93

itaque parentibus illorum quos supra nominaui si congruentes annos diuidas, numerus consentiet. ab excidio autem Troianae urbis colliguntur anni mille quadringenti septuaginta.

So if you assign fitting years to the parents of those I named above, the number will agree. And from the destruction of the city of Troy one thousand four hundred and seventy years are counted.

1.23.5CSEL 19:93–94

ex hac temporum ratione manifestum est ante annos non amplius quam mille octingentos natum esse Saturnum, qui sator omnium deorum fuit. non ergo isti glorientur sacrorum uetustate, quorum et origo et ratio et tempora deprehensa sunt.

From this reckoning of times it is clear that Saturn, who was the sower of all the gods, was born not more than eighteen hundred years ago. So let them not boast of the antiquity of their rites, whose origin, reason, and times have been discovered.

1.23.6CSEL 19:94

Restant adhuc aliqua quae ad coarguendas religiones falsas plurimum ualeant, sed iam finem libro facere decreui, ne modum excedat.

Some things still remain that would be very effective for refuting false religions, but I have now decided to end the book, lest it exceed due measure.

1.23.7CSEL 19:94

ea enim plenius sunt exequenda, ut omnibus refutatis quae ueritati uidentur obstare homines qui bonorum ignorantia uagantur incerti ad religionem ueram possimus inbuere.

For these things must be pursued more fully, so that, having refuted everything that seems to stand in the way of truth, we may be able to instruct in true religion men who wander uncertain through ignorance of good things.

1.23.8CSEL 19:94

primus autem sapientiae gradus est falsa intellegere, secundus uera cognoscere. ergo aput quem prima haec

The first step of wisdom is to understand what is false, the second to know what is true. So anyone with whom this first

1.23.9CSEL 19:94–95

institutio nostra profecerit, qua falsa deteximus, excitabitur ad ueri cognitionem, qua nulla est homini iucundior uoluptas, et erit iam caelestis disciplinae sapientia dignus, qui ad cognoscenda cetera libens ac paratus accesserit.

instruction of ours has made progress, in which we have uncovered what is false, will be stirred to the knowledge of the truth, than which no pleasure is sweeter to man; and he will now be worthy of the wisdom of the heavenly teaching who comes willingly and ready to learn the rest.

Divine 2, chapter 1

2.1.1CSEL 19:95

Quamquam primo libro religiones deorum falsas esse monstrauerim, quod ii quorum uarios dissimilesque cultus per uniuersam terram consensus hominum stulta persuasione suscepit, mortales fuerint functique uita diuinae necessitati morte concesserint, tamen ne qua dubitatio relinquatur, hic secundus liber fontem ipsum patefaciet errorum causasque omnes explicabit, quibus decepti homines et primitus deos esse crediderint et postmodum persuasione inueterata in susceptis prauissime religionibus perseuerauerint.

Although in the first book I have shown that the religions of the gods are false, because those whose various and unlike cults the consent of men has taken up throughout the whole earth by foolish persuasion were mortal and, having finished their lives, yielded to the divine necessity by death, yet so that no doubt may remain, this second book will lay open the very fountain of errors and explain all the causes by which men were deceived, both at first believing that there are gods and afterwards, by inveterate persuasion, persisting in religions most wrongly adopted.

2.1.2CSEL 19:95

gestio enim conuictis inanus et hominum inpia uanitate detecta singularis dei adserere maiestatem, suscipiens utilius et maius officium reuocandi homines a prauis itineribus et in gratiam secum ipsos reducendi, ne se, ut quidam philosophi faciunt, tanto opere despiciant neue se infirmos et superuacuos et nihili et frustra omnino natos putent, quae opinio plerosque ad uitia compellit.

For I am eager, once these empty things are refuted and men's impious vanity exposed, to assert the majesty of the one God, undertaking the more useful and greater task of calling men back from crooked ways and reconciling them with themselves, so that they may not, as certain philosophers do, despise themselves so greatly, nor think themselves weak, superfluous, worthless, and born entirely in vain; for that opinion drives most people to vice.

2.1.3CSEL 19:95

nam dum existimant nulli deo esse nos curae aut post mortem nihil futuros, totos se libidinibus addicunt et dum licere sibi putant, hauriendis uoluptatibus sitienter incumbunt, per quas inprudentes in laqueos mortis incurrant.

For while they suppose that we are of concern to no god, or that after death we shall be nothing, they give themselves wholly to lusts and, thinking it permitted to them, apply themselves thirstily to draining pleasures, through which they run unawares into the snares of death.

2.1.4CSEL 19:95–96

ignorant enim quae sit hominis ratio: quam si tenere uellent, in primis dominum suum agnoscerent, uirtutem iustitiamque sequerentur, terrenis figmentis animas suas non substernerent, mortiferas libidinum suauitates non adpeterent, denique se ipsos magni aestimarent atque intellegerent plus esse in homine quam uidetur: cuius uim condicionemque non aliter posse retineri, nisi cultum ueri parentis sui deposita prauitate susceperint.

For they do not know what the purpose of man is. If they wished to hold it, they would first acknowledge their Lord, follow virtue and justice, not subject their souls to earthly images, not seek the deadly sweetness of lusts; in short, they would value themselves highly and understand that there is more in man than appears, whose power and condition cannot be kept unless, putting away perversity, they take up the worship of their true Father.

2.1.5CSEL 19:96

equidem sicut oportet de summa rerum saepenumero cogitans admirari soleo, maiestatem dei singularis quae continet regitque omnia in tantam uenisse obliuionem, ut quae sola debeat coli, sola potissimum neclegatur, homines autem ipsos ad tantam caecitatem esse deductos, ut uero ac uiuo deo mortuos praeferant, terrenos autem sepultosque in terra ei qui fundator ipsius terrae fuit.

For my part, as I often reflect, as one should, on the whole of things, I am accustomed to wonder that the majesty of the one God, which holds together and rules all things, has come into such oblivion that what alone ought to be worshipped is above all alone neglected, and that men themselves have been led into such blindness that they prefer the dead to the true and living God, and earthly beings buried in the earth to him who was the founder of the earth itself.

2.1.6CSEL 19:96

et tamen huic inpietati hominum posset uenia concedi, si omnino ab ignorantia diuini nominis ueniret hic error. cum uero ipsos deorum cultores saepe uideamus deum summum et confiteri et praedicare, quam sibi ueniam sperare possint inpietatis suae qui non adgnoscunt cultum eius, quem prorsus ignorari ab homine fas non est?

And yet pardon could be granted to this impiety of men if this error came wholly from ignorance of the divine name. But since we often see the very worshippers of the gods both confessing and proclaiming the supreme God, what pardon can they hope for their impiety who do not acknowledge the worship of him whom it is not right for man to be wholly ignorant of?

2.1.7CSEL 19:96

nam et cum iurant et cum optant et cum gratias agunt, non Iouem aut deos multos, sed deum nominant: adeo ueritas ipsa cogente natura etiam ab inuitis pectoribus erumpit.

For when they swear, when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not Jupiter or many gods but God: so truly does the truth itself, under nature's compulsion, burst out even from unwilling hearts.

2.1.8CSEL 19:96–97

quod quidem non faciunt in prosperis rebus. nam tum maxime deus ex memoria hominum elabitur, cum beneficiis eius fruentes honorem dare diuinae indulgentiae debent.

They do not do this in prosperity, however. For then above all God slips from the memory of men, when, enjoying his benefits, they ought to give honour to the divine kindness.

2.1.9CSEL 19:97

at uero si qua necessitas grauis presserit, tunc deum recordantur: si belli terror infremuit, si morborum pestifera uis incubuit, si alimenta frugibus longa siccitas denegauit, si saeua tempestas, si grando ingruit, ad deum confugitur, a deo petitur auxilium, deus ut subueniat oratur.

But if some heavy necessity presses them, then they remember God. If the terror of war has roared, if the deadly force of disease has settled on them, if long drought has denied food from the crops, if a savage storm or hail has fallen, they flee to God, help is sought from God, God is prayed to come to their aid.

2.1.10CSEL 19:97

si quis in mari uento saeuiente iactatur, hunc inuocat, si quis aliqua ui adflictatur, hunc potius inplorat, si quis ad extremam mendicandi necessitatem deductus uictum precibus exposcit, deum solum obtestatur, per eius diuinum atque unicum nomen hominum sibi misericordiam quaerit.

If anyone is tossed at sea in a raging wind, it is he whom he invokes; if anyone is afflicted by some violence, it is he rather whom he implores; if anyone, brought to the last necessity of begging, asks for food by prayers, he calls on God alone and seeks men's pity for himself by his divine and unique name.

2.1.11CSEL 19:97

numquam igitur dei meminerunt, nisi dum in malis sunt: postquam metus deseruit et pericula recesserunt, tum uero alacres ad deorum templa concurrunt, his libant, his sacrificant, hos coronant.

So they never remember God except while they are in trouble. After fear has left them and dangers have receded, then they eagerly run together to the temples of the gods; to these they pour libations, to these they sacrifice, these they crown with garlands.

2.1.12CSEL 19:97

deo autem quem in ipsa necessitate implorauerant, ne uerbo quidem gratias agunt. adeo ex rerum prosperitate luxuria, ex luxuria uero ut uitia omnia sic inpietas aduersus deum nascitur.

But to God, whom they had implored in their very need, they do not give thanks even with a word. So true is it that from prosperity comes luxury, and from luxury, as every vice, so impiety toward God is born.

2.1.13CSEL 19:97

quanam istut ex causa fieri putemus nisi esse aliquam peruersam potestatem, quae ueritati sit semper inimica, quae humanis erroribus gaudeat, cui unum ac perpetuum sit opus offundere tenebras et hominum caecare mentes, ne lucem uideant, ne denique in caelum aspiciant ac naturam corporis sui seruent?

For what cause are we to think this happens, except that there is some perverse power, always hostile to the truth, which rejoices in human errors, whose one and perpetual work is to pour out darkness and blind the minds of men, so that they may not see the light, nor, in short, look up to heaven and keep the nature of their own bodies?

2.1.14CSEL 19:97–98

nam cum ceterae animantes pronis corporibus in humum spectent, quia rationem ac sapientiam non acceperunt, nobis autem status rectus, sublimis uultus ab artifice deo datus sit, apparet istas religiones deorum non esse rationis humanae, quia curuant caeleste animal ad ueneranda terrena.

For while the other living creatures look to the ground with bodies bent down, because they have not received reason and wisdom, while to us an upright posture and a lofty face have been given by God the Maker, it is clear that these religions of the gods are not of human reason, because they bend a heavenly creature down to venerate earthly things.

2.1.15CSEL 19:98

parens enim noster ille unus et solus cum fingeret hominem id est animal intellegens et rationis capax, eum uero ex humo subleuatum ad contemplationem sui artificis erexit. quod optime ingeniosus poeta signauit: pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, os homini sublime dedit caelumque uidere iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere uultus.

For that one and only Parent of ours, when he formed man, that is, a creature intelligent and capable of reason, raised him from the ground and set him upright to contemplate his Maker. This the ingenious poet expressed excellently: "And while the other animals bend down and look at the earth, he gave man a lofty face and bade him see the heaven and raise his upturned face to the stars."

2.1.16CSEL 19:98

hinc utique ἄνθρωπον Graeci appellauerunt, quod sursum spectet. ipsi ergo sibi renuntiant seque hominum nomine abdicant qui non sursum aspiciunt, sed deorsum: nisi forte id ipsum quod recti sumus sine causa homini adtributum putant.

Hence, surely, the Greeks called him anthrōpos, because he looks upward. Those, then, who look not upward but downward renounce themselves and disown the name of men; unless perhaps they think that the very fact that we are upright was given to man without a reason.

2.1.17CSEL 19:98

spectare nos caelum deus uoluit utique non frustra. nam et aues et ex mutis paene omnia caelum uident, sed nobis proprie datum est caelum rigidis ac stantibus intueri, ut religionem ibi quaeramus, ut deum, cuius illa sedes est, quoniam oculis non possumus, animo contemplemur: quod profecto non facit qui aes aut lapidem, quae sunt terrena, ueneratur.

God wished us to look at the heaven, and surely not in vain. For both birds and almost all dumb creatures see the heaven, but to us it is given in a special way to gaze at heaven upright and standing, so that we may seek religion there, so that we may contemplate with the mind God, whose seat it is, since we cannot with our eyes. This he certainly does not do who venerates bronze or stone, which are earthly.

2.1.18CSEL 19:98–99

est autem prauissimum, cum ratio corporis recta sit, quod est temporale, ipsum uero animum, qui sit aeternus, humilem fieri, cum figura et status nihil aliut significet nisi mentem hominis eo spectare oportere quo uultum, et animum tam rectum esse debere quam corpus, ut id cui dominari debet imitetur.

It is most perverse that the posture of the body, which is temporal, should be upright, while the soul itself, which is eternal, is made lowly, since the figure and posture signify nothing else than that the mind of man ought to look where his face looks, and that the soul ought to be as upright as the body, so as to imitate what it ought to rule.

2.1.19CSEL 19:99

uerum homines et nominis sui et rationis obliti oculos suos ab alto deiciunt soloque defigunt ac timent opera digitorum suorum, quasi uero quicquam esse possit artifice suo maius.

But men, forgetting both their name and their reason, cast their eyes down from on high, fix them on the ground, and fear the works of their own fingers, as if anything could be greater than its maker.

Divine 2, chapter 2

2.2.1CSEL 19:99

Quae igitur amentia est aut ea fingere quae ipsi postmodum timeant aut timere quae finxerint? non ipsa inquiunt timemus, sed eos ad quorum imaginem ficta et quorum nominibus consecrata sunt. nempe ideo timetis, quod eos in caelo esse arbitramini: neque enim, si dii sunt, aliter fieri potest.

What madness is it, then, either to fashion things which they themselves afterwards fear, or to fear things which they have fashioned? "We do not fear the things themselves," they say, "but those in whose likeness they were fashioned and to whose names they were consecrated." Surely you fear them because you think they are in heaven; for if they are gods, it cannot be otherwise.

2.2.2CSEL 19:99

cur igitur oculos non in caelum tollitis et aduocatis eorum nominibus in aperto sacrificia celebratis? cur ad parietes et ligna et lapides potissimum quam illo spectetis, ubi eos esse credatis? quid sibi templa, quid arae uolunt, quid denique ipsa simulacra, quae aut mortuorum aut absentium monumenta sunt?

Why then do you not lift your eyes to heaven and, calling on their names, celebrate sacrifices in the open? Why do you look at walls and wood and stones rather than there, where you believe them to be? What do temples mean, what do altars mean, what finally do the images themselves mean, which are memorials either of the dead or of the absent?

2.2.3CSEL 19:99

nam omnino fingendarum similitudinum ratio idcirco ab hominibus inuenta est, ut posset eorum memoria retineri qui uel morte subtracti uel absentia fuerant separati.

For the practice of making likenesses was invented by men altogether so that the memory of those could be kept who had been taken away by death or separated by absence.

2.2.4CSEL 19:99

deos igitur in quorum numero reponemus? si in mortuorum, quis tam stultus ut colat? si in absentium, colendi ergo non sunt, si nec uident quae facimus nec audiunt quae precamur.

Among which, then, shall we place the gods? If among the dead, who is so foolish as to worship them? If among the absent, then they are not to be worshipped, if they neither see what we do nor hear what we pray.

2.2.5CSEL 19:99–100

si autem dii absentes esse non possunt, qui quoniam diuini sunt, in quacumque parte mundi fuerint, uident et audiunt uniuersa, superuacua sunt ergo simulacra illis ubique praesentibus, cum satis sit audientium nomina precibus aduocare.

But if gods cannot be absent, since, being divine, in whatever part of the world they are, they see and hear everything, then images are superfluous, since they are present everywhere; it is enough to call on their names in prayer, since they hear.

2.2.6CSEL 19:100

at enim praesentes non nisi ad imagines suas adsunt. ita plane: quemadmodum uulgus existimat mortuorum animas circa tumulos et corporum suorum reliquias oberrare.

"But they are present only at their images." Just so: as the common people think that the souls of the dead wander around their tombs and the remains of their bodies.

2.2.7CSEL 19:100

set tamen postquam deus ille praesto esse coepit, iam simulacro eius opus non est. quaero enim, si quis imaginem hominis peregre constituti contempletur saepius, ut ex ea solacium capiat absentis, num idem sanus esse uideatur, si eo reuerso atque praesente in contemplanda imagine perseueret eaque potius quam ipsius hominis aspectu frui uelit?

But even so, once that god has begun to be present, his image is no longer needed. For I ask: if someone often gazes at the image of a man who is abroad, to take comfort from it for his absence, would he seem sane if, when the man has returned and is present, he went on gazing at the image and preferred to enjoy it rather than the sight of the man himself?

2.2.8CSEL 19:100

minime profecto. et tamen hominis imago necessaria tum uidetur, cum procul abest, superuacua futura, cum praesto est, dei autem, cuius numen ac spiritus ubique diffusus abesse numquam potest, semper utique superuacua est.

Certainly not. And yet a man's image seems necessary when he is far away and will be superfluous when he is present; but the image of God, whose divinity and spirit are spread everywhere and can never be absent, is always superfluous.

2.2.9CSEL 19:100

sed uerentur ne omnis illorum religio inanis sit et uana, si nihil in praesenti uideant quod adorent, et ideo simulacra constituunt, quae quia mortuorum sunt imagines, similia sunt mortuis: omni enim sensu carent.

But they fear that their whole religion would be empty and vain if they saw nothing present to adore; and so they set up images, which, because they are images of the dead, are like the dead: for they lack all sense.

2.2.10CSEL 19:100

dei autem in aeternum uiuentis uiuum et sensibile debet esse simulacrum. quod si a similitudine id nomen accepit, qui possunt ista simulacra deo similia iudicari quae nec sentiunt nec mouentur? itaque simulacrum dei non illut est quod, digitis hominis ex lapide aut aere aliaue materia fabricatur, sed ipse homo, quoniam et sentit et mouetur et multas magnasque actiones habet.

But the image of the God who lives forever ought to be living and sensible. If it took that name from likeness, how can those images be judged like God which neither feel nor move? So the image of God is not that which is made by human fingers out of stone or bronze or other material, but man himself, since he both feels and moves and has many great activities.

2.2.11CSEL 19:100–101

nec intellegunt homines ineptissimi quod, si sentire simulacra et moueri possent, ultro adoratura hominem fuissent a quo sunt expolita: quae essent aut incultus et horridus lapis aut materia informis ac rudis, nisi fuissent ab homine formata.

Nor do these most foolish men understand that, if images could feel and move, they would of their own accord have adored the man by whom they were polished; for they would be either rough, unshaped stone or shapeless, raw material, had they not been formed by man.

2.2.12CSEL 19:101

homo igitur illorum quasi parens putandus est, per cuius manus nata sunt, per quem figuram speciem pulchritudinem habere coeperunt, et ideo melior qui fecit quam illa quae facta sunt.

Man, then, is to be regarded as their parent, as it were, by whose hands they were born, through whom they began to have figure, appearance, and beauty; and therefore he who made them is better than the things made.

2.2.13CSEL 19:101

et tamen factorem ipsum nemo suspicit aut ueretur: quae fecit timent, tamquam possit plus esse in opere quam in opifice.

And yet no one looks up to or reveres the maker himself: they fear what he made, as if there could be more in the work than in the workman.

2.2.14CSEL 19:101

recte igitur Seneca in libris moralibus simulacra inquit deorum uenerantur, illis supplicant genu posito, illa adorant, illis per totum adsident diem aut adstant, illis stipem iaciunt, uictimas caedunt: et cum haec tanto opere suspiciant, fabros qui illa fecere contemnunt.

Rightly, then, Seneca says in his moral books: "They venerate the images of the gods, pray to them on bended knee, adore them, sit or stand by them all day long, throw them coins, slaughter victims; and while they look up to these things so greatly, they despise the craftsmen who made them."

2.2.15CSEL 19:101

quid inter se tam contrarium quam statuarium despicere, statuam adorare et eum ne in conuictum quidem admittere qui tibi deos faciat? quam ergo uim, quam potestatem habere possunt, cum ipse qui fecit illa non habeat? sed ne haec quidem dare iis potuit quae habebat, uidere audire loqui moueri.

What is so self-contradictory as to despise the sculptor and adore the statue, and not even to admit to your table the man who makes your gods? What force, then, what power can they have, when the man who made them does not have it? But he could not even give them what he did have: to see, hear, speak, and move.

2.2.16CSEL 19:101

quisquamne igitur tam ineptus est, ut putet aliquid esse in simulacro dei, in quo ne hominis quidem quicquam est praeter umbram? sed haec nemo considerat: infecti sunt enim persuasione (uana) ac mentes eorum penitus sucum stultitiae perbiberunt.

Is anyone so foolish, then, as to think there is anything in the image of a god, in which there is not even anything of a man except his shadow? But no one considers this: for they are stained with a vain persuasion, and their minds have drunk deeply of the juice of folly.

2.2.17CSEL 19:101–102

adorant ergo insensibilia qui sentiunt, inrationabilia qui sapiunt, exanima qui uiuunt, terrena qui oriuntur a caelo.

So those who feel adore what does not feel; those who are wise, what lacks reason; the living, the lifeless; those who spring from heaven, earthly things.

2.2.18CSEL 19:102

iuuat igitur uelut in aliqua sublimi specula constitutum, unde uniuersi exaudire possint, Persianum illud proclamare: o curuae in terris animae et caelestium inanes! caelum potius intuemini, ad cuius spectaculum uos excitauit ille artifex uester deus.

It is pleasing, then, as if placed on some lofty watchtower from which all could hear, to proclaim that line of Persius: "O souls bent down to the earth and empty of heavenly things!" Look rather to heaven, to the sight of which God your Maker has raised you.

2.2.19CSEL 19:102

ille uobis sublimem uultum dedit, uos in terram curuamini, uos altas mentes et ad parentem suum cum corporibus suis erectas ad inferiora deprimitis tamquam uos paeniteat non quadrupedes esse natos.

He gave you a lofty face; you bend down to the earth. Your minds, which are lofty and raised up toward their Parent together with your bodies, you press down to lower things, as if you regretted not having been born four-footed.

2.2.20CSEL 19:102

fas non est caeleste animal cum terrenis in terramque uergentibus coaequari. quid uos beneficiis caelestibus orbatis pronique in humum uestra sponte procumbitis? humi enim miseri uolutamini, cum deorsum quaeritis quod in sublimi quaerere debuistis.

It is not right for a heavenly creature to be made equal to earthly creatures bent toward the earth. Why do you deprive yourselves of heavenly benefits and fall forward of your own accord onto the ground? For you wretches roll on the ground when you seek below what you ought to have sought on high.

2.2.21CSEL 19:102

nam ista mortalium digitorum ludicra et fragilia figmenta ex quolibet materiae genere formata quid aliut sunt nisi terra ex qua nata sunt?

For those playthings of mortal fingers, those fragile figments formed from any kind of material, what else are they but earth, from which they were born?

2.2.22CSEL 19:102

quid ergo rebus inferioribus subiacetis? quid capitibus uestris terram superponitis? cum enim uos terrae submittitis humilioresque facitis, ipsi uos ultro ad inferos mergitis ad mortemque damnatis, quia nihil est inferius et humilius terra nisi mors et inferi.

Why then do you subject yourselves to lower things? Why do you set earth above your heads? For when you submit yourselves to the earth and make yourselves lower, you plunge yourselves of your own accord into the underworld and condemn yourselves to death, since nothing is lower and humbler than the earth except death and the underworld.

2.2.23CSEL 19:102–103

quae si effugere uelletis, subiectam pedibus uestris terram contemneretis corporis statu saluo, quod idcirco rectum accepistis, quo oculos atque mentem cum eo qui fecit conferre possetis.

If you wished to escape these, you would despise the earth set beneath your feet, keeping your bodily posture intact, which you received upright for this reason, that you might turn your eyes and mind to him who made it.

2.2.24CSEL 19:103

contemnere autem et calcare terram nihil aliut est quam simulacra non adorare, quia de terra ficta sunt, item diuitias non concupiscere, uoluptates corporis spernere, quia opes et corpus ipsum cuius hospitio utimur terra est. uiuum colite, ut uiuatis: moriatur enim necesse est qui se suamque animam mortuis adiudicauit.

To despise and trample on the earth is nothing else than not to adore images, because they are made from earth; and likewise not to covet riches and to spurn the pleasures of the body, because wealth and the very body whose hospitality we use are earth. Worship the Living One, that you may live; for he must die who has assigned himself and his soul to the dead.

Divine 2, chapter 3

2.3.1CSEL 19:103

Sed quid prodest ad uulgus et ad homines inperitos hoc modo contionari, cum uideamus etiam doctos ac prudentes uiros, cum religionum intellegant uanitatem, nihilo minus tamen in iis ipsis quae damnant colendis nescio qua prauitate perstare? intellegebat Cicero falsa esse quae homines adorarent.

But what use is it to harangue the crowd and the unlearned in this way, when we see that even learned and prudent men, though they understand the vanity of these religions, nevertheless by some perversity persist in worshipping the very things they condemn? Cicero understood that the things men adored were false.

2.3.2CSEL 19:103

nam cum multa dixisset quae ad euersionem religionum ualerent, ait tamen non esse illa uulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat.

For when he had said many things that tended to overthrow religions, he nevertheless said that these things were not to be discussed before the common people, lest such discussion extinguish the religions publicly adopted.

2.3.3CSEL 19:103–104

quid eo facias, qui cum errare se sentiat, ultro ipse in lapides inpingat, ut populus omnis offendat, ipsi sibi oculos eruat, ut omnes caeci sint? qui nec de aliis bene mereatur quos patitur errare nec de se ipso qui alienis accedit erroribus nec utitur tandem sapientiae suae bono, ut factis impleat quod mente percepit, sed prudens et sciens pedem laqueo inserit, ut simul cum ceteris quos liberare ut prudentior debuit et ipse capiatur.

What can you do with a man who, knowing that he is in error, of his own accord dashes himself against the stones so that all the people may stumble, and tears out his own eyes so that all may be blind? He deserves well neither of others, whom he allows to err, nor of himself, since he joins in others' errors; nor does he at last use the good of his own wisdom so as to fulfil in deeds what he has grasped in mind, but knowingly and wittingly puts his foot into the snare, so that he himself is caught together with the rest, whom as the wiser he ought to have freed.

2.3.4CSEL 19:104

quin potius si quid tibi, Cicero, uirtutis est, experire populum sapientem. digna res est ubi omnes eloquentiae tuae exeras non enim uerendum est ne te in tam bona causa deficiat oratio, qui saepe etiam malas copiose ac fortiter defendisti.

Rather, Cicero, if you have any courage, try to make the people wise. It is a cause worthy of your putting forth all your eloquence; for there is no fear that speech would fail you in so good a cause, you who have often defended even bad causes fully and boldly.

2.3.5CSEL 19:104

sed nimirum Socratis carcerem times ideoque patrocinium ueritatis suscipere non audes. at mortem ut sapiens contemnere debuisti, et erat multo pulchrius ut ob benedicta potius quam ob maledicta morerere, nec plus tibi laudis Philippicae adferre potuerunt quam discussus error generis humani et mentes hominum ad sanitatem tua disputatione reuocatae.

But no doubt you fear the prison of Socrates, and so you do not dare to take up the defence of the truth. Yet as a wise man you ought to have despised death, and it would have been far nobler to die for good speech rather than for abuse; nor could the Philippics have brought you more praise than the dispelling of the error of the human race and the recalling of men's minds to health by your reasoning.

2.3.6CSEL 19:104

sed concedamus timiditati, quae in sapiente esse non debet: quid ergo ipse in eodem uersaris errore? uideo te terrena et manu facta uenerari: uana esse intellegis et tamen eadem facis quae faciunt ii quos ipse stultissimos confiteris.

But let us make allowance for timidity, which ought not to be in a wise man: why then do you yourself remain in the same error? I see you venerating earthly things made by hand: you understand that they are vain, and yet you do the same things as those whom you yourself confess to be most foolish.

2.3.7CSEL 19:104

quid igitur profuit uidisse te ueritatem, quam nec defensurus esses nec secuturus? sed libenter errant etiam ii qui errare se sentiunt: quanto magis uulgus indoctum, quod pompis inanibus gaudet animisque puerilibus spectat omnia, oblectatur friuolis et specie simulacrorum capitur nec ponderare secum unam quamque rem potest, ut intellegat nihil colendum esse quod oculis mortalibus cernitur, quia mortale sit necesse est!

What good was it, then, for you to have seen the truth, when you would neither defend it nor follow it? But even those who know they are in error err willingly; how much more the unlearned crowd, which delights in empty processions, looks at everything with childish minds, is amused by trifles, is captured by the appearance of images, and cannot weigh each thing with itself so as to understand that nothing seen by mortal eyes is to be worshipped, because it must be mortal!

2.3.8CSEL 19:104

nec mirandum est si deum non uideat, cum ipsi ne hominem quidem uideant quem uidere se credunt. hoc enim quod oculis subiectum est non homo, sed hominis receptaculum est: cuius qualitas et figura non ex liniamentis uasculi quo continetur, sed ex factis ac moribus peruidetur.

Nor is it surprising if they do not see God, since they do not even see the man whom they think they see. For what is subject to the eyes is not the man but the man's receptacle; his quality and form are discerned not from the outlines of the little vessel in which he is contained, but from his deeds and character.

2.3.9CSEL 19:104–105

qui ergo colunt simulacra, corpora sunt hominibus carentia, quia se corporalibus dediderunt nec uident plus aliquid mente quam corpore, cum sit animi officium ea subtilius cernere quae acies corporalis non potest intueri.

Those who worship images, then, are bodies without men in them, because they have given themselves to bodily things and see nothing more with the mind than with the body, although it is the task of the soul to discern more finely what the bodily eye cannot see.

2.3.10CSEL 19:105

quos homines idem ille philosophus ac poeta grauiter accusat tamquam humiles et abiectos, qui contra naturae suae rationem ad ueneranda se terrena prosternant. ait enim: et faciunt animos humiles formidine diuum depressosque premunt ad terram. aliut quidem ille cum haec diceret, sentiebat, nihil utique colendum esse, quoniam dii humana non curent.

These men that same philosopher and poet sharply accuses as lowly and abject, since against the reason of their own nature they prostrate themselves to venerate earthly things. For he says: "And they make their souls lowly with fear of the gods, and press them down, bowed to the earth." He meant something else, indeed, when he said this: that nothing at all should be worshipped, since the gods do not care for human affairs.

2.3.11CSEL 19:105

denique alio loco religiones et cultus deorum inane esse officium confitetur: nec pietas ulla est uelatum saepe uideri uertere se ad lapidem atque omnis accedere ad aras et procumbere humi prostratum et pandere palmas ante deum delubra nec aras sanguine multo spargere quadrupedum nec uotis nectere uota. quae profecto si cassa sunt, non oportet sublimes et excelsos animos auocari atque in terram premi, sed nihil aliut quam caelestia cogitare.

Finally, in another place he confesses that religions and the worship of the gods are an empty duty: "Nor is it piety to be often seen with veiled head turning toward a stone and approaching every altar, and to fall prostrate on the ground and spread out the palms before the shrines of the gods, nor to sprinkle the altars with much blood of beasts, nor to link vow to vow." If these things are indeed vain, lofty and exalted souls should not be called away and pressed to the earth, but should think of nothing but heavenly things.

2.3.12CSEL 19:105

inpugnatae sunt ergo a prudentioribus falsae religiones, quia sentiebant esse falsas, sed non est inducta uera, quia qualis aut ubi esset ignorabant.

False religions, then, were attacked by the more prudent, because they perceived them to be false; but the true one was not brought in, because they did not know what or where it was.

2.3.13CSEL 19:105–106

itaque sic habuerunt tamquam nulla esset omnino, quia ueram non poterant inuenire, et eo modo inciderunt in errorem multo maiorem quam illi qui falsam tenebant.

So they behaved as if there were none at all, because they could not find the true one; and in this way they fell into a far greater error than those who held the false one.

2.3.14CSEL 19:106

nam isti fragilium cultores quamuis sint inepti, quia caelestia constituunt in rebus corruptibilibus atque terrenis, aliquid tamen sapientiae retinent et habere ueniam possunt, qui summum hominis officium etsi non re ipsa, tamen proposito tenent, siquidem hominum atque mutorum uel solum uel certe maximum in religione discrimen est.

For those worshippers of fragile things, though they are foolish in setting heavenly things in corruptible and earthly objects, still retain something of wisdom and can be pardoned, since they hold to the highest duty of man, if not in fact, at least in intention; for the only difference, or at any rate the greatest, between men and dumb animals lies in religion.

2.3.15CSEL 19:106

hi uero quanto fuerunt sapientiores, quod intellexerunt falsae religionis errorem, tanto sunt facti stultiores, quod esse aliquam ueram non putauerunt.

But these philosophers, the wiser they were in understanding the error of false religion, the more foolish they became in not thinking there was any true one.

2.3.16CSEL 19:106

itaque quoniam facilius est de alienis iudicare quam de suis, dum aliorum praecipitium uident, non prospexerunt quid ante pedes suos esset.

So, since it is easier to judge others' affairs than one's own, while they saw others' fall over the precipice, they did not look out for what was before their own feet.

2.3.17CSEL 19:106

in utraque igitur parte et summa stultitia inuenitur et odor quidam sapientiae, ut possis dubitare quos dicas potissimum stultiores, illosne qui falsam religionem suscipiunt an eos qui nullam.

On both sides, then, are found both the height of folly and a certain scent of wisdom, so that you may doubt whom above all to call the more foolish: those who adopt a false religion or those who adopt none.

2.3.18CSEL 19:106

sed ut dixi uenia concedi potest inperitis et qui se sapientes non esse fateantur: iis uero non potest, qui sapientiam professi stultitiam potius exhibent.

But, as I said, pardon can be granted to the unlearned and to those who confess that they are not wise; but not to those who, professing wisdom, display folly instead.

2.3.19CSEL 19:106

non sum equidem tam iniquus, ut eos putem diuinare debuisse ut ueritatem per se ipsos inuenirent, quod ego fieri non posse confitear, sed hoc ab iis exigo quod ratione ipsa praestare potuerunt.

I am not so unfair as to think they ought to have divined so as to find the truth by themselves, which I confess cannot be done; but I require of them what they could have achieved by reason itself.

2.3.20CSEL 19:106

facerent enim prudentius, si et intellegerent esse aliquam ueram religionem et falsis inpugnatis aperte pronuntiarent eam quae uera esset ab hominibus non teneri. sed mouerit eos fortasse illut, quod si qua esset uera religio, exereret se ac uindicaret nec pateretur esse aliut quicquam.

For they would act more prudently if they both understood that there is some true religion and, having attacked the false, openly declared that the one which is true is not held by men. But perhaps this moved them: that if there were a true religion, it would put itself forward and vindicate itself and not allow anything else to exist.

2.3.21CSEL 19:106–107

uidere enim nullo modo poterant quare aut a quo et quemadmodum religio uera opprimeretur, quod est diuini sacramenti et caelestis arcani: id uero nisi doceatur, aliquis scire nullo pacto potest. summa rei haec est.

For they could in no way see why, or by whom, and how true religion was suppressed, which belongs to the divine mystery and the heavenly secret; and this no one can know in any way unless he is taught. This is the sum of the matter:

2.3.22CSEL 19:107

inperiti et insipientes falsas religiones pro ueris habent, quia neque ueram sciunt neque falsam intellegunt, prudentiores autem quia ueram nesciunt, aut in his quas falsas esse intellegunt perseuerant, ut aliquid tenere uideantur, aut omnino nihil colunt, ne incidant in errorem, cum id ipsum maximi sit erroris, uitam pecudum sub figura hominis imitari.

the unlearned and foolish hold false religions for true, because they neither know the true nor understand the false; but the more prudent, because they do not know the true, either persist in those they understand to be false, so as to seem to hold something, or worship nothing at all, lest they fall into error, though this itself is the greatest error: to imitate the life of cattle under the form of man.

2.3.23CSEL 19:107

falsum uero intellegere est quidem sapientiae, sed humanae, ultra hunc gradum procedi ab homine non potest, itaque multi philosophorum religiones ut docui sustulerunt: uerum autem scire diuinae sapientiae est; homo autem per se ipsum peruenire ad hanc scientiam non potest, nisi doceatur a deo.

To understand what is false belongs indeed to wisdom, but human wisdom; beyond this step man cannot go, and so many philosophers, as I have shown, did away with religions. But to know what is true belongs to divine wisdom; and man cannot come to this knowledge by himself unless he is taught by God.

2.3.24CSEL 19:107

ita philosophi quod summum fuit humanae sapientiae adsecuti sunt, ut intellegerent quid non sit: illud adsequi nequiuerunt, ut dicerent quid sit. nota Ciceronis uox est: utinam tam facile uera inuenire possem quam falsa conuincere.

So the philosophers attained what was the highest point of human wisdom, to understand what is not; they could not attain to saying what is. Cicero's saying is well known: "I wish I could find the truth as easily as I can refute the false."

2.3.25CSEL 19:107

quod quia uires humanae condicionis excedit, eius officii facultas nobis adtributa est, quibus tradidit deus scientiam ueritatis. cui explicandae quattuor posteriores libri seruient: nunc interim falsa ut coepimus detegamus.

Because this exceeds the powers of the human condition, the ability for this task has been given to us, to whom God has handed down the knowledge of the truth. The last four books will serve to explain it; for now, meanwhile, let us uncover the false, as we began.

Divine 2, chapter 4

2.4.1CSEL 19:107–108

Quid igitur maiestatis possunt habere simulacra, quae fuerunt in homunculi potestate uel ut aliud fierent uel ut omnino ne fierent? idcirco aput Horatium Priapus ita loquitur: olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum cum faber incertus scamnum faceretne Priapum, maluit esse deum. deus inde ego, furum auiumque maxima formido.

What majesty, then, can images have, which were in the power of a puny man either to become something else or not to be made at all? That is why in Horace Priapus speaks thus: "Once I was a fig-tree trunk, a useless log, when the carpenter, unsure whether to make a stool or a Priapus, preferred that I be a god. So a god I am, the greatest terror of thieves and birds."

2.4.2CSEL 19:108

quis non sit hoc tanto custode securus? fures enim tam stulti sunt, ut Priapi tentiginem timeant, cum aues ipsae, quas terrore falcis aut inguinis abigi existimant, simulacris fabre factis id est hominum plane similibus insidant nidificent inquinent.

Who would not feel safe with so great a guardian? For thieves are so foolish as to fear Priapus' lust, while the very birds which they think are driven off by the terror of his sickle or his groin settle on skilfully made images, that is, ones plainly like men, and nest on them and foul them.

2.4.3CSEL 19:108

sed Flaccus ut satirici carminis scriptor derisit hominum uanitatem, uerum ii qui faciunt, seriam rem facere se opinantur.

But Flaccus, as a writer of satirical verse, mocked the vanity of men; yet those who do these things think they are doing something serious.

2.4.4CSEL 19:108

demque poeta maximus, homo in ceteris prudens, in hoc solo non poetice, sed aniliter desipit, cum in illis emendatissimis libris etiam fieri hoc iubet: et custos furum atque auium cum falce saligna Hellespontiaci seruet tutela Priapi.

And the greatest poet, a man prudent in other things, in this alone is foolish, not as a poet but as an old woman, when in those most polished books he even commands this to be done: "And let the guardianship of Hellespontine Priapus, keeper against thieves and birds with his willow sickle, protect them."

2.4.5CSEL 19:108

adorant ergo mortalia aut a mortalibus facta: frangi enim cremari perire possunt. nam et tectis uetustate labentibus saepe comminui solent et consumpta incendio dilabuntur in cinerem et plerumque, nisi sua illis magnitudo subuenerit aut custodia diligens saepserit, in praedam furibus cedunt.

They adore, then, things mortal or made by mortals: for they can be broken, burned, destroyed. For when roofs collapse with age they are often smashed, and when consumed by fire they fall into ashes, and often, unless their size saves them or careful guarding protects them, they become the prey of thieves.

2.4.6CSEL 19:108–109

quae igitur insania est ea timere, pro quibus aut ruinae aut ignes aut furta timeantur? quae uanitas ab iis aliquam sperare tutelam, quae tueri semet ipsa non possunt? quae peruersitas ad eorum praesidia decurrere, quae ipsa cum uiolantur inulta sunt, nisi a colentibus uindicentur? ubi ergo ueritas est?

What madness is it, then, to fear things for which ruin or fire or theft must be feared? What vanity to hope for any protection from things that cannot protect themselves? What perversity to run for help to things which, when violated, remain unavenged unless their worshippers avenge them? Where then is truth?

2.4.7CSEL 19:109

ubi nulla uis adhiberi potest religioni, ubi nihil quod uiolari possit apparet, ubi sacrilegium fieri non potest. quidquid autem oculis manibusque subiectum est, id uero quia fragile est, ab omni ratione immortalitatis alienum est.

Where no force can be applied to religion, where nothing appears that can be violated, where sacrilege cannot be committed. But whatever is subject to the eyes and hands, because it is fragile, is foreign to every notion of immortality.

2.4.8CSEL 19:109

frustra igitur homines auro ebore gemmis deos excolunt et exornant, quasi uero ex his rebus ullam possint capere uoluptatem.

In vain, then, do men adorn and deck out their gods with gold, ivory, and jewels, as if they could take any pleasure in these things.

2.4.9CSEL 19:109

qui usus est pretiosorum munerum nihil sentientibus? an ille qui mortuis? pari enim ratione defunctorum corpora odoribus ac uestibus pretiosis inlita et conuoluta humi condunt qua deos honorant, qui neque cum fierent sentiebant neque cum coluntur sciunt; nec enim sensum consecratione sumpserunt.

What use are costly gifts to things that feel nothing? The same as to the dead? For by the same reasoning they bury the bodies of the dead, smeared with perfumes and wrapped in costly garments, as they honour the gods, who neither felt anything when they were made nor know when they are worshipped; for they did not acquire sense by consecration.

2.4.10CSEL 19:109

non placebat Persio quod aurea uasa templis inferantur, superuacuum putanti esse inter religiones quod non sanctitatis, sed auaritiae sit instrumentum.

Persius did not like golden vessels being brought into temples, thinking it superfluous in religion to have what is an instrument not of holiness but of greed.

2.4.11CSEL 19:109

illa enim satius est deo, quem recte colas, inferre pro munere compositum ius fasque animo sanctosque recessus mentis et incoctum generoso pectus honesto. egregie sapienterque sensit.

For it is better to bring to God, if you would worship him rightly, as a gift, "justice and right well blended in the mind, holy recesses of the soul, and a breast steeped in noble honour." He thought excellently and wisely.

2.4.12CSEL 19:109

uerum illut ridicule subdidit, hoc esse aurum in templis, quod sint Veneri donatae a uirgine pupae; quas ille ob minutiem fortasse contemserit.

But he added that ridiculously: that gold in temples is what dolls given to Venus by a girl are; which he perhaps despised for their smallness.

2.4.13CSEL 19:109–110

non uidebat enim simulacra ipsa et effigies deorum Polycleti et Euphranoris et Phidiae manu ex auro atque ebore perfectas nihil aliut esse quam grandes pupas non a uirginibus, quarum lusibus uenia dari potest, sed a barbatis hominibus consecratas.

For he did not see that the very images and likenesses of the gods, completed in gold and ivory by the hand of Polyclitus, Euphranor, and Phidias, are nothing else than large dolls, consecrated not by girls, whose play can be pardoned, but by bearded men.

2.4.14CSEL 19:110

merito igitur etiam senum stultitiam Seneca deridet. non inquit bis pueri sumus ut uulgo dicitur, sed semper: uerum hoc interest, quod maiora nos ludimus.

Rightly, then, Seneca too mocks the folly of old men: "We are not twice children," he says, "as is commonly said, but always; only there is this difference, that we play at greater things."

2.4.15CSEL 19:110

ergo his ludicris et ornatis et grandibus pupis unguenta et tura et odores inferunt, his opimas et pingues hostias immolant, quibus est quidem os, sed carens officio dentium, his peplos et indumenta pretiosa, quibus usus uelaminis nullus est, his aurum et argentum consecrant, quae tam non habent qui accipiunt quam qui illa donarunt.

So to these playthings, these adorned and large dolls, they bring ointments, incense, and perfumes; to these they sacrifice fat and choice victims, which have a mouth indeed but without the use of teeth; to these they offer robes and costly garments, which have no use for covering; to these they consecrate gold and silver, which those who receive them possess no more than those who gave them.

2.4.16CSEL 19:110

nec inmerito Dionysius Siciliae tyrannus post uictoriam Graecia potitus deos tales contempsit spoliauit inlusit, siquidem sacrilegia sua iocularibus etiam dictis prosequebatur.

Not without reason did Dionysius, tyrant of Sicily, having won control of Greece after a victory, despise, plunder, and mock such gods; for he even accompanied his sacrileges with jokes.

2.4.17CSEL 19:110

nam cum Ioui Olympio aureum amiculum detraxisset, laneum iussit inponi dicens aestate graue esse aureum, hieme frigidum, laneum uero utrique tempori aptum.

For when he had taken a golden cloak from Olympian Jupiter, he ordered a woollen one to be put on him, saying that a golden one was heavy in summer and cold in winter, but a woollen one suited both seasons.

2.4.18CSEL 19:110

idem auream barbam detrahens Aesculapio incongruens et iniquum esse ait, cum Apollo pater eius inberbis adhuc esset ac leuis, priorem filium quam patrem barbatum uideri.

The same man, taking a golden beard from Aesculapius, said it was unsuitable and unfair that the son should appear bearded before the father, since his father Apollo was still beardless and smooth.

2.4.19CSEL 19:110–111

item pateras et exuuias et parua quaedam sigilla, quae simulacrorum protentis manibus tenebantur, detrahebat et accipere se illa, non auferre dicebat: perquam enim stultum esse et ingratum nolle accipere ab iis ultro porrigentibus, a quibus bona sibi homines precarentur.

Likewise he took away the bowls and spoils and certain small figures held in the outstretched hands of the images, and said he was receiving them, not carrying them off: for it was very foolish and ungrateful to be unwilling to receive from those who offered them of their own accord, from whom men prayed for good things.

2.4.20CSEL 19:111

haec ille fecit inpune, quia rex et uictor fuit, quin etiam secuta est eum solita felicitas: uixit enim usque ad senectutem regnumque per manus filio tradidit. in eo igitur, quia homines sacrilegia uindicare non poterant, oportuit deos ipsos sui uindices esse.

He did these things with impunity, because he was king and victor; indeed, his usual good fortune followed him: he lived to old age and handed on his kingdom to his son. In his case, then, since men could not avenge the sacrileges, the gods themselves ought to have been their own avengers.

2.4.21CSEL 19:111

at si humilis quid tale commiserit, huic praesto sunt flagella ignes eculei cruces et quidquid excogitare iratis ac furentibus licet. sed cum puniunt deprehensos in sacrilegio, ipsi

But if a lowly man commits anything of the kind, for him are ready scourges, fire, the rack, crosses, and whatever angry and raging men may devise. But when they punish those caught in sacrilege, they themselves

2.4.22CSEL 19:111

se deorum suorum potestate diffidunt. cur enim non ipsis potissimum relinquant ulciscendi sui locum, si eos posse aliquid arbitrantur?

distrust the power of their own gods. For why do they not leave the place of vengeance above all to the gods themselves, if they think they can do anything?

2.4.23CSEL 19:111

quin etiam putant illorum numine accidisse, ut praedones rerum sacrarum conprehensi tenerentur, et saeuiunt non tam ira quam metu, ne si deorum iniuriam non uindicauerint, in ipsos expetant poenae: incredibili scilicet uanitate, qui nocituros sibi deos putent ob aliena scelera, qui ipsis a quibus uiolati spoliatique sunt per se ipsos nihil nocere potuerunt. at enim saepe ipsi quoque in sacrilegos uindicauerunt.

They even think it happened by the gods' power that robbers of sacred things were caught and held, and they rage not so much from anger as from fear that, if they do not avenge the wrong done to the gods, the punishment may fall on themselves: with incredible vanity, surely, thinking the gods will harm them for others' crimes, when the gods could do no harm by themselves to those by whom they were violated and robbed. "But they themselves have often taken vengeance on the sacrilegious."

2.4.24CSEL 19:111

potest id uel casu accidisse, quod aliquando, non semper, sed tamen paulo post quomodo id acciderit ostendam.

That can have happened by chance, since it happened sometimes, not always; but a little later I shall show how it happened.

2.4.25CSEL 19:111–112

nunc interim quaero cur illi tot ac tanta sacrilegia in Dionysio non uindicauerint, qui non furtim, sed palam ludibrio deos habuit. cur hunc tam potentem sacrilegum a templis a caerimoniis ab imaginibus suis non arcuerunt? cur etiam sacris rebus ablatis prospere nauigauit? quod ioco ipse testatus est, ut solebat.

Meanwhile I ask why they did not avenge so many and such great sacrileges in Dionysius, who mocked the gods not secretly but openly. Why did they not keep so powerful a sacrilegious man away from their temples, ceremonies, and images? Why did he even sail prosperously after carrying off sacred things? He himself bore witness to this jokingly, as was his habit.

2.4.26CSEL 19:112

uidetisne inquit comitibus suis naufragium timentibus quam prospera sacrilegis nauigatio ab ipsis diis inmortalibus tribuatur? sed hic fortasse a Platone didicerat deos nihil esse.

"Do you see," he said to his companions, who feared shipwreck, "how prosperous a voyage is granted to the sacrilegious by the immortal gods themselves?" But perhaps he had learned from Plato that the gods are nothing.

2.4.27CSEL 19:112

quid Gaius Verres, quem Tullius accusator eius eidem Dionysio et Phalaridi et tyrannis omnibus comparat? nonne omnem Siciliam compilauit sublatis deorum simulacris ornamentisque fanorum?

What of Gaius Verres, whom Tullius, his accuser, compares to the same Dionysius and to Phalaris and all tyrants? Did he not plunder all Sicily, carrying off the images of the gods and the ornaments of the shrines?

2.4.28CSEL 19:112

otiosum est persequi singula, unum libet commemorare in quo accusator omnibus eloquentiae uiribus, omni denique conatu uocis et corporis deplorauit de Cerere uel Catinensi uel Hennensi: quarum alterius tanta fuit religio, ut adire templi eius secreta penetralia uiris nefas esset, alterius antiquitas tanta, ut omnes historiae loquantur ipsam deam fruges in Hennae solo primum repperisse filiamque eius uirginem ex eodem loco raptam.

It is idle to follow up each case; I wish to mention one, in which the accuser lamented with all the powers of eloquence, with every effort of voice and body, about Ceres, whether of Catina or of Henna: of whom the one had such sanctity that it was unlawful for men to approach the secret inner sanctuary of her temple, the other such antiquity that all histories say that the goddess herself first found grain on the soil of Henna and that her virgin daughter was carried off from that same place.

2.4.29CSEL 19:112

denique Gracchanis temporibus turbata re publica et seditionibus et ostentis cum repertum esset in carminibus Sibyllinis antiquissimam Cererem debere placari, legati sunt Hennam missi.

Indeed, in the times of the Gracchi, when the state was disturbed by seditions and portents, and it was found in the Sibylline verses that the most ancient Ceres ought to be appeased, envoys were sent to Henna.

2.4.30CSEL 19:112–113

haec igitur Ceres uel religiosissima, quam uidere maribus ne adorandi quidem gratia licebat, uel antiquissima, quam senatus populusque Romanus sacrificiis donisque placauerat, ex arcanis ac uetustis penetralibus a Gaio Verre inmissis latronibus seruis inpune sublata est.

This Ceres, then, whether the most sacred, whom males were not allowed to see even for the purpose of adoring her, or the most ancient, whom the senate and Roman people had appeased with sacrifices and gifts, was carried off with impunity from her secret and ancient sanctuary by slaves sent in as robbers by Gaius Verres.

2.4.31CSEL 19:113

idem uero cum adfirmaret se a Siculis ut causam prouinciae susciperet oratum, his usus est uerbis: sese iam ne deos quidem in suis urbibus ad quos confugerent habere, quod eorum simulacra sanctissima Gaius Verres ex delubris religiosissimis sustulisset: quasi uero si Verres ex urbibus delubrisque sustulerat, de caelo quoque sustulisset.

The same Cicero, when he declared that he had been asked by the Sicilians to take up the cause of the province, used these words: that they no longer had even gods in their cities to whom they might flee, because Gaius Verres had carried off their most sacred images from the most religious shrines; as if, when Verres had carried them off from the cities and shrines, he had carried them off from heaven too.

2.4.32CSEL 19:113

unde apparet istos deos nihil habere in se amplius quam materiam de qua sint fabricati.

From this it is clear that these gods have nothing in them beyond the material from which they were made.

2.4.33CSEL 19:113

nec inmerito ad te, Marce Tulli, hoc est ad hominem Siculi confugerunt, quoniam triennio sunt experti deos illos nihil ualere: essent enim stultissimi, si ad eos ob defendendas iniurias hominum confugissent, qui Gaio Verri nec pro se ipsis irati esse potuerunt. at enim Verres ob haec facinora damnatus est.

And not without reason did the Sicilians flee to you, Marcus Tullius, that is, to a man, since for three years they had found that those gods had no power; for they would have been most foolish to flee for defence against men's wrongs to those who could not even be angry with Gaius Verres on their own behalf. "But Verres was condemned for these crimes."

2.4.34CSEL 19:113

non ergo dii uindicauerunt, sed Ciceronis industria, qua uel defensores eius oppressit uel gratiae restitit.

Then it was not the gods who avenged them, but Cicero's diligence, by which he either overcame Verres' defenders or withstood their influence.

2.4.35CSEL 19:113

quid quod aput ipsum Verrem non fuit illa damnatio, sed uacatio, ut quemadmodum Dionysio deorum spolia gestanti dii inmortales bonam dederant nauigationem, sic etiam Verri bonam quietem tribuisse uideantur, in qua sacrilegiis suis tranquille frui posset?

What of the fact that for Verres himself that condemnation was not a punishment but a holiday, so that, just as the immortal gods had given Dionysius a good voyage while he carried their spoils, so they seem to have granted Verres a good rest in which he could enjoy his sacrileges in peace?

2.4.36CSEL 19:113–114

nam frementibus postea bellis ciuilibus sub obtentu damnationis ab omni periculo ac metu remotus aliorum graues casus ac miserabiles exitus audiebat et qui cecidisse solus uniuersis stantibus uidebatur, is uero uniuersis cadentibus stetit solus, donec illum et opibus sacrilegio partis et uita satiatum ac senectute confectum proscriptio triumuiralis auferret, eadem scilicet quae Tullium uiolatae deorum maiestatis ultorem.

For when civil wars later raged, removed under cover of his condemnation from every danger and fear, he heard of the heavy misfortunes and miserable deaths of others; and he who alone seemed to have fallen while all stood, alone stood while all fell, until, sated with the wealth gained by sacrilege and with life, and worn out by old age, he was carried off by the proscription of the triumvirs, the same, of course, that carried off Tullius, the avenger of the violated majesty of the gods.

2.4.37CSEL 19:114

quin etiam felix in eo ipso fuit, quod ante suam mortem crudelissimum exitum sui accusatoris audiuit, diis uidelicet prouidentibus ut sacrilegus ac praedo ille religionum suarum non ante moreretur quam solacium de ultione cepisset.

Indeed, he was fortunate even in this, that before his own death he heard of the most cruel end of his accuser: the gods, evidently, providing that that robber and despoiler of their religions should not die before he had taken the comfort of revenge.

Divine 2, chapter 5

2.5.1CSEL 19:114

Quanto igitur rectius est omissis insensibilibus et uanis oculos eo tendere ubi sedes, ubi habitatio est dei ueri, qui terram stabili firmitate suspendit, qui caelum distinxit astris fulgentibus, qui solem rebus humanis clarissimum ac singulare lumen in argumentum suae unicae maiestatis accendit, terris autem maria circumfudit, flumina sempiterno lapsu fluere praecepit, iussit et extendi campos, subsidere ualles, fronde tegi siluas, lapidosos surgere montes.

How much more right it is, then, to leave senseless and empty things and turn our eyes to where the seat and dwelling of the true God is, who hung the earth in stable firmness, who adorned the heaven with shining stars, who kindled the sun as the brightest and unique light for human affairs as a sign of his unique majesty, who poured the seas around the lands, commanded the rivers to flow in everlasting course, and "ordered the plains to stretch out, the valleys to sink, the woods to be covered with leaves, the rocky mountains to rise."

2.5.2CSEL 19:114

quae utique omnia non Iuppiter fecit, qui ante annos mille septingentos natus est, sed ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo, qui uocatur deus, cuius principium quoniam non potest conprehendi, ne quaeri quidem debet.

All these things Jupiter certainly did not make, who was born seventeen hundred years ago, but that "maker of things, the origin of a better world," who is called God, whose beginning, since it cannot be grasped, ought not even to be sought.

2.5.3CSEL 19:114–115

satis est homini ad plenam perfectamque prudentiam, si deum esse intellegat. cuius intellegentiae uis et summa haec est, ut suspiciat et honorificet communem parentem generis humani et rerum mirabilium fabricatorem.

It is enough for man, for full and perfect prudence, to understand that God exists. The force and sum of this understanding is this: that he look up to and honour the common Parent of the human race and the maker of wonderful things.

2.5.4CSEL 19:115

unde quidam hebetis obtunsique cordis elementa, quae et facta sunt et carent sensu, tamquam deos adorant.

Hence some of dull and blunted heart adore the elements, which were both made and lack sense, as if they were gods.

2.5.5CSEL 19:115

qui cum dei opera mirarentur id est caelum cum uariis luminibus, terram cum campis et montibus, mare cum fluminibus et stagnis et fontibus, earum rerum admiratione opstupefacti et ipsius artificis obliti, quem uidere non poterant, opera eius uenerari et colere coeperunt nec umquam intellegere quiuerunt, quanto maior quantoque mirabilior sit qui illa fecit ex nihilo.

For when they admired the works of God, that is, the heaven with its various lights, the earth with its plains and mountains, the sea with its rivers, lakes, and springs, they were stunned with admiration of these things and, forgetting the Maker himself, whom they could not see, began to venerate and worship his works; and they could never understand how much greater and more wonderful is he who made them out of nothing.

2.5.6CSEL 19:115

quae cum uideant diuinis legibus obsequentia commodis atque usibus hominis perpetua necessitate famulari, tamen illa deos existimant esse, ingrati aduersus beneficia diuina, qui deo et patri indulgentissimo sua sibi opera praetulerunt.

Though they see these things obeying divine laws and serving by perpetual necessity the advantage and use of man, they nevertheless think them gods, ungrateful toward the divine benefits, since they have preferred God's own works to God, the most indulgent Father.

2.5.7CSEL 19:115

sed quid mirum si aut barbari aut inperiti homines errant, cum etiam philosophi Stoicae disciplinae in eadem sint opinione, ut omnia caelestia quae mouentur in deorum numero habenda esse censeant? siquidem Lucilius Stoicus aput Ciceronem sic loquitur:

But what wonder if barbarous or unlearned men err, when even philosophers of the Stoic school hold the same opinion, judging that all the heavenly bodies that move are to be counted among the gods? For Lucilius the Stoic speaks thus in Cicero:

2.5.8CSEL 19:115

hanc igitur in stellis constantiam, hanc tantam in tam uariis cursibus in omni aeternitate conuenientiam temporum non possum intellegere sine mente ratione consilio. quae cum in sideribus esse uideamus, non possumus ea ipsa non in deorum numero reponere.

"This constancy, then, in the stars, this great agreement of times through all eternity in such varied courses, I cannot understand without mind, reason, and purpose. And since we see these in the stars, we cannot but place them among the gods."

2.5.9CSEL 19:115–116

item paulo superius: restat inquit ut motus astrorum sit uoluntarius: quae qui uideat, non indocte solum, uerum etiam inpie faciat, si deos esse neget.

Likewise a little earlier: "It remains," he says, "that the motion of the stars is voluntary; and whoever sees this would act not only ignorantly but impiously if he denied that they are gods."

2.5.10CSEL 19:116

nos uero et quidem constanter negamus ac uos, o philosophi, non solum indoctos et inpios, uerum etiam caecos ineptos deliros probamus, qui ignorantiam inperitorum uanitate uicistis. illi enim solem atque lunam, uos etiam sidera deos putatis.

But we deny it, and firmly, and we prove you, O philosophers, not only ignorant and impious, but also blind, foolish, and deranged, who have surpassed the ignorance of the unlearned by your vanity. For they think the sun and moon gods; you think even the stars are.

2.5.11CSEL 19:116

tradite igitur nobis stellarum mysteria, ut aras ac templa singulis erigamus, ut sciamus quo quamque ritu, quo die colamus, quibus nominibus, quibus precibus aduocemus: nisi forte nullo discrimine tam innumerabiles, tam minutos deos aceruatim colere debemus.

Hand down to us, then, the mysteries of the stars, so that we may set up altars and temples to each, so that we may know with what rite and on what day to worship each, and by what names and prayers to call on them; unless perhaps we ought to worship such countless and tiny gods in a heap without distinction.

2.5.12CSEL 19:116

quid quod argumentum illud, quo colligunt uniuersa caelestia deos esse, in contrarium ualet? nam si deos idcirco esse opinantur, quia certos et rationabiles cursus habent, errant. ex hoc enim apparet deos non esse, quod exorbitare illis a praestitutis itineribus non licet.

What of the fact that the argument by which they conclude that all heavenly bodies are gods proves the opposite? For if they think they are gods because they have fixed and regular courses, they err. For from this it appears that they are not gods, because they are not permitted to leave their appointed paths.

2.5.13CSEL 19:116

ceterum si dii essent, huc atque illuc passim sine ulla necessitate ferrentur sicut animantes in terra, quarum quia liberae sunt uoluntates, huc atque illuc uagantur ut libuit, et quo quamque mens duxerit, eo fertur.

Otherwise, if they were gods, they would be carried here and there at random without any necessity, like living creatures on earth, which, because their wills are free, wander here and there as they please, and each goes wherever its mind has led it.

2.5.14CSEL 19:116

non est igitur astrorum motus uoluntarius, sed necessarius, quia praestitutis legibus officiisque deseruiunt.

The motion of the stars, then, is not voluntary but necessary, because they serve fixed laws and duties.

2.5.15CSEL 19:116–117

sed cum disputaret de cursibus siderum, quos ex ipsa rerum ac temporum congruentia intellegebat non esse fortuitos, existimauit uoluntarios esse, tamquam non possent tam disposite, tam ordinate moueri, nisi sensus illis inesset officii sui sciens.

But when he was discussing the courses of the stars, which he understood from the very agreement of things and times not to be fortuitous, he thought they were voluntary, as if they could not move so orderly and so regularly unless there were sense in them aware of their duty.

2.5.16CSEL 19:117

o quam difficilis est ignorantibus ueritas et quam facilis scientibus! si motus inquit astrorum fortuiti non sunt, nihil aliut restat nisi ut uoluntarii sint. immo uero ut non esse fortuitos manifestum est, ita nec uoluntarios.

O how difficult is truth to those who do not know it, and how easy to those who know! "If the motions of the stars are not fortuitous," he says, "nothing remains but that they are voluntary." On the contrary: as it is clear that they are not fortuitous, so neither are they voluntary.

2.5.17CSEL 19:117

quomodo igitur in conficiendis itineribus constantiam suam seruant? nimirum deus uniuersi artifex sic illa disposuit, sic machinatus est, ut per spatia caeli diuina et admirabili ratione decurrerent ad efficiendas succedentium sibi temporum uarietates.

How then do they keep their constancy in completing their journeys? Clearly, God, the Maker of the universe, so arranged and contrived them that they should run through the spaces of heaven by a divine and wonderful plan, to produce the varieties of the seasons succeeding one another.

2.5.18CSEL 19:117

an Archimedes Siculus concauo aere similitudinem mundi ac figuram potuit machinari, in quo ita solem lunamque composuit, ut inaequales motus et caelestibus similes conuersionibus singulis quasi diebus efficerent et non modo accessus solis ac recessus uel incrementa deminutionesque lunae, uerum etiam stellarum uel inerrantium uel uagarum dispares cursus orbis ille dum uertitur exhiberet, deus ergo illa uera non potuit machinari et efficere quae potuit sollertia hominis imitatione simulare?

Could Archimedes of Sicily contrive a likeness and figure of the world in hollow bronze, in which he so arranged the sun and moon that they produced unequal motions, like the heavenly revolutions, as if in single days, and that sphere, as it turned, displayed not only the approach and withdrawal of the sun and the waxing and waning of the moon, but also the unequal courses of the stars, both fixed and wandering; and could God not contrive and make the real things which the skill of man could simulate by imitation?

2.5.19CSEL 19:117

utrumne igitur Stoicus si astrorum figuras in illo aere pictas effictasque uidisset, suo illa consilio moueri diceret ac non potius artificis ingenio? inest ergo sideribus ratio ad peragendos meatus suos apta, sed dei est illa ratio qui et fecit et regit omnia, non ipsorum siderum quae mouentur. nam si solem stare uoluisset,

Would the Stoic, then, if he had seen the figures of the stars painted and fashioned in that bronze, say that they moved by their own purpose and not rather by the skill of the craftsman? There is, then, in the stars a reason fitted to accomplishing their courses, but it is the reason of God, who both made and rules all things, not of the stars themselves which are moved. For if he had wished the sun to stand still,

2.5.20CSEL 19:117–118

perpetuus utique dies esset. item si motus astra non haberent, quis dubitat sempiternam noctem futuram fuisse?

there would certainly be perpetual day. Likewise, if the stars had no motion, who doubts that there would have been everlasting night?

2.5.21CSEL 19:118

sed ut diei ac noctis uices essent, moueri ea uoluit et tam uarie moueri, ut non modo lucis atque tenebrarum mutuae uicissitudines fierent, quibus laboris et quietis alterna spatia constarent, sed etiam frigoris et caloris, ut diuersorum temporum uis ac potestas uel generandis uel maturandis frugibus conueniret.

But so that there might be alternations of day and night, he willed them to move, and to move so variously that there should be not only mutual alternations of light and darkness, by which alternating periods of labour and rest are formed, but also of cold and heat, so that the force and power of the different seasons might suit either the producing or ripening of crops.

2.5.22CSEL 19:118

quam sollertiam diuinae potestatis in machinandis itineribus astrorum quia philosophi non uidebant, animalia esse sidera putauerunt, tamquam pedibus et sponte, non diuina ratione procederent.

Because the philosophers did not see this skill of the divine power in contriving the paths of the stars, they thought the stars were living creatures, as if they advanced on feet and of their own accord, not by divine reason.

2.5.23CSEL 19:118

cur autem illa excogitauerit deus, quis non intellegit? scilicet ne solis lumine decedente nimium caeca nox taetris atque horrentibus tenebris ingrauesceret noceretque uiuentibus. itaque et caelum simul mira uarietate distinxit et tenebras ipsas multis minutisque luminibus temperauit.

And why God devised them, who does not understand? Namely, so that when the sun's light departed, night might not grow too blind and heavy with foul and dreadful darkness and harm the living. So he both adorned the heaven with wonderful variety and tempered the darkness itself with many small lights.

2.5.24CSEL 19:118

quanto igitur Naso prudentius quam illi qui sapientiae studere se putant, qui sensit a deo lumina illa ut horrorem tenebrarum depellerent instituta! is eum librum quo Phaenomena breuiter conprehendit his tribus uersibus terminauit: tot numero talique deus simulacra figura inposuit caelo perque atras sparsa tenebras clara pruinosae iussit dare lumina nocti.

How much more prudent, then, was Naso than those who think they pursue wisdom, since he perceived that those lights were established by God to drive away the horror of darkness! He ended the book in which he briefly covered the Phaenomena with these three verses: "So many in number and of such form God placed likenesses in the sky, and, scattered through the black darkness, commanded them to give bright light to the frosty night."

2.5.25CSEL 19:118

quodsi fieri non potest ut stellae dii sint, ergo ne sol quidem ac luna dii esse possunt, quoniam luminibus astrorum non ratione differunt, sed magnitudine. quodsi hi dii non sunt, ergo ne caelum quidem in quo illa omnia continentur.

But if the stars cannot be gods, then neither can the sun and moon be gods, since they differ from the lights of the stars not in kind but in size. And if these are not gods, then neither is the heaven in which all these are contained.

2.5.26CSEL 19:118–119

simili modo si terra, quam calcamus, quam subigimus et colimus ad uictum, deus non est, ne campi quidem ac montes dii erunt: si hi non sunt, ergo ne tellus quidem uniuersa deus uideri potest.

In the same way, if the earth, which we tread on, which we subdue and cultivate for food, is not a god, neither will the plains and mountains be gods; and if these are not, then neither can the whole earth seem a god.

2.5.27CSEL 19:119

item si aqua, quae seruit animantibus ad usum bibendi aut lauandi, deus non est, ne fontes quidem ex quibus aqua profluit; si fontes non sunt, ne flumina quidem quae de fontibus colliguntur; si flumina quoque dii non sunt, ergo et mare quod ex fluminibus constat deus haberi non potest.

Likewise, if water, which serves living creatures for drinking or washing, is not a god, neither are the springs from which the water flows; if the springs are not, neither are the rivers gathered from the springs; if the rivers too are not gods, then the sea, which is made up of rivers, cannot be held a god either.

2.5.28CSEL 19:119

quodsi neque caelum neque terra neque mare, quae mundi partes sunt, dii esse possunt, ergo ne mundus quidem totus deus est, quem idem ipsi Stoici et animantem et sapientem esse contendunt et propterea deum. in quo tam inconstantes fuerunt, ut nihil ab iis dictum sit quod non ab isdem fuerit euersum.

But if neither heaven nor earth nor sea, which are parts of the world, can be gods, then neither is the whole world a god, which the same Stoics contend is both living and wise and therefore a god. In this they were so inconsistent that nothing was said by them that was not overturned by the same men.

2.5.29CSEL 19:119

sic enim argumentantur: fieri non posse ut sensu careat quod sensibilia ex se generat; mundus autem generat hominem, qui est sensu praeditus: ergo et ipsum esse sensibilem;

For they argue thus: it cannot be that what generates sentient beings from itself lacks sense; but the world generates man, who is endowed with sense; therefore it too is sentient.

2.5.30CSEL 19:119

item, sine sensu esse non posse cuius pars habeat sensum: igitur quia homo sensibilis est, etiam mundo cuius pars est homo inesse sensum.

Likewise: that cannot be without sense of which a part has sense; therefore, since man is sentient, there is also sense in the world, of which man is a part.

2.5.31CSEL 19:119

propositiones quidem uerae sunt, et sensibile esse quod sensu praeditum gignat et habere sensum cuius pars sensu aucta sit, sed adsumtiones falsae quibus argumenta concludunt, quia neque mundus generat hominem neque homo mundi pars est. nam hominem a principio idem deus fecit qui et mundum, et non est pars mundi homo sicut corporis membrum:

The propositions indeed are true, both that what begets a being endowed with sense is sentient and that that has sense of which a part is endowed with sense; but the minor premises by which they conclude the arguments are false, because the world does not beget man, nor is man a part of the world. For the same God who made the world made man from the beginning, and man is not a part of the world as a limb is of a body.

2.5.32CSEL 19:119–120

potest enim mundus esse sine homine sicut urbs et domus. atquin ut domus unius hominis habitaculum est et urbs unius populi, sic et mundus domicilium est totius generis humani: et aliut est quod incolitur, aliut quod incolit.

For the world can exist without man, as a city or a house can. Rather, as a house is the dwelling of one man and a city of one people, so the world is the home of the whole human race; and what is inhabited is one thing, what inhabits another.

2.5.33CSEL 19:120

sed illi dum student id quod falso susceperant confirmare, et sensibilem esse mundum et deum, non uiderunt argumentorum suorum consequentia.

But while they were eager to confirm what they had wrongly adopted, that the world is both sentient and a god, they did not see the consequences of their own arguments.

2.5.34CSEL 19:120

nam si mundi pars est homo et sensibilis est mundus, quia homo sentit, ergo quia mortalis est homo, mortalis sit et mundus necesse est nec tantum mortalis, sed et omnibus morbis passionibusque subiectus.

For if man is part of the world and the world is sentient because man feels, then, since man is mortal, the world too must be mortal, and not only mortal but subject to all diseases and sufferings.

2.5.35CSEL 19:120

et e contrario si deus est mundus et partes eius utique inmortales sunt, ergo et homo deus est, quia pars est ut dicitis mundi. si homo, ergo et iumenta et pecudes et cetera genera bestiarum et auium et piscium, quoniam et illa eodem modo sentiunt et mundi partes sunt.

And conversely, if the world is a god and its parts are certainly immortal, then man too is a god, since he is, as you say, a part of the world. If man, then also beasts of burden and cattle and all other kinds of beasts, birds, and fish, since they too feel in the same way and are parts of the world.

2.5.36CSEL 19:120

at hoc tolerabile est; nam et haec colunt Aegyptii. sed res eo peruenit ut et ranae et culices et formicae dii esse uideantur, quia et ipsis inest sensus et ex parte mundi sunt. ita semper argumenta ex falso petita ineptos et absurdos exitus habent.

But this is tolerable; for the Egyptians worship these too. But the matter comes to this, that frogs, gnats, and ants seem to be gods, since they too have sense and are part of the world. So arguments drawn from a false premise always have foolish and absurd outcomes.

2.5.37CSEL 19:120

quid quod idem ipsi aiunt deorum et hominum causa mundum esse constructum quasi communem domum? ergo mundus nec deus est nec animans, si constructus est: animans enim non construitur, sed nascitur, et si est aedificatus, sic utique tamquam domus, tamquam nauis. est ergo aliquis artifex mundi deus et seorsum erit mundus qui factus est, seorsum ille qui fecit.

What of the fact that these same men say the world was built for the sake of gods and men as a common house? Then the world is neither a god nor a living being, if it was built: for a living being is not built but born; and if it was constructed, it was surely like a house, like a ship. There is, then, some God who is the Maker of the world, and the world which was made will be separate from him who made it.

2.5.38CSEL 19:120–121

iam illut quam repugnans et absurdum, quod cum caelestes ignes ceteraque mundi elementa deos esse adfirment, idem mundum ipsum deum dicunt! quomodo potest ex multorum deorum aceruo unus deus confici?

Now how contradictory and absurd is this, that while they affirm the heavenly fires and the other elements of the world to be gods, they also call the world itself a god! How can one god be made out of a heap of many gods?

2.5.39CSEL 19:121

si astra dii sunt, mundus ergo non deus, sed domicilium deorum est. si uero mundus deus est, ergo illa omnia quae sunt in eo non dii sunt, sed dei membra, quae utique sola dei nomen accipere non possunt. nec enim recte quis dixerit membra

If the stars are gods, then the world is not a god but the dwelling of gods. But if the world is a god, then all the things in it are not gods but limbs of a god, which cannot by themselves receive the name of god. For no one would rightly say that the limbs

2.5.40CSEL 19:121

hominis unius multos homines esse. sed tamen non est similis comparatio animalis et mundi. animal enim quia sensu praeditum est, etiam membra eius habent sensum nec nisi a corpore diuulsa brutescunt. cuius igitur rei similitudinem gerit mundus?

of one man are many men. But the comparison between a living creature and the world is not alike. For a living creature, since it is endowed with sense, has sense in its limbs too, and they become senseless only when torn from the body. What, then, does the world resemble?

2.5.41CSEL 19:121

nimirum ipsi docent, cum factum esse non diffitentur, ut esset diis et hominibus quasi communis domus. si ergo est constructus ut domus, nec ipse deus est nec elementa, quae sunt partes eius, quia neque domus habere dominium sui potest neque illa de quibus domus constat.

They themselves teach it, of course, when they do not deny that it was made to be, as it were, a common house for gods and men. If, then, it was built like a house, neither is it a god, nor are the elements, which are its parts, since neither a house nor the things of which a house consists can have dominion over itself.

2.5.42CSEL 19:121

non tantum igitur ueritate, sed etiam uerbis suis reuincuntur. sicut enim domus in usum habitandi facta per se nihil sentit dominoque subiecta est, qui eam fecit aut incolit, ita mundus per se nihil sentiens factori deo subiacet, qui eum in usum sui fecit.

They are refuted, then, not only by the truth but also by their own words. For as a house made for dwelling feels nothing of itself and is subject to the master who made it or lives in it, so the world, feeling nothing of itself, is subject to God its Maker, who made it for his own use.

Divine 2, chapter 6

2.6.1CSEL 19:121

Duplici ergo ratione peccatur ab insipientibus, primum quod elementa id est dei opera deo praeferunt, deinde quod elementorum ipsorum figuras humana specie conprehensas colunt. nam solis lunaeque simulacra

The foolish, then, sin in two ways: first, in that they prefer the elements, that is, the works of God, to God; next, in that they worship figures of the elements themselves represented in human form. For images of the sun and moon

2.6.2CSEL 19:121–122

humanum in modum formant, item ignis et terrae et maris, quae illi Vulcanum Vestam Neptunum uocant, nec elementis ipsis in aperto litant. tanta homines imaginum cupiditas tenet, ut iam uiliora ducantur illa quae uera sunt: auro scilicet et gemmis et ebore delectantur.

they shape in human fashion, and likewise of fire, earth, and sea, which they call Vulcan, Vesta, and Neptune; and they do not sacrifice to the elements themselves in the open. Such a desire for images holds men that the things which are real are now held cheaper: they delight, of course, in gold and gems and ivory.

2.6.3CSEL 19:122

horum pulchritudo ac nitor praestringit oculos nec ullam religionem putant ubicumque illa non fulserint. itaque sub obtentu deorum auaritia et cupiditas colitur. credunt enim deos amare quidquid ipsi concupiscunt, quidquid est propter quod furta et homicidia et latrocinia cottidie saeuiunt, propter quod bella per totum orbem populos urbesque subuertunt.

The beauty and splendour of these dazzle the eyes, and they think there is no religion wherever these do not shine. So under the cover of gods avarice and greed are worshipped. For they believe the gods love whatever they themselves covet, whatever it is for which thefts, murders, and robberies rage daily, for which wars overturn peoples and cities throughout the world.

2.6.4CSEL 19:122

consecrant ergo diis manubias et rapinas suas, quos certe necesse est inbecillos esse ac summae uirtutis expertes, si subiecti sunt cupiditatibus.

So they consecrate their spoils and plunder to the gods, who surely must be weak and without the highest virtue, if they are subject to desires.

2.6.5CSEL 19:122

cur enim caelestes eos putemus, si desiderant aliquid de terra, uel beatos, si aliqua re indigent, uel incorruptos, si uoluptati habent ea in quibus adpetendis cupiditas hominum non inmerito damnatur?

For why should we think them heavenly, if they desire anything from the earth; or blessed, if they need anything; or incorruptible, if they take pleasure in the things for which men's greed is rightly condemned?

2.6.6CSEL 19:122

ueniunt igitur ad deos non tam religionis gratia, quae nulla potest esse in rebus male partis et corruptibilibus, quam ut aurum oculis hauriant, nitorem leuigati marmoris aut eboris aspiciant, ut insignes lapillis et coloribus uestes uel distincta gemmis fulgentibus pocula insatiabili contemplatione contrectent. et quanto fuerint ornatiora templa et pulchriora simulacra, tanto plus maiestatis habere creduntur: adeo religio eorum nihil est aliut quam quod cupiditas humana miratur.

So they come to the gods not so much for the sake of religion, which can have no place in things ill-gotten and corruptible, as to drink in gold with their eyes, to gaze at the gleam of polished marble or ivory, to handle with insatiable contemplation garments distinguished with jewels and colours or cups adorned with shining gems. And the more ornate the temples and the more beautiful the images, the more majesty they are believed to have: so true is it that their religion is nothing else than what human greed admires.

2.6.7CSEL 19:122

hae sunt religiones, quas sibi a maioribus suis traditas pertinacissime tueri ac defendere perseuerant, nec considerant quales sint, sed ex hoc ueras ac probatas esse confidunt, quod eas ueteres tradiderunt, tantaque est auctoritas uetustatis, ut inquirere in eam scelus esse ducatur. itaque creditur ei passim tamquam cognitae ueritati.

These are the religions, handed down to them by their ancestors, which they persist in guarding and defending most stubbornly. They do not consider what they are like, but are confident they are true and proven from the fact that the ancients handed them down; and so great is the authority of antiquity that to inquire into it is considered a crime. So it is everywhere believed as if it were known truth.

2.6.8CSEL 19:122–123

denique aput Ciceronem sic dicit Cotta Lucilio: habes, Balbe, quid Cotta, quid pontifex sentiat. fac nunc ego intellegam quid tu sentias: a te enim philosopho rationem religionis accipere debeo, maioribus autem nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere.

Indeed, in Cicero, Cotta says this to Lucilius: "You have, Balbus, what Cotta, what a pontiff, thinks. Now let me understand what you think: for from you, a philosopher, I ought to receive a reason for religion, but our ancestors I ought to believe even when no reason is given."

2.6.9CSEL 19:123

si credis, cur ergo rationem requiris, quae potest efficere ne credas? sin rationem quaerendam putas, ergo non credis: ideo enim quaeris, ut eam sequare, cum inueneris.

If you believe, why then do you seek a reason, which can bring it about that you do not believe? But if you think a reason must be sought, then you do not believe: for you seek it in order to follow it when you have found it.

2.6.10CSEL 19:123

docet ecce te ratio non esse ueras deorum religiones: quid facies? maioresne potius an rationem sequeris, quae quidem tibi non ab alio insinuata, sed a te ipso inuenta et elata est, cum omnes religiones radicitus eruisti?

See, reason teaches you that the religions of the gods are not true: what will you do? Will you follow your ancestors rather than reason, which indeed was not instilled into you by another but found and brought out by yourself, when you tore up all religions by the roots?

2.6.11CSEL 19:123

si rationem mauis, discedere te necesse est ab institutis et auctoritate maiorum, quoniam id solum rectum est quod ratio praescribit: si autem pietas maiores sequi suadet, fatere igitur et illos stultos fuisse, qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus seruierunt, et te ineptum, qui id colas quod falsum esse conuiceris.

If you prefer reason, you must depart from the institutions and authority of the ancestors, since that alone is right which reason prescribes. But if piety persuades you to follow the ancestors, then confess both that they were foolish, who served religions devised against reason, and that you are absurd, who worship what you have proved false.

2.6.12CSEL 19:123

sed tamen quoniam nobis tanto opere maiorum nomen opponitur, uideamus tandem qui fuerint maiores illi, a quorum auctoritate discedi nefas ducitur.

But since the name of the ancestors is opposed to us so strongly, let us see at last who those ancestors were from whose authority it is thought wicked to depart.

2.6.13CSEL 19:123–124

Romulus urbem conditurus pastores inter quos adoleuerat conuocauit cumque is numerus condendae urbi parum idoneus uideretur, constituit asylum. eo passim confugerunt ex finitimis locis pessimi quique sine ullo condicionis discrimine.

Romulus, about to found the city, called together the shepherds among whom he had grown up; and when that number seemed too small for founding a city, he set up an asylum. To it fled from the neighbouring places all the worst men, without any distinction of condition.

2.6.14CSEL 19:124

ita conflauit ex his omnibus populum legitque in senatum eos qui aetate anteibant et patres appellauit, quorum consilio gereret omnia. de quo senatu Propertius elegiarum scriptor haec loquitur: bucina cogebat priscos ad uerba Quirites, centum illi in prato saepe senatus erat. curia, praetexto nunc quae nitet alta senatu, pellitos habuit, rustica corda, patres.

So from all these he formed a people, and chose for the senate those who were older and called them Fathers, by whose counsel he conducted everything. Of this senate Propertius, the writer of elegies, says: "The trumpet called the old Quirites to speeches; those hundred men in a meadow were often the senate. The senate house, which now shines on high with its purple-bordered senate, held fathers clad in skins, rustic hearts."

2.6.15CSEL 19:124

hi sunt patres quorum decretis eruditi ac prudentes uiri deuotissime seruiant, idque uerum atque inmutabile omnis posteritas iudicet quod centum pelliti senes statutum esse uoluerunt: quos tamen, ut in primo libro dictum est, Pompilius inlexit, ut uera esse crederent sacra quae ipse tradebat.

These are the fathers whose decrees learned and prudent men most devotedly serve, and all posterity judges true and unchangeable what a hundred skin-clad old men wished to be established; whom, however, as was said in the first book, Pompilius enticed into believing that the rites he himself handed down were true.

2.6.16CSEL 19:124

est uero quod illorum auctoritas tanti habeatur a posteris, quos nemo cum uiuerent neque summus neque infimus adfinitate dignos iudicauit.

There is good reason, surely, for the authority of these men to be so highly esteemed by posterity, whom, while they lived, no one, whether of the highest or the lowest rank, judged worthy of marriage alliance!

Divine 2, chapter 7

2.7.1CSEL 19:124

Quare oportet in ea re maxime in qua uitae ratio uersatur, sibi quemque confidere suoque iudicio ac propriis sensibus niti ad inuestigandam et perpendendam ueritatem, quam credentem alienis erroribus decipi tamquam ipsum rationis expertem.

Therefore it is right, above all in the matter on which the conduct of life turns, that each should trust himself and rely on his own judgment and his own senses in investigating and weighing the truth, rather than, by believing, be deceived by the errors of others as though he himself lacked reason.

2.7.2CSEL 19:124–125

dedit omnibus deus pro uirili portione sapientiam, ut et inaudita inuestigare possent et audita perpendere. nec quia nos illi temporibus antecesserunt, sapientia quoque antecesserunt, quae si omnibus aequaliter datur, occupari ab antecedentibus non potest.

God has given wisdom to all in their proper share, so that they might both investigate things unheard and weigh things heard. Nor, because our ancestors preceded us in time, did they also precede us in wisdom; for if wisdom is given equally to all, it cannot be seized in advance by those who come first.

2.7.3CSEL 19:125

inlibabilis est tamquam lux et claritas solis, quia ut sol oculorum sic sapientia lumen est cordis humani.

It cannot be diminished, like the light and brightness of the sun; for as the sun is the light of the eyes, so wisdom is the light of the human heart.

2.7.4CSEL 19:125

quare cum sapere id est ueritatem quaerere omnibus sit innatum, sapientiam sibi adimunt qui sine ullo iudicio inuenta maiorum probant et ab aliis pecudum more ducuntur.

So since to be wise, that is, to seek the truth, is inborn in all, those take wisdom away from themselves who without any judgment approve what their ancestors discovered and are led by others like cattle.

2.7.5CSEL 19:125

sed hoc fallit, quod maiorum nomine posito non putant fieri posse ut aut ipsi plus sapiant, quia minores uocantur, aut illi desipuerint, quia maiores nominantur.

But they are deceived by this: once the name of "ancestors" (maiores, the greater) is used, they do not think it possible either that they themselves are wiser, because they are called "descendants" (minores, the lesser), or that those were foolish, because they are named "the greater."

2.7.6CSEL 19:125

quid ergo inpedit quin ab ipsis sumamus exemplum, ut quomodo illi quae falsa inuenerant posteris tradiderunt, sic nos qui uerum inuenimus posteris meliora tradamus?

What, then, prevents us from taking an example from them, so that, just as they handed down to posterity the falsehoods they had found, we who have found the truth may hand down better things to posterity?

2.7.7CSEL 19:125

Superest ingens quaestio, cuius disputatio non ab ingenio, sed a scientia uenit: quae pluribus explicanda erit, ne quid omnino dubium relinquatur. nam fortasse aliquis ad illa confugiat, quae a multis et non dubiis traduntur auctoribus, eos ipsos quos docuimus deos non esse, maiestatem suam persaepe ostendisse et prodigiis et somniis et auguriis et oraculis.

There remains a huge question, the discussion of which comes not from ingenuity but from knowledge; it must be explained at greater length, so that no doubt at all may be left. For perhaps someone may take refuge in the things handed down by many trustworthy authors: that those very beings whom we have shown not to be gods have very often shown their majesty by prodigies, dreams, auguries, and oracles.

2.7.8CSEL 19:125–126

et sane multa enumerari possunt digna miraculo, in primis illut, quod Attus Nauius summus augur cum Tarquinium Priscum moneret, ut nihil noui facere inciperet, nisi prius esset inauguratus, eique rex artis eius eleuans fidem diceret ut consultis auibus renuntiaret sibi, utrumne fieri posset id quod ipse animo concepisset, adfirmaretque Nauius posse, cape igitur inquit hanc cotem eamque nouacula dissice. at ille incunctanter accepit ac secuit.

And certainly many things worthy of wonder can be listed, first of all that when Attus Navius, the chief augur, warned Tarquinius Priscus to begin nothing new unless he had first taken the auspices, and the king, disparaging the credibility of his art, told him to consult the birds and report whether what he himself had conceived in his mind could be done, and Navius affirmed that it could, the king said: "Take this whetstone, then, and cut it with a razor." And he took it without hesitation and cut it.

2.7.9CSEL 19:126

deinde illut, quod Castor et Pollux bello Latino aput lacum Iuturnae uisi sunt equorum sudorem abluentes, cum aedes eorum quae iuncta fonti erat sua sponte patuisset.

Next, that Castor and Pollux were seen in the Latin War at the lake of Juturna washing the sweat from their horses, when their temple, which adjoined the spring, had opened of its own accord.

2.7.10CSEL 19:126

idem bello Macedonico equis albis insidentes Publio Vatieno Romam nocte uenienti se obtulisse dicuntur nuntiantes eo die regem Persen uictum atque captum: quod paucis post diebus litterae Pauli uerum fuisse docuerunt.

The same pair, in the Macedonian War, riding white horses, are said to have appeared to Publius Vatienus as he came to Rome at night, announcing that on that day King Perseus had been defeated and captured; and a few days later the letter of Paulus showed that this was true.

2.7.11CSEL 19:126

illut etiam mirabile, quod simulacrum Fortunae Muliebris non semel locutum esse traditur, item Iunonis Monetae, cum captis Veiis unus ex militibus ad eam transferendam missus iocabundus ac ludens interrogaret utrumne Romam migrare uellet, uelle respondit.

This too is wonderful, that the statue of Womanly Fortune is said to have spoken more than once, and likewise that of Juno Moneta: when, after Veii was taken, one of the soldiers sent to move her jokingly and playfully asked whether she wished to move to Rome, she answered that she did.

2.7.12CSEL 19:126

Claudia quoque proponitur in exemplum miraculi. nam cum ex libris Sibyllinis Idaea mater esset accita et in uado Tiberini fluminis nauis qua uehebatur haesisset nec ulla ui commoueretur, Claudiam ferunt, quae semper inpudica esset habita ob nimios corporis cultus, deam submissis genibus orasse, ut si se castam iudicaret, suum cingulum sequeretur: ita nauem, quae ab omni iuuentute non ualuit commoueri, ab una muliere esse commotam.

Claudia too is put forward as an example of a miracle. For when the Idaean Mother had been summoned in accordance with the Sibylline books, and the ship carrying her had stuck in a shallow of the Tiber and could not be moved by any force, they say that Claudia, who had always been thought unchaste because of her excessive attention to her person, prayed to the goddess on bended knees that, if she judged her chaste, she would follow her girdle; and so the ship, which all the young men could not move, was moved by one woman.

2.7.13CSEL 19:126

illut aeque mirum, quod lue saeuiente Aesculapius Epidauro accitus urbem Romam diuturna pestilentia

Equally wonderful is that, when a plague was raging, Aesculapius, summoned from Epidaurus, is said to have freed the city of Rome from a long pestilence.

2.7.14CSEL 19:126–127

liberasse perhibetur. sacrilegi quoque numerari possunt, quorum praesentibus poenis iniuriam suam dii uindicasse creduntur.

Sacrilegious men too can be listed, by whose immediate punishment the gods are believed to have avenged the wrong done to them.

2.7.15CSEL 19:127

Appius Claudius censor cum ad seruos publicos sacra Herculis transtulisset, luminibus orbatus est et Potitiorum gens, quae prodidit, intra unius anni tempus extincta est.

Appius Claudius the censor, when he had transferred the rites of Hercules to public slaves, was deprived of his sight, and the family of the Potitii, who had given them up, died out within a single year.

2.7.16CSEL 19:127

item censor Fuluius cum ei Iunonis Laciniae templo marmoreas tegulas abstulisset, quibus aedem Fortunae Equestris quam Romae fecerat tegeret, et mente captus est et amissis duobus filiis in Illyrico militantibus summo animi maerore consumptus est.

Likewise the censor Fulvius, when he had taken the marble tiles from the temple of Lacinian Juno to roof the temple of Equestrian Fortune which he had built at Rome, both lost his mind and, having lost two sons serving in Illyricum, was consumed by the deepest grief.

2.7.17CSEL 19:127

praefectus etiam Marci Antonii Turullius cum aput Coos euerso Aesculapii luco classem fecisset, eodem postea loco a militibus Caesaris interfectus est.

Also Turullius, a prefect of Mark Antony, having cut down the grove of Aesculapius on Cos to build a fleet, was later killed in that same place by Caesar's soldiers.

2.7.18CSEL 19:127

his exemplis adiungitur Pyrrhus, qui sublata ex thensauro Proserpinae Locrensis pecunia naufragium fecit ac uicinis deae litoribus inlisus est, ut nihil praeter eam pecuniam incolume reperiretur.

To these examples is added Pyrrhus, who, having taken money from the treasury of Proserpina at Locri, was shipwrecked and dashed on the shores near the goddess's shrine, so that nothing was found safe except that money.

2.7.19CSEL 19:127

Ceres quoque Milesia multum sibi aput homines uenerationis adiecit. nam cum ab Alexandro capta ciuitas esset ac milites ad eam spoliandam inrupissent, oculos omnium repente obiectus fulgor exstinxit.

Milesian Ceres too gained much veneration among men. For when the city had been taken by Alexander and the soldiers had burst in to plunder her, a flash suddenly thrown before them put out the eyes of all.

2.7.20CSEL 19:127–128

referuntur etiam somnia quae uim deorum uideantur ostendere. Tiberio namque Atinio homini plebeio per quietem obuersatus esse Iuppiter dicitur et praecepisse, ut consulibus et senatui nuntiaret ludis Circensibus proximis praesultorem sibi displicuisse, quod Autronius Maximus quidam uerberatum seruum sub furca medio circo ad supplicium duxerat, ideoque ludos instaurari oportere:

Dreams too are reported which seem to show the power of the gods. For Jupiter is said to have appeared in sleep to Tiberius Atinius, a plebeian, and to have commanded him to tell the consuls and senate that the leading dancer at the last Circensian games had displeased him, because a certain Autronius Maximus had led a slave, after scourging him, under the fork through the middle of the circus to execution, and that the games must therefore be renewed.

2.7.21CSEL 19:128

quod cum ille neclexisset, eodem die filium perdidisse, ipse autem graui morbo esse correptus; et cum rursus eandem imaginem cerneret quaerentem satisne poenarum pro neclecto imperio pependisset, lectica delatus ad consules et omni re in senatu exposita recepisse corporis firmitatem suisque pedibus domum redisse.

When he neglected this, he lost his son that same day and was himself seized by a serious illness; and when he again saw the same figure asking whether he had paid enough penalty for neglecting the command, he was carried in a litter to the consuls, and when the whole matter had been laid before the senate, he recovered his bodily strength and returned home on his own feet.

2.7.22CSEL 19:128

illut quoque somnium non minoris admirationis fuit quo Caesar Augustus dicitur esse seruatus. nam cum bello ciuili Brutiano inplicitus graui morbo abstinere proelio statuisset, medico eius Artorio Mineruae species obuersata est monens, ne propter corporis inbecillitatem castris se Caesar contineret. itaque in aciem lectica perlatus est et eodem die a Bruto castra

No less wonderful was that dream by which Caesar Augustus is said to have been saved. For when, involved in the civil war against Brutus, he had decided to stay out of battle because of a serious illness, the figure of Minerva appeared to his physician Artorius, warning that Caesar should not keep to the camp because of his bodily weakness. So he was carried into the battle line in a litter, and on that same day his camp was

2.7.23CSEL 19:128

capta sunt. multa praeterea possunt similia exempla proferri, sed uereor ne si fuero in propositione rerum contrariarum diutius inmoratus, aut oblitus esse propositi uidear aut crimen loquacitatis incurram.

taken by Brutus. Many similar examples can be brought forward besides, but I fear that if I linger too long in setting out opposing matters, I may seem either to have forgotten my purpose or to incur the charge of talkativeness.

Divine 2, chapter 8

2.8.1CSEL 19:128–129

Exponam igitur istorum omnium rationem, quo facilius res difficiles et obscurae intellegantur, et has omnes simulati numinis praestrigias reuelabo, quibus inducti homines a ueritatis uia longius recesserunt.

I shall therefore set out the explanation of all these things, so that difficult and obscure matters may be more easily understood, and I shall unveil all these deceptions of a counterfeit divinity, by which men have been led far away from the path of truth.

2.8.2CSEL 19:129

sed repetam longe altius, ut si quis ad legendum ueri expers et ignarus accesserit, instruatur atque intellegat quod tandem sit caput horum et causa malorum, et lumine accepto suos ac totius generis humani perspiciat errores.

But I shall go back much further, so that anyone who comes to read without knowledge of the truth may be instructed and understand what at last is the head and cause of these evils, and, having received the light, may see through his own errors and those of the whole human race.

2.8.3CSEL 19:129

cum esset deus ad excogitandum prouidentissimus, ad faciendum sollertissimus, antequam ordiretur hoc opus mundi, quoniam pleni et consummati boni fons in ipso erat, sicut est semper, ut ab eo bonum tamquam riuus oreretur longeque proflueret, produxit similem sui spiritum, qui esset uirtutibus patris dei praeditus. quomodo autem id uoluerit, in quarto libro docere conabimur.

Since God was most provident in planning and most skilful in making, before he began this work of the world, because the fountain of full and complete good was in him, as it always is, so that good might spring from him like a stream and flow far, he brought forth a Spirit like himself, who should be endowed with the powers of God the Father. How he willed this, we shall try to teach in the fourth book.

2.8.4CSEL 19:129

deinde fecit alterum, in quo indoles diuinae stirpis non permansit. itaque suapte inuidia tamquam ueneno infectus est et ex bono ad malum transcendit suoque arbitrio, quod illi a deo liberum fuerat datum, contrarium sibi nomen adsciuit.

Then he made another, in whom the character of the divine stock did not remain. So he was infected by his own envy as by poison and passed over from good to evil, and by his own choice, which had been given him free by God, he took for himself a name contrary to him.

2.8.5CSEL 19:129–130

unde apparet cunctorum malorum fontem esse liuorem. inuidit enim illi antecessori suo, qui deo patri perseuerando cum probatus tum etiam carus est.

From this it appears that envy is the fountain of all evils. For he envied that one who came before him, who by persevering with God the Father is both approved and also dear.

2.8.6CSEL 19:130

hunc ergo ei bono per se malum effectum Graeci διάβολον appellant, nos criminatorem uocamus, quod crimina in quae ipse inlicit ad deum deferat.

This one, then, who from good became evil by his own act, the Greeks call diabolos; we call him the accuser, because he reports to God the crimes into which he himself entices men.

2.8.7CSEL 19:130–132

exorsus igitur deus fabricam mundi illum primum et maximum filium praefecit operi uniuerso eoque simul et consiliatore usus est et artifice in excogitandis ordinandis perficiendisque rebus, quoniam is et prouidentia et ratione et potestate perfectus est; de quo nunc parcius, quod alio loco et uirtus eius et nomen et ratio enarranda nobis erit.

So God, beginning the fabric of the world, set that first and greatest Son over the whole work and used him at once as counsellor and craftsman in devising, arranging, and completing things, since he is perfect in providence, reason, and power. Of him I say little now, because his power, name, and nature must be set out by us in another place.

2.8.8CSEL 19:132

nemo quaerat ex quibus ista materiis tam magna, tam mirifica opera deus fecerit: omnia enim fecit ex nihilo. nec audiendi sunt poetae, qui aiunt chaos in principio fuisse, id est confusionem rerum atque elementorum, postea uero deum diremisse omnem illam congeriem singulisque rebus ex confuso aceruo separatis in ordinemque discriptis instruxisse mundum pariter et ornasse.

Let no one ask from what materials God made such great and wonderful works: for he made all things out of nothing. Nor are the poets to be listened to, who say that chaos was in the beginning, that is, a confusion of things and elements, and that afterwards God divided that whole mass and, having separated each thing from the confused heap and arranged them in order, both built and adorned the world.

2.8.9CSEL 19:132

quibus facile est respondere potestatem dei non intellegentibus, quem credant nihil efficere posse nisi ex materia subiacente ac parata: in quo errore etiam philosophi fuerunt.

It is easy to answer them, since they do not understand the power of God, whom they believe can make nothing except from material lying ready and prepared; and in this error even the philosophers were.

2.8.10CSEL 19:132

nam Cicero de natura deorum disputans ait sic: primum igitur non est probabile eam materiam rerum unde omnia orta sunt esse diuina prouidentia effectam, sed et habere et habuisse uim et naturam suam.

For Cicero, discussing the nature of the gods, says this: "First, then, it is not probable that the matter of things from which all things arose was made by divine providence, but that it has and has had its own force and nature.

2.8.11CSEL 19:132

ut igitur faber cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed utitur ea quae sit parata, fictorque item cera, sic isti prouidentiae diuinae materiam praesto esse oportuit, non quam ipsa faceret, sed quam haberet paratam. quodsi materia non est a deo facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aer et ignis a deo factus est.

As, therefore, a builder, when he is going to build something, does not himself make the material but uses what is ready, and a modeller likewise uses wax, so for that divine providence material had to be at hand, not one which it made itself, but one which it had ready. But if matter was not made by God, then neither earth nor water nor air nor fire was made by God."

2.8.12CSEL 19:132–133

o quam multa sunt uitia in his decem uersibus! primum quod is qui in aliis disputationibus et libris fere omnibus prouidentiae fuerit adsertor et qui acerrimis argumentis inpugnauerit eos qui prouidentiam non esse dixerunt, idem nunc quasi proditor aliquis aut transfuga prouidentiam conatus est tollere.

O how many faults there are in these ten lines! First, that he who in other discussions and in almost all his books was a champion of providence, and who attacked with the sharpest arguments those who said there was no providence, now like some traitor or deserter has tried to abolish providence.

2.8.13CSEL 19:133

in quo si contra dicere uelis, nec cogitatione opus est nec labore: sua illi dicta recitanda sunt; nec enim poterit ab ullo Cicero quam a Cicerone uehementius refutari.

If you wished to contradict him in this, you need neither thought nor labour: his own words need only be read out to him; for Cicero could be refuted by no one more forcefully than by Cicero.

2.8.14CSEL 19:133

sed concedamus hoc mori et instituto Academicorum, ut liceat hominibus ualde liberis dicere ac sentire quae uelint: sententias ipsas consideremus. non est inquit probabile materiam rerum a deo factam. quibus hoc argumentis doces?

But let us grant this to the custom and practice of the Academics, that men who are very free may say and think what they like: let us consider the opinions themselves. "It is not probable," he says, "that the matter of things was made by God." By what arguments do you show this?

2.8.15CSEL 19:133

nihil enim dixisti quare hoc non sit probabile.

For you have said nothing about why this is not probable.

2.8.16CSEL 19:133

itaque mihi e contrario uel maxime probabile uidetur, nec tamen temere uidetur, cogitanti plus esse aliquid in deo, quem profecto ad inbecillitatem hominis redigis, cui nihil aliut quam opificium concedis.

So to me, on the contrary, it seems most probable, and not without reason, when I consider that there is something more in God, whom you reduce to the weakness of man, granting him nothing but craftsmanship.

2.8.17CSEL 19:133

quo igitur ab homine diuina illa uis differet, si ut homo sic etiam deus ope indiget aliena? indiget autem, si nihil moliri potest, nisi ab altero illi materia ministretur. quod si fit, inperfectae utique uirtutis est, et erit iam potentior iudicandus materiae institutor. quo ergo nomine appellabitur qui potentia deum uincit?

In what, then, will that divine power differ from man, if God, like man, needs another's help? And he does need it, if he can build nothing unless material is supplied to him by another. If that is so, his power is certainly imperfect, and the one who provided the material must now be judged more powerful. By what name, then, will he be called who surpasses God in power?

2.8.18CSEL 19:133

siquidem maius est propria facere quam aliena disponere.

For it is greater to make one's own things than to arrange another's.

2.8.19CSEL 19:133

si autem fieri non potest ut sit potentius deo quicquam, quem necesse est perfectae esse uirtutis potestatis rationis, idem igitur materiae fictor est qui et rerum ex materia constantium. neque enim deo non faciente et inuito esse aliquid aut potuit aut debuit.

But if it cannot be that anything is more powerful than God, who must be of perfect power, might, and reason, then the same one is the maker of matter who is the maker of the things that consist of matter. For nothing either could or should exist without God making it or against his will.

2.8.20CSEL 19:133–134

sed probabile est inquit materiam rerum (et) habere et habuisse uim et naturam suam. quam uim potuit habere nullo dante, quam naturam nullo generante? si habuit uim, ab aliquo eam sumpsit. a quo autem sumere nisi a deo potuit?

"But it is probable," he says, "that the matter of things both has and has had its own force and nature." What force could it have if no one gave it? What nature if no one begot it? If it had force, it took it from someone. From whom could it take it except from God?

2.8.21CSEL 19:134

si habuit naturam, quae utique a nascendo dicitur, nata est. a quo autem nisi a deo potuit procreari? natura enim, qua dicitis orta esse omnia, si consilium non habet, efficere nihil potest: si autem generandi et faciendi potens est, habet ergo consilium et propterea deus sit

If it had a nature, which is certainly named from being born (nasci), it was born. From whom but God could it have been produced? For nature, from which you say all things arose, if it has no purpose, can make nothing; but if it is able to generate and make, then it has purpose and therefore must be

2.8.22CSEL 19:134

necesse est, nec alio nomine appellari potest ea uis, in qua inest et prouidentia excogitandi et sollertia potestasque faciendi.

God; nor can that force be called by any other name, in which there is both the providence to devise and the skill and power to make.

2.8.23CSEL 19:134

melius igitur Seneca omnium Stoicorum acutissimus, qui uidit nihil aliut esse naturam quam deum. ergo inquit deum non laudabimus, cui naturalis est uirtus? nec enim illam didicit ex ullo. immo laudabimus. quamuis enim naturalis illi sit, sibi illam dedit, quoniam deus ipse natura est.

Better, then, Seneca, the keenest of all the Stoics, who saw that nature is nothing else than God. "Shall we then not praise God," he says, "whose virtue is natural? For he did not learn it from anyone. Yes, we shall praise him; for although it is natural to him, he gave it to himself, since God himself is nature."

2.8.24CSEL 19:134

cum igitur ortum rerum tribuis naturae ac detrahis deo, in eodem luto haesitans uersura soluis, Geta. a quo enim fieri negas, ab eodem plane fieri mutato nomine confiteris.

When, then, you assign the origin of things to nature and take it from God, "stuck in the same mud, you pay off a debt by borrowing, Geta." For you plainly confess, with the name changed, that things were made by the one by whom you deny they were made.

2.8.25CSEL 19:134

sequitur ineptissima comparatio. ut faber inquit cum quid aedificaturus est, non ipse facit materiam, sed utitur ea quae sit parata, fictorque item cera, sic isti prouidentiae diuinae materiam praesto esse oportuit, non quam ipsa faceret, sed quam haberet paratam.

There follows a most foolish comparison. "As a builder," he says, "when he is going to build something, does not himself make the material but uses what is ready, and a modeller likewise wax, so for that divine providence material had to be at hand, not one which it made itself, but one which it had ready."

2.8.26CSEL 19:134–135

immo uero non oportuit: erit enim deus minoris potestatis, si ex parato facit; quod est hominis. faber sine ligno nihil aedificabit, quia lignum ipsum facere non potest; non posse autem inbecillitatis humanae est.

On the contrary, it did not have to: for God will be of lesser power if he makes things from what is ready, which is man's way. A builder will build nothing without wood, because he cannot make the wood itself; and not to be able belongs to human weakness.

2.8.27CSEL 19:135

deus uero facit sibi ipse materiam, quia potest: posse enim dei est; nam si non potest, deus non est.

But God makes material for himself, because he can: for to be able belongs to God; if he cannot, he is not God.

2.8.28CSEL 19:135

homo facit ex eo quod est, quia per mortalitatem inbecillus est, per inbecillitatem definitae ac modicae potestatis; deus autem facit ex eo quod non est, quia per aeternitatem fortis est, per fortitudinem potestatis inmensae, quae fine ac modo careat sicut uita factoris.

Man makes from what exists, because through mortality he is weak, and through weakness of limited and moderate power; but God makes from what does not exist, because through eternity he is strong, and through strength of immense power, which has neither end nor measure, like the life of the Maker.

2.8.29CSEL 19:135

quid ergo mirum si facturus mundum deus prius materiam de qua faceret praeparauit et praeparauit ex eo quod non erat? quia nefas est deum aliunde aliquid mutuari, cum ex ipso uel in ipso sint omnia.

What wonder, then, if God, when about to make the world, first prepared the material from which to make it, and prepared it out of what did not exist? For it is unthinkable that God should borrow anything from elsewhere, since all things are from him or in him.

2.8.30CSEL 19:135

nam si est aliquid ante illum, si factum est quicquam non ab ipso, iam potestatem dei et nomen amittet. at enim materia numquam facta est sicut deus, qui ex materia fecit hunc mundum.

For if there is anything before him, if anything was made not by him, he will lose both the power and the name of God. "But matter was never made, just as God, who made this world out of matter, was not."

2.8.31CSEL 19:135

duo igitur constituuntur aeterna et quidem inter se contraria, quod fieri sine discordia et pernicie non potest; conlidant enim necesse est ea quorum uis ac ratio diuersa est. sic utraque aeterna esse non poterunt, si repugnant, quia superare alterum necesse est.

Then two eternal things are established, and those contrary to each other, which cannot happen without discord and destruction; for things whose force and nature are different must collide. So both could not be eternal if they conflict, since one must overcome the other.

2.8.32CSEL 19:135

ergo fieri non potest quin aeterni natura sit simplex, ut inde omnia uelut ex fonte descenderint. itaque aut deus ex materia ortus est aut materia ex deo. quid horum sit uerius facile est intellegi. ex his enim duobus alterum sensibile est, alterum caret sensu.

It must be, therefore, that the nature of the eternal is simple, so that all things may descend from it as from a fountain. So either God arose from matter or matter from God. Which of these is truer is easy to understand. For of these two, one has sense, the other lacks sense.

2.8.33CSEL 19:135–136

potestas faciendi aliquid non potest esse nisi in eo quod sentit, quod sapit, quod cogitat, quod mouetur.

The power of making anything can exist only in what feels, is wise, thinks, and moves.

2.8.34CSEL 19:136

nec incipi aut fieri aut consummari quicquam potest, nisi fuerit ratione prouisum et quemadmodum fiat antequam est et quemadmodum constet postquam fuerit effectum.

Nor can anything be begun, made, or completed unless it has been foreseen by reason both how it is to be made before it exists and how it is to endure after it has been made.

2.8.35CSEL 19:136

denique is facit aliquid qui habet uoluntatem ad faciendum et manus ad id quod uoluit inplendum. quod autem insensibile est, iners et torpidum semper iacet; nihil inde oriri potest ubi nullus est motus uoluntarius.

In short, he makes something who has the will to make it and hands to carry out what he has willed. But what lacks sense always lies inert and sluggish; nothing can arise from where there is no voluntary motion.

2.8.36CSEL 19:136

nam si omne animal ratione constat, certe nasci non potest ex eo quod ratione praeditum non est, nec aliunde accipi potest id quod ibi unde petitur non est.

For if every living creature consists of reason, it certainly cannot be born from what is not endowed with reason, nor can what is not in the source be received from it.

2.8.37CSEL 19:136

nec tamen commoneat aliquem quod animalia quaedam de terra nasci uidentur. haec enim non terra per se gignit, sed spiritus dei, sine quo nihil gignitur.

Nor let it disturb anyone that certain animals seem to be born from the earth. For the earth does not beget these of itself, but the Spirit of God, without whom nothing is begotten.

2.8.38CSEL 19:136

non ergo deus ex materia, quia sensu praeditum ex insensibili, sapiens ex bruto, inpatibile de patibili, expers corporis de corporali numquam potest oriri, sed materia potius ex deo est.

God, then, is not from matter, because the sentient can never arise from the insentient, the wise from the brute, the impassible from the passible, the bodiless from the bodily; rather matter is from God.

2.8.39CSEL 19:136

quidquid est enim solido et contrectabili corpore, accipit externam uim; quod accipit uim, dissolubile est; quod dissoluitur, interibit; quod interit, ortum sit necesse est; quod ortum est, habuit fontem unde oreretur id est factorem aliquem sentientem prouidum peritumque faciendi. is est profecto nec ullus alius quam deus.

For whatever has a solid and tangible body receives external force; what receives force is dissoluble; what is dissolved will perish; what perishes must have come into being; what has come into being had a source from which it arose, that is, some maker who is sentient, provident, and skilled in making. This is certainly none other than God.

2.8.40CSEL 19:136–137

qui quoniam sensu ratione prouidentia potestate uirtute praeditus est, et animantia et inanima creare et efficere potest, quia tenet quomodo sit quidque faciendum.

And since he is endowed with sense, reason, providence, power, and might, he can create and make both living and lifeless things, because he knows how each thing is to be made.

2.8.41CSEL 19:137

materia uero semper fuisse non potest, quia mutationem non caperet, si fuisset. quod enim semper fuit, semper esse non desinit, et unde afuit principium, abesse hinc etiam finem necesse est. quin etiam facilius est ut id quod habuit initium fine careat, quam ut habeat finem quod initio caruit.

But matter cannot always have existed, because it would not admit change if it had. For what always was does not cease always to be, and from what has had no beginning an end also must be absent. Indeed, it is easier for what had a beginning to lack an end than for what lacked a beginning to have an end.

2.8.42CSEL 19:137

materia igitur si facta non est, nec fieri ex ea quicquam potest; si fieri ex ea non potest, ne materia quidem erit; materia est enim ex qua fit aliquid. omne autem ex quo fit, quia recipit opificis manum, destruitur et aliut esse incipit.

So if matter was not made, nothing can be made from it either; if nothing can be made from it, it will not even be matter; for matter is that from which something is made. But everything from which something is made, since it receives the craftsman's hand, is destroyed and begins to be something else.

2.8.43CSEL 19:137

ergo quoniam finem habuit materia tum, cum factus est ex ea mundus, et initium quoque habuit. nam quod destruitur, aedificatum est, quod soluitur, alligatum, quod finitur, inceptum. si ergo ex commutatione ac fine materia colligitur habuisse principium, a quo alio fieri nisi a deo potuit?

Therefore, since matter had an end when the world was made from it, it also had a beginning. For what is destroyed was built up, what is loosed was bound, what is ended was begun. If, then, it is gathered from its change and end that matter had a beginning, by whom else could it have been made but by God?

2.8.44CSEL 19:137

solus igitur deus est qui factus non est, et idcirco destruere alia potest, ipse destrui non potest. permanebit semper in eo quod fuit, quia non est aliunde generatus, nec ortus ac natiuitas eius ex aliqua re altera pendet, quae illum mutata dissoluat. ex se ipso est, ut in primo diximus libro, et ideo talis est qualem esse se uoluit, inpassibilis inmutabilis incorruptus beatus aeternus.

God alone, then, is the one who was not made, and therefore he can destroy other things but cannot himself be destroyed. He will always remain in what he was, because he was not begotten from elsewhere, nor does his origin and birth depend on any other thing which, if changed, might dissolve him. He is from himself, as we said in the first book, and therefore he is such as he willed to be: impassible, unchangeable, incorrupt, blessed, eternal.

2.8.45CSEL 19:137

iam uero illa conclusio qua sententiam terminauit multo absurdior. quodsi materia inquit non est a deo facta, ne terra quidem et aqua et aer et ignis a deo factus est. quam callide periculum praeteruolauit!

Now that conclusion with which he ended the sentence is much more absurd: "But if matter was not made by God, neither were earth and water and air and fire made by God." How cleverly he flew past the danger!

2.8.46CSEL 19:137–138

sic enim superius illut adsumpsit, tamquam probatione non indigeret, cum id multo esset incertius quam illud propter quod adsumptum est. si non est inquit a deo facta materia, nec mundus a deo factus est.

For he assumed the former point as if it needed no proof, although it was much more uncertain than that for the sake of which it was assumed. "If matter was not made by God," he says, "neither was the world made by God."

2.8.47CSEL 19:138

ex falso maluit colligere quod est falsum quam ex uero quod uerum, et cum debeant incerta de certis probari, hic probationem sumpsit ex incerto ad euertendum quod erat certum.

He preferred to infer the false from the false rather than the true from the true; and while uncertain things ought to be proved from certain ones, he took his proof from the uncertain to overturn what was certain.

2.8.48CSEL 19:138

nam diuina prouidentia effectum esse mundum, ut taceam de Trismegisto qui hoc praedicat, taceam de carminibus Sibyllarum quae idem nuntiant, taceam de prophetis qui opus mundi et opificium dei uno spiritu et pari uoce testantur, etiam inter philosophos paene uniuersos conuenit; id enim Pythagorei Stoici Peripatetici, quae sunt principales omnium disciplinae.

For that the world was made by divine providence (to say nothing of Trismegistus, who proclaims this, nothing of the verses of the Sibyls, which announce the same, nothing of the prophets, who testify with one spirit and a like voice to the work of the world and the craftsmanship of God) is agreed even among almost all philosophers; for this the Pythagoreans, Stoics, and Peripatetics, which are the chief schools of all, hold.

2.8.49CSEL 19:138

denique a primis illis septem sapientibus ad Socraten usque ac Platonem pro confesso et indubitato habitum est, donec unus multis post saeculis extitit delirus Epicurus, qui auderet negare id quod est euidentissimum, studio scilicet inueniendi noua, ut nomine suo constitueret disciplinam.

In short, from those first seven wise men down to Socrates and Plato it was held as admitted and undoubted, until, many ages later, there arose one crazy Epicurus, who dared to deny what is most evident, from a desire, of course, of finding novelties, so that he might found a school in his own name.

2.8.50CSEL 19:138

et quia nihil noui potuit reperire, ut tamen dissentire a ceteris uideretur, uetera uoluit euertere: in quo illum circumlatrantes philosophi omnes coarguerunt. certius est igitur mundum prouidentia instructum quam materiam prouidentia conglobatam.

And because he could find nothing new, he wished to overturn old views, so as still to seem to disagree with the rest; in which all the philosophers barking around him refuted him. It is more certain, then, that the world was built by providence than that matter was gathered by providence.

2.8.51CSEL 19:138–139

quare non oportuit putare idcirco non esse mundum diuina prouidentia factum, quia materia eius diuina prouidentia facta non sit, sed quia mundus diuina prouidentia sit effectus, etiam materiam factam esse diuinitus.

So he ought not to have thought that the world was not made by divine providence because its matter was not made by divine providence, but, because the world was made by divine providence, that matter too was made by God.

2.8.52CSEL 19:139

credibilius est enim materiam potius a deo factam, quia deus potest omnia, quam mundum non esse a deo factum, quia sine mente ratione consilio nihil fieri potest.

For it is more credible that matter was made by God, since God can do all things, than that the world was not made by God, since nothing can be made without mind, reason, and purpose.

2.8.53CSEL 19:139

uerum haec non Ciceronis est culpa, sed sectae. cum enim suscepisset disputationem qua deorum naturam tolleret, de qua philosophi garriebant, omnem diuinitatem ignorantia ueri putauit esse tollendam.

But this is not Cicero's fault but his school's. For when he had undertaken a discussion to do away with the nature of the gods, about which the philosophers prattled, in ignorance of the truth he thought that all divinity had to be done away with.

2.8.54CSEL 19:139

itaque deos potuit tollere, quia non erant: cum autem prouidentiam diuinam quae est in uno deo conaretur euertere, quia contra ueritatem niti coeperat, deficientibus argumentis in hanc foueam necessario decidit, unde se extricare non posset. hic ergo illum teneo haerentem, teneo defixum, quoniam Lucilius qui contra disserebat ommutuit.

So he could do away with the gods, because they did not exist; but when he tried to overturn the divine providence which is in the one God, because he had begun to strive against the truth, his arguments failed and he necessarily fell into this pit, from which he could not extricate himself. Here, then, I hold him stuck, I hold him fixed, since Lucilius, who argued on the other side, fell silent.

2.8.55CSEL 19:139

hic est cardo rerum, hic uertuntur omnia. explicet se Cotta si potest ex hac uoragine, proferat argumenta quibus doceat semper fuisse materiam, quam nulla prouidentia effecerit, ostendat quomodo quicquam ponderosum et graue aut esse potuerit sine auctore aut inmutari ualuerit, ac desierit esse quod semper fuit, ut inciperet esse quod numquam fuit.

This is the hinge of things, on this all turns. Let Cotta extricate himself from this abyss if he can; let him bring forward arguments to show that matter always existed, which no providence made; let him show how anything ponderous and heavy could either exist without an author or be changed, and cease to be what it always was, so as to begin to be what it never was.

2.8.56CSEL 19:139

quae si docuerit, tum demum adsentiar ne mundum quidem diuina prouidentia constitutum, et tamen sic adsentiar, ut aliis illum laqueis teneam.

If he proves these things, then at last I will agree that even the world was not established by divine providence; and yet I will agree in such a way as to hold him with other snares.

2.8.57CSEL 19:139–140

eodem enim quo nolet reuoluetur, ut dicat et materiam, de qua mundus est, et mundum, qui de materia est, natura extitisse, cum ego ipsam naturam deum esse contendam.

For he will come back to the point to which he does not wish to come, so as to say that both the matter of which the world is made and the world which is made of matter arose by nature, while I contend that nature itself is God.

2.8.58CSEL 19:140

nec enim potest facere mirabilia id est maxima ratione constantia nisi qui habet mentem prouidentiam potestatem.

For no one can make wonderful things, that is, things constituted with the greatest reason, except one who has mind, providence, and power.

2.8.59CSEL 19:140

ita fiet ut deus fecerit omnia nec quicquam esse possit omnino quod non originem a deo traxerit.

So it will follow that God made all things, and that nothing at all can exist which has not drawn its origin from God.

2.8.60CSEL 19:140

at idem quotiens Epicureus est ac non uult a deo factum esse mundum, quaerere solet quibus manibus, quibus machinis, quibus uectibus, qua molitione tantum hoc opus fecerit. uideres fortasse, si eo tempore potuisses esse quo fecit.

But the same man, whenever he plays the Epicurean and does not want the world to have been made by God, usually asks with what hands, what machines, what levers, what effort he made so great a work. You might perhaps have seen it, had you been able to be there at the time he made it.

2.8.61CSEL 19:140

sed ne perspiceret homo dei opera, noluit eum inducere in hunc mundum nisi perfectis omnibus.

But so that man might not see through the works of God, God did not wish to bring him into this world until everything was completed.

2.8.62CSEL 19:140

sed ne induci quidem poterat: quomodo enim subsisteret, cum fabricaretur desuper caelum, terra subter fundaretur, cum fortasse umida uel nimiis rigoribus torporata concrescerent uel igneis caloribus incocta et solidata durescerent? aut quomodo uiueret nondum sole instituto nec frugibus aut animalibus natis? itaque necesse fuit hominem postremo fieri, cum iam mundo ceterisque rebus manus summa esset inposita.

But he could not even have been brought in: for how could he have survived while the heaven was being fashioned above and the earth being founded below, when perhaps things were either congealing, damp or stiffened by excessive cold, or hardening, baked and solidified by fiery heat? Or how could he have lived before the sun was established and before crops or animals were born? So it was necessary that man be made last, when the finishing hand had already been put to the world and everything else.

2.8.63CSEL 19:140

denique sanctae litterae docent hominem fuisse ultimum dei opus et sic inductum esse in hunc mundum quasi in domum iam paratam et instructam; illius enim causa facta sunt omnia.

In fact, the holy writings teach that man was God's last work and was brought into this world as into a house already prepared and furnished; for all things were made for his sake.

2.8.64CSEL 19:140–141

idem etiam poetae fatentur. Ouidius perfecto iam mundo et uniuersis animalibus figuratis hoc addidit: sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altae derat adhuc et quod dominari in cetera posset, natus homo est. adeo nefas existimandum est ea scrutari quae deus uoluit esse celata.

The poets too confess the same. Ovid, when the world was already completed and all the animals formed, added this: "A creature holier than these and more capable of lofty mind was still lacking, one that could rule over the rest: man was born." So much is it to be judged wrong to search into what God wished to be hidden.

2.8.65CSEL 19:141

uerum ille non audiendi aut discendi studio requirebat, sed refellendi, quia confidebat neminem id posse dicere: quasi uero ex hoc putandum sit non esse haec diuinitus facta, quia quomodo facta sint non potest peruideri.

But he asked not out of eagerness to hear or learn, but to refute, because he was confident no one could answer; as if it should be thought from this that these things were not made by God, because how they were made cannot be seen.

2.8.66CSEL 19:141

an tu si educatus in domo fabre facta et ornata nullam umquam fabricam uidisses, domum illam putasses non esse ab homine aedificatam, quia quomodo aedificetur ignorares? idem profecto de domo quaereres quod nunc de mundo requiris, quibus manibus, quibus ferramentis homo tanta esset opera molitus, maxime si saxa ingentia, inmensa caementa, uastas columnas, opus totum sublime et excelsum uideres. nonne haec tibi humanarum uirium modum uiderentur excedere, quia illa non tam uiribus quam ratione atque artificio facta esse nescires?

If you had been brought up in a house skilfully built and adorned and had never seen any building work, would you have thought that house was not built by man because you did not know how it is built? You would surely ask about the house what you now ask about the world: with what hands, with what tools man had produced such great works, especially if you saw huge stones, immense masonry, vast columns, the whole work lofty and high. Would these not seem to you to exceed the measure of human strength, since you did not know they were done not so much by strength as by reason and skill?

2.8.67CSEL 19:141

quodsi homo, in quo nihil perfectum est, tamen plus efficit ratione quam uires eius exiguae patiuntur, quid est cur incredibile tibi esse uideatur, cum mundus dicitur factus a deo, in quo, quia perfectus est, nec sapientia potest habere terminum nec fortitudo mensuram?

But if man, in whom nothing is perfect, nevertheless achieves more by reason than his small strength allows, why should it seem incredible to you when the world is said to have been made by God, in whom, because he is perfect, wisdom can have no limit nor strength any measure?

2.8.68CSEL 19:141–142

opera ipsius uidentur oculis, quomodo autem illa fecerit, ne mente quidem uidetur, quia, ut Hermes ait, mortale inmortali, temporale perpetuo, corruptibile incorrupto propinquare non potest id est propius accedere et intellegentia subsequi. et ideo terrenum adhuc animal rerum caelestium perspectionem non capit, quia corpore quasi custodia saeptum tenetur, quominus soluto ac libero sensu cernat omnia.

His works are seen by the eyes, but how he made them is not seen even by the mind, because, as Hermes says, the mortal cannot draw near to the immortal, the temporal to the everlasting, the corruptible to the incorrupt, that is, approach more closely and follow with understanding. And so a creature still earthly cannot grasp the view of heavenly things, because it is held enclosed in the body as in a prison, which keeps it from seeing all things with free and unbound sense.

2.8.69CSEL 19:142

sciat igitur quam inepte faciat qui res inenarrabiles quaerat. hoc est enim modum condicionis suae transgredi nec intellegere quousque homini liceat accedere.

Let him know, then, how foolishly he acts who inquires into things that cannot be told. For this is to go beyond the measure of one's condition and not to understand how far man is permitted to approach.

2.8.70CSEL 19:142

denique cum aperiret homini ueritatem deus, ea sola scire nos uoluit quae interfuit hominem scire ad uitam consequendam, quae uero ad curiosam et profanam cupiditatem pertinebant, reticuit, ut arcana

Indeed, when God opened the truth to man, he wished us to know only what it concerned man to know for attaining life; what pertained to curious and profane desire he kept silent, so that they might be secret.

2.8.71CSEL 19:142

essent. quid ergo quaeris quae nec potes scire nec si scias, beatior fies? perfecta est in homine sapientia, si et deum esse unum et ab ipso facta esse uniuersa cognoscat.

Why then do you seek what you can neither know nor, if you knew it, would be happier for knowing? Wisdom in man is complete if he knows both that God is one and that all things were made by him.

Divine 2, chapter 9

2.9.1CSEL 19:142

Nunc quoniam refutauimus eos qui de mundo et de factore eius deo aliter sentiunt quam ueritas habet, ad diuinam mundi fabricam reuertamur, de qua in arcanis religionis sanctae litteris traditur.

Now, since we have refuted those who think otherwise than the truth about the world and God its Maker, let us return to the divine fabric of the world, which is handed down in the secret writings of holy religion.

2.9.2CSEL 19:142

fecit igitur deus primum omnium caelum et in sublime suspendit, quod esset sedes ipsius dei conditoris. deinde terram fundauit ac subdidit caelo, quam homo cum ceteris animalium generibus incoleret. eam uoluit umore circumflui et contineri.

God, then, first of all made the heaven and hung it on high, to be the seat of God the Creator himself. Then he founded the earth and placed it beneath the heaven, for man to inhabit with the other kinds of living creatures. He willed it to be surrounded and held together by water.

2.9.3CSEL 19:142

suum uero habitaculum distinxit claris luminibus et inpleuit, sole scilicet et lunae orbe fulgenti et astrorum micantium splendentibus signis adornauit. tenebras autem, quod est his contrarium, constituit in terra; nihil enim per se continet luminis, nisi accipiat e caelo: in quo posuit lucem perennem et superos et uitam perpetuam, et contra in terra tenebras et inferos et mortem.

His own dwelling he adorned and filled with bright lights, namely the sun and the shining orb of the moon, and adorned it with the gleaming signs of the twinkling stars. But darkness, which is contrary to these, he placed on the earth; for it contains no light of itself unless it receives it from heaven. In heaven he placed perpetual light, the beings above, and everlasting life; and on the contrary, on earth, darkness, the beings below, and death.

2.9.4CSEL 19:142

tanto enim haec ab illis superioribus distant, quantum mala a bonis et uitia a uirtutibus.

For these are as far from those above as evils from goods and vices from virtues.

2.9.5CSEL 19:142–143

ipsius quoque terrae binas partes contrarias inter se diuersasque constituit, orientem scilicet occidentemque. ex quibus oriens deo adcensetur, quia ipse luminis fons et inlustrator est rerum et quod oriri nos faciat ad uitam sempiternam: occidens autem conturbatae illi prauaeque menti adscribitur, quod lumen abscondat, quod tenebras semper inducat et quod homines faciat occidere atque interire peccatis.

Of the earth itself also he established two parts contrary and opposed to each other, namely east and west. Of these the east is assigned to God, because he himself is the source of light and the enlightener of things, and because he makes us rise to eternal life; but the west is ascribed to that disturbed and perverse mind, because it hides the light, always brings on darkness, and makes men fall and perish in sins.

2.9.6CSEL 19:143

nam sicut lux orientis est, in luce autem uitae ratio uersatur, sic occidentis tenebrae sunt, in tenebris autem mors et interitus continetur.

For as light belongs to the east, and the principle of life lies in light, so darkness belongs to the west, and in darkness death and destruction are contained.

2.9.7CSEL 19:143

deinde alteras partes eadem ratione dimensus est, meridiem ac septentrionem, quae partes illis duabus societate iunguntur.

Then by the same reasoning he measured out the other parts, south and north, which are joined in partnership with those two.

2.9.8CSEL 19:143

ea enim quae est solis calore flagrantior, proxima est et cohaeret orienti, at illa quae frigoribus ac perpetuo gelu torpet, eiusdem est cuius extremus occasus. nam sicut contrariae sunt lumini tenebrae, ita frigus calori.

For the one that burns more with the heat of the sun is next to and joined with the east, while the one numb with cold and perpetual ice belongs to the same as the far west. For as darkness is contrary to light, so is cold to heat.

2.9.9CSEL 19:143

ut igitur calor lumini est proximus, sic meridies orienti, ut frigus tenebris, ita plaga septentrionalis occasui. quibus singulis partibus suum tempus adtribuit, uer scilicet orienti, aestatem meridianae plagae; occidentis autumnus est, septentrionis hibernum. in his quoque duabus partibus, meridiana

As, then, heat is nearest to light, so the south to the east; as cold to darkness, so the northern region to the west. To each of these parts he assigned its season: spring to the east, summer to the southern region; autumn belongs to the west, winter to the north. In these two parts also, the southern

2.9.10CSEL 19:143

et septentrionali, figura uitae ac mortis continetur, quia uita in calore est, mors in frigore. sicut autem calor ex igni est, ita frigus ex aqua.

and the northern, a figure of life and death is contained, because life is in heat and death in cold. And as heat is from fire, so cold is from water.

2.9.11CSEL 19:143–144

secundum harum partium dimensionem diem quoque fecit ac noctem, quae spatia et orbes temporum perpetuos ac uolubiles, quos uocamus annos, alterna per uices successione conficiant. dies, quem primus oriens subministrat, dei sit necesse est, ut omnia quaecumque meliora sunt, nox autem, quam occidens extremus inducit, eius scilicet quem dei esse aemulum diximus. quae duo etiam in hoc praescius futurorum deus fecit, ut ex his et uerae religionis et falsarum superstitionum imago quaedam ostenderetur.

According to the measurement of these parts he also made day and night, to complete by alternate succession the perpetual and revolving spaces and cycles of time which we call years. The day, which the east first supplies, must belong to God, as all things that are better; but the night, which the far west brings in, belongs, of course, to him whom we have called God's rival. These two God, foreknowing the future, made also for this purpose, that from them some image both of true religion and of false superstitions might be shown.

2.9.12CSEL 19:144

nam sicut sol, qui oritur in diem, licet sit unus, unde solem esse appellatum Cicero uult uideri, quod obscuratis sideribus solus appareat, tamen quia uerum ac perfectae plenitudinis lumen est et calore potentissimo et fulgore clarissimo inlustrat omnia, ita in deo, licet sit unus, et maiestas et uirtus et claritudo perfecta est.

For as the sun, which rises to make day, though it is one (from which Cicero would have it seem that it was called sol, because when the stars are darkened it appears alone, solus), yet, because it is a true light of perfect fullness and illuminates all things with most powerful heat and brightest splendour, so in God, though he is one, there is perfect majesty, power, and brightness.

2.9.13CSEL 19:144

nox autem, quam prauo illi antitheo dicimus adtributam, eius ipsius multas et uarias religiones per similitudinem

But the night, which we say has been assigned to that perverse adversary of God, shows by likeness his many and various religions.

2.9.14CSEL 19:144

monstrat. quamuis enim stellae innumerabiles micare ac radiare uideantur, tamen quia non sunt plena et solida lumina, nec caloris praeferunt quicquam nec tenebras multitudine sua uincunt.

For although countless stars seem to twinkle and shine, yet because they are not full and solid lights, they give out no heat, nor do they overcome the darkness by their number.

2.9.15CSEL 19:144

duo igitur illa principalia inueniuntur, quae diuersam et contrariam sibi habent potestatem, calor et umor, quae mirabiliter deus ad sustentanda et gignenda

Two principal things, then, are found, which have powers opposite and contrary to each other, heat and moisture, which God wonderfully devised for sustaining and generating

2.9.16CSEL 19:144

omnia excogitauit. nam cum uirtus dei sit in calore et igni, nisi ardorem uimque eius admixta umoris ac frigoris materia temperasset, nec nasci quicquam nec cohaerere potuisset, quin statim conflagratione interiret quidquid esse coepisset.

all things. For since the power of God is in heat and fire, unless he had tempered its burning force with an admixture of the matter of moisture and cold, nothing could have been born or held together, but whatever had begun to exist would at once have perished in a conflagration.

2.9.17CSEL 19:144–145

unde et philosophi quidam et poetae discordi concordia mundum constare dixerunt, sed rationem penitus non uidebant.

Hence certain philosophers and poets said that the world consists of a discordant concord, but they did not see the reason thoroughly.

2.9.18CSEL 19:145

Heraclitus ex igni nata esse dixit omnia, Thales ex aqua. uterque uidit aliquid, sed errauit tamen uterque, quod alterutrum si solum fuisset, neque aqua nasci posset ex igni neque rursus ignis ex aqua: sed est uerius simul ex utroque permixto cuncta generari.

Heraclitus said all things were born from fire, Thales from water. Each saw something, yet each erred, because if either had been alone, neither could water be born from fire nor fire from water; but it is truer that all things are generated from both mixed together.

2.9.19CSEL 19:145

ignis quidem permisceri cum aqua non potest, quia sunt utraque inimica et si comminus uenerint, alterutrum quod superauerit conficiat alterum necesse est, sed eorum substantiae permisceri possunt: substantia ignis calor est, aquae umor.

Fire indeed cannot be mingled with water, because they are enemies, and if they come to close quarters, whichever prevails must destroy the other; but their substances can be mingled: the substance of fire is heat, that of water moisture.

2.9.20CSEL 19:145

recte igitur Ouidius: quippe ubi temperiem sumpsere umorque calorque, concipiunt et ab his oriuntur cuncta duobus. cumque sit ignis aquae pugnax, uapor umidus omnes res creat et discors concordia fetibus apta est.

Rightly, then, Ovid: "For when moisture and heat take on a balance, they conceive, and from these two all things arise; and though fire fights with water, moist vapour creates all things, and discordant concord is fit for offspring."

2.9.21CSEL 19:145

alterum enim quasi masculinum elementum est, alterum quasi femininum, alterum actiuum, alterum patibile. ideoque a ueteribus institutum est ut sacramento ignis et aquae nuptiarum foedera sanciantur, quod fetus animantium calore et umore corporentur atque animentur ad uitam.

For the one is, as it were, the masculine element, the other the feminine; the one active, the other passive. And therefore it was established by the ancients that the bonds of marriage should be sanctioned by the rite of fire and water, because the offspring of living creatures are given body and animated to life by heat and moisture.

2.9.22CSEL 19:145–146

cum enim constet omne animal ex anima et corpore, materia corporis in umore est, animae in calore: quod ex auium fetibus datur scire, quos crassi umoris plenos nisi opifex calor fouerit, nec umor potest corporari nec corpus animari.

For since every living creature consists of soul and body, the matter of the body is in moisture, that of the soul in heat; and this we may learn from the eggs of birds, which are full of thick moisture: unless heat, as craftsman, warms them, neither can the moisture be given body nor the body be given life.

2.9.23CSEL 19:146

exulibus quoque igni et aqua interdici solebat: adhuc enim nefas uidebatur quamuis malos, tamen homines supplicio capitis adficere.

Exiles too used to be forbidden fire and water: for it still seemed wrong to inflict capital punishment on men, however wicked.

2.9.24CSEL 19:146

interdicto igitur usu earum rerum quibus uita hominum constat perinde habebatur, ac si esset qui eam sententiam exceperat morte multatus. adeo duo ista elementa prima sunt habita, ut nec ortum hominis nec uitam sine his crediderint posse constare.

So when the use of the things by which human life consists was forbidden, the one who received that sentence was considered as if he had been punished with death. So much were these two elements held to be primary, that they believed neither the birth nor the life of man could exist without them.

2.9.25CSEL 19:146

horum alterum nobis commune cum ceteris animalibus est, alterum soli homini datum. nos enim quoniam caeleste atque inmortale animal sumus, igni utimur, qui nobis in argumentum inmortalitatis est datus, quoniam ignis e caelo est; cuius natura quia mobilis est et sursum nititur, uitae continet rationem.

One of these we have in common with the other animals, the other is given to man alone. For since we are a heavenly and immortal creature, we use fire, which has been given to us as a sign of immortality, since fire is from heaven; and because its nature is mobile and strives upward, it contains the principle of life.

2.9.26CSEL 19:146

cetera uero animalia quoniam sunt tota mortalia, tantummodo aqua utuntur, quod est elementum corporale atque terrenum. cuius natura quia mobilis est ac deorsum uergens, figuram mortis ostendit. ideo pecudes neque in caelum suspiciunt neque religionem sentiunt, quoniam ab his usus ignis alienus est.

But the other animals, since they are wholly mortal, use only water, which is a bodily and earthly element; and because its nature is mobile and tends downward, it shows a figure of death. That is why cattle neither look up to heaven nor perceive religion, since the use of fire is foreign to them.

2.9.27CSEL 19:146

unde autem uel quomodo deus haec duo principalia, ignem et aquam, uel accenderit uel eliquauerit, solus potest scire qui fecit.

But from where or how God either kindled or liquefied these two principal things, fire and water, only he who made them can know.

Divine 2, chapter 10

2.10.1CSEL 19:146–147

Consummato igitur mundo animalia uarii generis, dissimilibus formis, et magna et minora uti fierent imperauit. et facta sunt bina id est diuersi sexus singula, ex quorum fetibus et aer et terra et maria conpleta sunt, deditque his omnibus generatim deus alimenta de terra, ut usui esse homini possent, alia nimirum ad cibos, alia uero ad uestitum, quae autem magnarum sunt uirium, ut in excolenda terra iuuarent; unde sunt dicta iumenta.

When the world was completed, then, he commanded living creatures of various kinds, of unlike forms, both large and small, to be made. And they were made in pairs, that is, one of each sex, from whose offspring the air, the earth, and the seas were filled; and God gave all these, according to their kinds, food from the earth, so that they might be of use to man, some for food, others for clothing, and those of great strength to help in cultivating the earth; hence they are called iumenta (beasts of burden).

2.10.2CSEL 19:147

ita rebus omnibus mirabili discriptione compositis regnum sibi aeternum parare constituit et innumerabiles animas procreare, quibus inmortalitatem daret.

So when all things had been composed in wonderful order, he resolved to prepare for himself an eternal kingdom and to create countless souls, to whom he would give immortality.

2.10.3CSEL 19:147

tum fecit sibi ipse simulacrum sensibile atque intellegens id est ad imaginis suae formam, qua nihil potest esse perfectius: hominem figurauit ex limo terrae; unde homo nuncupatus est, quod sit fictus ex humo.

Then he made for himself a sentient and intelligent image, that is, after the form of his own image, than which nothing can be more perfect: he formed man from the slime of the earth; hence he was named homo, because he was formed from the soil (humus).

2.10.4CSEL 19:147

denique Plato humanam formam θεοειδῆ esse ait, et Sibylla quae dicit: είϰών ὲστ ᾰνθρωπος ἐμὴ λόγον ὀρθὸν ἔχουσα.

In fact Plato says the human form is "godlike," and so does the Sibyl, who says: "Man is my image, having right reason."

2.10.5CSEL 19:147

de hac hominis fictione poetae quoque quamuis corrupte, tamen non aliter tradiderunt: namque hominem de luto a Prometheo factum esse dixerunt. res eos non fefellit, sed nomen artificis.

About this forming of man the poets too, though in a corrupted way, handed down nothing different: for they said man was made from clay by Prometheus. The fact did not escape them, but the name of the Maker did.

2.10.6CSEL 19:147–148

nullas enim litteras ueritatis attigerant, sed quae prophetarum uaticinio tradita in sacrario dei continebantur, ea de fabulis et obscura opinione collecta et deprauata, ut ueritas a uulgo solet uariis sermonibus dissipata corrumpi nullo non addente aliquid ad id quod audierat, carminibus suis conprehenderunt. et hoc quidem inepte, quod tam mirabile tamque diuinum opificium homini dederunt.

For they had touched no writings of truth; but what was handed down by the prophecy of the prophets and kept in God's sanctuary, they gathered from fables and obscure rumour, and, corrupted (as truth is usually corrupted when scattered among the people by varied talk, everyone adding something to what he had heard), they put it into their poems. And they did this foolishly, in giving so wonderful and divine a work to a man.

2.10.7CSEL 19:148

quid enim opus fuit hominem de luto fingi, cum posset eadem ratione generari qua ipse Prometheus ex Iapeto natus est? qui si fuit homo, generare hominem potuit, facere non potuit: de diis autem illum non fuisse poena eius in Caucaso monte declarat.

For what need was there for man to be formed from clay, when he could have been begotten in the same way in which Prometheus himself was born of Iapetus? If he was a man, he could beget a man, but he could not make one; and that he was not one of the gods his punishment on Mount Caucasus declares.

2.10.8CSEL 19:148

sed neque patrem eius Iapetum patruumque Titana quisquam deos nuncupauit, quia regni sublimitas penes Saturnum solum fuit, per quam diuinos honores cum omnibus suis posteris consecutus est. multis argumentis hoc figmentum poetarum coargui potest.

But no one called his father Iapetus or his uncle Titan gods, because the height of kingship lay with Saturn alone, through which he gained divine honours together with all his descendants. This fiction of the poets can be refuted by many arguments.

2.10.9CSEL 19:148

factum esse diluuium ad perdendam tollendamque ex orbe terrae malitiam constat inter omnes. id enim et philosophi et poetae scriptoresque rerum antiquarum locuntur in eoque uel maxime cum prophetarum sermone consentiunt.

It is agreed among all that the flood was made to destroy and remove wickedness from the world. For philosophers, poets, and writers of ancient history say this, and in it they agree most of all with the words of the prophets.

2.10.10CSEL 19:148

si ergo cataclysmus ideo factus est, ut malitia quae per nimiam multitudinem increuerat perderetur, quomodo fictor hominis Prometheus fuit, cuius filium Deucalionem idem ipsi ob iustitiam solum dicunt esse seruatum? quomodo unus gradus et una progenies orbem terrae tam celeriter potuit hominibus inplere?

If, then, the deluge was made to destroy the wickedness which had grown through the excessive multitude, how was Prometheus the maker of man, when these same writers say that his son Deucalion alone was saved for his righteousness? How could one degree of descent and one generation fill the world with men so quickly?

2.10.11CSEL 19:148–149

sed uidelicet hoc quoque sic corruperunt ut illut superius, cum ignorarent et quo tempore cataclysmus sit factus in terra et quis ob iustitiam meruerit genere humano pereunte seruari et quomodo aut cum quibus seruatus sit: quae omnia propheticae litterae docent. apparet ergo esse falsum quod de opificio Promethei narrant.

But evidently they corrupted this too, like the former, since they did not know at what time the deluge happened on the earth, who deserved to be saved for his righteousness when the human race was perishing, and how and with whom he was saved: all of which the prophetic writings teach. It is clear, then, that what they tell of the workmanship of Prometheus is false.

2.10.12CSEL 19:149

uerum quia poetas dixeram non omnino mentiri solere, sed figuris inuoluere et obscurare quae dicant, non dico esse mentitos, sed primum omnium Promethea simulacrum hominis formasse de molli ac pingui luto ab eoque primo natam esse artem statuas et simulacra fingendi, siquidem Iouis temporibus fuit, quibus primum templa constitui et noui deorum cultus esse coeperunt.

But because I had said that the poets are not wont to lie outright but to wrap up and obscure what they say in figures, I do not say they lied, but that Prometheus was the first of all to shape an image of a man from soft, rich clay, and that from him first arose the art of fashioning statues and images, since he lived in the times of Jupiter, when temples first began to be built and new cults of the gods to arise.

2.10.13CSEL 19:149

sic ueritas fucata mendacio est et illut quod a deo factum ferebatur, homini, qui opus diuinum imitatus est, coepit adscribi. ceterum fictio ueri ac uiui hominis e limo dei est.

So truth was coloured with falsehood, and what was reported to have been made by God began to be ascribed to a man who imitated the divine work. But the forming of a true and living man from clay belongs to God.

2.10.14CSEL 19:149

quod Hermes quoque tradit, qui non tantum hominem ad imaginem dei factum esse dixit a deo, sed etiam illut explanare temptauit, quam subtili ratione singula quaeque in corpore hominis membra formauerit, cum eorum nihil sit quod non tantundem ad usus necessitatem quantum ad pulchritudinem ualeat.

Hermes too teaches this: he not only said that man was made by God after the image of God, but even tried to explain with what fine reasoning God formed each of the members in the human body, since none of them is not as valuable for the needs of use as for beauty.

2.10.15CSEL 19:149–150

id uero etiam Stoici cum de prouidentia disserunt, facere conantur et secutus eos Tullius pluribus quidem locis, sed tamen materiam tam copiosam et uberem strictim contingit. quam ego nunc idcirco praetereo, quia nuper proprium de ea re librum ad Demetrianum auditorem meum scripsi.

The Stoics too try to do this when they discuss providence, and Tullius, following them, in several places; yet he touches only briefly on so copious and rich a subject. I pass over it now because I recently wrote a book of its own on this subject to my pupil Demetrianus.

2.10.16CSEL 19:150

illut hoc loco praeterire non possum quod errantes quidam philosophi aiunt, homines ceteraque animalia sine ullo artifice orta esse de terra. unde illud est Vergilianum uirumque terrea progenies duris caput extulit aruis. et ii maxime in ea fuere sententia qui esse prouidentiam negant: nam Stoici animantium fabricam diuinae sollertiae tribuunt.

I cannot pass over here what certain erring philosophers say, that men and the other animals arose from the earth without any maker; hence that line of Virgil: "and the earthborn race of men raised its head from the hard fields." And those especially held this opinion who deny that there is providence; for the Stoics attribute the fabric of living things to divine skill.

2.10.17CSEL 19:150

Aristoteles autem labore se ac molestia liberauit dicens semper fuisse mundum: itaque et humanum genus et cetera quae in eo sunt initium non habere, sed fuisse semper ac semper fore.

But Aristotle freed himself from toil and trouble by saying the world always existed, and therefore the human race and the other things in it have no beginning, but always were and always will be.

2.10.18CSEL 19:150

sed cum uideamus singula quaeque animalia quae ante non fuerint esse incipere et esse desinere, necesse est totum genus aliquando esse coepisse et aliquando desiturum esse, quia coepit.

But since we see that each single animal which did not exist before begins to exist and ceases to exist, the whole race must at some time have begun to exist and will at some time cease, because it began.

2.10.19CSEL 19:150

omnia enim tribus temporibus contineri necesse est, praeterito praesenti futuro. praeteriti est origo, praesentis substantia, futuri dissolutio.

For all things must be contained in three times: past, present, and future. To the past belongs origin, to the present existence, to the future dissolution.

2.10.20CSEL 19:150–151

quae omnia in singulis hominibus apparent: et incipimus enim, cum nascimur, et sumus, cum uiuimus, et desinimus, cum interimus. unde etiam tres Parcas esse uoluerunt, unam quae uitam hominis ordiatur, alteram quae contexat, tertiam quae rumpat ac finiat.

All these appear in individual men: we begin when we are born, we exist while we live, and we cease when we die. That is why they held there are three Fates, one who begins the web of a man's life, another who weaves it, a third who breaks and ends it.

2.10.21CSEL 19:151

in toto autem genere hominum quia solum praesens tempus apparet, ex eo tamen et praeteritum id est origo colligitur et futurum id est dissolutio.

In the whole human race, although only the present time appears, from it are gathered both the past, that is, the origin, and the future, that is, the dissolution.

2.10.22CSEL 19:151

nam quoniam est, apparet aliquando coepisse — esse enim nulla res sine exordio potest - et quia coepit, apparet quandoque desiturum; nec enim potest id totum esse inmortale quod ex mortalibus constat.

For since it exists, it is clear that it began at some time (for nothing can exist without a beginning), and since it began, it is clear that it will one day cease; for the whole cannot be immortal which consists of mortals.

2.10.23CSEL 19:151

nam sicut uniuersi per singulos interimus, fieri potest ut aliquo casu omnes simul, uel sterilitate terrarum, quae accidere particulatim solet, uel pestilentia, ubique diffusa, quae singulas urbes aut regiones plerumque populatur, uel incendio in orbem inmisso, quale iam fuisse sub Phaethonte dicitur, uel diluuio aquarum, quale sub Deucalione traditur, cum praeter unum hominem genus omne deletum est.

For as we all perish one by one, it can happen that by some chance all perish together, whether by barrenness of the earth, which usually happens in particular places; or by pestilence spread everywhere, which often lays waste individual cities or regions; or by fire sent upon the world, such as is said to have happened under Phaethon; or by a flood of waters, such as is recorded under Deucalion, when all the race except one man was destroyed.

2.10.24CSEL 19:151

quod diluuium si casu accidit, profecto potuit accidere ut et ille unus qui superfuit interiret. si autem diuinae prouidentiae nutu, quod negari non potest, ad reparandos homines reseruatus est, apparet in dei potestate esse uel uitam uel interitum generis humani. quod si potest occidere in totum, quia per partes occidit, apparet aliquando esse ortum, et fragilitas ut initium, sic declarat et terminum.

If that deluge happened by chance, it could certainly have happened that the one who survived also perished. But if he was kept by the will of divine providence, which cannot be denied, to restore mankind, it is clear that both the life and the destruction of the human race are in God's power. And if it can perish entirely, since it perishes in parts, it is clear that it arose at some time; and frailty, as it declares a beginning, so it declares an end.

2.10.25CSEL 19:151

quae si uera sunt, non poterit defendere Aristoteles quominus habuerit et mundus ipse principium. quod si Aristoteli Plato et Epicurus extorquent, et Platoni et Aristoteli qui semper fore mundum putauerunt, licet sint eloquentes, ingratis tamen idem Epicurus eripiet quia sequitur ut habeat et finem.

If these things are true, Aristotle will not be able to maintain that the world itself had no beginning. And if Plato and Epicurus wrest this from Aristotle, then from Plato and Aristotle, who thought the world would last forever, eloquent though they are, the same Epicurus will against their will snatch this away, since it follows that it has an end too.

2.10.26CSEL 19:151–152

sed haec in ultimo libro pluribus: nunc ad hominis originem recurramus.

But of these things more in the last book; now let us return to the origin of man.

Divine 2, chapter 11

2.11.1CSEL 19:152

Aiunt certis conuersionibus caeli et astrorum motibus maturitatem quandam extitisse animalium serendorum, itaque terram nouam semen genitale retinentem folliculos ex se quosdam in uterorum similitudinem protulisse — de quibus Lucretius: crescebant uteri terram radicibus apti — eosque cum maturuissent, natura cogente ruptos animalia tenera profudisse.

They say that through certain revolutions of the heaven and motions of the stars there came about a kind of ripeness for sowing living creatures, and so the new earth, holding generative seed, put forth from itself certain bags like wombs (of which Lucretius says: "wombs grew, fixed to the earth by roots"); and that when these had ripened, they burst by nature's compulsion and poured out tender animals.

2.11.2CSEL 19:152

deinde terram ipsam umore quodam qui esset lacti similis exuberasse eoque alimento animantes esse nutritas. quomodo igitur uim frigoris uel caloris ferre aut uitare potuerunt aut omnino nasci, cum sol exureret, frigus adstringeret? non erant inquiunt in principio mundi nec hiemps nec aestas, sed perpetua temperies et uer aequabile.

Then the earth itself overflowed with a certain moisture like milk, and the living creatures were fed by that food. How then could they either bear or avoid the force of cold or heat, or be born at all, when the sun scorched and the cold bound? "There were," they say, "at the beginning of the world neither winter nor summer, but a perpetual mildness and even spring."

2.11.3CSEL 19:152

cur ergo nihil horum fieri etiamnunc uidemus? quia semel fieri necessarium fuit ut animalia nascerentur; postquam uero esse coeperunt, concessa his facultate generandi et terra parere desiit et temporis condicio mutata est.

Why then do we see none of these things happen even now? "Because it was necessary for this to happen once, so that animals might be born; but after they began to exist, when the power of generating was granted to them, the earth ceased to bear and the condition of the season was changed."

2.11.4CSEL 19:152

o quam facile est redarguere mendacia! primum, quod nihil potest esse in hoc mundo, quod non sic permaneat ut coepit. nec enim sol et luna et astra tunc non erant aut cum essent, meatus non habebant ac non diuina moderatio, quae cursus eorum temperat et gubernat, cum ipsis simul coeperat.

O how easy it is to refute lies! First, because nothing can be in this world which does not continue as it began. For the sun and moon and stars either did not exist then, or, if they existed, did not have their courses; or else the divine governance, which tempers and rules their courses, began together with them.

2.11.5CSEL 19:152

deinde, quod si ita sit ut dicunt, esse prouidentiam necesse est, et in id ipsum incidunt quod maxime fugiunt.

Next, if it is as they say, there must be providence, and they fall into the very thing they most flee.

2.11.6CSEL 19:152–153

nondum enim natis animalibus aliquis utique prouidit ut nascerentur, ne orbis terrae desertus atque incultus horreret. ut autem de terra sine officio parentum nasci possent, necesse est magna ratione esse prouisum; deinde ut umor ille concretus e terra in uarias imagines corporum fingeretur, item ut e folliculis quibus tegebantur accepta uiuendi sentiendique ratione tamquam ex aluo matrum profunderentur, mira inextricabilisque prouisio est.

For before the animals were born, someone certainly provided that they should be born, lest the world bristle desert and untilled. And that they could be born from the earth without the service of parents must have been provided with great reason; then that that moisture congealed from the earth should be shaped into various forms of bodies, and likewise that, receiving the principle of living and feeling, they should be poured out of the bags that covered them as if from mothers' wombs, is a wonderful and inexplicable provision.

2.11.7CSEL 19:153

sed putemus id quoque casu accidisse, illa certe quae secuntur fortuita esse non possunt, ut terra continuo lacte manaret, ut aeris temperies esset aequalis.

But suppose that this too happened by chance; the things that follow certainly cannot be fortuitous: that the earth flowed continuously with milk, that the temperature of the air was even.

2.11.8CSEL 19:153

quae si constat idcirco esse facta, ut animalia recens edita uel haberent alimentum uel non haberent periculum, necesse est ut aliquis diuina nescio qua ratione prouiderit. quis autem potest prouidere nisi deus?

If it is agreed that these were made so that newborn animals might have food or be free from danger, someone must have provided it by some divine reason. And who can provide but God?

2.11.9CSEL 19:153

uideamus tamen an id ipsum quod dictitant fieri potuerit, ut homines nascerentur e terra. si consideret aliquis quamdiu et quibus modis educetur infans, intelleget profecto non potuisse terrigenas illos pueros sine ullo educatore nutriri.

Let us see, however, whether what they keep saying could have happened, that men were born from the earth. If anyone considers how long and in what ways an infant is reared, he will surely understand that those earthborn children could not have been nourished without anyone to rear them.

2.11.10CSEL 19:153

fuit enim necesse conpluribus mensibus iacere proiectos, donec confirmatis neruis mouere se locumque mutare possent: quod uix intra unius anni spatium fieri potest.

For they would have had to lie abandoned for many months until their sinews were strengthened and they could move and change place, which can hardly happen within the space of one year.

2.11.11CSEL 19:153

iam uide utrumne infans eodem loco et eodem modo quo effusus est iacere per multos menses ualuerit ac non et umore illo terrae, quem alimenti gratia ministrabat, et sui corporis purgamentis in unum mixtis obrutus corruptusque moreretur?

Now consider whether an infant could have lain for many months in the same place and in the same way in which it was poured out, and not have died, overwhelmed and corrupted by that moisture of the earth which it received for food mixed together with the refuse of its own body.

2.11.12CSEL 19:153–154

itaque nullo modo fieri potest quin ab aliquo fuerit educatus: nisi forte animalia omnia non tenera nata sunt, sed excreta, quod ut dicerent numquam illis uenit in mentem.

So it cannot possibly be that he was not reared by someone: unless perhaps all animals were born not tender but full-grown, which it never occurred to them to say.

2.11.13CSEL 19:154

omnis igitur illa ratio inpossibilis et uana est, si tamen ratio dici potest qua id agitur, ut nulla sit ratio. qui enim dicit omnia sua sponte esse nata nihilque diuinae prouidentiae tribuit, hic profecto rationem non adserit, sed euertit.

That whole theory, then, is impossible and empty, if indeed it can be called a theory (ratio) whose aim is that there be no reason (ratio). For he who says all things were born of their own accord and attributes nothing to divine providence certainly does not assert reason but overturns it.

2.11.14CSEL 19:154

quodsi neque fieri quicquam sine ratione neque nasci potest, apparet esse diuinam prouidentiam, cuius est proprium quod dicitur ratio. deus igitur rerum omnium machinator fecit hominem.

But if nothing can be made or born without reason, it is clear that there is divine providence, whose property is what is called reason. God, then, the designer of all things, made man.

2.11.15CSEL 19:154

quod Cicero quamuis expers caelestium litterarum uidit tamen, qui libro de legibus primo hoc idem tradidit quod prophetae.

Cicero, though without the heavenly writings, nevertheless saw this; in the first book On the Laws he taught the same as the prophets.

2.11.16CSEL 19:154

cuius uerba subieci. animal hoc prouidum sagax multiplex acutum memor plenum rationis et consilii, quem uocamus hominem, praeclara quadam condicione generatum esse a supremo deo. solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis particeps rationis et cogitationis, cum cetera sint omnia expertia.

I have added his words: "This creature, provident, shrewd, many-sided, acute, mindful, full of reason and counsel, which we call man, was begotten by the supreme God in a certain glorious condition. For he alone, of so many kinds and natures of living things, shares in reason and thought, while all the rest lack them."

2.11.17CSEL 19:154

uidesne hominem quamuis longe a ueritatis notitia remotum tamen, quoniam imaginem sapientiae tuebatur, intellexisse non nisi a deo hominem potuisse generari?

Do you see that a man, though far removed from knowledge of the truth, nevertheless, because he kept to an image of wisdom, understood that man could only have been begotten by God?

2.11.18CSEL 19:154–155

sed tamen diuinis opus est testimoniis, ne minus humana sufficiant. Sibylla hominem dei opus esse testatur: ὃς μόνος ἐστὶ θεὸς ϰτίστης ὰϰράτητος ύπάρχων αὐτὸς δ ἐστήριξε τύπον μορϕῆς μερόπων τε - αὐτὸς ἕμιξε ϕύσιν πάντων, γενέτης βιότοιο.

But divine testimonies are needed, lest human ones be insufficient. The Sibyl testifies that man is the work of God: "He who alone is God, creator, unconquerable, he himself fixed the type of the form of mortals, he himself mingled the nature of all, the begetter of life."

2.11.19CSEL 19:155

eadem sanctae litterae continent. deus ergo ueri patris officio functus est, ipse corpus effinxit, ipse animam qua spiramus infudit, illius est totum quidquid sumus.

The holy writings contain the same. God, then, performed the office of a true father: he himself fashioned the body, he himself breathed in the soul by which we breathe; all that we are is his.

2.11.20CSEL 19:155

quomodo id fecerit si nos oporteret scire, docuisset, sicut docuit cetera quae cognitionem nobis et pristini erroris et ueri luminis adtulerunt.

How he did this, if we needed to know, he would have taught us, as he taught the other things that have brought us knowledge both of former error and of true light.

Divine 2, chapter 12

2.12.1CSEL 19:155

Cum ergo marem primum ad similitudinem suam finxisset, tum etiam feminam configurauit ad ipsius hominis effigiem, ut duo inter se permixti sexus propagare subolem possent et omnem terram multitudine opere.

When, then, he had first formed the male after his own likeness, he then also shaped the female after the image of the man himself, so that the two sexes, joined together, might propagate offspring and fill the whole earth with their multitude.

2.12.2CSEL 19:155

in ipsius autem hominis fictione illarum duarum materiarum quas inter se diximus esse contrarias, ignis et aquae, conclusit perfecitque rationem.

In the making of man himself he included and completed the principle of those two materials which we said are contrary to each other, fire and water.

2.12.3CSEL 19:155–156

ficto enim corpore, inspirauit ei animam de mtah fonte spiritus sui qui est perennis, ut ipsius mundi ex contrariis constantis elementis similitudinem gereret. constat enim ex anima et corpore id est quasi ex caelo et terra, quandoquidem anima qua uiuimus uelut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cuius e limo diximus esse formatum.

For when the body had been formed, he breathed into it a soul from the living fountain of his Spirit, which is everlasting, so that he might bear the likeness of the world itself, which consists of contrary elements. For he consists of soul and body, that is, as it were of heaven and earth, since the soul by which we live arises as if from heaven, from God, and the body from the earth, from whose slime we said it was formed.

2.12.4CSEL 19:156

Empedocles, quem nescias utrumne inter poetas an inter philosophos numeres, quia de rerum natura uersibus scripsit ut aput Romanos Lucretius et Varro, quattuor elementa constituit, ignem aerem aquam terram, fortasse Trismegistum secutus, qui nostra corpora ex his quattuor elementis constituta esse dixit a deo:

Empedocles, whom you could not tell whether to count among the poets or the philosophers, because he wrote on nature in verse, as Lucretius and Varro did among the Romans, established four elements, fire, air, water, earth, perhaps following Trismegistus, who said that our bodies were constituted by God from these four elements:

2.12.5CSEL 19:156

habere namque in se aliquid ignis, aliquid aeris, aliquid aquae, aliquid terrae, et neque ignem esse neque aerem neque aquam neque terram. quae quidem falsa non sunt: nam terrae ratio in carne est, umoris in sanguine, aeris in spiritu, ignis in calore uitali.

that they have in them something of fire, something of air, something of water, something of earth, and yet are neither fire nor air nor water nor earth. These things are not false: for the principle of earth is in the flesh, of moisture in the blood, of air in the breath, of fire in the vital heat.

2.12.6CSEL 19:156

sed neque sanguis a corpore secerni potest sicut umor a terra neque calor uitalis a spiritu sicut ignis ab aere: adeo rerum omnium duo sola reperiuntur elementa, quorum omnis ratio in nostri corporis fictione conclusa est.

But blood cannot be separated from the body as moisture from earth, nor vital heat from breath as fire from air: so only two elements of all things are found, whose whole principle is included in the fashioning of our body.

2.12.7CSEL 19:156

ex rebus ergo diuersis ac repugnantibus homo factus est sicut ipse mundus ex luce ac tenebris, ex uita et morte: quae duo inter se pugnare in homine praecepit, ut si anima superauerit quae oritur ex deo, sit inmortalis et in perpetua luce uersetur, si autem corpus uicerit animam dicionique subiecerit, sit in tenebris sempiternis et in morte.

Man, then, was made from diverse and conflicting things, as the world itself was from light and darkness, from life and death; and God ordained that these two should fight with each other in man, so that if the soul, which arises from God, prevails, he may be immortal and dwell in perpetual light; but if the body conquers the soul and subjects it to its rule, he may be in everlasting darkness and in death.

2.12.8CSEL 19:156

cuius non ea uis est ut iniustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in aeternum. eam poenam mortem secundam nominamus, quae est et ipsa perpetua sicut et inmortalitas.

Its force is not such as to extinguish unjust souls altogether, but to punish them forever. That punishment we call the second death, which is itself perpetual, just as immortality is.

2.12.9CSEL 19:156–157

primam sic definimus: mors est naturae animantium dissolutio, uel ita: mors est corporis animaeque seductio; secundam uero sic: mors est aeterni doloris perpessio, uel ita: mors est animarum pro meritis ad aeterna supplicia damnatio. haec mutas pecudes non adtingit, quarum animae non ex deo constantes, sed ex communi aere morte soluuntur.

The first we define thus: death is the dissolution of the nature of living beings; or thus: death is the separation of body and soul. The second thus: death is the enduring of eternal pain; or thus: death is the condemnation of souls to eternal punishments according to their deserts. This does not touch dumb cattle, whose souls, consisting not of God but of the common air, are dissolved by death.

2.12.10CSEL 19:157

in hac igitur societate caeli atque terrae, quorum effigies expressa est in homine, superiorem partem tenent ea quae sunt dei, anima scilicet quae dominium corporis habet, inferiorem autem ea quae sunt diaboli, corpus utique, quod quia terrenum est, animae debet esse subiectum sicut terra caelo.

In this partnership of heaven and earth, then, whose likeness is expressed in man, the higher part is held by what belongs to God, namely the soul, which has dominion over the body; but the lower part by what belongs to the devil, namely the body, which, because it is earthly, ought to be subject to the soul, as earth to heaven.

2.12.11CSEL 19:157

est enim quasi uasculum, quo tamquam domicilio temporali spiritus hic caelestis utatur. utriusque officia sunt, ut hoc quod est ex caelo et deo, imperet, illut uero quod ex terra et diabolo, seruiat.

For it is like a little vessel, which this heavenly spirit uses as a temporary dwelling. The duties of each are that what is from heaven and God should rule, and what is from earth and the devil should serve.

2.12.12CSEL 19:157

quod quidem non fugit hominem nequam Sallustium, qui ait: sed nostra omnis uis in animo et corpore sita est: animi imperio, corporis seruitio magis utimur.

This did not escape even that worthless man Sallust, who says: "But all our power lies in mind and body: we use the mind rather to rule, the body to serve."

2.12.13CSEL 19:157

recte, si ita uixisset ut locutus est.

Rightly, if he had lived as he spoke.

2.12.14CSEL 19:157

seruiuit enim foedissimis uoluptatibus suamque ipse sententiam uitae prauitate dissoluit. quodsi anima ignis est ut ostendimus, in caelum debet eniti sicut ignis, ne exstinguatur, hoc est ad inmortalitatem, quae in caelo est: et sicut ardere ac uiuere non potest ignis, nisi aliqua pingui materia teneatur in qua habeat alimentum, sic animae materia et cibus est sola iustitia, qua tenetur ad uitam.

For he was a slave to the foulest pleasures and undid his own saying by the depravity of his life. But if the soul is fire, as we have shown, it ought to strive toward heaven like fire, lest it be extinguished, that is, toward immortality, which is in heaven; and as fire cannot burn and live unless it is held by some rich material in which it has nourishment, so the material and food of the soul is justice alone, by which it is held to life.

2.12.15CSEL 19:157–158

post haec deus hominem qua exposui ratione generatum posuit in Paradiso id est in horto fecundissimo et amoenissimo: quem in partibus orientis omni genere ligni arborumque conseuit, ut ex earum uariis fructibus aleretur expersque omnium laborum deo patri summa deuotione seruiret.

After this God placed the man, begotten in the way I have set out, in Paradise, that is, in a most fruitful and pleasant garden, which he planted in the regions of the east with every kind of wood and tree, so that he might be fed by their various fruits and, free from all labours, serve God the Father with the utmost devotion.

2.12.16CSEL 19:158

tum dedit ei certa mandata, quae si obseruasset, inmortalis maneret, si transcendisset, morte adficeretur. id autem praeceptum fuit, ut ex arbore una quae fuerat in medio Paradiso non gustaret, in qua posuerat intellegentiam boni ac mali.

Then he gave him certain commands, which, if he kept them, he would remain immortal, and if he transgressed them, he would be punished with death. The precept was that he should not taste of one tree which was in the middle of Paradise, in which he had placed the knowledge of good and evil.

2.12.17CSEL 19:158

tum criminator ille inuidens operibus dei omnes fallacias et calliditates suas ad deiciendum hominem intendit, ut ei adimeret inmortalitatem.

Then that accuser, envying the works of God, bent all his deceits and cunning to casting man down, so as to take immortality from him.

2.12.18CSEL 19:158

et primo mulierem dolo inlexit ut uetitum cibum sumeret, et per eam ipsi quoque homini persuasit ut transcenderet dei legem. percepta igitur scientia boni et mali pudere eum nuditatis suae coepit absconditque se a facie dei, quod antea non solebat.

And first he enticed the woman by guile to take the forbidden food, and through her persuaded the man himself also to transgress the law of God. Having gained, then, the knowledge of good and evil, he began to be ashamed of his nakedness and hid himself from the face of God, which he had not been accustomed to do before.

2.12.19CSEL 19:158–159

tum deus sententia in peccatores data eiecit hominem de Paradiso, ut uictum sibi labore conquireret, ipsumque Paradisum igni circumuallauit, ne homo posset accedere, donec summum iudicium faciat in terra et iustos uiros cultores suos in eundem locum reuocet morte sublata, sicut sacrae uoces docent et Sibylla Erythraea, cum dicit: οἱ δὲ θεὸν τιμῶντες ἀληθινὸν ἀέναόν τε ζωὴν κληρονομοῦσι, τὸν αἰῶνος χρόνον αὐτοὶ οἰκοῦντες Παράδεισον ὁμῶς, ὲριθηλέα κῆπον. uerum haec quoniam extrema sunt, in extrema

Then God, passing sentence on the sinners, cast the man out of Paradise to seek his living by labour, and surrounded Paradise itself with fire, so that man could not approach, until he executes the final judgment on earth and calls the just, his worshippers, back to the same place, death being taken away, as the sacred voices teach and the Erythraean Sibyl, when she says: "But those who honour the true and everlasting God inherit life, dwelling for the time of the age in Paradise alike, the flourishing garden." But since these things belong to the end, we shall treat them in the final

2.12.20CSEL 19:159

operis huius parte tractabimus: nunc ea quae prima sunt explicemus. mors itaque secuta est hominem secundum dei sententiam, quod etiam Sibylla in carmine suo docet dicens: ὰνθρωπον πλασθέντα θεοῦ παλάμαις άγίαισιν, ὃν ἀ ὲπλάνησεν ὅϕις δολίως ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἀνελθεῖν τοῦ θανάτου γνῶσιν τε λαβεῖν ἀγαθοῦ τε κακοῦ τε.

part of this work; now let us explain the things that come first. Death, then, followed man according to God's sentence, which the Sibyl also teaches in her song, saying: "Man, formed by God's holy hands, whom the serpent deceived by guile, so that he went to the fate of death and received the knowledge of good and evil."

2.12.21CSEL 19:159–160

sic facta est uita hominis temporaria, sed tamen longa, quae in mille annos prorogaretur. quod diuinis litteris proditum et per omnium scientiam publicatum cum Varro non ignoraret, argumentari nisus est, cur putarentur antiqui mille annos uictitasse.

So man's life was made temporary, yet long, extending to a thousand years. Since Varro was not ignorant of this, which was handed down in the divine writings and made public to the knowledge of all, he tried to argue why the ancients were thought to have lived a thousand years.

2.12.22CSEL 19:160

ait enim, aput Aegyptios pro annis menses haberi, ut non solis per duodecim signa circuitus faciat annum, sed luna, quae orbem illum signiferum triginta dierum spatio lustrat. quod argumentum perspicue falsum est: nemo enim tunc millesimum annum trans-

For he says that among the Egyptians months were reckoned as years, so that not the sun's circuit through the twelve signs makes a year, but the moon, which traverses that circle of signs in the space of thirty days. This argument is plainly false: for no one then passed

2.12.23CSEL 19:160

gressus est, nunc uero qui ad centesimum perueniunt, quod fit saepissime, mille certe ac ducentis mensibus uiuunt. et auctores idonei tradunt ad centum uiginti annos perueniri solere.

his thousandth year, whereas now those who reach a hundred, which happens very often, certainly live twelve hundred months. And reliable authors report that people commonly reach a hundred and twenty years.

2.12.24CSEL 19:160

sed quia ignorabat Varro cur aut quando esset uita hominis deminuta, ipse deminuit, cum sciret, mille et quadringentis mensibus posse hominem uiuere.

But because Varro did not know why or when man's life was shortened, he himself shortened it, though he knew that a man could live fourteen hundred and forty months.

Divine 2, chapter 13

2.13.1CSEL 19:160

Deus autem postea cum uideret orbem terrae malitia et sceleribus obpletum, statuit humanum genus diluuio perdere. sed tamen ad multitudinem reparandam delegit unum, quod corruptis omnibus singulare iustitia supererat exemplum.

Afterwards, when God saw the world filled with wickedness and crimes, he resolved to destroy the human race by a flood. But to restore the multitude he chose one, who, when all were corrupted, remained a singular example of righteousness.

2.13.2CSEL 19:160

hic cum sescentorum esset annorum, fabricauit arcam, sicut ei praeceperat deus, in qua ipse cum coniuge ac tribus filiis totidemque nuribus reseruatus est, cum aqua uniuersos montes altissimos operuisset.

When he was six hundred years old, he built an ark, as God had commanded him, in which he himself with his wife and three sons and as many daughters-in-law was preserved when the water had covered all the highest mountains.

2.13.3CSEL 19:160

deinde orbe siccato exsecratus iniustitiam prioris saeculi deus, ne rursus longitudo uitae causa esset excogitandorum malorum, paulatim per singulas progenies deminuit hominis aetatem atque in centum et uiginti annis metam conlocauit, quam transgredi non liceret.

Then, when the world had been dried, God, abhorring the injustice of the former age, lest length of life should again be a cause of devising evils, gradually shortened the age of man generation by generation and set the limit at a hundred and twenty years, which it would not be permitted to pass.

2.13.4CSEL 19:160–161

ille uero cum egressus esset ex arca, sicuti sanctae litterae docent, terram studiose coluit ac uineam sua manu seuit. unde arguuntur qui auctorem uini Liberum putant. ille enim non modo Liberum, sed etiam Saturnum atque Uranum multis antecessit aetatibus.

When he had come out of the ark, as the holy writings teach, he tilled the earth diligently and planted a vineyard with his own hand. By this those are refuted who think Liber the author of wine. For he preceded not only Liber but even Saturn and Uranus by many ages.

2.13.5CSEL 19:161

qua ei uinea cum primum fructum cepisset, laetus factus bibit usque ad ebrietatem iacuitque nudus. quod cum uidisset unus ex filiis, cui nomen fuit Cham, non texit patris nuditatem, sed egressus etiam fratribus indicauit. at illi sumpto pallio intrauerunt auersis uultibus patremque texerunt.

When he had first gathered fruit from that vineyard, he became merry, drank to drunkenness, and lay naked. When one of his sons, whose name was Ham, saw this, he did not cover his father's nakedness but went out and even told his brothers. But they took a cloak, went in with faces turned away, and covered their father.

2.13.6CSEL 19:161

quae facta cum pater recognosset, abdicauit atque expulit filium. at ille profugus in eius terrae parte consedit quae nunc Arabia nominatur, eaque terra de nomine eius Chanaan dicta est et posteri eius Chananaei.

When the father learned what had been done, he disowned and drove out his son. And he, a fugitive, settled in that part of the earth which is now called Arabia, and that land was called Canaan from his name, and his descendants Canaanites.

2.13.7CSEL 19:161

haec fuit prima gens quae deum ignorauit, quoniam princeps eius et conditor cultum dei a patre non accepit maledictus ab eo: itaque ignorantiam diuinitatis minoribus suis reliquit.

This was the first nation that did not know God, since its chief and founder did not receive the worship of God from his father, being cursed by him; and so he left ignorance of the divinity to his descendants.

2.13.8CSEL 19:161

ab hac gente proximi quique populi multitudine increscente fluxerunt. ipsius autem patris posteri Hebraei dicti: penes quos religio dei resedit.

From this nation, as the multitude increased, all the neighbouring peoples flowed. But the descendants of the father himself were called Hebrews, among whom the religion of God remained.

2.13.9CSEL 19:161

sed et ab his postea multiplicato in inmensum numero cum eos angustiae locorum suorum capere non possent, tum adulescentes uel missi a parentibus uel sua sponte, cum rerum penuria cogeret, profugi ad quaerendas sibi nouas sedes huc atque illuc dispersi omnes insulas et orbem totum repleuerunt et a stirpe sanctae radicis auulsi nouos sibi mores atque instituta pro arbitrio condiderunt.

But from these too, afterwards, when their number had multiplied immensely and the narrowness of their lands could not hold them, young men, either sent by their parents or of their own accord, when want of things compelled them, went out as fugitives to seek new homes for themselves, scattered here and there, filled all the islands and the whole world, and, torn from the stock of the holy root, founded new customs and institutions for themselves at their own will.

2.13.10CSEL 19:161–162

sed omnium primi qui Aegyptum occupauerant caelestia suspicere atque adorare coeperunt. et quia neque domiciliis tegebantur propter aeris qualitatem nec ullis in ea regione nubibus subtexitur caelum, cursus siderum et effectus notauerunt, dum ea saepe uenerantes curiosius ac liberius intuentur.

But first of all those who had occupied Egypt began to look up to and adore the heavenly bodies. And because they were neither sheltered by houses, owing to the quality of the air, nor is the sky in that region veiled by any clouds, they observed the courses and effects of the stars, while, often venerating them, they gazed at them more curiously and freely.

2.13.11CSEL 19:162

postea deinde portentificas animalium figuras quas colerent commenti sunt quibusdam prodigiis inducti, quorum mox auctores aperiemus.

Afterwards they devised monstrous figures of animals to worship, led by certain prodigies, whose authors we shall soon disclose.

2.13.12CSEL 19:162

ceteri autem qui per terram dispersi fuerant admirantes elementa mundi, caelum solem terram mare, sine ullis imaginibus ac templis uenerabantur et his sacrificia in aperto celebrabant, donec processu temporum potentissimis regibus templa et simulacra fecerunt eaque uictimis et odoribus colere instituerunt. sic aberrantes a notitia dei gentes esse coeperunt.

But the others, who had been scattered over the earth, admiring the elements of the world, heaven, sun, earth, and sea, venerated them without any images or temples and celebrated sacrifices to them in the open, until in the course of time they made temples and images for their most powerful kings and began to worship them with victims and incense. So the Gentiles, straying from the knowledge of God, began to exist.

2.13.13CSEL 19:162

errant igitur qui deorum cultus ab exordio rerum fuisse contendunt et priorem esse gentilitatem quam dei religionem, quam putant posterius inuentam, quia fontem atque originem ueritatis ignorant. nunc ad principium mundi reuertamur.

They err, therefore, who contend that the worship of gods existed from the beginning of things and that paganism is older than the religion of God, which they think was invented later; because they do not know the fountain and origin of truth. Now let us return to the beginning of the world.

Divine 2, chapter 14

2.14.1CSEL 19:162–163

Cum ergo numerus hominum coepisset increscere, prouidens deus ne fraudibus suis diabolus, cui ab initio dederat terrae potestatem, uel corrumperet homines uel disperderet, quod in exordio fecerat, misit angelos ad tutelam cultumque generis humani: quibus praecepit ante omnia, ne terrae contagione maculati substantiae caelestis amitterent dignitatem. scilicet id eos facere prohibuit quod sciebat esse facturos, ut ueniam sperare non possent.

When, then, the number of men had begun to increase, God, providing lest the devil, to whom from the beginning he had given power over the earth, should either corrupt men by his frauds or destroy them, as he had done at the beginning, sent angels for the protection and cultivation of the human race; and he commanded them above all not to be stained by contact with the earth and so lose the dignity of their heavenly substance. Evidently he forbade them to do what he knew they would do, so that they could not hope for pardon.

2.14.2CSEL 19:163

itaque illos cum hominibus commorantes dominator ille terrae fallacissimus consuetudine ipsa paulatim ad uitia pellexit et mulierum congressibus inquinauit.

So, while they lived with men, that most deceitful lord of the earth gradually enticed them into vices by custom itself and defiled them by intercourse with women.

2.14.3CSEL 19:163

tum in caelum ob peccata quibus se inmerserant non recepti ceciderunt in terram. sic eos diabolus ex angelis dei suos fecit satellites ac ministros.

Then, not received into heaven because of the sins in which they had plunged themselves, they fell to the earth. So the devil made them, from angels of God, his own attendants and ministers.

2.14.4CSEL 19:163

qui autem sunt ex his procreati quia neque angeli neque homines fuerunt, sed mediam quandam naturam gerentes, non sunt ad inferos recepti sicut in caelum parentes eorum.

But those who were begotten from them, because they were neither angels nor men but bore a kind of middle nature, were not received into the underworld, as their parents were not into heaven.

2.14.5CSEL 19:163

ita duo genera daemonum facta sunt, unum caeleste, alterum terrenum. hi sunt immundi spiritus, malorum quae geruntur auctores, quorum idem diabolus est princeps.

So two kinds of demons came into being, one heavenly, the other earthly. These are the unclean spirits, authors of the evils that are done, whose prince is the same devil.

2.14.6CSEL 19:163

unde illum Trismegistus daemoniarchen uocat. daemonas autem grammatici dictos aiunt quasi δαήμονας, id est peritos ac rerum scios: hos enim putant deos esse. sciunt illi quidem futura multa, sed non omnia, quippe quibus penitus consilium dei scire non liceat, et ideo solent responsa in ambiguos exitus temperare.

Hence Trismegistus calls him "prince of demons." The grammarians say demons are so called as if daēmones, that is, skilled and knowing things; for they think these are gods. They do indeed know many future things, but not all, since they are not permitted to know God's counsel fully; and so they usually make their responses ambiguous in outcome.

2.14.7CSEL 19:163–164

eos poetae et sciunt esse daemonas et locuntur. Hesiodus ita tradit: τοὶ μὲν δαίμονές εἰσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλὰς ἐσθλοί, ἐπιχθόνιοι, ϕύλαϰες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

The poets both know that they are demons and speak of them. Hesiod hands down thus: "These are daemons by the counsels of great Zeus, good, dwelling on earth, guardians of mortal men."

2.14.8CSEL 19:164

quod idcirco dictum est, quoniam custodes eos humano generi deus miserat; sed et ipsi, cum sint perditores hominum, custodes tamen se uideri uolunt, ut ipsi colantur et deus non colatur.

This was said because God had sent them as guardians to the human race; but they themselves, though they are destroyers of men, still wish to seem guardians, so that they themselves may be worshipped and God not worshipped.

2.14.9CSEL 19:164

philosophi quoque de his disserunt. nam Plato etiam naturas eorum in Symposio exprimere conatus est et Socrates esse circa se adsiduum daemona loquebatur, qui puero sibi adhaesisset, cuius nutu et arbitrio sua uita regeretur.

The philosophers also discuss them. For Plato even tried to describe their natures in the Symposium, and Socrates used to say that there was a daemon constantly about him, which had attached itself to him as a boy, by whose nod and will his life was ruled.

2.14.10CSEL 19:164

magorum quoque ars omnis ac potentia horum adspirationibus constat, a quibus inuocati uisus hominum praestigiis obcaecantibus fallunt, ut non uideant ea quae sunt et uidere se putent illa quae non sunt.

The whole art and power of the magicians also consists in their inspirations; invoked by them, they deceive men's sight with blinding illusions, so that they do not see what is and think they see what is not.

2.14.11CSEL 19:164

hi ut dico spiritus contaminati ac perditi per omnem terram uagantur et in solacium perditionis suae perdendis hominibus operantur.

These spirits, as I say, polluted and lost, wander over the whole earth and, as a comfort for their own perdition, work to destroy men.

2.14.12CSEL 19:164–165

itaque omnia insidiis fraudibus dolis erroribus conplent: adhaerent enim singulis hominibus et omnes ostiatim domos occupant ac sibi geniorum nomen adsumunt; sic enim latino sermone daemonas interpretantur.

So they fill everything with snares, frauds, deceits, and errors: for they attach themselves to individual men and occupy all houses door by door, and they take for themselves the name of genii; for so in the Latin language they translate "demons."

2.14.13CSEL 19:165

hos in suis penetralibus consecrant, his cotidie (uina.) profundunt, et scientes daemonas uenerantur quasi terrestres deos et quasi depulsores malorum quae ipsi faciunt et inrogant.

These they consecrate in their inner shrines, to these they pour out wine daily, and knowingly they venerate demons as earthly gods and as averters of the evils which they themselves cause and inflict.

2.14.14CSEL 19:165

qui quoniam spiritus sunt tenues et inconprehensibiles, insinuant se corporibus hominum et occulte in uisceribus operati ualetudinem uitiant, morbos citant, somniis animos terrent, mentes furoribus quatiunt, ut homines his malis cogant ad eorum auxilia decurrere.

Since they are thin and intangible spirits, they insinuate themselves into men's bodies and, working secretly in the inward parts, impair health, provoke diseases, terrify minds with dreams, shake minds with madness, so that by these evils they may compel men to run to them for help.

Divine 2, chapter 15

2.15.1CSEL 19:165

Quarum omnium fallaciarum ratio expertibus ueritatis obscura est. prodesse enim putant eos, cum nocere desinunt, qui nihil possunt aliut quam nocere.

The nature of all these deceptions is obscure to those who have no share in the truth. For they think the demons do them good when they stop harming, though they can do nothing but harm.

2.15.2CSEL 19:165

dicat fortasse aliquis colendos ergo esse, ne noceant, siquidem possint nocere. nocent illi quidem, sed iis a quibus timentur, quos manus dei potens et excelsa non protegit, qui profani sunt a sacramento ueritatis. iustos autem id est cultores dei metuunt,

Someone may perhaps say that they should therefore be worshipped so that they may not harm, since they can harm. They do indeed harm, but only those by whom they are feared, whom the mighty and lofty hand of God does not protect, who are strangers to the sacrament of truth. But the just, that is, the worshippers of God, they fear,

2.15.3CSEL 19:165

cuius nomine adiurati de corporibus excedunt: quorum uerbis tamquam flagris uerberati non modo daemonas esse se confitentur, sed etiam nomina sua edunt, illa quae in templis adorantur. quod plerumque coram cultoribus suis faciunt, non utique in obprobrium religionis, sed honoris sui, quia nec deo per quem adiurantur nec iustis quorum uoce torquentur mentiri possunt.

adjured by whose name they leave the bodies of the possessed; and scourged by their words as by whips, they not only confess that they are demons but also give their names, the ones that are adored in the temples. This they usually do in the presence of their own worshippers, not indeed to the disgrace of religion, but of their own honour, because they cannot lie either to God, by whom they are adjured, or to the just, by whose voice they are tormented.

2.15.4CSEL 19:165

itaque maximis saepe ululatibus editis uerberari se et ardere et iam iamque exire proclamant:

So, often uttering the loudest howls, they cry out that they are beaten and burning and are just about to come out:

2.15.5CSEL 19:165–166

tantum habet cognitio dei ac iustitia potestatis. cui ergo nocere possunt nisi iis quos habent in sua potestate?

so much power has the knowledge of God and righteousness. Whom, then, can they harm but those whom they hold in their power?

2.15.6CSEL 19:166

denique adfirmat Hermes eos qui cognouerint deum non tantum ab incursibus daemonum tutos esse, uerum etiam ne fato quidem teneri. μία inquit ϕυλαϰὴ εὐσέβεια. εὐσεβοῦς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου οὔτε δαίμων ϰαϰὸς οὔτε εἱμαρμένη ϰρατεῖ. θεὸς γὰρ ῥύεται τὸν εὐσεβῆ ἐκ παντὸς κακοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ἓν καὶ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν εὐσέβεια.

In fact Hermes affirms that those who have known God are not only safe from the attacks of demons but are not even held by fate. "The one safeguard," he says, "is piety. For over a pious man neither evil daemon nor fate has power. For God rescues the pious man from every evil. For the one and only good among men is piety."

2.15.7CSEL 19:166

quid sit autem εὺσέβεια, ostendit alio loco his uerbis: ἠ γὰρ εὐσέβεια γνῶσίς έστιν τοῦ θεοῦ. Asclepius quoque auditor eius eandem sententiam latius explicauit in illo sermone perfecto quem scripsit ad regem.

And what piety is he shows in another place in these words: "For piety is the knowledge of God." Asclepius too, his disciple, explained the same idea more fully in that Perfect Discourse which he wrote to the king.

2.15.8CSEL 19:166–167

uterque uero daemonas esse adfirmat inimicos et uexatores hominum, quos ideo Trismegistus ἀγγέλους πονηρούς appellat: adeo non ignorauit ex caelestibus deprauatos terrenos esse coepisse.

Both of them affirm that demons are enemies and tormentors of men, whom Trismegistus therefore calls "evil angels"; so far was he from not knowing that, corrupted from heavenly beings, they had begun to be earthly.

Divine 2, chapter 16

2.16.1CSEL 19:167

Eorum inuenta sunt astrologia et haruspicina et auguratio et ipsa quae dicuntur oracula et necromantia et ars magica et quidquid praeterea malorum exercent homines uel palam uel occulte: quae omnia per se falsa sunt, ut Sibylla Erythraea testatur: έπεὶ πλάνα πάντα τάδ έστιν, ὅσσαπερ ἄϕρονες ἄνδρες έρευνῶσιν ϰατὰ ήμαρ.

Their inventions are astrology, soothsaying, augury, the so-called oracles themselves, necromancy, the magic art, and whatever other evils men practise either openly or in secret. All these are false in themselves, as the Erythraean Sibyl testifies: "Since all these things are deceptions, which foolish men search out day by day."

2.16.2CSEL 19:167

sed idem ipsi auctores praesentia sua faciunt ut uera esse credantur: ita hominum credulitatem mentita diuinitate deludunt, quod illis uerum aperire non expedit.

But these same authors, by their presence, make them believed to be true: so they mock men's credulity with a lying divinity, because it does not suit them to reveal the truth.

2.16.3CSEL 19:167

hi sunt qui fingere imagines et simulacra docuerunt, qui ut hominum mentes a cultu ueri dei auerterent, effictos mortuorum regum uultus et ornatos exquisita pulchritudine statui consecrarique fecerunt et illorum sibi nomina quasi personas aliquas induerunt.

These are they who taught men to fashion images and statues; who, to turn men's minds from the worship of the true God, caused the likenesses of dead kings, fashioned and adorned with exquisite beauty, to be set up and consecrated, and put on their names as if they were masks.

2.16.4CSEL 19:167–168

sed eos magi et ii quos uere maleficos uulgus appellat, cum artes suas exsecrabiles exercent, ueris suis nominibus cient, illis caelestibus quae in litteris sanctis leguntur.

But the magicians, and those whom the common people truly call sorcerers, when they practise their accursed arts, summon them by their true names, the heavenly ones which are read in the holy writings.

2.16.5CSEL 19:168

hi porro incesti ac uagi spiritus ut turbent omnia et errores humanis pectoribus offundant, serunt ac miscent falsa cum ueris. ipsi enim caelestes multos esse finxerunt unumque omnium regem Iouem eo, quod multi sint in caelo spiritus angelorum et unus dominus ac parens omnium deus: sed ueritatem mentitis nominibus inuolutam ex oculis abstulerunt.

Moreover, these impure and wandering spirits, to throw everything into confusion and pour errors into human hearts, sow and mix false things with true. For they invented that there are many heavenly gods and one king of all, Jupiter, because there are many spirits of angels in heaven and one Lord and Parent of all, God; but they took the truth from sight, wrapped in false names.

2.16.6CSEL 19:168

nam deus, ut in principio docui, neque nomine, cum solus sit, eget neque angeli, cum sint inmortales, dici se deos aut patiuntur aut uolunt: quorum unum solumque officium est seruire nutibus dei nec omnino quicquam nisi iussu facere.

For God, as I taught at the beginning, needs no name, since he is alone; nor do the angels, since they are immortal, allow or wish themselves to be called gods: their one and only duty is to serve God's will and to do nothing at all except at his command.

2.16.7CSEL 19:168

sic enim mundum regi a deo dicimus ut a rectore prouinciam: cuius apparitores nemo socios esse in regenda prouincia dixerit, quamuis illorum ministerio res geratur.

For we say the world is ruled by God as a province by its governor, whose attendants no one would call partners in governing the province, although business is carried on by their service.

2.16.8CSEL 19:168

et hi tamen possunt aliquid praeter iussa rectoris per ipsius ignorantiam, quae est condicionis humanae: ille autem praeses mundi et rector uniuersi, qui scit omnia, cuius diuinis oculis nihil saeptum est, solus habet rerum omnium potestatem nec est in angelis quicquam nisi parendi necessitas.

And yet these can do something beyond the governor's orders through his ignorance, which belongs to the human condition; but that ruler of the world and governor of the universe, who knows all things, from whose divine eyes nothing is hidden, alone has power over all things, and in the angels there is nothing but the necessity of obeying.

2.16.9CSEL 19:168–169

itaque nullum sibi honorem tribui uolunt, quorum honor omnis in deo est, illi autem qui desciuerunt a dei ministerio, quia sunt ueritatis inimici et praeuaricatores dei, nomen sibi et cultum deorum uindicare conantur, non quo ullum honorem desiderent — quis enim perditis honor est? — nec ut deo noceant, cui noceri non potest, sed ut hominibus: quos nituntur a cultu et notitia uerae maiestatis auertere, ne inmortalitatem possint adipisci, quam ipsi sua nequitia perdiderunt.

So they wish no honour to be given to themselves, since all their honour is in God. But those who have revolted from God's service, because they are enemies of the truth and traitors to God, try to claim for themselves the name and worship of gods, not because they desire any honour (for what honour is there for the lost?), nor to harm God, who cannot be harmed, but to harm men, whom they strive to turn away from the worship and knowledge of the true majesty, so that they may not attain immortality, which they themselves lost by their wickedness.

2.16.10CSEL 19:169

offundunt itaque tenebras et ueritatem caligine obducunt, ne dominum, ne patrem suum norint, et ut facile inliciant, in templis se occulunt et sacrificiis omnibus praesto adsunt eduntque saepe prodigia, quibus obstupefacti homines fidem commodent simulacris diuinitatis ac numinis.

So they spread darkness and cover the truth with mist, so that men may not know their Lord and Father; and to entice them easily, they hide in temples, attend all sacrifices, and often produce prodigies, so that men, astonished by them, may give images credit for divinity and power.

2.16.11CSEL 19:169

inde est quod ab augure lapis nouacula incisus est, quod Iuno Veiens migrare se Romam uelle respondit, quod Fortuna Muliebris periculum denuntiauit, quod Claudiae manum nauis secuta est, quod in sacrilegos et Iuno nudata et Locrensis Proserpina et Ceres Milesia uindicauit et Hercules de Appio et Iuppiter de Atinio et Minerua de Caesare, hinc quod serpens urbem Romam pestilentia liberauit Epidauro accersitus.

Hence it is that the stone was cut by the augur with a razor, that Juno of Veii answered that she wished to move to Rome, that Womanly Fortune announced danger, that the ship followed Claudia's hand, that both despoiled Juno and Locrian Proserpina and Milesian Ceres took vengeance on the sacrilegious, and Hercules on Appius, Jupiter on Atinius, and Minerva on Caesar's behalf; hence that the serpent summoned from Epidaurus freed the city of Rome from pestilence.

2.16.12CSEL 19:169–170

nam illuc daemoniarches ipse in figura sua sine ulla dissimulatione perlatus est, siquidem legati ad eam rem missi draconem secum mirae magnitudinis aduexerunt.

For the prince of demons himself was carried there in his own form, without any disguise, since the envoys sent for this purpose brought back with them a serpent of wonderful size.

2.16.13CSEL 19:170

in oraculis autem uel maxime fallunt, quorum praestrigias profani a ueritate intellegere non possunt, ideoque ab ipsis adtribui putant et imperia et uictorias et opes et euentus prosperos rerum, denique ipsorum nutu saepe rem publicam periculis inminentibus liberatam, quae pericula et responsis denuntiauerint et sacrificiis placati auerterint.

But in oracles above all they deceive, whose tricks the profane cannot distinguish from the truth; and so they think that commands, victories, riches, and prosperous outcomes are granted by them, and finally that by their nod the state has often been freed from impending dangers, dangers which they both announced in responses and, appeased by sacrifices, averted.

2.16.14CSEL 19:170

sed omnia ista fallaciae sunt. nam cum dispositiones dei praesentiant, quippe qui ministri eius fuerunt, interponunt se in his rebus, ut quaecumque a deo uel facta sunt uel fiunt, ipsi potissimum facere aut fecisse uideantur, et quotiens alicui populo uel urbi secundum dei statutum boni quid inpendet, illi se id facturos uel prodigiis uel somniis uel oraculis pollicentur, si sibi templa, si honores, si sacrificia tribuantur. quibus datis cum illut acciderit quod necesse est, summam sibi pariunt uenerationem.

But all these are deceptions. For since they foresee God's arrangements, having been his ministers, they interpose themselves in these matters, so that whatever has been or is being done by God, they may seem above all to be doing or to have done; and whenever something good hangs over some people or city according to God's decree, they promise by prodigies, dreams, or oracles that they will bring it about, if temples, honours, and sacrifices are given them. When these are given and what must happen happens, they win for themselves the highest veneration.

2.16.15CSEL 19:170

hinc templa deuouentur et nouae imagines consecrantur, mactantur greges hostiarum, sed cum haec facta sunt, nihilo minus tamen uita et salus eorum qui haec fecerint immolatur.

Hence temples are vowed and new images consecrated, herds of victims are slaughtered; but when these things have been done, the life and safety of those who did them is sacrificed nonetheless.

2.16.16CSEL 19:170–171

quotiens autem pericula impendent, ob aliquam se ineptam et leuem causam profitentur iratos, sicut Iuno Varroni, quod formonsum puerum in tensa Iouis ad exuuias tenendas conlocauerat: et ob hanc causam Romanum nomen aput Cannas paene deletum est.

But whenever dangers threaten, they profess to be angry for some foolish and trivial reason, as Juno was with Varro because he had placed a handsome boy in Jupiter's chariot to hold the sacred emblems; and for this reason the Roman name was almost destroyed at Cannae.

2.16.17CSEL 19:171

quodsi Iuno alterum Ganymeden uerebatur, cur iuuentus Romana luit poenas? uel si dii tantummodo duces curant, ceteram multitudinem neclegunt, cur Varro solus euasit qui hoc fecit et Paulus qui nihil meruit occisus est? uidelicet nihil tunc Romanis accidit fatis Iunonis iniquae, cum Hannibal duos exercitus populi Romani et astu et uirtute confecit.

But if Juno feared a second Ganymede, why did the Roman youth pay the penalty? Or if the gods care only for the leaders and neglect the rest of the multitude, why did Varro alone, who did this, escape, and Paulus, who deserved nothing, perish? Evidently nothing then happened to the Romans "by the fates of hostile Juno," when Hannibal destroyed two armies of the Roman people by cunning and courage.

2.16.18CSEL 19:171

nam Juno audere non poterat aut Carthaginem defendere, ubi arma eius et currus fuit, aut Romanis nocere, quia progeniem — Troiano a sanguine duci audierat, Tyrias olim quae uerteret arces.

For Juno could not dare either to defend Carthage, where her arms and chariot were, or to harm the Romans, because she had heard "that a race was being drawn from Trojan blood which would one day overturn the Tyrian citadels."

2.16.19CSEL 19:171

sed illorum sunt isti lusus, qui sub nominibus mortuorum delitiscentes uiuentibus plagas tendunt. itaque siue illut periculum quod imminet uitari potest, uideri uolunt id placati auertisse, siue non potest, id agunt ut propter illorum contemptum accidisse uideatur. ita sibi aput homines qui eos nesciunt auctoritatem pariunt ac timorem.

But these are the games of those who, lurking under the names of the dead, set snares for the living. So if the threatening danger can be avoided, they wish to seem to have averted it when appeased; if it cannot, they contrive that it seem to have happened because they were despised. So they gain authority and fear among men who do not know them.

2.16.20CSEL 19:171–172

hac uersutia et his artibus notitiam dei ueri et singularis apud omnes gentes inueterauerunt. suis enim uitiis perditi saeuiunt et grassantur, ut perdant.

By this craft and these arts they have made the knowledge of the true and only God grow old and fade among all nations. For, ruined by their own vices, they rage and prowl in order to ruin.

2.16.21CSEL 19:172

idcirco etiam humanas hostias excogitauerunt, ipsi hostes generis humani, ut quam multas deuorent animas.

For this reason they even devised human victims, being themselves enemies of the human race, so as to devour as many souls as possible.

Divine 2, chapter 17

2.17.1CSEL 19:172

Dicet aliquis cur ergo deus haec fieri patitur nec tam malis succurrit erroribus? ut mala cum bonis pugnent, ut uitia sint aduersa uirtutibus, ut habeat alios quos puniat, alios quos honoret. ultimis enim temporibus statuit de uiuis ac mortuis iudicare; de quo iudicio mihi erit in ultimo libro disputatio.

Someone will say: "Why then does God allow these things and not come to the help of such evil errors?" So that evils may fight with goods, that vices may be opposed to virtues, that he may have some to punish and others to honour. For he has determined at the last times to judge the living and the dead; of that judgment I shall discuss in the last book.

2.17.2CSEL 19:172

differt igitur, donec ueniat temporum finis, quo effundat iram suam in potestate ac uirtute caelesti, sicut uatum praedicta piorum terribili monitu horrificant.

He delays, then, until the end of the times comes, when he may pour out his wrath in heavenly power and might, as "the predictions of the pious prophets terrify with fearful warning."

2.17.3CSEL 19:172

nunc autem patitur homines errare et aduersum se quoque inpios esse, ipse iustus et mitis et patiens. nec enim fieri potest ut non is in quo perfecta sit uirtus, sit etiam perfecta

But now he allows men to err and even to be impious against himself, being himself just, gentle, and patient. For it cannot be that he in whom virtue is perfect should not also have perfect

2.17.4CSEL 19:172

patientia. unde quidam putant ne irasci quidem deum omnino, quod adfectibus, qui sunt perturbationes animi, subiectus non sit, quia fragile est omne animal quod adficitur et commouetur. quae persuasio ueritatem ac religionem funditus tollit.

patience. Hence some think that God does not even become angry at all, because he is not subject to emotions, which are disturbances of the mind, since every creature that is affected and moved is frail. This persuasion destroys truth and religion from the foundations.

2.17.5CSEL 19:172–173

sed seponatur interim nobis hic locus de ira dei disserendi, quod et uberior est materia et opere proprio latius exequenda. illos ergo nequissimos spiritus quisquis ueneratus fuerit ac secutus, neque caelo neque luce potietur, quae sunt dei, sed in illa decidet quae in distributione rerum adtributa esse ipsi malorum principi disputauimus, in tenebras scilicet et inferos et supplicium sempiternum.

But let this topic of discussing the anger of God be set aside for us for now, because the subject is richer and must be pursued more broadly in a work of its own. Whoever, then, has venerated and followed those most wicked spirits will gain neither heaven nor light, which belong to God, but will fall into those things which, in the distribution of things, we have shown were assigned to the prince of evils himself, namely darkness, the underworld, and eternal punishment.

2.17.6CSEL 19:173

Docui religiones deorum triplici modo uanas esse: uno, quod simulacra ista quae coluntur effigies sint hominum mortuorum; esse autem peruersum et incongruens ut simulacrum hominis a simulacro dei colatur: colit enim quod est deterius et inbecillius;

I have taught that the religions of the gods are vain in three ways. First, because those images which are worshipped are likenesses of dead men; and it is perverse and unfitting that the image of a man should be worshipped by the image of God, for he worships what is worse and weaker;

2.17.7CSEL 19:173

tum inexpiabile facinus esse deserere uiuentem, ut defunctorum monumentis seruias, qui nec uitam nec lucem dare cuiquam possunt, qua ipsi carent; nec esse alium quemquam deum praeter unum, cuius iudicio ac potestati omnis anima subiecta sit.

and it is an inexpiable crime to desert the Living One in order to serve the memorials of the dead, who can give no one life or light, which they themselves lack; nor is there any other god besides the one, to whose judgment and power every soul is subject.

2.17.8CSEL 19:173

altero, quod ipsae imagines sacrae quibus homines inanissimi seruiunt omni sensu careant, quoniam terra sint.

Second, because the sacred images themselves, which the most foolish men serve, lack all sense, since they are earth.

2.17.9CSEL 19:173–174

quis autem non intellegat nefas esse rectum animal curuari, ut adoret terram? quae idcirco pedibus nostris subiecta est, ut calcanda nobis, non adoranda sit, qui simus ideo excitati ex ea statumque sublimem praeter ceteras animantes acceperimus, ut non reuoluamur deorsum nec hunc caelestem uultum proiciamus ad terram, sed oculos eo dirigamus quo illos naturae suae condicio direxit nihilque aliut adoremus, nihil colamus nisi solius artificis parentisque nostri unicum nomen, qui propterea hominem rigidum figurauit, ut sciamus nos ad superna et caelestia prouocari.

And who does not understand that it is wrong for an upright creature to bend down to adore the earth? It is placed beneath our feet so that we may tread on it, not adore it, since we were raised from it and received an upright posture beyond the other creatures, so that we might not turn back downward nor throw this heavenly face to the ground, but direct our eyes where the condition of our nature directed them, and adore nothing, worship nothing, but the one name of our sole Maker and Parent, who formed man upright so that we might know that we are called to things above and heavenly.

2.17.10CSEL 19:174

tertio, quod spiritus qui praesunt ipsis religionibus condemnati et abiecti a deo per terram uolutentur; qui non tantum nihil praestare cultoribus suis possint, quoniam rerum potestas penes unum est, uerum etiam mortiferis eos inlecebris et erroribus perdant, quoniam hoc illis cottidianum sit opus, tenebras hominibus obducere, ne quaeratur ab iis uerus deus.

Third, because the spirits who preside over these religions, condemned and cast off by God, roll about the earth; they not only can give their worshippers nothing, since power over things lies with the One, but even destroy them with deadly enticements and errors, since this is their daily work: to draw darkness over men, so that the true God may not be sought by them.

2.17.11CSEL 19:174

non igitur colendi sunt, quia sententiae dei subiacent. est enim piaculum maximum addicere se potestati eorum quibus, si iustitiam sequare, potentior esse possis et eos adiuratione diuini nominis expellere ac fugare.

They are not, then, to be worshipped, since they are subject to God's sentence. For it is the greatest sacrilege to hand oneself over to the power of those than whom, if you follow righteousness, you can be more powerful, and whom you can drive out and put to flight by adjuring them with the divine name.

2.17.12CSEL 19:174

quodsi apparet religiones istas tot modis esse uanas quibus docui, manifestum est eos qui uel mortuis supplicant uel terram uenerantur uel spiritibus inpuris animas suas mancipant, rationem hominum non tenere eosque inpietatis ac sceleris sui supplicia pensuros, qui rebelles aduersus parentem generis humani deum susceptis inexpiabilibus sacris fas omne uiolauerint.

If, then, it is clear that these religions are vain in the many ways I have taught, it is manifest that those who either pray to the dead or venerate the earth or enslave their souls to unclean spirits do not keep to the reason of men, and that they will pay the penalty for their impiety and crime, since, rebels against God, the Parent of the human race, they have violated all that is right by taking up inexpiable rites.

Divine 2, chapter 18

2.18.1CSEL 19:174–175

Quicumque igitur sacramentum hominis tueri rationemque naturae suae nititur obtinere, ipse se ab humo suscitet et erecta mente oculos suos tendat in caelum. non sub pedibus deum quaerat nec a uestigiis suis eruat quod adoret, quia quidquid homini subiacet, infra hominem sit necesse est: sed quaerat in sublimi, quaerat in summo, quia nihil potest esse homine maius nisi quod fuerit supra hominem. deus autem maior est homine: supra ergo, non infra est nec in ima potius, sed in summa regione quaerendus est.

Whoever, then, strives to guard the sacrament of being human and to keep the principle of his nature, let him raise himself from the ground and, with upright mind, stretch his eyes to heaven. Let him not seek God under his feet nor dig up from his footprints something to adore, because whatever lies beneath man must be below man; but let him seek on high, seek in the highest place, because nothing can be greater than man except what is above man. But God is greater than man: therefore he is above, not below, and is to be sought not in the lowest but in the highest region.

2.18.2CSEL 19:175

quare non est dubium quin religio nulla sit ubicumque simulacrum est. nam si religio ex diuinis rebus est, diuini autem nihil est nisi in rebus caelestibus, carent ergo religione simulacra, quia nihil potest esse caeleste in ea re quae fit ex terra. quod quidem de nomine ipso apparere sapienti potest.

So there is no doubt that there is no religion wherever there is an image. For if religion is from divine things, and there is nothing divine except in heavenly things, images lack religion, because nothing heavenly can be in a thing made from earth. This can appear to a wise man even from the name itself.

2.18.3CSEL 19:175

quidquid enim simulatur, id falsum sit necesse est, nec potest umquam ueri nomen accipere quod ueritatem fuco et imitatione mentitur. si autem omnis imitatio non res potissimum seria, sed quasi ludus ac iocus est, non religio in simulacris, sed mimus religionis est.

For whatever is simulated must be false, nor can that ever receive the name of true which counterfeits truth by paint and imitation. And if all imitation is not a serious thing but as it were play and jest, there is not religion in images (simulacra) but a mime of religion.

2.18.4CSEL 19:175

praeferendum est igitur falsis omnibus uerum, calcanda terrena, ut caelestia consequamur.

The truth, then, is to be preferred to all falsehoods, and earthly things trampled underfoot, so that we may attain heavenly things.

2.18.5CSEL 19:175

ita enim se res habet, ut quisquis animam suam, cuius origo de caelo est, ad inferna et ima prostrauerit, eo cadat quo se ipse deiecerit, ideoque oportet rationis ac status sui memorem non nisi ad superna niti semper ac tendere.

For so it is: whoever has prostrated his soul, whose origin is from heaven, to things infernal and lowest, falls where he has cast himself down; and so, mindful of his reason and posture, he ought always to strive and stretch toward nothing but things above.

2.18.6CSEL 19:175

quod qui fecerit, hic plane sapiens, hic iustus, hic homo, hic denique caelo dignus iudicabitur, quem suus parens non humilem nec ad terram more quadrupedis abiectum, sed stantem potius ac rectum sicut eum fecit adgnouerit.

Whoever does this will be judged plainly wise, just, a man, and in short worthy of heaven, whom his Parent will recognize not as lowly or cast down to the earth like a four-footed beast, but rather standing and upright as he made him.

Divine 2, chapter 19

2.19.1CSEL 19:175

Peracta est nisi fallor magna et difficilis suscepti operis portio et maiestate caelesti suggerente nobis dicendi facultatem inueteratos depulimus errores.

A great and difficult portion of the work undertaken has now, unless I am mistaken, been completed, and, with the heavenly majesty supplying us the power of speech, we have driven out inveterate errors.

2.19.2CSEL 19:175–176

nunc uero maior nobis ac difficilior cum philosophis proposita luctatio est, quorum summa doctrina et eloquentia quasi moles aliqua mihi opponitur.

But now a greater and more difficult struggle is set before us with the philosophers, whose supreme learning and eloquence are opposed to me like some massive weight.

2.19.3CSEL 19:176

nam ut illic multitudine ac prope consensu omnium gentium premebamur, ita hic auctoritate praestantium omni genere laudis uirorum.

For as there we were pressed by the multitude and almost the consent of all nations, so here we are pressed by the authority of men outstanding in every kind of praise.

2.19.4CSEL 19:176

quis autem nesciat plus esse momenti in paucioribus doctis quam in pluribus inperitis?

And who does not know that there is more weight in a few learned men than in many unlearned?

2.19.5CSEL 19:176

sed non est desperandum istos quoque de sententia deo et ueritate ducibus posse depelli nec tam pertinaces fore arbitror, ut clarissimum solem sanis ac patentibus oculis uidere se negent.

But we must not despair that these too can be driven from their opinion, with God and truth as guides; nor do I think they will be so stubborn as to deny that they see the brightest sun with sound and open eyes.

2.19.6CSEL 19:176

modo illut uerum sit quod ipsi solent profiteri, studio inuestigandae ueritatis se teneri, efficiam profecto ut quaesitam ueritatem diu et aliquando inuentam esse credant et humanis ingeniis inueniri non potuisse fateantur.

Provided only that what they themselves usually profess is true, that they are held by eagerness to search out the truth, I shall certainly make them believe that the truth, long sought, has at last been found, and confess that it could not have been found by human ingenuity.

Divine 3, chapter 1

3.1.1CSEL 19:177

Vellem mihi, quoniam ueritas in obscuro latere adhuc existimatur uel errore atque inperitia uulgi uariis et ineptis superstitionibus seruientis uel philosophis prauitate ingeniorum turbantibus eam potius quam inlustrantibus, etsi non qualis in Marco Tullio fuit, quia praecipua et admirabilis fuit, aliquam tamen proximam eloquentiae contingere facultatem, ut quantum ueritas ui sua propria ualet, tantum ingenii quoque uiribus nixa exereret se aliquando et discussis conuictisque tam publicis quam eorum qui sapientes putantur erroribus humano generi clarissimum lumen inferret.

Since truth is still thought to lie hidden in obscurity, either through the error and ignorance of the crowd, which is enslaved to various and foolish superstitions, or through the philosophers, who by the perversity of their minds confuse it rather than illuminate it, I could wish that some power of eloquence had fallen to me, if not such as was in Marcus Tullius, for his was outstanding and admirable, yet something close to it; so that, as far as truth prevails by its own proper force, it might also, supported by the strength of talent, at last put itself forward and, once the errors both of the public and of those who are thought wise had been scattered and refuted, bring the clearest light to the human race.

3.1.2CSEL 19:177

quod quidem duabus ex causis fieri uellem: uel quod magis possent credere homines ornatae ueritati, qui etiam mendacio credunt capti orationis ornatu lenocinioque uerborum, uel certe ut ipsi philosophi suis armis potissimum, quibus placere sibi et confidere solent, opprimerentur a nobis.

I would wish this for two reasons: either because people might more readily believe truth when it is adorned, since they believe even a lie when captivated by the ornament of speech and the allurement of words; or at any rate so that the philosophers themselves might be overthrown by us chiefly with their own weapons, in which they are accustomed to take pleasure and confidence.

3.1.3CSEL 19:177

sed quoniam deus hanc rei uoluit esse naturam, ut simplex et nuda ueritas esset luculentior, quia satis ornata per se est ideoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur, mendacium uero specie placeret aliena, quia per se corruptum uanescit ac diffluit, nisi ornatu aliunde quaesito circumlitum fuerit ac politum, aequo animo fero ingenium mihi mediocre esse concessum.

But since God willed this to be the nature of the matter, that simple and bare truth should be the more brilliant, because it is adorned enough in itself, and so is spoiled when painted over with ornaments added from outside, while falsehood pleases by a borrowed appearance, because, being corrupt in itself, it vanishes and melts away unless it has been smeared over and polished with ornament sought from elsewhere, I bear with an even mind that only a modest talent has been granted to me.

3.1.4CSEL 19:177–178

uerum ego non eloquentiae, sed ueritatis fiducia suscepi hoc opus maius fortasse quam ut possit meis uiribus sustineri: quod tamen, etiamsi ego defecerim, deo cuius hoc munus est adiuuante ueritas ipsa complebit.

Yet I have undertaken this work, perhaps too great to be sustained by my strength, trusting not in eloquence but in truth; and even if I should fail, truth itself will complete it, with the help of God, whose gift this is.

3.1.5CSEL 19:178

etenim cum sciam maximos quosque oratores a causidicis mediocribus saepe uictos, quod tanta est potentia ueritatis, ut se ipsa quamuis in rebus exiguis sua claritate defendat, cur hanc ego in maxima causa ab ingeniosis quidem illis ac disertis

For since I know that the very greatest orators have often been defeated by ordinary pleaders, because the power of truth is so great that it defends itself by its own clearness even in trifling matters, why should I think that in the greatest of causes it will be overwhelmed by those men, talented indeed and eloquent,

3.1.6CSEL 19:178

uiris, sed tamen falsa dicentibus oppressuiri putem ac non illa si minus oratione nostra, quae de tenui fonte admodum exilis emanat, lumine tamen suo clara et inlustris appareat? nec si philosophi doctrina litterarum mirabiles extiterunt, ego illis etiam scientiam ueri cognitionemque concesserim, quam

but nevertheless speaking falsehoods, and that it will not appear clear and illustrious by its own light, if not by our speech, which flows very thin from a slender spring? Nor, if the philosophers stood out as remarkable for their learning in letters, would I concede to them also the knowledge and understanding of truth, which

3.1.7CSEL 19:178

nemo cogitando aut disputando adsequi potest. neque ego nunc reprehendo eorum studium qui ueritatem scire uoluerunt, quia naturam hominis deus ueri adipiscendi cupientissimam fecit, sed id arguo, id reuinco, quod honestam illorum et optimam uoluntatem non sit secutus effectus, quia neque quid esset uerum ipsum sciebant neque quomodo aut ubi aut qua mente quaerendum.

no one can attain by thinking or by disputing. Nor do I now blame the zeal of those who wished to know the truth, since God made human nature most eager to gain the truth; but this I charge, this I prove, that the result did not follow their honourable and excellent intention, because they did not know what truth itself was, nor how, nor where, nor with what mind it was to be sought.

3.1.8CSEL 19:178

ita dum succurrere humanis erroribus cupiunt, ipsi se in plagas et in errores maximos induerunt. ad hoc igitur me opus coarguendi philosophiam susceptae materiae ordo ipse deduxit.

So, while they desired to rescue human beings from their errors, they themselves fell into snares and into the greatest errors. It is to this work, then, of refuting philosophy, that the very order of the subject I have undertaken has brought me.

3.1.9CSEL 19:178

nam cum error omnis aut ex religione falsa oriatur aut ex sapientia, in eo conuincendo necesse est utrumque subuertere.

For since all error arises either from false religion or from wisdom, in refuting it both must be overthrown.

3.1.10CSEL 19:178–179

cum enim sit nobis diuinis litteris traditum cogitationes philosophorum stultas esse, id ipsum re et argumentis docendum est, ne quis honesto sapientiae nomine inductus aut inanis eloquentiae splendore deceptus humanis malit quam diuinis credere.

For since it has been handed down to us in the divine writings that the thoughts of the philosophers are foolish, this very thing must be shown by facts and arguments, so that no one, led on by the honourable name of wisdom or deceived by the splendour of empty eloquence, may prefer to believe human things rather than divine.

3.1.11CSEL 19:179

quae quidem tradita sunt breuiter ac nude. nec enim decebat ut cum deus ad hominem loqueretur, argumentis adsereret suas uoces, tamquam aliter fides ei non haberetur, sed ut oportuit locutus est tamquam rerum omnium maximus iudex, cuius est non argumentari, sed pronuntiare.

These things, indeed, were handed down briefly and plainly. For it was not fitting that, when God spoke to man, he should support his words with arguments, as if otherwise he would not be believed; but he spoke as he ought, as the supreme judge of all things, whose part is not to argue but to pronounce.

3.1.12CSEL 19:179

uerum ipse, ut deus: nos autem cum ad res singulas testimonia diuinae uocis habeamus, profecto monstrabimus quanto certioribus argumentis possint uera defendi, cum etiam falsa sic defendantur, ut uera soleant uideri.

But he did so as God. We, however, since we have testimonies of the divine voice for each matter, will surely show by how much more certain arguments true things can be defended, when even false things are defended in such a way that they are commonly taken for true.

3.1.13CSEL 19:179

quare non est quod philosophis tantum honoris habeamus, ut eorum eloquentiam pertimescamus.

So there is no reason for us to pay the philosophers so much honour as to be terrified of their eloquence.

3.1.14CSEL 19:179

loqui enim bene potuerunt ut homines eruditi, uere autem loqui nullo modo, quia ueritatem non didicerant ab eo qui eius potens esset.

For they could speak well, as learned men; but speak truly they could not in any way, because they had not learned the truth from him who had power over it.

3.1.15CSEL 19:179

nec sane magnum aliquid efficiemus, quod illos ignorantiae redarguemus, quam ipsi saepissime confitentur.

Nor indeed shall we accomplish anything great in convicting them of ignorance, which they themselves very often confess.

3.1.16CSEL 19:179

in eo solo his quoniam non creditur in quo solo credi debuit, conabor ostendere numquam illos tam ueridicos fuisse quam cum sententiam de sua ignoratione dixerunt.

Since they are not believed in the one thing in which alone they ought to have been believed, I will try to show that they were never so truthful as when they pronounced sentence on their own ignorance.

Divine 3, chapter 2

3.2.1CSEL 19:179–180

Nunc, quoniam duobus prioribus libris religionum falsitas demonstrata est nec non origo ipsa totius erroris exposita, huius libri munus est philosophiam quoque ostendere quam inanis et falsa sit, ut omni errore sublato ueritas patefacta clarescat.

Now, since in the two previous books the falsity of the religions has been demonstrated, and also the very origin of the whole error set out, the task of this book is to show how empty and false philosophy also is, so that, all error removed, the truth may be laid open and shine forth.

3.2.2CSEL 19:180

ordiamur itaque a communi philosophiae nomine, ut ipso capite destructo facilior nobis aditus pateat ad excindendum omne corpus, si tamen potest corpus uocari, cuius partes ac membra discordent nec ulla compage inter se cohaereant, sed quasi disiecta et dissipata palpitare potius uideantur quam uiuere.

Let us begin, then, from the common name of philosophy, so that, once the head itself is destroyed, an easier approach may lie open to us for cutting down the whole body, if indeed that can be called a body whose parts and members disagree and do not hold together by any joining, but, as if torn apart and scattered, seem to twitch rather than to live.

3.2.3CSEL 19:180

Philosophia est, ut nomen indicat ipsique definiunt, studium sapientiae. unde igitur probem philosophiam non esse sapientiam quam ex ipsius nominis significatione? qui enim sapientiae studet, utique nondum sapit, sed ut sapere possit studet.

Philosophy is, as the name indicates and as they themselves define it, the pursuit of wisdom. How then may I better prove that philosophy is not wisdom than from the meaning of the name itself? For he who pursues wisdom is certainly not yet wise, but pursues it so that he may become wise.

3.2.4CSEL 19:180

in ceteris artibus studium quid efficiat et quo tendat apparet: quas cum discendo aliquis adsecutus est, iam non studiosus artificii, sed artifex nominatur.

In the other arts it is clear what pursuit achieves and at what it aims; and when someone has attained them by learning, he is no longer called a student of the craft but a craftsman.

3.2.5CSEL 19:180

at enim uerecundiae causa studiosos se sapientiae, non sapientes uocauerunt.

'But it was out of modesty that they called themselves students of wisdom, not wise men.'

3.2.6CSEL 19:180

immo uero Pythagoras, qui hoc primus nomen inuenit, cum paulo plus saperet quam illi priores qui se sapientes putauerant, intellexit nullo humano studio posse ad sapientiam perueniri et ideo non oportere inconprehensae atque inperfectae rei perfectum nomen inponi. itaque cum ab eo quaereretur quemnam se profiteretur, respondit philosophum, id est quaesitorem sapientiae.

On the contrary, Pythagoras, who first invented this name, since he was a little wiser than those earlier men who had thought themselves wise, understood that wisdom cannot be reached by any human pursuit, and that therefore a perfect name ought not to be given to a thing not grasped and imperfect. So when he was asked what he professed himself to be, he answered, 'a philosopher', that is, a seeker of wisdom.

3.2.7CSEL 19:180

si ergo philosophia sapientiam quaerit, nec ipsa sapientia est, quia necesse est aliut esse quod quaerit, aliut quod quaeritur, nec quaesitio ipsa recta est, quia nihil potest inuenire. ego uero ne studiosos quidem sapientiae philosophos esse concesserim, quia illo studio ad sapientiam non peruenitur.

If, then, philosophy seeks wisdom, it is not itself wisdom, for that which seeks must be one thing and that which is sought another; nor is the seeking itself right, since it can find nothing. For my part I would not even grant that the philosophers are students of wisdom, because by that pursuit wisdom is not reached.

3.2.8CSEL 19:180–181

nam si facultas inueniendae ueritatis huic studio subiaceret, si esset id studium tamquam iter ad sapientiam, aliquando esset inuenta. cum uero tot temporibus, tot ingeniis in eius inquisitione contritis non sit conprehensa, apparet nullam ibi esse sapientiam.

For if the power of finding the truth lay within this pursuit, if this pursuit were a road, as it were, to wisdom, it would at some time have been found. But since, though so many ages and so many talents have been worn out in searching for it, it has not been grasped, it is clear that there is no wisdom there.

3.2.9CSEL 19:181

non ergo sapientiae student qui philosophantur, sed ipsi studere se putant, quia illut quod quaerunt ubi aut quale sit nesciunt.

So those who philosophize do not pursue wisdom, but think that they pursue it, because they do not know where or of what kind that is which they seek.

3.2.10CSEL 19:181

siue igitur sapientiae student siue non student, sapientes non sunt, quia numquam reperiri potest quod aut non recte quaeritur aut omnino non quaeritur. uideamus tamen id ipsum, possitne hoc studio reperiri aliquid an nihil.

Whether, then, they pursue wisdom or do not, they are not wise, because that can never be found which is either not rightly sought or not sought at all. Let us see, however, whether by this pursuit something can be found, or nothing.

Divine 3, chapter 3

3.3.1CSEL 19:181

Duabus rebus uidetur philosophia constare, scientia et opinatione, nec ulla re alia.

Philosophy seems to consist of two things, knowledge and opinion, and of nothing else.

3.3.2CSEL 19:181

scientia uenire ab ingenio non potest nec cogitatione conprehendi, quia in se ipso habere propriam scientiam non hominis, sed dei est.

Knowledge cannot come from one's own talent nor be grasped by thought, because to have one's own knowledge in oneself belongs not to man but to God.

3.3.3CSEL 19:181

mortalis autem natura non capit scientiam nisi quae ueniat extrinsecus. idcirco enim oculos et aures et ceteros sensus patefecit in corpore diuina sollertia, ut per eos aditus scientia permanet ad mentem.

Mortal nature, however, does not receive knowledge except what comes from outside. For this is why the divine skill opened eyes and ears and the other senses in the body: so that through these entrances knowledge might pass through to the mind.

3.3.4CSEL 19:181–182

nam causas naturalium rerum disquirere aut scire uelle sol utrumne tantus quantus uidetur an multis partibus maior sit quam omnis haec terra, item luna globosa sit an concaua et stellae utrumne adhaereant caelo an per aerem libero cursu ferantur, caelum ipsum qua magnitudine, qua materia constet, utrum quietum sit et immobile an incredibili celeritate uoluatur, quanta sit terrae crassitudo aut quibus fundamentis librata et suspensa sit,

For to investigate or to wish to know the causes of natural things: whether the sun is as large as it appears or many times larger than this whole earth; likewise whether the moon is spherical or concave, and whether the stars are fixed to the sky or are carried through the air in free course; of what size and of what material the sky itself consists, whether it is at rest and immovable or revolves with incredible speed; how great the thickness of the earth is, or on what foundations it is balanced and hung:

3.3.5CSEL 19:182

haec inquam disputando et coniecturis uelle conprehendere tale est profecto, quale si disserere uelimus, qualem esse arbitremur cuiuspiam remotissimae gentis urbem, quam numquam uidimus cuiusque nihil aliut quam nomen audiuimus.

to wish, I say, to grasp these things by disputing and conjecture is surely just as if we wished to discuss what we suppose the city of some very remote nation to be like, which we have never seen and of which we have heard nothing but the name.

3.3.6CSEL 19:182

si nobis in ea re scientiam uindicemus quae non potest sciri, nonne insanire uideamur qui adfirmare id audeamus in quo reuinci possimus? quanto magis qui naturalia, quae sciri ab homine non possunt, scire se putant, furiosi dementesque sunt iudicandi!

If we were to claim knowledge for ourselves in a matter that cannot be known, would we not seem mad, daring to affirm that in which we could be refuted? How much more are those to be judged raving and demented who think they know natural things, which cannot be known by man!

3.3.7CSEL 19:182

recte ergo Socrates et eum secuti Academici scientiam sustulerunt, quae non disputantis est, sed diuinantis.

Rightly, then, did Socrates and the Academics who followed him do away with knowledge, which belongs not to one who disputes but to one who divines.

3.3.8CSEL 19:182

superest ut opinatio in philosophia sola sit: nam unde abest scientia, id totum possidet opinatio. id enim opinatur quisque quod nescit. illi autem qui de rebus naturalibus disputant, opinantur ita esse ut disputant. nesciunt igitur ueritatem, quoniam scientia certi est, opinatio incerti.

It remains that opinion alone is in philosophy; for where knowledge is absent, opinion possesses the whole. For each person holds an opinion about what he does not know. Those who dispute about natural things hold the opinion that things are as they argue. They do not know the truth, therefore, since knowledge is of what is certain, opinion of what is uncertain.

3.3.9CSEL 19:182

redeamus ad superius illud exemplum. age, opinemur de statu et qualitate urbis illius quae nobis rebus omnibus praeter nomen ignota est. ueri simile est in plano sitam, lapideis moenibus, aedificiis sublimibus, uiis pluribus, magnificis ornatisque delubris.

Let us return to that earlier example. Come, let us form opinions about the situation and character of that city which is unknown to us in every respect but its name. It is probable that it is set on a plain, with stone walls, lofty buildings, many streets, and magnificent and adorned temples.

3.3.10CSEL 19:182–183

describamus si placet mores habitumque ciuium. sed cum haec dixerimus, alius contraria disputabit et cum hic quoque perorauerit, surget tertius et alii deinceps et opinabuntur multo disparia quam nos opinati sumus.

Let us describe, if you like, the customs and dress of the citizens. But when we have said these things, another will argue the contrary, and when he too has finished, a third will rise and others in turn, and they will hold opinions very different from those we held.

3.3.11CSEL 19:183

quid ergo ex omnibus erit uerius? fortasse nihil. at omnia dicta sunt quae in rerum naturam cadunt, ut necesse sit aliquid eorum esse uerum. at nescietur quis uerum dixerit.

Which of them all, then, will be truer? Perhaps none. 'But everything has been said that falls within the nature of things, so that one of them must be true.' But no one will know who has spoken the truth.

3.3.12CSEL 19:183

potest fieri ut omnes ex parte aliqua errauerint, ex parte adtigerint ueritatem. stulti ergo simus, si hoc disputatione quaeramus: potest enim superuenire aliquis qui opiniones nostras derideat nosque pro insanis habeat, qui uelimus id quod nesciamus quale sit opinari.

It may be that all have erred in some part and touched the truth in some part. We should be fools, then, to seek this by disputation; for someone may arrive who laughs at our opinions and takes us for madmen, for wishing to hold opinions about the character of what we do not know.

3.3.13CSEL 19:183

uerum non opus est longe posita conquirere, unde nemo fortasse ueniat qui nos redarguat.

But there is no need to hunt out things placed far away, from which perhaps no one may come to refute us.

3.3.14CSEL 19:183

age opinemur quid nunc in foro geratur, quid in curia. longum est id quoque. dicamus interposito uno pariete quid fiat: nemo id potest scire nisi qui audierit aut uiderit. nullus igitur audet id dicere, quia statim non uerbis, sed re ipsa praesenti refutabitur.

Come, let us form opinions about what is now being done in the forum, what in the senate house. That too is far. Let us say what is being done on the other side of a single wall: no one can know it except one who has heard or seen it. So no one dares to say it, because he will at once be refuted, not by words but by the fact itself before him.

3.3.15CSEL 19:183

atquin hoc idem faciunt philosophi, qui disputant in caelo quid agatur, sed eo se inpune id facere arbitrantur, quia nullus exsistit qui errores eorum coarguat.

Yet the philosophers do this very thing when they dispute about what goes on in heaven; but they think they do it with impunity because there is no one to prove their errors.

3.3.16CSEL 19:183–184

quodsi existimarent descensurum aliquem qui eos delirare ac mentiri doceret, numquam quicquam de iis rebus quas scire non possunt disputarent. nec tamen ideo felicior putanda est eorum inpudentia et audacia, quia non redarguuntur: redarguit enim deus, cui soli ueritas nota est, licet coniuere uideatur, eamque hominum sapientiam pro summa stultitia computat.

But if they thought that someone would come down to show them that they were raving and lying, they would never dispute about those things which they cannot know. Yet their shamelessness and daring are not to be thought the more fortunate because they are not refuted; for God refutes them, to whom alone the truth is known, although he seems to overlook it, and he reckons this human wisdom as the height of folly.

Divine 3, chapter 4

3.4.1CSEL 19:184

Recte igitur Zenon ac Stoici opinationem repudiarunt. opinari enim te scire quod nescias non est sapientis, sed temerarii potius ac stulti.

Rightly, then, did Zeno and the Stoics reject opinion. For to suppose that you know what you do not know is not the part of a wise man, but rather of a rash and foolish one.

3.4.2CSEL 19:184

ergo si neque sciri quicquam potest, ut Socrates docuit, neque opinari oportet, ut Zenon, tota philosophia sublata est. quid quod non tantum ab his duobus euertitur qui philosophiae principes fuerunt, sed ab omnibus, ut iam uideatur iam pridem suis armis esse confecta?

If, then, nothing can be known, as Socrates taught, and one ought not to hold opinions, as Zeno taught, the whole of philosophy is removed. What of the fact that it is overthrown not only by these two, who were the leaders of philosophy, but by all, so that it seems long ago to have been finished off by its own weapons?

3.4.3CSEL 19:184

in multas sectas philosophia diuisa est et omnes uaria sentiunt. in qua ponimus ueritatem? in omnibus certe non potest.

Philosophy has been divided into many sects, and all hold different views. In which shall we place the truth? Certainly it cannot be in all.

3.4.4CSEL 19:184

designemus quamlibet: nempe in ceteris omnibus sapientia non erit. transeamus ad singulas: eodem modo quidquid uni dabimus, ceteris auferemus. una quaeque enim secta omnes alias euertit, ut se suaque confirmet, nec ulli alteri sapere concedit, ne se desipere fateatur: sed sicut alias tollit, sic ipsa quoque ab aliis omnibus tollitur.

Let us name any one: then in all the others there will be no wisdom. Let us go through them one by one: in the same way, whatever we give to one we shall take away from the rest. For each sect overthrows all the others in order to establish itself and its own views, and grants wisdom to no other, lest it confess itself foolish; but as it removes the others, so it is itself removed by all the others.

3.4.5CSEL 19:184

nihilominus enim philosophi sunt qui eam stultitiae accusant. quamcumque laudaueris ueramque dixeris, a philosophis uituperatur ut falsa.

For those who accuse it of folly are no less philosophers. Whichever one you praise and call true is censured as false by philosophers.

3.4.6CSEL 19:184

credemusne igitur uni se suamque doctrinam laudanti an multis unius alterius ignorantiam culpantibus?

Shall we then believe one man praising himself and his own teaching, or many blaming the ignorance of one other?

3.4.7CSEL 19:184–185

rectius sit necesse est quod plurimi sentiunt quam quod unus. nemo enim de se potest recte iudicare: quod nobilis poeta testatur: itan conparatam esse hominum naturam omnium, aliena ut melius uideant et diiudicent quam sua.

What the majority thinks must be more correct than what one thinks. For no one can judge rightly about himself, as a noble poet testifies: 'Is the nature of all men so constituted that they see and judge the affairs of others better than their own?'

3.4.8CSEL 19:185

cum igitur omnia incerta sint, aut omnibus credendum est aut nemini. si nemini, sapientes ergo non sunt, quia singuli sapientes esse se putant, si omnibus, aeque non sunt sapientes, quia singuli ab omnibus negantur esse sapientes.

Since, then, all things are uncertain, either all must be believed or none. If none, then they are not wise, since each thinks himself wise; if all, they are equally not wise, since each is denied by all to be wise.

3.4.9CSEL 19:185

pereunt igitur uniuersi hoc modo et tamquam Sparti illi poetarum sic inuicem iugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet: quod eo fit, quia gladium habent, scutum non habent.

So in this way they all perish, and like those Sown Men of the poets they slaughter one another, so that none of them all is left; and this happens because they have a sword but no shield.

3.4.10CSEL 19:185

si ergo singulae sectae multarum sectarum iudicio stultitiae conuincuntur, omnes igitur uanae atque inanes reperiuntur: ita se ipsa philosophia consumit et conficit.

If, then, the individual sects are convicted of folly by the judgment of many sects, all are found to be vain and empty; thus philosophy consumes and destroys itself.

3.4.11CSEL 19:185

quod cum intellegeret Arcesilas Academiae conditor, reprehensiones inter se omnium collegit confessionemque ignorantiae clarorum philosophorum armauitque se aduersus omnes: ita constituit nouam non philosophandi philosophiam.

When Arcesilas, the founder of the Academy, understood this, he gathered together the criticisms of all against one another and the confession of ignorance of the famous philosophers, and armed himself against them all; so he established a new philosophy of not philosophizing.

3.4.12CSEL 19:185

eo igitur auctore duo philosophiae genera esse coeperunt, unum illut uetus, quod scientiam sibi uindicat, alterum nouum repugnans, quod eam detrahit. in his duobus generibus uideo discidium et quasi ciuile bellum:

From his initiative, then, there began to be two kinds of philosophy: the one old, which claims knowledge for itself; the other new, opposing it, which takes knowledge away. Between these two kinds I see discord and, as it were, a civil war.

3.4.13CSEL 19:185–186

sapientiam, quae distrahi non potest, in qua parte ponemus? si natura rerum sciri potest, haec tironum caterua interibit; si non potest, ueterani conficientur; si pares fuerint, nihilominus peribit dux omnium philosophia, quia distracta est: nihil enim potest sine interitu sibi esse contrarium.

In which part shall we place wisdom, which cannot be divided? If the nature of things can be known, this troop of recruits will perish; if it cannot, the veterans will be destroyed; if they are equal, philosophy, the leader of all, will perish nonetheless, because it is torn apart: for nothing can be contrary to itself without destruction.

3.4.14CSEL 19:186

si autem ut docui nulla in homine potest esse interna et propria scientia ob fragilitatem condicionis humanae, Arcesilae manus uincit. sed ne ipse quidem stabit, quia non potest omnino nihil sciri.

But if, as I have shown, there can be no inward and self-derived knowledge in man because of the frailty of the human condition, the band of Arcesilas wins. But not even he will stand, because it cannot be that nothing at all is known.

Divine 3, chapter 5

3.5.1CSEL 19:186

Sunt enim multa quae scire nos natura ipsa et usus frequens et uitae necessitas cogit. itaque pereundum est, nisi scias quae ad uitam sint utilia, ut adpetas, quae periculosa, ut fugias et uites.

For there are many things that nature itself, frequent experience, and the necessities of life compel us to know. So one must perish unless one knows what things are useful for life, so as to seek them, and what are dangerous, so as to flee and avoid them.

3.5.2CSEL 19:186

praeterea multa sunt quae usus inuenit. nam solis ac lunae uarii cursus et meatus siderum et ratio temporum deprehensa est, et natura corporum a medicis herbarumque uires, et ab agricolis natura terrarum nec non imbrium futurorum ac tempestatum signa collecta sunt: nulla denique ars est quae non scientia constet.

Besides, there are many things that experience has discovered. For the varied courses of the sun and moon, the movements of the stars, and the reckoning of times have been discovered; the nature of bodies and the powers of herbs have been gathered by physicians, and by farmers the nature of soils and also the signs of coming rains and storms; in short, there is no art that does not consist of knowledge.

3.5.3CSEL 19:186

debuit ergo Arcesilas, si quid saperet, distinguere quae sciri possent quaeue nesciri. sed si id fecisset, ipse se in populum redegisset.

Arcesilas ought, then, if he had any sense, to have distinguished which things can be known and which cannot. But if he had done that, he would have reduced himself to the common people.

3.5.4CSEL 19:186

nam uulgus interdum plus sapit, quia tantum quantum opus est sapit. a quo si quaeras utrum sciat aliquid an nihil, dicet se scire quae sciat, fatebitur nescire quae nesciat.

For the common people are sometimes wiser, because they are wise just so far as is needed. If you ask one of them whether he knows something or nothing, he will say that he knows what he knows, and will admit that he does not know what he does not know.

3.5.5CSEL 19:186–187

recte ergo aliorum sustulit disciplinas, sed non recte fundauit suam. ignoratio enim rerum omnium non potest esse sapientia, cuius est scire proprium. ita cum philosophos expugnauerit ac docuerit nihil eos scire, ipse quoque nomen philosophi perdidit, quia doctrina eius est nihil sciri. nam qui alios reprehendit, quod nesciant

He rightly, then, did away with the teachings of others, but he did not rightly found his own. For ignorance of all things cannot be wisdom, whose proper function is to know. So, when he had defeated the philosophers and taught that they knew nothing, he too lost the name of philosopher, because his teaching is that nothing is known. For he who blames others because they do not know

3.5.6CSEL 19:187

, ipse debet sciens esse: cum autem nihil sciat, quae peruersitas quaeue insolentia est ob id ipsum se philosophum constituere propter quod ceteros tollat? possunt enim sic respondere:

must himself be knowing; but since he knows nothing, what perversity or what insolence is it to set himself up as a philosopher on the very ground on which he abolishes the rest? For they can answer thus:

3.5.7CSEL 19:187

si nihil nos scire conuincis et ideo non esse sapientes, quia nihil sciamus, ergo ne tu quidem sapiens es, quia te quoque confiteris nihil scire:

'If you convict us of knowing nothing, and therefore of not being wise because we know nothing, then neither are you wise, because you too confess that you know nothing.'

3.5.8CSEL 19:187

quid ergo promouit Arcesilas nisi quod confectis omnibus philosophis se quoque ipsum eodem mucrone transfixit?

What, then, did Arcesilas accomplish, except that, having finished off all the philosophers, he also ran himself through with the same blade?

Divine 3, chapter 6

3.6.1CSEL 19:187

Nusquamne igitur sapientia est? immo uero inter ipsos fuit, sed nemo uidit. alii putauerunt posse sciri omnia: sapientes utique non fuerunt; alii nihil: ne hi quidem sapientes fuerunt: illi, quia plus homini dederunt, hi, quia minus; utrisque in utramque partem modus defuit. ubi ergo sapientia est?

Is wisdom, then, nowhere? No, it was there among them, but no one saw it. Some thought that all things could be known: they certainly were not wise. Others thought nothing could be: not even these were wise; the former because they gave too much to man, the latter too little. In both, measure was lacking in one direction or the other. Where, then, is wisdom?

3.6.2CSEL 19:187

ut neque omnia scire te putes, quod est dei, neque omnia nescire, quod pecudis. est enim aliquid medium quod sit hominis, id est scientia cum ignoratione coniuncta et temperata.

In neither thinking that you know all things, which belongs to God, nor that you are ignorant of all things, which belongs to a beast. For there is a middle something which belongs to man, that is, knowledge joined with ignorance and tempered by it.

3.6.3CSEL 19:187

scientia in nobis ab animo est, qui oritur e caelo, ignoratio a corpore, quod ex terra; unde nobis et cum deo et cum animalibus est aliqua communitas.

Knowledge in us comes from the soul, which has its origin from heaven; ignorance from the body, which is from the earth. Hence we have some fellowship both with God and with the animals.

3.6.4CSEL 19:187–188

ita quoniam ex his duobus constamus elementis, quorum alterum luce praeditum est, alterum tenebris, pars nobis data est scientiae, pars ignorantiae. per hunc quasi pontem transire sine cadendi periculo licet: nam illi omnes qui se in alteram partem inclinauerunt, aut dextro aut sinistro uersus ceciderunt. utraque autem pars quomodo errauerit dicam.

So, since we consist of these two elements, one endowed with light, the other with darkness, a portion of knowledge has been given us and a portion of ignorance. Across this, as across a bridge, we may pass without danger of falling; for all those who leaned to one side or the other fell, turned either to the right or to the left. How each side went astray I will explain.

3.6.5CSEL 19:188

Academici contra physicos ex rebus obscuris argumentati sunt nullam esse scientiam et exemplis paucarum rerum inconprehensibilium contenti amplexi sunt ignorantiam, tamquam scientiam totam sustulissent, quia in parte sustulerant.

The Academics argued against the natural philosophers from obscure things that there is no knowledge, and, content with examples of a few incomprehensible things, embraced ignorance, as though they had removed all knowledge because they had removed it in part.

3.6.6CSEL 19:188

physici contra ex iis quae aperta sunt argumentum trahebant (omnia) sciri posse contentique perspicuis retinebant scientiam, tamquam totam defendissent, quia ex parte defenderant. ita neque hi clara neque illi obscura uiderunt, sed utrique dum solam scientiam consertis manibus uel retinent uel eripiunt, non uiderunt in medio constitutam forem, quae illos ad sapientiam transmitteret.

The natural philosophers, on the other hand, drew the argument from things that are plain that ⟨all things⟩ can be known, and, content with what is evident, held on to knowledge, as though they had defended the whole of it because they had defended it in part. So neither did the latter see what is clear nor the former what is obscure; but both, while they either hold on to knowledge alone or snatch it away in hand-to-hand combat, did not see the door placed in the middle which would have brought them through to wisdom.

3.6.7CSEL 19:188

uerum Arcesilas ignorantiae magister cum Zenoni obtrectaret principi Stoicorum, ut totam philosophiam euerteret, auctore Socrate suscepit hanc sententiam, ut adfirmaret sciri nihil posse.

But Arcesilas, the master of ignorance, when he was disparaging Zeno, the leader of the Stoics, in order to overthrow the whole of philosophy, took up this view on the authority of Socrates, so as to affirm that nothing can be known.

3.6.8CSEL 19:188

itaque coarguit existimationem philosophorum, qui putassent ingeniis suis erutam esse atque inuentam ueritatem. uidelicet quia mortalis fuerat illa sapientia paucisque ante temporibus instituta ad summum iam incrementum peruenerat, ut iam necessario consenesceret ac periret, extitit repente Academia tamquam senectus

So he refuted the belief of the philosophers who had supposed that the truth had been dug out and discovered by their own talents. Evidently, since that wisdom was mortal, and, established only a short time before, had already reached its greatest growth, so that it must now necessarily grow old and perish, the Academy suddenly arose like the old age

3.6.9CSEL 19:188

philosophiae, quae illam conficeret iam deflorescentem, recteque Arcesilas uidit adrogantes uel potius stultos esse qui putent scientiam ueritatis coniectura posse conprehendi.

of philosophy, to finish it off as it was already fading; and Arcesilas rightly saw that those who think the knowledge of truth can be grasped by conjecture are arrogant, or rather foolish.

3.6.10CSEL 19:188–189

sed tamen falsa dicentem redarguere non potest nisi qui scierit ante quid uerum sit. quod Arcesilas ueritate non cognita facere conatus introduxit genus philosophiae asystatum, quod latine instabile uel inconstans possumus dicere.

But no one can refute a man who speaks falsely unless he has first known what is true. Arcesilas, trying to do this without having known the truth, introduced a kind of philosophy that is asystaton, which in Latin we can call unstable or inconsistent.

3.6.11CSEL 19:189

ut enim nihil sciendum sit, aliquid sciri necesse est: nam si nihil omnino scias, id ipsum, sciri nihil posse, tolletur.

For in order that nothing may be known, something must be known; for if you know nothing at all, this very thing, that nothing can be known, will be removed.

3.6.12CSEL 19:189

ita qui uelut sententiae loco pronuntiat nihil sciri, tamquam perceptum profitetur et cognitum: ergo aliquid sciri potest.

So he who pronounces as a settled judgment that nothing is known professes it as something perceived and known: therefore something can be known.

3.6.13CSEL 19:189

huic simile est illut quod in scholis proponi solet in asystati generis exemplum, somniasse quendam ne somniis crederet. si enim crediderit, tum sequetur ut non sit credendum, si autem non crediderit, tum sequetur ut credendum sit.

Like this is that example commonly set forth in the schools as a case of the inconsistent kind: a man dreamed that he should not believe dreams. For if he believes it, it follows that he should not believe; but if he does not believe it, it follows that he should believe.

3.6.14CSEL 19:189

ita si nihil sciri potest, necesse est id ipsum sciri, quod nihil sciatur, si autem scitur non posse sciri, falsum est ergo quod dicitur nihil sciri posse. sic inducitur dogma sibi ipsi repugnans seque dissoluens.

So, if nothing can be known, this very thing must be known, that nothing is known; but if it is known that it cannot be known, then what is said, that nothing can be known, is false. Thus a doctrine is brought in that contradicts itself and dissolves itself.

3.6.15CSEL 19:189

sed homo uersutus ceteris philosophis scientiam uoluit eripere, ut eam domi absconderet — nam sibi illam profecto non adimit qui aliquid adfirmat, ut ceteris adimat —: sed nihil agit; apparet enim ac furem suum prodit.

But the crafty man wished to snatch knowledge from the other philosophers in order to hide it at home; for he who affirms something in order to take it from others certainly does not take it from himself. But he achieves nothing; for it is apparent and betrays its thief.

3.6.16CSEL 19:189

quanto faceret sapientius ac uerius, si exceptione facta diceret causas rationesque dumtaxat rerum caelestium seu naturalium quia sunt abditae nec sciri posse, quia nullus doceat, nec quaeri oportere, quia inueniri quaerendo non possint.

How much more wisely and truly he would have acted if he had made an exception and said that only the causes and reasons of heavenly or natural things, because they are hidden, cannot be known, since no one teaches them, and ought not to be sought, since they cannot be found by seeking.

3.6.17CSEL 19:189

qua exceptione interposita et physicos admonuisset, ne quaererent ea quae modum excederent cogitationis humanae, et se ipsum calumniae inuidia liberasset et nobis certe dedisset aliquid quod sequeremur.

By inserting this exception he would both have warned the natural philosophers not to seek things beyond the limit of human thought, and freed himself from the odium of false accusation, and would certainly have given us something to follow.

3.6.18CSEL 19:189–190

nunc autem cum ab aliis sequendis nos retraxerit, ne uelimus plus scire quam possumus, non minus a se quoque ipso retraxit.

But as it is, while he has drawn us back from following others, so that we may not wish to know more than we can, he has drawn us back no less from himself.

3.6.19CSEL 19:190

quis enim uelit laborare, ne quicquam sciat, aut eiusmodi suscipere doctrinam, ut etiam communem scientiam perdat? quae si doctrina est, scientia constet necesse est, si non est, quis tam stultus, ut discendum id putet in quo aut nihil discitur aut etiam dediscitur?

For who would wish to toil so as to know nothing, or to take up a teaching of such a kind that he loses even common knowledge? If it is a teaching, it must consist of knowledge; if it is not, who is so foolish as to think something must be learned in which either nothing is learned or something is even unlearned?

3.6.20CSEL 19:190

quare si neque omnia sciri possunt, quod physici putauerunt, neque nihil, quod Academici, philosophia omnis extincta est.

Therefore, if neither can all things be known, as the natural philosophers thought, nor nothing, as the Academics thought, the whole of philosophy is extinguished.

Divine 3, chapter 7

3.7.1CSEL 19:190

Transeamus nunc ad alteram philosophiae partem quam ipsi moralem uocant, in qua totius philosophiae ratio continetur, siquidem in illa physica sola oblectatio est, in hac etiam utilitas.

Let us now pass to the other part of philosophy, which they themselves call moral, in which the whole purpose of philosophy is contained, since in natural philosophy there is only enjoyment, but in this there is also usefulness.

3.7.2CSEL 19:190

et quoniam in disponendo uitae statu formandisque moribus periculo maiore peccatur, maiorem diligentiam necesse est adhiberi, ut sciamus quomodo nos oporteat uiuere.

And since one errs with greater danger in ordering the condition of life and forming character, greater care must be applied so that we may know how we ought to live.

3.7.3CSEL 19:190

illic potest uenia concedi, quia siue aliquid dicunt, nihil prosunt, siue delirant, nihil nocent, hic uero nullus discidio, nullus errori locus est. unum sentire omnes oportet ipsamque philosophiam uno quasi ore praecipere, quia si quid fuerit erratum, uita omnis euertitur.

In the former field indulgence can be granted, because if they say something, they do no good, and if they rave, they do no harm; but here there is no room for disagreement, none for error. All ought to think the same, and philosophy itself ought to teach as with one mouth, because if any error is made, the whole of life is overturned.

3.7.4CSEL 19:190–191

in illa priore parte ut periculi minus, ita plus difficultatis est, quod obscura rerum ratio cogit diuersa et uaria sentire, hic ut plus periculi est, ita minus difficultatis, quod usus ipse rerum et cottidiana experimenta possunt docere quid sit melius et uerius.

In that former part, as there is less danger, so there is more difficulty, because the obscurity of the subject forces people to hold different and varied opinions; here, as there is more danger, so there is less difficulty, because the very practice of affairs and daily experience can teach what is better and truer.

3.7.5CSEL 19:191

uideamus ergo utrumne consennant aut quid nobis adferant, quo rectius uita degatur.

Let us see, then, whether they agree, or what they offer us by which life may be led more rightly.

3.7.6CSEL 19:191

non necesse est omnia circumire, unum eligamus ac potissimum, quod est summum ac principale, in quo totius sapientiae cardo uersatur.

It is not necessary to go round all the questions; let us choose one, and that the most important, which is the highest and chief, on which the hinge of all wisdom turns.

3.7.7CSEL 19:191

Epicurus summum bonum in uoluptate animi esse censet, Aristippus in uoluptate corporis; Callipho et Dinomachus honestatem cum uoluptate iunxerunt. Diodorus in priuatione doloris summum bonum posuit, Hieronymus in non dolendo, Peripatetici autem in bonis animi et corporis et fortunae.

Epicurus holds that the highest good is in pleasure of the mind, Aristippus in pleasure of the body; Callipho and Dinomachus joined honourableness with pleasure. Diodorus placed the highest good in the removal of pain, Hieronymus in not feeling pain, and the Peripatetics in the goods of the mind, the body and fortune.

3.7.8CSEL 19:191

Herilli summum bonum est scientia, Zenonis, cum natura congruenter uiuere, quorundam Stoicorum, uirtutem sequi. Aristoteles in honestate ac uirtute summum bonum conlocauit. hae sunt fere omnes omnium sententiae.

The highest good of Herillus is knowledge; of Zeno, to live in agreement with nature; of certain Stoics, to follow virtue. Aristotle placed the highest good in honour and virtue. These are more or less all the opinions of them all.

3.7.9CSEL 19:191–192

in tanta diuersitate quem sequimur? cui credimus? par est in omnibus auctoritas. si eligere possumus quod est melius, iam non est nobis philosophia necessaria, quia sapientes iam sumus qui de sapientium sententiis iudicemus.

In so great a diversity, whom do we follow? Whom do we believe? The authority is equal in all. If we can choose what is better, then philosophy is no longer necessary for us, since we who judge the opinions of the wise are already wise.

3.7.10CSEL 19:192

cum uero discendae sapientiae causa ueniamus, qui possumus iudicare qui nondum sapere coeperimus, maxime cum praesto adsit Academicus, qui nos pallio retrahat ac uetet cuiquam credere nec tamen ipse adferat quod sequamur?

But since we come for the sake of learning wisdom, how can we judge, who have not yet begun to be wise, especially when the Academic is at hand to pull us back by the cloak and forbid us to believe anyone, and yet himself offers nothing for us to follow?

Divine 3, chapter 8

3.8.1CSEL 19:192

Quid ergo superest nisi ut omissis litigatoribus furiosis ac pertinacibus ueniamus ad iudicem, illum scilicet datorem simplicis et quietae sapientiae, quae non tantum formare nos et inducere in uiam possit, uerum etiam de controuersiis istorum ferre sententiam?

What remains, then, except that we leave these raving and obstinate litigants and come to the judge, that is, to the giver of simple and tranquil wisdom, which can not only shape us and lead us into the way, but also pass sentence on their controversies?

3.8.2CSEL 19:192

haec nos docet quod sit hominis uerum ac summum bonum. de quo priusquam dicere incipiam, illae omnes sententiae refellendae sunt, ut appareat neminem illorum fuisse sapientem.

This wisdom teaches us what the true and highest good of man is. But before I begin to speak of it, all those opinions must be refuted, so that it may be clear that none of them was wise.

3.8.3CSEL 19:192

Cum de officio hominis agatur, oportet summum summi animalis bonum in eo constitui, quod commune cum ceteris animalibus esse non possit.

Since the question concerns the duty of man, the highest good of the highest living creature ought to be placed in something that cannot be shared with the other animals.

3.8.4CSEL 19:192

sed ut feris dentes, armentis cornua, uolucribus pinnae propria sunt, sic homini aliquid suum debet adscribi sine quo rationem suae condicionis amittat. nam quod uiuendi aut generandi causa datum est omnibus, est quidem bonum naturale, summum tamen non est, nisi quod est uni cuique generi proprium.

But as teeth are proper to wild beasts, horns to cattle, and wings to birds, so something of his own ought to be ascribed to man, without which he would lose the principle of his condition. For what has been given to all for the sake of living or begetting is indeed a natural good, but it is not the highest, unless it is proper to each kind.

3.8.5CSEL 19:192–193

sapiens ergo non fuit qui summum bonum credidit animi uoluptatem, quoniam siue illa securitas siue gaudium est, communis est omnibus.

So he was not wise who believed that pleasure of the mind is the highest good, since whether it is freedom from care or joy, it is common to all.

3.8.6CSEL 19:193

Aristippo ne respondendum quidem duco, quem semper in corporis uoluptates ruentem nihilque aliut quam uentri et Veneri seruientem nemini dubium est hominem non fuisse. sic enim uixit, ut nihil inter eum pecudemque distaret nisi unum, quod loquebatur.

Aristippus I do not think even worth answering: no one doubts that he, always rushing into the pleasures of the body and serving nothing but his belly and lust, was not a man. For he lived in such a way that there was no difference between him and a beast except one thing: that he spoke.

3.8.7CSEL 19:193

quodsi asino aut sui aut cani facultas loquendi tribuatur quaerasque ab iis quid sibi uelint, cum feminas tam rabide consectantur, ut uix diuelli queant, cibos etiam potumque neglegant, cur aut alios mares uiolenter abigant aut ne uicti quidem absistant, sed a fortioribus saepe contriti eo magis insectentur, cur nec imbres nec frigora pertimescant, laborem suscipiant, periculum non recusent, quid aliut respondebunt nisi summum bonum esse corporis uoluptatem? eam se adpetere, ut adficiantur suauissimis sensibus eosque esse tanti, ut adsequendorum causa nec laborem sibi ullum nec uulnera nec mortem ipsam recusandam putent.

But if the power of speech were given to an ass or a pig or a dog, and you asked them what they mean when they pursue the females so madly that they can hardly be torn away, neglecting even food and drink; why they either drive other males off violently or, even when beaten, do not give up, but, often crushed by stronger ones, press on all the more; why they fear neither rains nor cold, undertake toil, and do not shrink from danger: what else will they answer but that the highest good is bodily pleasure? That they seek it so as to be affected with the sweetest sensations, and that these are worth so much that for the sake of obtaining them they think no toil, no wounds, not death itself should be refused?

3.8.8CSEL 19:193

ab hisne igitur praecepta uiuendi petemus, qui hoc idem sentiunt quod animae rationis expertes?

Shall we then seek rules for living from those who think the very same as creatures without reason?

3.8.9CSEL 19:193–194

aiunt Cyrenaici uirtutem ipsam ex eo esse laudandam, quod sit efficiens uoluptatis. uero inquit obscenus canis aut sus ille lutulentus; nam ideo cum aduersario summa uirium contentione depugno, ut uirtus mea pariat mihi uoluptatem, cuius expers sim necesse est, si uictus abscessero’.

The Cyrenaics say that virtue itself is to be praised because it produces pleasure. 'Yes indeed,' says the filthy dog or that muddy pig, 'for this is why I fight my adversary with the utmost strain of my strength, so that my virtue may bring me pleasure, which I must go without if I come away defeated.'

3.8.10CSEL 19:194

ab his ergo sapere discamus, quos a pecudibus ac beluis non sententia, sed lingua discernit? priuationem doloris summum bonum putare non plane Peripateticorum aut Stoicorum, sed clinicorum philosophorum est.

Shall we then learn wisdom from those who are distinguished from cattle and beasts not by their thinking but by their tongue? To hold that the removal of pain is the highest good is not at all the view of Peripatetics or Stoics, but of bedridden philosophers.

3.8.11CSEL 19:194

quis enim non intellegat ab aegrotis et in aliquo dolore positis esse hoc disputatum? quid tam ridiculum quam id habere pro summo bono, quod medicus possit dare? dolendum est ergo, ut fruamur bono, et quidem grauiter ac saepe, ut sit postea non dolere iucundius.

For who does not see that this was argued by the sick and those in some pain? What is so ridiculous as to hold for the highest good what a physician can give? One must then suffer pain in order to enjoy the good, and that severely and often, so that not suffering afterwards may be the more pleasant.

3.8.12CSEL 19:194

miserrimus est igitur qui numquam doluit, quia bono caret: quem nos felicissimum putabamus, quia malo caruit.

So he is most wretched who has never suffered pain, because he lacks the good; yet we thought him most fortunate, because he lacked evil.

3.8.13CSEL 19:194

ab hac uanitate non longe afuit qui omnino nihil dolere summum bonum dixit, nam praeter quod omne animal doloris est fugiens, quis potest sibi hoc bonum praestare, quod nobis ut eueniat, nihil aliut possumus quam optare?

Not far from this folly was he who said that the highest good is to feel no pain at all. For besides the fact that every animal flees pain, who can guarantee himself this good, which we can do nothing but wish may befall us?

3.8.14CSEL 19:194

summum autem bonum non potest efficere quemquam beatum, nisi semper fuerit in ipsius potestate: hoc autem non uirtus homini, non doctrina, non labor, sed natura ipsa cunctis animantibus praestat.

But the highest good cannot make anyone happy unless it is always in his own power; and this it is not virtue, not learning, not labour that supplies to man, but nature itself supplies it to all living things.

3.8.15CSEL 19:194

qui uoluptatem cum honestate iunxerunt, communionem hanc effugere uoluerunt, sed effecerunt repugnans bonum, quoniam qui uoluptati deditus est, honestate careat necesse est, qui honestati studet, uoluptate.

Those who joined pleasure with honourableness wished to escape this commonality, but they produced a self-contradictory good, since he who is devoted to pleasure must lack honourableness, and he who pursues honourableness must lack pleasure.

3.8.16CSEL 19:194–195

Peripateticorum bonum nimium multiplex et exceptis animi bonis, quae ipsa quae sint magna contentio est, commune cum beluis potest uideri.

The good of the Peripatetics is too manifold, and, apart from the goods of the mind, about which there is great dispute as to what they are, it may seem common with the beasts.

3.8.17CSEL 19:195

nam corporis bona id est incolumitas indolentia ualetudo non minus sunt mutis quam homini necessaria ac nescio an etiam magis, quia homo et medellis et ministeriis subleuari potest, muta non possunt. item, quae appellant fortunae bona:

For the goods of the body, that is, safety, freedom from pain and health, are no less necessary to dumb animals than to man, and perhaps even more, because man can be relieved by remedies and services, and dumb animals cannot. So too what they call the goods of fortune:

3.8.18CSEL 19:195

nam sicut homini opibus ad uitam tuendam, sic illis praeda et pabulis opus est.

for as man needs wealth to sustain life, so they need prey and fodder.

3.8.19CSEL 19:195

ita inducendo bonum quod non sit in hominis potestate, totum hominem alienae dicioni subiugauerunt.

So, by bringing in a good that is not in man's power, they subjected the whole man to another's control.

3.8.20CSEL 19:195

audiamus etiam Zenonem: nam is interdum uirtutem somniat. summum inquit est bonum cum natura consentanee uiuere. beluarum igitur nobis more uiuendum est.

Let us hear Zeno too, for at times he dreams of virtue. 'The highest good,' he says, 'is to live in agreement with nature.' Then we must live after the manner of beasts.

3.8.21CSEL 19:195

nam quae abesse debent ab homine, in his omnia deprehenduntur: uoluptates adpetunt, metuunt fallunt insidiantur occidunt et, quod ad rem maxime attinet, deum nesciunt.

For in them are found all the things that ought to be absent from man: they seek pleasures, they fear, they deceive, they lie in wait, they kill, and, what matters most, they do not know God.

3.8.22CSEL 19:195

quid ergo me docet ut uiuam secundum naturam, quae ipsa in deterius prona est et quibusdam blandimentis lenioribus in uitia praecipitat?

Why then does he teach me to live according to nature, which itself is prone to the worse and by certain gentle allurements hurls one headlong into vices?

3.8.23CSEL 19:195

uel si aliam mutorum, aliam hominis dicit esse naturam, quod homo ad uirtutem sit genitus, nonnihil hoc, sed tamen non erit definitio summi boni, quia nullum est animal quod non secundum naturam suam uiuat.

Or if he says that the nature of dumb animals is one thing and that of man another, because man was born for virtue, this is something; but still it will not be a definition of the highest good, since there is no animal that does not live according to its own nature.

3.8.24CSEL 19:195

qui scientiam summum bonum fecit, aliquid homini proprium dedit, sed scientiam alterius rei gratia homines adpetunt, non propter ipsam.

He who made knowledge the highest good gave man something proper to him; but people seek knowledge for the sake of something else, not for itself.

3.8.25CSEL 19:195–196

quis enim scire contentus est non expetens aliquem fructum scientiae? artes ideo discuntur ut exerceantur, exercentur autem uel ad subsidia uitae uel ad uoluptatem uel ad gloriam. non est igitur summum bonum quod non propter se expetitur.

For who is content to know without seeking some fruit of knowledge? Arts are learned in order to be practised, and they are practised either for the support of life or for pleasure or for glory. So that which is not sought for its own sake is not the highest good.

3.8.26CSEL 19:196

quid ergo interest utrum scientiam summum bonum putemus an illa ipsa, quae scientia ex se parit id est uictum gloriam uoluptatem? quae non sunt homini propria et ideo ne summa quidem bona: nam uoluptatis et uictus adpetentia non homini solum, sed etiam mutis inest.

What difference, then, is there whether we think knowledge the highest good or those very things which knowledge produces from itself, that is, livelihood, glory, pleasure? These are not proper to man and so are not the highest goods either; for the desire of pleasure and livelihood is found not in man alone but in dumb animals too.

3.8.27CSEL 19:196

quid cupiditas gloriae? nonne in equis deprehenditur, cum uictores exultant, uicti dolent? tantus amor laudum, tantae est uictoria curae. nec inmerito summus poeta experiendum esse ait, et quis cuique dolor uicto, quae gloria palmae.

What of the desire for glory? Is it not found in horses, when as victors they exult and when defeated they grieve? 'So great is their love of praise, so great their care for victory.' And not without reason does the greatest poet say that one must try 'what grief each feels when beaten, what glory in the palm.'

3.8.28CSEL 19:196

quodsi ea quae parit scientia communia sunt cum aliis animalibus, non est ergo summum bonum scientia. praeterea non mediocre huius definitionis est uitium, quod scientia nude ponitur. incipient enim beati omnes uideri qui artem aliquam scierint, immo uero qui et res malas scierint, ut tam beatus sit qui uenena didicerit temperare quam qui mederi.

If, then, the things that knowledge produces are common with other animals, knowledge is not the highest good. Besides, there is no small fault in this definition, that knowledge is put without qualification. For all who know some art will begin to seem happy, and indeed even those who know evil things, so that he who has learned to mix poisons will be as happy as he who has learned to heal.

3.8.29CSEL 19:196–197

quaero igitur ad quam rem scientia referenda sit. si ad causas rerum naturalium, quae beatitudo mihi erit proposita, si sciero unde Nilus oriatur uel quidquid de caelo physici delirant? quid quod earum rerum non est scientia, sed opinatio, quae pro ingeniis uaria est?

I ask, then, to what knowledge is to be referred. If to the causes of natural things, what happiness will be set before me if I know where the Nile rises, or whatever the natural philosophers rave about the heavens? What of the fact that of these things there is no knowledge but opinion, which varies with men's talents?

3.8.30CSEL 19:197

restat ut scientia bonorum ac malorum summum bonum sit. cur ergo scientiam maluit quam ipsam sapientiam summum bonum dicere, cum sit utriusque significatio et uis eadem? nemo tamen usque adhuc summum bonum dixit esse sapientiam, quod melius dici potuit.

It remains that the knowledge of good and evil is the highest good. Why then did he prefer to call knowledge the highest good rather than wisdom itself, since the meaning and force of both are the same? Yet no one up to now has said that the highest good is wisdom, which could have been said better.

3.8.31CSEL 19:197

nam scientia parum est ad bonum suscipiendum malumque fugiendum, nisi accedat et uirtus. multi enim philosophorum cum de bonis malisque dissererent, aliter tamen quam loquebantur natura cogente uixerunt, quia uirtute caruerunt. uirtus autem cum scientia coniuncta sapientia est.

For knowledge is too little for taking up good and fleeing evil unless virtue is added. For many of the philosophers, while they discoursed on good and evil, nevertheless lived otherwise than they spoke, nature compelling them, because they lacked virtue. But virtue joined with knowledge is wisdom.

3.8.32CSEL 19:197

superest ut eos etiam refellamus, qui uirtutem ipsam summum bonum putauerunt, in qua opinione etiam Marcus Tullius fuit: in quo multum inconsiderati fuerunt. non enim uirtus ipsa est summum bonum, sed effectrix et mater est summi boni, quoniam perueniri ad illut sine uirtute non potest. utrumque intellectu facile est.

It remains for us to refute also those who thought virtue itself the highest good, of which opinion Marcus Tullius also was; in this they were very inconsiderate. For virtue itself is not the highest good, but the producer and mother of the highest good, since it cannot be reached without virtue. Both points are easy to understand.

3.8.33CSEL 19:197

quaero enim utrumne ad praeclarum illut bonum facile perueniri putent an cum difficultate ac labore? expediant acumen suum erroremque defendant.

For I ask whether they think that famous good is reached easily or with difficulty and toil. Let them bring out their sharpness and defend their error.

3.8.34CSEL 19:197

si facile ad illut ac sine ullo labore perueniri potest, summum bonum non est. quid enim nos cruciemus, quid conficiamus enitendo diebus ac noctibus, quandoquidem tam in promptu id quod quaerimus iacet, ut illut quilibet sine ulla contentione animi comprehendat?

If it can be reached easily and without any toil, it is not the highest good. For why should we torment ourselves, why wear ourselves out by striving day and night, if what we seek lies so ready to hand that anyone may grasp it without any effort of mind?

3.8.35CSEL 19:197–198

sed si commune quoque ac mediocre quodlibet bonum non nisi labore adsequimur, quoniam bonorum natura in arduo posita est, malorum in praecipiti, summo igitur labore summum bonum adsequi necesse est. quod si est uerissimum, ergo altera uirtute opus est, ut perueniamus ad eam uirtutem quae dicitur summum bonum: quod est incongruens et absurdum, ut uirtus per se ipsam perueniat ad se ipsam.

But if we obtain even any common and ordinary good only with toil, since the nature of goods is set on a steep ascent and that of evils on a downward slope, then the highest good must be obtained with the highest toil. If this is most true, then another virtue is needed for us to reach that virtue which is called the highest good; and this is incongruous and absurd, that virtue should arrive at itself through itself.

3.8.36CSEL 19:198

si non potest ad ullum bonum nisi per laborem perueniri, apparet uirtutem esse per quam perueniatur, quoniam in suscipiendis ac perferendis laboribus uis officiumque uirtutis est. ergo summum bonum non potest esse id per quod necesse est ad aliut perueniri.

If no good can be reached except through toil, it is clear that virtue is that through which it is reached, since the force and office of virtue lie in undertaking and enduring toils. So the highest good cannot be that through which one must reach something else.

3.8.37CSEL 19:198

sed illi cum ignorarent quid efficeret uirtus aut quo tenderet, honestius autem nihil reperirent, substiterunt in ipsius uirtutis nomine, quam nullo proposito emolumento adpetendam esse dixerunt, ut bonum sibi constituerent quod bono indigeret.

But they, not knowing what virtue produces or at what it aims, and yet finding nothing more honourable, stopped at the name of virtue itself, which they said was to be sought with no reward in view; so they set up for themselves a good which itself needed a good.

3.8.38CSEL 19:198

Aristoteles ab his non longe recessit, qui uirtutem cum honestate summum bonum putauit: quasi possit ulla esse uirtus inhonesta ac non, si quid habuerit turpitudinis, uirtus esse desinat.

Aristotle did not depart far from them, who thought virtue together with honour the highest good, as if there could be any virtue that is dishonourable, and as if, should it have anything shameful, it would not cease to be virtue.

3.8.39CSEL 19:198

sed uidit fieri posse ut de uirtute prauo iudicio male sentiatur, et ideo existimationi hominum seruiendum putauit: quod qui faciat, a recto bonoque discedet, quia non est in nostra potestate ut uirtus pro suis meritis honestetur. nam quid est honestas nisi honor perpetuus ad aliquem secundo populi rumore delatus?

But he saw that it could happen that people think ill of virtue through perverse judgment, and so he thought that men's esteem should be served. He who does this will depart from what is right and good, because it is not in our power that virtue be honoured according to its merits. For what is honour but a lasting esteem conferred on someone by the favourable report of the people?

3.8.40CSEL 19:198

quid ergo fiet, si errore ac prauitate hominum mala existimatio subsequatur? abiciemusne uirtutem, quia flagitiosa et turpis ab insipientibus iudicetur?

What then will happen if, through men's error and depravity, a bad reputation follows? Shall we throw away virtue because it is judged wicked and shameful by the foolish?

3.8.41CSEL 19:198–199

quae quoniam inuidia premi ac uexari potest, ut sit ipsa proprium ac perpetuum bonum, nullo extrinsecus adiumento indigere debet, quin suis per se uiribus nitatur et constet.

Since virtue can be oppressed and harassed by ill will, if it is to be a proper and lasting good it ought to need no help from outside, but to rest and stand by its own strength.

3.8.42CSEL 19:199

itaque nec ullum ei ab homine bonum sperandum est nec ullum malum recusandum.

So it must neither hope for any good from man nor refuse any evil.

Divine 3, chapter 9

3.9.1CSEL 19:199

Venio nunc ad uerae sapientiae summum bonum. cuius natura hoc modo determinanda est, primum ut solius hominis sit nec cadat in ullum aliut animal, deinde ut solius animi nec communicari possit cum corpore, postremo ut non possit cuiquam sine scientia et uirtute contingere.

I come now to the highest good of true wisdom. Its nature must be defined in this way: first, that it belongs to man alone and does not fall to any other animal; next, that it belongs to the soul alone and cannot be shared with the body; lastly, that it cannot fall to anyone without knowledge and virtue.

3.9.2CSEL 19:199

quae circumscriptio illorum omnes sententias excludit ac soluit: eorum enim quae dixerunt nihil tale est.

This definition excludes and dissolves all their opinions, for nothing they said is of this kind.

3.9.3CSEL 19:199

dicam nunc quid sit, ut doceam quod institui, philosophos omnes caecos atque insipientes fuisse, qui quod esset homini summum bonum constitutum nec uidere nec intellegere nec suspicari aliquando quiuerunt.

I will now say what it is, in order to show what I set out to show: that all the philosophers were blind and foolish, who could never see nor understand nor even suspect what highest good had been established for man.

3.9.4CSEL 19:199

Anaxagoras, cum ab eo quaereretur cuius rei causa natus esset, respondit caeli ac solis uidendi. hanc uocem admirantur omnes ac philosopho dignam iudicant.

Anaxagoras, when he was asked for what purpose he had been born, answered, 'To see the heaven and the sun.' Everyone admires this saying and judges it worthy of a philosopher.

3.9.5CSEL 19:199

at ego hunc puto non inuenientem quid responderet effudisse hoc passim, ne taceret: quod quidem secum, si sapiens fuisset, commentatum meditatumque habere debuit, quia si quis rationem sui nesciat, ne homo sit quidem. set putemus non ex tempore dictum illut effusum. uideamus in tribus uerbis quot et quanta peccauerit:

But I think that he, not finding what to answer, blurted this out at random so as not to be silent; if he had been wise, he ought to have had it thought out and pondered beforehand, because if anyone does not know the reason for his own existence, he is not even a man. But let us suppose that saying was not blurted out on the spur of the moment. Let us see how many and how great errors he committed in three words.

3.9.6CSEL 19:199

primum, quod omne hominis officium in solis oculis posuit nihil ad mentem referens, sed ad corpus omnia. quid?

First, that he placed the whole duty of man in the eyes alone, referring nothing to the mind but everything to the body. What then?

3.9.7CSEL 19:199–200

si caecus fuerit, officiumne hominis amittet?

If a man were blind, would he lose the duty of man?

3.9.8CSEL 19:200

quod fieri sine occasu animae non potest. quid ceterae corporis partes? num carebunt suis quaeque muneribus? quid quod plus est in auribus quam in oculis situm, quoniam doctrina et sapientia percipi auribus solis potest, oculis solis non potest?

That cannot happen without the death of the soul. What of the other parts of the body? Will each lack its own functions? What of the fact that more is placed in the ears than in the eyes, since learning and wisdom can be received by the ears alone, but not by the eyes alone?

3.9.9CSEL 19:200

caeli ac solis uidendi causa natus es: quis te in hoc spectaculum induxit aut quid caelo rerumque naturae uisio tua confert? nimirum ut hoc inmensum et admirabile opus laudes.

You were born to see the heaven and the sun: who brought you into this spectacle, or what does your seeing contribute to the heaven and the nature of things? No doubt, that you may praise this vast and wonderful work.

3.9.10CSEL 19:200

confitere igitur esse rerum omnium constitutorem deum, qui te in hunc mundum quasi testem laudatoremque tanti sui operis induxit.

Confess, then, that there is a God, the maker of all things, who brought you into this world as a witness and praiser of his so great work.

3.9.11CSEL 19:200

magnum esse credis uidere caelum atque solem: cur ergo non gratias agis ei qui huius beneficii auctor est? cur non ipsius uirtutem prouidentiam potestatem metiris animo, cuius opera miraris? necesse est enim multo mirabilior sit qui mirabilia perfecit.

You believe it a great thing to see the heaven and the sun: why then do you not give thanks to him who is the author of this benefit? Why do you not measure in your mind the power, providence and might of him whose works you admire? For he who accomplished wonders must be far more wonderful.

3.9.12CSEL 19:200

si te quispiam uocasset ad cenam in eaque optime acceptus esses, num sanus uiderere, si pluris faceres ipsam uoluptatem quam uoluptatis auctorem? adeo philosophi ad corpus referunt omnia, nihil prorsus ad mentem nec uident amplius quam quod sub oculos uenit.

If someone had invited you to dinner and you had been splendidly entertained there, would you seem sane if you valued the pleasure itself more than the author of the pleasure? So completely do the philosophers refer everything to the body, nothing at all to the mind, and see no further than what comes before their eyes.

3.9.13CSEL 19:200–201

atquin remotis omnibus officiis corporis in sola mente ponenda est hominis ratio. non ergo ideo nascimur, ut ea quae sunt facta uideamus, sed ut ipsum factorem rerum omnium contemplemur id est mente cernamus.

Yet, all the functions of the body set aside, the purpose of man must be placed in the mind alone. We are born, then, not in order to see the things that have been made, but to contemplate the maker of all things himself, that is, to behold him with the mind.

3.9.14CSEL 19:201

quare si quis hominem qui uere sapiat interroget, cuius rei causa natus sit, respondebit intrepidus ac paratus colendi se dei gratia natum, qui nos ideo generauit, ut ei seruiamus.

So if anyone asks a truly wise man for what purpose he was born, he will answer fearlessly and readily that he was born for the sake of worshipping God, who begot us for this reason, that we might serve him.

3.9.15CSEL 19:201

seruire autem deo nihil aliut est quam bonis operibus tueri et conseruare iustitiam. sed ille ut homo diuinarum rerum inperitus rem maximam redegit ad minimum duo sola deligendo, quae sibi diceret intuenda.

And to serve God is nothing else than to maintain and preserve justice by good works. But he, as a man ignorant of divine things, reduced the greatest matter to the least, choosing only two things which he said he was to gaze on.

3.9.16CSEL 19:201

quodsi natum se esse dixisset, ut mundum intueretur, quamquam omnia conprehenderet ac maiore uteretur sono, tamen non inplesset hominis officium, quia quanto pluris est anima quam corpus, tanto pluris est deus quam mundus, quia mundum deus et fecit et regit.

And if he had said that he was born to gaze on the world, though he would have included everything and used a grander sound, he still would not have fulfilled the duty of man; because as much as the soul is worth more than the body, so much is God worth more than the world, since God both made the world and rules it.

3.9.17CSEL 19:201

non ergo mundus oculis, quia utrumque corpus est, sed deus animo contemplandus est, quia deus ut est ipse inmortalis, sic animum esse uoluit sempiternum. dei autem contemplatio est uenerari et colere communem parentem generis humani.

So it is not the world that is to be contemplated with the eyes, for both are bodies, but God with the soul; for as God is himself immortal, so he willed the soul to be everlasting. And the contemplation of God is to venerate and worship the common parent of the human race.

3.9.18CSEL 19:201

quod si a philosophis afuit proiectique in terram fuerunt diuina ignorando, existimandus est Anaxagoras ad quae uidenda natum esse se dixerit, nec caelum uidisse nec solem.

And if this was absent from the philosophers, and they were cast down to the earth through ignorance of divine things, Anaxagoras must be judged to have seen neither the heaven nor the sun, which he said he was born to see.

3.9.19CSEL 19:201–202

expedita est igitur hominis ratio, si sapiat: cuius propria est humanitas. (sed) ipsa humanitas quid est nisi iustitia? quid iustitia nisi pietas? pietas autem nihil aliut quam dei parentis agnitio.

The purpose of man, then, is plain, if he is wise; and humanity is proper to him. ⟨But⟩ what is humanity itself but justice? What is justice but piety? And piety is nothing other than the acknowledgement of God as parent.

Divine 3, chapter 10

3.10.1CSEL 19:202

Summum igitur hominis bonum in sola religione est. nam cetera, etiam quae putantur esse homini propria, in ceteris quoque animalibus reperiuntur.

Man's highest good, then, is in religion alone. For the other things, even those thought proper to man, are found in the other animals too.

3.10.2CSEL 19:202

cum enim suas uoces propriis inter se notis discernunt atque dinoscunt, conloqui uidentur. ridendi quoque ratio apparet in his aliqua, cum demulsis auribus contractoque rictu et oculis in lasciuiam resolutis aut homini adludunt aut suis. quid coniugibus ac fetibus propriis? nonne aliquid amori mutuo et indulgentiae simile inpertiunt?

For when they distinguish and recognize their own cries among themselves by their own signs, they seem to converse. Some capacity for laughter also appears in them, when with ears laid back, mouth drawn in, and eyes relaxed into playfulness they fawn on a person or on their own kind. What of their mates and their own young? Do they not show something like mutual love and indulgence?

3.10.3CSEL 19:202

iam illa quae sibi prospiciunt in futurum et cibos reponunt, habent utique prouidentiam. rationis quoque signa in multis deprehenduntur. nam quando utilia sibi adpetunt, malo cauent, periculum uitant, latibula sibi parant in plures exitus dispatentia, profecto aliquid intellegunt.

Again, those that provide for the future and store up food certainly have foresight. Signs of reason, too, are found in many. For when they seek what is useful to them, beware of evil, avoid danger, and prepare lairs for themselves opening into several exits, surely they understand something.

3.10.4CSEL 19:202

potest aliquis negare illis inesse rationem, cum hominem ipsum saepe deludant? nam quibus generandi mellis officium est, cum adsignatas incolunt sedes, castra muniunt, domicilia inenarrabili arte componunt, regi suo seruiunt, nescio an in his sit perfecta prudentia.

Can anyone deny that reason is in them, when they often outwit man himself? For those whose task is to produce honey, when they inhabit their assigned dwellings, fortify camps, build homes with indescribable skill, and serve their king, I do not know whether perfect prudence is not in them.

3.10.5CSEL 19:203

incertum igitur est utrumne illa quae homini tribuuntur communia sint cum aliis uiuentibus, religionis certe sunt expertia.

It is uncertain, then, whether those things attributed to man are common with other living things; they are certainly without religion.

3.10.6CSEL 19:203

equidem sic arbitror, uniuersis animalibus datam esse rationem, sed mutis tantummodo ad uitam tuendam, homini etiam ad propagandam. et quia in homine ratio ipsa perfecta est, sapientia nominatur, quae in hoc eximium facit hominem, quod soli datum est intellegere diuina.

My own view is this: reason has been given to all animals, but to the dumb ones only for protecting life, to man also for prolonging it. And because in man reason itself is perfect, it is called wisdom, which makes man outstanding in this, that to him alone it has been given to understand divine things.

3.10.7CSEL 19:203

qua de re Ciceronis uera sententia est: ex tot inquit generibus nullum est animal praeter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei, ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam mansueta neque tam fera, quae non etiamsi ignoret qualem haberi deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat.

On this point the opinion of Cicero is true: 'Of so many kinds,' he says, 'there is no animal except man that has any knowledge of God; and among men themselves there is no nation so civilized or so savage that, even if it does not know what sort of God it ought to have, does not know that it ought to have one.'

3.10.8CSEL 19:203

ex quo efficitur ut is agnoscat deum, qui unde ortus sit quasi recordetur.

From this it follows that he acknowledges God who, as it were, remembers where he came from.

3.10.9CSEL 19:203

qui ergo philosophi uolunt animos omni metu liberare, tollunt etiam religionem et orbant hominem suo proprio ac singulari bono: quod est a recte uiuendo atque ab omni humanitate diiunctum, quia deus ut cuncta uiuentia subiecit homini, sic ipsum hominem sibi.

So those philosophers who wish to free minds from all fear take away religion too and rob man of his own proper and unique good, which is separate from right living and from all humanity; because God, as he subjected all living things to man, so subjected man himself to himself.

3.10.10CSEL 19:203–204

nam quid est cur idem ipsi disputent eo dirigendam esse mentem quo uultus erectus est? si enim nobis in caelum spectandum est nihil utique aliut quam ob religionem, si religio tollitur, nulla nobis ratio cum caelo est.

For why is it that these same men argue that the mind should be directed where the upright face is turned? For if we are to look to heaven, it is certainly for no other reason than religion; if religion is taken away, we have no business with heaven.

3.10.11CSEL 19:204

itaque aut eo spectandum est aut in terram procumbendum. in terram procumbere ne si uelimus quidem possumus, quorum status rectus est.

So we must either look there or bow down to the earth. We cannot bow down to the earth even if we wish, since our posture is upright.

3.10.12CSEL 19:204

in caelum igitur spectandum est, quo natura corporis prouocat. quod si constat esse faciendum, aut ideo faciendum est, ut religioni seruiamus, aut ideo, ut rationem rerum caelestium cognoscamus.

We must, then, look to heaven, to which the nature of the body summons us. And if it is agreed that this must be done, it must be done either so that we may serve religion, or so that we may learn the principle of heavenly things.

3.10.13CSEL 19:204

sed rationem rerum caelestium cognoscere nullo modo possumus, quia nihil eiusmodi potest cogitando inueniri, sicut supra docui.

But we cannot in any way learn the principle of heavenly things, because nothing of that kind can be discovered by thinking, as I showed above.

3.10.14CSEL 19:204

religioni ergo seruiendum est, quam qui non suscipit, ipse se prosternit in terram et uitam pecudum secutus humanitate se abdi-

Religion, then, must be served; and he who does not take it up throws himself down to the earth and, following the life of cattle, renounces his humanity.

3.10.15CSEL 19:204

cat. sapientiores igitur inperiti, qui etiamsi errant in religione deligenda, tamen naturae suae condicionisque meminerunt.

The unlearned, then, are wiser, who, even if they err in choosing their religion, yet remember their own nature and condition.

Divine 3, chapter 11

3.11.1CSEL 19:204

Constat igitur totius humani generis consensu religionem suscipi oportere. sed quomodo in ea erretur explicandum est.

It is agreed, then, by the consent of the whole human race, that religion ought to be taken up. But how people go wrong in it must be explained.

3.11.2CSEL 19:204

naturam hominis deus hanc esse uoluit, ut duarum rerum cupidus et adpetens esset, religionis et sapientiae. sed homines ideo falluntur, quod aut religionem suscipiunt omissa sapientia aut sapientiae soli student omissa religione, cum alterum sine altero uerum esse non possit.

God willed human nature to be such that it would desire and seek two things, religion and wisdom. But people are deceived because either they take up religion and neglect wisdom, or they pursue wisdom alone and neglect religion, whereas neither can be true without the other.

3.11.3CSEL 19:204–205

cadunt ergo ad multiplices religiones, sed ideo falsas, quia sapientiam reliquerunt, quae illos docere poterat deos multos esse non posse, aut student sapientiae, sed ideo falsae, quia religionem summi dei omiserunt, qui eos ad ueri scientiam potuit erudire.

So they fall into many religions, but false ones, because they have abandoned wisdom, which could have taught them that there cannot be many gods; or they pursue wisdom, but a false one, because they have neglected the religion of the supreme God, who could have instructed them in the knowledge of the truth.

3.11.4CSEL 19:205

sic homines qui alterutrum suscipiunt uitam deuiam maximisque erroribus plenam secuntur, quoniam in his duobus inseparabiliter conexis et officium hominis et ueritas omnis inclusa est.

Thus those who take up only one of the two follow a life that has left the road and is full of the greatest errors, since in these two, inseparably joined, both the duty of man and all truth are contained.

3.11.5CSEL 19:205

miror itaque nullum omnino philosophorum extitisse, qui sedem ac domicilium summi boni reperiret.

I am surprised, then, that none at all of the philosophers appeared who found the seat and dwelling of the highest good.

3.11.6CSEL 19:205

potuerunt enim sic quaerere: quodcumque est summum bonum, necesse est omnibus esse propositum. uoluptas est quae adpetitur a cunctis, sed haec et communis est cum beluis et honesti uim non habet et satietatem adfert et nimia nocet et processu minuitur aetatis et multis non contingit; nam qui opibus carent, quorum maior est numerus, etiam uoluptate careant necesse est. non est igitur summum bonum, sed ne bonum quidem uoluptas.

For they could have sought it in this way: whatever the highest good is, it must be set before all. Pleasure is what all seek; but it is common with the beasts, has not the force of the honourable, brings satiety, harms when in excess, diminishes with advancing age, and does not fall to many; for those who lack means, who are the greater number, must also lack pleasure. So pleasure is not the highest good, and not even a good.

3.11.7CSEL 19:205

quid diuitiae? multo magis: nam et paucioribus et plerumque casu et inertibus saepe et nonnumquam scelere contingunt et optantur ab iis qui eas iam tenent. quid regnum ipsum?

What of riches? Much more so; for they fall to fewer, and mostly by chance, often to the idle, and sometimes through crime, and they are wished for by those who already have them. What of kingship itself?

3.11.8CSEL 19:205

ne id quidem: non enim cuncti homines regnare possunt et necesse est uniuersos summi boni capaces esse.

Not that either: for not all men can reign, and all must be capable of the highest good.

3.11.9CSEL 19:205

quaeramus igitur aliquid quod propositum sit omnibus. num uirtus? negari non potest quin et bonum sit et omnium certe bonum. sed si beata esse non potest, quia uis et natura eius in malorum perferentia posita est, non est profecto summum bonum. quaeramus aliut.

Let us seek, then, something that is set before all. Is it virtue? It cannot be denied that it is a good, and certainly a good for all. But if it cannot be happy, because its force and nature lie in the endurance of evils, it is surely not the highest good. Let us seek something else.

3.11.10CSEL 19:205–206

at nihil uirtute pulchrius, nihil sapiente dignius inueniri potest. si enim uitia ob turpitudinem fugienda sunt, uirtus igitur adpetenda est ob decorem. quid ergo? potestne fieri ut quod bonum, quod honestum esse constat, mercede ac praemio careat sitque tam sterile, ut nihil ex se commodi pariat?

Yet nothing more beautiful than virtue, nothing more worthy of the wise man, can be found. For if vices are to be avoided because of their ugliness, virtue is to be sought because of its beauty. What then? Can it be that what is agreed to be good and honourable should lack reward and prize, and be so barren as to produce no benefit from itself?

3.11.11CSEL 19:206

labor ille magnus et difficultas et eluctatio aduersus mala, quibus haec uita plena est, aliquid magni boni pariat necesse est.

That great toil and difficulty and struggle against the evils with which this life is full must produce some great good.

3.11.12CSEL 19:206

id uero quid esse dicemus? num uoluptatem? at nihil turpe ex honesto nasci potest. num diuitias? num potentatus? at ea quidem fragilia sunt et caduca. num gloriam? num honorem? num memoriam nominis? at haec omnia non sunt in ipsa uirtute, sed in aliorum existimatione atque arbitrio posita.

But what shall we say this is? Pleasure? But nothing shameful can be born of the honourable. Riches? Power? But these are frail and perishable. Glory? Honour? The remembrance of one's name? But all these lie not in virtue itself but in the esteem and judgment of others.

3.11.13CSEL 19:206

nam saepe uirtus et inuisa est et malo adficitur. debet autem id bonum quod ex ea nascitur ita cohaerere, ut diuelli atque abstrahi nequeat, nec aliter summum bonum uideri potest, quam si et proprium sit uirtutis et tale, ut neque adici quicquam neque detrahi possit.

For virtue is often hated and suffers evil. The good that is born of it ought to cling to it so closely that it cannot be torn away and separated; and it cannot be seen as the highest good in any other way than if it is both proper to virtue and such that nothing can be added to it or taken away.

3.11.14CSEL 19:206

quid quod in his omnibus contemnendis uirtutis officia consistunt? nam uoluptates opes potentias honores eaque omnia quae pro bonis habentur non concupiscere, non adpetere, non amare, quod ceteri faciunt uicti cupiditate, id est profecto uirtutis.

What of the fact that the duties of virtue consist in despising all these things? For not to covet, not to seek, not to love pleasures, wealth, power, honours, and all the things that are held to be goods, as the rest do, overcome by desire, this is surely the part of virtue.

3.11.15CSEL 19:206–207

aliut ergo sublimius atque praeclarius efficit nec frustra his praesentibus bonis reluctatur, nisi quod maiora et ueriora desiderat.

It produces, then, something else more sublime and splendid; and it does not struggle against these present goods in vain, but because it desires greater and truer ones.

3.11.16CSEL 19:207

non desperemus inueniri posse, modo uerset se cogitatio in omnia: neque enim leuia aut ludicra petuntur praemia.

Let us not despair that it can be found, if only our thought turns itself to everything; for the rewards sought are not light or trifling.

Divine 3, chapter 12

3.12.1CSEL 19:207

Si quaeritur quid sit propter quod nascimur, quid efficiat uirtus, possumus sic inuestigare. duo sunt ex quibus homo constat, animus et corpus. multa sunt propria animi, multa propria corporis, multa utrique communia, sicut est ipsa uirtus: quae quotiens ad corpus refertur, discernendi gratia fortitudo nominatur.

If it is asked what it is for which we are born, and what virtue produces, we can investigate it in this way. There are two things of which man consists, soul and body. Many things are proper to the soul, many to the body, many common to both, as is virtue itself; which, whenever it is referred to the body, is called fortitude, for the sake of distinction.

3.12.2CSEL 19:207

quoniam igitur utrique subiacet fortitudo, utrique proposita dimicatio est et utrique ex dimicatione uictoria: corpus quia solidum est et conprehensibile, cum solidis et conprehensibilibus confligat necesse est, animus autem quia tenuis est et inuisibilis, cum iis congreditur hostibus qui uideri tangique non possunt.

Since, then, fortitude underlies both, a combat is set before both, and to both comes victory from the combat. The body, because it is solid and can be grasped, must fight with things solid and graspable; but the soul, because it is subtle and invisible, engages with enemies that cannot be seen or touched.

3.12.3CSEL 19:207

qui sunt autem hostes animi nisi cupiditates uitia peccata? quae si uicerit uirtus ac fugauerit, inmaculatus erit animus ac purus.

And who are the soul's enemies but desires, vices, sins? If virtue conquers and routs these, the soul will be unstained and pure.

3.12.4CSEL 19:207

unde igitur colligi potest quid efficiat animi fortitudo? nimirum ex coniuncto et pari hoc est ex corporis fortitudine: quod cum in aliquam congressionem certamenque uenerit, quid aliut ex uictoria quam uitam petit? siue enim cum homine siue cum bestia dimices, pro salute certatur.

From what, then, can we infer what the soul's fortitude produces? Surely from what is joined and equal to it, that is, from the fortitude of the body. When the body enters some encounter and contest, what else does it seek from victory but life? For whether you fight with a man or with a beast, the contest is for safety.

3.12.5CSEL 19:207

ergo ut corpus uincendo id adsequitur, ut non intereat, sic et animus, ut permaneat, et sicut corpus ab hostibus suis uictum morte multatur, ita superatus a uitiis animus moriatur necesse est.

So as the body by conquering gains this, that it does not perish, so also the soul gains that it endures; and as the body, conquered by its enemies, is punished with death, so the soul overcome by vices must die.

3.12.6CSEL 19:207

quid ergo intererit inter animi et corporis dimicationem nisi quod corpus temporalem uitam expetit, animus sempiternam?

What difference, then, will there be between the combat of soul and of body, except that the body seeks temporal life, the soul eternal?

3.12.7CSEL 19:207–208

si ergo uirtus per se ipsam beata non est, quoniam in perferendis ut dixi malis tota uis eius est, si omnia quae pro bonis concupiscuntur neclegit, si summus eius gradus ad mortem patet, quandoquidem uitam quae optatur a ceteris saepe respuit mortemque quam ceteri timent fortiter suscipit, si necesse est ut aliquid ex se magni boni pariat, quia suscepti et superati usque ad mortem labores

If, then, virtue is not happy of itself, since, as I said, its whole force lies in enduring evils; if it neglects all the things that are coveted as goods; if its highest step lies open to death, since it often rejects the life others long for and bravely takes up the death others fear; if it must produce some great good from itself, because labours undertaken and overcome even to death

3.12.8CSEL 19:208

sine praemio esse non possunt, si nullum praemium quod ea dignum sit reperitur in terra, quandoquidem cuncta quae fragilia et caduca sunt spernit, quid aliud restat nisi ut caeleste aliquid efficiat, quia terrena uniuersa contemnit, et ad altiora nitatur, quia humilia despicit? id uero nihil potest esse aliut quam inmortalitas.

cannot be without reward; if no reward worthy of it is found on earth, since it spurns all things frail and perishable: what else remains but that it produces something heavenly, since it despises all earthly things, and strives toward higher things, since it looks down on low ones? And that can be nothing else than immortality.

3.12.9CSEL 19:208

merito ergo philosophorum non obscurus Euclides qui fuit Megaricorum conditor disciplinae, dissentiens a ceteris id esse dixit summum bonum, quod simile sit et idem semper.

Rightly, then, Euclides, no obscure philosopher, the founder of the Megarian school, dissenting from the others, said that the highest good is that which is alike and always the same.

3.12.10CSEL 19:208

intellexit profecto quae sit natura summi boni, licet id non explicauerit, quid sit: id est autem inmortalitas nec aliut omnino quicquam, quia sola nec inminui nec augeri nec immutari potest.

He surely understood what the nature of the highest good is, though he did not explain what it is. It is immortality and nothing else whatever, because it alone can neither be diminished nor increased nor changed.

3.12.11CSEL 19:208

Seneca quoque inprudens incidit ut fateretur nullum esse aliud uirtutis praemium quam inmortalitatem. laudans enim uirtutem in eo libro quem de inmatura morte conscripsit, una inquit res est uirtus, quae nos inmortalitate donare possit et pares diis facere.

Seneca too fell unawares into confessing that there is no other reward of virtue than immortality. For praising virtue in the book he wrote On Untimely Death, he says: 'Virtue is the one thing that can endow us with immortality and make us equal to the gods.'

3.12.12CSEL 19:208–209

sed et Stoici, quos secutus est, negant sine uirtute effici posse quemquam beatum. ergo uirtutis praemium beata uita est, si uirtus, at recte dictum est, beatam uitam facit.

But the Stoics too, whom he followed, deny that anyone can be made happy without virtue. So the reward of virtue is the happy life, if virtue, as has rightly been said, makes life happy.

3.12.13CSEL 19:209

non est igitur ut aiunt propter se ipsam uirtus expetenda, sed propter uitam beatam, quae uirtutem necessario sequitur.

So virtue is not to be sought for its own sake, as they say, but for the sake of the happy life, which necessarily follows virtue.

3.12.14CSEL 19:209

quod argumentum docere eos potuit, quod esset summum bonum. haec autem uita praesens et corporalis beata esse non potest, quia malis est subiecta per corpus.

This argument could have taught them what the highest good is. But this present bodily life cannot be happy, because through the body it is subject to evils.

3.12.15CSEL 19:209

Epicurus deum beatum et incorruptum uocat, quia sempiternus est. beatitudo enim perfecta esse debet, ut nihil sit quod eam uexare aut minuere aut inmutare possit.

Epicurus calls God happy and incorruptible because he is everlasting. For happiness must be perfect, so that there is nothing that can trouble or lessen or change it.

3.12.16CSEL 19:209

nec aliter quicquam existimari beatum potest nisi fuerit incorruptum. incorruptum autem nihil est nisi quod est inmortale. sola ergo inmortalitas beata est, quia corrumpi ac dissolui non potest.

Nor can anything be thought happy unless it is incorruptible; and nothing is incorruptible except what is immortal. Immortality alone, then, is happy, because it cannot be corrupted and dissolved.

3.12.17CSEL 19:209

quodsi cadit in hominem uirtus, quod negare nullus potest, cadit et beatitudo: non potest enim fieri ut sit miser qui uirtute est praeditus. si cadit beatitudo, ergo et inmortalitas cadit in hominem, quae beata est.

But if virtue falls to man, which no one can deny, happiness falls to him too; for it cannot be that he who is endowed with virtue is wretched. If happiness falls to him, then immortality, which is happy, falls to man too.

3.12.18CSEL 19:209

summum igitur bonum sola inmortalitas inuenitur, quia nec aliut animal nec corpus adtingit nec potest cuiquam sine scientia et uirtute id est sine dei cognitione ac iustitia prouenire.

Immortality alone, then, is found to be the highest good, because it touches neither another animal nor the body, and cannot come to anyone without knowledge and virtue, that is, without the knowledge of God and justice.

3.12.19CSEL 19:209–210

cuius adpetitio quam recta, quam uera sit, ipsa uitae huiusce cupiditas indicat, quae licet sit temporalis et labore plenissima, expetitur tamen ab omnibus et optatur: hanc enim tam senes quam pueri, tam reges quam infimi, tam denique sapientes quam stulti cupiunt.

How right and true the desire for it is, the very longing for this life shows, which, though it is temporal and full of toil, is yet sought and wished for by all: old and young, kings and the lowest, wise and foolish alike desire it.

3.12.20CSEL 19:210

tanti est, ut Anaxagorae uisum est, contemplatio caeli ac lucis ipsius, ut quascumque miserias libeat sustinere.

So precious, as it seemed to Anaxagoras, is the contemplation of the sky and of light itself that one is glad to endure any miseries.

3.12.21CSEL 19:210

cum igitur laboriosa haec et breuis uita non tantum hominum, sed etiam ceterarum animantium consensu magnum bonum esse ducatur, manifestum est eandem summum ac perfectum fieri bonum, si et fine careat et omni malo.

Since, then, this toilsome and short life is held to be a great good by the agreement not only of men but of the other living creatures too, it is plain that the same life becomes the highest and perfect good if it is without end and without any evil.

3.12.22CSEL 19:210

denique nemo umquam extitisset qui hanc ipsam breuem contemneret aut subiret (mortem) nisi spe uitae longioris. nam illi qui pro salute ciuium uoluntariae se neci optulerunt, sicut Thebis Menoeceus, Athenis Codrus, Romae Curtius et Mures duo, numquam mortem uitae commodis praetulissent, nisi se inmortalitatem opinione ciuium consequi putauissent. qui tamenetsi nescierunt inmortalitatis uiam, res eos tamen non fefellit.

In short, no one would ever have appeared who despised this short life or underwent ⟨death⟩ except in the hope of a longer life. For those who offered themselves to a voluntary death for the safety of their fellow citizens, as Menoeceus at Thebes, Codrus at Athens, and at Rome Curtius and the two Mures, would never have preferred death to the advantages of life unless they had thought they would gain immortality in the opinion of their fellow citizens. And although they did not know the way of immortality, yet the matter did not deceive them.

3.12.23CSEL 19:210

si enim uirtus diuitias et opes ideo contemnit, quia fragiles sunt, uoluptates ideo, quia breues, ergo et uitam fragilem breuemque ideo contemnit, ut solidam et perpetuam consequatur.

For if virtue despises riches and wealth because they are frail, and pleasures because they are brief, then it also despises this frail and brief life in order to gain one that is solid and everlasting.

3.12.24CSEL 19:210

ipsa igitur cogitatio per ordinem gradiens et uniuersa considerans perducit nos ad eximium illut ac singulare cuius causa nascimur bonum.

So thought itself, advancing in order and considering everything, leads us to that outstanding and unique good for the sake of which we are born.

3.12.25CSEL 19:210–211

quod si fecissent philosophi, non quod semel apprehenderant tueri pertinaciter maluissent, profecto peruenissent ad uerum hoc, ut ostendi modo. quod si non fuit eorum qui caelestes animas una cum corporibus extinguunt, illi tamen qui de inmortalitate animae disputant intellegere debuerunt ideo propositam nobis esse uirtutem, ut perdomitis libidinibus rerumque terrestrium cupiditate superata purae ac uictrices animae ad deum id est ad originem suam reuertantur.

If the philosophers had done this, and had not preferred obstinately to defend what they had once taken up, they would surely have arrived at this truth, as I have just shown. And if this was not for those who extinguish heavenly souls together with bodies, yet those who argue for the immortality of the soul ought to have understood that virtue is set before us so that, when lusts have been subdued and the desire for earthly things overcome, souls may return pure and victorious to God, that is, to their origin.

3.12.26CSEL 19:211

idcirco enim soli animantium ad aspectum caeli erecti sumus, ut summum bonum nostrum in summo esse credamus,

For this is why we alone of living creatures are made upright to look at the sky: so that we may believe our highest good to be in the highest place;

3.12.27CSEL 19:211

ideo religionem soli capimus, ut ex hoc sciamus humanum spiritum non esse mortalem, quod deum qui est inmortalis et desiderat et agnoscit.

and this is why we alone receive religion: so that we may know from this that the human spirit is not mortal, because it both longs for and acknowledges God, who is immortal.

3.12.28CSEL 19:211

igitur ex omnibus philosophis qui aut scientiam pro summo bono aut uirtutem sunt amplexi, tenuerunt quidem ueritatis uiam, sed non peruenerunt ad summum.

So of all the philosophers, those who embraced either knowledge or virtue as the highest good held to the way of truth, but did not reach the top.

3.12.29CSEL 19:211

haec enim duo sunt, quae simul efficiant illut quod quaeritur: scientia id praestat, ut quomodo et quo perueniendum sit nouerimus, uirtus, ut perueniamus. alterum sine altero nihil ualet: ex scientia enim uirtus, ex uirtute summum bonum nascitur.

For these are the two things which together produce what is sought: knowledge ensures that we know how and where we must arrive, virtue that we arrive. The one without the other avails nothing; for from knowledge virtue is born, and from virtue the highest good.

3.12.30CSEL 19:211

beata igitur uita, quam philosophi quaesierunt semper et quaerunt siue in cultu deorum siue in philosophia, nulla est et ideo non potuit ab his reperiri, quia summum bonum non in summo quaesierunt, sed in imo.

The happy life, then, which the philosophers have always sought and still seek, whether in the worship of the gods or in philosophy, does not exist there, and so could not be found by them, because they sought the highest good not in the highest place but in the lowest.

3.12.31CSEL 19:211

summum autem quid est nisi caelum et deus, unde animus oritur? imum quid nisi terra, unde corpus est?

And what is the highest but heaven and God, from whom the soul arises? What is the lowest but the earth, from which the body comes?

3.12.32CSEL 19:211

itaque licet quidam philosophi summum bonum non corpori, sed animo dederint, tamen quoniam illut ad hanc uitam rettulerunt quae cum corpore terminatur, ad corpus reuoluti sunt, cuius est omne hoc tempus quod transigitur in terra.

So, though some philosophers assigned the highest good not to the body but to the soul, yet because they referred it to this life, which ends with the body, they fell back to the body, to which belongs all this time that is spent on earth.

3.12.33CSEL 19:211

quare non inmerito summum bonum non conprehenderunt, quia quidquid spectat ad corpus et inmortalitatis est expers, imum sit necesse est.

So not without reason they did not grasp the highest good, because whatever looks to the body and has no share of immortality must be the lowest.

3.12.34CSEL 19:211–212

non cadit ergo in hominem beatitudo illo modo quo philosophi putauerunt, sed ita cadit, non ut tunc beatus sit, cum uiuit in corpore, quod utique ut dissoluatur corrumpi necesse est, sed tunc, cum anima societate corporis liberata in solo spiritu uiuit.

Happiness, then, does not fall to man in the way the philosophers thought; but it does fall to him, not so that he is happy while he lives in the body, which must in any case decay in order to be dissolved, but then, when the soul, freed from partnership with the body, lives in spirit alone.

3.12.35CSEL 19:212

hoc uno beati esse in hac uita possumus, si minime beati esse uideamur, si fugientes inlecebras uoluptatum solique uirtuti seruientes in omnibus miseriis laboribusque uiuamus, quae sunt exercitia et corroboramenta uirtutis, si denique asperam illam uiam difficilemque teneamus, quae nobis ad beatitudinem patefacta est.

We can be happy in this life in this one way: if we seem least happy; if, fleeing the enticements of pleasures and serving virtue alone, we live in all miseries and toils, which are the exercises and strengthenings of virtue; if, finally, we keep to that rough and difficult way which has been opened to us toward happiness.

3.12.36CSEL 19:212

summum igitur bonum quod beatos facit non potest esse nisi in ea religione atque doctrina, cui spes inmortalitatis adiuncta est.

The highest good that makes us happy, then, can be nowhere but in that religion and teaching to which the hope of immortality is joined.

Divine 3, chapter 13

3.13.1CSEL 19:212

Res exigere uidetur hoc loco, ut quoniam docuimus inmortalitatem esse summum bonum, id ipsum, inmortalem esse animam, conprobemus.

The matter seems to require at this point that, since we have shown immortality to be the highest good, we should prove this very thing, that the soul is immortal.

3.13.2CSEL 19:212

qua de re ingens inter philosophos disceptatio est, nec quicquam tamen explicare aut probare potuerunt ii qui uerum de anima sentiebant.

On this question there is great dispute among the philosophers; yet those who thought truly about the soul could not explain or prove anything.

3.13.3CSEL 19:212

expertes enim diuinae huius eruditionis nec argumenta uera quibus uincerent adtulerunt nec testimonia quibus probarent. sed oportunius hanc quaestionem tractabimus in ultimo libro, cum de uita beata nobis erit disserendum.

For, lacking this divine instruction, they brought forward neither true arguments by which to win nor testimonies by which to prove. But we shall treat this question more fittingly in the last book, when we must discuss the happy life.

3.13.4CSEL 19:212

superest pars illa philosophiae tertia quam uocant λογικήν, in qua tota dialectica et omnis loquendi ratio continetur.

There remains that third part of philosophy which they call logic, in which all dialectic and the whole method of speaking is contained.

3.13.5CSEL 19:212–213

hanc diuina eruditio non desiderat, quia non in lingua, sed in corde sapientia est nec interest quali utare sermone. res enim, non uerba quaeruntur. et nos non de grammatico aut oratore, quorum scientia est quomodo loqui deceat, sed de sapiente disserimus, cuius doctrina est quomodo uiuere oporteat.

Divine instruction does not need this, because wisdom is not in the tongue but in the heart, and it makes no difference what kind of speech you use. For things, not words, are sought. And we are discussing not the grammarian or the orator, whose knowledge is how one should speak, but the wise man, whose teaching is how one should live.

3.13.6CSEL 19:213

quodsi neque physica illa ratio necessaria est neque haec logica, quia beatum facere non possunt, restat ut in sola ethica totius philosophiae uis contineatur; ad quam se abiectis omnibus Socrates contulisse dicitur.

If, then, neither that natural philosophy is necessary nor this logic, because they cannot make one happy, it remains that the whole force of philosophy is contained in ethics alone, to which Socrates is said to have devoted himself after casting aside all else.

3.13.7CSEL 19:213

in qua etiam parte quoniam philosophos errasse docui, qui summum bonum cuius capiendi gratia generati sumus non conprehenderunt, apparet falsam et inanem esse omnem philosophiam, quia nec instruit ad iustitiae munera nec officium hominis rationemque consummat.

And since I have shown that in this part too the philosophers went wrong, who did not grasp the highest good for the obtaining of which we were begotten, it is clear that all philosophy is false and empty, because it neither equips us for the duties of justice nor completes the duty and purpose of man.

3.13.8CSEL 19:213

sciant igitur errare se qui philosophiam putant esse sapientiam; non trahantur auctoritate cuiusquam, sed ueritati potius et faueant et accedant. nullus hic temeritati locus est, in aeternum stultitiae poena subeunda est, si aut persona inanis aut opinio falsa deceperit.

Let those, then, who think philosophy is wisdom know that they are wrong; let them not be carried away by anyone's authority, but rather favour and draw near to the truth. There is no room here for rashness: the penalty of folly must be undergone for ever, if either an empty person or a false opinion has deceived us.

3.13.9CSEL 19:213

homo autem, qualiscumque est, si sibi credit hoc est si homini credit, ut non dicam stultus, qui suum non uideat errorem, certe adrogans est, qui sibi audeat uindicare quod humana condicio non recipit.

But a man, whatever he is like, if he believes himself, that is, if he believes a man, is, not to call him a fool who does not see his own error, certainly arrogant, daring to claim for himself what the human condition does not admit.

3.13.10CSEL 19:213–214

ipse Romanae linguae summus auctor quantum fallatur, licet ex illa sententia peruidere: qui cum in libris officiorum philosophiam nihil aliut esse dixisset quam studium sapientiae, ipsam autem sapientiam rerum diuinarum et humanarum scientiam, tum adiecit: cuius studium qui uituperat, haut sane intellego quidnam sit quod laudandum putet.

How greatly the chief author of the Roman tongue himself is deceived can be seen from that sentence of his in which, having said in the books On Duties that philosophy is nothing else than the pursuit of wisdom, and wisdom itself the knowledge of things divine and human, he then added: 'Whoever blames the pursuit of this, I do not really understand what he thinks worth praising.

3.13.11CSEL 19:214

nam si oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid anquirunt quod spectet et ualeat ad bene beateque uiuendum? siue ratio constantiae uirtutisque ducitur, aut haec est ars aut nulla omnino, per quam eas adsequamur. nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum, minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium atque in maximis rebus errantium. si autem est aliqua disciplina uirtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab isto discendi genere discesseris?

For if delight of mind and rest from cares is sought, what can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always searching out something that bears on and avails for living well and happily? Or if an account of constancy and virtue is sought, either this is the art by which we attain them, or there is none at all. To say that there is no art of the greatest things, when there is none of the least without art, is the part of men speaking inconsiderately and erring in the greatest things. But if there is some discipline of virtue, where will it be sought when you have left this kind of learning?'

3.13.12CSEL 19:214

equidem tametsi operam dederim ut quantulamcumque dicendi adsequerer facultatem propter studium docendi, tamen eloquens numquam fui, quippe qui forum ne adtigerim quidem: sed necesse est ipsa me faciat causae bonitas eloquentem, ad quam diserte copioseque defendendam scientia diuinitatis et ipsa ueritas sufficit.

For my part, although I have taken pains to acquire some small power of speaking for the sake of teaching, I have never been eloquent, since I never so much as set foot in the forum; but the goodness of my cause must itself make me eloquent, for the eloquent and copious defence of which the knowledge of the divine and truth itself suffice.

3.13.13CSEL 19:214–215

uellem igitur Ciceronem paulisper ab inferis surgere, ut uir eloquentissimus ab homunculo non diserto doceretur: primum quidnam sit quod laudandum putet qui uituperat id studium quod uocatur philosophia; deinde neque illam esse artem qua uirtus et iustitia discatur nec aliam ullam, sicut putauit; postremo quoniam est uirtutis disciplina, ubi quaerenda sit, cum ab illo discendi genere discesseris, quod ille non audiendi discendique gratia quaerebat. a quo enim posset audire, cum sciret id nemo?

I could wish, then, that Cicero might rise for a little while from the dead, so that the most eloquent of men might be taught by a little man without eloquence: first, what it is that he thinks worth praising who blames the pursuit called philosophy; next, that neither is that the art by which virtue and justice are learned, nor any other such as he supposed; lastly, since there is a discipline of virtue, where it is to be sought when you have left that kind of learning, which he was not seeking for the sake of hearing and learning. For from whom could he have heard it, when he knew that no one knew it?

3.13.14CSEL 19:215

sed ut in causis facere solebat, interrogatione uoluit urguere ad confessionemque perducere, tamquam confideret responderi prorsus nihil posse, quominus philosophia esset magistra uirtutis. quod quidem in Tusculanis disputationibus aperte professus est ad eam ipsam conuersa oratione, tamquam se declamatorio dicendi genere iactaret.

But, as he used to do in lawsuits, he wanted to press by questioning and bring to a confession, as though confident that nothing at all could be answered to prevent philosophy being the teacher of virtue. This indeed he openly professed in the Tusculan Disputations, turning his speech to philosophy herself, as though showing off in the declamatory style:

3.13.15CSEL 19:215

o (uitae) philosophia dux inquit o uirtutis indagatrix expultrixque uitiorum! quid non modo nos, sed omnino uita hominum sine te esse potuisset? — tu inuentrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinae fuisti:

'O philosophy, guide ⟨of life⟩,' he says, 'O searcher out of virtue and expeller of vices! What could not only we but the whole life of men have been without you? You were the discoverer of laws, you the teacher of morals and discipline.'

3.13.16CSEL 19:215–216

quasi uero aliquid per se ipsa sentiret ac non potius ille laudandus esset qui eam tribuit. potuit eodem modo gratias agere cibo et potui, quod sine his rebus constare uita non possit, in quibus ut sensus ita beneficii nihil est: atquin ut illa corporis alimenta sunt, sic animae sapientia.

As though philosophy perceived anything by itself, and he were not rather to be praised who bestowed it! In the same way he could have given thanks to food and drink, because life cannot continue without these things, in which there is no feeling and so no kindness; and yet as those are the nourishment of the body, so wisdom is of the soul.

Divine 3, chapter 14

3.14.1CSEL 19:216

Rectius itaque Lucretius, cum eum laudat qui sapientiam primus inuenit, sed hoc inepte, quod ab homine inuentam putauit: quasi uero illam alicubi iacentem homo ille quem laudabat inuenerit tamquam tibias ad fontem, ut poetae aiunt.

Lucretius, then, did better when he praised him who first discovered wisdom; but this foolishly, that he thought it was discovered by a man, as if that man whom he praised had found it lying somewhere, like the pipes by the spring, as the poets say.

3.14.2CSEL 19:216

quodsi repertorem sapientiae ut deum laudauit — ita enim dicit: nemo, ut opinor, erit mortali corpore cretus. nam si, ut ipsa petit maiestas cognita rerum, - dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus, inclute Memmi —

And if he praised the discoverer of wisdom as a god, for he says: 'No one, I think, who is born of mortal body. For if we must speak as the known majesty of things itself demands, he was a god, a god, illustrious Memmius',

3.14.3CSEL 19:216

tamen non erat sic laudandus deus, quod sapientiam inuenerit, sed quod hominem fecerit qui posset capere sapientiam: minuit enim laudem qui partem laudat ex toto.

yet God should not have been praised in that way, for having discovered wisdom, but for having made man able to receive wisdom; for he lessens praise who praises a part out of the whole.

3.14.4CSEL 19:216

sed ille ut hominem laudauit, qui tamen ob id ipsum deberet pro deo haberi, quod sapere inuenerit: nam sic ait: nonne decebit hunc hominem numero diuum dignarier esse?

But he praised him as a man, who nevertheless ought to be held a god for this very reason, that he discovered wisdom. For so he says: 'Will it not be fitting that this man be deemed worthy to be numbered among the gods?'

3.14.5CSEL 19:216

unde apparet aut Pythagoram uoluisse laudare, qui se primus ut dixi philosophum nominauit, aut Milesium Thalen, qui de rerum natura primus traditur disputasse.

From which it appears that he wished to praise either Pythagoras, who, as I said, first called himself a philosopher, or Thales of Miletus, who is said to have been the first to discuss the nature of things.

3.14.6CSEL 19:216–217

ita dum hominem quaerit extollere, rem ipsam depressit: non est enim magna, si ab homine potuit inueniri.

So while he seeks to exalt a man, he has lowered the thing itself; for it is not great if it could be discovered by a man.

3.14.7CSEL 19:217

uerum potest ut poetae dari uenia. at ille idem perfectus orator, idem summus philosophus, ne Graecos reprehendam quorum leuitatem semper accusat et tamen sequitur, ipsam sapientiam, quam alias donum, alias inuentum deorum uocat, poetice figuratam laudat in faciem. grauiter etiam queritur extitisse aliquos qui eam uituperarent.

But pardon can be granted him as a poet. Yet that same man, the perfect orator and the greatest philosopher, not to blame the Greeks, whose levity he always accuses and yet follows, praises wisdom itself to its face, figured poetically, calling it at one time the gift, at another the discovery of the gods; and he complains bitterly that some have appeared who blamed it.

3.14.8CSEL 19:217

quisquamne inquit uituperare uitae parentem et hoc parricidio se inquinare audet et tam inpie ingratus esse?

'Does anyone,' he says, 'dare to blame the parent of life, and to stain himself with this parricide, and to be so impiously ungrateful?'

3.14.9CSEL 19:217

nos ergo, Marce Tulli, parricidae sumus et insuendi iudice in culleum, qui philosophiam negamus parentem esse uitae,

Are we then parricides, Marcus Tullius, and in your judgment to be sewn up in the sack, we who deny that philosophy is the parent of life?

3.14.10CSEL 19:217–218

an tu, qui aduersus deum tam inpie ingratus es, non hunc cuius effigiem ueneraris in Capitolio sedentem, sed illum qui mundum fecit hominemque generauit, qui sapientiam quoque ipsam inter cetera caelestia sua beneficia largitus est? magistram tu uirtutis aut parentem uitae uocas? ad quam si quis accesserit, multo sit incertior necesse est quam prius fuerit.

Or are not you rather so impiously ungrateful toward God, not this one whose image you venerate sitting on the Capitol, but him who made the world and begot man, who also bestowed wisdom itself among his other heavenly benefits? Do you call it the teacher of virtue or the parent of life? Whoever approaches it must become far more uncertain than he was before.

3.14.11CSEL 19:218

cuius enim uirtutis? quae ipsa ubi sita sit, adhuc philosophi non expediunt. cuius uitae? cum ipsi doctores ante fuerint senectute ac morte confecti quam constituerint quomodo uiui deceat. cuius ueritatis indagatricem profiteri potes, qui saepe testaris, cum tanta multitudo fuerit philosophorum, sapientem tamen extitisse adhuc neminem? quid ergo te magistra illa uitae docuit?

Of what virtue? The philosophers have not yet explained where it is situated. Of what life? The teachers themselves were worn out by old age and death before they settled how one should live. Of what truth can you profess it the searcher, you who often bear witness that, though there has been so great a multitude of philosophers, no one has yet appeared who was wise? What, then, did that teacher of life teach you?

3.14.12CSEL 19:218

an ut potentissimum consulem maledictis incesseres eumque hostem patriae uenenatis orationibus faceres? sed omittamus illa quae possunt excusari fortunae nomine.

Was it to attack a most powerful consul with abuse and make him an enemy of the fatherland by poisonous speeches? But let us pass over those things which can be excused in the name of fortune.

3.14.13CSEL 19:218

studuisti nempe philosophiae et quidem sic, ut nullus umquam diligentius, quippe qui omnes cognoueris disciplinas, sicut ipse gloriari soles, eamque ipsam Latinis litteris inlustraueris imitatoremque te Platonis ostenderis.

You studied philosophy, certainly, and more diligently than anyone ever did, since you came to know all the schools, as you yourself like to boast, and illustrated it in Latin letters and showed yourself an imitator of Plato.

3.14.14CSEL 19:218

cedo igitur quid didiceris aut in qua secta ueritatem deprehenderis. in Academia scilicet, quam secutus es, quam probasti.

Tell me, then, what you learned, or in which sect you found the truth. In the Academy, no doubt, which you followed, which you approved.

3.14.15CSEL 19:218–219

at haec nihil docet nisi ut scias te nihil scire. tui ergo te libri arguunt, quam nihil a philosophia disci possit ad uitam. haec tua uerba sunt: mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci uidemur, sed ad ea ipsa quae aliqua ex parte cerni uideantur, hebetes et obtunsi.

But it teaches nothing except that you know that you know nothing. Your own books, then, prove against you how nothing can be learned from philosophy for life. These are your words: 'But we seem to me not only blind with regard to wisdom, but dull and blunted even toward those things which seem in some part to be discerned.'

3.14.16CSEL 19:219

si ergo philosophia uitae magistra est, cur tibi ipse caecus et hebes et obtunsus uidebare, quem oportuit illa docente et sentire et sapere et in clarissima luce uersari?

If, then, philosophy is the teacher of life, why did you seem to yourself blind and dull and blunted, you who ought, under its teaching, to have perceived and been wise and to have dwelt in the clearest light?

3.14.17CSEL 19:219

at quam confisus fueris philosophiae ueritate, docent ad filium conposita praecepta, quibus mones philosophiae quidem praecepta noscenda, uiuendum autem esse ciuiliter. quid tam repugnans dici potest?

But how much you trusted in the truth of philosophy is shown by the precepts written for your son, in which you advise that the precepts of philosophy should indeed be known, but that one should live as a citizen. What more self-contradictory thing can be said?

3.14.18CSEL 19:219

si noscenda sunt praecepta philosophiae, ideo utique noscenda sunt, ut recte sapienterque uiuamus, uel si ciuiliter uiuendum est, non est igitur philosophia sapientia, siquidem melius est ciuiliter quam philosophe uiuere.

If the precepts of philosophy are to be known, they are surely to be known so that we may live rightly and wisely; or if one is to live as a citizen, then philosophy is not wisdom, since it is better to live as a citizen than as a philosopher.

3.14.19CSEL 19:219

nam si sapientia est quae dicitur philosophia, stulte profecto uiuet qui non secundum philosophiam uiuet: si autem non stulte uiuit qui ciuiliter uiuit, sequitur ut stulte uiuat qui philosophe uiuit. tuo itaque iudicio philosophia stultitiae inanitatisque damnata est.

For if what is called philosophy is wisdom, he will surely live foolishly who does not live according to philosophy; but if he who lives as a citizen does not live foolishly, it follows that he who lives as a philosopher lives foolishly. So by your own judgment philosophy has been condemned of folly and emptiness.

3.14.20CSEL 19:219–220

idem in Consolatione id est in opere non ioculari hanc de philosophia sententiam tulisti: sed nescio a qui nos teneat error ac miserabilis ignoratio ueri. ubi est ergo philosophiae magisterium aut quid te docuit illa uitae parens, si uerum miserabiliter ignoras?

The same man in the Consolation, that is, in no jesting work, pronounced this sentence on philosophy: 'But I do not know what error holds us and what wretched ignorance of the truth.' Where, then, is the teaching of philosophy, or what did that parent of life teach you, if you are wretchedly ignorant of the truth?

3.14.21CSEL 19:220

quodsi haec erroris ignorationisque confessio paene inuito tibi ab intimo pectore expressa est, cur non tibi uerum fateris aliquando: philosophiam, quam tu nihil docentem in caelum laudibus extulisti, magistram uirtutis esse non posse?

And if this confession of error and ignorance was forced out of your inmost heart almost against your will, why do you not at last confess the truth to yourself: that philosophy, which you exalted to heaven with praises though it teaches nothing, cannot be the teacher of virtue?

Divine 3, chapter 15

3.15.1CSEL 19:220

Eodem ductus errore Seneca — quis enim ueram uiam teneret errante Cicerone? — philosophia inquit nihil aliut est quam recta ratio uiuendi uel honeste uiuendi scientia uel ars rectae uitae agendae. non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque uiuendi, et qui dixerit illam regulam uitae, suum illi reddidit.

Led by the same error, Seneca (for who would keep the true way when Cicero errs?) says: 'Philosophy is nothing else than the right method of living, or the knowledge of living honourably, or the art of leading a right life. We shall not err if we say that philosophy is the law of living well and honourably; and he who called it the rule of life gave it its due.'

3.15.2CSEL 19:220

hic plane non respexit ad commune philosophiae nomen. quae cum sit in plures sectas disciplinasque diffusa nihilque habeat certi, nihil denique de quo uniuersi una mente ac uoce consentiant, quid potest esse tam falsum quam regulam uitae philosophiam nominari, in qua diuersitas praeceptorum rectum iter inpediat et turbet aut legem bene uiuendi, cuius capita longe dissonant, aut scientiam uitae agendae, in qua nihil aliut efficitur contraria saepe dicendo quam ut nemo quicquam sciat?

He plainly did not look to the common name of philosophy. Since it is spread out into many sects and schools and has nothing certain, nothing in short on which all agree with one mind and voice, what can be so false as to call philosophy the rule of life, when the diversity of its precepts hinders and confuses the right road; or the law of living well, when its chief articles are widely discordant; or the knowledge of leading life, in which nothing else is achieved by often saying contrary things than that no one knows anything?

3.15.3CSEL 19:220–221

quaero enim utrumne Academiam philosophiam putet esse an non. negaturum non arbitror. quod si est, nihil ergo illorum cadit in philosophiam, quae ut omnia reddat incerta, legem abrogat, artem nullam putat, rationem subuertit, regulam deprauat, scientiam funditus tollit. falsa igitur illa omnia, quia in rem semper incertam et adhuc nihil explicantem cadere non possunt.

For I ask whether he thinks the Academy is philosophy or not. I do not think he will deny it. If it is, then none of these fits philosophy, which, in order to make everything uncertain, abolishes law, thinks there is no art, overthrows method, perverts the rule, and removes knowledge entirely. All those definitions are false, then, because they cannot fit something always uncertain and so far explaining nothing.

3.15.4CSEL 19:221

nulla itaque ratio uel scientia uel lex bene uiuendi nisi in hac unica et uera et caelesti sapientia constituta est, quae philosophis fuerat ignota.

So there is no method or knowledge or law of living well established anywhere except in this unique, true and heavenly wisdom, which had been unknown to the philosophers.

3.15.5CSEL 19:221

nam illa terrena quoniam falsa est, uaria et multiplex sibique tota contraria est. et sicut unus est huius mundi constitutor et rector deus, una ueritas, ita unam esse ac simplicem sapientiam necesse est, quia quidquid est uerum ac bonum, id perfectum esse non potest, nisi fuerit singulare.

For that earthly wisdom, since it is false, is varied, manifold, and wholly contradictory to itself. And as there is one God, the founder and ruler of this world, and one truth, so wisdom must be one and simple, because whatever is true and good cannot be perfect unless it is single.

3.15.6CSEL 19:221

quodsi philosophia uitam posset instruere, nulli alii nisi philosophi essent boni et qui eam non didicissent, essent omnes semper mali.

If philosophy could equip life, no others but philosophers would be good, and those who had not learned it would all always be bad.

3.15.7CSEL 19:221

cum uero innumerabiles exsistant et semper extiterint qui sint aut fuerint sine ulla doctrina boni, ex philosophis autem perraro fuerit qui aliquid in uita fecerit laude dignum, quis est tandem qui non uideat eos homines uirtutis, qua ipsi egent, non esse doctores?

But since there are and always have been countless people who are or were good without any learning, while among the philosophers there has very rarely been one who did anything in life worthy of praise, who is there at last who does not see that these men are not teachers of the virtue which they themselves lack?

3.15.8CSEL 19:221

nam si quis mores eorum diligenter inquirat, inueniet iracundos cupidos libidinosos adrogantes proteruos et sub obtentu sapientiae sua uitia celantes, tum domi facientes ea quae in scolis arguissent.

For if anyone examines their characters carefully, he will find them irascible, greedy, lustful, arrogant, insolent, and hiding their vices under the cloak of wisdom, doing at home the very things they had censured in the schools.

3.15.9CSEL 19:221–222

mentior fortasse accusandi gratia: nonne id ipsum Tullius et fatetur et queritur? quotus quisque inquit philosophorum inuenitur qui sit ita moratus, ita animo ac uita constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam (suam) non ostentationem scientiae, sed legem uitae putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi et decretis pareat suis? uidere licet alios tanta leuitate et iactatione, ut iis fuerit non didicisse melius, alios pecuniae cupidos, alios gloriae, multos libidinum seruos, ut cum eorum uita mirabiliter pugnet oratio.

Perhaps I lie for the sake of accusing? Does not Tullius himself both admit and complain of this very thing? 'How few of the philosophers,' he says, 'are found whose character, mind and life are ordered as reason demands; who think ⟨their⟩ teaching not a display of knowledge but a law of life; who obey themselves and submit to their own decrees! One may see some of such levity and boastfulness that it would have been better for them not to have learned; others greedy of money, others of glory, many slaves of lusts, so that their speech is wonderfully at war with their life.'

3.15.10CSEL 19:222

Nepos quoque Cornelius ad eundem Ciceronem ita scribit: tantum abest ut ego magistram putem esse uitae philosophiam beataeque uitae perfectricem, ut nullis magis existimem opus esse magistros uiuendi quam plerisque qui in ea disputanda uersantur. uideo enim magnam partem eorum qui in schola de pudore (et) continentia praecipiant argutissime, eosdem in omnium libidinum cupiditatibus uiuere.

Cornelius Nepos too writes thus to the same Cicero: 'So far am I from thinking philosophy the teacher of life and the perfecter of the happy life, that I consider none need teachers of living more than most of those who are occupied in discussing it. For I see that a great part of those who give the subtlest precepts in the school about modesty ⟨and⟩ self-control live in the desires of every lust.'

3.15.11CSEL 19:222

item Seneca in Exhortationibus plerique inquit philosophorum tales sunt, diserti in conuicium suum. quos si audias in auaritiam, in libidinem, in ambitionem perorantes, indicium professos putes: adeo redundant ad ipsos maledicta in publicum missa. quos non aliter intueri decet quam medicos, quorum tituli remedia habent, puxides uenena.

Likewise Seneca in his Exhortations: 'Most philosophers,' he says, 'are like this, eloquent to their own reproach. If you hear them declaiming against avarice, against lust, against ambition, you would think they were informing against themselves: so much do the reproaches aimed at the public flow back upon themselves. They should be regarded exactly as physicians whose labels promise remedies and whose boxes hold poisons.'

3.15.12CSEL 19:222–223

quosdam uero nec pudor uitiorum tenet, sed patrocinia turpitudini suae fingunt, ut etiam honeste peccare uideantur.

Some, indeed, are not even held back by shame at their vices, but invent defences for their own baseness, so that they may seem to sin even honourably.

3.15.13CSEL 19:223

— faciet sapiens inquit idem Seneca etiam quae non probabit, ut etiam ad maiora transitum inueniat, nec relinquet mores bonos, sed tempori aptabit, et quibus alii utuntur in gloriam aut uoluptatem, utetur agendae rei causa.

'The wise man,' says the same Seneca, 'will do even things he will not approve, in order to find a passage to greater things; nor will he abandon good morals, but will adapt them to the occasion; and what others use for glory or pleasure, he will use for the sake of getting things done.'

3.15.14CSEL 19:223

deinde paulo post: omnia quae luxuriosi faciunt quaeque inperiti, faciet et sapiens, sed non eodem modo eodemque proposito. atquin nihil interest quo animo facias quod fecisse uitiosum est, quia facta cernuntur, animus non uidetur.

Then shortly afterwards: 'Everything the luxurious do and the ignorant, the wise man too will do, but not in the same way nor with the same purpose.' Yet it makes no difference with what intention you do what is vicious to have done, because deeds are seen, the intention is not seen.

3.15.15CSEL 19:223

Aristippo Cyrenaicorum magistro cum Laide nobili scorto fuit consuetudo. quod flagitium grauis ille philosophiae doctor sic defendebat, ut diceret multum inter se et ceteros Laidis amatores interesse, quod ipse haberet Laidem, alii a Laide haberentur.

Aristippus, the master of the Cyrenaics, had an affair with Lais, the famous prostitute. That grave teacher of philosophy defended this outrage by saying that there was much difference between himself and Lais's other lovers, because he possessed Lais, while the others were possessed by Lais.

3.15.16CSEL 19:223

o praeclara et bonis imitanda sapientia! huic uero liberos in disciplinam dares, ut discerent habere meretricem? aliquid inter se ac perditos interesse dicebat, scilicet quod illi bona sua perderent, ipse gratis luxuriaretur. in quo tamen sapientior meretrix fuit:

O splendid wisdom, to be imitated by good men! Would you really give your children to him for instruction, so that they might learn to keep a prostitute? He said there was some difference between himself and the profligate, namely that they squandered their property while he indulged himself for free. Yet in this the prostitute was wiser:

3.15.17CSEL 19:223–224

quae philosophum habuit pro lenone, ut ad se omnis iuuentus doctoris exemplo et auctoritate corrupta sine ullo pudore concurreret.

she had the philosopher as her pander, so that all the youth, corrupted by the teacher's example and authority, flocked to her without any shame.

3.15.18CSEL 19:224

quid ergo interfuit quo animo philosophus ad meretricem famosissimam commearet, cum eum populus et riuales sui uiderent omnibus perditis nequiorem?

What difference did it make, then, with what intention the philosopher visited the most notorious prostitute, when the people and his rivals saw him more worthless than all the profligates?

3.15.19CSEL 19:224

nec satis fuit ita uiuere, sed docere etiam libidines coepit ac mores suos de lupanari ad scolam transtulit disserens uoluptatem corporis esse summum bonum. quae doctrina exsecrabilis et pudenda non in corde philosophi, sed in sinu meretricis est nata.

Nor was it enough to live so; he began also to teach lusts, and transferred his habits from the brothel to the school, arguing that bodily pleasure is the highest good. This detestable and shameful doctrine was born not in the heart of a philosopher but in the bosom of a prostitute.

3.15.20CSEL 19:224

nam quid ego de Cynicis loquar, quibus in propatulo coire cum coniugibus mos fuit? quid mirum si a canibus, quorum uitam imitantur, etiam uocabulum nomenque traxerunt?

For what shall I say of the Cynics, whose custom it was to have intercourse with their wives in public? What wonder if they took even their name and title from dogs, whose life they imitate?

3.15.21CSEL 19:224

nullum igitur in hac disciplina magisterium uirtutis est, cum etiam illi qui honestiora praecipiunt, aut non faciant ipsi quae suadent aut si faciunt, quod raro accidit, non disciplina eos ad rectum, sed natura producat, quae saepius etiam indoctos inpellit ad laudem.

There is no teaching of virtue, then, in this discipline, since even those who give more honourable precepts either do not themselves do what they urge, or, if they do, which rarely happens, it is not their discipline that brings them to what is right but nature, which more often drives even the unlearned to praiseworthy conduct.

Divine 3, chapter 16

3.16.1CSEL 19:224

Verum enim cum se perpetuae desidiae tradant nullamque uirtutem capessant et omnem suam uitam nihil aliut quam in eloquendo peragant, quid aliut quam inertes debent putari?

But since they give themselves to perpetual idleness, take up no virtue, and spend their whole life in nothing but speaking, what else are they to be thought but idlers?

3.16.2CSEL 19:224–225

sapientia enim nisi in aliquo actu fuerit quo uim suam exerceat, inanis et falsa est recteque Tullius ciuiles uiros, qui rem publicam gubernent, qui urbes aut nouas constituant aut constitutas aequitate tueantur, qui salutem libertatemque ciuium uel bonis legibus uel salubribus consiliis uel iudiciis grauibus conseruent, philosophiae doctoribus praefert.

For wisdom, unless it is in some action in which to exercise its force, is empty and false; and Tullius rightly prefers to the teachers of philosophy the statesmen who govern the commonwealth, who either found new cities or preserve founded ones with equity, who safeguard the welfare and liberty of the citizens by good laws, sound counsels, or weighty judgments.

3.16.3CSEL 19:225

bonos enim facere oportet potius quam inclusos in angulis facienda praecipere quae ne ipsi quidem faciant qui locuntur; et quoniam se a ueris actibus remouerunt, apparet eos exercendae linguae causa uel auocandi (animi) gratia artem istam philosophiae repperisse. qui autem docent tantum nec faciunt, ipsi praeceptis suis detrahunt pondus. quis enim optemperet, cum ipsi praeceptores doceant non optemperare?

For one ought to make men good rather than, shut away in corners, to prescribe what is to be done, which not even those who speak do themselves; and since they have withdrawn from real affairs, it is clear that they invented this art of philosophy to exercise the tongue or for the sake of diverting ⟨the mind⟩. Those who only teach and do not act take away the weight of their own precepts. For who would obey, when the teachers themselves teach disobedience?

3.16.4CSEL 19:225

bonum est autem recta et honesta praecipere, sed nisi et facias, mendacium est, et est incongruens atque ineptum non in pectore, sed in labris habere bonitatem.

It is good to prescribe what is right and honourable; but unless you do it too, it is a lie, and it is incongruous and absurd to have goodness not in the heart but on the lips.

3.16.5CSEL 19:225

non ergo utilitatem ex philosophia, sed oblectationem petunt. quod quidem Cicero testatus est. profecto inquit omnis istorum disputatio quamquam uberrimos fontes uirtutis et scientiae continet, tamen conlata cum eorum actis perfectisque rebus uereor ne non tantum uideatur utilitatis adtulisse negotiis hominum quantam oblectationem otiis.

So they seek from philosophy not usefulness but amusement. Cicero indeed bore witness to this: 'Surely,' he says, 'the whole discussion of these men, although it contains the richest springs of virtue and knowledge, yet, compared with their deeds and accomplishments, I fear may seem to have brought less usefulness to men's business than amusement to their leisure.'

3.16.6CSEL 19:225–226

uereri quidem non debuit, cum uerum diceret, sed quasi timeret ne proditi mysterii reus a philosophis citaretur, non est ausus confidenter pronuntiare quod fuit uerum, illos non ideo disputare ut doceant, sed ut se oblectent in otio. qui quoniam auctores sunt rerum gerendarum nec ipsi quicquam gerunt, pro loquacibus sunt habendi.

He ought not to have feared, since he spoke the truth; but, as if afraid of being summoned by the philosophers as guilty of betraying a mystery, he did not dare to pronounce confidently what was true: that they do not dispute in order to teach but to amuse themselves in leisure. Since they are advocates of action and do nothing themselves, they are to be held mere talkers.

3.16.7CSEL 19:226

sed profecto quia nihil ad uitam boni adferebant, nec ipsi decretis suis obtemperauerunt nec quisquam per tot saecula inuentus est qui eorum legibus uiueret. abicienda est igitur omnis philosophia, quia non studendum sapientiae, quod fine ac modo caret, sed sapiendum est et quidem mature.

But surely, because they brought nothing good for life, they neither obeyed their own decrees themselves, nor has anyone been found in so many ages who lived by their laws. All philosophy, then, is to be cast aside, because one must not pursue wisdom, which is without end or limit, but be wise, and that early.

3.16.8CSEL 19:226

non enim nobis altera uita conceditur, ut cum in hac sapientiam quaeramus, in illa sapere possimus: in hac utrumque fieri necesse est. cito inueniri debet, ut cito suscipi possit, ne quid pereat ex uita, cuius finis incertus est.

For a second life is not granted us, so that, having sought wisdom in this one, we may be wise in the other: both must be done in this. It must be found quickly so that it can be taken up quickly, lest anything be lost from life, whose end is uncertain.

3.16.9CSEL 19:226

Ciceronis Hortensius contra philosophiam disserens circumuenitur arguta conclusione, quod cum diceret philosophandum non esse, nihilominus philosophari uidebatur, quoniam philosophi est quid in uita faciendum uel non faciendum sit disputare.

Cicero's Hortensius, arguing against philosophy, is caught by a clever conclusion: while saying that one should not philosophize, he nevertheless seemed to be philosophizing, since it is the philosopher's part to discuss what should or should not be done in life.

3.16.10CSEL 19:226

nos ab hac calumnia inmunes ac liberi sumus qui philosophiam tollimus, quia humanae cogitationis inuentio est, sophiam defendimus, quia diuina traditio est, eamque ab omnibus suscipi oportere testamur.

We are immune and free from this charge, who do away with philosophy because it is a discovery of human thought, and defend sophia because it is divine tradition, and testify that it ought to be taken up by all.

3.16.11CSEL 19:226

ille cum philosophiam tolleret nec melius aliquid adferret, sapientiam tollere putabatur eoque facilius de sententia pulsus est, quia constat hominem non ad stultitiam, sed ad sapientiam nasci.

He, when he did away with philosophy and offered nothing better, was thought to be doing away with wisdom, and so was the more easily driven from his position, because it is agreed that man is born not for folly but for wisdom.

3.16.12CSEL 19:226–227

praeterea illut quoque argumentum contra philosophiam ualet plurimum, quo idem est usus Hortensius, ex eo posse intellegi philosophiam non esse sapientiam, quod principium et origo eius appareat.

Moreover, that argument against philosophy which the same Hortensius used is also very strong: that it can be understood that philosophy is not wisdom from the fact that its beginning and origin are apparent.

3.16.13CSEL 19:227

quando inquit philosophi esse coeperunt? Thales ut opinor primus. recens haec quidem aetas: ubi ergo aput antiquiores latuit amor iste inuestigandae ueritatis? idem Lucretius ait:

'When,' he says, 'did philosophers begin to be? Thales, I think, was the first. That is a recent age. Where, then, among the more ancient did this love of investigating the truth lie hidden?' Lucretius also says:

3.16.14CSEL 19:227

denique natura haec rerum ratioque reperta est nuper, et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim uertere uoces.

'Finally, this nature and system of things was discovered but lately, and I myself am now found the very first who can turn it into our native tongue.'

3.16.15CSEL 19:227

et Seneca non sunt inquit mille anni, ex quo initia sapientiae mota sunt. multis igitur saeculis humanum genus sine ratione uixit: quod inridens Persius postquam inquit sapere urbi cum pipere et palmis uenit, tamquam sapientia cum saporis mercibus fuerit inuecta. quae si est secundum hominis naturam, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est, si uero non est, ne capere quidem illam posset humana natura.

And Seneca says: 'It is not a thousand years since the beginnings of wisdom were set in motion.' So for many ages the human race lived without reason! Persius mocks this, saying, 'After wisdom came to the city with pepper and dates,' as though wisdom had been imported with the goods of flavour. If wisdom accords with man's nature, it must have begun with man himself; if it does not, human nature could not even receive it.

3.16.16CSEL 19:227–228

sed quia recipit, a principio igitur fuisse sapientiam necesse est: ergo philosophia quia non a principio fuit, non est eadem uera sapientia. sed uidelicet Graeci quia sacras ueritatis litteras non attigerant, quemadmodum deprauata esset sapientia nescierunt;

But since it does receive it, wisdom must have existed from the beginning; therefore philosophy, since it did not exist from the beginning, is not that same true wisdom. But the Greeks, evidently, because they had not touched the sacred writings of truth, did not know how wisdom had been corrupted;

3.16.17CSEL 19:228

et ideo cum uacare sapientia humanam uitam putarent, philosophiam commenti sunt id est latentem atque ignotam sibi ueritatem disserendo eruere uoluerunt: quod studium per ignorantiam ueri sapientiam putauerunt.

and so, since they thought human life empty of wisdom, they devised philosophy; that is, they wished to dig out by disputation the truth that was hidden and unknown to them; and through ignorance of the truth they thought this pursuit was wisdom.

Divine 3, chapter 17

3.17.1CSEL 19:228

Dixi de philosophia ipsa quam potui breuiter. nunc ad philosophos ueniamus, non ut cum his decertemus, qui stare non possunt, sed ut eos fugientes atque deiectos nostro campo insequamur.

I have spoken of philosophy itself as briefly as I could. Now let us come to the philosophers, not to contend with them, since they cannot stand, but to pursue them, fleeing and thrown down, across our field.

3.17.2CSEL 19:228

Epicuri disciplina multo celebrior semper fuit quam ceterorum, non quia ueri aliquid adferat, sed quia multos populare nomen uoluptatis inuitat. nemo enim non in uitia pronus est.

The school of Epicurus was always much more popular than the rest, not because it brings anything true, but because the popular name of pleasure attracts many. For there is no one who is not prone to vices.

3.17.3CSEL 19:228

praeterea ut ad se multitudinem contrahat, adposita singulis quibusque moribus loquitur. desidiosum uetat is litteras discere, auarum populari largitione liberat, ignauum prohibet accedere ad rem publicam, pigrum exerceri, timidum militare.

Moreover, to draw the multitude to himself, he speaks in terms suited to each kind of character. He forbids the lazy man to learn letters; he frees the greedy man from public largesse; he prohibits the idle man from entering public life, the sluggard from exercise, the timid from military service.

3.17.4CSEL 19:228

inreligiosus audit deos nihil curare, inhumanus et suis commodis seruiens iubetur nihil cuiquam tribuere: omnia enim sua causa facere sapientem.

The irreligious man hears that the gods care for nothing; the man who is unkind and serves his own advantage is told to give nothing to anyone, for the wise man does everything for his own sake.

3.17.5CSEL 19:228–229

fugienti turbam solitudo laudatur, qui nimium parcus est, discit aqua et polenta uitam posse tolerari. qui odit uxorem, huic enumerantur caelibatus bona, habenti malos liberos orbitas praedicatur, aduersus parentes inpio, nullum uinculum esse naturae. inpatienti ac delicato dolorem esse omnium malorum maximum dicitur, forti, etiam in tormentis beatum esse sapientem.

To the man who flees the crowd, solitude is praised; he who is too sparing learns that life can be sustained on water and barley-meal. To him who hates his wife, the goods of celibacy are listed; to him who has bad children, childlessness is preached; to the man undutiful to his parents, that there is no bond of nature. To the man who is intolerant and delicate, pain is said to be the greatest of all evils; to the brave, that the wise man is happy even under torture.

3.17.6CSEL 19:229

qui claritati ac potentiae studet, huic praecipitur reges colere, qui molestiam ferre non potest, huic regiam fugere.

He who seeks fame and power is taught to court kings; he who cannot bear trouble, to flee the court.

3.17.7CSEL 19:229

ita homo astutus ex uariis diuersisque moribus circulum cogit et dum studet placere omnibus, maiore discordia secum ipse pugnauit quam inter se uniuersi. unde autem disciplina eius tota descendat, quam originem habeat, explicandum est.

So the cunning man gathers a circle out of various and differing characters, and while he strives to please everyone, he has fought with himself in greater discord than all the others with one another. But where his whole teaching comes from, and what origin it has, must be explained.

3.17.8CSEL 19:229

uidebat Epicurus bonis aduersa semper accidere, paupertatem labores exilia carorum amissiones, malos contra beatos esse, augeri potentia, honoribus adfici; uidebat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera inpune committi; uidebat sine dilectu morum, sine ordine ac discrimine annorum saeuire mortem, sed alios ad senectutem peruenire, alios infantes rapi, alios iam robustos interire, alios in primo adulescentiae flore inmaturis funeribus extingui, in bellis meliores potius et uinci et peru e.

Epicurus saw that adversities always befall the good, poverty, toils, exile, loss of loved ones, while the wicked, on the contrary, are happy, grow in power, and are loaded with honours. He saw that innocence is less safe, that crimes are committed with impunity. He saw that death rages without regard to character, without order or distinction of years: some reach old age, others are snatched away as infants, others perish when already strong, others are extinguished by untimely deaths in the first flower of youth; and that in wars it is rather the better who are defeated and perish.

3.17.9CSEL 19:229–230

maxime autem commouebat homines in primis religiosos grauioribus malis adfici, iis autem qui aut deos omnino neclegerent aut non pie colerent, uel minora incommoda euenire uel nulla; ipsa etiam saepe templa fulminibus conflagrare.

But what moved him most was that those who were especially religious were afflicted with heavier evils, while to those who either wholly neglected the gods or did not worship them piously, lesser misfortunes or none befell; and that even the temples themselves often burned from lightning.

3.17.10CSEL 19:230

quod Lucretius queritur, cum dicit de deo: tum fulmina mittat et aedis ipse suas disturbet et in deserta recedens saeuiat exercens telum, quod saepe nocentes praeterit exanimatque indignos inque merentes.

Lucretius complains of this when he says of God: 'Then let him send thunderbolts, and destroy his own temples, and, withdrawing into deserts, rage there, exercising his bolt, which often passes by the guilty and kills the innocent and undeserving.'

3.17.11CSEL 19:230

quodsi uel exiguam ueritatis auram colligere potuisset, numquam diceret aedis illum suas disturbare, cum ideo disturbet, quia non sint suae.

But if he had been able to catch even a slight breath of truth, he would never say that God destroys his own temples, since he destroys them precisely because they are not his.

3.17.12CSEL 19:230

Capitolium, quod est Romanae urbis et religionis caput summum, non semel, sed saepius fulmine ictum conflagrauit:

The Capitol, which is the highest head of the city and religion of Rome, was struck by lightning and burned not once but several times.

3.17.13CSEL 19:230

homines autem ingeniosi quid de hoc existimauerint, ex dicto Ciceronis apparet, qui ait diuinitus extitisse illam flammam, non quae terrestre illut domicilium Iouis deleret, sed quae sublimius magnificentiusque deposceret.

What clever men thought of this is clear from a saying of Cicero, who says that the flame arose by divine agency, not to destroy that earthly dwelling of Jupiter, but to demand a loftier and more magnificent one.

3.17.14CSEL 19:230–231

qua de re etiam in libris consulatus sui eadem dixit quae Lucretius: nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo ipse suas arces atque inclyta templa petiuit et Capitolinis iniecit sedibus ignes.

On this matter he also said in the books on his consulship the same as Lucretius: 'For the high-thundering father, resting on starry Olympus, himself attacked his citadels and famous temples, and hurled fires on the Capitoline seats.'

3.17.15CSEL 19:231

pertinaci ergo stultitia non modo uim maiestatemque ueri dei non intellexerunt, sed etiam inpietatem sui erroris auxerunt, qui templum caelesti iudicio saepe damnatum restituere contra fas omne contenderint.

So in obstinate folly they not only did not understand the power and majesty of the true God, but even increased the impiety of their error, striving against all divine law to restore a temple often condemned by heavenly judgment.

3.17.16CSEL 19:231

cum haec igitur cogitaret Epicurus, earum rerum uelut iniquitate inductus — sic enim causam rationemque ignoranti uidebatur — existimauit nullam esse prouidentiam. quod cum sibi persuasisset, suscepit etiam defendendum: sic in errores inextricabiles se ipse coniecit.

When Epicurus considered these things, led on as it were by the injustice of them (for so it seemed to one ignorant of the cause and reason), he concluded that there is no providence. When he had persuaded himself of this, he undertook to defend it as well; and so he threw himself into inextricable errors.

3.17.17CSEL 19:231

si enim prouidentia nulla est, quomodo tam ordinate, tam disposite mundus effectus est? nulla inquit dispositio est: multa enim facta sunt aliter quam fieri debuerunt. et inuenit homo diuinus quae reprehenderet.

For if there is no providence, how was the world made so orderly, so well arranged? 'There is no arrangement,' he says, 'for many things have been made otherwise than they ought to have been.' And the divine man found things to find fault with.

3.17.18CSEL 19:231

quae singula si uacaret refellere, facile ostenderem nec sapientem hunc fuisse nec sanum. item si nulla prouidentia est, quomodo animalium corpora tam prouidenter ordinata sunt, ut singula quaeque membra mirabili ratione disposita sua officia conseruent?

If I had leisure to refute these points one by one, I would easily show that this man was neither wise nor sane. Again, if there is no providence, how are the bodies of animals so providently ordered that each of their members, arranged with wonderful design, keeps its own function?

3.17.19CSEL 19:231

nihil inquit in procreandis animalibus prouidentiae ratio molita est. nam neque oculi ad uidendum facti sunt neque aures ad audiendum neque lingua ad loquendum neque pedes ad ambulandum, quoniam prius haec nata sunt quam esset uidere audire loqui ambulare. itaque non haec ad usum nata sunt, sed usus ex illis natus est.

'No providence,' he says, 'contrived anything in the producing of animals. For neither were eyes made for seeing, nor ears for hearing, nor the tongue for speaking, nor feet for walking, since these came into being before there was seeing, hearing, speaking, walking. So these did not arise for use, but use arose from them.'

3.17.20CSEL 19:231–232

si nulla prouidentia est, cur imbres cadunt, fruges oriuntur, arbusta frondescunt? non inquit animantium causa ista fiunt, quoniam prouidentiae nihil prosunt, sed omnia sua sponte fieri necesse est.

If there is no providence, why do rains fall, crops spring up, trees come into leaf? 'These things do not happen for the sake of living creatures,' he says, 'since they are of no use to providence; but all things must happen of their own accord.'

3.17.21CSEL 19:232

unde ergo nascuntur aut quomodo fiunt omnia quae geruntur non est inquit prouidentiae opus: sunt enim semina per inane uolitantia, quibus inter se temere conglobatis uniuersa gignuntur atque concrescunt.

From where, then, are they born, or how do all things that happen come about? 'It is not the work of providence,' he says; 'for there are seeds flying through the void, and when these are massed together at random, all things are born and grow.'

3.17.22CSEL 19:232

cur igitur illa non sentimus aut cernimus? quia nec colorem habent inquit nec calorem ullum nec odorem. saporis quoque et umoris expertia sunt et tam minuta, ut secari ac diuidi nequeant.

Why then do we not perceive or see them? 'Because,' he says, 'they have no colour, nor any heat or smell. They are also without taste and moisture, and so tiny that they cannot be cut and divided.'

3.17.23CSEL 19:232

sic eum, quia falsum in principio susceperat, consequentium rerum necessitas ad deliramenta perduxit. ubi enim sunt aut unde ista corpuscula? cur nemo illa praeter unum Leucippum somniauit, a quo Democritus eruditus hereditatem stultitiae reliquit Epicuro?

So, because he had taken up a falsehood at the start, the necessity of what followed led him to ravings. For where are these little bodies, or where do they come from? Why has no one dreamed of them except Leucippus alone, from whom Democritus was taught, and who left the inheritance of folly to Epicurus?

3.17.24CSEL 19:232

quae si sunt corpuscula et quidem solida ut dicunt, sub oculos certe uenire possunt. si eadem est natura omnium, quomodo res uarias efficiunt? uario inquit ordine ac positione conueniunt sicut litterae: quae cum sint paucae, uarie tamen collocatae innumerabilia uerba conficiunt.

If these little bodies exist, and are solid, as they say, they can surely come before the eyes. If all have the same nature, how do they produce various things? 'They come together,' he says, 'in various order and position, like letters, which, though few, placed variously make up countless words.'

3.17.25CSEL 19:232–233

at litterae uarias formas habent. ita inquit et haec ipsa primordia: nam sunt aspera, sunt hamata, sunt leuia. secari ergo ac diuidi possunt, si aliquid inest illis quod emineat. si autem leuia sunt et hamis indigent, cohaerere non possunt. hamata igitur esse oportet, ut possint inuicem concatenari.

But letters have various shapes. 'So too,' he says, 'have these first beginnings: some are rough, some hooked, some smooth.' Then they can be cut and divided, if there is something in them that projects. But if they are smooth and lack hooks, they cannot cohere. So they must be hooked, so that they can be linked to one another.

3.17.26CSEL 19:233

cum uero tam minuta esse dicantur, ut nulla ferri acie dissici ualeant, quomodo hamos aut angulos habent? quos, quia extant, necesse est posse diuelli.

But since they are said to be so tiny that no edge of iron can split them, how do they have hooks or angles? Since these project, they must be able to be torn off.

3.17.27CSEL 19:233

deinde quo foedere inter se, qua mente conueniunt, ut ex iis aliquid construatur? si sensu carent, nec coire tam disposite possunt, quia non potest quicquam rationale perficere nisi ratio. quam multis coargui haec uanitas potest!

Next, by what compact among themselves, by what mind, do they come together so that something is built from them? If they lack sense, they cannot combine in so orderly a way, because nothing can accomplish what is rational except reason. By how many arguments this emptiness can be refuted!

3.17.28CSEL 19:233

sed properat oratio. hic est ille, qui genus humanum ingenio superauit et omnes restinxit, stellas exortus ut aetherius sol. quos equidem uersus numquam sine risu legere possum.

But my discourse hastens on. This is the man who 'surpassed the human race in genius and outshone all, as the heavenly sun, arisen, puts out the stars.' Those verses I can never read without laughing.

3.17.29CSEL 19:233

non enim de Socrate hoc saltem aut Platone dicebat, qui uelut reges habentur philosophorum, sed de homine, quo sano ac uigente nullus aeger ineptius delirauit. itaque poeta inanissimus leonis laudibus murem non ornauit, sed obruit et obtriuit.

For he was not saying this even of Socrates or Plato, who are held as the kings of philosophers, but of a man than whom, sane and healthy though he was, no sick man ever raved more absurdly. So the most empty-headed poet did not adorn a mouse with a lion's praises, but buried and crushed it.

3.17.30CSEL 19:233

at idem nos liberat metu mortis, de qua haec ipsius expressa uerba sunt: quando nos sumus, mors non est: quando mors est, nos non sumus. mors ergo nihil ad nos. quam argute nos fefellit!

But the same man frees us from the fear of death, about which these are his own words: 'When we are, death is not; when death is, we are not. So death is nothing to us.' How cleverly he has deceived us!

3.17.31CSEL 19:233–234

quasi uero transacta mors timeatur, qua iam sensus ereptus est, ac non ipsum mori, quo sensus eripitur. est enim tempus aliquod quo et nos iam non sumus et mors tamen nondum est, idque ipsum uidetur esse miserum, quod et mors esse incipit et nos esse desinimus;

As though death already accomplished were feared, by which sense has already been taken away, and not dying itself, by which sense is taken away! For there is a time when we already are not and yet death is not yet; and this very thing seems wretched, that death begins to be and we cease to be;

3.17.32CSEL 19:234

nec frustra dictum est: mors misera non est, aditus ad mortem est miser, hoc est morbo tabescere, ictum perpeti, ferrum corpore excipere, ardere igni, dentibus laniari.

and not in vain was it said: 'Death is not wretched; the approach to death is wretched,' that is, to waste away with disease, to suffer a blow, to receive a sword in the body, to burn in fire, to be torn by teeth.

3.17.33CSEL 19:234

haec sunt quae timentur, non quia mortem adferunt, sed quia dolorem magnum. quin potius effice ne dolor malum sit omnium inquit malorum maximum est. qui ergo possum non timere, si id quod mortem antecedit aut efficit, malum est? quid quod totum illut argumentum falsum est, quia non intereunt animae?

These are what are feared, not because they bring death but because they bring great pain. 'Rather make pain not to be an evil.' 'It is,' he says, 'the greatest of all evils.' How then can I not fear, if what precedes or causes death is an evil? And what of the fact that that whole argument is false, because souls do not perish?

3.17.34CSEL 19:234

(minime) uero inquit; nam quod cum corpore nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est. iam superius dixi differre me hunc locum et operi ultimo reseruare, ut hanc Epicuri persuasionem, siue illa Democriti siue Dicaearchi fuit, et argumentis et diuinis testimoniis redarguam.

'⟨Not at all⟩,' he says; 'for what is born with the body must perish with the body.' I said above that I would postpone this topic and reserve it for the last part of the work, so as to refute this persuasion of Epicurus, whether it was his or Democritus's or Dicaearchus's, both by arguments and by divine testimonies.

3.17.35CSEL 19:234–235

uerum ille fortasse inpunitatem uitiis suis spopondit: fuit enim turpissimae uoluptatis adsertor, cuius capiendae causa nasci hominem putauit.

But perhaps he promised impunity to his own vices, for he was the champion of the basest pleasure, for the gaining of which he thought man was born.

3.17.36CSEL 19:235

quis cum hoc adfirmari audiat, uitiis et sceleribus abstineat? nam si periturae sunt animae, adpetamus diuitias, ut omnes suauitates capere possimus. quae si nobis desunt, ab iis qui habent auferamus clam dolo ui; eo magis, si humanas res nullus deus curat, quandocumque spes inpunitatis adriserit, rapiamus necemus.

Who, hearing this affirmed, would abstain from vices and crimes? For if souls are to perish, let us seek riches so that we can enjoy all delights. If we lack them, let us take them from those who have them, by stealth, fraud, or force; all the more so, if no god cares for human affairs; whenever the hope of impunity smiles on us, let us plunder and kill.

3.17.37CSEL 19:235

sapientis est enim male facere, si et utile sit et tutum, quoniam si quis in caelo deus est, non irascitur cuiquam. aeque stulti est bene facere, quia sicut ira non commouetur, ita nec gratia tangitur.

For it is the part of a wise man to do evil, if it is both profitable and safe, since if there is any god in heaven, he is angry with no one. Equally it is the part of a fool to do good, since, as he is not moved by anger, so he is not touched by favour.

3.17.38CSEL 19:235

uoluptatibus igitur quoquo modo possumus seruiamus: breui enim tempore nulli erimus omnino. ergo nullum diem, nullum denique temporis punctum fluere nobis sine uoluptate patiamur, ne quia ipsi quandoque perituri sumus, id ipsum quod uiuimus pereat. haec ille tametsi non dicit uerbo, re tamen ipsa docet.

Let us then serve pleasures in whatever way we can; for in a short time we shall be nothing at all. So let us allow no day, not even a moment of time, to slip away from us without pleasure, lest, since we ourselves shall one day perish, the very time we live should perish too. Though he does not say this in words, he teaches it in fact.

3.17.39CSEL 19:235

nam cum disputat omnia sapientem sua causa facere, ad utilitatem suam refert omnia quae agit.

For when he argues that the wise man does everything for his own sake, he refers everything he does to his own advantage.

3.17.40CSEL 19:235–236

ita qui audit haec flagitia, nec boni quicquam faciendum putabit, quoniam bene facere ad utilitatem spectat alienam, nec ab scelere abstinendum, quia maleficio praeda coniuncta est.

So he who hears these outrages will think that nothing good should be done, since doing good looks to another's advantage, nor that one should abstain from crime, since booty is joined to wrongdoing.

3.17.41CSEL 19:236

archipirata quispiam uel latronum ductor si suos ad grassandum cohortetur, quo alio sermone uti potest quam ut eadem dicat quae dicit Epicurus?

If some pirate chief or leader of robbers were urging his men to their raids, what other speech could he use than to say the same things Epicurus says?

3.17.42CSEL 19:236

deos nihil curare; non ira, non gratia tangi; inferorum poenas non esse metuendas, quod animae post mortem occidant nec ulli omnino sint inferi; uoluptatem esse maximum bonum; nullam esse humanam societatem; sibi quemque consulere; neminem esse qui alterum diligat nisi sua causa; mortem non esse metuendam forti uiro nec ullum dolorem, qui etiamsi torqueatur, si uratur, nihil curare se dicat.

That the gods care for nothing; that they are touched neither by anger nor by favour; that the punishments of the underworld are not to be feared, because souls perish after death and there is no underworld at all; that pleasure is the greatest good; that there is no human society; that each looks after himself; that there is no one who loves another except for his own sake; that death is not to be feared by a brave man, nor any pain, for even if he is tortured or burned, he says he does not care.

3.17.43CSEL 19:236

est plane cur quisquam putet hanc uocem uiri esse sapientis, quae potest latronibus aptissime commodari.

There is plainly good reason why anyone should think this the voice of a wise man, when it can be lent most fittingly to robbers!

Divine 3, chapter 18

3.18.1CSEL 19:236

Alii autem contraria his disserunt, superesse animas post mortem: et hi sunt maxime Pythagorei ac Stoici, quibus etsi ignoscendum est, quia uerum sentiunt, non possum tamen non reprehendere eos, quia non scientia, sed casu inciderunt in ueritatem. itaque in eo ipso quod recte sentiebant, aliquid errarunt.

Others argue the contrary, that souls survive after death; these are chiefly the Pythagoreans and Stoics. Though they are to be pardoned, because they think what is true, I cannot but blame them, because they fell on the truth not by knowledge but by chance. So even in what they rightly thought they went somewhat astray.

3.18.2CSEL 19:236

nam cum timerent argumentum illud quo colligitur necesse esse ut occidant animae cum corporibus, quia cum corporibus nascuntur, dixerunt non nasci animas, sed insinuari potius in corpora et de aliis in alia migrare.

For, fearing the argument by which it is inferred that souls must perish with bodies because they are born with bodies, they said that souls are not born, but rather slip into bodies and migrate from some into others.

3.18.3CSEL 19:236–237

non putauerunt aliter fieri posse ut supersint animae post corpora, nisi uideantur fuisse ante corpora. par igitur ac prope similis error est partis utriusque. sed haec in praeterito falsa est, illa in futuro.

They did not think it could otherwise come about that souls survive bodies unless they are seen to have existed before bodies. The error of both sides, then, is equal and nearly alike; but the one is false about the past, the other about the future.

3.18.4CSEL 19:237

nemo enim uidit quod est uerissimum, et nasci animas et non occidere, quia cur id fieret aut quae ratio esset hominis nescierunt.

For no one saw what is most true, that souls are both born and do not perish, because they did not know why this should happen or what the purpose of man was.

3.18.5CSEL 19:237

multi ergo ex iis qui aeternas esse animas suspicabantur, tamquam in caelum migraturi essent, sibi ipsi manus intulerunt, ut Cleanthes, ut Chrysippus, ut Zenon, ut Empedocles, qui se in ardentis Aetnae specus intempesta nocte deiecit, ut cum repente non apparuisset, abisse ad deos crederetur, et ex Romanis Cato, qui fuit in omni sua uita Stoicae uanitatis imitator.

So many of those who suspected that souls are eternal laid hands on themselves, as if they were about to migrate to heaven: Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno, Empedocles, who threw himself into the caverns of burning Etna in the dead of night, so that, having suddenly disappeared, he might be believed to have gone off to the gods; and among the Romans Cato, who throughout his whole life was an imitator of Stoic vanity.

3.18.6CSEL 19:237

nam Democritus in alia fuit persuasione, sed tamen sponte sua leto caput obuius optulit ipse, quo nihil sceleratius fieri potest. nam si homicida nefarius est, quia hominis extinctor est, eidem sceleri obstrictus est qui se necat, quia hominem necat.

Democritus was of another persuasion, yet 'of his own accord he offered his head to death'; and nothing more wicked can be done. For if a murderer is abominable because he destroys a man, he who kills himself is bound by the same crime, because he kills a man.

3.18.7CSEL 19:237–238

immo uero maius esse id facinus existimandum est, cuius ultio soli deo subiacet. nam sicut in hanc uitam non nostra sponte uenimus, ita rursus ex hoc domicilio corporis, quod tuendum nobis adsignatum est, eiusdem iussu recedendum est, qui nos in hoc corpus induxit tamdiu habitaturos, donec iubeat emitti. et si uis aliqua inferatur, aequa mente patiendum, cum extincta innocentis anima inulta esse non possit habeamusque iudicem magnum, cui soli uindicta in integro semper est.

Indeed, it must be judged a greater crime, since its punishment belongs to God alone. For as we did not come into this life of our own will, so we must withdraw from this dwelling of the body, which has been assigned to us to guard, only at the command of him who put us into this body to dwell in it until he orders us to be sent out. And if some violence is inflicted, it must be borne with an even mind, since the soul of an innocent person when destroyed cannot go unavenged, and we have a great judge, to whom alone vengeance always belongs.

3.18.8CSEL 19:238

homicidae igitur illi omnes philosophi et ipse Romanae sapientiae princeps Cato, qui antequam se occideret, perlegisse Platonis librum dicitur qui est scriptus de aeternitate animarum, et ad summum nefas philosophi auctoritate conpulsus est. et hic tamen aliquam moriendi causam uidetur habuisse, odium seruitutis.

All those philosophers, then, were murderers, and Cato himself, the chief of Roman wisdom, who, before he killed himself, is said to have read through Plato's book written on the eternity of souls, and was driven to the ultimate crime by a philosopher's authority. And yet he seems to have had some reason for dying: hatred of slavery.

3.18.9CSEL 19:238

quid Ambraciotes ille, qui cum eundem librum perlegisset, praecipitem se dedit nullam aliam ob causam nisi quod Platoni credidit? execrabilis prorsus ac fugienda doctrina, si abigit homines a uita.

What of that man of Ambracia, who, having read the same book, threw himself headlong for no other reason than that he believed Plato? A doctrine utterly detestable and to be shunned, if it drives men from life.

3.18.10CSEL 19:238

quodsi scisset Plato atque docuisset a quo et quomodo et quibus et quae ob facta et quo tempore inmortalitas tribuatur, nec Theombrotum inpegisset in mortem uoluntariam nec Catonem, sed eos ad uitam et iustitiam potius erudisset.

But if Plato had known and taught by whom, how, to whom, for what deeds, and at what time immortality is granted, he would not have driven Theombrotus or Cato into voluntary death, but would rather have trained them for life and justice.

3.18.11CSEL 19:238–239

nam mihi Cato uidetur causam quaesisse moriendi non tam ut Caesarem fugeret, quam ut Stoicorum decretis obtemperaret, quos sectabatur, suumque nomen grandi aliquo facinore clarificaret: cui quid mali potuerit accidere, si uiueret, non inuenio.

For Cato seems to me to have sought a reason for dying, not so much to escape Caesar, as to obey the decrees of the Stoics whom he followed, and to make his name famous by some great deed; for I cannot find what evil could have befallen him had he lived.

3.18.12CSEL 19:239

Gaius enim Caesar ut erat clemens, nihil aliut efficere uolebat etiam in ipso belli ciuilis ardore, quam ut bene mereri de re publica uideretur duobus optimis ciuibus Cicerone et Catone seruatis. sed redeamus ad eos qui mortem pro bono laudant.

For Gaius Caesar, merciful as he was, wished for nothing else, even in the very heat of civil war, than to be seen to deserve well of the commonwealth by saving two excellent citizens, Cicero and Cato. But let us return to those who praise death as a good.

3.18.13CSEL 19:239

de uita quereris, quasi uixeris aut umquam tibi ratio constiterit, cur omnino sis natus. nonne igitur tibi uerus ille et communis omnium pater Terentianum illut iure increpauerit: prius disce quid sit uiuere, si displicebit uita, tum istoc utitor.

You complain of life, as though you had lived or had ever grasped why you were born at all. Might not that true and common Father of all justly rebuke you with that line of Terence: 'First learn what living is; then, if life displeases you, use that'?

3.18.14CSEL 19:239

indignaris te malis esse subiectum, quasi quicquam merearis boni qui patrem, qui dominum, qui regem tuum nescis, qui quamuis clarissimam lucem intuearis oculis, mens tamen caeca est et in profundis ignorantiae tenebris iacet. quae ignorantia effecit ut quosdam dicere non puderet idcirco nos esse natos, ut scelerum poenas lueremus: quo quid delirius dici possit non uideo.

You resent being subject to evils, as though you deserved any good, you who do not know your Father, your Lord, your King; who, though you gaze at the brightest light with your eyes, yet your mind is blind and lies in the depths of the darkness of ignorance. This ignorance has made some unashamed to say that we are born in order to pay the penalty for crimes; and I do not see what could be said more insane.

3.18.15CSEL 19:239–240

ubi enim uel quae scelera potuimus admittere qui omnino non fuimus? nisi forte credemus inepto illi seni, qui se in priore uita Euphorbum fuisse mentitus est. hic credo quod erat ignobili genere natus, familiam sibi ex Homeri carminibus adoptauit.

For where, or what crimes, could we have committed, who did not exist at all? Unless perhaps we are to believe that silly old man who falsely claimed that in a former life he had been Euphorbus. He, I suppose, being of low birth, adopted a family for himself from Homer's poems.

3.18.16CSEL 19:240

o miram et singularem Pythagorae memoriam et o miseram obliuionem nostrum omnium, qui nesciamus qui ante fuerimus! sed fortasse uel errore aliquo uel gratia sit effectum, ut ille solus Lethaeum gurgitem non adtigerit nec obliuionis aquam gustauerit. uidelicet senex uanus, sicut otiosae aniculae solent, fabulas tamquam infantibus credulis finxit.

O wonderful and unique memory of Pythagoras, and O wretched forgetfulness of all of us, who do not know who we were before! But perhaps by some mistake or favour it came about that he alone did not touch the stream of Lethe nor taste the water of forgetfulness. Evidently the vain old man, as idle old women do, invented fables as for credulous infants.

3.18.17CSEL 19:240

quodsi bene sensisset de iis quibus haec locutus est, si homines eos existimasset, numquam sibi tam petulanter mentiendi licentiam uindicasset. sed deridenda hominis leuissimi uanitas.

But if he had thought well of those to whom he said these things, if he had considered them men, he would never have claimed for himself so insolent a licence to lie. But the vanity of this most frivolous man is to be laughed at.

3.18.18CSEL 19:240

quid Cicerone faciemus? qui cum in principio Consolationis suae dixisset luendorum scelerum causa nasci homines, iterauit id ipsum postea quasi obiurgans eum qui uitam non esse poenam putet. recte ergo praefatus est errore ac miserabili ueritatis ignorantia se teneri.

What shall we do with Cicero? Having said at the beginning of his Consolation that men are born to atone for crimes, he afterwards repeated the very same thing, as if rebuking one who thinks that life is not a punishment. Rightly, then, did he say at the start that he was held by error and a wretched ignorance of the truth.

Divine 3, chapter 19

3.19.1CSEL 19:240

At illi qui de mortis bono disputant quia nihil ueri sciunt, sic argumentantur: si nihil est post mortem, non est malum mors; aufert enim sensum mali. si autem supersunt animae, etiam bonum est, quia inmortalitas sequitur.

But those who argue for the goodness of death, because they know nothing true, reason thus: 'If there is nothing after death, death is not an evil, for it takes away the sense of evil. But if souls survive, it is even a good, because immortality follows.'

3.19.2CSEL 19:240–241

quam sententiam Cicero de Legibus sic explicauit: gratulemurque nobis, quoniam mors aut meliorem quam qui est in uita aut certe non deteriorem adlatura est statum: nam sine corpore animo uigente diuina uita est, sensu carente nihil profecto est mali.

Cicero set out this view in On the Laws thus: 'And let us congratulate ourselves, since death will bring either a better state than that in life or at least not a worse; for if the mind lives without the body, it is a divine life; if it lacks sense, there is surely nothing evil.'

3.19.3CSEL 19:241

argute, ut sibi uidentur, quasi nihil esse aliut possit. atquin utrumque hoc falsum est. docent enim diuinae litterae non extingui animas, sed aut pro iustitia praemio adfici aut poena pro sceleribus sempiterna.

Cleverly, as it seems to them, as if nothing else could be the case. Yet both of these are false. For the divine writings teach that souls are not extinguished, but are either rewarded for justice or given everlasting punishment for crimes.

3.19.4CSEL 19:241

nec enim fas est aut eum qui sceleratus in uita feliciter fuerit, effugere quod meretur aut eum qui ob iustitiam miserrimus fuerit, sua mercede fraudari.

For it is not right either that one who has been wicked and prosperous in life should escape what he deserves, or that one who has been most wretched because of his justice should be cheated of his reward.

3.19.5CSEL 19:241

quod adeo uerum est, ut idem Tullius in Consolatione non easdem sedes incolere iustos atque inpios praedicauerit.

This is so true that the same Tullius in his Consolation declared that the just and the impious do not inhabit the same abodes.

3.19.6CSEL 19:241

nec enim omnibus inquit idem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in caelum patere. nam uitiis et sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras atque in caeno iacere docuerunt, castos autem animos, puros integros incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos leui quodam et facili lapsu ad deos id est ad naturam similem sui peruolare. quae sententia superiori illi argumento repugnat.

'For those same wise men,' he says, 'did not think that the same course to heaven lies open to all. For they taught that those stained with vices and crimes are thrust down into darkness and lie in mire, but that chaste souls, pure, whole, and uncorrupted, polished also by good studies and arts, fly up with a light and easy gliding to the gods, that is, to a nature like their own.' This opinion contradicts that earlier argument.

3.19.7CSEL 19:241

illut enim sic adsumptum est, tamquam necesse sit omnem hominem natum inmortalitate donari. quod igitur erit

For that argument was assumed as though every man who is born must necessarily be endowed with immortality. What, then, will become of

3.19.8CSEL 19:241–242

discrimen uirtutis ac sceleris, si nihil interest utrumne Aristides sit aliquis an Phalaris, utrum Cato an Catilina? sed hanc repugnantiam rerum sententiarumque non cernit nisi qui tenet ueritatem.

the distinction between virtue and crime, if it makes no difference whether one is an Aristides or a Phalaris, a Cato or a Catiline? But this contradiction of facts and opinions is not seen except by one who holds the truth.

3.19.9CSEL 19:242

si quis igitur nos roget utrumne bonum sit mors. an malum, respondebimus qualitatem eius ex uitae ratione pendere. nam sicut uita ipsa bonum est, si cum uirtute uiuatur, malum, si cum scelere, sic et mors ex praeteritis uitae actibus ponderanda est.

If anyone asks us, then, whether death is a good or an evil, we shall answer that its character depends on the conduct of life. For as life itself is a good if it is lived with virtue, and an evil if with crime, so death too must be weighed by the past actions of life.

3.19.10CSEL 19:242

ita fit ut si uita in dei religione transacta sit, mors malum non sit, quia translatio est ad inmortalitatem: sin aliter, malum sit necesse est, quoniam ut dixi ad aeterna supplicia transmittit.

So it comes about that if life has been passed in the worship of God, death is not an evil, because it is a passing over to immortality; but if otherwise, it must be an evil, since, as I said, it sends one on to eternal punishments.

3.19.11CSEL 19:242

quid ergo dicemus nisi errare illos qui aut mortem adpetunt tamquam bonum aut uitam fugiunt tamquam malum? nisi quod sunt iniquissimi, qui pauciora mala non pensant bonis pluribus.

What shall we say, then, but that those are wrong who either seek death as a good or flee life as an evil? Except that they are most unfair, who do not weigh fewer evils against more goods.

3.19.12CSEL 19:242

nam cum omnem uitam per exquisitas et uarias traducant uoluptates, mori cupiunt, si quid forte iis amaritudinis superuenit, et sic habent, tamquam illis numquam fuerit bene, si aliquando fuerit male. damnant igitur uitam omnem plenamque nihil aliut quam malis opinantur.

For though they pass their whole life through exquisite and varied pleasures, they long to die if some bitterness happens to come upon them, and regard it as though things had never gone well with them if once they have gone badly. So they condemn the whole of life and think it full of nothing but evils.

3.19.13CSEL 19:242

hinc nata est inepta illa sententia, hanc esse mortem quam nos uitam putemus, illam uitam quam nos pro morte timeamus: ita primum bonum esse non nasci, secundum, citius mori.

Hence arose that foolish opinion that this is death which we think life, and that is life which we fear as death; and so that the first good is not to be born, the second to die quickly.

3.19.14CSEL 19:242–243

quae ut maioris sit auctoritatis, Sileno adtribuitur. Cicero in Consolatione non nasci inquit longe optimum nec in hos scopulos incidere uitae, proximum autem, si natus sis, quam primum tamquam ex incendio effugere fortunae. credidisse illum uanissimo dicto exinde apparet, quod adiecit de suo aliquid, ut ornaret.

To give it greater authority, it is attributed to Silenus. Cicero in the Consolation says: 'Not to be born is by far the best, and not to fall upon these rocks of life; but next, if you are born, to escape as quickly as possible, as from a fire of fortune.' That he believed this empty saying is clear from the fact that he added something of his own to embellish it.

3.19.15CSEL 19:243

quaero igitur cui esse optimum putet non nasci, cum sit nullus omnino qui sentiat: nam ut bonum sit aliquid aut malum, sensus efficit.

I ask, then, for whom he thinks it best not to be born, since there is no one at all to feel it; for it is sensation that makes a thing good or evil.

3.19.16CSEL 19:243

deinde, cur omnem uitam nihil esse aliud quam scopulos et incendium putauerit: quasi aut in nostra fuerit potestate ne nasceremur aut uitam nobis fortuna tribuat, non deus, aut uiuendi ratio quicquam simile incendio habere uideatur.

Next, why he thought all of life nothing but rocks and fire: as if it had been in our power not to be born, or fortune gives us life and not God, or the course of living seemed to have anything like a fire.

3.19.17CSEL 19:243

non dissimile Platonis illut est, quod aiebat se gratias agere naturae: primum quod homo natus esset potius quam mutum animal, deinde quod mas potius quam femina, quod Graecus quam barbarus, postremo quod Atheniensis et quod temporibus Socratis.

Not unlike this is that saying of Plato's, that he gave thanks to nature: first that he was born a man rather than a dumb animal; next that he was a male rather than a female, a Greek rather than a barbarian; lastly that he was an Athenian and born in the time of Socrates.

3.19.18CSEL 19:243

dici non potest quantam mentibus caecitatem, quantos pariat errores ignoratio ueritatis. ego plane contenderim numquam quicquam in rebus humanis dictum esse delirius: quasi uero si aut barbarus aut mulier aut asinus denique natus esset, idem ipse Plato esset ac non illud ipsum quod natus fuisset.

It cannot be told what blindness of mind, what errors, ignorance of the truth produces. I would plainly contend that nothing was ever said in human affairs more insane: as though, if he had been born a barbarian or a woman or indeed an ass, he would be the same Plato, and not the very thing he had been born.

3.19.19CSEL 19:243–244

sed uidelicet Pythagorae credidit, qui ut uetaret homines animalibus uesci, dixit animas de corporibus in aliorum animalium corpora commeare. quod et uanum et inpossibile est: uanum, quia necesse non fuit ueteres animas in noua corpora inducere, cum idem artifex qui primas aliquando fecerat, potuerit semper nouas facere, inpossibile, quia rectae rationis anima tam inmutare naturam status sui non potest quam ignis aut deorsum niti aut in transuersum fluminis modo flammam suam fundere.

But evidently he believed Pythagoras, who, to forbid men from eating animals, said that souls pass from bodies into the bodies of other animals. This is both empty and impossible: empty, because there was no need to lead old souls into new bodies, since the same craftsman who once made the first could always make new ones; impossible, because a soul of right reason can no more change the nature of its condition than fire can tend downward or pour out its flame sideways like a river.

3.19.20CSEL 19:244

existimauit igitur homo sapiens potuisse fieri, ut anima quae tunc erat in Platone, in aliquod mutum animal includeretur essetque humano sensu praedita, ut intellegeret ac doleret incongruenti se corpore oneratam.

So the wise man thought it could happen that the soul which was then in Plato might be shut up in some dumb animal and be endowed with human sense, so as to understand and grieve that it was burdened with an unsuitable body.

3.19.21CSEL 19:244

quanto sanius faceret, si gratias agere se diceret, quod ingeniosus, quod docilis natus esset, quod in iis opibus, ut liberaliter erudiretur!

How much more sanely he would have acted if he had said he gave thanks that he was born talented and teachable, and with such means that he could be liberally educated!

3.19.22CSEL 19:244

nam quod Athenis natus est, quid in eo beneficii fuit? an non plurimi extiterunt in aliis ciuitatibus excellenti ingenio atque doctrina uiri, qui meliores singuli quam omnes Athenienses fuerunt?

For what benefit was there in being born at Athens? Did not very many men of excellent talent and learning appear in other cities, each of whom was better than all the Athenians?

3.19.23CSEL 19:244

quanta hominum milia fuisse credamus qui et Athenis nati et temporibus Socratis indocti tamen ac stulti fuerint? non enim parietes aut locus in quo quisque est effusus ex utero, conciliat homini sapientiam.

How many thousands of men must we believe were born both at Athens and in the time of Socrates, and yet were unlearned and foolish? For it is not walls, or the place in which each is poured forth from the womb, that confers wisdom on a man.

3.19.24CSEL 19:244

quid uero attinuit Socratis se temporibus natum gratulari? num Socrates ingenia discentibus potuit commodare?

And what did it matter to congratulate himself on being born in the time of Socrates? Could Socrates lend talent to his pupils?

3.19.25CSEL 19:244–245

non uenit in mentem Platoni Alcibiaden quoque et Critiam eiusdem Socratis adsiduos auditores fuisse, quorum alter hostis patriae acerrimus fuit, alter crudelissimus omnium tyrannorum?

Did it not occur to Plato that Alcibiades and Critias too were constant hearers of the same Socrates, of whom one was the fiercest enemy of his country and the other the cruellest of all tyrants?

Divine 3, chapter 20

3.20.1CSEL 19:245

Videamus nunc quid in Socrate ipso tam magnum fuerit, ut homo sapiens merito gratias ageret illius temporibus esse se natum.

Let us see now what was so great in Socrates himself, that a wise man should rightly give thanks for being born in his time.

3.20.2CSEL 19:245

non infitior fuisse illum paulo cordatiorem quam ceteros, qui naturam rerum putauerint ingenio posse conprehendi: in quo illos non excordes tantum fuisse arbitror, sed etiam inpios, quod in secreta caelestis illius prouidentiae curiosos oculos uoluerint inmittere.

I do not deny that he was a little more sensible than the others who thought the nature of things could be grasped by talent; in which I judge them to have been not only senseless but also impious, because they wished to thrust curious eyes into the secrets of that heavenly providence.

3.20.3CSEL 19:245

Romae et in plerisque urbibus scimus esse quaedam sacra quae aspici a uiris nefas habeatur. abstinent igitur aspectu quibus contaminare illa non licet, et si forte uel errore uel casu quopiam uir aspexit, primo poena eius, deinde instauratione sacrificii scelus expiatur.

We know that at Rome and in most cities there are certain rites which it is held impious for men to look upon. Those not permitted to defile them, then, refrain from looking; and if by chance a man has looked, whether by mistake or some accident, the offence is expiated first by his punishment and then by the renewal of the sacrifice.

3.20.4CSEL 19:245

quid his facias qui inconcessa scrutari uolunt? nimirum multo sceleratiores qui arcana mundi et hoc caeleste templum profanare inpiis disputationibus quaerunt quam qui aedem Vestae aut Bonae Deae aut Cereris intrauerit. quae penetralia quamuis adire uiris non liceat, tamen a uiris fabricata sunt.

What would you do with those who wish to search out what is not permitted? Surely they are much more wicked who seek to profane the secrets of the world and this heavenly temple with impious disputations than one who has entered the shrine of Vesta or the Good Goddess or Ceres. Those inner sanctuaries, though men may not enter them, were nevertheless built by men.

3.20.5CSEL 19:245–246

hi uero non tantum inpietatis crimen effugiunt, sed, quod est multo indignius, eloquentiae famam et ingenii gloriam consecuntur.

But these not only escape the charge of impiety, but, what is far more shameful, gain a reputation for eloquence and the glory of genius.

3.20.6CSEL 19:246

quid si aliquid inuestigare possent? sunt enim tam stulti in adseuerando quam inprobi in quaerendo, cum neque inuenire quicquam possint nec defendere, etiamsi inuenerint.

What if they could discover anything? For they are as foolish in asserting as they are wicked in inquiring, since they can neither find anything nor defend it even if they found it.

3.20.7CSEL 19:246

nam si uerum uel fortuito uiderint, quod saepius contingit, committunt ut ab aliis id pro falso refellatur. non enim descendit aliquis e caelo qui sententiam de singulorum opinionibus ferat.

For if they have seen the truth even by chance, which often happens, they bring it about that it is refuted by others as false. For no one comes down from heaven to pass judgment on each one's opinions.

3.20.8CSEL 19:246

quapropter nemo dubitauerit eos qui ista conquirant stultos ineptos insanos esse.

So no one should doubt that those who hunt out such things are foolish, absurd, and mad.

3.20.9CSEL 19:246

aliquid ergo Socrates habuit cordis humani, qui cum haec intellegeret non posse inueniri, ab eiusmodi quaestionibus se remouit, uereorque ne in eo solo. multa enim sunt eius non modo laude indigna, sed etiam reprehensione.

Socrates, then, had something of human sense, since, understanding that these things cannot be found, he withdrew from questions of that kind; and I fear it was in that alone. For many of his actions are not only unworthy of praise but also most deserving

3.20.10CSEL 19:246

dignissima, in quibus fuit suorum simillimus. ex his unum eligam quod ab omnibus sit probatum. celebre hoc prouerbium Socrates habuit: quod supra nos, nihil ad nos.

of blame, in which he was very like his fellows. Of these I will choose one which is approved by all. Socrates had this famous proverb: 'What is above us is nothing to us.'

3.20.11CSEL 19:246

procumbamus igitur in terram et manus ad praeclara opera nobis datas conuertamus in pedes, nihil ad nos caelum, ad cuius contemplationem sumus excitati, nihil denique lux ipsa pertineat.

Let us then fall down to the earth, and turn into feet the hands given us for splendid works; let the heaven, to the contemplation of which we have been raised, be nothing to us; in short, let light itself be no concern of ours.

3.20.12CSEL 19:246–247

(at) certe uictus nostri causa de caelo est. quodsi hoc sensit, non esse de rebus caelestibus disputandum, ne illorum quidem rationem poterat conprehendere quae sub pedibus habebat. quid ergo? num errauit in uerbis? ueri simile non est, sed nimirum id sensit quod locutus est, religioni minime seruiendum: quod si aperte diceret, nemo pateretur.

⟨But⟩ certainly our food comes from heaven. If he meant that one should not dispute about heavenly things, he could not grasp even the reason of the things he had under his feet. What then? Did he err in his words? It is not likely; but he meant what he said, that religion should by no means be served. Had he said this openly, no one would have tolerated it.

3.20.13CSEL 19:247

quis enim non sentiat hunc mundum tam mirabili ratione perfectum aliqua prouidentia gubernari, quandoquidem nihil est quod possit sine ullo moderatore consistere?

For who does not perceive that this world, completed with such wonderful design, is governed by some providence, since there is nothing that can hold together without some governor?

3.20.14CSEL 19:247

sic domus ab habitatore deserta dilabitur, nauis sine gubernatore abit pessum et corpus relictum ab anima diffluit, nedum putemus tantam istam molem aut construi sine artifice aut stare tamdiu sine rectore potuisse.

So a house abandoned by its inhabitant falls apart, a ship without a helmsman goes to the bottom, and a body left by the soul decays; much less should we think that this vast mass could either be built without a craftsman or stand so long without a ruler.

3.20.15CSEL 19:247

quodsi publicas illas religiones uoluit euertere, non inprobo, quin etiam laudabo, si ipse quod est melius inuenerit. uerum idem per canem et anserem deierabat. o hominem scurram, ut ait Zeno Epicureus, ineptum perditum desperatum, si cauillari uoluit religionem, dementem, si hoc serio fecit, ut animal turpissimum pro deo haberet!

If he wished to overthrow those public religions, I do not disapprove; indeed I will praise him, if he found something better himself. But the same man swore by a dog and a goose. O buffoon, as Zeno the Epicurean says, absurd, lost, desperate, if he wished to mock religion; mad, if he did this seriously, so as to hold a most base animal for a god!

3.20.16CSEL 19:247

quis iam superstitiones Aegyptiorum audeat reprehendere quas Athenis Socrates auctoritate sua confirmauit? illut uero nonne summae uanitatis, quod ante mortem familiares suos rogauit, ut Aesculapio gallum quem uouerat prosecarent?

Who now would dare to blame the superstitions of the Egyptians, which Socrates confirmed at Athens by his authority? And is not this the height of vanity, that before his death he asked his friends to sacrifice to Aesculapius the cock he had vowed?

3.20.17CSEL 19:247–248

timuit uidelicet ne aput Rhadamanthum reciperatorem reus uoti fieret ab Asclepio. dementisse hominem putarem, si morbo adfectus perisset. cum uero sanus hoc fecerit, est ipse insanus qui eum putat fuisse sapientem. en cuius temporibus natum esse se homo sapiens gratuletur!

He feared, no doubt, that before Rhadamanthus as judge he would be made a defendant by Asclepius for his vow. I would think the man had lost his mind if he had died from disease; but since he did this while sane, he himself is insane who thinks he was wise. Behold the man in whose time the wise man congratulates himself on being born!

Divine 3, chapter 21

3.21.1CSEL 19:248

Videamus tamen quid illum Socrates docuerit: qui cum totam physicam repudiasset, eo se contulit, ut de uirtute atque officio quaereret. itaque non dubito quin auditores suos iustitiae praeceptis erudierit.

Let us see, however, what Socrates taught him. Having rejected all natural philosophy, he turned to inquiring about virtue and duty. So I do not doubt that he instructed his hearers in the precepts of justice.

3.21.2CSEL 19:248

docente igitur Socrate non fugit Platonem iustitiae uim in aequitate consistere, siquidem omnes pari condicione nascuntur. ergo nihil inquit priuati ac proprii habeant, sed ut pares esse possint, quod iustitiae ratio desiderat, omnia in commune possideant.

So, with Socrates teaching, it did not escape Plato that the force of justice consists in equality, since all are born in equal condition. 'Therefore,' he says, 'let them have nothing private and their own, but, so that they may be equal, as the principle of justice requires, let them possess all things in common.'

3.21.3CSEL 19:248

ferri hoc potest, quamdiu de pecunia dici uidetur. quod ipsum quam inpossibile sit et quam iniustum, poteram multis rebus ostendere, concedamus tamen ut possit fieri: omnes enim sapientes erunt et pecuniam contemnent.

This can be tolerated as long as it seems to be said of money. How impossible and how unjust that itself is, I could show by many facts; but let us grant that it can happen: for all will be wise and will despise money.

3.21.4CSEL 19:248–249

quo ergo illum communitas ista perduxit? matrimonia quoque inquit communia esse debebunt: scilicet ut ad eandem mulierem multi uiri tamquam canes confluant et is utique optineat qui uiribus uicerit aut, si patientes sunt ut philosophi, expectent, ut uicibus tamquam lupanar obeant.

Where then did this community lead him? 'Marriages too,' he says, 'will have to be common': so, no doubt, that many men may flock like dogs to the same woman, and he who has prevailed by strength will have her; or, if they are patient like philosophers, they may wait to take their turn as in a brothel.

3.21.5CSEL 19:249

o miram Platonis aequitatem! ubi est igitur uirtus castitatis? ubi fides coniugalis? quae si tollas, omnis iustitia sublata est.

O wonderful equity of Plato! Where then is the virtue of chastity? Where is conjugal fidelity? If you take these away, all justice is taken away.

3.21.6CSEL 19:249

at idem dixit beatas ciuitates futuras fuisse, si aut philosophi regnarent aut reges philosopharentur. huic uero tam iusto, tam aequo uiro regnum dares, qui aliis abstulisset sua, aliis condonasset aliena, prostituisset pudicitiam feminarum, quae nullus umquam non modo rex, sed ne tyrannus quidem fecit? quam tamen intulit rationem turpissimi huius consilii?

But the same man said that cities would be happy if either philosophers reigned or kings philosophized. Would you really give a kingdom to this so just and equitable a man, who would have taken from some their own and given to others what belonged to others, and would have prostituted the chastity of women, which no king, nor even any tyrant, ever did? And what reason did he give for this most shameful plan?

3.21.7CSEL 19:249

sic inquit ciuitas concors erit et amoris mutui constricta uinculis, si omnes omnium fuerint et mariti et patres et uxores et liberi.

'So,' he says, 'the city will be harmonious and bound by the chains of mutual love, if all are husbands and fathers and wives and children of all.'

3.21.8CSEL 19:249

quae ista confusio generis humani est? quomodo seruari caritas potest, ubi nihil certum est quod ametur? quis aut uir mulierem aut mulier uirum diliget, nisi habitauerint semper una, nisi deuota mens et seruata inuicem fides indiuiduam fecerit caritatem? quae uirtus in illa promiscua uoluptate locum non habet.

What confusion of the human race is this? How can love be preserved where there is nothing definite to be loved? What man will love a woman, or woman a man, unless they have always lived together, unless a devoted mind and mutually kept faith have made their love undivided? That virtue has no place in that promiscuous pleasure.

3.21.9CSEL 19:249–250

item si omnes omnium liberi sint, quis amare filios tamquam suos poterit, cum suos esse aut ignoret aut dubitet? quis honorem tamquam patri deferet, cum unde natus sit nesciat? ex quo fit

Likewise, if all children belong to all, who will be able to love children as his own, when he either does not know or doubts that they are his? Who will pay honour as to a father, when he does not know from whom he was born? From this it follows

3.21.10CSEL 19:250

ut non tantum alienum pro patre habeat, sed etiam patrem pro alieno. quid quod uxor potest esse communis, filius non potest? quem concipi non nisi ex uno necesse est. perit ergo illi uni communitas ipsa reclamante natura.

that he will not only hold a stranger as his father, but also his father as a stranger. What of the fact that a wife can be common, but a son cannot? He must be conceived from one man only. So the community itself fails for that one, nature herself protesting.

3.21.11CSEL 19:250

superest ut tantummodo concordiae causa uxores uelit esse communes. at nulla uehementior discordiarum causa est quam unius feminae a multis maribus adpetitio.

It remains that he wants wives to be common only for the sake of harmony. But there is no more violent cause of discord than the desire of many men for one woman.

3.21.12CSEL 19:250

quod Plato si ratione non potuit, exemplis certe potuit admoneri et mutorum animalium, quae ob hoc uel acerrime pugnant, et hominum, qui semper ob eam rem grauissima inter se bella gesserunt.

If Plato could not be warned of this by reason, he certainly could have been by examples: both of dumb animals, which fight most fiercely over this, and of men, who have always waged the gravest wars with one another over this very thing.

Divine 3, chapter 22

3.22.1CSEL 19:250

Restat ut communio ista nihil aliut habeat praeter adulteria et libidines, propter quas funditus eruendas uirtus est uel maxime necessaria.

It remains that this community has nothing in it but adulteries and lusts, for the rooting out of which virtue is most of all necessary.

3.22.2CSEL 19:250

itaque non inuenit concordiam quam quaerebat, quia non uidebat unde oriatur. nam iustitia in extra positis nihil momenti habet, ne in corpore quidem, sed tota in hominis mente uersatur.

So he did not find the harmony he sought, because he did not see where it arises. For justice has no weight in external things, not even in the body, but is wholly concerned with the mind of man.

3.22.3CSEL 19:250

qui ergo uult homines adaequare, non matrimonia, non opes subtrahere debet, sed adrogantiam superbiam tumorem, ut illi potentes et elati pares esse se etiam mendicissimis sciant.

He, then, who wishes to make men equal ought to take away not marriages, not wealth, but arrogance, pride, and swelling, so that the powerful and exalted may know that they are equal even to the poorest beggars.

3.22.4CSEL 19:250

detracta enim diuitibus insolentia et iniquitate nihil intererit utrumne alii diuites, alii pauperes sint, cum animi pares fuerint, quod efficere nulla res alia praeter religionem dei potest.

For when insolence and injustice are taken from the rich, it will make no difference whether some are rich and others poor, since their minds will be equal; and nothing else can bring this about but the religion of God.

3.22.5CSEL 19:250–251

putauit igitur se inuenisse iustitiam, cum eam prorsus euerteret, quia non rerum fragilium, sed mentium debet esse communitas. nam si iustitia uirtutum omnium mater est, cum illae singulae tolluntur, ipsa subuertitur.

So he thought he had found justice, while he overthrew it entirely, because there ought to be a community not of frail things but of minds. For if justice is the mother of all the virtues, when these are removed one by one, justice itself is overturned.

3.22.6CSEL 19:251

tulit autem Plato ante omnia frugalitatem, quae utique nulla est ubi proprii nihil habetur, tulit abstinentiam, siquidem nihil fuerit quo abstineatur alienum, tulit temperantiam, tulit castitatem, quae uirtutes in utroque sexu maximae sunt, tulit uerecundiam pudorem modestiam, si honesta et legitima esse incipiunt quae solent flagitiosa et turpia iudicari.

Plato took away above all frugality, which certainly does not exist where nothing is one's own; he took away abstinence, since there would be nothing belonging to another from which to abstain; he took away temperance, he took away chastity, virtues which are greatest in both sexes; he took away shame, modesty, and restraint, if things commonly judged wicked and shameful begin to be honourable and lawful.

3.22.7CSEL 19:251

sic uirtutem dum uult omnibus dare, omnibus ademit. nam rerum proprietas et uitiorum et uirtutum materiam continet, communitas autem nihil aliut quam uitiorum licentiam.

So, while he wishes to give virtue to all, he has taken it from all. For ownership of things contains the material both of vices and of virtues; but community contains nothing but licence for vices.

3.22.8CSEL 19:251

nam uiri qui multas mulieres habent, nihil aliut dici possunt quam luxuriosi ac nepotes. item mulieres quae a multis habentur, non utique adulterae, quia certum matrimonium nullum est, sed prostitutae ac meretrices sint necesse est.

For men who have many women can be called nothing but debauchees and prodigals. Likewise women who are had by many are certainly not adulteresses, since there is no definite marriage, but they must be prostitutes and harlots.

3.22.9CSEL 19:251

redegit ergo humanam uitam ad similitudinem non dicam mutorum, sed pecudum ac beluarum. nam uolucres paene omnes matrimonia faciunt et paria iungunt et nidos suos tamquam geniales toros concordi mente defendunt et fetus suos quia certi sunt amant et si alienos subieceris abigunt.

He reduced human life, then, to the likeness, I will not say of dumb creatures, but of cattle and beasts. For almost all birds make marriages and join in pairs, and defend their nests as marriage beds with one mind, and love their young because they are sure of them, and drive away others if you put them in.

3.22.10CSEL 19:251–252

at homo sapiens contra morem hominum contraque naturam stultiora sibi quae imitaretur elegit et quoniam uidebat in ceteris animalibus officia marum feminarumque non esse diuisa, existimauit oportere etiam mulieres militare et consiliis publicis interesse et magistratus gerere et imperia suscipere. itaque his arma et equos adsignauit: consequens est ut lanam et telam uiris et infantium gestationes.

But the wise man, against the custom of men and against nature, chose more foolish things to imitate; and since he saw that in the other animals the duties of males and females are not divided, he thought that women too should go to war, take part in public councils, hold magistracies, and take up commands. So he assigned them arms and horses; it follows that to men he should assign wool and the loom and the carrying of infants.

3.22.11CSEL 19:252

nec uidit inpossibilia esse quae diceret et ex eo, quod adhuc in orbe terrae neque tam stulta neque tam sapiens ulla gens extitit, quae hoc modo uiueret.

Nor did he see that what he said was impossible, from the very fact that no nation in the world has yet appeared so foolish or so wise as to live in this way.

Divine 3, chapter 23

3.23.1CSEL 19:252

Cum igitur in tanta uanitate ipsi philosophorum principes deprehendantur, quid illos minores putabimus? numquam sibi tam sapientes uideri solent quam cum pecuniae contemptu gloriantur. fortis animus. sed expecto quid faciant et quo ille contemptus euadat.

Since, then, the very chiefs of the philosophers are caught in such vanity, what shall we think of the lesser ones? They never seem to themselves so wise as when they boast of their contempt of money. A brave spirit! But I wait to see what they do and where that contempt ends up.

3.23.2CSEL 19:252

tradita sibi a parentibus patrimonia tamquam malum fugiunt ac deserunt et ne in tempestate naufragium faciant, in tranquillum se ultro praecipitant, non uirtute, sed peruerso metu fortes, sicut illi, qui cum timent ne ab hoste iugulentur, ipsi se iugulant, ut mortem morte deuitent.

They flee and abandon the patrimonies handed down to them by their parents as if they were an evil, and, lest they be shipwrecked in a storm, they throw themselves overboard in calm weather, brave not by virtue but by perverse fear, like those who, fearing to have their throats cut by the enemy, cut their own, avoiding death by death.

3.23.3CSEL 19:252

sic isti unde possent gloriam liberalitatis adquirere, sine honore, sine gratia perdunt.

So these men waste, without honour and without gratitude, what could have gained them the glory of generosity.

3.23.4CSEL 19:252

laudatur Democritus, quod agros suos reliquerit eosque pascua publica fieri passus sit. probarem, si donasset. nihil autem sapienter fit, quod si ab omnibus fiat, inutile est ac malum.

Democritus is praised because he abandoned his fields and allowed them to become public pasture. I would approve if he had given them away. But nothing is done wisely which, if done by all, is useless and bad.

3.23.5CSEL 19:252–253

sed haec neclegentia tolerabilis. quid ille qui patrimonium in nummos redactum effudit in mare? ego dubito utrumne sanus an demens fuerit. abite inquit in profundum malae cupiditates, ego uos mergam, ne ipse mergar a uobis.

But this negligence is tolerable. What of him who turned his patrimony into coins and threw it into the sea? I doubt whether he was sane or mad. 'Go,' he says, 'into the deep, you evil desires; I will drown you, lest I myself be drowned by you.'

3.23.6CSEL 19:253

si tantus pecuniae contemptus est, fac illam beneficium, fac humanitatem, largire pauperibus: potes hoc quod perditurus es multis succurrere, ne fame aut siti aut nuditate moriantur.

If you have so great a contempt of money, make it a benefit, make it kindness, give it to the poor: what you are going to throw away can help many, so that they do not die of hunger or thirst or nakedness.

3.23.7CSEL 19:253

imitare insaniam saltem furoremque Tuditani: sparge populo diripiendam. potes et pecuniam effugere et tamen bene collocare, quia saluum est quidquid pluribus profuit. Zenonis autem paria peccata quis probat?

At least imitate the madness and frenzy of Tuditanus: scatter it to the people to snatch. You can both be rid of money and yet place it well, because whatever has benefited many is safe. And who approves Zeno's equality of sins?

3.23.8CSEL 19:253

sed omittamus id quod est ab omnibus semper inrisum: illut satis est ad coarguendum furiosi hominis errorem, quod inter uitia et morbos misericordiam ponit. adimit nobis adfectum quo ratio humanae uitae paene omnis continetur.

But let us pass over what has always been laughed at by all. This is enough to prove the error of the raving man, that he places pity among vices and diseases. He takes from us the feeling in which almost the whole principle of human life is contained.

3.23.9CSEL 19:253

cum enim natura hominis inbecillior sit quam ceterorum animalium, quae uel ad perferendam uim temporum uel ad incursiones a suis corporibus arcendas naturalibus munimentis prouidentia caelestis armauit, homini autem quia nihil istorum datum est, accepit pro istis omnibus miserationis adfectum qui plane uocatur humanitas, qua nosmet inuicem tueremur.

For since man's nature is weaker than that of the other animals, which heavenly providence has armed with natural defences either to bear the force of the seasons or to ward off attacks from their bodies, while to man none of these has been given, he received instead of all these the feeling of compassion, which is rightly called humanity, by which we might protect one another.

3.23.10CSEL 19:253

nam si homo ad conspectum alterius hominis efferaretur, quod facere uidemus animantes quarum natura soliuaga est, nulla esset hominum societas, nulla urbium condendarum uel cura uel ratio, sic ne uita quidem satis tuta, cum et ceteris animalibus exposita esset inbecillitas hominum et ipsi inter semet ipsos beluarum more saeuirent. non minor in aliis dementia.

For if man were made savage at the sight of another man, as we see those animals do whose nature is solitary, there would be no society of men, no care or plan of founding cities; so life itself would not be safe enough, since the weakness of men would be exposed to the other animals, and they themselves would rage among themselves in the manner of beasts. No less madness is found in others.

3.23.11CSEL 19:253–254

quid enim dici potest de illo qui nigram esse dixit niuem? quam consequens erat ut etiam picem albam esse diceret! hic est ille qui se idcirco natum esse dixit, ut caelum ac solem uideret, qui in terra nihil uidebat sole lucente.

For what can be said of him who said that snow is black? How consistent it would have been for him to say that pitch is white! This is the man who said he was born to see the heaven and the sun, who saw nothing on earth while the sun was shining.

3.23.12CSEL 19:254

Xenophanes dicentibus mathematicis orbem lunae duodeuiginti partibus maiorem esse quam terram stultissime credidit et quod huic leuitati fuit consentaneum, dixit intra concauum lunae sinum esse aliam terram et ibi aliut genus hominum simili modo uiuere, quo nos in hac terra uiuimus.

Xenophanes, when the mathematicians said that the orb of the moon is eighteen times larger than the earth, most foolishly believed it, and, as fitted this levity, said that inside the hollow of the moon there is another earth, and there another race of men lives in a similar way to that in which we live on this earth.

3.23.13CSEL 19:254

habent igitur illi lunatici homines alteram lunam, quae illis nocturnum lumen exhibeat sicut haec exhibet nobis, et fortasse noster hic orbis alterius inferioris terrae luna sit.

So those lunatic men have another moon to give them light at night as this one gives it to us; and perhaps this globe of ours is the moon of another, lower earth.

3.23.14CSEL 19:254

fuisse Seneca inter Stoicos ait qui deliberaret, utrumne soli quoque suos populos daret: inepte scilicet, qui dubitauerit. quid enim perderet, si dedisset? sed credo calor deterrebat, ne tantam multitudinem periculo committeret, ne si aestu nimio perissent, ipsius culpa euenisse tanta calamitas diceretur.

Seneca says there was one among the Stoics who deliberated whether he should give the sun too its own peoples: foolishly, to have hesitated. For what would he lose if he had given them? But I suppose the heat deterred him from exposing so great a multitude to danger, lest, if they perished from excessive heat, so great a calamity should be said to have happened by his fault.

Divine 3, chapter 24

3.24.1CSEL 19:254–255

Quid? illi qui esse contrarios uestigiis nostris antipodas putant num aliquid locuntur? aut est quisquam tam ineptus qui credat esse homines quorum uestigia sint superiora quam capita? aut ibi quae aput nos iacent, inuersa pendere, fruges et arbores deorsum uersus crescere, pluuias et niues et grandines sursum uersus cadere in terram? et miratur aliquis hortos pensiles inter septem mira narrari, cum philosophi et agros et urbes et maria et montes pensiles faciant? huius quoque erroris aperienda nobis origo est.

What of those who think there are antipodes, opposite to our footsteps? Do they say anything? Or is anyone so absurd as to believe that there are men whose footprints are higher than their heads? Or that there the things that lie flat with us hang upside down, crops and trees grow downward, rains and snows and hail fall upward to the earth? And does anyone wonder that the hanging gardens are told among the seven wonders, when philosophers make hanging fields and cities and seas and mountains? The origin of this error too must be laid open by us.

3.24.2CSEL 19:255

nam semper eodem modo falluntur. cum enim falsum aliquid in principio sumpserint ueri similitudine inducti, necesse est eos in ea quae consecuntur incurrere. sic incidunt in multa ridicula, quia necesse est falsa esse quae rebus falsis congruunt.

For they are always deceived in the same way. When they have assumed something false at the start, led on by its likeness to truth, they must run into what follows from it. So they fall into many absurdities, because what agrees with false things must be false.

3.24.3CSEL 19:255

cum autem primis habuerint fidem, qualia sint ea quae secuntur non circumspiciunt, sed defendunt omni modo, cum debeant prima illa utrumne uera sint an falsa ex consequentibus iudicare. quae igitur illos ad antipodas ratio perduxit?

And when they have put faith in the first things, they do not look around at what the consequences are like, but defend them in every way, when they ought to judge from the consequences whether those first things are true or false. What reasoning, then, led them to the antipodes?

3.24.4CSEL 19:255

uidebant siderum cursus in occasum meantium, solem atque lunam in eandem partem semper occidere et oriri semper ab eadem.

They saw the courses of the stars moving toward the west, and the sun and moon always setting in the same quarter and always rising from the same.

3.24.5CSEL 19:255

cum autem non perspicerent quae machinatio cursus eorum temperaret nec quomodo ab occasu ad orientem remearent, caelum autem ipsum in omnes partes putarent esse deuexum, quod sic uideri propter inmensam latitudinem necesse est, existimauerunt rotundum esse mundum sicut pilam et ex motu siderum opinati sunt caelum uolui; sic astra solemque, cum occiderint, uolubilitate ipsa mundi ad ortum referri.

But since they did not perceive what mechanism regulated their courses, nor how they returned from west to east, and thought the sky itself sloped down in every direction, which must seem so because of its immense breadth, they concluded that the world is round like a ball, and from the motion of the stars they supposed that the sky revolves; and so the stars and the sun, when they have set, are carried back to their rising by the very revolving of the world.

3.24.6CSEL 19:255

itaque et aereos orbes fabricati sunt quasi ad figuram mundi eosque caelarunt portentosis quibusdam simulacris, quae astra esse dicerent.

So they even made bronze spheres, as if after the shape of the world, and engraved them with certain monstrous images which they said were the stars.

3.24.7CSEL 19:255–256

hanc igitur caeli rotunditatem illut sequebatur, ut terra in medio sinu eius esset inclusa. quod si ita esset, (esse) etiam ipsam terram globo similem: neque enim fieri posse ut non esset rotundum quod rotundo conclusum teneretur.

This roundness of the sky led to the conclusion that the earth is enclosed in the middle of its hollow. If that were so, the earth itself too ⟨would be⟩ like a globe; for it could not be that what was held enclosed by a round thing was not round.

3.24.8CSEL 19:256

si autem rotunda etiam terra esset, necesse esse ut in omnes caeli partes eandem faciem gerat, id est montes erigat, campos (ex)tendat, maria consternat. quod si esset, etiam sequebatur illut extremum, ut nulla sit pars terrae quae non ab hominibus ceterisque animalibus incolatur. sic pendulos istos antipodas caeli rotunditas adinuenit.

But if the earth also were round, it must present the same face to all parts of the sky, that is, raise mountains, spread plains, and lay out seas. If that were so, that final consequence followed, that there is no part of the earth not inhabited by men and other animals. So the roundness of the sky invented these hanging antipodes.

3.24.9CSEL 19:256

quodsi quaeras ab iis qui haec portenta defendunt, quomodo ergo non cadant omnia in inferiorem illam caeli partem, hanc respondent rerum esse naturam, ut pondera in medium ferantur et ad medium conexa sint omnia, sicut radios uidemus in rota, quae autem leuia sunt, ut nebula fumus ignis, a medio differantur, ut caelum petant.

But if you ask those who defend these monstrosities how it is, then, that everything does not fall into that lower part of the sky, they answer that the nature of things is such that heavy things are borne to the middle and all things are joined to the middle, as we see spokes in a wheel, while light things, such as cloud, smoke, and fire, are carried away from the middle so as to seek the sky.

3.24.10CSEL 19:256

quid dicam de his nescio, qui cum semel aberrauerint, constanter in stultitia perseuerant et uanis uana defendunt, nisi quod eos interdum puto aut ioci causa philosophari aut prudentes et scios mendacia defendenda suscipere, quasi ut ingenia sua in malis rebus exerceant uel ostendant.

I do not know what to say of these men, who, having once gone astray, persist steadily in folly and defend vain things with vain things, except that I sometimes think they philosophize either as a joke, or knowingly and deliberately undertake to defend lies, as if to exercise or display their talents on bad subjects.

3.24.11CSEL 19:256–257

at ego multis argumentis probare possem nullo modo fieri posse ut caelum terra sit inferius, nisi et liber iam concludendus esset et adhuc aliqua restarent quae magis sint praesenti operi necessaria. et quoniam singulorum errores percurrere non est unius libri opus, satis sit pauca enumerasse, ex quibus possit qualia sint cetera intellegi.

I could prove by many arguments that it is in no way possible for the sky to be lower than the earth, were it not that the book must now be brought to a close, and some things still remain that are more necessary to the present work. And since running through the errors of each one is not the work of a single book, let it be enough to have listed a few, from which the nature of the rest can be understood.

Divine 3, chapter 25

3.25.1CSEL 19:257

Nunc pauca nobis de philosophia in commune dicenda sunt, ut confirmata causa peroremus. summus ille noster Platonis imitator existimauit philosophiam non esse uulgarem, quod eam non nisi docti homines adsequi possint.

Now a few things must be said by us about philosophy in general, so that, the case being confirmed, we may conclude. That great imitator of Plato among us thought that philosophy is not for the common people, because only learned men can attain it.

3.25.2CSEL 19:257

est inquit philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens. non est ergo sapientia, si ab hominum coetu abhorret, quoniam sapientia si homini data est, sine ullo discrimine omnibus data est, ut nemo sit prorsus qui eam capere non possit.

'Philosophy,' he says, 'is content with few judges, deliberately shunning the multitude.' It is not wisdom, then, if it shrinks from the company of men; since if wisdom has been given to man, it has been given to all without any distinction, so that there is absolutely no one who cannot receive it.

3.25.3CSEL 19:257

at illi uirtutem humano generi datam sic amplexantur, ut soli omnium publico bono frui uelle uideantur, tam inuidi quam si uelint deligare oculos aut effodere ceteris, ne solem uideant.

But they embrace virtue, which was given to the human race, in such a way that they alone of all seem to want to enjoy a public good, as envious as if they wished to bind or gouge out the eyes of others so that they could not see the sun.

3.25.4CSEL 19:257

nam quid est aliut hominibus negare sapientiam quam mentibus eorum uerum ac diuinum lumen auferre?

For what else is it to deny wisdom to men than to take away the true and divine light from their minds?

3.25.5CSEL 19:257

quodsi natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et mulieres et omnes denique qui humanam formam gerunt doceri, ut sapiant, populumque (sapientium) ex omni lingua et condicione et sexu et aetate conflari.

If human nature is capable of wisdom, then craftsmen and farmers and women and in short all who bear human form ought to have been taught to be wise, and a people ⟨of the wise⟩ ought to have been gathered from every tongue and condition and sex and age.

3.25.6CSEL 19:257

maximum itaque argumentum est philosophiam neque ad sapientiam tendere neque ipsam esse sapientiam, quod mysterium eius barba tantum celebratur et pallio.

So the strongest argument that philosophy neither tends toward wisdom nor is itself wisdom is that its mystery is celebrated only with a beard and a cloak.

3.25.7CSEL 19:257–258

senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et seruis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt, Epicurus quoque, qui rudes omnium litterarum ad philosophiam inuitat, item Plato, qui ciuitatem de sapientibus uoluit conponere.

The Stoics were so aware of this that they said slaves and women should philosophize; Epicurus too, who invites to philosophy those ignorant of all letters; likewise Plato, who wished to compose a city of wise men.

3.25.8CSEL 19:258

conati quidem sunt illi facere quod

They tried, indeed, to do what

3.25.9CSEL 19:258

ueritas exigebat, sed non potuit ultra uerba procedi, primum, quia multis artibus opus est, ut ad philosophiam possit accedi: discendae istae communes litterae propter usum legendi, quia in tanta rerum uarietate nec disci audiendo possunt omnia nec memoria contineri.

truth demanded, but they could not go beyond words: first, because many arts are needed before one can approach philosophy. These common letters must be learned for the sake of reading, because in so great a variety of subjects not everything can be learned by hearing or held in memory.

3.25.10CSEL 19:258

grammaticis quoque non parum operae dandum est, ut rectam loquendi rationem scias; id multos annos auferat necesse est.

No little effort must also be given to the grammarians, so that you may know the right way of speaking; that must take many years.

3.25.11CSEL 19:258

ne oratoria quidem ignoranda est, ut ea quae didiceris proferre atque eloqui possis. geometria quoque ac musica et astrologia necessaria est, quod hae artes cum philosophia habent aliquam societatem.

Not even rhetoric may be neglected, so that you can set forth and express what you have learned. Geometry, music and astronomy are also necessary, because these arts have some connection with philosophy.

3.25.12CSEL 19:258

quae uniuersa perdiscere neque feminae possunt, quibus intra puberes annos officia mox usibus domesticis profutura discenda sunt, neque serui, quibus per eos annos uel maxime seruiendum est quibus possunt discere, neque pauperes aut opifices aut rustici, quibus in diem uictus labore quaerendus est. ob eam causam Tullius ait abhorrere a multitudine philosophiam.

Women cannot master all these, since before the years of puberty they must learn the duties soon to serve domestic needs; nor slaves, who during the very years in which they could learn must above all serve; nor the poor, craftsmen, or farmers, who must seek their daily food by labour. For this reason Tullius says that philosophy shrinks from the multitude.

3.25.13CSEL 19:258

at enim rudes Epicurus accipiet. quomodo ergo illa quae de principiis rerum dicuntur intellegent, quae perplexa et inuoluta uix etiam politi homines adsecuntur?

'But Epicurus will take the uneducated.' How then will they understand what is said about the first principles of things, which are intricate and involved and which even polished men scarcely grasp?

3.25.14CSEL 19:258–259

in rebus igitur obscuritate inplicatis et ingeniorum uarietate confusis et eloquentium uirorum exquisito sermone fucatis quis inperito ac rudi locus est?

In matters entangled in obscurity, confused by the variety of talents, and dressed up in the refined speech of eloquent men, what place is there for the unskilled and uneducated?

3.25.15CSEL 19:259

denique nullas umquam mulieres philosophari docuerunt praeter unam ex omni memoria Themisten neque seruos praeter unum Phaedonem, quem male seruientem redemisse ac docuisse traduntur.

In short, they never taught any women to philosophize except one in all memory, Themista, nor any slaves except one, Phaedo, whom they are said to have ransomed from a bad servitude and taught.

3.25.16CSEL 19:259

enumerant etiam Platonem ac Diogenem, qui tamen non serui fuerunt, sed his seruitus euenerat: sunt enim capti. Platonem quidem redemisse Anniceris quidam traditur sestertiis octo. itaque insectatus est conuiciis hunc ipsum redemptorem Seneca, quod Platonem paruo aestimauerit,

They also list Plato and Diogenes, who nevertheless were not slaves, but slavery had befallen them, for they were captured. A certain Anniceris is said to have ransomed Plato for eight sesterces. So Seneca attacked this very ransomer with abuse because he valued Plato cheaply:

3.25.17CSEL 19:259

furiosus, ut mihi uidetur, qui homini fuerit iratus, quod non multam pecuniam perdidit: scilicet aurum appendere debuit tamquam pro mortuo Hectore aut tantum ingerere nummorum, quantum uenditor non poposcit.

raving, it seems to me, to be angry with a man because he did not lose much money. No doubt he should have weighed out gold as for the dead Hector, or heaped on more coins than the seller had asked.

3.25.18CSEL 19:259

ex barbaris uero nullum praeter unum Anacharsin Scytham, qui philosophiam ne somniasset quidem, nisi et linguam et litteras ante didicisset.

And of the barbarians, none except Anacharsis the Scythian, who would never even have dreamed of philosophy had he not first learned both the language and letters.

Divine 3, chapter 26

3.26.1CSEL 19:259

Quod ergo illi poscente natura faciendum esse senserunt, sed tamen neque ipsi facere potuerunt neque a philosophis fieri posse uiderunt, sola haec efficit doctrina caelestis, quia sola sapientia est.

What, then, they felt ought to be done at nature's demand, yet neither could do themselves nor saw could be done by philosophers, this heavenly teaching alone accomplishes, because it alone is wisdom.

3.26.2CSEL 19:259–260

illi scilicet persuadere cuiquam potuerunt, qui nihil persuadent etiam sibi, aut cuiusquam cupiditates oppriment, iram temperabunt, libidinem cohercebunt, cum ipsi et cedant uitiis et fateantur plus ualere naturam?

Could they, forsooth, persuade anyone, who persuade even themselves of nothing? Or will they suppress anyone's desires, temper anger, restrain lust, when they themselves both yield to vices and confess that nature is stronger?

3.26.3CSEL 19:260

dei autem praecepta quia et simplicia et uera sunt, quantum ualeant in animis hominum, cottidiana experimenta demonstrant.

But how much the precepts of God, because they are both simple and true, prevail in the minds of men, daily experience shows.

3.26.4CSEL 19:260

da mihi uirum qui sit iracundus maledicus effrenatus, paucissimis dei uerbis tam placidum quam ouem reddam.

Give me a man who is irascible, abusive, unbridled: with very few words of God I will make him as gentle as a sheep.

3.26.5CSEL 19:260

da cupidum auarum tenacem, iam tibi eum liberalem dabo et pecuniam suam plenis manibus largientem.

Give me one who is greedy, avaricious, tight-fisted: I will presently give him back to you generous and bestowing his money with full hands.

3.26.6CSEL 19:260

da timidum doloris ac mortis, iam cruces et ignes et Perilli taurum contemnet.

Give me one afraid of pain and death: presently he will despise crosses and fires and the bull of Perillus.

3.26.7CSEL 19:260

da libidinosum adulterum ganeonem, iam sobrium castum continentem uidebis.

Give me one lustful, an adulterer, a glutton: presently you will see him sober, chaste, self-controlled.

3.26.8CSEL 19:260

da crudelem et sanguinis adpetentem, iam in meram clementiam furor ille mutabitur.

Give me one who is cruel and thirsty for blood: presently that fury will be changed into pure clemency.

3.26.9CSEL 19:260

da iniustum insipientem peccatorem, continuo et aequus et prudens et innocens erit: uno enim lauacro malitia omnis abolebitur.

Give me one who is unjust, foolish, a sinner: at once he will be fair and prudent and innocent; for by one washing all his wickedness will be abolished.

3.26.10CSEL 19:260

tanta diuinae sapientiae uis est, ut in hominis pectus infusa matrem delictorum stultitiam uno semel inpetu expellat: ad quod efficiendum non mercede, non libris, non lucubrationibus opus est.

So great is the power of divine wisdom that, poured into a man's breast, it drives out folly, the mother of sins, with one single onset; and to accomplish this there is no need of fees, of books, of night study.

3.26.11CSEL 19:260–261

gratis ista fiunt, facile, cito, pateant modo aures et pectus sapientiam sitiat. nemo uereatur: nos aquam non uendimus nec solem mercede praestamus. dei fons uberrimus atque plenissimus patet cunctis et hoc caeleste lumen uniuersis oritur quicumque oculos habent.

These things are done freely, easily, quickly, if only the ears are open and the heart thirsts for wisdom. Let no one fear: we do not sell water, nor provide the sun for a fee. God's fountain, most abundant and full, lies open to all, and this heavenly light rises for all who have eyes.

3.26.12CSEL 19:261

num quis haec philosophorum aut umquam praestitit aut praestare si uelit potest? qui cum aetates suas in studio philosophiae conterant, neque alium quemquam neque se ipsos, si natura paululum obstitit, possunt facere meliores. itaque sapientia illorum, ut plurimum efficiat, non excindit uitia, sed abscondit.

Has any of the philosophers ever provided these things, or could he if he wished? Though they wear out their lives in the study of philosophy, they cannot make anyone else, or even themselves, better, if nature puts up a little resistance. So their wisdom, at the most it achieves, does not cut out vices but hides them.

3.26.13CSEL 19:261

pauca uero dei praecepta sic totum hominem inmutant et exposito uetere nouum reddunt, ut non cognoscas eundem esse.

But a few precepts of God so change the whole man, and, having put off the old, make him new, that you would not recognize him as the same.

Divine 3, chapter 27

3.27.1CSEL 19:261

Quid ergo? nihilne illi simile praecipiunt? immo permulta, et ad uerum frequenter accedunt, sed nihil ponderis habent illa praecepta, quia sunt humana et auctoritate maiore id est diuina carent.

What then? Do they teach nothing similar? On the contrary, very many things, and they frequently approach the truth; but those precepts have no weight, because they are human and lack greater authority, that is, divine.

3.27.2CSEL 19:261

nemo igitur credit, quia tam se hominem putat esse qui audit, quam est ille qui praecipit.

So no one believes, because the hearer thinks himself as much a man as he who gives the precept.

3.27.3CSEL 19:261

praeterea nihil aput eos certi est, nihil quod a scientia ueniat, sed cum omnia coniecturis agantur, multa etiam diuersa et uaria proferantur, stultissimi est hominis praeceptis eorum uelle parere, quae utrum uera sint an falsa dubitatur: et ideo nemo paret, quia nemo uult ad incertum laborare.

Besides, there is nothing certain among them, nothing that comes from knowledge; but since everything is done by conjecture, and many different and varied things are put forward, it is the part of a very foolish man to want to obey their precepts, when it is doubtful whether they are true or false; and so no one obeys, because no one wishes to toil for what is uncertain.

3.27.4CSEL 19:261–262

uirtutem esse Stoici aiunt, quae sola efficiat uitam beatam. nihil potest uerius. sed quid si cruciabitur aut dolore adficietur? poteritne quisquam inter carnifices beatus esse? immo uero inlatus corpori dolor materia uirtutis est, itaque ne in tormentis quidem miser est.

The Stoics say that it is virtue alone which makes life happy. Nothing can be truer. But what if a man is tortured or afflicted with pain? Will anyone be able to be happy among executioners? 'Rather,' they say, 'pain inflicted on the body is the material of virtue, so he is not wretched even under torture.'

3.27.5CSEL 19:262

Epicurus multo fortius sapiens inquit semper beatus est et uel inclusus in Phalaridis tauro hanc uocem emittet: suaue est et nihil curo. quis eum non inriserit, maxime quod homo uoluptarius personam sibi uiri fortis inposuit et quidem supra modum? non enim fieri potest ut quisquam cruciatus corporis pro uoluptatibus ducat, cum satis sit ad officium uirtutis inplendum perferre ac sustinere.

Epicurus says much more boldly: 'The wise man is always happy, and even shut in the bull of Phalaris he will utter this cry: "It is pleasant, and I care nothing."' Who would not laugh at him, especially because a man of pleasure put on the mask of a brave man, and beyond all measure? For it cannot be that anyone should count bodily tortures as pleasures, when it is enough for fulfilling the duty of virtue to bear and endure them.

3.27.6CSEL 19:262

quid dicitis Stoici? quid tu Epicure? beatus est sapiens, etiam cum torquetur. si propter gloriam patientiae, non fruetur: in tormentis enim fortasse morietur; si propter memoriam, aut non sentiet, si occidunt animae, aut si sentiet, nihil ex ea consequetur.

What do you say, Stoics? What do you say, Epicurus? 'The wise man is happy even when he is tortured.' If because of the glory of endurance, he will not enjoy it, for perhaps he will die under the torture; if because of remembrance, either he will not perceive it, if souls perish, or if he does perceive it, he will gain nothing from it.

3.27.7CSEL 19:262

quis ergo alius in uirtute fructus est? quae beatitudo uitae? aequo aiunt animo moriatur. bonum mihi adfertis unius horae aut fortasse momenti, propter quod non expediat in tota uita miseriis et laboribus confici.

What other fruit, then, is there in virtue? What happiness of life? 'Let him die with an even mind,' they say. You offer me the good of one hour, or perhaps a moment, for the sake of which it is not worth being worn out by miseries and toils through a whole life.

3.27.8CSEL 19:262

quantum autem temporis mors occupat? quae cum uenit, utrum aequo an iniquo animo subieris, iam nihil refert. ita fit ut nihil aliut ex uirtute captetur nisi gloria.

And how much time does death take up? When it comes, it makes no difference whether you have undergone it with an even mind or not. So it comes about that nothing else is gained from virtue but glory.

3.27.9CSEL 19:262

sed haec aut superuacua et breuis est aut prauis hominum iudiciis non sequetur. nullus igitur ex uirtute fructus est, ubi uirtus mortalis est et caduca.

But this is either superfluous and brief, or through the perverse judgments of men will not follow. So there is no fruit from virtue, where virtue is mortal and perishable.

3.27.10CSEL 19:262–263

ita qui haec locuti sunt, umbram quandam uirtutis uidebant, ipsam uirtutem non uidebant. defixi enim fuerunt in terram nec uultus suos in altum erigebant, ut eam possent intueri, quae sese a caeli regionibus ostentabat.

So those who said these things saw a kind of shadow of virtue, but did not see virtue itself. For they were fixed on the earth and did not raise their faces on high so as to be able to behold it, as it showed itself from the regions of heaven.

3.27.11CSEL 19:263

haec causa est cur praeceptis eorum nullus obtemperet, quoniam aut ad uitia erudiunt, si uoluptatem defendunt, aut si uirtutem adserunt, neque peccato poenam minantur nisi solius turpitudinis neque uirtuti ullum praemium pollicentur nisi solius honestatis et laudis, cum dicant non propter aliut, sed propter se ipsam expetendam esse uirtutem.

This is the reason why no one obeys their precepts: because either they train men to vices, if they defend pleasure, or, if they champion virtue, they neither threaten sin with any punishment but its disgrace alone, nor promise virtue any reward but honour and praise alone, since they say virtue is to be sought not for anything else but for itself.

3.27.12CSEL 19:263

beatus est igitur sapiens in tormentis: sed cum torquetur pro fide, pro iustitia, pro deo, illa patientia doloris beatissimum faciet.

The wise man, then, is happy under torture; but when he is tortured for faith, for justice, for God, that endurance of pain will make him most happy.

3.27.13CSEL 19:263

est enim deus qui solus potest honorare uirtutem, cuius merces inmortalitas sola est. quam qui non adpetunt nec religionem tenent, cui aeterna subiacet uita, profecto neque uirtutis uim sciunt, cuius praemium ignorant, neque in caelum spectant, quod ipsi facere se putant, cum res non uestigabiles quaerunt, quia ratio in caelum spectandi nulla est alia nisi aut religionem suscipere aut animam suam inmortalem esse credere.

For it is God who alone can honour virtue, whose reward is immortality alone. Those who do not seek this, nor hold the religion to which eternal life belongs, surely neither know the power of virtue, whose reward they do not know, nor look to heaven, as they think they do when they search out things that cannot be traced; because there is no other reason for looking to heaven but either to take up religion or to believe that one's soul is immortal.

3.27.14CSEL 19:263

quisquis enim aut deum colendum esse intellegit aut inmortalitatis spem propositam sibi habet, mens eius in caelo est et licet id non aspiciat oculis, animi tamen lumine aspicit.

For whoever either understands that God is to be worshipped or has the hope of immortality set before him, his mind is in heaven; and though he does not behold it with his eyes, yet he beholds it with the light of the soul.

3.27.15CSEL 19:263

qui autem religionem non suscipiunt, terreni sunt, quia religio de caelo est, et qui animam putant cum corpore interire, aeque in terram spectant, quia ultra corpus, quod est terra, nihil amplius uident quod sit inmortale.

But those who do not take up religion are earthly, because religion is from heaven; and those who think the soul perishes with the body likewise look to the earth, because beyond the body, which is earth, they see nothing further that is immortal.

3.27.16CSEL 19:263–264

nihil igitur prodest ita fictum esse hominem, ut recto corpore spectet in caelum, nisi erecta mente deum cernat et cogitatio eius in spe uitae perpetuae tota uersetur.

It profits nothing, then, that man is so formed as to look to heaven with upright body, unless with upright mind he beholds God and his whole thought is occupied with the hope of everlasting life.

Divine 3, chapter 28

3.28.1CSEL 19:264

Quapropter nihil est aliut in uita quo ratio, quo condicio nostra nitatur, nisi dei qui nos genuit agnitio et religiosus ac pius cultus: unde quoniam philosophi aberrauerunt, sapientes utique non fuerunt.

Therefore there is nothing else in life on which our reason and condition rest but the knowledge of God who begot us and his religious and pious worship; and since the philosophers strayed from this, they were certainly not wise.

3.28.2CSEL 19:264

quaesiuerunt illi quidem sapientiam, sed quia non rite quaerebant, prolapsi sunt longius et in nobis errores inciderunt, ut etiam communem sapientiam non tenerent.

They did indeed seek wisdom, but because they did not seek it rightly, they slipped further and fell into such errors that they did not hold even common wisdom.

3.28.3CSEL 19:264

non enim tantum religionem adserere noluerunt, uerum etiam sustulerunt, dum specie falsae uirtutis inducti conantur animos omni metu liberare. quae religionis euersio naturae nomen inuenit.

For they not only refused to champion religion, but even did away with it, while, led on by the appearance of a false virtue, they try to free minds from all fear. This overthrow of religion found the name of nature.

3.28.4CSEL 19:264

illi enim cum aut ignorarent a quo esset mundus effectus aut persuadere uellent nihil esse diuina mente perfectum, naturam esse dixerunt rerum omnium matrem, quasi dicerent omnia sua sponte esse nata: quo uerbo plane inprudentiam suam confitentur. natura enim, remota prouidentia et potestate diuina, prorsus nihil est.

For since they either did not know by whom the world was made, or wished to persuade people that nothing was accomplished by a divine mind, they said that nature is the mother of all things, as if to say that all things were born of their own accord; and by that word they plainly confess their ignorance. For nature, apart from divine providence and power, is absolutely nothing.

3.28.5CSEL 19:264

quodsi deum naturam uocant, quae peruersitas est naturam potius quam deum nominare? si autem natura est ratio uel necessitas uel condicio nascendi, non est per se ipsa sensibilis, sed necesse est mentem esse diuinam, quae sua prouidentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat, aut si natura est caelum atque terra et omne quod natum est, non est deus natura, sed dei opus.

But if they call God nature, what perversity is it to name nature rather than God? If nature is the principle or necessity or condition of being born, it is not sentient in itself; but there must be a divine mind which by its providence provides all things with the beginning of birth. Or if nature is heaven and earth and all that has been born, then nature is not God, but God's work.

3.28.6CSEL 19:264–265

non dissimili errore credunt esse fortunam quasi deam quandam res humanas uariis casibus inludentem, quia nesciunt unde sibi bona et mala eueniant.

With no different error they believe in Fortune as a kind of goddess mocking human affairs with various chances, because they do not know from where good and evil come to them.

3.28.7CSEL 19:265

cum hac se compositos ad proeliandum putant nec ullam tamen rationem reddunt a quo et quam ob causam, sed tantum cum fortuna se digladiari momentis omnibus gloriantur.

They think themselves matched against her for battle, yet give no account of by whom and for what reason, but only boast that they are fighting it out with Fortune at every moment.

3.28.8CSEL 19:265

iam quicumque consolati sunt alios ob interitum amissionemque carorum, fortunae nomen acerrimis accusationibus prosciderunt nec omnino ulla eorum disputatio de uirtute est, in qua non fortuna uexetur.

Indeed, all who have consoled others for the death and loss of loved ones have torn the name of Fortune with the bitterest accusations, and there is no discussion of theirs about virtue in which Fortune is not harassed.

3.28.9CSEL 19:265

Marcus Tullius in sua Consolatione pugnasse se semper contra fortunam loquitur eamque a se esse superatam, cum fortiter inimicorum impetus rettudisset; ne tum quidem se ab ea fractum, cum domo pulsus patria caruerit: tum autem, cum amiserit carissimam filiam, uictum se a fortuna turpiter confitetur. cedo inquit et manum tollo. quid hoc homine miserius, qui sic iaceat?

Marcus Tullius in his Consolation says that he always fought against Fortune and overcame her, when he bravely repelled the attacks of his enemies; that not even then was he broken by her, when, driven from his home, he lost his country; but then, when he lost his dearest daughter, he confesses that he was shamefully beaten by Fortune. 'I yield,' he says, 'and raise my hand.' What is more wretched than this man, lying so prostrate?

3.28.10CSEL 19:265

insipienter inquit, sed qui se profitetur esse sapientem. quid ergo sibi uult adsumptio nominis? quid contemptus ille rerum, qui magnificis uerbis praetenditur? quid dispar ceteris habitus? aut cur omnino praecepta sapientiae datis, si nemo adhuc qui sapiat inuentus est? et quisquam nobis inuidiam facit, quia philosophos negamus esse sapientes, cum ipsi nec scire se quicquam nec sapere fateantur?

'He acts foolishly,' someone says. But he is one who professes to be wise. What then is the meaning of assuming the name? What of that contempt for things, paraded in grand words? What of the dress different from others? Or why do you give precepts of wisdom at all, if no one who is wise has yet been found? And does anyone reproach us because we deny that philosophers are wise, when they themselves confess that they neither know nor are wise in anything?

3.28.11CSEL 19:265–266

nam si quando ita defecerint, ut ne adtingere quidem quicquam possint, quod faciunt in rebus ceteris, tum uero admonentur ignorantiae et quasi furibundi exiliunt et exclamant caecos esse se et excordes.

For whenever they have so failed that they cannot touch anything, as they do in other matters, then they are reminded of their ignorance and, as if in a frenzy, leap up and cry out that they are blind and senseless.

3.28.12CSEL 19:266

Anaxagoras pronuntiat circumfusa esse tenebris omnia; Empedocles angustas esse sensuum semitas queritur, tamquam illi ad cogitandum reda et quadrigis opus esset;

Anaxagoras declares that all things are surrounded with darkness; Empedocles complains that the paths of the senses are narrow, as if they needed a carriage and a four-horse team for thinking;

3.28.13CSEL 19:266

Democritus quasi in puteo quodam sic alto, ut fundus nullus sit, ueritatem iacere demersam: nimirum stulte, ut cetera.

Democritus says that truth lies sunk as in a well so deep that it has no bottom: foolishly, no doubt, like the rest.

3.28.14CSEL 19:266

non enim tamquam in puteo demersa ueritas est, quo uel descendere uel etiam cadere illi licebat, sed tamquam in summo montis excelsi uertice uel potius in caelo, quod est uerissimum.

For truth is not sunk as in a well, where he might have gone down or even fallen, but as on the very top of a lofty mountain, or rather in heaven, which is most true.

3.28.15CSEL 19:266

quid est enim cur eam potius in imum depressam diceret quam in summum leuatam? nisi forte mentem quoque in pedibus aut in imis calcibus constituere malebat potius quam in pectore aut in capite.

For why should he say it was sunk to the bottom rather than raised to the top? Unless perhaps he preferred to place the mind too in the feet or the lowest heels rather than in the breast or the head.

3.28.16CSEL 19:266

adeo remotissimi fuerunt ab ipsa ueritate, ut eos ne status quidem sui corporis admoneret ueritatem illis in summo esse quaerendam.

So far were they from truth itself that not even the posture of their own body reminded them that truth must be sought above.

3.28.17CSEL 19:266

ex hac desperatione confessio illa Socratis nata est, qua se nihil scire dixit nisi hoc unum, quod nihil sciat, hinc Academiae disciplina manauit, si tamen disciplina dici potest in qua ignoratio et discitur et docetur.

From this despair was born that confession of Socrates, in which he said he knew nothing except this one thing, that he knew nothing; from here flowed the discipline of the Academy, if indeed that can be called a discipline in which ignorance is both learned and taught.

3.28.18CSEL 19:266

sed ne illi quidem qui scientiam sibi adsumpserunt, id ipsum, quod scire se putabant, constanter defendere potuerunt.

But not even those who claimed knowledge for themselves could consistently defend the very thing they thought they knew.

3.28.19CSEL 19:266–267

qui, quoniam ratio illis non quadrabat per ignorantiam rerum diuinarum, tam uarii, tam incerti fuerunt sibique saepe contraria disserentes, ut quid sentirent, quid uellent, statuere ac diiudicare non posses.

Since their reasoning did not square, through ignorance of divine things, they were so varied, so uncertain, and so often argued things contrary to themselves, that you could not settle or decide what they thought or what they meant.

3.28.20CSEL 19:267

quid igitur pugnes aduersus eos homines qui suo sibi gladio pereunt? quid labores ut eos destruas, quos sua ipsos destruit atque adfligit oratio? Aristoteles inquit Cicero ueteres philosophos accusans ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse, qui existimauissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam: sed se uidere, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, breui tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore.

Why, then, fight against men who perish by their own sword? Why labour to destroy those whom their own speech destroys and casts down? 'Aristotle,' says Cicero, 'accusing the old philosophers, says that they were either very foolish or very vainglorious, who thought that philosophy had been perfected by their talents; but that he saw, since great progress had been made in a few years, that in a short time philosophy would be entirely completed.'

3.28.21CSEL 19:267

quod igitur fuit illut tempus? quando est aut a quibus absoluta? nam quod ait stultissimos fuisse, qui putassent ingeniis suis perfectam esse sapientiam, uerum est: sed ne ipse quidem satis prudenter, qui aut a ueteribus coeptam aut a nouis auctam [aut] mox a posterioribus perfectuiri putauit.

What, then, was that time? When was it completed, or by whom? For his saying that they were very foolish who thought wisdom was perfected by their talents is true; but not even he was wise enough, who thought it was begun by the ancients, or increased by the moderns, and would soon be perfected by those who came after.

3.28.22CSEL 19:267

numquam enim potest inuestigari quod non per uiam suam quaeritur.

For what is not sought by its own road can never be found.

Divine 3, chapter 29

3.29.1CSEL 19:267

Sed repetamus id quod omisimus. fortuna ergo per se nihil est: nec sic habendum est, tamquam sit in aliquo sensu, siquidem fortuna est accidentium rerum subitus atque inopinatus euentus.

But let us take up again what we left aside. Fortune, then, is nothing in itself; nor is it to be held as though it had any sense, since fortune is the sudden and unexpected outcome of things that happen.

3.29.2CSEL 19:267

uerum philosophi, ne aliquando non errent, in re stulta uolunt esse sapientes: qui fortunae sexum mutant eamque non deam sicut uulgus, sed deum esse dicunt.

But the philosophers, lest they should ever fail to err, wish to be wise in a foolish matter: they change Fortune's sex and say that it is not a goddess, as the crowd does, but a god.

3.29.3CSEL 19:267–268

eundem tamen interdum naturam, interdum fortunam uocant, quod multa inquit idem Cicero efficiat inopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. cum igitur causas ignorent propter quas fiat aliquid, et ipsum qui faciat ignorent necesse est.

Yet they call the same one sometimes nature, sometimes fortune, 'because,' says the same Cicero, 'it brings about many things unexpected by us, through the obscurity of causes and our ignorance of them.' Since, then, they do not know the causes for which something happens, they must also be ignorant of him who makes it happen.

3.29.4CSEL 19:268

idem in opere ualde serio, in quo praecepta uitae deprompta ex philosophia filio dabat, magnam inquit esse fortunae uim in utramque partem quis nescit? nam et cum prospero flatu eius utimur, ad exitus peruenimus optatos, et cum reflauit, adfligimur.

The same man, in a very serious work in which he gave his son precepts of life drawn from philosophy, says: 'Who does not know that the power of fortune is great in both directions? For when we enjoy her favourable breeze, we reach the outcomes we wished; and when she has blown against us, we are cast down.'

3.29.5CSEL 19:268

primum, qui negat sciri posse quicquam, sic hoc dixit, tamquam et ipse et omnes sciant. deinde, qui etiam quae clara sunt, dubia conatur efficere, hoc putauit esse clarum quod illi esse debuit uel maxime dubium: nam sapienti omnino falsum est.

First, he who denies that anything can be known said this as though both he and everyone knew it. Next, he who tries to make even what is clear doubtful thought this was clear, which ought to have been most doubtful to him; for to the wise man it is altogether false.

3.29.6CSEL 19:268

quis inquit nescit? ego uero nescio. doceat me, si potest, quae sit illa uis, qui flatus iste et qui reflatus. turpe igitur, hominem ingeniosum id dicere, quod si neges probare non possit.

'Who does not know?' he says. I for one do not know. Let him teach me, if he can, what that power is, what that breeze and what that contrary blast. It is shameful, then, for a man of talent to say what, if you denied it, he could not prove.

3.29.7CSEL 19:268–269

postremo, quod is qui dicit adsensus esse retinendos, quod stulti sit hominis rebus incognitis temere assentire, is plane uulgi et inperitorum opinionibus credidit, qui fortunam putant esse quae tribuat hominibus bona et mala. nam simulacrum eius cum copia et gubernaculo fingunt, tamquam haec et opes tribuat et humanarum rerum regimen optineat.

Lastly, he who says that assent must be withheld, because it is the part of a foolish man to assent rashly to things unknown, plainly believed the opinions of the crowd and the ignorant, who think that it is Fortune that assigns good and evil to men. For they fashion her image with a horn of plenty and a rudder, as though she both assigned wealth and held the government of human affairs.

3.29.8CSEL 19:269

cui opinioni et Vergilius adsentit, qui fortunam omnipotentem uocat, et historicus, qui ait: sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur. quid ergo ceteris diis loci superest?

Virgil too assents to this opinion, who calls Fortune 'all-powerful', and the historian, who says: 'But surely fortune rules in every matter.' What room, then, is left for the other gods?

3.29.9CSEL 19:269

cur non aut ipsa regnare dicitur, si plus potest, aut sola colitur, si omnia? uel si tantum mala immittit, aliquid causae proferant cur, si dea sit, inuideat hominibus eosque perditos cupiat, cum ab iis religiose colatur, cur aequior sit malis, iniquior autem bonis, cur insidietur adfligat decipiat exterminet,

Why is she not either said to reign, if she can do more, or worshipped alone, if she can do everything? Or if she only sends evils, let them give some reason why, if she is a goddess, she envies men and wishes them ruined, though she is worshipped by them religiously; why she is fairer to the bad and more unfair to the good; why she lies in wait, afflicts, deceives, destroys;

3.29.10CSEL 19:269

quis illam generi hominum uexatricem perpetuam constituerit, cur denique tam malam sortita sit potestatem, ut res cunctas ex libidine magis quam ex uero celebret obscuretque.

who appointed her the perpetual tormentor of the human race; why, in short, she has been allotted so evil a power as to make all things famous or obscure according to her whim rather than according to truth.

3.29.11CSEL 19:269

haec, inquam, philosophos inquirere oportuit potius quam temere innocentem accusare fortunam: quae etiamsi sit aliqua, nihil tamen adferri ab iis potest, cur hominibus tam inimica sit quam putatur.

These things, I say, the philosophers ought to have inquired into, rather than rashly accuse innocent Fortune; for even if she is something, they can give no reason why she should be as hostile to men as she is thought to be.

3.29.12CSEL 19:269

itaque illae omnes orationes quibus iniquitatem fortunae lacerant suasque uirtutes contra fortunam superbissime iactant, nihil sunt aliut quam deliramenta inconsideratae leuitatis.

So all those speeches in which they tear at the injustice of Fortune and most proudly boast of their virtues against Fortune are nothing but the ravings of thoughtless levity.

3.29.13CSEL 19:269–270

quare non inuideant nobis, quibus aperuit ueritatem deus: qui sicut scimus nihil esse fortunam, ita scimus esse prauum ac subdolum spiritum, qui sit inimicus bonis hostisque iustitiae, qui contraria faciat quam deus, cuius inuidiae causam in secundo libro explicauimus.

So let them not envy us, to whom God has opened the truth: we who, as we know that Fortune is nothing, so know that there is a depraved and cunning spirit, who is an enemy of the good and a foe of justice, who does the opposite of what God does; the cause of whose envy we explained in the second book.

3.29.14CSEL 19:270

hic ergo insidiatur uniuersis: sed eos qui deum nesciunt errore inpedit, stultitia obruit, tenebris circumfundit, ne quis possit ad diuini nominis peruenire notitiam, in quo uno et sapientia continetur et uita perpetua;

He, then, lies in wait for all; but those who do not know God he entangles in error, overwhelms with folly, surrounds with darkness, so that no one may attain the knowledge of the divine name, in which alone both wisdom and everlasting life are contained;

3.29.15CSEL 19:270

eos autem qui deum sciunt dolis et astu adgreditur, ut cupiditate aut libidine inretiat, ut peccatis blandientibus deprauatos inpellat ad mortem, uel si dolo nihil profecerit, ui et uiolentia deicere conatur.

while those who know God he attacks with tricks and cunning, to ensnare them with greed or lust, to drive them to death depraved by flattering sins; or, if he achieves nothing by guile, he tries to throw them down by force and violence.

3.29.16CSEL 19:270

idcirco enim in primordiis transgressionis non statim ad poenam detrusus a deo est, ut hominem malitia sua exerceat ad uirtutem: quae nisi agitetur, nisi uexatione adsidua roboretur, non potest esse perfecta, siquidem uirtus est perferendorum malorum fortis atque inuicta patientia. ex quo fit ut uirtus nulla sit, si aduersarius desit.

For this is why, at the beginning of his transgression, he was not at once thrust down to punishment by God: so that by his malice he might exercise man for virtue. For virtue, unless it is stirred up, unless it is strengthened by constant harassment, cannot be perfect, since virtue is a brave and unconquered endurance of evils that must be borne. From this it follows that there is no virtue if an adversary is lacking.

3.29.17CSEL 19:270–271

huius itaque peruersae potestatis cum uim sentirent uirtuti repugnantem, nomen ignorarent, fortunae sibi uocabulum inane finxerunt: quod quam longe a sapientia sit remotum, declarat Iuuenalis his uersibus: nullum numen habes, si sit prudentia: nos te, nos facimus, fortuna, deam caeloque locamus.

So, feeling the force of this perverse power opposing virtue but not knowing its name, they invented for themselves the empty word Fortune. How far that is from wisdom Juvenal declares in these lines: 'You have no divinity, if there is prudence; it is we, we who make you a goddess, Fortune, and place you in heaven.'

3.29.18CSEL 19:271

stultitia igitur et error et caecitas et, ut Cicero ait, ignoratio rerum atque causarum naturae ac fortunae nomina induxit.

Folly, then, and error and blindness and, as Cicero says, ignorance of things and causes brought in the names of nature and fortune.

3.29.19CSEL 19:271

sed ut aduersarium suum nesciunt, sic ne uirtutem quidem sciunt, cuius scientia ab aduersarii notione descendit. quae si coniuncta est cum sapientia uel, ut ipsi dicunt, eadem ipsa sapientia est, ignorent necesse est in quibus rebus sita sit.

But as they do not know their adversary, so they do not know virtue either, the knowledge of which comes from knowing the adversary. If virtue is joined with wisdom, or, as they themselves say, is wisdom itself, they must be ignorant of what it consists in.

3.29.20CSEL 19:271

nemo enim potest ueris armis instrui, si hostem contra quem fuerit armandus ignorat, nec aduersarium uincere qui in dimicando non hostem uerum, sed umbram petit. prosternetur enim qui alio intentus uenientem uitalibus suis ictum nec praeuiderit ante nec cauerit.

For no one can be equipped with true arms if he does not know the enemy against whom he must be armed, nor conquer an adversary who in the fight strikes not at the real enemy but at a shadow. For he who is intent on something else will be laid low, neither foreseeing nor guarding against the blow that comes at his vitals.

Divine 3, chapter 30

3.30.1CSEL 19:271

Docui, quantum mea mediocritas tulit, longe deuium philosophos iter a ueritate tenuisse, sentio tamen quam multa praeterierim, quia non erat mihi propria contra philosophos disputatio.

I have shown, as far as my modest ability allowed, that the philosophers kept to a road far astray from the truth; yet I am aware how much I have passed over, since the dispute against the philosophers was not my proper subject.

3.30.2CSEL 19:271

sed huc necessario deuertendum fuit, ut ostenderem tot ac tanta ingenia in rebus falsis esse consumpta, ne quis forte a prauis religionibus exclusus ad eos se conferre uellet tamquam certi aliquid reperturus.

But I had to turn aside here, to show that so many and such great talents were spent on false things, lest anyone, shut out from depraved religions, should wish to betake himself to them, as if he would find something certain.

3.30.3CSEL 19:271–272

una igitur spes homini, una salus in hac doctrina quam defendimus posita est, omnis sapientia hominis in hoc uno est, ut deum cognoscat et colat: hoc nostrum dogma, haec sententia est.

The one hope for man, then, the one salvation, lies in this teaching which we defend; all the wisdom of man consists in this alone, that he know and worship God: this is our doctrine, this our conviction.

3.30.4CSEL 19:272

quanta itaque uoce possum, testificor proclamo denuntio: hic, hic est illut, quod philosophi omnes in tota sua uita quaesierunt nec umquam tamen inuestigare conprehendere tenere ualuerunt, quia religionem aut prauam retinuerunt aut totam penitus sustulerunt.

With as loud a voice as I can, I bear witness, I proclaim, I declare: here, here is that which all the philosophers sought through their whole life and yet never could track down, grasp, or hold, because they either kept a depraved religion or took it away altogether.

3.30.5CSEL 19:272

facessant igitur illi omnes, qui humanam uitam non instruunt, sed turbant. quid enim docent aut quem instruunt qui se ipsos nondum instruxerunt? quem sanare aegroti, quem regere caeci possunt? huc ergo nos omnes, quibus est cura sapientiae, conferamus.

Let all those be gone, then, who do not equip human life but disturb it. For what do they teach, or whom do they equip, who have not yet equipped themselves? Whom can the sick heal, whom can the blind guide? Let all of us, then, who care for wisdom, betake ourselves here.

3.30.6CSEL 19:272

an expectabimus, donec Socrates aliquid sciat aut Anaxagoras in tenebris lumen inueniat aut Democritus ueritatem de puteo extrahat aut Empedocles dilatet animi sui semitas aut Arcesilas et Carneades uideant sentiant percipiant?

Or shall we wait until Socrates knows something, or Anaxagoras finds light in the darkness, or Democritus draws truth out of the well, or Empedocles widens the paths of his mind, or Arcesilas and Carneades see, perceive, and grasp?

3.30.7CSEL 19:272

uox ecce de caelo ueritatem docens et nobis sole ipso clarius lumen ostendens. quid nobis iniqui sumus et sapientiam suscipere cunctamur, quam docti homines contritis in quaerendo aetatibus suis numquam reperire potuerunt?

Behold, a voice from heaven teaching the truth and showing us a light clearer than the sun itself. Why are we unfair to ourselves and hesitate to take up wisdom, which learned men, having worn out their lives in seeking, could never find?

3.30.8CSEL 19:272

qui uult sapiens ac beatus esse, audiat dei uocem, discat iustitiam, sacramentum natiuitatis suae norit, humana contemnat, diuina suscipiat, ut summum illut bonum ad quod natus est possit adipisci.

Whoever wishes to be wise and happy, let him hear the voice of God, learn justice, know the mystery of his birth, despise human things, take up divine things, so that he may attain that highest good for which he was born.

3.30.9CSEL 19:272–273

Dissolutis religionibus uniuersis et omnibus quaecumque in earum defensionem dici uel solebant uel poterant refutatis, deinde conuictis philosophiae disciplinis, ad ueram nobis religionem sapientiamque ueniendum est, quoniam est ut docebo utrumque coniunctum, ut eam uel argumentis uel exemplis uel idoneis testibus adseramus et stultitiam, quam nobis isti deorum cultores obiectare non desinunt, ut nullam penes nos, sic totam penes ipsos esse doceamus.

Now that all the religions have been dissolved, and everything that used to be said or could be said in their defence refuted, and then the schools of philosophy convicted, we must come to the true religion and wisdom, since, as I shall show, the two are joined, so that we may champion it by arguments, examples, and suitable witnesses, and show that the folly which these worshippers of the gods never cease to throw at us is none of it with us and all of it with them.

3.30.10CSEL 19:273

et quamquam prioribus libris, cum falsas arguerem religiones, et hoc, cum falsam sapientiam tollerem, ubi ueritas sit ostenderim, planius tamen quae religio et quae sapientia uera sit liber proximus indicabit.

And although in the earlier books, when I refuted false religions, and in this one, when I removed false wisdom, I have shown where the truth is, yet the next book will show more plainly what religion and what wisdom is true.

Divine 4, chapter 1

4.1.1CSEL 19:274

Cogitanti mihi et cum animo meo saepe reputanti priorem illum generis humani statum et mirum pariter et indignum uideri solet, quod unius saeculi stultitia religiones uarias suscipientis deosque multos esse credentis in tantam subito ignorationem sui uentum est, ut ablata ex oculis ueritate neque religio dei ueri neque humanitatis ratio teneretur, hominibus non in caelo summum bonum quaerentibus, sed in terra.

As I think and often turn over in my mind that earlier state of the human race, it usually seems to me both wonderful and shameful that through the folly of one age, which took up various religions and believed there were many gods, men came suddenly to such ignorance of themselves that, truth having been taken from their eyes, neither the religion of the true God nor the principle of humanity was held, since men sought the highest good not in heaven but on earth.

4.1.2CSEL 19:274

quam ob causam profecto saeculorum ueterum mutata felicitas est. coeperunt enim relicto parente et constitutore omnium deo insensibilia digitorum suorum figmenta uenerari. quae prauitas quid effecerit aut quid malorum adtulerit, res ipsa declarat.

For this reason, surely, the happiness of the ancient ages was changed. For, having abandoned God, the parent and founder of all things, they began to venerate senseless figures made by their own fingers. What this depravity brought about, or what evils it caused, the facts themselves declare.

4.1.3CSEL 19:274–275

auersi namque a summo bono, quod ideo beatum ac sempiternum est, quia uideri tangi conprehendi non potest, et a uirtutibus ei bono congruentibus, quae sunt aeque inmortales, ad hos corruptos et fragiles deos lapsi et studentes iis rebus quibus solum corpus ornatur alitur delectatur, mortem sibi perpetuam cum diis et cum bonis corporalibus quaesierunt, quia morti corpus omne subiectum est.

For, turned away from the highest good, which is happy and everlasting precisely because it cannot be seen, touched, or grasped, and from the virtues that accord with that good, which are equally immortal, they slipped to these corrupt and frail gods; and, devoting themselves to the things by which the body alone is adorned, nourished, and delighted, they sought for themselves everlasting death together with their gods and bodily goods, because every body is subject to death.

4.1.4CSEL 19:275

insecuta est igitur huiusmodi religiones iniustitia et inpietas, sicuti fuerat necesse. desierunt etenim uultus suos in caelum tollere, sed deorsum mentes hominum depressae terrenis ut religionibus, sic etiam bonis inhaerebant.

Injustice and impiety, then, followed such religions, as was bound to happen. For men ceased to lift their faces to heaven, but their minds, pressed downward, clung to earthly goods as to earthly religions.

4.1.5CSEL 19:275

secutum est discidium generis humani et fraus et nefas omne, quia spretis aeternis atque incorruptis bonis, quae sola debent ab homine concupisci, temporalia et breuia maluerunt maiorque hominibus ad malum fides fuit, qui prauum recto, quia praesentius fuerat, praetulerunt.

There followed the division of the human race, and fraud and every crime, because, despising eternal and incorruptible goods, which alone ought to be desired by man, they preferred temporal and brief ones; and men had greater confidence in evil, preferring the depraved to the right because it was nearer at hand.

4.1.6CSEL 19:275

sic humanam uitam prioribus saeculis in clarissima luce uersatam caligo ac tenebrae conprehenderunt: et quod huic prauitati congruens erat, postquam sublata sapientia est, tunc demum sibi homines sapientium nomen uindicare coeperunt.

So mist and darkness seized human life, which in earlier ages had been passed in the clearest light; and, as fitted this depravity, only after wisdom had been taken away did men begin to claim for themselves the name of wise men.

4.1.7CSEL 19:275

tum autem nemo sapiens uocabatur, cum omnes erant: utinamque nomen illut aliquando publicum quamuis ad paucos redactum tamen uim suam retineret.

But then no one was called wise, when all were; and would that that name, once common, though now reduced to a few, still kept its force!

4.1.8CSEL 19:275

possent enim fortasse pauci illi uel ingenio uel auctoritate uel adsiduis hortamentis liberare populum uitiis et erroribus. sed adeo in totum sapientia occiderat, ut ex ipsa nominis adrogantia nullum eorum qui uocarentur appareat fuisse sapientem.

For perhaps those few could, by talent or authority or constant exhortation, free the people from vices and errors. But wisdom had so completely perished that from the very arrogance of the name it is clear that none of those so called was wise.

4.1.9CSEL 19:275–276

et tamen prius quam haec philosophia quae dicitur esset inuenta, septem fuisse traduntur, qui primi omnium quia de rebus naturalibus quaerere ac disputare sunt ausi, sapientes haberi appellarique meruerunt.

And yet, before this so-called philosophy was invented, there are said to have been seven men who, because they were the first of all to dare to inquire and dispute about natural things, deserved to be held and called wise.

4.1.10CSEL 19:276

o miserum calamitosumque saeculum, quo per orbem totum septem soli fuerunt qui hominum uocabulo cierentur! nemo enim potest iure dici homo nisi qui sapiens est.

O wretched and calamitous age, in which throughout the whole world there were only seven who could be called by the name of men! For no one can rightly be called a man except one who is wise.

4.1.11CSEL 19:276

sed si ceteri omnes praeter ipsos stulti fuerunt, ne illi quidem sapientes, quia nemo sapiens esse uere iudicio stultorum potest.

But if all the rest except them were fools, not even they were wise, because no one can truly be wise by the judgment of fools.

4.1.12CSEL 19:276

adeo ab iis afuit sapientia, ut ne postea quidem increscente doctrina et multis magnisque ingeniis in id ipsum semper intentis potuerit perfici ac ueritas conprehendi. nam post illorum septem sapientium gloriam incredibile est, quanto studio inquirendae ueritatis Graecia omnis exarserit.

So far was wisdom from them that not even afterwards, when learning increased and many great talents were always intent on this very thing, could it be perfected and the truth grasped. For after the fame of those seven wise men, it is incredible with what zeal for seeking the truth all Greece blazed up.

4.1.13CSEL 19:276

ac primum nomen ipsum sapientiae adrogans putauerunt seque non sapientes, sed studiosos sapientiae uocauerunt. quo facto et illos qui temere sapientium sibi nomen asciuerant, erroris stultitiaeque damnarunt et se quoque ipsos igno-

And first they thought the very name of wisdom arrogant, and called themselves not wise men but students of wisdom. By doing this they both condemned of error and folly those who had rashly taken for themselves the name of wise men, and condemned themselves of ignorance too,

4.1.14CSEL 19:276–277

rantiae, quam quidem non diffitebantur. nam ubicumque rerum natura ingeniis eorum quasi manus opposuerat, ne rationem possent aliquam reddere, testificari solebant nihil scire se, nihil cernere. unde multo sapientiores inueniuntur qui se (insipientes esse) aliqua ex parte uiderunt quam illi qui se sapere crediderant.

which indeed they did not deny. For wherever the nature of things had, as it were, set its hand against their talents so that they could give no account, they used to testify that they knew nothing and perceived nothing. So those who saw that they were ⟨unwise⟩ in some respect are found to be much wiser than those who had believed they were wise.

Divine 4, chapter 2

4.2.1CSEL 19:277

Quare si neque illi fuere sapientes qui sunt appellati neque posteriores qui non dubitauerunt insipientiam confiteri, quid superest nisi ut alibi sit quaerenda sapientia, quia non est ubi quaerebatur inuenta?

Therefore, if neither those who were called wise were wise, nor those later men who did not hesitate to confess their lack of wisdom, what remains but that wisdom must be sought elsewhere, since it has not been found where it was sought?

4.2.2CSEL 19:277

quid autem putemus fuisse causae cur tot ingeniis totque temporibus summo studio ac labore quaesita non reperiretur, nisi quod eam philosophi extra fines suos quaesierunt?

And what shall we think was the reason why, though sought by so many talents over so long a time with the utmost zeal and toil, it was not found, except that the philosophers sought it outside its own bounds?

4.2.3CSEL 19:277

qui quoniam peragratis et exploratis omnibus nusquam ullam sapientiam conprehenderunt et alicubi esse illam necesse est, apparet ibi potissimum esse quaerendam ubi stultitiae titulus apparet: cuius uelamento deus, ne arcanum sui diuini operis in propatulo esset, thensaurum sapientiae ac ueritatis abscondit.

Since, having travelled over and explored everything, they grasped no wisdom anywhere, and it must be somewhere, it is clear that it must be sought above all where the label of folly appears: under that veil God has hidden the treasure of wisdom and truth, so that the secret of his divine work might not lie open to all.

4.2.4CSEL 19:277

unde equidem soleo mirari, quod cum Pythagoras et postea Plato amore indagandae ueritatis incensi ad Aegyptios et Magos et Persas usque penetrassent, ut earum gentium ritus et sacra cognoscerent — suspicabantur enim sapientiam in religione uersari —, ad Iudaeos tantum non accesserint, penes quos tunc solos erat et quo facilius ire potuissent.

So I often wonder that, although Pythagoras and afterwards Plato, fired with love of tracking down the truth, penetrated as far as the Egyptians and the Magi and the Persians to learn the rites and sacred things of those nations (for they suspected that wisdom lay in religion), they did not approach the Jews alone, with whom alone wisdom then was, and to whom they could more easily have gone.

4.2.5CSEL 19:277–278

sed auersos esse arbitror diuina prouidentia, ne scire possent ueritatem, quia nondum fas erat alienigenis hominibus religionem dei ueri iustitiamque notescere. statuerat enim deus adpropinquante ultimo tempore ducem magnum caelitus mittere, qui eam perfido ingratoque populo ablatam exteris nationibus reuelaret. qua de re in hoc libro adgrediar disputare, si prius ostendero sapientiam cum religione sic cohaerere, ut diuelli utrumque non possit.

But I think they were turned away by divine providence so that they could not know the truth, because it was not yet permitted that the religion and justice of the true God should become known to foreigners. For God had determined, as the last time drew near, to send from heaven a great leader, who would reveal it to the foreign nations, taken away from a faithless and ungrateful people. This I shall undertake to discuss in this book, once I have first shown that wisdom so coheres with religion that the two cannot be torn apart.

Divine 4, chapter 3

4.3.1CSEL 19:278

Deorum cultus, ut in primo libro docui, non habet sapientiam, non modo quia diuinum animal, hominem, terrenis fragilibusque substernit, sed quia nihil ibi disseritur quod proficiat ad mores excolendos uitamque formandam; nec habet inquisitionem aliquam ueritatis, sed tantummodo ritum colendi, qui non officio mentis, sed ministerio corporis constat.

The worship of the gods, as I showed in the first book, has no wisdom, not only because it subjects man, a divine living being, to earthly and frail things, but because nothing is taught there that helps to cultivate character and shape life; nor does it have any inquiry into truth, but only a rite of worship, which consists not in the service of the mind but in the ministry of the body.

4.3.2CSEL 19:278

et ideo non est illa uera religio iudicanda, quia nullis iustitiae uirtutisque praeceptis erudit efficitque meliores. ita philosophia quia religionem id est summam pietatem non habet, non est uera sapientia.

So it must not be judged true religion, because it instructs with no precepts of justice and virtue and makes no one better. So too philosophy, because it has no religion, that is, the highest piety, is not true wisdom.

4.3.3CSEL 19:278

nam si diuinitas, quae gubernat hunc mundum, incredibili beneficentia genus hominum sustentat et quasi paterna indulgentia fouet, uult profecto gratiam sibi referri et honorem dari, nec constare homini ratio pietatis potest, si caelestibus beneficiis extiterit ingratus, quod non est utique sapientis.

For if the divinity that governs this world sustains the human race with incredible kindness and cherishes it with, as it were, a father's indulgence, it surely wishes thanks to be returned to it and honour to be given; nor can man keep the principle of piety if he proves ungrateful for heavenly benefits, which is certainly not the mark of a wise man.

4.3.4CSEL 19:278

quoniam igitur ut dixi philosophia et religio deorum diiuncta sunt longeque discreta, siquidem alii sunt professores sapientiae, per quos utique ad deos non aditur, alii religionis antistites, per quos sapere non discitur, apparet nec illam esse ueram sapientiam nec hanc religionem.

Since, then, as I said, philosophy and the religion of the gods are disjoined and far apart, since some are professors of wisdom, through whom there is surely no approach to the gods, and others are priests of religion, through whom wisdom is not learned, it is clear that neither is the former true wisdom nor the latter religion.

4.3.5CSEL 19:278

idcirco nec philosophia potuit ueritatem conprehendere nec religio deorum rationem sui, qua caret, reddere.

For this reason neither could philosophy grasp the truth, nor the religion of the gods give an account of itself, which it lacks.

4.3.6CSEL 19:278–279

ubi autem sapientia cum religione inseparabili nexu cohaeret, utrumque esse uerum necesse est, quia et in colendo sapere debemus, id est scire quid nobis et quomodo sit colendum, et in sapiendo colere id est re et actu quod scierimus inplere.

But where wisdom coheres with religion by an inseparable bond, both must be true; because in worshipping we ought to be wise, that is, to know what we should worship and how, and in being wise to worship, that is, to fulfil in fact and action what we have known.

4.3.7CSEL 19:279

ubi ergo sapientia cum religione coniungitur? ibi scilicet ubi deus colitur unus, ubi uita et actus omnis ad unum caput et ad unam summam refertur, denique idem sunt doctores sapientiae qui et dei sacerdotes.

Where, then, is wisdom joined with religion? There, surely, where one God is worshipped, where life and every action is referred to one head and one sum; in short, where the teachers of wisdom are the same as the priests of God.

4.3.8CSEL 19:279

nec tamen moueat quemquam quia et saepe factum est et fieri potest, ut philosophus aliquis deorum suscipiat sacerdotium: quod cum fit, non tamen coniungitur philosophia cum religione, sed et philosophia inter sacra cessabit, et religio, quando philosophia tractabitur.

Nor should it disturb anyone that it has often happened, and can happen, that some philosopher takes up a priesthood of the gods; when that happens, philosophy is still not joined with religion, but philosophy will be idle amid the rites, and religion when philosophy is being discussed.

4.3.9CSEL 19:279

illa enim religio muta est, non tantum quia mutorum est, sed quia ritus eius in manu et in digitis est, non in corde aut in lingua, sicut nostra, quae uera est.

For that religion is dumb, not only because it belongs to dumb things, but because its rite is in the hand and the fingers, not in the heart or the tongue, as is ours, which is true.

4.3.10CSEL 19:279

idcirco et in sapientia religio et in religione sapientia est. ergo non potest segregari, quia sapere nihil aliut est nisi deum uerum iustis ac piis cultibus honorare.

Therefore religion is in wisdom and wisdom in religion. So they cannot be separated, because to be wise is nothing other than to honour the true God with just and pious worship.

4.3.11CSEL 19:279–280

multorum autem deorum cultum non esse secundum naturam etiam hoc argumento colligi et conprehendi potest: omnem deum qui ab homine colitur necesse est inter sollemnes ritus et precationes patrem nuncupari, non tantum honoris gratia, uerum etiam rationis, quod et antiquior est homine et quod uitam salutem uictum praestat ut pater.

That the worship of many gods is not according to nature can also be inferred and grasped from this argument: every god who is worshipped by man must, in solemn rites and prayers, be addressed as father, not only for the sake of honour but also of reason, because he is both older than man and provides life, safety, and food like a father.

4.3.12CSEL 19:280

itaque et Iuppiter a precantibus pater uocatur et Saturnus et Ianus et Liber et ceteri deinceps: quod Lucilius in deorum concilio inridet: ut nemo sit nostrum, quin aut pater optimus diuum aut Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars, Ianus, Quirinus pater siet ac dicatur ad unum.

So Jupiter is called father by those who pray, and Saturn and Janus and Liber and the rest in turn; which Lucilius mocks in the council of the gods: 'so that there is none of us who is not best father of the gods, or father Neptune, Liber, father Saturn, Mars, Janus, father Quirinus, and is not called so, every one.'

4.3.13CSEL 19:280

quodsi natura non patitur ut sint unius hominis multi patres — ex uno enim procreatur —, ergo etiam deos multos colere contra naturam est contraque pietatem.

But if nature does not allow one man to have many fathers (for he is begotten from one), then to worship many gods too is against nature and against piety.

4.3.14CSEL 19:280

unus igitur colendus est, qui potest uere pater nominari: idem etiam dominus sit necesse est, quia sicut potest indulgere, ita etiam cohercere.

One, then, must be worshipped, who can truly be called father; and he must also be lord, because as he can indulge, so he can also restrain.

4.3.15CSEL 19:280

pater ideo appellandus est, quia nobis multa et magna largitur, dominus ideo, quia castigandi ac puniendi habet maximam potestatem. dominum uero eundem esse qui sit pater etiam iuris ciuilis ratio demonstrat. quis enim poterit filios educare, nisi habeat in eos domini potestatem?

He is to be called father because he bestows many great things on us; lord because he has the greatest power to chastise and punish. That the same one who is father is also lord is shown even by the principle of civil law. For who could bring up sons unless he had over them the power of a master?

4.3.16CSEL 19:280–281

nec inmerito pater familias dicitur, licet tantum filios habeat: uidelicet nomen patris conplectitur etiam seruos, quia familias sequitur, et nomen familiae conplectitur etiam filios, quia pater antecedit. unde apparet eundem ipsum et patrem esse seruorum et dominum filiorum.

And not without reason is he called father of the household, even if he has only sons: evidently the name of father embraces the slaves too, because 'household' follows it, and the name of household embraces the sons too, because 'father' precedes it. From which it appears that the same man is both father of the slaves and master of the sons.

4.3.17CSEL 19:281

denique et filius manu emittitur tamquam seruus et seruus liberatus patroni nomen accipit tamquam filius. quodsi propterea pater familias nominatur, ut appareat eum duplici potestate praeditum, quia et indulgere debet, quia pater est, et cohercere, quia dominus, ergo idem seruus est qui et filius, idem dominus qui et pater.

Finally, a son is emancipated like a slave, and a freed slave receives the name of patron like a son. If, then, he is called father of the household to show that he is endowed with a double power, because he ought both to indulge, since he is father, and to restrain, since he is master, then the same person is slave who is son, and the same master who is father.

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sicut igitur naturae necessitate non potest esse nisi unus pater, ita nec dominus nisi unus. quid enim faciet seruus, si multi domini diuersa imperauerint?

As, then, by the necessity of nature there cannot be more than one father, so neither can there be more than one master. For what will a slave do if many masters give different orders?

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ergo contra rationem contraque naturam sunt religiones multorum deorum, siquidem nec patres multi possunt esse nec domini, deos autem et patres et dominos nuncupari necesse est.

So the religions of many gods are against reason and against nature, since there cannot be many fathers or masters, and gods must be called both fathers and masters.

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teneri ergo ueritas non potest ubi homo idem multis patribus dominisque subiectus est, ubi animus in multa dispersus huc atque illuc diuagatur,

So truth cannot be held where the same man is subject to many fathers and masters, where the mind, scattered among many, wanders this way and that;

4.3.21CSEL 19:281

nec habere ullam firmitatem religio potest, quando certo et stabili domicilio caret.

nor can religion have any firmness when it lacks a fixed and stable dwelling.

4.3.22CSEL 19:281

cultus igitur deorum ueri esse non possunt, eodem modo quo matrimonium dici non potest ubi mulier una multos uiros habet, sed haec aut meretrix aut adultera nominabitur: a qua enim pudor castitas fides abest, uirtute careat necesse est.

The worship of the gods, then, cannot be true, in the same way that it cannot be called a marriage where one woman has many husbands, but she will be called either a prostitute or an adulteress; for she from whom modesty, chastity, and faithfulness are absent must lack virtue.

4.3.23CSEL 19:281–282

sic et religio deorum inpudica est et incesta, quia fide caret, quia honos ille instabilis et incertus caput atque originem non habet.

So the religion of the gods is unchaste and impure, because it lacks faithfulness, because that unstable and uncertain honour has no head and origin.

Divine 4, chapter 4

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Quibus rebus apparet quam inter se coniuncta sint sapientia et religio. sapientia spectat ad filios, quae exigit amorem, religio ad seruos, quae exigit timorem. nam sicut illi patrem diligere debent et honorare, sic hi dominum colere ac uereri.

From these things it appears how closely wisdom and religion are joined. Wisdom looks to sons, and requires love; religion to slaves, and requires fear. For as the former must love and honour their father, so the latter must worship and revere their master.

4.4.2CSEL 19:282

deus autem, qui unus est, quoniam utramque personam sustinet et patris et domini, et amare eum debemus, quia filii sumus, et timere, quia serui. non potest igitur nec religio a sapientia separari nec sapientia a religione secerni, quia idem deus est qui et intellegi debet, quod est sapientiae, et honorari, quod est religionis.

But God, who is one, since he bears both roles, of father and of master, we must both love, because we are sons, and fear, because we are servants. So neither can religion be separated from wisdom nor wisdom be parted from religion, because it is the same God who must both be understood, which belongs to wisdom, and honoured, which belongs to religion.

4.4.3CSEL 19:282

sed sapientia praecedit, religio sequitur, quia prius est deum scire, consequens colere. ita in duobus nominibus una uis est, quamuis diuersa esse uideantur: alterum enim positum est in sensu, alterum in actu; sed tamen similia sunt duobus riuis ex uno fonte manantibus.

But wisdom goes first, religion follows, because knowing God comes first, worshipping follows. So in the two names there is one force, although they seem different: the one lies in understanding, the other in action; but still they are like two streams flowing from one spring.

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fons autem sapientiae et religionis deus est, a quo hi duo riui si aberrauerint, arescant necesse est: quem qui nesciunt, nec sapientes esse possunt nec religiosi.

And the spring of wisdom and religion is God; if these two streams stray from him, they must dry up. Those who do not know him can be neither wise nor religious.

4.4.5CSEL 19:282–283

sic fit ut et philosophi et qui deos colunt similes sint aut filiis abdicatis aut seruis fugitiuis, quia neque illi patrem quaerunt neque hi dominum. et sicut abdicati hereditatem patris non adsecuntur et fugitiui inpunitatem, ita neque philosophi inmortalitatem accipient, quae est regni caelestis hereditas, id est summum bonum, quod illi maxime quaerunt, neque cultores deorum poenam sempiternae mortis effugient, quae est animaduersio ueri domini aduersus fugitiuos suae maiestatis ac nominis.

So it comes about that both the philosophers and those who worship the gods are like disowned sons or runaway slaves, because the former do not seek their father nor the latter their master. And as the disowned do not obtain their father's inheritance, nor runaways impunity, so neither will the philosophers receive immortality, which is the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom, that is, the highest good which they most seek; nor will the worshippers of the gods escape the punishment of everlasting death, which is the true master's sentence against the runaways from his majesty and name.

4.4.6CSEL 19:283

deum uero esse patrem eundemque dominum utrique ignorauerunt, tam cultores deorum quam ipsi sapientiae professores, quia aut nihil omnino colendum putauerunt aut religiones falsas adprobauerunt aut, etiamsi uim potestatemque summi dei intellexerunt, ut Plato, qui ait unum esse fabricatorem mundi deum, et Marcus Tullius, qui fatetur hominem praeclara quadam condicione a supremo deo esse generatum, tamen ei debitum cultum tamquam summo patri non reddiderunt, quod erat consequens ac necessarium.

But both groups, the worshippers of the gods as much as the professors of wisdom, did not know that God is father and also lord; because they either thought nothing at all should be worshipped, or approved false religions, or, even if they understood the power and might of the supreme God, as Plato, who says that there is one God, the maker of the world, and Marcus Tullius, who confesses that man was begotten by the supreme God in a certain excellent condition, yet they did not render him the worship due to him as the supreme Father, which was the logical and necessary consequence.

4.4.7CSEL 19:283

deos autem neque patres neque dominos esse posse non tantum multitudo, ut supra ostendi, sed etiam ratio declarat, quia neque fictum esse a diis hominem traditur neque deos ipsos antecedere originem hominis inuenitur,

That the gods can be neither fathers nor masters is declared not only by their number, as I showed above, but also by reason, because it is not recorded that man was fashioned by the gods, nor are the gods themselves found to precede the origin of man;

4.4.8CSEL 19:283

siquidem fuisse in terra homines ante quam Vulcanus et Liber et Apollo et ipse Iuppiter nascerentur apparet; sed neque Saturno fictio hominis neque Caelo patri eius adsignari solet.

since it is plain that there were men on earth before Vulcan and Liber and Apollo and Jupiter himself were born; but the fashioning of man is not usually assigned either to Saturn or to his father Caelus.

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quodsi nullus eorum qui coluntur formasse a principio atque instituisse hominem traditur, nullus igitur ex his pater hominis nuncupari potest, ita ne deus quidem. ergo fas non est uenerari eos a quibus non sit homo generatus, quia neque.... a multis generari potest.

If none of those who are worshipped is said to have formed and established man from the beginning, then none of them can be called the father of man, and so not even a god. It is not right, then, to venerate those by whom man was not begotten, because neither … can be begotten by many.

4.4.10CSEL 19:283–284

unus igitur ac solus coli debet qui Iouem, qui Saturnum, qui caelum ipsum terramque antecessit. is enim necesse est hominem figurauerit, qui ante hominem caelum terramque perfecit.

One and only one, then, must be worshipped, who preceded Jupiter, Saturn, and heaven itself and earth. For he must have shaped man who, before man, completed heaven and earth.

4.4.11CSEL 19:284

solus pater uocandus est qui creauit, solus dominus nuncupandus qui regit, qui habet uitae ac necis ueram et perpetuam potestatem: quem qui non adorat, et insipiens seruus est, qui dominum suum aut fugiat aut nesciat, et inpius filius, qui suum uerum patrem uel oderit uel ignoret.

He alone is to be called father who created, he alone to be named lord who rules, who has the true and everlasting power of life and death. Whoever does not adore him is both a foolish slave, who flees or does not know his master, and an impious son, who hates or does not know his true father.

Divine 4, chapter 5

4.5.1CSEL 19:284

Nunc, quoniam docui sapientiam et religionem non posse diduci, superest ut de ipsa religione ac sapientia disseramus.

Now, since I have shown that wisdom and religion cannot be separated, it remains for us to discuss religion and wisdom themselves.

4.5.2CSEL 19:284

sentio quidem quam sit difficilis de rebus caelestibus disputatio, sed tamen audendum est, ut inlustrata ueritas pateat multique ab errore atque interitu liberentur, qui eam sub uelamine stultitiae latentem aspernantur ac respuunt.

I am aware how difficult a discussion of heavenly things is; yet one must dare, so that truth, brought to light, may be open, and many may be freed from error and destruction who despise and reject it because it lies hidden under a veil of folly.

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sed priusquam incipiam de deo et operibus eius dicere, pauca mihi de prophetis ante dicenda sunt, quorum testimoniis nunc uti necesse est: quod in prioribus libris ne facerem temperaui.

But before I begin to speak of God and his works, I must first say a few things about the prophets, whose testimonies it is now necessary to use; this I refrained from doing in the earlier books.

4.5.4CSEL 19:284

ante omnia qui ueritatem studet conprehendere, non modo intellegendis prophetarum uocibus animum debet intendere, sed etiam tempora per quae quisque illorum fuerit diligentissime requirere, ut sciat et quae futura praedixerint et post quot annos praedicta conpleta sint.

Above all, whoever strives to grasp the truth must not only apply his mind to understanding the words of the prophets, but also inquire most carefully into the times in which each of them lived, so that he may know both what they foretold and after how many years their predictions were fulfilled.

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nec difficultas in his colligendis inest ulla. testati sunt enim sub quo quisque rege diuini spiritus

Nor is there any difficulty in gathering these. For they have testified under which king each of them

4.5.6CSEL 19:284–285

fuerit passus instinctum, multique scriptores libros de temporibus ediderunt initium facientes a propheta Moyse, qui Troianum bellum nongentis fere annis antecessit. is autem cum per annos quadraginta populum rexisset, successorem habuit Iesum, qui septem ac uiginti annis tenuit principatum.

experienced the impulse of the divine Spirit; and many writers have published books on chronology, beginning from the prophet Moses, who preceded the Trojan War by about nine hundred years. When he had ruled the people for forty years, he had as successor Jesus, who held the leadership for twenty-seven years.

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exinde sub iudicibus fuerunt per annos trecentos septuaginta. tum mutato statu reges habere coeperunt. quibus imperium tenentibus per annos quadringentos quinquaginta usque ad Sedeciae regnum obpugnati a rege Babylonio captique Iudaei diuturnum seruitium pertulerunt, donec septuagesimo post anno Cyrus maior terris ac sedibus suis redderet, qui per idem tempus in Persas suscepit imperium quo Romae Tarquinius Superbus.

After that they were under judges for three hundred and seventy years. Then, their condition changed, they began to have kings; and after these had held power for four hundred and fifty years, up to the reign of Zedekiah, the Jews, attacked and captured by the king of Babylon, endured a long servitude, until in the seventieth year afterwards Cyrus restored them to their lands and homes, Cyrus who took power over the Persians at the same time as Tarquinius Superbus at Rome.

4.5.8CSEL 19:285

quare cum omnis temporum series et ex Iudaicis et ex Graecis Romanisque historiis colligatur, etiam singulorum prophetarum tempora colligi possunt; quorum sane ultimus Zacharias fuit, quem constat sub Dario rege, secundo anno regni eius octauo mense cecinisse. adeo antiquiores etiam Graecis scriptoribus prophetae reperiuntur.

So, since the whole series of times is gathered from Jewish, Greek, and Roman histories, the times of the individual prophets can also be gathered; of whom the last was Zechariah, who is known to have prophesied under King Darius, in the second year of his reign, in the eighth month. So the prophets are found to be older even than the Greek writers.

4.5.9CSEL 19:285–286

quae omnia eo profero, ut errorem suum sentiant qui scripturam sacram coarguere nituntur tamquam nouam et recens fictam, ignorantes ex quo fonte religionis sanctae origo manauerit.

All this I bring forward so that those may perceive their error who strive to refute sacred Scripture as new and recently invented, not knowing from what spring the origin of holy religion flowed.

4.5.10CSEL 19:286

quodsi quis collectis perspectisque temporibus fundamentum doctrinae salubriter iecerit, et ueritatem penitus conprehendet et errorem cognita ueritate deponet.

But if anyone, having gathered and examined the times, lays the foundation of doctrine soundly, he will both grasp the truth thoroughly and, once the truth is known, lay aside error.

Divine 4, chapter 6

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Deus igitur machinator constitutorque rerum, sicut in secundo libro diximus, antequam praeclarum hoc opus mundi adoriretur, sanctum et incorruptibilem spiritum genuit, quem filium nuncuparet.

God, then, the contriver and founder of things, as we said in the second book, before he undertook this splendid work of the world, begot a holy and incorruptible Spirit, whom he might call Son.

4.6.2CSEL 19:286

et quamuis alios postea innumerabiles creauisset, quos angelos dicimus, hunc tamen solum primogenitum diuini nominis appellatione dignatus est, patria scilicet uirtute ac maiestate pollentem.

And though he afterwards created countless others, whom we call angels, yet this one alone, the first-begotten, he deemed worthy of the appellation of the divine name, strong, namely, with his Father's power and majesty.

4.6.3CSEL 19:286

esse autem summi dei filium, qui sit potestate maxima praeditus, non tantum congruentes in unum uoces prophetarum, sed etiam Trismegisti praedicatio et Sibyllarum uaticinia demonstrant.

That there is a Son of the supreme God, endowed with the greatest power, is shown not only by the voices of the prophets agreeing as one, but also by the preaching of Trismegistus and the oracles of the Sibyls.

4.6.4CSEL 19:286–288

Hermes in eo libro qui λόγος τέλειος inscribitur, his usus est uerbis: ὁ κύριος καὶ τῶν πάντων ποιητὴς, ὃν Θεὸν καλεῖν νενομίκαμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε θεὸν ὁρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν — αἰσθητὸν δέ φημι οὐ διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτὸν, περὶ γὰρ τούτου, πότερον αὐτὸς αἰσθάνεται ἣ μή, εἰσαῦθις ῥηθήσεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι εἰς αἴσθησιν ὑποπέμπει καὶ εἰς ὅρασιν — ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦτον ἐποίησε πρῶτον καὶ μόνον καὶ ἕνα, καλὸς δέ αὐτῷ ἐφάνη, καὶ πληρέστατος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίλησεν ὤς ἴδιον τόκον.

Hermes, in the book entitled The Perfect Discourse, used these words: 'The Lord and maker of all things, whom we have been accustomed to call God, since he made the second god, visible and perceptible (I call him perceptible not because he perceives, for whether he himself perceives or not will be discussed another time, but because he falls under perception and sight), since, then, he made this one first and only and one, and he appeared to him beautiful and most full of all good things, he admired him and loved him greatly as his own offspring.'

4.6.5CSEL 19:288–290

Sibylla Erythraea in carminis sui principio, quod a summo deo exorsa est, filium dei ducem et imperatorem omnium his uersibus praedicat: παντοτρόφον κτίστην, ὅστις γλυκὺ πνεῦμα ἅπασιν κάτθετο, χἠγητῆρα Θεὸν πάντων ἐποίησεν. et rursus in fine: ἄλλον ἔδωκε Θεὸς πιστοῖς ἀνδράσσι γεραίρειν. et alia Sibylla praecipit hunc oportere cognosci: αὐτὸν σου γίνωσκε Θεὸν Θεοῦ υἱὸν ἐόντα.

The Erythraean Sibyl, at the beginning of her poem, which she began from the supreme God, proclaims the Son of God as leader and commander of all in these verses: 'The all-nourishing creator, who placed sweet breath in all and made God the leader of all.' And again at the end: 'God gave another to faithful men to honour.' And another Sibyl directs that he must be known: 'Know him as your God, being the Son of God.'

4.6.6CSEL 19:290–291

uidelicet et ipse est dei filius, qui per Solomonem sapientissimum regem diuino spiritu plenum locutus est ea quae subiecimus: dominus condidit me initium uiarum suarum in opera sua, ante saeculum fundauit me: in principio antequam terram faceret et antequam abyssos constitueret, priusquam procederent fontes aquarum, ante omnes colles genuit me. dominus fecit regiones et fines inhabitabiles sub caelo.

He, evidently, is the Son of God who spoke through Solomon, the wisest king, full of the divine Spirit, the words which we have added: 'The Lord established me as the beginning of his ways for his works; before the age he founded me; in the beginning, before he made the earth and before he set the depths, before the springs of waters came forth, before all the hills he begot me. The Lord made the regions and the uninhabitable bounds under heaven.

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cum pararet caelum, aderam illi, et cum secerneret suam sedem: cum super uentos faceret ualidas nubes et cum confirmatos ponebat fontes sub caelo, quando fortia faciebat fundamenta terrae, eram penes illum disponens.

When he prepared the heaven, I was with him, and when he set apart his seat; when he made strong clouds above the winds, and when he set the fountains firm under heaven, when he made strong the foundations of the earth, I was with him arranging.

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ego eram cui adgaudebat. cottidie autem iucundabar ante faciem eius, cum laetaretur orbe perfecto.

I was the one in whom he rejoiced. Daily I delighted before his face, when he rejoiced over the completed world.'

4.6.9CSEL 19:291

idcirco illum Trismegistus δημιουργὸν τοῦ θεοῦ et Sibylla σύμβουλον appellat, quod tanta sapientia et uirtute sit instructus a deo patre, ut consilio eius et manibus uteretur in fabricatione mundi.

For this reason Trismegistus calls him 'the craftsman of God' and the Sibyl 'counsellor', because he was furnished by God the Father with such wisdom and power that God used his counsel and his hands in the making of the world.

Divine 4, chapter 7

4.7.1CSEL 19:291–292

Fortasse quaerat aliquis hoc loco, quis sit iste tam potens, tam deo carus, et quod nomen habeat, cuius prima natiuitas non modo antecesserit mundum, uerum etiam prudentia disposuerit, uirtute construxerit.

Perhaps someone may ask at this point who this is, so powerful, so dear to God, and what name he has, whose first birth not only preceded the world but also arranged it by wisdom and built it by power.

4.7.2CSEL 19:292

primum scire nos conuenit nomen eius ne angelis quidem notum esse qui morantur in caelo, sed ipsi soli ac deo patri, nec ante id publicabitur, ut est sanctis litteris traditum, quam dispositio dei fuerit impleta;

First, we should know that his name is not known even to the angels who dwell in heaven, but only to himself and God the Father; nor will it be made public, as has been handed down in the holy writings, before the plan of God has been fulfilled;

4.7.3CSEL 19:292–293

deinde nec enuntiari posse hominis ore, sicut Hermes docet haec dicens: αἴτιος δὲ τούτου τοῦ αἰτίου ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἅτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βούλησις, οὗ τὸ ὄνομα οὐ δύναται ἀνθρωπίνῳ στόματι λαληθῆναι. et paulo post ad filium: ἔστι γὰρ τις, ὦ τέκνον, ἀπόῤῥητος λόγος σοφίας ὅσιος τε περὶ τοῦ μόνου κυρίου πάντων, καὶ πάντα προεννοουμένου Θεοῦ, ὃν εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπόν ἐστιν.

next, that it cannot be uttered by human mouth, as Hermes teaches, saying: 'The cause of this cause is the will of God, as of the good, whose name cannot be spoken by human mouth.' And a little after, to his son: 'For there is, my child, a secret and holy word of wisdom about the only Lord of all and God who foreknows all, whom to speak of is beyond man.'

4.7.4CSEL 19:293

sed quamuis nomen eius, quod ei a principio pater summus inposuit, nullus alius praeter ipsum sciat, habet tamen et inter angelos aliut uocabulum et inter homines aliut. Iesus quippe inter homines nominatur. nam Christus non proprium nomen est, sed nuncupatio potestatis et regni: sic enim Iudaei reges suos appellabant.

But although his name, which the supreme Father gave him from the beginning, no one knows but himself, yet he has one name among the angels and another among men. For among men he is named Jesus. For Christ is not a proper name, but a title of power and kingship; for so the Jews used to call their kings.

4.7.5CSEL 19:293–294

sed exponenda huius nominis ratio est propter ignorantium errorem, qui eum inmutata littera Chrestum solent dicere.

But the reason for this name must be explained because of the error of the ignorant, who by changing a letter commonly call him Chrestus.

4.7.6CSEL 19:294

erat Iudaeis ante praeceptum ut sacrum conficerent unguentum, quo perungui possent ii qui uocabantur ad sacerdotium uel ad regnum, et sicut nunc Romanis indumentum purpurae insigne est regiae dignitatis assumptae, sic illis unctio sacri unguenti nomen ac potestatem regium conferebat.

The Jews had formerly been commanded to prepare a sacred ointment with which those who were called to the priesthood or to kingship might be anointed; and as now among the Romans the robe of purple is the sign of royal dignity assumed, so among them anointing with the sacred ointment conferred the name and power of king.

4.7.7CSEL 19:294

uerum quoniam Graeci ueteres χρίεσθαι dicebant ungui, quod nunc ἀλείϕεσθαι, sicut indicat Homeri uersus ille: τοὺς δ ἐπεὶ οὖν δμῳαὶ λοῦσαν καὶ χρῖσαν ἐλαίῳ, ob hanc rationem nos eum Christum nuncupamus, id est unctum, qui Hebraeice Messias dicitur. unde in quibusdam Graecis scripturis, quae male de Hebraeicis interpretatae sunt, ήλειμμένος scriptum inuenitur, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλείϕεσθαι.

But since the ancient Greeks used chriesthai for 'to be anointed', which is now aleiphesthai, as that line of Homer shows, 'and when the maidservants had washed them and anointed them with oil', for this reason we call him Christ, that is, the Anointed, who in Hebrew is called Messiah. Hence in some Greek scriptures, which were badly translated from the Hebrew, eleimmenos is found written, from aleiphesthai.

4.7.8CSEL 19:294–295

sed tamen utrolibet nomine rex significatur, non quod ille regnum hoc terrenum fuerit adeptus, cuius capiendi nondum tempus aduenit, sed quod caeleste ac sempiternum; de quo disseremus in ultimo libro. nunc uero de prima eius natiuitate dicamus.

Yet by either name a king is meant, not because he obtained this earthly kingdom, the time for taking which has not yet come, but a heavenly and everlasting one, of which we shall discuss in the last book. Now let us speak of his first birth.

Divine 4, chapter 8

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In primis enim testificamur illum bis esse natum, primum in spiritu, postea in carne. unde aput Hieremiam ita dicitur: priusquam te formarem in utero, noui te. item: beatus qui erat, antequam nasceretur; quod nulli alii contigit praeter Christum.

First of all, we testify that he was born twice: first in the spirit, afterwards in the flesh. Hence it is said in Jeremiah: 'Before I formed you in the womb, I knew you.' Likewise: 'Blessed is he who was before he was born'; which happened to no one else but Christ.

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qui cum esset a principio filius dei, regeneratus est denuo secundum carnem. quae duplex natiuitas eius magnum intulit humanis pectoribus errorem circumfuditque tenebras etiam iis qui uerae religionis sacramenta retinebant.

He, since he was the Son of God from the beginning, was born again anew according to the flesh. This double birth of his brought great error into human hearts and spread darkness even over those who kept the mysteries of the true religion.

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sed nos id plane dilucideque monstrabimus, ut amatores sapientiae facilius ac diligentius instruantur. qui audit dei filium dici, non debet tantum nefas mente concipere, ut existimet ex conubio ac permixtione feminae alicuius deum procreasse, quod non facit nisi animal corporale mortique subiectum.

But we shall show it plainly and clearly, so that lovers of wisdom may be instructed more easily and carefully. He who hears the Son of God spoken of must not conceive so great an impiety in his mind as to think that God begot him through marriage and union with some woman, which only a bodily animal subject to death does.

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deus autem cum solus adhuc esset, cui permiscere se potuit? aut cum esset tantae potestatis, ut quidquid uellet efficeret, utique ad creandum societate alterius non indigebat: nisi forte existimabimus deum, sicut Orpheus putauit, et marem esse et feminam, quod aliter generare non quiuerit, nisi haberet uim sexus utriusque, quasi aut ipse secum coierit aut sine coitu non potuerit procreare.

But God, since he was still alone, with whom could he unite? Or since he was of such power that he could accomplish whatever he wished, he certainly needed no partner in order to create; unless perhaps we shall think that God, as Orpheus supposed, is both male and female, because otherwise he could not have begotten unless he had the power of both sexes, as if he had either united with himself or could not produce without union.

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sed et Hermes in eadem fuit opinione, cum dicit eum αὺτοπάτορα et αὺτομήτορα. quod si ita esset, ut a prophetis pater dicitur, sic etiam mater diceretur.

Hermes too was of the same opinion when he calls him 'self-fathered' and 'self-mothered'. But if that were so, as he is called Father by the prophets, so he would also be called Mother.

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quomodo igitur procreauit? primum nec sciri a quoquam possunt nec enarrari opera diuina, sed tamen sanctae litterae docent, in quibus cautum est illum dei filium dei esse sermonem itemque ceteros angelos dei spiritus esse. nam sermo est spiritus cum uoce aliquid significante prolatus.

How, then, did he beget? First, the divine works can neither be known nor told by anyone; but still the holy writings teach, in which it is laid down that that Son of God is the Word of God, and likewise that the other angels are spirits of God. For a word is breath uttered with a voice that signifies something.

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sed tamen quoniam spiritus et sermo diuersis partibus proferuntur, siquidem spiritus naribus, ore sermo procedit, magna inter hunc dei filium ceterosque angelos differentia est. illi enim ex deo taciti spiritus exierunt, quia non ad doctrinam dei tradendam, sed ad ministerium creabantur.

But since breath and word come forth from different parts, breath from the nostrils and word from the mouth, there is great difference between this Son of God and the other angels. For they came forth from God as silent spirits, because they were created not to hand on God's teaching but for service.

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ille uero cum sit et ipse spiritus, tamen cum uoce ac sono ex dei ore processit sicut uerbum, ea scilicet ratione, quia uoce eius ad populum fuerat usurus, id est quod ille magister futurus esset doctrinae dei et caelestis arcani ad homines perferendi. ipsum primo locutus est, ut per eum ad nos loqueretur et ille uocem dei ac uoluntatem nobis reuelaret.

But he, though he is himself also a spirit, yet came forth from God's mouth with voice and sound, as a word, for this reason: that God would use his voice to the people, that is, that he would be the teacher of God's doctrine and would bring the heavenly secret to men. God spoke him first, so that through him he might speak to us and he might reveal to us God's voice and will.

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merito igitur sermo ac uerbum dei dicitur, quia deus procedentem de ore suo uocalem spiritum, quem non utero, sed mente conceperat, inexcogitabili quadam maiestatis suae uirtute ac potentia in effigiem, quae proprio sensu et sapientia uigeat, conprehendit; et alios item spiritus suos in angelos figurauit.

Rightly, then, is he called the Speech and Word of God, because God, by an inconceivable power and might of his majesty, gave form to the vocal spirit proceeding from his mouth, which he had conceived not in a womb but in his mind, into an image that thrives with its own sense and wisdom; and he likewise shaped his other spirits into angels.

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nostri spiritus dissolubiles sunt, quia mortales sumus, dei autem spiritus et uiuunt et manent et sentiunt, quia ipse immortalis est et sensus ac uitae dator.

Our breaths are dissoluble, because we are mortal; but God's spirits both live and remain and perceive, because he himself is immortal and the giver of sense and life.

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nostrae uoces licet aurae misceantur atque uanescant, tamen plerumque permanent litteris conprehensae: quanto magis dei uocem credendum est et manere in aeternum et sensu ac uirtute comitari, quam de deo patre tamquam riuus de fonte traduxerit!

Our words, though they mix with the air and vanish, yet often remain, captured in letters: how much more must we believe that God's voice both remains forever and is accompanied by sense and power, which he has drawn from God the Father like a stream from its spring!

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quodsi quis miratur ex deo deum prolatione uocis ac spiritus potuisse generari, si sacras uoces prophetarum cognouerit, desinet profecto mirari.

But if anyone wonders that God could be begotten from God by the utterance of voice and breath, once he knows the sacred words of the prophets he will surely cease to wonder.

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Solomonem patremque eius Dauid potentissimos reges fuisse et eosdem prophetas etiam iis fortasse sit notum, qui diuinas litteras non attigerunt: quorum alter, qui posterius regnauit, Troianae urbis excidium centum et quadraginta annis antecessit.

That Solomon and his father David were most powerful kings and also prophets is perhaps known even to those who have not touched the divine writings; the second of them, who reigned later, preceded the destruction of the city of Troy by a hundred and forty years.

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huius pater diuinorum scriptor hymnorum in psalmo XXXII sic ait: uerbo dei caeli solidati sunt et spiritu eius omnis uirtus eorum. item rursus in psalmo XLIIII: eructauit cor meum uerbum bonum, dico ego opera mea regi, contestans uidelicet nulli alii opera dei esse nota nisi filio soli, qui est uerbum dei et quem regnare in perpetuum necesse est.

His father, the writer of divine hymns, says thus in Psalm 32: 'By the word of God the heavens were made firm, and by his spirit all their power.' Likewise again in Psalm 44: 'My heart has poured forth a good word; I speak my works to the king', bearing witness, that is, that the works of God are known to no other but the Son alone, who is the Word of God and who must reign forever.

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item Solomon ipsum uerbum dei esse demonstrat, cuius manibus opera ista mundi fabricata sint. ego inquit ex ore altissimi prodiui ante omnem creaturam. ego in caelis feci ut oreretur lumen indeficiens, et nebula texi omnem terram. ego in altis habitaui et thronus meus in columna nubis.

Likewise Solomon shows that he is the very Word of God, by whose hands these works of the world were fashioned. 'I,' he says, 'came forth from the mouth of the Most High before every creature. I made an unfailing light arise in the heavens, and covered the whole earth as a cloud. I dwelt on high, and my throne was in a pillar of cloud.'

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Iohannes quoque ita tradit: in principio fuit uerbum et uerbum erat aput deum et deus erat uerbum. hoc fuit in principio aput deum. omnia per illum facta sunt et sine illo factum est nihil.

John too hands it down thus: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made.'

Divine 4, chapter 9

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Sed melius Graeci λόγον dicunt quam nos uerbum siue sermonem: λόγος enim et sermonem significat et rationem, quia ille est et uox et sapientia dei.

But the Greeks say logos better than we say verbum or sermo; for logos means both speech and reason, because he is both the voice and the wisdom of God.

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hunc sermonem diuinum ne philosophi quidem ignorauerunt, siquidem Zenon rerum naturae dispositorem atque opificem uniuersitatis λόγον praedicat, quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum Iouis nuncupat, ea scilicet consuetudine, qua solent Iouem pro deo accipere.

This divine Word not even the philosophers were ignorant of, since Zeno proclaims the logos as the arranger of the nature of things and the craftsman of the universe, and calls it fate and the necessity of things and god and the mind of Jupiter, by that custom, namely, by which they commonly take Jupiter for God.

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sed nihil obstant uerba, cum sententia congruat ueritati. est enim spiritus dei quem ille animum Iouis nominauit. nam Trismegistus, qui ueritatem paene uniuersam nescio quo modo inuestigauit, uirtutem maiestatemque uerbi saepe descripsit, sicut declarat superius illut exemplum, quo fatetur esse ineffabilem quendam sanctumque sermonem, cuius enarratio modum hominis excedat.

But words are no obstacle when the thought agrees with the truth. For it is the spirit of God which he named the mind of Jupiter. For Trismegistus, who somehow tracked down almost the whole truth, often described the power and majesty of the Word, as that earlier example shows, in which he confesses that there is a certain ineffable and holy Word, whose telling exceeds the measure of man.

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Dixi de natiuitate prima breuiter ut potui. nunc de secunda, quoniam controuersia est in ea maxime, latius disserendum est, ut ueritatem scire cupientibus lumen intellegentiae praeferamus.

I have spoken of the first birth as briefly as I could. Now the second, since the controversy is chiefly about it, must be discussed more fully, so that we may hold out the light of understanding to those who desire to know the truth.

Divine 4, chapter 10

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In primis igitur scire homines oportet sic a principio processisse dispositionem summi dei, ut esset necesse adpropinquante saeculi termino dei filium descendere in terram, ut constitueret deo templum doceretque iustitiam, uerum tamen non in uirtute angeli aut potestate caelesti, sed in figura hominis et condicione mortali, et cum magisterio functus fuisset, traderetur in manus inpiorum mortemque susciperet, ut ea quoque per uirtutem domita resurgeret et homini, quem induerat, quem gerebat, et spem uincendae mortis offerret et ad praemia inmortalitatis admitteret.

First of all, then, people must know that the plan of the supreme God proceeded from the beginning in such a way that it was necessary, as the end of the age drew near, for the Son of God to descend to earth to establish a temple for God and teach justice; yet not in the power of an angel or heavenly might, but in the form of a man and in a mortal condition; and when he had fulfilled his office of teacher, to be handed over into the hands of the impious and undergo death, so that, having conquered that too by his power, he might rise again and offer to the man whom he had put on and bore both the hope of conquering death and admission to the rewards of immortality.

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hanc ergo dispositionem ne quis ignoret, docebimus praedicta esse omnia quae in Christo uidemus esse conpleta.

That no one may be ignorant of this plan, we shall show that everything we see fulfilled in Christ was foretold.

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nemo adseuerationi nostrae fidem commodet, nisi ostendero prophetas ante multam temporum seriem praedicasse, fore aliquando ut filius dei nasceretur sicut homo et mirabilia faceret et cultum dei per totam terram seminaret et postremo patibulo figeretur et tertio die resurgeret.

Let no one give credit to our assertion unless I show that the prophets foretold, a long series of ages before, that at some time the Son of God would be born as a man, would do wonders, would sow the worship of God through the whole earth, and at last would be fixed to a gibbet and would rise on the third day.

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quae omnia cum probauero eorum ipsorum litteris qui deum suum mortali corpore utentem uiolauerunt, quid aliut obstabit quominus ueram sapientiam clarum sit in hac sola religione uersari?

When I have proved all this from the writings of those very people who violated their God while he was using a mortal body, what else will stand in the way of its being clear that true wisdom is found in this religion alone?

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Nunc a principio totius sacramenti origo narranda est. maiores nostri, qui erant principes Hebraeorum, cum sterilitate atque inopia laborarent, transierunt in Aegyptum rei frumentariae gratia ibique diutius commorantes intolerabili seruitutis iugo premebantur.

Now the origin of the whole mystery must be told from the beginning. Our ancestors, who were the chiefs of the Hebrews, when they were suffering from barrenness and want, went over into Egypt for the sake of grain, and, staying there a long while, were oppressed by the intolerable yoke of slavery.

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tum misertus eorum deus eduxit eos ac liberauit de manu regis Aegyptiorum post annos quadringentos et triginta duce Moyse, per quem postea lex illis a deo data est. in qua eductione ostendit uirtutem maiestatis suae deus.

Then God, pitying them, led them out and freed them from the hand of the king of the Egyptians after four hundred and thirty years, under the leadership of Moses, through whom the law was afterwards given them by God. In this exodus God showed the power of his majesty.

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transiecit enim populum medio mari rubro praecedente angelo et scindente aquam, ut populus per siccum gradi posset, quem uerius, ut ait poeta, curuata in montis faciem circumstetit unda.

For he brought the people across through the middle of the Red Sea, with an angel going before and dividing the water, so that the people could walk over dry ground, whom, as the poet says (and here more truly), 'the wave, curved into the shape of a mountain, stood around'.

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qua re audita tyrannus Aegyptiorum cum magna suorum manu insecutus et mare adhuc patens temere ingressus coeuntibus aquis cum omni exercitu deletus est. Hebraei uero ingressi in solitudinem multa mirabilia uiderunt.

When he heard this, the tyrant of the Egyptians pursued with a great band of his men, and, rashly entering the sea while it still lay open, was destroyed with his whole army as the waters came together. The Hebrews, having entered the wilderness, saw many wonders.

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namque cum sitim paterentur, ictu uirgae rupe percussa prosiliuit fons aquae populumque recreauit.

For when they suffered thirst, a rock was struck with a blow of a rod, a spring of water leapt out, and refreshed the people.

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quo rursus esuriente caelestis alimenti pluuia descendit; quin etiam coturnices in castra eorum uentus inuexit, ut non modo pane caelesti, sed etiam instructioribus epulis saturarentur.

When they were hungry again, a rain of heavenly food came down; and the wind even brought quails into their camp, so that they were filled not only with heavenly bread but also with a more furnished feast.

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pro his tamen diuinis beneficiis honorem deo non reddiderunt, sed depulsa iam seruitute, iam siti fameque deposita in luxuriam prolapsi ad profanos Aegyptiorum ritus animos transtulerunt.

Yet for these divine benefits they did not render honour to God; but, slavery now driven off, thirst and hunger now laid aside, they slipped into luxury and turned their minds to the profane rites of the Egyptians.

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cum enim Moyses dux eorum ascendisset in montem atque ibi quadraginta diebus moraretur, aureum caput bouis, quem uocant Apim, quod eos in signo praecederet, figurarunt.

For when Moses their leader had gone up the mountain and stayed there forty days, they fashioned a golden head of an ox, which they call Apis, to go before them as a standard.

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quo peccato ac scelere offensus deus inpium et ingratum populum pro merito poenis grauibus adfecit et legi quam per Moysen dederat subiugauit.

Offended by this sin and crime, God afflicted the impious and ungrateful people with heavy punishments, as they deserved, and subjected them to the law which he had given through Moses.

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postea uero cum in deserta quadam parte Syriae consedissent, amiserunt uetus nomen Hebraei, et quoniam princeps examinis eorum Iudas erat, Iudaei appellati et terra quam incoluere Iudaea.

Afterwards, when they had settled in a certain desert part of Syria, the Hebrews lost their old name, and since the leader of their band was Judah, they were called Jews, and the land they inhabited Judaea.

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et primo quidem non dominio regum subiecti fuerunt, sed populo ac legi ciuiles iudices praesidebant, non tamen in annum constituti sicut Romani consules, sed perpetua iurisdictione subnixi. tum sublato iudicum nomine potestas regalis inducta est.

At first they were not subject to the rule of kings, but civil judges presided over the people and the law, appointed not for a year like the Roman consuls but with a lifelong jurisdiction. Then, the name of judges removed, royal power was introduced.

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uerum iudicibus regimen eorum tenentibus prauas religiones saepe susceperant, atque offensus ab iis deus totiens alienigenis subiugabat, donec rursus paenitentia populi mitigatus liberaret eos seruitute.

But while the judges held their government, they often took up depraved religions, and God, offended by them, so often subjected them to foreigners, until, softened again by the people's repentance, he freed them from slavery.

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item sub regibus finitimorum bellis ob delicta uexati, postremo capti abductique Babylonem poenas inpietatis suae graui seruitio pependerunt, donec Cyrus ueniret in regnum, qui statim Iudaeos restituit edicto.

Likewise under the kings they were harassed by wars with their neighbours because of their offences, and at last, captured and led away to Babylon, they paid the penalty of their impiety in heavy slavery, until Cyrus came to the throne, who at once restored the Jews by an edict.

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exinde tetrarchas habuerunt usque ad Herodem, qui fuit sub imperio Tiberii Caesaris: cuius anno quinto decimo id est duobus Geminis consulibus ante diem decimum Kalendarum Aprilium Iudaei Christum cruci adfixerunt.

From then on they had tetrarchs up to Herod, who was under the rule of Tiberius Caesar; in whose fifteenth year, that is, when the two Gemini were consuls, on the tenth day before the Kalends of April, the Jews fixed Christ to the cross.

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hic rerum textus, hic ordo in arcanis sanctarum litterarum continetur. sed prius ostendam qua de causa in terram uenerit Christus, ut fundamentum diuinae religionis et ratio clarescat.

This sequence of events, this order is contained in the secret places of the holy writings. But first I shall show why Christ came to earth, so that the foundation and the reason of the divine religion may become clear.

Divine 4, chapter 11

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Cum saepe Iudaei praeceptis salutaribus repugnarent atque a diuina lege desciscerent aberrantes ad inpios cultus deorum, tum deus iustos et electos uiros sancto spiritu inplebat, prophetas, in media plebe constituens, per quos peccata ingrati populi uerbis minacibus increparet et nihilominus hortaretur ad paenitentiam sceleris agendam:

When the Jews often resisted wholesome precepts and departed from the divine law, straying to the impious worship of gods, then God filled just and chosen men with the Holy Spirit, setting them as prophets in the midst of the people, through whom he might rebuke the sins of the ungrateful people with threatening words and yet exhort them to do penance for their crime:

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quam nisi egissent atque abiectis uanitatibus ad deum suum redissent, fore ut testamentum suum mutaret id est hereditatem uitae inmortalis ad exteras conuerteret nationes aliumque sibi populum fideliorem ex alienigenis congregaret.

and unless they did so, and cast off their vanities and returned to their God, he would change his testament, that is, turn the inheritance of immortal life to foreign nations and gather to himself another, more faithful people from among the foreigners.

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illi autem a prophetis increpiti non modo uerba eorum respuerunt, sed quod sibi peccata exprobrarentur offensi eos ipsos exquisitis cruciatibus necauerunt. quae omnia diuinae litterae signata conseruant. dicit enim propheta Hieremias:

But they, rebuked by the prophets, not only rejected their words, but, offended that their sins were reproached, killed those very prophets with exquisite tortures. The divine writings keep all these things sealed. For the prophet Jeremiah says:

4.11.4CSEL 19:305

misi ad uos seruos meos prophetas. ante lucem mittebam, et non audiebatis me neque intendebatis auribus uestris, cum dicerem uobis: conuertantur unus quisque a uia sua mala et a nequissimis adfectationibus uestris, et habitabitis in terra ista, quam dedi uobis et patribus uestris a saeculo usque in saeculum. nolite ambulare post deos alienos, ut seruiatis eis, et ne incitetis me in operibus manuum uestrarum ad disperdendos uos.

'I sent to you my servants the prophets; I sent them before dawn, and you did not hear me nor incline your ears, when I said to you: Let each turn from his evil way and from your most wicked pursuits, and you will dwell in this land which I gave to you and to your fathers from age to age. Do not walk after other gods to serve them, and do not provoke me with the works of your hands to destroy you.'

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Hesdras etiam propheta, qui fuit eiusdem Cyri temporibus a quo Iudaei sunt restituti, sic loquitur: desciuerunt a te et abiecerunt legem tuam post corpus suum et prophetas tuos interfecerunt, qui obtestabantur eos ut reuerterentur ad te.

Ezra too, a prophet who lived in the time of that same Cyrus by whom the Jews were restored, speaks thus: 'They revolted from you and cast your law behind their body, and killed your prophets, who adjured them to return to you.'

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item Helias in libro Basilion tertio: aemulando aemulatus sum domino deo omnipotenti, quia dereliquerunt te filii Israhel, altaria tua demolierunt et prophetas tuos interfecerunt gladio: et remansi ego solitarius et quaerunt animam meam auferre eam.

Likewise Elijah in the third book of Kingdoms: 'I have been very zealous for the Lord God Almighty, because the children of Israel have forsaken you, torn down your altars, and killed your prophets with the sword; and I alone am left, and they seek my life to take it away.'

4.11.7CSEL 19:306

propter has illorum inpietates abdicauit eos in perpetuum, itaque desiit prophetas mittere ad eos. sed illum filium suum primogenitum, illum opificem rerum et consiliatorem suum, delabi iussit e caelo, ut religionem sanctam dei transferret ad gentes, id est ad eos qui deum ignorabant, doceretque iustitiam, quam perfidus populus abiecerat.

Because of these impieties of theirs he disowned them forever, and so ceased to send prophets to them. But he commanded that firstborn Son of his, that maker of things and his counsellor, to descend from heaven, so that he might transfer God's holy religion to the gentiles, that is, to those who did not know God, and teach the justice which the faithless people had cast away.

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quod iam pridem denuntiauerat se esse facturum, sicut Malachiel propheta indicat dicens: non est mihi uoluntas circa uos, dicit dominus, et sacrificium acceptum non habebo ex manibus uestris, quoniam a solis ortu usque in occasum clarificabitur nomen meum apud gentes.

He had long before announced that he would do this, as the prophet Malachi indicates, saying: 'I have no pleasure in you, says the Lord, and I will not accept a sacrifice from your hands; for from the rising of the sun to its setting my name will be glorified among the gentiles.'

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item Dauid in psalmo XVII: constitues me in caput gentium: populus quem non cognoui seruiuit mihi.

Likewise David in Psalm 17: 'You will make me head of the gentiles; a people whom I did not know has served me.'

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Esaias quoque sic loquitur: uenio colligere omnes gentes et linguas, et uenient et uidebunt claritatem meam. et dimittam super eos signum et mittam ex iis conseruatos in gentes quae longe sunt, quae non audierunt gloriam meam, et nuntiabunt claritatem meam in gentes.

Isaiah too speaks thus: 'I come to gather all nations and tongues, and they shall come and see my glory. And I will send a sign upon them, and I will send those of them who are saved to the nations that are far off, who have not heard of my glory, and they shall proclaim my glory among the nations.'

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uolens igitur deus metatorem templi sui mittere in terram noluit eum in potestate et claritate caelesti mittere, ut ingratus in deum populus in errorem maximum induceretur ac poenas pro facinoribus suis luerent qui dominum ac deum suum non recepissent: quod olim prophetae cecinerant sic esse futurum.

So God, wishing to send the measurer of his temple to earth, did not wish to send him in heavenly power and glory, so that the people ungrateful to God might be led into the greatest error and those who had not received their Lord and God might pay the penalty for their crimes; which the prophets had long ago sung would come to pass.

4.11.12CSEL 19:307–308

Esaias enim, quem ipsi Iudaei serra consectum crudelissime necauerunt, ita dicit: audi caelum et percipe auribus terra, quoniam dominus locutus est: filios generaui et exaltaui, ipsi autem me spreuerunt. agnouit bos possessorem et asinus praesepem domini sui: Israhel autem me non agnouit et populus me non intellexit. Hieremias quoque similiter ait:

For Isaiah, whom the Jews themselves most cruelly killed by cutting him in two with a saw, says thus: 'Hear, O heaven, and give ear, O earth, for the Lord has spoken: I have begotten and exalted sons, but they have despised me. The ox knows its owner and the ass its master's manger; but Israel has not known me, and my people has not understood me.' Jeremiah too says likewise:

4.11.13CSEL 19:308–309

cognouit tempus suum turtur et hirundo, et ruris passeres custodierunt tempora introitus sui, populus autem meus non cognouit indicium domini. quomodo dicetis: sapientes sumus et lex domini nobiscum est? in cassum facta est metatura falsa scribae, confusi sunt sapientes, trepidauerunt et capti sunt, quia uerbum domini reprobauerunt.

'The turtledove and the swallow have known their time, and the sparrows of the field have kept the times of their coming; but my people has not known the judgment of the Lord. How will you say, We are wise, and the law of the Lord is with us? The false measuring of the scribes has been made in vain; the wise are confounded, they have trembled and been taken, because they rejected the word of the Lord.'

4.11.14CSEL 19:309

ergo, ut coeperam dicere, cum statuisset deus doctorem uirtutis mittere ad homines, renasci eum denuo in carne praecepit et ipsi homini similem fieri, cui dux et comes et magister esset futurus.

So, as I had begun to say, when God had determined to send a teacher of virtue to men, he commanded him to be born again in the flesh and to become like man himself, whose leader and companion and teacher he was to be.

4.11.15CSEL 19:309

sed tamen quoniam clemens et pius est erga suos deus, ad eos ipsos eum misit quos oderat, ne illis in perpetuum salutis uiam clauderet, sed daret iis liberam facultatem sequendi deum, ut et praemium uitae adipiscerentur, si secuti fuissent, quod plurimi eorum faciunt atque fecerunt, et culpa sua in poenam mortis incurrerent, si regem suum repudiassent.

But since God is merciful and kind toward his own, he sent him to those very people whom he hated, so as not to close the way of salvation to them forever, but to give them free opportunity of following God, so that they might gain the reward of life if they followed, as very many of them do and have done, and by their own fault incur the penalty of death if they rejected their king.

4.11.16CSEL 19:309

aput illos igitur et ex eorum semine regenerari eum iussit, ne si fuisset alienigena, iustam possent excusationem de lege praetendere, quod eum non suscepissent, simul, ut nulla omnino gens esset in terra cui spes inmortalitatis negaretur.

So he commanded him to be born again among them and of their seed, lest, if he had been a foreigner, they could plead a just excuse from the law for not receiving him; and at the same time so that there might be no nation at all on earth to which the hope of immortality was denied.

Divine 4, chapter 12

4.12.1CSEL 19:309

Descendens itaque de caelo sanctus ille spiritus dei sanctam uirginem cuius utero se insinuaret elegit. at illa diuino spiritu hausto repleta concepit et sine ullo adtactu uiri repente uirginalis uterus intumuit.

So that holy Spirit of God, descending from heaven, chose a holy virgin into whose womb he might enter. And she, filled with the divine Spirit she had taken in, conceived, and without any touch of man her virgin womb suddenly swelled.

4.12.2CSEL 19:309–310

quodsi animalia quaedam uento et aura concipere solere omnibus notum est, cur quisquam mirum putet, cum dei spiritu, cui facile est quidquid uelit, grauatam esse uirginem dicimus?

But if it is known to all that certain animals commonly conceive by the wind and the breeze, why should anyone think it strange when we say that a virgin was made pregnant by the Spirit of God, for whom whatever he wishes is easy?

4.12.3CSEL 19:310

quod sane incredibile posset uideri, nisi hoc futurum ante multa saecula prophetae cecinissent. Solomon in ode undeuicesima ita dicit: infirmatus est uterus uirginis et accepit fetum, et grauata est et facta est in multa miseratione mater uirgo.

This could indeed seem incredible, had not the prophets sung many ages before that it would happen. Solomon in the nineteenth ode says thus: 'The womb of the virgin was weakened and received offspring, and she was burdened, and the virgin became a mother in great mercy.'

4.12.4CSEL 19:310

item propheta Esaias, cuius uerba sunt haec: propter hoc dabit deus ipse uobis signum: ecce uirgo accipiet in uterum et pariet filium, et uocabitis nomen eius Emmanuel.

Likewise the prophet Isaiah, whose words are these: 'Therefore God himself will give you a sign: behold, a virgin will conceive in her womb and bear a son, and you will call his name Emmanuel.'

4.12.5CSEL 19:310–311

quid hoc manifestius dici potest? legebant ista Iudaei qui eum necauerunt. si quis nos haec fingere arbitratur, ab his requirat, ab his potissimum sumat: satis firmum testimonium est ad probandam ueritatem quod ab ipsis perhibetur inimicis.

What could be said more plainly? The Jews who killed him used to read these things. If anyone thinks we invent them, let him ask them, let him take it from them above all: testimony given by enemies themselves is firm enough to prove the truth.

4.12.6CSEL 19:311

Emmanuel autem numquam uocitatus est, sed Iesus, qui latine dicitur salutaris siue saluator, quia cunctis gentibus salutifer uenit: sed propheta declarauit hoc nomine quod deus ad homines in carne uenturus esset.

He was never called Emmanuel, but Jesus, which in Latin means 'salutary' or 'saviour', because he came bringing salvation to all nations; but the prophet declared by this name that God would come to men in the flesh.

4.12.7CSEL 19:311

Emmanuel enim significat nobiscum deus, scilicet quia illo per uirginem nato confiteri homines oportebat deum secum esse id est in terra et in carne mortali. unde Dauid in psalmo LXXXIIII ueritas inquit de terra orta est, quia deus, in quo ueritas est, terrenum corpus accepit, ut terrenis uiam salutis aperiret.

For Emmanuel means 'God with us', namely because, when he was born of the virgin, men had to confess that God was with them, that is, on earth and in mortal flesh. Hence David in Psalm 84 says: 'Truth has sprung from the earth', because God, in whom truth is, took an earthly body to open the way of salvation to earthly beings.

4.12.8CSEL 19:311

item Esaias ipse: ipsi autem non crediderunt et exacerbauerunt spiritum sanctum et conuersus est eis ad inimicitiam. et ipse expugnauit et recordatus est dierum saeculi, qui suscitauit de terra pastorem ouium.

Likewise Isaiah himself: 'But they did not believe and provoked the Holy Spirit, and he turned to enmity against them; and he himself fought against them, and remembered the days of old, he who raised up from the earth the shepherd of the sheep.'

4.12.9CSEL 19:311–312

quis autem futurus esset ille pastor, declarauit alio loco dicens: exsultent caeli desuper et nubes induant iustitiam, aperiatur terra et pullulet saluator. ego enim dominus deus creaui eum. saluator uero est, ut supra diximus, Iesus.

Who that shepherd would be he declared in another place, saying: 'Let the heavens rejoice from above, and let the clouds put on justice; let the earth be opened and let the Saviour spring forth; for I the Lord God have created him.' And the Saviour, as we said above, is Jesus.

4.12.10CSEL 19:312

sed et alio loco idem propheta sic praedicauit: ecce natus est uobis puer, et datus est uobis filius, cuius imperium super umeros eius: et uocatum est nomen eius magni consilii nuntius.

And in another place the same prophet foretold thus: 'Behold, a child is born to you, and a son is given to you, whose rule is upon his shoulders; and his name is called Messenger of Great Counsel.'

4.12.11CSEL 19:312

idcirco enim missus est a deo patre, ut uniuersis gentibus quae sub caelo sunt singularis et ueri dei sanctum mysterium reuelaret ablatum perfido populo, qui aduersus deum saepe deliquit.

For this reason he was sent by God the Father: to reveal to all the nations under heaven the holy mystery of the one and true God, taken away from the faithless people, which often sinned against God.

4.12.12CSEL 19:312–313

Daniel quoque similia praelocutus est. uidebam inquit in uisu noctis: et ecce in nubibus caeli ut filius hominis ueniens et usque ad uetustum dierum peruenit. et qui adsistebant, obtulerunt eum: et datum est ei regnum et honor et imperium, et omnes populi tribus linguae seruient ei, et potestas eius aeterna, quae numquam transibit et regnum eius non corrumpetur.

Daniel too foretold similar things. 'I saw,' he says, 'in the vision of the night: and behold, on the clouds of heaven one like a son of man coming, and he came even to the Ancient of Days. And those standing by brought him forward; and to him was given kingdom and honour and dominion, and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve him; and his power is eternal, which shall never pass away, and his kingdom shall not be destroyed.'

4.12.13CSEL 19:313

quomodo igitur Iudaei et confitentur et sperant Christum dei, qui hunc idcirco reprobauerant, quia ex homine natus est?

How, then, do the Jews both confess and hope for the Christ of God, who rejected this one precisely because he was born of a human being?

4.12.14CSEL 19:313

nam cum ita sit a deo constitutum, ut idem Christus bis adueniat in terram, semel ut unum deum gentibus nuntiet, deinde rursus ut regnet, quomodo in secundum eius aduentum credunt qui in primum non crediderunt?

For since it has been so ordained by God that the same Christ should come to earth twice, once to announce the one God to the gentiles, and then again to reign, how do those believe in his second coming who did not believe in his first?

4.12.15CSEL 19:313

atquin propheta utrosque aduentus eius paucis uerbis comprehendit. ecce inquit in nubibus caeli ut filius hominis ueniens. non dixit ut filius dei, sed ut filius hominis, ut ostenderet quod carne indui haberet in terra, ut suscepta hominis figura et condicione mortali doceret homines iustitiam et cum mandatis dei functus ueritatem gentibus reuelasset, multaretur etiam morte, ut inferos quoque uinceret ac resignaret atque ita demum resurgens ad patrem proficisceretur in nube sublatus.

Yet the prophet comprised both his comings in a few words. 'Behold,' he says, 'on the clouds of heaven one like a son of man coming.' He did not say 'like a son of God', but 'like a son of man', to show that he was to be clothed with flesh on earth, so that, having taken the form of man and the mortal condition, he might teach men justice, and, having fulfilled God's commands and revealed the truth to the gentiles, might also be punished with death, so as to conquer and unseal the underworld too, and so at last, rising again, go to the Father, taken up in a cloud.

4.12.16CSEL 19:313

adiecit enim propheta et ait: et usque ad anticum dierum peruenit et oblatus est ei. anticum dierum appellauit deum summum, cuius aetas et origo non potest conprehendi, quia solus a saeculis fuit, ut erit semper in saecula.

For the prophet added, saying: 'And he came even to the Ancient of Days and was presented to him.' He called the supreme God the Ancient of Days, whose age and origin cannot be grasped, because he alone existed from the ages, as he will always exist to the ages.

4.12.17CSEL 19:313–314

Christum autem post passionem ac resurrectionem ascensurum esse ad deum patrem Dauid in psalmo CVIIII contestatus est his uerbis: dixit dominus domino meo: sede ad dexteram meam, quoadusque ponam inimicos tuos subpedaneum pedum tuorum. qui propheta cum rex esset, quem appellare dominum suum posset qui sederet ad dexteram dei nisi Christum filium dei, qui est rex regum et dominus dominorum?

That Christ, after his passion and resurrection, would ascend to God the Father, David testified in Psalm 109 in these words: 'The Lord said to my Lord, Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies the footstool of your feet.' Since the prophet was a king, whom could he call his Lord, who would sit at the right hand of God, but Christ the Son of God, who is King of kings and Lord of lords?

4.12.18CSEL 19:314–315

quod Esaias apertius ostendit dicens: sic dicit dominus deus Christo domino meo, cuius tenui dexteram obaudire ante eum gentes, et fortitudinem regum disrumpam, aperiam ante illum portas et ciuitates non cludentur. ego ante te ibo et montes deplanabo, et fores aereas conteram et seras ferreas confringam. et dabo tibi thensauros absconditos et inuisibiles, ut scias quia ego dominus deus, qui uoco nomen tuum.

Isaiah shows this more openly, saying: 'Thus says the Lord God to Christ my Lord, whose right hand I have held, that the nations may obey before him; and I will break the strength of kings, I will open gates before him, and cities shall not be shut. I will go before you and level the mountains, and I will break the gates of bronze and shatter the bars of iron. And I will give you treasures hidden and invisible, that you may know that I am the Lord God who call your name.'

4.12.19CSEL 19:315

denique ob uirtutem ac fidem, quam deo exhibuit in terra, datum est ei regnum et honor et imperium et omnes populi tribus linguae seruiunt ei, et potestas eius aeterna, quae numquam transibit, et regnum eius non corrumpetur.

Finally, because of the virtue and faithfulness he showed to God on earth, 'kingdom and honour and dominion were given to him, and all peoples, tribes, and tongues serve him; and his power is eternal, which shall never pass away, and his kingdom shall not be destroyed.'

4.12.20CSEL 19:315

quod quidem duobus modis intellegitur, quia et nunc habet perpetuam potestatem, cum omnes gentes et omnes linguae nomen eius uenerantur, maiestatem confitentur, doctrinam secuntur, uirtutem imitantur, habet imperium atque honorem, cum omnes tribus terrae praeceptis eius obtemperant,

This is understood in two ways: because he now too has everlasting power, since all nations and all tongues venerate his name, confess his majesty, follow his teaching, and imitate his virtue; he has dominion and honour, since all the tribes of the earth obey his precepts;

4.12.21CSEL 19:315–316

et idem postea, cum rursus aduenerit in claritate ac potestate, ut omnem animam iudicet et iustos restituat ad uitam, tunc uere totius terrae regimen obtinebit: tunc sublato de rebus humanis omni malo aureum saeculum ut poetae uocant, id est iustum ac pacificum tempus orietur.

and the same one, when he comes again later in glory and power to judge every soul and restore the just to life, will then truly hold the government of the whole earth; then, all evil removed from human affairs, the golden age, as the poets call it, that is, a just and peaceful time, will arise.

4.12.22CSEL 19:316

sed haec uberius in ultimo libro disseremus, cum de secundo aduentu loquemur: nunc de primo ut coepimus explicemus.

But we shall discuss these things more fully in the last book, when we speak of the second coming; now let us explain, as we began, about the first.

Divine 4, chapter 13

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Summus igitur deus ac parens omnium cum religionem suam transferre uoluisset, doctorem iustitiae misit e caelo, ut nouis cultoribus nouam legem in eo uel per eum daret, non sicut ante fecerat per hominem, sed tamen nasci eum uoluit tamquam hominem, ut per omnia summo patri similis existeret.

So the supreme God and parent of all, when he wished to transfer his religion, sent a teacher of justice from heaven, so that in him or through him he might give a new law to new worshippers, not, as he had done before, through a man; and yet he willed him to be born as a man, so that in all things he might be like the supreme Father.

4.13.2CSEL 19:316

ipse enim pater deus, origo et principium rerum, quoniam parentibus caret, ὰπάτωρ atque ὰμήτωρ a Trismegisto uerissime nominatur, quod ei nullo sit procreatus. idcirco etiam filium bis nasci oportuit, ut et ipse fieret ὰπάτωρ atque ὰμήτωρ.

For God the Father himself, the origin and beginning of things, since he has no parents, is most truly called by Trismegistus 'fatherless' and 'motherless', because he was begotten by no one. So it was fitting that the Son too should be born twice, so that he too might become fatherless and motherless.

4.13.3CSEL 19:316

in prima enim natiuitate spiritali ὰμήτωρ fuit, quia

For in his first, spiritual birth he was motherless, because

4.13.4CSEL 19:316–317

sine officio matris a solo deo patre generatus est, in secunda uero carnali ὰπάτωρ fuit, quoniam sine patris officio uirginali utero procreatus est, ut mediam inter deum hominemque substantiam gerens nostram hanc fragilem inbecillamque naturam quasi manu ad inmortalitatem posset educere.

he was begotten by God the Father alone without the office of a mother; but in the second, fleshly birth he was fatherless, since he was procreated in a virgin womb without the office of a father; so that, bearing a middle substance between God and man, he might lead this frail and weak nature of ours, as by the hand, to immortality.

4.13.5CSEL 19:317

factus est et dei filius per spiritum et hominis per carnem, id est et deus et homo. dei uirtus in eo ex operibus quae fecit apparuit, fragilitas hominis ex passione quam pertulit: quam cur susceperit paulo post docebo.

He was made both Son of God through the spirit and son of man through the flesh, that is, both God and man. The power of God appeared in him from the works he did; the frailty of man from the passion he endured, why he underwent it I shall show shortly.

4.13.6CSEL 19:317

interim et deum fuisse et hominem ex utroque genere permixtum prophetis uaticinantibus discimus.

Meanwhile we learn from the prophets' predictions that he was both God and man, blended of both kinds.

4.13.7CSEL 19:317–318

Esaias deum fuisse testatur his uerbis: fatigata est Aegyptus, et negotiatio Aethiopum et Sabain uiri alti ad te transgredientur et tui erunt serui et post te ambulabunt uincti conpedibus et adorabunt te et in te precabuntur: quoniam in te deus est, et non est deus alius praeter te. tu enim es deus, et nos nesciebamus, deus Israhel saluator. confundentur et reuerebuntur omnes qui aduersantur tibi, et cadent in confessionem. item propheta Hieremias sic ait:

Isaiah testifies that he was God in these words: 'Egypt has been wearied, and the merchandise of the Ethiopians and of the Sabaeans, men of stature, shall pass over to you and be your servants, and they shall walk after you bound in fetters, and shall worship you and pray to you: for God is in you, and there is no other God besides you. For you are God, and we did not know it, the God of Israel, the Saviour. All who oppose you shall be confounded and put to shame, and shall fall into confession.' Likewise the prophet Jeremiah says thus:

4.13.8CSEL 19:318

hic deus noster est et non deputabitur alius absque illo, qui inuenit omnem uiam prudentiae et dedit eam Iacob puero suo et Israhel dilecto sibi. post haec in terris uisus est et cum hominibus conuersatus est.

'This is our God, and no other shall be reckoned beside him, who found every way of prudence and gave it to Jacob his servant and to Israel his beloved. After this he was seen on earth and lived among men.'

4.13.9CSEL 19:318

item Dauid in psalmo XLEQI: thronus tuus, deus, in saecula saeculorum, uirga aequitatis uirga regni tui. dilexisti iustitiam, odio habuisti iniustitiam. propterea unxit te dominus deus tuus oleum exultationis. quo uerbo etiam nomen ostendit, siquidem, ut supra docui, ab unctione appellatus est Christus.

Likewise David in Psalm 44: 'Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever; the rod of equity is the rod of your kingdom. You have loved justice and hated injustice; therefore the Lord your God has anointed you with the oil of gladness.' With this word he also shows his name, since, as I showed above, he is called Christ from anointing.

4.13.10CSEL 19:318–319

deinde hominem fuisse eundem Hieremias docet dicens: et homo est et quis cognouit eum? item Esaias: et mittet eis dominus hominem, qui saluabit eos et iudicans sanabit eos. sed et Moyses in Numeris ita loquitur: orietur stella ex Iacob et exsurget homo ex Israhel.

Next, Jeremiah teaches that the same one was man, saying: 'He is also a man, and who has known him?' Likewise Isaiah: 'And the Lord will send them a man who will save them, and judging will heal them.' And Moses too speaks thus in Numbers: 'A star shall arise from Jacob, and a man shall rise up from Israel.'

4.13.11CSEL 19:319–320

propterea Milesius Apollo consultus utrumne deus an homo fuerit, hoc modo respondit: θνητὸς ἔην κατὰ σάρκα σοϕὸς τερατώδεσιν ἕργοις, ἀλλ ύπὸ Χαλδαίοισι διϰασπολίαισιν ἀλώσας, γομϕωθεὶς σκολόπεσσι πιϰρὴν ἀνέπλησε τελευτήν.

For this reason the Milesian Apollo, when consulted whether he was God or man, replied thus: 'He was mortal according to the flesh, wise in portentous works; but, seized under Chaldaean judges, fixed with nails and stakes, he fulfilled a bitter end.'

4.13.12CSEL 19:320

primo uersu uerum quidem dixit, sed argute consultorem fefellit sacramentum ueritatis penitus nescientem: uidetur enim negasse illum deum. sed cum fatetur secundum carnem fuisse mortalem, quod etiam nos praedicamus, consequens est ut secundum spiritum deus fuerit, quod nos adfirmamus.

In the first line he spoke the truth, but cunningly deceived the inquirer, who was wholly ignorant of the mystery of truth; for he seems to have denied that he was God. But since he confesses that he was mortal according to the flesh, which we too proclaim, it follows that according to the spirit he was God, which we affirm.

4.13.13CSEL 19:320

quid enim fuerat necesse carnis facere mentionem, cum satis esset dicere fuisse mortalem? sed ueritate pressus negare non potuit quemadmodum se res haberet, sicut illut, quod ait sapientem fuisse.

For what need was there to mention the flesh, when it was enough to say he was mortal? But, pressed by truth, he could not deny how the matter stood, just as he said that he was wise.

4.13.14CSEL 19:320

quid ad hoc, o Apollo, respondes? si sapiens fuit, ergo doctrina eius sapientia est nec ulla alia, et sapientes qui secuntur nec ulli alii. cur igitur uulgo pro stultis et uanis et ineptis habemur, qui sectamur magistrum etiam ipsorum deorum confessione sapientem?

What do you answer to this, Apollo? If he was wise, then his teaching is wisdom and nothing else is, and those who follow him are wise and none others. Why then are we commonly held foolish, empty, and absurd, who follow a teacher who is wise even by the confession of the gods themselves?

4.13.15CSEL 19:320

nam quod ait portentifica illum opera fecisse, quo maxime diuinitatis fidem meruit, adsentiri nobis iam uidetur, cum dicit eadem quibus nos gloriamur.

For in saying that he did portentous works, by which above all he merited belief in his divinity, he now seems to agree with us, since he says the same things in which we glory.

4.13.16CSEL 19:320

sed colligit se tamen et ad daemoniacas fraudes redit. cum enim uerum necessitate dixisset, iam deorum ac sui proditor uidebatur, nisi quod ab eo ueritas expresserat, mendacio fallente (obs)curasset. ait ergo illum fecisse quidem opera miranda, uerum non diuina uirtute, sed magica.

But he pulls himself together and returns to demonic deceits. For having spoken the truth under compulsion, he would have seemed a betrayer of the gods and of himself unless he had ⟨ob⟩scured with a deceiving lie what truth had forced from him. So he says that he did indeed do wonderful works, but not by divine power but by magic.

4.13.17CSEL 19:320–321

quid mirum, si hoc Apollo ueritatem ignorantibus persuasit, cum Iudaei quoque, cultores ut uidebantur summi dei, hoc idem putauerint, cum ante oculos eorum cottidie fierent illa miracula? nec tamen tantarum uirtutum contemplatione inpelli potuerunt ut deum crederent, quem uidebant.

What wonder if Apollo persuaded those ignorant of the truth of this, when the Jews too, worshippers, as it seemed, of the supreme God, thought the same, though those miracles were done daily before their eyes? Yet they could not be moved by the sight of such great mighty works to believe in the God whom they saw.

4.13.18CSEL 19:321

propterea Dauid, quem praeter ceteros prophetas uel maxime legunt, in psalmo XXVII sic eos damnat: redde illis retributionem eorum, quoniam non intellexerunt in operibus domini. ex huius ipsius domo Christum generatuiri secundum carnem et ipse Dauid et alii prophetae adnuntiauerunt.

For this reason David, whom they read more than the other prophets, condemns them thus in Psalm 27: 'Give them their recompense, because they did not understand the works of the Lord.' That Christ would be born from his very house according to the flesh, both David himself and other prophets announced.

4.13.19CSEL 19:321

aput Esaiam ita scriptum est: et erit in illa die radix Iesse et qui exsurget principari in nationes: in eum gentes sperabunt et erit requies eius in honore.

In Isaiah it is written thus: 'And in that day there shall be the root of Jesse, and he who shall rise to rule over the nations; in him the nations shall hope, and his rest shall be in honour.'

4.13.20CSEL 19:321–322

et alio loco: exiet uirga de radice Iesse et flos de radice ascendet: et requiescet super eum spiritus dei, spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis: inplebit illum spiritus timoris dei.

And in another place: 'A rod shall come forth from the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise from the root; and the Spirit of God shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and strength, the spirit of knowledge and piety; the spirit of the fear of God shall fill him.'

4.13.21CSEL 19:322

Iesse autem fuit pater Dauid, ex cuius radice ascensurum esse florem praelocutus est, eum scilicet, de quo Sibylla dicit ἀνθήσει δ ἄνθος καθαρόν.

Jesse was the father of David, from whose root he foretold that a flower would rise, namely him of whom the Sibyl says: 'A pure flower shall bloom.'

4.13.22CSEL 19:322–323

item in Basilion libro secundo propheta Nathan missus est ad Dauid uolentem deo templum fabricare. et fuit uerbum domini ad Nathan dicens: uade et dic seruo meo Dauid: haec dicit dominus deus omnipotens: non tu aedificabis mihi domum ad inhabitandum, sed cum inpleti fuerint dies tui et dormieris cum patribus tuis, suscitabo semen tuum post te et parabo regnum eius.

Likewise in the second book of Kingdoms, the prophet Nathan was sent to David when he wished to build a temple for God. 'And the word of the Lord came to Nathan, saying: Go and say to my servant David, Thus says the Lord God Almighty: You shall not build me a house to dwell in; but when your days are fulfilled and you sleep with your fathers, I will raise up your seed after you and prepare his kingdom.

4.13.23CSEL 19:323

hic aedificabit mihi domum in nomine meo et erigam thronum eius usque in saeculum, et ego ero ei in patre et ipse erit mihi in filio. et fidem consequetur domus eius, et regnum eius usque in saeculum.

He shall build me a house in my name, and I will set up his throne forever; and I will be to him as a father, and he shall be to me as a son. And his house shall be established, and his kingdom forever.'

4.13.24CSEL 19:323–324

sed haec ut Iudaei non intellegerent, illa fuit causa, quod Solomon filius Dauid templum deo aedificauit et ciuitatem, quam de suo nomine Hierosolymam nuncupauit. itaque ad ipsum quae a propheta dicta sunt rettulerunt. Solomon autem ab ipso patre suo imperii regimen accepit.

The reason the Jews did not understand these things was that Solomon, the son of David, built a temple for God and a city which he named Jerusalem after himself. So they referred to him what was said by the prophet. But Solomon received the government of the kingdom from his father himself.

4.13.25CSEL 19:324

prophetae uero de eo loquebantur qui tum nasceretur, postquam Dauid cum patribus suis requieuisset. praeterea Solomonis imperium perpetuum non fuit: annis enim quadraginta regnauit.

But the prophets were speaking of one who would be born then, after David had rested with his fathers. Besides, Solomon's rule was not perpetual: he reigned forty years.

4.13.26CSEL 19:324

deinde, quod numquam filius dei dictus est, sed filius Dauid, et domus quam aedificauit non est fidem consecuta sicut ecclesia, quae est uerum templum dei, quod non in parietibus est, sed in corde ac fide hominum qui credunt in eum ac uocantur fideles: illut uero Solomonium templum quia manu factum est, manu cecidit.

Next, he was never called the Son of God, but the son of David; and the house he built was not established as the church is, which is the true temple of God, which is not in walls but in the heart and faith of men who believe in him and are called faithful; but that temple of Solomon, because it was made by hand, fell by hand.

4.13.27CSEL 19:324

denique pater eius in psalmo CXXVI de operibus filii sui prophetauit hoc modo: si dominus non aedificauerit domum, in uanum laborauerunt qui illam aedificauerunt: si dominus non custodierit ciuitatem, in uacuum uigilauit qui eam custodiuit.

Finally, his father prophesied of the works of his son in Psalm 126 in this way: 'Unless the Lord builds the house, those who built it have laboured in vain; unless the Lord guards the city, he who guarded it has watched in vain.'

Divine 4, chapter 14

4.14.1CSEL 19:324–325

Quibus ex rebus apparet prophetas omnes denuntiasse de Christo, fore aliquando ut ex genere Dauid corporaliter natus constitueret aeternum templum deo, quod appellatur ecclesia, et uniuersas gentes ad religionem ueram dei conuocaret.

From these things it is clear that all the prophets announced of Christ that at some time, born bodily of the race of David, he would establish an eternal temple for God, which is called the church, and would call all the nations to the true religion of God.

4.14.2CSEL 19:325

haec est domus fidelis, hoc inmortale templum, in quo si quis non sacrificauerit, inmortalitatis praemium non habebit.

This is the faithful house, this the immortal temple, in which if anyone has not sacrificed, he will not have the reward of immortality.

4.14.3CSEL 19:325

cuius templi et magni et aeterni quoniam Christus fabricator fuit, idem necesse est habeat in eo sacerdotium sempiternum, nec potest nisi per eum qui constituit ad templum et ad conspectum dei perueniri.

And since Christ was the builder of this great and eternal temple, he must also hold an everlasting priesthood in it; and no one can come to the temple and to the sight of God except through him who established it.

4.14.4CSEL 19:325

Dauid in psalmo CVIIII id ipsum docet dicens: ante luciferum genui te. iurauit dominus et non paenitebit eum: tu es sacerdos in aeternum.

David teaches this very thing in Psalm 109, saying: 'Before the morning star I begot you. The Lord has sworn and will not repent: you are a priest forever.'

4.14.5CSEL 19:325

item in Basilion libro primo: et suscitabo mihi sacerdotem fidelem, qui omnia quae sunt in corde meo faciet, et aedificabo ei domum fidelem, et transibit in conspectu meo omnibus diebus.

Likewise in the first book of Kingdoms: 'And I will raise up for myself a faithful priest, who will do all that is in my heart, and I will build him a faithful house, and he shall pass before me all his days.'

4.14.6CSEL 19:325–326

quis autem futurus esset cui deus aeternum sacerdotium pollicebatur, Zacharias etiam nomine posito apertissime docuit. sic enim dixit: et ostendit mihi dominus Iesum sacerdotem magnum stantem ante faciem angeli domini, et diabolus stabat ad dexteram ipsius, ut contradiceret ei.

Who it would be to whom God promised an eternal priesthood, Zechariah taught most plainly, even setting down his name. For he said thus: 'And the Lord showed me Jesus the high priest standing before the face of the angel of the Lord, and the devil was standing at his right hand to oppose him.

4.14.7CSEL 19:326

et dixit dominus ad diabolum: imperet dominus in te, qui elegit Hierusalem: et ecce titio eiectus ab igni. et Iesus erat indutus uestimenta sordida, et stabat ante faciem angeli. et respondit et dixit ad circumstantes ante faciem ipsius dicens:

And the Lord said to the devil: The Lord who chose Jerusalem rebuke you; and behold, a brand plucked from the fire. And Jesus was clothed in filthy garments and was standing before the face of the angel. And he answered and spoke to those standing before his face, saying:

4.14.8CSEL 19:326

auferte uestimenta sordida ab eo et induite eum tunicam talarem et imponite cidarim mundam super caput ipsius. et cooperuerunt eum uestimenta et imposuerunt cidarim super caput eius. et angelus domini stabat et testificabatur ad Iesum dicens: haec dicit dominus omnipotens:

Take away the filthy garments from him and clothe him with a long robe and put a clean mitre on his head. And they clothed him with garments and put the mitre on his head. And the angel of the Lord stood and testified to Jesus, saying: Thus says the Lord Almighty:

4.14.9CSEL 19:326–327

si in uiis meis ambulaueris et praecepta mea seruaueris, tu iudicabis domum meam, et dabo tibi qui conuersentur in medio horum circumstantium. audi itaque, Iesu sacerdos magne.

If you walk in my ways and keep my commandments, you shall judge my house, and I will give you those who walk among these who stand here. Hear, then, O Jesus, high priest.'

4.14.10CSEL 19:327

quis non igitur captos mentibus tum fuisse Iudaeos arbitretur, qui cum haec et legerent et audirent, nefandas manus deo suo intulerunt?

Who, then, would not think the Jews had been out of their minds, who, while both reading and hearing these things, laid wicked hands on their God?

4.14.11CSEL 19:327

atquin ab eo tempore quo Zacharias fuit usque ad annum quintum decimum imperii Tiberi Caesaris, quo Iesus fixus est, prope quingenti anni numerantur, siquidem Darii et Alexandri adoleuit aetate, qui fuerunt non multo post quam Tarquinius Superbus exactus est.

And yet from the time when Zechariah lived to the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, in which Jesus was crucified, nearly five hundred years are counted, since he flourished in the time of Darius and Alexander, who lived not long after Tarquinius Superbus was expelled.

4.14.12CSEL 19:327

sed illi rursus eodem modo falsi deceptique sunt putantes haec de Iesu esse dicta filio Naue, qui successor Moysi fuit, aut de sacerdote Iesu filio Iosedech: in quos nihil congruit eorum quae propheta narrauit.

But they were again deceived and misled in the same way, thinking these things were said of Jesus the son of Nun, who was the successor of Moses, or of the priest Jesus son of Josedech; to whom none of the things the prophet narrated fits.

4.14.13CSEL 19:327

non enim sorditati umquam illi fuerunt, cum alter eorum potentissimus princeps fuisset, alter sacerdos, aut perpessi sunt aliquid aduersi, ut tamquam titio eiectus ex igni putarentur, aut aliquando in conspectu dei et angelorum steterunt aut propheta de praeteritis loquebatur potius quam futuris.

For they were never in filthy garments, since one of them had been a most powerful prince and the other a priest; nor did they suffer any adversity so as to be thought a brand plucked from the fire; nor did they ever stand in the sight of God and the angels; nor was the prophet speaking of the past rather than the future.

4.14.14CSEL 19:327–328

locutus est igitur de Iesu filio dei, ut ostenderet eum primo in humilitate et carne uenturum. haec est enim uestis sordida, ut pararet templum deo et sicut titio igni ambureretur id est ab hominibus cruciamenta perferret et ad ultimum extingueretur. titionem enim uulgus appellat extractum foco torrem semiustum et extinctum.

He spoke, then, of Jesus the Son of God, to show that he would come first in humility and flesh. For this is the filthy garment, so that he might prepare a temple for God and, like a brand, be scorched by fire, that is, endure torments from men and at last be extinguished. For people call a brand a half-burnt, extinguished log drawn from the hearth.

4.14.15CSEL 19:328

quomodo autem et cum quibus mandatis a deo mitteretur in terram, declarauit spiritus dei per prophetam docens futurum ut cum uoluntatem summi patris fideliter et constanter inplesset, acciperet iudicium atque imperium sempiternum.

How and with what commands he would be sent by God to earth the Spirit of God declared through the prophet, teaching that when he had faithfully and steadfastly fulfilled the will of the supreme Father, he would receive everlasting judgment and dominion.

4.14.16CSEL 19:328

si in uiis meis inquit ambulaueris et praecepta mea seruaueris, tu iudicabis domum meam. quae fuerint uiae dei et quae praecepta eius, nec ambiguum nec obscurum est.

'If you walk in my ways,' he says, 'and keep my commandments, you shall judge my house.' What the ways of God and his commandments were is neither ambiguous nor obscure.

4.14.17CSEL 19:328

deus enim cum uideret malitiam et falsorum deorum cultus per orbem terrae ita inualuisse, ut iam nomen eius ex hominum memoria fuisset paene sublatum — siquidem Iudaei quoque, quibus solis arcanum dei creditum fuerat, relicto deo uiuo ad colenda figmenta inretiti daemonum fraudibus aberrassent nec increpiti per prophetas reuerti ad deum uellent —, filium suum principem angelorum legauit ad homines, ut eos conuerteret ab inpiis et uanis cultibus ad cognoscendum et colendum deum uerum, item ut eorum mentes a stultitia ad sapientiam, ab iniquitate ad iustitiae opera traduceret.

For God, when he saw that wickedness and the worship of false gods had so prevailed throughout the world that his name had almost been removed from human memory (since even the Jews, to whom alone the secret of God had been entrusted, having abandoned the living God, had strayed, ensnared by the frauds of demons, to worshipping images, and when rebuked through the prophets would not return to God), sent his Son, the prince of the angels, as envoy to men, to turn them from impious and vain worship to knowing and worshipping the true God, and also to lead their minds from folly to wisdom and from iniquity to works of justice.

4.14.18CSEL 19:328–329

hae sunt uiae dei in quibus eum ambulare praecepit, haec praecepta quae seruanda mandauit. ille uero exhibuit deo fidem: docuit enim quod unus deus sit eumque solum coli oportere, nec umquam se ipse deum dixit, quia non seruasset fidem, si missus ut deos tolleret et unum adsereret, induceret alium praeter unum.

These are the ways of God in which he commanded him to walk, these the commandments he ordered to be kept. And he showed faithfulness to God: for he taught that there is one God and that he alone must be worshipped; nor did he ever call himself God, because he would not have kept faith if, sent to take away the gods and assert the one, he had brought in another besides the one.

4.14.19CSEL 19:329

hoc erat non de uno deo facere praeconium nec eius qui miserat, sed suum proprium negotium gerere ac se ab eo quem inlustratum uenerat separare.

This would have been to make proclamation not of the one God, nor of him who had sent him, but to pursue his own proper business and separate himself from him whom he had come to make known.

4.14.20CSEL 19:329

propterea quia tam fidelis extitit, quia sibi nihil prorsus adsumpsit, ut mandata mittentis inpleret, et sacerdotis perpetui dignitatem et regis summi honorem et iudicis potestatem et dei nomen accepit.

Therefore, because he proved so faithful, because he claimed absolutely nothing for himself, so as to fulfil the commands of him who sent him, he received both the dignity of an everlasting priest and the honour of supreme king, the power of judge, and the name of God.

Divine 4, chapter 15

4.15.1CSEL 19:329

Quoniam de secunda natiuitate diximus, qua se hominibus in carne monstrauit, ueniamus ad opera illa miranda, quae cum essent caelestis indicia uirtutis, magum Iudaei putauerunt.

Since we have spoken of the second birth, in which he showed himself to men in the flesh, let us come to those wonderful works which, though they were signs of heavenly power, the Jews thought were those of a magician.

4.15.2CSEL 19:329

cum primum coepit adolescere, tinctus est ab Iohanne propheta in Iordane flumine, ut lauacro spiritali peccata non sua, quae utique non habebat, sed carnis quam gerebat aboleret, ut quemadmodum Iudaeos suscepta circumcisione, sic etiam gentes baptismo id est purifici roris perfusione saluaret.

When he first began to grow up, he was dipped by John the prophet in the river Jordan, so that by a spiritual washing he might abolish not his own sins, which he certainly did not have, but those of the flesh which he bore; so that, as he saved the Jews by the circumcision he had received, so he might save the gentiles also by baptism, that is, by the pouring of the purifying dew.

4.15.3CSEL 19:329–330

tum uox audita de caelo est: filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. quae uox aput Dauid praedicta inuenitur. et descendit super eum spiritus dei formatus in specie columbae candidae.

Then a voice was heard from heaven: 'You are my Son; today I have begotten you.' This voice is found foretold in David. And the Spirit of God descended upon him, formed in the likeness of a white dove.

4.15.4CSEL 19:330

exinde maximas uirtutes coepit operari, non praestrigiis magicis, quae nihil ueri ac solidi ostentant, sed ui ac potestate caelesti: quae iam pridem prophetis nuntiantibus canebantur.

From then on he began to work very great mighty works, not by magical sleights of hand, which show nothing true and solid, but by heavenly force and power, which had long before been sung by the prophets announcing them.

4.15.5CSEL 19:330

quae opera tam multa sunt, ut unus liber ad conplectenda omnia satis non sit. enumerabo igitur illa breuiter atque generatim sine ulla personarum ac locorum designatione, ut ad exponendam passionis eius crucisque rationem possim peruenire, quo iam dudum festinat oratio.

These works are so many that one book would not be enough to include them all. I will list them briefly, then, and in general, without naming persons and places, so that I may reach the explanation of his passion and cross, toward which my discourse has long been hastening.

4.15.6CSEL 19:330

uirtutes eius fuerunt quas Apollo portentificas appellauit, quod quacumque iter faciebat, aegros ac debiles et omni morborum genere laborantes uno uerbo unoque momento reddebat incolumes, adeo ut membris omnibus capti receptis repente uiribus roborati ipsi lectulos suos reportarent, in quibus fuerant paulo ante delati.

His mighty works were those which Apollo called portentous: wherever he journeyed, he restored the sick and the feeble and those suffering from every kind of disease to health with one word and in one moment, so that men disabled in all their limbs, suddenly strengthened with recovered powers, themselves carried back the pallets on which they had been brought a little before.

4.15.7CSEL 19:330

claudis uero ac pedum uitio adflictis non modo gradiendi, sed etiam currendi dabat facultatem. tum quorum caeca lumina in altissimis tenebris erant, eorum oculos in pristinum restituebat aspectum.

To the lame and those afflicted in their feet he gave the ability not only to walk but even to run. Then those whose eyes were in deepest darkness, he restored to their former sight.

4.15.8CSEL 19:330

mutorum quoque linguas in eloquium sermonemque soluebat item surdorum patefactis auribus insinuabat auditum, pollutos et aspersos maculis repurgabat.

He also loosed the tongues of the dumb into speech and discourse, likewise opened the ears of the deaf and gave them hearing, and cleansed the polluted and spotted.

4.15.9CSEL 19:330–331

et haec omnia non manibus aut aliqua medella, sed uerbo ac iussione faciebat, sicut etiam Sibylla praedixerat: πάντα λόγῳ πράσσων πᾶσάν τε νόσον θεραπεύων

And he did all these things not with his hands or with any remedy, but by word and command, as the Sibyl too had foretold: 'Doing all things by a word, and healing every disease.'

4.15.10CSEL 19:331

nec utique mirum quod uerbo faceret mirabilia, cum ipse esset dei uerbum caelesti uirtute ac potestate subnixum.

Nor indeed is it strange that he did wonders by a word, since he himself was the Word of God, upheld by heavenly power and might.

4.15.11CSEL 19:331

nec satis fuit quod uires inbecillis redderet, quod debilibus integritatem, quod aegris et languentibus sanitatem, nisi etiam mortuos suscitaret uelut e somno solutos ad uitamque reuocaret.

Nor was it enough that he gave strength to the weak, soundness to the disabled, health to the sick and languishing, unless he also raised the dead, recalling them to life as if released from sleep.

4.15.12CSEL 19:331

quae uidentes tunc Iudaei daemonica potentia fieri arguebant, cum omnia sic futura ut facta sunt arcanae illorum litterae continerent.

Seeing these things, the Jews of that time charged that they were done by demonic power, although their own secret writings contained that everything would happen just as it did.

4.15.13CSEL 19:331–332

legebant quippe cum aliorum prophetarum tum Esaiae uerba dicentis: confortamini, manus resolutae, et genua debilia, consolamini. qui estis pusilli animi, nolite timere, nolite metuere. deus noster iudicium retribuet, ipse ueniet et saluos faciet nos.

For they read the words of other prophets and of Isaiah, who says: 'Be strong, you slack hands and feeble knees; be comforted, you who are faint-hearted; do not fear, do not be afraid. Our God will repay judgment; he himself will come and save us.

4.15.14CSEL 19:332

tunc aperientur oculi caecorum et aures surdorum audient: tunc saliet clodus sicut ceruus et plana erit lingua mutorum, quia rupta est in deserto aqua et riuus in terra sitienti.

Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened and the ears of the deaf shall hear; then the lame shall leap like a deer, and the tongue of the dumb shall be clear, because water has broken out in the wilderness and a stream in the thirsty land.'

4.15.15CSEL 19:332

sed et Sibylla eadem cecinit his uersibus: νεκρῶν δὲ ἀνάστασις ἔσται καὶ χωλῶν δρόμος ὠκύτατος καὶ κωφὸς ἀκούσει καὶ τυφλοὶ βλέψουσι, λαλήσουσ᾽ οὐ λαλέοντες.

And the Sibyl too sang the same things in these verses: 'There shall be a resurrection of the dead, and the swiftest running of the lame, and the deaf shall hear, and the blind shall see, those who do not speak shall speak.'

4.15.16CSEL 19:332–333

ob has eius uirtutes et opera diuina cum magna illum multitudo sequeretur uel debilium uel aegrorum uel eorum qui curandos suos offerre cupiebant, ascendit in montem quendam desertum, ut ibi adoraret. ubi cum triduo moratus esset ac fame populus laboraret, uocauit discipulos suos quaerens quantos secum cibos gestarent. at illi quinque panes et duos pisces in para se habere dixerunt. adferri ea iussit ac multitudinem per quinquagenos distributam discumbere.

Because of these mighty works and divine deeds of his, when a great multitude followed him, of the disabled, the sick, or those who wished to bring their own to be healed, he went up into a certain desert mountain to pray there. When he had stayed there three days and the people were suffering from hunger, he called his disciples and asked how much food they had with them. They said they had five loaves and two fishes in their bag. He ordered these to be brought, and the multitude to sit down, divided into groups of fifty.

4.15.17CSEL 19:333

quod dum discipuli faciunt, frangebat ipse panem minutatim carnemque piscium comminuebat: et utraque in manibus eius augebantur. et cum adponere illa populo discipulis imperasset, saturata sunt quinque milia hominum et insuper duodecim cophini de residuis fragminibus inpleti. quid aut dici aut fieri potest mirabilius?

While the disciples were doing this, he himself broke the bread into small pieces and divided the flesh of the fishes, and both increased in his hands. And when he had commanded the disciples to set them before the people, five thousand men were filled, and besides that twelve baskets were filled with the fragments left over. What can be said or done more wonderful?

4.15.18CSEL 19:333–334

at id futurum Sibylla cecinerat olim, cuius uersus tales feruntur: ἐκ τ ἄρτων ἅμα πέντε καὶ ἰχθύος εἰναλίοιο ἀνδρῶν χιλιάδας ἐν ἐρήμῳ πέντε κορέσσει καὶ τὰ περισσεύοντα λαβὼν μετὰ κλάσματα πάντα, δώδεκα πληρώσει κοφίνους εἰς ἐλπίδα λαῶν.

Yet the Sibyl had long ago sung that this would happen; her verses are reported as follows: 'From five loaves together and a fish of the sea he will satisfy five thousand men in the wilderness; and taking up all the fragments that remain, he will fill twelve baskets for the hope of the peoples.'

4.15.19CSEL 19:334

quaero igitur quid hic potuerit ars magica moliri, cuius peritia nihil aliut quam ad circumscribendos oculos ualet.

I ask, then, what magic art could have contrived here, whose skill avails for nothing but deceiving the eyes?

4.15.20CSEL 19:334

idem secessurus orandi gratia, sicut solebat, in montem praecepit discipulis, ut nauiculam sumerent seque praecederent. atque illi urguente iam uespera profecti contrario uento laborare coeperunt.

The same one, about to withdraw to a mountain to pray, as he was accustomed, ordered his disciples to take a boat and go ahead of him. And they, setting out as evening was pressing on, began to struggle against a contrary wind.

4.15.21CSEL 19:334

cumque iam medium fretum tenerent, tum pedibus mare ingressus consecutus est eos tamquam in solido gradiens, non ut poetae Orionem mentiuntur in pelago incedentem, qui demersa corporis parte umero supereminet undas.

And when they were already in the middle of the sea, he entered the sea on foot and overtook them, walking as on solid ground; not as the poets falsely say of Orion, advancing through the deep, who, with part of his body submerged, rises above the waves with his shoulder.

4.15.22CSEL 19:334

et rursus cum obdormisset in naui ac uentus usque ad extremum periculum saeuire coepisset, excitatus e somno silere uentum protinus iussit et fluctus qui maximi ferebantur conquiescere: statimque sub uerbo eius tranquillitas insecuta est.

And again, when he had fallen asleep in the ship and the wind began to rage to the point of extreme danger, roused from sleep he at once ordered the wind to be silent and the waves, which were rolling very high, to be still; and immediately at his word calm followed.

4.15.23CSEL 19:334

mentiuntur fortasse litterae sanctae docentes tantam fuisse in eo potestatem, ut imperio suo cogeret uentos obsequi, maria seruire, morbos cedere, inferos oboedire.

Perhaps the holy writings lie in teaching that there was such power in him that by his command he compelled the winds to obey, the seas to serve, diseases to yield, the underworld to submit.

4.15.24CSEL 19:334–335

quid quod eadem Sibyllae carminibus suis ante docuerunt? quarum una, cuius supra fecimus mentionem, sic ait: τοὺς ἀνέμους παύσειε λόγῳ, στρώσει δὲ θάλασσαν μαινομένην ποσὶν εἰρήνης πίστει τε πατήσας.

What of the fact that the Sibyls taught the same things beforehand in their verses? One of them, whom we mentioned above, says thus: 'He will stop the winds with a word, and will calm the raging sea, treading it with feet of peace and in faith.'

4.15.25CSEL 19:335–336

et rursus alia, quae dicit: κύματα πεζεύσει, νόσον ἀνθρώπων ἀπολύσει, στήσει τεθνηῶτας, ἀπώσεται ἄλγεα πολλὰ, ἐκ δὲ μιῆς πήρης ἄρτου κόρος ἔσσεται ἀνδρῶν.

And again another, who says: 'He will walk on the waves, he will release men from disease, he will raise the dead, he will drive away many pains, and from one wallet of bread there shall be a fill for men.'

4.15.26CSEL 19:336

his testimoniis quidam relicti solent eo confugere, ut aiant non esse illa carmina Sibyllina, sed a nostris ficta atque conposita.

Some, left without resource by these testimonies, usually take refuge in saying that these are not Sibylline verses, but were invented and composed by our people.

4.15.27CSEL 19:336

quod profecto non putabit qui Ciceronem Varronemque legerit aliosque ueteres, qui Erythraeam Sibyllam ceterasque commemorant, quarum ex libris ista exempla proferimus: qui auctores ante obierunt quam Christus secundum carnem nasceretur.

Surely no one will think this who has read Cicero and Varro and other ancients, who mention the Erythraean Sibyl and the others, from whose books we bring forward these examples; and those authors died before Christ was born according to the flesh.

4.15.28CSEL 19:336

uerum non dubito quin illa carmina prioribus temporibus pro deliramentis habita sint, cum ea nemo intellegeret, denuntiabant enim monstruosa quaedam miracula, quorum nec ratio nec tempus nec auctor designabatur.

But I do not doubt that in earlier times those verses were held to be ravings, since no one understood them; for they announced certain monstrous wonders, of which neither the reason, nor the time, nor the author was indicated.

4.15.29CSEL 19:336–337

denique Erythraea fore ait ut diceretur insana et mendax. ait enim: φήσουσι Σιβλλην μαινομένην, ψευστείραν· ἐπὰν δὲ γένηται ἅπαντα, τηνίκα μου μνήμην ποιήσετε κοὐκέτι μ᾽ οὐδεὶς μαινομένην φήσειε, θεοῦ μεγάλοιο προφῆτιν.

Finally, the Erythraean Sibyl says it would come to pass that she would be called mad and a liar. For she says: 'They will call the Sibyl mad, a liar; but when all things come to pass, then you will remember me, and no one will any longer call me mad, but a prophetess of the great God.'

4.15.30CSEL 19:337

iacuerunt igitur multis saeculis, postea uero animaduersa sunt quam natiuitas Christi et passio patefecit arcana, sicut etiam uoces prophetarum. quae cum per annos mille quingentos et eo amplius lectae fuissent a populo Iudaeorum, nec tamen intellectae (sunt) nisi postquam illas Christus et uerbo et operibus interpretatus est —

They lay neglected, then, for many ages, but were noticed after the birth and passion of Christ laid open their secrets, just as with the words of the prophets too. These, though they had been read by the Jewish people for fifteen hundred years and more, were ⟨still⟩ not understood until Christ interpreted them by word and deeds;

4.15.31CSEL 19:337

illum enim prophetae adnuntiauerant — nec ullo modo poterant quae illi loquebantur intellegi, nisi fuissent uniuersa conpleta.

for the prophets had announced him; nor could what they said be understood in any way unless all had been fulfilled.

Divine 4, chapter 16

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Venio nunc ad ipsam passionem, quae uelut obprobrium nobis obiectari solet, quod et hominem et ab hominibus insigni supplicio adfectum et cruciatum colamus, ut doceam eam ipsam passionem adeo cum magna et diuina ratione susceptam et in ea sola et uirtutem et ueritatem et sapientiam contineri.

I come now to the passion itself, which is often thrown at us as a reproach, that we worship a man, and one who was afflicted and tortured by men with a notorious punishment; so that I may show that that very passion was undertaken with great and divine purpose, and that in it alone are contained virtue, truth, and wisdom.

4.16.2CSEL 19:337

neque enim si beatissimus in terra fuisset et per omnem uitam in summa felicitate regnasset, quisquam illum sapiens aut deum credidisset aut honore diuino dignum iudicasset: quod faciunt uerae diuinitatis expertes, qui caducas opes et fragilem potentiam et alieni beneficii bona non tantum suspiciunt, uerum etiam consecrant et scientes memoriae mortuorum deseruiunt fortunam iam extinctam colentes, quam ne uiuam quidem praesentemque sapientes colendam sibi umquam putauerunt.

For if he had been most fortunate on earth and had reigned in the highest prosperity all his life, no wise man would have believed him God or judged him worthy of divine honour; which is what those without true divinity do, who not only look up to perishable wealth, frail power, and goods that are the gift of others, but even consecrate them, and knowingly devote themselves to the memory of the dead, worshipping a fortune already extinct, which wise men never thought should be worshipped even while it was alive and present.

4.16.3CSEL 19:337–338

nec enim potest aliquid in rebus terrenis esse uenerabile caeloque dignum, sed sola est uirtus, sola iustitia quae potest uerum bonum et caeleste et perpetuum iudicari, quia nec datur cuiquam nec aufertur.

For nothing in earthly things can be venerable and worthy of heaven; virtue alone, justice alone, can be judged a true, heavenly, and everlasting good, because it is neither given to anyone nor taken away.

4.16.4CSEL 19:338

qua uirtute ac iustitia quoniam Christus instructus uenit in terram, immo uero quoniam ipse uirtus et ipse iustitia est, descendit, ut eam doceret hominemque formaret. quo magisterio ac dei legatione perfunctus ob eam ipsam uirtutem, quam simul et docuit et fecit, ab omnibus gentibus et meruit et potuit deus credi.

Since Christ came to earth equipped with this virtue and justice, or rather, since he himself is virtue and himself justice, he came down to teach it and to form man. Having fulfilled this office of teacher and embassy from God, because of that very virtue which he both taught and practised, he both deserved and was able to be believed God by all nations.

4.16.5CSEL 19:338

ergo cum magnus populus ad eum uel ob iustitiam quam docebat uel ob miracula quae faciebat subinde conflueret et praecepta eius audiret et a deo missum deique filium crederet, tum primores Iudaeorum ac sacerdotes et ira stimulati, quod ab eo tamquam peccatores increpabantur, et inuidia deprauati, quod confluente ad eum multitudine contemni se ac deseri uidebant, et, quod caput sceleris illorum fuit, stultitia et errore caecati et inmemores praeceptorum caelestium ac prophetarum coierunt aduersus eum inpiumque consilium de eo tollendo cruciandoque ceperunt: quod prophetae multo ante descripserant.

So when a great people kept flocking to him, either because of the justice he taught or the miracles he did, and heard his precepts and believed that he was sent from God and was the Son of God, then the leaders of the Jews and the priests, spurred by anger because he rebuked them as sinners, and depraved by envy because they saw themselves despised and deserted as the multitude flocked to him, and, what was the head of their crime, blinded by folly and error and forgetful of the heavenly precepts and the prophets, conspired against him and formed the impious plan of removing and torturing him; which the prophets had described long before.

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nam et Dauid in principio psalmorum suorum prouidens in spiritu quantum facinus admissuri essent, beatum esse ait qui non abierit in consilio inpiorum.

For David too, at the beginning of his psalms, foreseeing in the spirit how great a crime they would commit, says that blessed is he who has not walked in the counsel of the impious.

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et Solomon in libro sapientiae his uerbis usus est: circumueniamus iustum, quoniam insuauis est nobis et exprobrat nobis peccata legis. promittit scientiam dei se habere et filium dei se nominat. factus est nobis in traductionem cogitationum nostrarum, grauis est nobis etiam ad uidendum, quoniam dissimilis est aliis uita illius et mutatae sunt uiae illius.

And Solomon in the book of Wisdom used these words: 'Let us lie in wait for the just man, because he is unpleasant to us and reproaches us with sins against the law. He professes to have the knowledge of God and names himself the son of God. He has become to us a reproof of our thoughts; he is grievous to us even to behold, because his life is unlike others' and his ways are changed.

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tamquam nugaces aestimati sumus ab eo, continet se a uiis nostris quasi ab inmunditiis et praefert nouissima iustorum et gloriatur patrem dominum. uideamus ergo si sermones illius ueri sunt, et temptemus quae euentura sunt illi.

We are esteemed by him as triflers; he keeps himself from our ways as from uncleanness, and he prefers the latter end of the just and boasts of God as his father. Let us see, then, whether his words are true, and let us test what will happen to him.

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contumelia et tormenta interrogemus eum, et sciamus reuerentiam illius et probemus patientiam illius. morte turpissima condemnemus eum.

Let us examine him with insult and torment, and know his reverence and prove his patience. Let us condemn him to a most shameful death.

4.16.10CSEL 19:340

haec cogitauerunt, et errauerant: excaecauit enim illos stultitia ipsorum et nescierunt sacramenta dei. nonne ita descripsit nefarium illud consilium ab inpiis initum contra deum, ut plane interfuisse uideatur? atquin a Solomone qui haec cecinit usque ad id tempus quo gesta res est mille ac decem anni fuerunt.

These things they thought, and they went astray; for their own folly blinded them, and they did not know the mysteries of God.' Did he not so describe that wicked plan formed by the impious against God that he seems to have been present? And yet from Solomon, who sang these things, to the time when the deed was done, there were a thousand and ten years.

4.16.11CSEL 19:340–341

nihil nos adfingimus, nihil addimus: habebant haec qui fecerunt, legebant in quos haec dicta sunt. sed et nunc heredes nominis ac sceleris illorum et habent et damnationem suam prophetarum uoce praedictam cottidianis lectionibus personant nec aliquando in cor suum, quae pars est et ipsa damnationis, admittunt.

We invent nothing, we add nothing: those who did it had these writings; those against whom these things were said read them. And even now the heirs of their name and crime both have them and daily sound out in their readings their own condemnation foretold by the voice of the prophets, and never admit it into their heart, which is itself part of their condemnation.

4.16.12CSEL 19:341

increpiti ergo a Christo saepe Iudaei exprobrante illis peccata et iniustitiam et a populo paene deserti concitati sunt ad eum necandum: cuius rei audaciam dedit illis humilitas eius.

So the Jews, often rebuked by Christ as he reproached them for their sins and injustice, and almost deserted by the people, were stirred up to kill him; and his humility gave them the boldness for this.

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nam cum legerent cum quanta uirtute et claritate filius dei uenturus esset e caelo, Iesum autem cernerent humilem sordidum informem, non credebant filium dei esse ignorantes duos eius aduentus a prophetis esse praedictos, primum in humilitate carnis obscurum, secundum in fortitudine maiestatis manifestum. de primo Dauid in psalmo LXXI sic ait:

For when they read with what power and glory the Son of God would come from heaven, but saw Jesus humble, lowly, and without beauty, they did not believe him to be the Son of God, not knowing that two comings of his had been foretold by the prophets: the first obscure in the humility of the flesh, the second manifest in the might of majesty. Of the first David speaks thus in Psalm 71:

4.16.14CSEL 19:341

descendet sicut pluuia in uellus, et orietur in diebus eius iustitia et abundantia pacis, donec extollatur luna. sicut enim pluuia si descendat in uellus, animaduerti non potest, quia strepitum non facit, ita Christum in terram sine cuiusquam suspicione uenturum esse dixit, ut iustitiam doceat et pacem. Esaias quoque ita tradidit:

'He shall come down like rain upon a fleece, and in his days justice shall rise and abundance of peace, until the moon is taken away.' For as rain, if it falls on a fleece, cannot be noticed, because it makes no noise, so he said that Christ would come to earth without anyone's suspecting it, to teach justice and peace. Isaiah too handed it down thus:

4.16.15CSEL 19:341–342

domine, quis credidit auditui nostro et bracchium dei cui reuelatum est? adnuntiauimus coram ipso sicut pueri et sicut radix in terra sitienti. non est figura eius neque claritas: et uidimus illum, et non habuit figuram neque decorem, sed figura eius sine honore et deficiens praeter ceteros homines. homo in plaga positus et sciens ferre inbecillitatem, quia auersus est et non est conputatus.

'Lord, who has believed our report, and to whom has the arm of God been revealed? We announced before him like children, and like a root in a thirsty land. He has no form nor glory; and we saw him, and he had no form nor beauty, but his form was without honour and failing beyond other men. A man set among blows and knowing how to bear weakness, because he was turned away and was not esteemed.

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hic peccata nostra portat et pro nobis dolet, et nos putauimus ipsum esse in dolore et in plaga et in uexatione: ipse autem uulneratus est propter facinora nostra et infirmatus est propter peccata nostra. doctrina pacis nostrae super illum, liuore eius nos sanati sumus. omnes sicut oues errauimus, et deus tradidit illum pro peccatis nostris.

He bears our sins and grieves for us, and we thought him to be in pain and in blows and in affliction; but he was wounded for our crimes and weakened for our sins. The discipline of our peace was upon him; by his bruise we are healed. We all have gone astray like sheep, and God handed him over for our sins.'

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et Sibylla eodem modo: οἰκτρὸς ἄτιμος ἄμορφος, ἐν οἰκτροῖς ἐλπίδα δώσει. propter hanc humilitatem deum suum non adgnoscentes inierunt consilium detestandum, ut priuarent eum uita qui ut eos uiuificaret aduenerat.

And the Sibyl in the same way: 'Pitiable, dishonoured, unsightly, he will give hope to the pitiable.' Because of this humility, not recognizing their God, they formed a detestable plan to deprive of life him who had come to give them life.

Divine 4, chapter 17

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Sed irae atque inuidiae suae, quam in cordibus suis gerebant intus inclusam, alias causas praeferebant: quod legem dei per Moysen datam solueret, id est quod sabbatis non uacaret operans in salutem hominum, quod circumcisionem uacuefaceret, quod abstinentiam suillae carnis auferret:

But they put forward other reasons for the anger and envy they carried shut up in their hearts: that he was dissolving the law of God given through Moses, that is, that he did not rest on the sabbaths, working for people's salvation; that he was making circumcision void; that he was removing the abstinence from pork:

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in quibus rebus Iudaicae religionis sacramenta consistunt. ob haec itaque cetera pars populi, quae nondum ad Christum secesserat, a sacerdotibus incitabatur ut inpium iudicaret eum, quod legem dei solueret, cum hoc ille non suo iudicio, sed ex dei uoluntate et secundum praedicta faceret prophetarum.

in which things the sacred rites of the Jewish religion consist. For these reasons, then, the rest of the people, who had not yet gone over to Christ, were incited by the priests to judge him impious for dissolving the law of God, although he did this not by his own judgment but by the will of God and according to the predictions of the prophets.

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Micheas enim nouam legem datuiri denuntiauit hoc modo: lex de Sion proficiscetur et sermo domini ab Hierusalem. et iudicabit inter plurimos populos et reuincet et detege ualidas nationes.

For Micah announced that a new law would be given, in this way: 'The law shall go forth from Zion and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge between many peoples and shall rebuke and lay bare strong nations.'

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illa enim prior lex quae per Moysen data est, non in monte Sion, sed in monte Choreb data est quam Sibylla fore ut a filio dei solueretur ostendit: † ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ ταῦτα πάντα τελειωθῇ ἅπερ εἶπον, εἰς αὐτὸν τότε πᾶς λύεται νόμος.

For that former law, which was given through Moses, was given not on Mount Zion but on Mount Horeb; and the Sibyl showed that it would be dissolved by the Son of God: 'But when all these things are fulfilled which I have spoken, then the whole law is dissolved into him.'

4.17.5CSEL 19:344–345

sed et ipse Moyses, per quem sibi datam legem dum pertinaciter tuentur, exciderunt a deo et deum non adgnouerunt, praedixerat fore ut propheta maximus mitteretur a deo, qui sit supra legem, qui uoluntatem dei ad homines perferat.

But Moses himself too, through whom they, while stubbornly guarding the law given to them, fell away from God and did not know God, had foretold that a very great prophet would be sent by God, who would be above the law, who would bring God's will to men.

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in Deuteronomio ita scriptum reliquit: et dixit dominus ad me: prophetam excitabo eis de fratribus eorum sicut te et dabo uerbum meum in os eius, et loquetur ad eos ea quae praecepero ei. et quisque non audierit ea quae loquetur propheta ille in nomine meo, ego uindicabo in eum.

In Deuteronomy he left it written thus: 'And the Lord said to me: I will raise up for them a prophet from among their brothers like you, and I will put my word in his mouth, and he shall speak to them what I command him. And whoever does not hear the things that prophet shall speak in my name, I will take vengeance on him.'

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denuntiauit scilicet deus per ipsum legiferum quod filium suum id est uiuam praesentemque legem missurus esset et illam ueterem per mortalem datam soluturus, ut denuo per eum qui esset aeternus, legem sanciret aeternam.

God announced, namely through the lawgiver himself, that he would send his Son, that is, a living and present law, and would dissolve that old one given through a mortal, so that through him who was eternal he might establish an eternal law anew.

4.17.8CSEL 19:345–346

item de circumcisione soluenda Esaias ita prophetauit: haec dicit dominus uiris Iuda et qui inhabitant in Hierusalem: renouate inter uos nouitatem et ne seminaueritis in spinis. circumcidite uos deo uestro et circumcidite praeputium cordis uestri, ne exeat ira mea sicut ignis et non sit qui extinguat item Moyses ipse:

Likewise about the dissolving of circumcision Isaiah prophesied thus: 'Thus says the Lord to the men of Judah and those who dwell in Jerusalem: Renew newness among yourselves, and do not sow among thorns. Circumcise yourselves to your God and circumcise the foreskin of your heart, lest my anger go forth like fire and there be none to quench it.' Likewise Moses himself:

4.17.9CSEL 19:346

in nouissimis diebus circumcidet deus cor tuum ad dominum deum tuum amandum. item Iesus Naue successor eius: et dixit dominus ad Iesum: fac tibi cultellos petrinos nimis acutos et sede et circumcide secundo filios Israhel.

'In the last days God will circumcise your heart to love the Lord your God.' Likewise Jesus son of Nun, his successor: 'And the Lord said to Jesus: Make for yourself stone knives, very sharp, and sit and circumcise the children of Israel a second time.'

4.17.10CSEL 19:346

secundam circumcisionem futuram esse dixit non carnis, sicut fuit prima, qua etiamnunc Iudaei utuntur, sed cordis ac spiritus, quam tradidit Christus, qui uerus Iesus fuit.

He said that there would be a second circumcision, not of the flesh, as the first was, which the Jews still practise, but of the heart and spirit, which Christ handed down, who was the true Jesus.

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non enim propheta sic ait et dixit dominus ad me, sed ad Iesum, ut ostenderet quod non de se loqueretur, sed de Christo, ad quem tum deus loquebatur.

For the prophet does not say, 'And the Lord said to me', but 'to Jesus', to show that he was not speaking of himself but of Christ, to whom God was then speaking.

4.17.12CSEL 19:346–347

Christi enim figuram gerebat ille Iesus. qui cum primum Auses uocaretur, Moyses futura praesentiens iussit eum Iesum uocari, ut quoniam dux militiae delectus esset aduersus Amalech, qui obpugnabat filios Israhel, et aduersarium debellaret per nominis figuram et populum in terram promissionis induceret.

For that Jesus bore the figure of Christ. When he was first called Auses, Moses, foreseeing the future, ordered him to be called Jesus, so that, since he had been chosen commander of the army against Amalek, who was attacking the children of Israel, he might both defeat the adversary through the figure of the name and lead the people into the land of promise.

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et idcirco etiam Moysi successit, ut ostenderetur nouam legem per Christum Iesum datam ueteri legi successuram, quae data per Moysen fuit.

And for this reason he also succeeded Moses, to show that the new law given through Christ Jesus would succeed the old law, which was given through Moses.

4.17.14CSEL 19:347

nam illa carnis circumcisio caret utique ratione, quia si deus id uellet, sic a principio formasset hominem, ut praeputium non haberet: sed huius secundae circumcisionis figura erat significans nudandum esse pectus, id est aperto et simplici corde oportere nos uiuere, quoniam pars illa corporis quae circumciditur habet quandam similitudinem cordis et est pudenda.

For that circumcision of the flesh certainly lacks reason, because if God wanted it, he would have formed man from the beginning without a foreskin; but it was a figure of this second circumcision, signifying that the breast must be laid bare, that is, that we ought to live with an open and simple heart, since that part of the body which is circumcised has a certain likeness to the heart and is shameful.

4.17.15CSEL 19:347

ob hanc causam deus nudari eam iussit, ut hoc argumento nos admoneret, ne inuolutum pectus habeamus, id est ne quod pudendum facinus intra conscientiae secreta uelemus. haec est cordis circumcisio, de qua prophetae loquuntur:

For this reason God ordered it to be bared, so as to warn us by this token not to have a wrapped-up breast, that is, not to veil any shameful deed within the secrets of conscience. This is the circumcision of the heart of which the prophets speak,

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quam deus a carne mortali ad animam transtulit, quae sola mansura est.

which God transferred from the mortal flesh to the soul, which alone will endure.

4.17.17CSEL 19:347–348

uolens enim uitae ac saluti nostrae pro aeterna sua pietate consulere, paenitentiam nobis in illa circumcisione proposuit, ut si cor nudauerimus, id est si peccata nostra confessi satis deo fecerimus, ueniam consequamur, quae contumacibus et admissa sua celantibus denegatur ab eo qui non faciem sicut homo, sed intima et arcana pectoris intuetur.

For, wishing in his eternal kindness to provide for our life and salvation, he set repentance before us in that circumcision: so that if we lay bare our heart, that is, if we confess our sins and make satisfaction to God, we may obtain pardon, which is denied to the obstinate and those who conceal their misdeeds by him who looks not on the face, as man does, but on the inmost and secret things of the heart.

4.17.18CSEL 19:348

eodem spectat etiam carnis suillae interdictio. qua cum eos abstinere deus iussit, id potissimum uoluit intellegi, ut se peccatis atque inmunditiis abstinerent.

The prohibition of pork looks to the same end. When God ordered them to abstain from it, he wished it to be understood above all that they should abstain from sins and uncleanness.

4.17.19CSEL 19:348

est enim lutulentum hoc animal et inmundum nec umquam caelum aspicit, sed in terram toto et corpore et ore proiectum uentri semper et pabulo seruit, nec ullum alium cum uiuit praestare usum potest sicut ceterae animantes, quae uel sedendi uehiculum praebent uel in cultibus agrorum iuuant uel plaustra collo trahunt uel onera tergo gestant uel indumentum exuuiis suis exhibent uel copia lactis exuberant uel custodiendis domibus inuigilant.

For this animal is muddy and unclean and never looks at the sky, but, thrown down on the earth with its whole body and snout, always serves its belly and its fodder; nor can it provide any other use while it lives, as the other animals do, which either provide a vehicle to sit on, or help in cultivating the fields, or draw carts with their necks, or carry loads on their backs, or provide clothing from their hides, or abound in plenty of milk, or keep watch in guarding houses.

4.17.20CSEL 19:348

interdixit ergo ne porcina carne uterentur, id est ne uitam porcorum imitarentur, qui ad solam mortem nutriuntur, ne uentri ac uoluptatibus seruientes ad faciendam iustitiam inutiles essent ac morte adficerentur;

So he forbade them to use pork, that is, to imitate the life of pigs, which are fed only for death; lest, serving the belly and pleasures, they be useless for doing justice and be struck by death;

4.17.21CSEL 19:348–349

item ne se foedis libidinibus inmergerent sicut sus, qui se ingurgitat caeno, uel ne terrenis seruiant simulacris ac se luto inquinent. luto enim se oblinunt qui deos id est lutum terramque uenerantur. sic uniuersa praecepta Iudaicae legis ad exhibendam iustitiam spectant, quoniam per ambagem data sunt, ut per carnalium figuram spiritalia noscerentur.

likewise lest they plunge into foul lusts like the pig that wallows in the mud, or serve earthly images and defile themselves with clay. For those smear themselves with mud who worship gods, that is, mud and earth. So all the precepts of the Jewish law look to showing justice, since they were given in a figurative way, so that through the figure of the fleshly the spiritual might be known.

Divine 4, chapter 18

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Cum igitur ea quae deus fieri uoluit quaeque per prophetas suos multis saeculis ante praedixit, Christus inpleret, ob ea incitati et diuinas litteras nescientes coierunt, ut deum suum condemnarent.

So when Christ fulfilled the things that God willed to be done and had foretold through his prophets many ages before, they, stirred up by these things and ignorant of the divine writings, conspired to condemn their God.

4.18.2CSEL 19:349

quod cum sciret futurum ac subinde diceret oportere se pati atque interfici pro salute multorum, secessit tamen cum discipulis suis, non ut uitaret quod necesse erat perpeti ac sustinere, sed ut ostenderet quod ita fieri oporteat in omni persecutione, ne sua quis culpa incidisse uideatur; ac denuntiauit fore ut ab uno eorum proderetur.

Though he knew this would happen and said repeatedly that he must suffer and be killed for the salvation of many, he nevertheless withdrew with his disciples, not to avoid what had to be suffered and endured, but to show that in every persecution one should act so, lest anyone seem to have fallen into it by his own fault; and he announced that he would be betrayed by one of them.

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itaque Iudas praemio inlectus tradidit eum Iudaeis.

So Judas, enticed by a reward, handed him over to the Jews.

4.18.4CSEL 19:349

at illi conprehensum ac Pontio Pilato, qui tum legatus Syriam regebat, oblatum cruci adfigi postulauerunt obicientes ei nihil aliut nisi quod diceret se filium dei esse, regem Iudaeorum; item quia dixerat: si solueritis hoc templum, quod aedificatum est annis XLVI, ego illut in triduo sine manibus resuscitabo, significans futuram breui passionem suam et se a Iudaeis interfectum tertio die resurrecturum. ipse enim fuerat uerum dei templum.

They, having seized him and brought him to Pontius Pilate, who then governed Syria as legate, demanded that he be fixed to the cross, charging him with nothing else but that he said he was the Son of God, the king of the Jews; likewise because he had said: 'If you destroy this temple, which was built in forty-six years, I will raise it up in three days without hands', signifying his coming passion, and that, killed by the Jews, he would rise on the third day. For he himself was the true temple of God.

4.18.5CSEL 19:349–350

has uoces eius tamquam infaustas et inpias insectabantur. quae cum Pilatus audisset et ille in defensionem sui nihil diceret, pronuntiauit nihil in eo damnatione dignum uideri. at illi iniustissimi accusatores cum populo, quem incitauerant, subclamare coeperunt et crucem eius uiolentis uocibus flagitare.

They pursued these words of his as ill-omened and impious. When Pilate heard them, and he said nothing in his own defence, he pronounced that nothing in him seemed worthy of condemnation. But those most unjust accusers, with the people they had stirred up, began to shout and to demand his cross with violent cries.

4.18.6CSEL 19:350

tum Pontius et illorum clamoribus et Herodis tetrarchae instigatione metuentis, ne regno pelleretur; uictus est, nec tamen ipse sententiam protulit, sed tradidit eum Iudaeis, ut ipsi de illo secundum legem suam iudicarent.

Then Pontius was overcome both by their clamour and by the instigation of Herod the tetrarch, who feared he would be driven from his kingdom; yet he did not himself pronounce sentence, but handed him over to the Jews so that they might judge him according to their own law.

4.18.7CSEL 19:350

duxerunt igitur eum flagellis uerberatum et priusquam cruci adfigerent, inluserunt: indutum enim coloris punicei ueste ac spinis coronatum quasi regem salutarunt et dederunt ei cibum fellis et miscuerunt ei aceti potionem.

So they led him away, beaten with scourges, and before fixing him to the cross they mocked him: for having clothed him in a purple-coloured robe and crowned him with thorns, they saluted him as a king, and gave him gall for food and mixed him a drink of vinegar.

4.18.8CSEL 19:350

post haec conspuerunt faciem eius et palmis ceciderunt. cumque ipsi carnifices de uestimentis eius contenderent, sortiti sunt inter se de tunica et pallio.

After this they spat in his face and struck him with their palms. And when the executioners themselves quarrelled over his garments, they cast lots among themselves for his tunic and cloak.

4.18.9CSEL 19:350

et cum haec omnia fierent, nullam uocem ex ore suo, tamquam si mutus esset, emisit. tum suspenderunt eum inter duos noxios medium, qui ob latrocinia damnati erant, crucique fixerunt.

And while all these things were done, he uttered no word from his mouth, as if he were dumb. Then they hung him in the middle between two criminals, who had been condemned for robbery, and fixed him to the cross.

4.18.10CSEL 19:350–351

quid ego hic in tanto facinore deplorem aut quibus uerbis tantum nefas conquerar? non enim Gauianam crucem describimus, quam Marcus Tullius uniuersis eloquentiae suae neruis ac uiribus uelut effusis totius ingenii fontibus prosecutus est, facinus indignum esse proclamans ciuem Romanum contra omnes leges in crucem esse sublatum.

What shall I lament here in so great a crime, or with what words shall I bewail so great an outrage? For we are not describing the cross of Gavius, which Marcus Tullius pursued with all the sinews and strength of his eloquence, as if pouring out the fountains of his whole genius, proclaiming it an unworthy crime that a Roman citizen had been raised on a cross against all laws.

4.18.11CSEL 19:351

qui quamuis innocens fuerit et illo supplicio indignus, mortalis tamen et ab homine scelesto qui iustitiam ignoraret adfectus.

He, though he was innocent and unworthy of that punishment, was yet mortal, and was afflicted by a wicked man who did not know justice.

4.18.12CSEL 19:351

quid de huius crucis indignitate dicemus, in qua deus a cultoribus dei suspensus est atque subfixus? quis tam facundus et tanta rerum uerborumque copia instructus existet, quae oratio tantae affluentiae ubertate decurrens, ut illam crucem merito deploret, quam mundus ipse et tota mundi elementa luxerunt?

What shall we say of the indignity of this cross, on which God was hung and fastened by the worshippers of God? Who will be so eloquent, so equipped with abundance of matter and words, what speech running with such rich fullness, as to lament worthily that cross which the world itself and all the elements of the world mourned?

4.18.13CSEL 19:351

haec autem sic futura esse et prophetarum uocibus et Sibyllinis carminibus denuntiatum est. aput Esaiam ita scriptum inuenitur: non sum contumax neque contradico: dorsum meum posui ad flagella et maxillas meas ad palmas, faciem autem meam non auerti a foeditate sputorum. similiter Dauid in psalmo XXXIIII:

That these things would happen so was announced both by the voices of the prophets and by the Sibylline verses. In Isaiah it is found written thus: 'I am not rebellious nor do I contradict: I gave my back to the scourges and my cheeks to blows, and I did not turn away my face from the foulness of spitting.' Similarly David in Psalm 34:

4.18.14CSEL 19:351–352

congregata sunt in me flagella et ignorauerunt, dissoluti sunt nec conpuncti sunt: temptauerunt me et deriserunt derisum, striderunt super me dentibus suis.

'Scourges were gathered against me and they did not know; they were scattered and not pricked at heart; they tempted me and mocked me with mockery; they gnashed their teeth at me.'

4.18.15CSEL 19:352–353

Sibylla quoque eadem futura monstrauit: εἰς ἀνόμους χεῖρας καὶ ἀπίστων ὕστερον ἥξει, δώσουσι δὲ θεῷ ῥαπίσματα χερσὶν ἀνάγνοις, καὶ στόμασιν μιαροῖσι ἐμπτύσματα φαρμακόεντα· δώσει δ᾽ εἰς μάστιγας ἁπλῶς ἁγνὸν τότε νῶτον.

The Sibyl too showed the same things would happen: 'Afterwards he will come into the lawless hands of the faithless, and they will give God blows with unholy hands, and with polluted mouths poisonous spittings; and he will then simply give his holy back to the scourges.'

4.18.16CSEL 19:353

item de silentio eius, quod usque ad mortem pertinaciter tenuit, Esaias iterum sic locutus est: sicut ouis ad immolandum adductus est et sicut agnus coram tondentibus sine uoce, sic non aperuit os suum.

Likewise about his silence, which he kept steadfastly until death, Isaiah again spoke thus: 'As a sheep he was led to the slaughter, and as a lamb before the shearers is without voice, so he did not open his mouth.'

4.18.17CSEL 19:353–354

et Sibylla supra dicta: καὶ κολαφιζόμενος σιγήσει, μή τις ἐπιγνῶ τίς λόγος ἢ πόθεν ἦλθεν, ἵνα φθιμένοισι λαλήσει, καὶ στέφανον φορέσει τὴν ἀκάνθινον.

And the Sibyl mentioned above: 'And when struck he will be silent, lest anyone should know what word he is or whence he came, so that he may speak to the dead; and he will wear the crown of thorns.'

4.18.18CSEL 19:354

de cibo uero et potu, quem antequam figerent ei obtulerunt, Dauid in psalmo LXVIII sic ait: et dederunt in escam meam fel et in siti mea potum mihi dederunt acetum.

About the food and drink they offered him before they fixed him, David in Psalm 68 says thus: 'And they gave gall for my food, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink.'

4.18.19CSEL 19:354

idem hoc futurum etiam Sibylla contionata est: εἰς δὲ τὸ βρῶμα χολὴν καὶ εἰς δίψαν ὄξος ἔδωκαν, τῆς ἀφιλοξενίης ταύτην δείξουσι τράπεζαν.

The Sibyl too proclaimed that this would happen: 'They gave gall for food and vinegar for thirst; this table of inhospitality they will show.'

4.18.20CSEL 19:354–355

et alia Sibylla Iudaeam terram his increpat uersibus: αὐτὴ γὰρ δύσφρων, τὸν σὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἐνόησας παίζοντα θνητοῖσι νοήμασιν, ἀλλὰ ἀπ ἀκάνθης ἔστεψας στεφάνῳ φοβερὴν τε χολὴν ἐκέρασσας.

And another Sibyl rebukes the land of Judaea with these verses: 'For you yourself, senseless one, did not perceive your God playing with mortal thoughts, but crowned him with a crown of thorns and mixed dreadful gall.'

4.18.21CSEL 19:355

fore autem ut Iudaei manus inferrent deo suo eumque interficerent, testimonia prophetarum haec antecesserunt.

That the Jews would lay hands on their God and kill him, these testimonies of the prophets went before.

4.18.22CSEL 19:355–356

aput Hesdram ita scriptum est: et dixit Hesdras ad populum: hoc pascha saluator noster est et refugium nostrum. cogitate et ascendat in cor uestrum, quoniam habemus humiliare eum in signo: et post haec sperabimus in eum, ne deseratur hic locus in aeternum tempus, dicit dominus deus uirtutum. si non credideritis ei neque exaudieritis adnuntiationem eius, eritis derisio in gentibus.

In Ezra it is written thus: 'And Ezra said to the people: This passover is our Saviour and our refuge. Consider, and let it come up into your heart, that we are to humble him in a sign; and after this we shall hope in him, lest this place be deserted for all time, says the Lord God of hosts. If you do not believe him nor hearken to his proclamation, you will be a laughing-stock among the nations.'

4.18.23CSEL 19:356

unde apparet Iudaeos nullam aliam spem habere nisi se abluerint a sanguine ac sperauerint in eum ipsum quem necauerunt.

From which it appears that the Jews have no other hope unless they wash themselves from the blood and hope in the very one whom they killed.

4.18.24CSEL 19:356

Esaias quoque facinus eorum designat et dicit: in humilitate iudicium eius sublatam est. natiuitatem eius quis enarrabit? quoniam auferetur a terra uita eius, a facinoribus populi mei abductus est ad mortem. et dabo malos pro sepultura eius et diuites pro morte eius, quia facinus non fecit neque insidias ore suo locutus est.

Isaiah too indicates their crime and says: 'In humiliation his judgment was taken away. Who shall declare his generation? For his life is taken away from the earth; from the crimes of my people he was led to death. And I will give the wicked for his burial and the rich for his death, because he did no crime nor spoke treachery with his mouth.

4.18.25CSEL 19:356–357

propterea ipse consequetur multos et fortium diuidet spolia, propterea quod traditus est ad mortem et inter facinerosos deputatus est: et ipse peccata multorum pertulit et propter facinora illorum traditus est.

Therefore he shall obtain many and divide the spoils of the strong, because he was handed over to death and reckoned among the wicked; and he bore the sins of many and was handed over for their crimes.'

4.18.26CSEL 19:357

Dauid quoque in psalmo XCIII: captabunt in animam iusti et sanguinem innocentem condemnabunt, et factus est mihi dominus in refugium.

David too in Psalm 93: 'They will hunt after the soul of the just and condemn innocent blood; and the Lord has become my refuge.'

4.18.27CSEL 19:357–358

item Hieremias: domine, significa mihi, et cognoscam. tunc uidi meditationes eorum: ego sicut agnus sine malitia perductus sum ad uictimam: in me cogitauerunt cogitationem dicentes: uenite, mittamus lignum in panem eius et eradamus a terra uitam eius et nomen eius non erit in memoria amplius.

Likewise Jeremiah: 'Lord, make it known to me, and I shall know. Then I saw their thoughts: I was led like a lamb without malice to the sacrifice; they devised a plan against me, saying: Come, let us put wood into his bread, and let us wipe out his life from the earth, and his name shall be remembered no more.'

4.18.28CSEL 19:358

lignum autem crucem significat et panem corpus eius, quia ipse est cibus ac uita omnium qui credunt in carnem quam portauit et in crucem qua pependit.

The wood signifies the cross, and the bread his body, because he is the food and life of all who believe in the flesh which he bore and in the cross on which he hung.

4.18.29CSEL 19:358

de qua tamen apertius ipse Moyses in Deuteronomio ita praedicauit: et erit pendens uita tua ante oculos tuos, et timebis die ac nocte et non credes uitae tuae, idem rursus in Numeris: non quasi homo dominus suspenditur neque quasi filius hominis minas patitur. Zacharias etiam sic tradidit: et intuebuntur in me, quem transfixerunt.

Of this Moses himself foretold more plainly in Deuteronomy thus: 'And your life shall hang before your eyes, and you shall fear day and night, and you shall not believe in your life.' The same again in Numbers: 'The Lord is not hung up like a man, nor does he suffer threats like a son of man.' Zechariah also handed down thus: 'And they shall look on me whom they pierced.'

4.18.30CSEL 19:358–359

item Dauid in psalmo XXI: effoderunt manus meas et pedes meos, dinumerauerunt omnia ossa mea: ipsi autem contemplati sunt et uiderunt me et diuiserunt uestimenta mea sibi et super uestem meam sortem miserunt.

Likewise David in Psalm 21: 'They dug through my hands and my feet; they numbered all my bones. And they looked and saw me, and divided my garments among them, and on my robe they cast lots.'

4.18.31CSEL 19:359

quae utique propheta non de se locutus est. fuit enim rex et numquam illa perpessus est, sed spiritus dei per eum loquebatur, qui fuerat illa passurus post annos mille et quinquaginta, tot enim colliguntur anni a regno Dauid usque ad crucem Christi.

The prophet certainly did not say these things of himself. For he was a king and never suffered them; but the Spirit of God was speaking through him, who was to suffer them one thousand and fifty years later; for so many years are reckoned from the reign of David to the cross of Christ.

4.18.32CSEL 19:359–360

sed et Solomon filius eius, qui Hierosolymam condidit, eam ipsam perituram esse in ultionem sanctae crucis prophetauit: quodsi auertimini a me, dicit dominus, et non custodieritis ueritatem meam, reiciam Israhel a terra quam dedi illis, et domum hanc quam aedificaui illis in nomine meo, proiciam illam ex omnibus, et erit Israhel in perditionem et in inproperium populo, et domus haec erit deserta, et omnis qui transiet per illam admirabitur et dicet: propter quam rem deus fecit terrae huic et huic domui haec mala?

But Solomon too, his son, who founded Jerusalem, prophesied that it would perish in vengeance for the holy cross: 'But if you turn away from me, says the Lord, and do not keep my truth, I will cast Israel out of the land which I gave them, and this house which I built for them in my name I will cast out from all, and Israel shall be for destruction and a reproach to the people, and this house shall be deserted, and everyone who passes by it will marvel and say: Why has God done these evils to this land and to this house?

4.18.33CSEL 19:360

et dicent: quia reliquerunt dominum deum suum et persecuti sunt regem suum dilectissimum deo et cruciauerunt illum in humilitate magna: propter hoc inportauit illis deus mala haec.

And they will say: Because they forsook the Lord their God and persecuted their king, most beloved of God, and tortured him in great humiliation; for this reason God brought these evils upon them.'

Divine 4, chapter 19

4.19.1CSEL 19:360

Quid amplius iam de facinore Iudaeorum dici potest quam excaecatos tum fuisse atque insanabili furore correptos, qui haec cottidie legentes neque intellexerunt neque quin facerent cauere potuerunt?

What more can now be said of the crime of the Jews than that they were then blinded and seized by incurable madness, who, reading these things daily, neither understood them nor could keep from doing them?

4.19.2CSEL 19:360

suspensus igitur et adfixus exclamauit ad deum uoce magna et ultro spiritum posuit. et eadem hora terrae motus factus est et uelum templi quod separabat duo tabernacula scissum est in duas partes et sol repente subductus est et ab hora sexta usque in nonam tenebrae fuerunt.

So, hanging and fastened there, he cried out to God with a loud voice and of his own accord laid down his spirit. And at the same hour there was an earthquake, and the veil of the temple, which separated the two tabernacles, was torn into two parts, and the sun was suddenly withdrawn, and from the sixth hour until the ninth there was darkness.

4.19.3CSEL 19:360–361

qua de re Amos propheta testatur: et erit in illo die, dicit dominus, occidet sol meridie et obtenebrabitur dies lucis: et conuertam dies festos uestros in luctum et cantica uestra in lamentationem.

Of this the prophet Amos testifies: 'And it shall be in that day, says the Lord, the sun shall set at noon, and the day of light shall be darkened; and I will turn your feasts into mourning and your songs into lamentation.'

4.19.4CSEL 19:361

item Hieremias: exterrita est quae parit et taeduit anima, et subiuit sol ei, cum adhuc medius dies esset, contusa est et maledicta: reliquos eorum in gladium dabo in conspectu inimicorum eorum. et Sibylla:

Likewise Jeremiah: 'She who bears is terrified and her soul is weary, and the sun has gone down for her while it was still midday; she is crushed and cursed: the rest of them I will give to the sword in the sight of their enemies.' And the Sibyl:

4.19.5CSEL 19:361–362

ναοῦ δὲ σχισθῆ τὸ πέτασμα, καὶ ἤματι μέσσῳ νὺξ ἔσται σκοτόεσσα πελώριος ἐν τρίσιν ὤραις.

'The veil of the temple shall be torn, and at midday there shall be a dark, monstrous night for three hours.'

4.19.6CSEL 19:362

cum haec facta essent, ne prodigiis quidem caelestibus facinus suum intellegere quiuerunt, sed quoniam praedixerat se tertio die ab inferis resurrecturum, metuentes ne a discipulis subrepto et amoto corpore uniuersi resurrexisse eum crederent et fieret multo maior in plebe confusio, detraxerunt eum cruci et conclusum in monumento firmiter militari custodia circumdederunt.

When these things had happened, not even by the heavenly portents could they understand their crime; but since he had foretold that he would rise from the dead on the third day, fearing that if his body were stolen and removed by the disciples everyone would believe he had risen, and far greater confusion would arise among the people, they took him down from the cross, shut him in a tomb, and surrounded it firmly with a military guard.

4.19.7CSEL 19:362

uerum tertio die ante lucem terrae motu repente facto patefactum est sepulcrum et custodibus quos adtonitos obstupefecerat pauor nihil uidentibus integer e sepulcro ac uiuus egressus in Galilaeam profectus est, ut discipulos suos quaereret, in sepulcro uero nihil repertum est nisi exuuiae, quibus conuolutum corpus incluserant.

But on the third day before dawn, an earthquake suddenly occurred, the tomb was opened, and while the guards, whom fear had struck dumb and dazed, saw nothing, he came out of the tomb whole and alive and set out for Galilee to seek his disciples; in the tomb nothing was found but the grave-clothes in which they had wrapped and enclosed the body.

4.19.8CSEL 19:362–363

illum autem aput inferos non remansurum, sed die tertio resurrecturum prophetae cecinerant. David in psalmo XV: non derelinques animam meam ad inferos neque dabis sanctum tuum uidere interitum. item in tertio: ego dormiui et somnum cepi, et surrexi, quoniam dominus auxiliatus est mihi.

The prophets had sung that he would not remain in the underworld but would rise on the third day. David in Psalm 15: 'You will not leave my soul in the underworld, nor give your holy one to see corruption.' Likewise in the third: 'I slept and took my sleep, and I rose, because the Lord helped me.'

4.19.9CSEL 19:363

Osee quoque primus duodecim prophetarum de resurrectione eius testificatus est: hic filius meus sapiens, propter quod nunc non resistet in contribulatione filiorum suorum: et de manu inferorum eruam eum. ubi est iudicium tuum, mors, aut ubi est aculeus tuus? idem alio loco: uiuificabit nos post biduum die tertio.

Hosea too, the first of the twelve prophets, testified of his resurrection: 'This is my wise son, therefore he shall not now stand in the affliction of his sons; and I will rescue him from the hand of the underworld. Where is your judgment, O death, or where is your sting?' The same in another place: 'He will revive us after two days, on the third day.'

4.19.10CSEL 19:363–364

et ideo Sibylla inpositurum esse morti terminum dixit post tridui somnum: καὶ θανάτου μοῖραν τελέσει τρίτον ἧμαρ ὑπνώσας· καὶ τότ᾽ ἀπὸ φθιμένων ἀναλύσας εἰς φάος ἥξει πρῶτος ἀναστάσεως κλητοῖς ἀρχὴν ὑποδείξας.

And so the Sibyl said he would set an end to death after a three days' sleep: 'And he will fulfil the lot of death, having slept for the third day; and then, released from the dead, he will come to the light, the first to show the beginning of resurrection to the called.'

4.19.11CSEL 19:364

uitam enim nobis adquisiuit morte superata nulla igitur spes alia consequendae immortalitatis homini datur, nisi crediderit in eum et crucem portandam patiendamque susceperit.

For he gained life for us by conquering death. No other hope, then, of attaining immortality is given to man, unless he believes in him and takes up the cross to be carried and endured.

Divine 4, chapter 20

4.20.1CSEL 19:364

Profectus ergo in Galilaeam — noluit enim se Iudaeis ostendere, ne adduceret eos in paenitentiam atque inpios resanaret —, discipulis iterum congregatis scripturae sanctae litteras id est prophetarum arcana patefecit. quae antequam pateretur perspici nullo modo poterant, quia ipsum passionemque eius adnuntiabant.

So he set out for Galilee (for he did not wish to show himself to the Jews, lest he lead them to repentance and heal the impious), and, having gathered his disciples again, he opened to them the writings of holy Scripture, that is, the secrets of the prophets, which could in no way be perceived before he suffered, because they announced him and his passion.

4.20.2CSEL 19:364

idcirco Moyses et idem ipsi prophetae legem quae Iudaeis data est testamentum uocant, quia nisi testator mortuus fuerit, nec confirmari testamentum potest nec sciri quid in eo scriptum sit, quia clausum et obsignatum est.

For this reason Moses and the same prophets call the law given to the Jews a testament, because unless the testator has died, a testament can neither be confirmed nor can it be known what is written in it, since it is closed and sealed.

4.20.3CSEL 19:364

itaque nisi Christus mortem suscepisset, aperiri testamentum

So unless Christ had undergone death, the testament could not have been opened,

4.20.4CSEL 19:364–365

id est reuelari et intellegi mysterium dei non potuisset uerum scriptura omnis in duo testamenta diuisa est illut quod aduentum passionemque Christi antecessit, id est lex et prophetae, uetus dicitur, ea uero quae post resurrectionem eius scripta sunt, nouum testamentum nominatur.

that is, the mystery of God could not have been revealed and understood. But all Scripture is divided into two testaments. That which preceded the coming and passion of Christ, that is, the law and the prophets, is called the Old; but the writings after his resurrection are named the New Testament.

4.20.5CSEL 19:365

Iudaei uetere utuntur, nos nouo: sed tamen diuersa non sunt, quia nouum ueteris adinpletio est et in utroque idem testator est Christus, qui pro nobis morte suscepta nos heredes regni aeterni facit abdicato et exheredato populo Iudaeorum, sicut Hieremias propheta testatur, cum loquitur talia:

The Jews use the Old, we the New; but they are not different, because the New is the fulfilment of the Old, and in both the testator is the same, Christ, who, having undergone death for us, makes us heirs of the eternal kingdom, the Jewish people having been disowned and disinherited, as the prophet Jeremiah testifies when he speaks thus:

4.20.6CSEL 19:365

ecce dies ueniunt, dicit dominus, et consummabo domui Israhel et domui Iuda testamentum nouum, non secundum testamentum quod disposui patribus eorum in die, qua adprehendi manum eorum, ut educerem illos de terra Aegypti, quia ipsi non perseuerauerunt in testamento meo, et ego neclexi eos, dicit dominus.

'Behold, the days come, says the Lord, and I will accomplish for the house of Israel and the house of Judah a new testament, not according to the testament which I made with their fathers in the day when I took their hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt; because they did not continue in my testament, and I neglected them, says the Lord.'

4.20.7CSEL 19:365

idem alio loco similiter ait: dereliqui domum meam, dimisi hereditatem meam in manus inimicorum eius. facta est hereditas mea mihi sicut leo in silua, dedit ipsa super me uocem suam, idcirco odiui eam.

The same says likewise in another place: 'I have forsaken my house, I have given my inheritance into the hands of its enemies. My inheritance has become to me like a lion in the forest; it has given its voice against me; therefore I have hated it.'

4.20.8CSEL 19:365

cum sit hereditas eius caeleste regnum, non utique ipsam hereditatem se dicit odisse, sed heredes, qui aduersus eum ingrati et inpii extiterunt.

Since his inheritance is the heavenly kingdom, he surely does not say that he hates the inheritance itself, but the heirs, who proved ungrateful and impious toward him.

4.20.9CSEL 19:365–366

facta est inquit hereditas mea mihi sicut leo, id est praeda et deuoratio factus sum heredibus meis, qui me immolauerunt sicut pecus. dedit super me uocem suam, id est sententias aduersus me mortis crucisque dixerunt.

'My inheritance,' he says, 'has become to me like a lion', that is, I have become prey and something devoured to my heirs, who sacrificed me like a beast. 'It has given its voice against me', that is, they pronounced sentences of death and the cross against me.

4.20.10CSEL 19:366

nam quod superius ait consummaturum se domui Iuda testamentum nouum, ostendit uetus illut testamentum quod per Moysen datum est non fuisse perfectum, id autem quod per Christum dari haberet consummatum fore.

For in saying above that he would accomplish a new testament for the house of Judah, he shows that the old testament given through Moses was not perfect, but that the one to be given through Christ would be complete.

4.20.11CSEL 19:366

domum autem Iuda et Israhel non utique Iudaeos significat, quos abdicauit, sed nos, qui ab eo conuocati ex gentibus in illorum locum adoptione successimus et appellamur filii Iudaeorum: quod declarat Sibylla, cum dicit: Ἰουδαίων μακάρων θεῖον γένος οὐρανιώνων.

And the house of Judah and Israel certainly does not signify the Jews, whom he disowned, but us, who, called by him from the gentiles, have succeeded to their place by adoption and are called sons of the Jews; which the Sibyl declares when she says: 'The divine race of the blessed heavenly Jews.'

4.20.12CSEL 19:366–367

quod autem futurum esset id genus, Esaias docet, apud quem pater summus ad filium loquitur dicens: ego dominus deus uocaui te in iustitiam, et tenebo manum tuam et confirmabo te, et dedi te in testamentum generis mei, in lucem gentium, aperire oculos caecorum, producere ex uinculis alligatos et de domo carceris sedentes in tenebris.

And who that race would be, Isaiah teaches, in whom the supreme Father speaks to the Son, saying: 'I the Lord God have called you in justice, and I will hold your hand and strengthen you, and I have given you for a covenant of my race, for a light of the gentiles, to open the eyes of the blind, to bring out the bound from their chains, and from the house of prison those who sit in darkness.'

4.20.13CSEL 19:367

cum igitur nos antea tamquam caeci et tamquam carcere stultitiae inclusi sederemus in tenebris ignorantes deum et ueritatem, inluminati ab eo sumus, qui nos testamento suo adoptauit et liberatos malis uinculis atque in lucem sapientiae productos in hereditatem regni caelestis adsciuit.

Since, then, we formerly sat in darkness, as if blind and shut up in the prison of folly, ignorant of God and the truth, we have been enlightened by him who adopted us by his testament, and, freed from evil chains and brought out into the light of wisdom, admitted us to the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom.

Divine 4, chapter 21

4.21.1CSEL 19:367

Ordinata uero discipulis suis euangelii ac nominis sui praedicatione circumfudit se repente nubes eumque in caelum sustulit, quadragesimo post passionem die, sicut Daniel fore ostenderat dicens: et ecce in nubibus caeli ut filius hominis ueniens (et) usque ad uetustum dierum peruenit.

Having appointed his disciples to the preaching of the gospel and of his name, a cloud suddenly surrounded him and took him up into heaven, on the fortieth day after the passion, as Daniel had shown would happen, saying: 'And behold, on the clouds of heaven one like a son of man coming, ⟨and⟩ he came even to the Ancient of Days.'

4.21.2CSEL 19:367–368

discipuli uero per prouincias dispersi fundamenta ecclesiae ubique posuerunt facientes et ipsi in nomine magistri dei magna et paene incredibilia miracula, quia discedens instruxerat eos uirtute ac potestate, quo posset nouae adnuntiationis ratio fundari et confirmari. sed et futura illis aperuit omnia: quae Petrus et Paulus Romae praedicauerunt et ea praedicatio in memoriam scripta permansit. in qua cum multa alia mira tum etiam hoc futurum esse dixerunt, ut post breue tempus inmitteret deus regem, qui expugnaret Iudaeos et ciuitates eorum solo adaequaret, ipsos autem fame sitique confectos obsideret.

The disciples, scattered through the provinces, laid the foundations of the church everywhere, themselves also doing, in the name of their divine master, great and almost incredible miracles, because at his departure he had equipped them with power and might, by which the principle of the new proclamation could be founded and confirmed. He also opened to them all things to come, which Peter and Paul preached at Rome, and that preaching remained written down for remembrance. In it, among many other wonderful things, they said this too would come to pass: that after a short time God would send a king who would conquer the Jews and level their cities to the ground, and besiege them, worn out with hunger and thirst.

4.21.3CSEL 19:368

tum fore ut corporibus

Then it would come to pass that they would feed on the bodies

4.21.4CSEL 19:368

suorum uescerentur et consumerent inuicem, postremo ut capti uenirent in manus hostium et in conspectu suo uexari acerbissime coniuges suas cernerent, uiolari ac prostitui uirgines, diripi pueros, allidi paruulos, omnia denique igni ferroque uastari, captiuos in perpetuum terris suis exterminari, eo quod exultauerint super amantissimum et probatissimum dei filium.

of their own and devour one another; and finally that they would be captured and come into the hands of their enemies, and would see before their eyes their wives most cruelly abused, virgins violated and prostituted, boys torn away, little children dashed down, everything laid waste by fire and sword, and the captives banished forever from their lands; because they had exulted over the most beloved and most approved Son of God.

4.21.5CSEL 19:368

itaque post illorum obitum, cum eos Nero interemisset, Iudaeorum nomen et gentem Vespasianus extinxit fecitque omnia quae illi futura praedixerant.

So, after their death, when Nero had killed them, Vespasian extinguished the name and nation of the Jews and did everything they had foretold would happen.

Divine 4, chapter 22

4.22.1CSEL 19:368

Confirmata sunt ut opinor quae falsa et incredibilia putantur ab iis quos uera caelestium litterarum doctrina non inbuit. sed tamen ut refellantur a nobis etiam illi qui nimium non sine malo suo sapiunt rebusque diuinis fidem detrahunt, argumentis quoque illorum coarguamus errorem, ut tandem aliquando peruideant ita fieri oportuisse, sicut nos ostendimus factum.

I think it has been confirmed, what is thought false and incredible by those whom the true teaching of the heavenly writings has not instructed. But still, so that we may also refute those who are too wise, not without harm to themselves, and who withhold belief from divine things, let us also prove their error by arguments, so that at length they may see that it had to happen just as we have shown it happened.

4.22.2CSEL 19:368–369

et quamquam aput bonos iudices satis habeant firmitatis uel testimonia sine argumentis uel argumenta sine testimoniis, nos tamen non contenti alterutro sumus, cum subpetat nobis utrumque, ne cui peruerse ingenioso aut non intellegendi aut contra disserendi locum relinquamus.

And although with good judges either testimonies without arguments or arguments without testimonies have firmness enough, we are not content with either alone, since we have both at hand, lest we leave any perversely clever person room either for not understanding or for arguing against.

4.22.3CSEL 19:369

negant fieri potuisse ut naturae inmortali quicquam decederet, negant denique deo dignum ut homo fieri uellet seque infirmitate carnis oneraret, ut passionibus, ut dolori, ut morti se ipse subiceret — quasi non facile illi esset ut citra corporis inbecillitatem se hominibus ostenderet eosque iustitiam doceret, siquidem id uolebat, maiore auctoritate ut professi dei —:

They deny that it could happen that anything should be taken from an immortal nature; they deny, in short, that it was worthy of God to wish to become man and burden himself with the weakness of the flesh, subjecting himself to sufferings, to pain, to death; as if it were not easy for him to show himself to men without the weakness of a body and to teach them justice, if that was what he wished, with greater authority as one professing himself God:

4.22.4CSEL 19:369

tunc enim cunctos fuisse praeceptis caelestibus parituros, si ad ea uirtus ac potestas dei praecipientis accederet.

'for then all would have obeyed the heavenly precepts, if the might and power of God giving the precepts had accompanied them.'

4.22.5CSEL 19:369

cur igitur aiunt ad docendos homines non ut deus uenit? cur se tam humilem inbecillumque constituit, ut ab hominibus et contemni et poena adfici posset? cur uim ab inbecillis et mortalibus passus est? cur non manus hominum aut uirtute reppulit aut diuinitate uitauit? cur non maiestatem suam sub ipsa saltem morte patefecit, sed ut inualidus in iudicium ductus est, ut nocens damnatus, ut mortalis occisus?

'Why then,' they say, 'did he not come as God to teach men? Why did he make himself so humble and weak that he could be both despised and punished by men? Why did he suffer violence from the weak and mortal? Why did he not repel the hands of men by power, or avoid them by his divinity? Why did he not reveal his majesty at least in death itself, but was led to judgment as powerless, condemned as guilty, killed as mortal?'

4.22.6CSEL 19:369

refutabo haec diligenter nec quemquam patiar errare. illa enim magna et mirabili ratione sunt facta: quam quicumque perceperit, non tantum mirari desinet deum ab hominibus esse cruciatum, uerum etiam facile peruidebit ne deum quidem potuisse credi, si ea ipsa quae arguit facta non essent.

I will refute these things carefully and will let no one err. For those things were done with a great and wonderful purpose: whoever grasps it will not only cease to wonder that God was tortured by men, but will also easily see that he could not even have been believed God if the very things they object to had not been done.

Divine 4, chapter 23

4.23.1CSEL 19:369–370

Quicumque praecepta dat hominibus ad uitam moresque fingit aliorum, quaero debeatne ipse facere quae praecipit an non debeat.

Whoever gives men precepts for life and shapes the characters of others, I ask whether he ought himself to do what he prescribes, or not.

4.23.2CSEL 19:370

si non fecerit, soluta praecepta sunt. si enim bona sunt quae praecipiuntur, si uitam hominum in optimo statu collocant, non se debet ipse praeceptor a numero coetuque hominum segregare inter quos agit, et ipsi eodem modo uiuendum est quo docet esse uiuendum, ne si aliter uixerit, ipse praeceptis suis fidem detrahat leuioremque doctrinam suam faciat, si re ipsa resoluat quod uerbis nitatur adstringere.

If he does not, the precepts are undone. For if the things prescribed are good, if they set human life in the best condition, the teacher must not separate himself from the number and company of the men among whom he lives, and he himself must live in the same way he teaches one must live; lest, if he lives otherwise, he himself take away credit from his precepts and make his teaching lighter, if by the fact itself he loosens what he strives to bind with words.

4.23.3CSEL 19:370

unus quisque enim cum audit praecipientem, non uult inponi sibi necessitatem parendi, tamquam sibi ius libertatis adimatur.

For each one, when he hears someone giving precepts, does not wish the necessity of obeying to be imposed on him, as though the right of liberty were being taken from him.

4.23.4CSEL 19:370

respondet itaque doctori hoc modo: non possum facere quae iubes, quoniam sunt inpossibilia. uetas me irasci, uetas cupere, uetas libidine commoueri, uetas dolorem, uetas mortem timere, sed hoc adeo contra naturam est, ut his adfectibus animalia uniuersa subiecta sint: uel si adeo putas repugnari posse naturae, tu ipse qui praecipis fac, ut sciam fieri posse.

So he answers the teacher thus: 'I cannot do what you command, because it is impossible. You forbid me to be angry, you forbid me to desire, you forbid me to be moved by lust, you forbid me to fear pain and death; but this is so contrary to nature that all living things are subject to these feelings. Or if you think nature can be resisted so far, do it yourself, you who prescribe it, so that I may know it can be done.'

4.23.5CSEL 19:370

cum autem ipse non facias, quae insolentia est ut homini libero inponere uelis leges quibus ipse non pareas? prius disce qui doces et

'But since you do not do it yourself, what insolence it is to wish to impose on a free man laws that you yourself do not obey! Learn first, you who teach, and

4.23.6CSEL 19:370

antequam mores aliorum corrigas, tuos corrige. quis neget iustam esse hanc responsionem? quin etiam in contemtum ueniet huiusmodi doctor et deludetur uicissim, quia uidebitur et ipse deludere.

before you correct others' morals, correct your own.' Who would deny that this answer is just? Indeed such a teacher will come into contempt and be mocked in turn, because he himself will seem to mock.

4.23.7CSEL 19:370–371

quid ergo faciet ille praeceptor, si haec ei fuerint obposita? quomodo adimet excusationem contumacibus, nisi ut praesentibus factis doceat possibilia se docere? inde euenit ut philosophorum praeceptis nullus obtemperet.

What, then, will that teacher do if these objections are put to him? How will he take away the excuse of the obstinate, unless he teaches by deeds before their eyes that what he teaches is possible? Hence it happens that no one obeys the precepts of the philosophers.

4.23.8CSEL 19:371

homines enim malunt exempla quam uerba, quia loqui facile est, praestare difficile: utinamque tam multi bene facerent quam multi locuntur bene! sed qui praecipiunt nec faciunt, abest ab iis fides: et si homines fuerint, contemnentur ut leues, si deus, opponetur ei excusatio fragilitatis humanae.

For men prefer examples to words, because speaking is easy, performing difficult. Would that as many did well as speak well! But those who prescribe and do not act have no credit; and if they are men, they will be despised as frivolous; if God, the excuse of human frailty will be set against him.

4.23.9CSEL 19:371

superest ut factis uerba firmentur: quod philosophi facere nequeunt. itaque cum ipsi praeceptores uincantur adfectibus quos uinci praedicant oportere, neminem possunt ad uirtutem quam falso praedicant erudire ob eamque causam putant neminem adhuc perfectum extitisse sapientem, id est in quo summae doctrinae ac scientiae summa uirtus et perfecta iustitia consenserit; quod quidem uerum fuit.

It remains that words be confirmed by deeds, which the philosophers cannot do. So, since the teachers themselves are conquered by the passions which they proclaim must be conquered, they can train no one to the virtue they falsely proclaim; and for this reason they think that no perfectly wise man has yet appeared, that is, one in whom the highest virtue and perfect justice agreed with the highest learning and knowledge; and that indeed was true.

4.23.10CSEL 19:371

nemo enim post mundum conditum talis extitit nisi Christus, qui et uerbo sapientiam tradidit et doctrinam praesenti uirtute firmauit.

For no one such has appeared since the world was founded except Christ, who both handed down wisdom by word and confirmed his teaching by present virtue.

Divine 4, chapter 24

4.24.1CSEL 19:371

Age nunc consideremus an doctor e caelo missus possit non esse perfectus. nondum de hoc loquor quem uenisse a deo negant. fingamus aliquem de caelo esse mittendum, qui uitam hominum rudimentis uirtutis instituat et ad iustitiam formet.

Come now, let us consider whether a teacher sent from heaven can fail to be perfect. I am not yet speaking of him whom they deny came from God. Let us imagine that someone is to be sent from heaven to establish human life in the rudiments of virtue and form it to justice.

4.24.2CSEL 19:371

nemini dubium potest esse quin is doctor qui caelitus mittitur tam scientia sit rerum omnium quam uirtute perfectus, ne nihil inter caelestem terrenumque differat.

No one can doubt that the teacher who is sent from heaven is perfect both in knowledge of all things and in virtue, lest there be no difference between the heavenly and the earthly.

4.24.3CSEL 19:371–372

nam in homine interna et propria doctrina esse nullo pacto potest: nec enim mens terrenis uisceribus inclusa et tabe corporis inpedita aut conprehendere per se potest aut capere ueritatem, nisi aliunde doceatur.

For in man there can in no way be inner and self-derived teaching; for the mind, shut up in earthly flesh and hindered by the corruption of the body, cannot by itself grasp or receive the truth unless it is taught from elsewhere.

4.24.4CSEL 19:372

et si maxime possit, summam tamen uirtutem capere nequeat et omnibus uitiis resistere, quorum materia in uisceribus continetur. eo fit ut terrenus doctor perfectus esse non possit.

And even if it could, still it could not attain the highest virtue and resist all vices, whose material is contained in the flesh. So it comes about that an earthly teacher cannot be perfect.

4.24.5CSEL 19:372

at uero caelestis, cui scientiam diuinitas, uirtutem inmortalitas tribuit, in docendo quoque sicut in ceteris perfectus et consummatus sit necesse est. at id omnino fieri non potest, nisi mortale sibi corpus adsumat. cur autem fieri non possit, ratio clara est.

But a heavenly one, to whom divinity gives knowledge and immortality virtue, must be perfect and complete in teaching as in everything else. But this cannot happen at all unless he takes on a mortal body. And why it cannot happen, the reason is clear.

4.24.6CSEL 19:372

nam si ueniat ad homines ut deus, ut omittam quod mortales oculi claritatem maiestatis eius conspicere ac sustinere non possunt, ipse certe deus uirtutem docere non poterit, quia expers corporis non faciet quae docebit ac per hoc doctrina eius perfecta non erit.

For if he came to men as God (to pass over the fact that mortal eyes cannot look upon and bear the brightness of his majesty), God himself certainly could not teach virtue, because, being without a body, he would not do what he taught, and so his teaching would not be perfect.

4.24.7CSEL 19:372

alioquin si summa uirtus est dolorem patienter pro iustitia officioque perferre, si uirtus est mortem ipsam et intentatam non metuere et inlatam fortiter sustinere, debet ergo doctor ille perfectus et docere ista praecipiendo et confirmare faciendo, quia qui dat praecepta uiuendi amputare debet omnium excusationum uias, ut inponat hominibus parendi necessitatem non ui aliqua sed pudore, et tamen libertatem relinquat, ut et praemium sit constitutum parentibus, quia poterant non parere si uellent, et non parentibus poena, quia poterant parere si uellent.

Besides, if the highest virtue is to bear pain patiently for justice and duty, if virtue is not to fear death itself when threatened and to endure it bravely when inflicted, then that perfect teacher must both teach these things by precept and confirm them by doing; because he who gives rules for living must cut off every road of excuse, so as to impose on men the necessity of obeying, not by any force but by shame; and yet leave them freedom, so that a reward may be set for those who obey, since they could disobey if they wished, and a punishment for those who do not obey, since they could obey if they wished.

4.24.8CSEL 19:373

quomodo igitur poterit amputari excusatio, nisi ut qui docet, faciat quae docet et sit quasi praeuius et manum porrigat secuturo? quemadmodum autem potest facere quae docet, si non sit similis ei quem docet?

How, then, can the excuse be cut off, unless he who teaches does what he teaches, and goes before, as it were, and holds out his hand to one who follows? And how can he do what he teaches if he is not like him whom he teaches?

4.24.9CSEL 19:373

nam si nulli subiectus sit passioni, potest ei docenti homo sic respondere: uolo equidem non peccare, sed uincor: indutus sum enim carne fragili et inbecilla, haec est quae concupiscit, quae irascitur, quae dolere, quae mori timet. itaque ducor inuitus et pecco, non quia uolo, sed quia cogor. sentio me et ipse peccare, sed necessitas fragilitatis inpellit, cui repugnare non possum.

For if he is subject to no passion, a man can answer him as he teaches: 'I do wish not to sin, but I am overcome; for I am clothed with frail and weak flesh; it is this that desires, that is angry, that grieves, that fears to die. So I am led against my will and sin, not because I wish, but because I am compelled. I feel that I sin, but the necessity of frailty drives me, and I cannot resist it.'

4.24.10CSEL 19:373

quid ad haec respondebit praeceptor ille iustitiae? quomodo confutabit ac redarguet hominem qui delictis suis excusationem carnis obtendet, nisi et ipse carne fuerit indutus, ut ostendat etiam carnem posse capere uirtutem? contumacia enim redargui non potest nisi exemplo.

What will that teacher of justice answer to this? How will he refute and convict a man who puts forward the excuse of the flesh for his offences, unless he too is clothed with flesh, to show that even flesh can receive virtue? For obstinacy cannot be refuted except by example.

4.24.11CSEL 19:373

nam si habere non possunt quae doceas firmitatem, nisi ea prior feceris, quia natura hominum procliuis in uitia uideri uult non modo cum uenia, sed etiam cum ratione peccare,

For if the things you teach cannot have firmness unless you have done them first, because human nature, prone to vices, wishes to seem to sin not only with pardon but also with reason,

4.24.12CSEL 19:373

oportet magistrum doctoremque uirtutis homini simillimum fieri, ut uincendo peccatum doceat hominem uinci ab eo posse peccatum.

then the master and teacher of virtue must become most like man, so that by conquering sin he may teach man that sin can be conquered by him.

4.24.13CSEL 19:373–374

sin uero sit inmortalis, exemplum proponere homini nullo modo potest. exsistet enim constans aliquis ac dicet: tu quidem non peccas, quia liber es ab hoc corpore, non concupiscis, quia immortali nihil est necessarium: mihi uero multis rebus opus est ut tuear hanc uitam. mortem non times, quia ualere in te non potest, dolorem contemnis, quia nullam uim pati potes:

But if he is immortal, he can in no way set an example before man. For some steadfast person will stand up and say: 'You indeed do not sin, because you are free of this body; you do not desire, because the immortal needs nothing; but I need many things to sustain this life. You do not fear death, because it can have no power over you; you despise pain, because you can suffer no violence.

4.24.14CSEL 19:374

at ego mortalis utrumque timeo, quia cruciatus mihi grauissimos inferunt, quos tolerare carnis infirmitas non

But I, a mortal, fear both, because they bring me most grievous tortures, which the weakness of the flesh cannot

4.24.15CSEL 19:374

potest. doctor itaque uirtutis etiam hanc excusationem debuit hominibus auferre, ne quis quod peccat necessitati potius adscribat quam culpae suae.

bear.' So the teacher of virtue had to take this excuse too from men, so that no one might ascribe his sinning to necessity rather than to his own fault.

4.24.16CSEL 19:374

ergo ut perfectus esse possit, nihil ei debet opponi ab eo qui docendus est, ut si forte dixerit inpossibilia praecipis, respondeat ecce ipse facio. (at ego carne indutus sum, cuius est peccare proprium. et ego eandem car-

So, in order to be perfect, nothing must be objected to him by the one to be taught; so that if perhaps he says, 'You command impossible things', he may answer, 'See, I do them myself.' 'But I am clothed with flesh, whose property is to sin.' 'And I wear the same flesh,

4.24.17CSEL 19:374–375

nem gero et tamen peccatum in me non dominatur. mihi opes contemnere difficile est, quia uiui aliter non potest in hoc corpore: ecce et mihi corpus est et tamen pugno contra omnem cupiditatem. non possum pro iustitia nec dolorem ferre nec mortem, quia fragilis sum. ecce et in me dolor ac mors habet potestatem et (tamen) ea ipsa quae times uinco, ut uictorem te faciam doloris ac mortis. prior uado per ea quae sustineri non posse praetendis: si praecipientem sequi non potes, sequere antecedentem. sublata omnis hoc modo excusatio est et fateri hominem necesse est sua culpa iniustum esse qui doctorem uirtutis et eundem ducem non sequatur. uides ergo quanto perfectior sit mortalis doctor, quia dux esse mortali potest, quam inmortalis, quia patientiam docere non potest qui subiectus passionibus non est.

and yet sin does not reign in me.' 'It is hard for me to despise wealth, because one cannot live otherwise in this body.' 'See, I too have a body, and yet I fight against every desire.' 'I cannot bear pain or death for justice, because I am frail.' 'See, pain and death have power over me too, and ⟨yet⟩ I conquer the very things you fear, so as to make you a conqueror of pain and death. I go first through the things you claim cannot be endured: if you cannot follow one who commands, follow one who goes before.' In this way every excuse is removed, and it must be confessed that a man is unjust by his own fault who does not follow the one who is both teacher of virtue and leader. You see, then, how much more perfect a mortal teacher is, because he can be a leader to a mortal, than an immortal one, because he who is not subject to sufferings cannot teach endurance.

4.24.18CSEL 19:375

nec hoc tamen eo pertinet ut hominem deo praeferam, sed ut ostendam neque hominem perfecta doctrina esse posse, nisi sit idem deus, ut auctoritate caelesti necessitatem parendi hominibus inponat, neque deum, nisi mortali corpore induatur, ut praecepta sua factis adinplendo ceteros parendi necessitate constringat.

Yet this does not mean that I prefer man to God, but that I show that neither can a man be perfect in teaching unless he is also God, so as to impose on men the necessity of obeying by heavenly authority; nor God, unless he is clothed with a mortal body, so as to bind others by the necessity of obeying by fulfilling his precepts in deeds.

4.24.19CSEL 19:375

liquido igitur apparet eum qui uitae dux et iustitiae sit magister corporalem esse oportere nec aliter fieri posse ut sit illius plena et perfecta doctrina habeatque radicem ac fundamentum stabilisque aput homines ac fixa permaneat, ipsum autem subire carnis et corporis inbecillitatem uirtutemque in se recipere cuius doctor est, ut eam simul et uerbis doceat et factis; item, subiectum esse morti et passionibus cunctis, quoniam et in passione toleranda et in morte subeunda uirtutis officia uersantur. quae omnia ut dixi consummatus doctor perferre debet, ut doceat posse perferri.

It is plainly clear, then, that he who is to be the leader of life and the master of justice must be bodily; nor can it happen otherwise that his teaching be full and perfect and have root and foundation, and remain stable and fixed among men; but that he himself must undergo the weakness of flesh and body and receive in himself the virtue of which he is teacher, so as to teach it at once by words and deeds; likewise, that he must be subject to death and all sufferings, since the duties of virtue lie both in bearing suffering and in undergoing death. All these things, as I said, the complete teacher must endure, so as to teach that they can be endured.

Divine 4, chapter 25

4.25.1CSEL 19:375

Discant igitur homines et intellegant quare deus summus cum legatum ac nuntium suum mitteret ad erudiendam praeceptis iustitiae mortalitatem, uoluerit eum carne indui et cruciatu adfici et morte multari.

Let men learn, then, and understand why the supreme God, when he sent his envoy and messenger to instruct mortality in the precepts of justice, willed him to be clothed with flesh, afflicted with torture, and punished with death.

4.25.2CSEL 19:375–376

nam cum iustitia nulla esset in terra, doctorem misit quasi uiuam legem, ut nomen ac templum nouum conderet, ut uerum ac pium cultum per omnem terram et uerbis et exemplo seminaret.

For since there was no justice on earth, he sent a teacher as a living law, to found a new name and temple, to sow true and pious worship through the whole earth both by words and by example.

4.25.3CSEL 19:376

sed tamen ut certum esset a deo missum, non ita illum nasci oportuit, sicut homo nascitur ex mortali utroque concretus, sed ut appareret etiam in homine illum esse caelestem, creatus est sine opera genitoris.

But still, so that it might be certain that he was sent by God, he had to be born not as a man is born, formed from two mortal parents, but, so that it might appear that even in man he was heavenly, he was created without the work of a father.

4.25.4CSEL 19:376

habebat enim spiritalem patrem deum et sicut pater spiritus eius deus sine matre, ita mater corporis eius uirgo sine patre.

For he had God as his spiritual father; and as God, the father of his spirit, was without a mother, so the mother of his body was a virgin without a father.

4.25.5CSEL 19:376

fuit igitur et deus et homo, inter deum atque hominem medius constitutus, unde illum Graeci μεσίτην uocant, ut hominem perducere ad deum posset id est ad inmortalitatem: quia si deus tantum fuisset, ut supra dictum est, exempla uirtutis homini praebere non posset, si homo tantum, non posset homines ad iustitiam cogere, nisi auctoritas ac uirtus homine maior accederet.

He was, then, both God and man, set as a mediator between God and man, whence the Greeks call him mesites, so that he might lead man to God, that is, to immortality; because if he had been only God, as was said above, he could not provide examples of virtue to man; if only man, he could not compel men to justice unless authority and power greater than man's were added.

4.25.6CSEL 19:376

etenim cum constet homo ex carne ac spiritu et oporteat spiritum iustitiae operibus emereri ut fiat aeternus, caro quoniam terrena est ideoque mortalis, copulatum sibi spiritum trahit secum et ab inmortalitate inducit ad mortem.

For since man consists of flesh and spirit, and the spirit must earn by works of justice that it become eternal, the flesh, since it is earthly and therefore mortal, drags with it the spirit joined to it and leads it from immortality to death.

4.25.7CSEL 19:376–377

ergo spiritus carnis expers dux esse homini ad inmortalitatem nullo pacto poterat, quoniam caro inpedit spiritum quominus deum sequatur. est enim fragilis et subiecta peccato, peccatum autem pabulum mortis est.

So a spirit without flesh could in no way be man's leader to immortality, since the flesh hinders the spirit from following God. For it is frail and subject to sin, and sin is the food of death.

4.25.8CSEL 19:377

itaque idcirco mediator aduenit id est deus in carne, ut caro eum sequi posset, et eriperet hominem morti cuius est dominatio in carnem. ideo carne se induit, ut desideriis carnis edomitis doceret non necessitatis esse peccare, sed propositi ac uoluntatis.

So for this reason the mediator came, that is, God in the flesh, so that the flesh could follow him, and he might snatch man from death, which has dominion over the flesh. For this reason he clothed himself with flesh, so that, having subdued the desires of the flesh, he might teach that sinning is not a matter of necessity but of purpose and will.

4.25.9CSEL 19:377

una enim nobis et magna et praecipua cum carne luctatio est, cuius infinitae cupiditates premunt animam nec dominium retinere patiuntur, sed eam uoluptatibus et inlecebris suauibus mancipatam morte adficiunt sempiterna.

For we have one great and principal struggle, with the flesh, whose endless desires press on the soul and do not allow it to keep control, but, having made it a slave to pleasures and sweet enticements, bring it to everlasting death.

4.25.10CSEL 19:377

quibus ut repugnare possemus, deus nobis uiam superandae carnis et aperuit et ostendit. quae uirtus perfecta et omnibus numeris absoluta coronam uincentibus et mercedem inmortalitatis inpertit.

So that we might resist them, God both opened and showed us the way of overcoming the flesh. This perfect virtue, complete in every respect, bestows a crown and the reward of immortality on those who conquer.

Divine 4, chapter 26

4.26.1CSEL 19:377

Dixi de humilitate et fragilitate et passione, cur haec deus subire maluerit: nunc ipsius crucis ratio reddenda est et uis enarranda.

I have spoken of the humility, the frailty, and the passion, why God preferred to undergo these; now the reason of the cross itself must be given and its power explained.

4.26.2CSEL 19:377

quid summus pater a principio disposuerit et quemadmodum cuncta quae gesta sunt ordinarit, non tantum diuinatio prophetarum, quae in Christum uera praecessit, sed etiam ratio ipsius passionis docet.

What the supreme Father arranged from the beginning, and how he ordered all that was done, is taught not only by the divination of the prophets, which went before and proved true in Christ, but also by the reason of the passion itself.

4.26.3CSEL 19:377

quaecumque enim passus est, non fuerunt inania, sed habuerunt figuram et significantiam magnam sicut etiam diuina illa opera quae fecit: quorum uis et potentia ualebat quidem in praesens, sed declarabat aliquid in futurum. aperuit caecorum lumina.

For whatever he suffered was not empty, but had a figure and great significance, as did those divine works which he did: their force and power availed indeed for the present, but declared something for the future. He opened the eyes of the blind:

4.26.4CSEL 19:377–378

caelestis uirtus, lucem non uidentibus reddidisse: sed hoc facto significabat fore ut conuersus ad gentes quae deum nesciebant insipientium pectora inluminaret luce sapientiae et ad ueritatem contemplandam oculos cordis aperiret.

a heavenly power, to have given back light to those who did not see; but by this deed he signified that he would turn to the gentiles, who did not know God, and illuminate the hearts of the foolish with the light of wisdom and open the eyes of the heart to contemplate the truth.

4.26.5CSEL 19:378

uere enim caeci sunt qui caelestia non uidentes et tenebris ignorantiae circumfusi terrena et fragilia uenerantur.

For those are truly blind who, not seeing heavenly things and surrounded by the darkness of ignorance, venerate earthly and frail things.

4.26.6CSEL 19:378

patefecit aures surdorum. non utique hactenus uis illa caelestis operata est: sed declarabat breui fore ut qui erant ueritatis expertes, et audirent et intellegerent diuinas dei uoces. uere enim surdos dixeris qui caelestia et uera et facienda non audiunt.

He opened the ears of the deaf. That heavenly power did not work only so far; it declared that before long those who were without the truth would both hear and understand the divine words of God. For you may truly call deaf those who do not hear the things that are heavenly, true, and to be done.

4.26.7CSEL 19:378

mutorum linguas in eloquium soluit. admirabilis, etiam cum (hoc tantum) fieret, potentia: sed inerat huic uirtuti alia significatio, quae ostenderet mox futurum ut rerum caelestium nuper ignari percepta sapientiae disciplina de deo et ueritate dissererent.

He loosed the tongues of the dumb into speech. An admirable power, even if ⟨only this⟩ had been done; but in this mighty work there was another meaning, which showed that soon those lately ignorant of heavenly things, having received the discipline of wisdom, would discourse of God and the truth.

4.26.8CSEL 19:378

nam qui rationem diuinitatis ignorat, is uere elinguis et mutus est, licet sit omnium disertissimus. lingua enim cum uerum loqui coeperit id est uirtutem maiestatemque dei singularis interpretari, tum demum officio naturae suae fungitur, quamdiu autem falsa loquitur, in usu suo non est: et ideo infans sit necesse est qui diuina proloqui non potest.

For he who does not know the principle of divinity is truly tongueless and dumb, though he be the most eloquent of all. For the tongue, when it begins to speak the truth, that is, to interpret the power and majesty of the one God, then at last fulfils the office of its nature; but as long as it speaks falsehoods, it is not in its proper use; and so he must be speechless who cannot speak out divine things.

4.26.9CSEL 19:378

pedes quoque claudorum ad officium gradiendi reformauit. laudabilis diuini operis fortitudo: sed figura id continebat, quod cohibitis erroribus uitae saecularis ac deuiae iter ueritatis aperiretur, per quod graderentur homines ad dei gratiam consequendam.

He also restored the feet of the lame to the office of walking. Praiseworthy is the strength of the divine work; but it contained a figure: that, the errors of worldly and wayward life being checked, the road of truth would be opened, by which men might walk to obtain God's grace.

4.26.10CSEL 19:378–379

is enim uere claudus existimandus est qui caligine ac tenebris insipientiae inplicatus et quo tendat ignarus offensibilibus et caducis gressibus per uiam mortis incedit.

For he is truly to be thought lame who, entangled in the mist and darkness of folly and ignorant where he is going, walks the way of death with stumbling and falling steps.

4.26.11CSEL 19:379

item labes et maculas inquinatorum corporum repurgauit. non exigua immortalis potentiae opera: uerum id portendebat haec uis, quod peccatorum labibus ac uitiorum maculis inquinatos doctrina eius purificatura esset eruditione iustitiae.

Likewise he cleansed the stains and spots of polluted bodies. No small works of immortal power; but this mighty deed portended that his teaching would purify, by instruction in justice, those polluted with the stains of sins and the spots of vices.

4.26.12CSEL 19:379

leprosi enim uere atque elephantiaci debent haberi quos uel infinitae cupiditates ad scelera uel insatiabiles uoluptates ad flagitia conpellunt et dedecorum maculis inustos labe adficiunt sempiterna.

For those should truly be held lepers and elephantiacs whom either endless desires drive to crimes or insatiable pleasures to outrages, and who, branded with the spots of disgrace, are affected with an everlasting stain.

4.26.13CSEL 19:379

iacentia mortuorum corpora erexit eosque nominibus suis inclamatos a morte reuocauit. quid congruentius deo? quid miraculo dignius omnium saeculorum quam decursam uitam resignasse, conpletis hominum temporibus adiecisse, arcana mortis reuelasse?

He raised the lying bodies of the dead and called them back from death, calling them by their names. What is more fitting for God? What more worthy of the wonder of all ages than to have unsealed a life that had run its course, added to the completed times of men, and revealed the secrets of death?

4.26.14CSEL 19:379

sed haec inenarrabilis potestas imago uirtutis maioris fuit, quae demonstrabat tantam uim habituram esse doctrinam suam, ut gentes in orbe toto, quae alienae a deo subiectae morti fuerunt, cognitione ueri luminis animatae ad inmortalitatis praemia peruenirent.

But this indescribable power was an image of a greater power, which showed that his teaching would have such force that the nations throughout the whole world, who, estranged from God, were subject to death, would, quickened by the knowledge of the true light, attain the rewards of immortality.

4.26.15CSEL 19:379

eos enim recte mortuos aestimaueris, qui datorem uitae deum nescientes atque animas suas a caelo in terram deprimentes in laqueos aeternae mortis incurrunt.

For you may rightly count those dead who, not knowing God the giver of life and pressing their souls down from heaven to earth, run into the snares of eternal death.

4.26.16CSEL 19:379–380

quae igitur tum faciebat in praesens, imagines erant futurorum, quae in laesis adfectisque corporibus exhibebat, ea spiritalium figuram gerebant, ut et in praesenti uirtutis non terrenae opera monstraret et in futurum potestatem caelestis suae maiestatis ostenderet.

So the things he then did for the present were images of things to come; what he displayed in injured and afflicted bodies bore the figure of spiritual things, so that he might both show in the present the works of a power not earthly and display for the future the might of his heavenly majesty.

4.26.17CSEL 19:380

ergo sicut opera eius significantiam quoque maioris potestatis habuerunt, ita etiam passio non simplex nec superuacua nec fortuita praecessit.

So as his works also had the significance of a greater power, so too his passion did not come about as something simple, superfluous, or accidental.

4.26.18CSEL 19:380

sed ut illa quae fecit magnam uirtutem ac potestatem doctrinae eius significabant, sic ea quae passus est odio futuram esse sapientiam nuntiabant. aceti enim potus ac fellis cibus acerbitates et amaritudines in hac uita sectatoribus ueritatis pollicebatur.

But as the things he did signified the great virtue and power of his teaching, so the things he suffered announced that wisdom would be hated. For the drink of vinegar and the food of gall promised bitterness and harshness in this life to the followers of truth.

4.26.19CSEL 19:380

et quamquam passio ipsa per se acerba et amara specimen nobis futurorum tormentorum dabat, quae morantibus in hoc saeculo uirtus ipsa proponit, tamen illiusmodi potus et cibus in os doctoris nostri ueniens pressurarum nobis et laborum et miseriarum praebebat exemplum.

And although the passion itself, bitter and harsh in itself, gave us a specimen of the torments to come which virtue itself sets before those who dwell in this world, yet such drink and food coming into the mouth of our teacher gave us an example of pressures, labours, and miseries.

4.26.20CSEL 19:380

quae omnia tolerare ac perpeti necesse est eos qui ueritatem secuntur, quoniam ueritas acerba est et inuisa omnibus qui uirtutis

All these those who follow the truth must bear and endure, since truth is bitter and hateful to all who, without virtue,

4.26.21CSEL 19:380

expertes uitam suam mortiferis uoluptatibus dedunt nam corona spinea capiti eius inposita id declarabat, fore ut diuinam sibi plebem de nocentibus congregaret. corona enim dicitur circumstans in orbem populus.

give their life over to deadly pleasures. For the crown of thorns placed on his head declared that he would gather to himself a divine people from the guilty. For a crowd standing round in a circle is called a crown.

4.26.22CSEL 19:380

nos autem, qui ante cognitionem dei fuimus iniusti, spinae id est mali ac nocentes eramus, ignorantes quid esset bonum, et a iustitiae notione atque operibus alieni omnia scelere ac libidine polluebamus.

And we, who before knowing God were unjust, were thorns, that is, evil and guilty, not knowing what was good; and, strangers to the idea and works of justice, we polluted everything with crime and lust.

4.26.23CSEL 19:380–381

electi ergo ex dumis et sentibus sanctum dei caput cingimus, quia conuocati ab ipso et circumfusi undique ad eum magistro ac doctori deo adsistimus regemque illum mundi et omnium uiuentium dominum coronamus.

So, chosen out of briars and brambles, we surround the holy head of God; because, called together by him and gathered round him on every side, we stand by him as master, teacher, and God, and crown him King of the world and Lord of all living things.

4.26.24CSEL 19:381

quod uero ad crucem spectat, magna in ea uis ac ratio est: quam nunc conabor ostendere.

As for the cross, there is great power and meaning in it, which I shall now try to show.

4.26.25CSEL 19:381

deus namque, sicut superius exposui, cum statuisset hominem liberare, magistrum uirtutis legauit in terram, qui et praeceptis salutaribus formaret homines ad innocentiam et operibus factisque praesentibus iustitiae uiam panderet, qua gradiens homo et doctorem suum sequens ad uitam aeternam perueniret.

For God, as I explained above, when he had determined to free man, sent the master of virtue to earth as his envoy, who would both form men to innocence by wholesome precepts and open the way of justice by present works and deeds, walking on which, and following his teacher, man might come to eternal life.

4.26.26CSEL 19:381

is igitur corporatus est et ueste carnis indutus, ut homini, ad quem docendum uenerat, uirtutis exempla et incitamenta praeberet.

He therefore took a body and was clothed with the garment of flesh, so as to provide examples and incentives of virtue to man, whom he had come to teach.

4.26.27CSEL 19:381

sed cum in omnibus uitae officiis iustitiae specimen praebuisset, ut doloris quoque patientiam mortisque contemptum, quibus perfecta et consummata fit uirtus, traderet homini, uenit in manus inpiae nationis, cum et uitare potuisset scientia futuri quam gerebat et repellere eadem uirtute qua mirabilia faciebat. sustinuit ergo cruciatus et uerbera et spinas.

But when he had given a pattern of justice in all the duties of life, in order also to hand on to man patience in pain and contempt of death, by which virtue is made perfect and complete, he came into the hands of an impious nation, though he could have avoided it by the knowledge of the future which he had, and repelled it by the same power by which he did wonders. So he endured tortures, blows, and thorns.

4.26.28CSEL 19:381

postremo etiam mortem suscipere non recusauit, ut homo illo duce subactam et catenatam mortem cum suis terroribus triumpharet.

Finally he did not refuse even to undergo death, so that man, with him as leader, might triumph over death subdued and chained, with all its terrors.

4.26.29CSEL 19:381–382

cur autem summus pater id potissimum genus mortis elegerit quo adfici eum sineret, haec ratio est dicat enim fortasse aliquis: cur si deus fuit et mori uoluit, non saltem honesto aliquo mortis genere adfectus est? cur potissimum cruce? cur infami genere supplicii, quod etiam homine libero

Why the supreme Father chose this kind of death above all to allow him to suffer, the reason is this. For someone may perhaps say: 'Why, if he was God and wished to die, was he not at least put to death by some honourable kind of death? Why the cross above all? Why an infamous kind of punishment, which seems unworthy even of a free man,

4.26.30CSEL 19:382

quamuis nocente uideatur indignum? primum, quod is qui humilis aduenerat, ut humilibus et infimis opem ferret et omnibus spem salutis ostenderet, eo genere adficiendus fuit quo humiles et infimi solent, ne quis esset omnino qui eum non posset imitari.

however guilty?' First, because he who had come humble, to bring help to the humble and lowest and show the hope of salvation to all, had to suffer by the kind of death the humble and lowest usually suffer, so that there might be no one at all who could not imitate him.

4.26.31CSEL 19:382

deinde, ut integrum corpus eius conseruaretur, quem die tertio resurgere ab inferis oportebat. nec hoc enim cuiquam ignorandum est, quod ipse ante de sua passione praedicans etiam id notum fecerit habere se potestatem cum uellet deponendi spiritum et resumendi.

Next, so that his body might be kept whole, since it had to rise from the dead on the third day. For no one should be unaware of this either, that he himself, foretelling his passion, made it known that he had power, when he wished, to lay down his spirit and take it up again.

4.26.32CSEL 19:382

subfixus itaque quia spiritum deposuerat, necessarium carnifices non putauerunt ossa eius suffringere, sicut mos eorum ferebat, sed tantummodo latus eius perforauerunt.

So, when he was fastened there, because he had laid down his spirit, the executioners did not think it necessary to break his bones, as their custom was, but only pierced his side.

4.26.33CSEL 19:382–383

sic integrum corpus patibulo detractum est et sepulchro diligenter inclusum. quae omnia idcirco facta sunt, ne laesum ac deminutum corpus ad resurgendum inhabile redderetur. illa quoque praecipua fuit causa cur deus crucem maluerit, quod illa exaltari eum fuit necesse omnibusque gentibus passionem dei notescere.

So his body was taken down from the gibbet whole and carefully enclosed in a tomb. All these things were done so that his body might not be made unfit for rising by being injured and diminished. There was also this chief reason why God preferred the cross: that by it he had to be lifted up, and the passion of God be made known to all nations.

4.26.34CSEL 19:383

nam quoniam is qui patibulo suspenditur, et conspicuus est omnibus et ceteris altior, crux potius electa est, quae significaret illum tam conspicuum tamque sublimem futurum, ut ad eum cognoscendum pariter et colendum cunctae nationes ex omni orbe concurrerent.

For since one who is hung on a gibbet is both conspicuous to all and higher than the rest, the cross was chosen rather, to signify that he would be so conspicuous and so exalted that all nations from the whole world would run together to know and worship him.

4.26.35CSEL 19:383

denique nulla gens tam inhumana est, nulla regio tam remota, cui aut passio eius aut summa maiestas ignota sit.

In short, there is no nation so savage, no region so remote, to which either his passion or his supreme majesty is unknown.

4.26.36CSEL 19:383

extendit ergo in passione manus suas orbemque dimensus est, ut iam tunc ostenderet ab ortu solis usque ad occasum magnum populum ex omnibus linguis et tribubus congregatum sub alas suas esse uenturum signumque illut maximum atque sublime frontibus suis suscepturum.

So in his passion he stretched out his hands and measured the world, to show even then that from the rising of the sun to its setting a great people, gathered from all tongues and tribes, would come under his wings and receive on their foreheads that greatest and most sublime sign.

4.26.37CSEL 19:383

cuius rei figuram Iudaei etiamnunc exhibent, cum limina sua de cruore agni notant. deus enim percussurus Aegyptios, ut ab ea plaga inmunes faceret Hebraeos, praeceperat his ut agnum candidum sine macula immolarent ac signum liminibus suis de sanguine eius inponerent.

The Jews still display a figure of this, when they mark their doorways with the blood of a lamb. For God, when about to strike the Egyptians, to make the Hebrews immune from that plague, commanded them to sacrifice a white lamb without spot and put a sign of its blood on their doorways.

4.26.38CSEL 19:383

itaque cum Aegyptiorum primogenita una nocte interissent, Hebraei soli signo sanguinis tuti fuerunt, non quia cruor pecudis tantam in se uim gerebat, ut hominibus saluti esset, sed Imago fuerat rerum futurarum.

So when the firstborn of the Egyptians died in one night, the Hebrews alone were safe by the sign of the blood; not because the blood of a beast had in itself such power as to be salvation for men, but it had been an image of things to come.

4.26.39CSEL 19:383–384

agnus enim candidus sine macula Christus fuit, id est innocens et iustus et sanctus, qui ab isdem Iudaeis immolatus saluti est omnibus, qui signum sanguinis, id est crucis qua sanguinem fudit, in sua fronte conscripserint. frons enim summum limen est hominis et lignum sanguine delibutum crucis significatio est.

For the white lamb without spot was Christ, that is, innocent and just and holy, who, sacrificed by those same Jews, is salvation to all who have written on their forehead the sign of the blood, that is, of the cross on which he shed his blood. For the forehead is the highest threshold of man, and wood smeared with blood is a sign of the cross.

4.26.40CSEL 19:384

denique immolatio pecudis ab iis ipsis qui faciunt pascha nominatur ἀπὸ τοῦ πάσχειν, quia passionis figura est, quam deus praescius futurorum tradidit per Moysen populo suo celebrandam.

Finally, the sacrifice of the beast is called pascha by those who perform it, from paschein ('to suffer'), because it is a figure of the passion, which God, foreknowing the future, handed down through Moses for his people to celebrate.

4.26.41CSEL 19:384

sed tum figura ualuit in praesenti ad depellendum periculum, ut appareret quantum ueritas ipsa ualitura sit ad plebem dei protegendam in extrema totius orbis necessitate.

But then the figure availed for the present to ward off danger, so that it might appear how much the truth itself would avail to protect the people of God in the final necessity of the whole world.

4.26.42CSEL 19:384

quomodo autem uel in qua plaga tuti omnes sint futuri qui signum hoc ueri et diuini sanguinis in summo corporis sui notauerint, in nouissimo libro docebo.

How, or in what plague, all will be safe who have marked this sign of the true and divine blood on the highest part of their body, I shall teach in the last book.

Divine 4, chapter 27

4.27.1CSEL 19:384

Nunc satis est huius signi potentiam quantum ualeat exponere. quanto terrori sit daemonibus hoc signum, sciet qui uiderit quatenus adiurati per Christum de corporibus quae obsederint fugiant.

For now it is enough to set out how much power this sign has. How great a terror this sign is to demons will be known by anyone who has seen how, adjured through Christ, they flee from the bodies they have possessed.

4.27.2CSEL 19:384–385

nam sicut ipse cum inter homines ageret, uniuersos daemonas uerbo fugabat hominumque mentes emotas et malis incursibus furiatas in sensus pristinos reponebat, ita nunc sectatores eius eosdem spiritus inquinatos de hominibus et nomine magistri sui et signo passionis excludunt.

For as he himself, when he lived among men, put all demons to flight by a word and restored to their former senses the minds of men that had been driven out and maddened by evil attacks, so now his followers drive out those same unclean spirits from men both by the name of their master and by the sign of the passion.

4.27.3CSEL 19:385

cuius rei non difficilis est probatio. nam cum diis suis immolant, si adsistat aliquis signatam frontem gerens, sacra nullo modo litant nec responsa potest consultus reddere uates. et haec saepe causa praecipua iustitiam persequendi malis regibus fuit.

The proof of this is not difficult. For when they sacrifice to their gods, if someone stands by bearing a marked forehead, the rites give no favourable omens at all, nor can the seer, when consulted, give answers. And this has often been the chief cause for wicked kings to persecute justice.

4.27.4CSEL 19:385

cum enim quidam ministrorum nostri sacrificantibus dominis adsisterent, inposito frontibus signo deos illorum fugauerunt, ne possent in uisceribus hostiarum futura depingere.

For when some of our people who were attendants stood by their masters while they sacrificed, by placing the sign on their foreheads they put their gods to flight, so that they could not trace the future in the entrails of the victims.

4.27.5CSEL 19:385

quod cum intellegerent haruspices, instigantibus isdem daemonibus quibus prosecant conquerentes profanos homines sacris interesse egerunt principes suos in furorem, ut expugnarent dei templum seque uero sacrilegio contaminarent, quod grauissimis persequentium poenis expiaretur.

When the soothsayers understood this, incited by those same demons to whom they sacrifice, complaining that profane men were present at the rites, they drove their rulers to fury, so as to attack the temple of God and defile themselves with true sacrilege, which would be expiated by the heaviest punishments of the persecutors.

4.27.6CSEL 19:385

nec tamen ex hoc ipso caeci homines intellegere possunt aut hanc esse ueram religionem cui ad uincendum tanta uis inest aut illam falsam quae subsistere aut congredi non potest.

Yet not even from this can blind men understand either that this is the true religion, which has such power to conquer, or that that is false, which cannot stand firm or engage.

4.27.7CSEL 19:385–386

sed aiunt hoc deos non metu, uerum odio facere: quasi quisquam possit odisse nisi eum qui aut noceat aut possit nocere. immo uero congruens maiestati fuit ut eos quos oderant, praesentibus poenis adficerent potius quam fugerent.

But they say the gods do this not from fear but from hatred: as though anyone could hate except one who either harms or can harm. On the contrary, it would have befitted their majesty to afflict those they hated with present punishments rather than to flee them.

4.27.8CSEL 19:386

sed quoniam neque accedere ad eos possunt in quibus caelestem notam uiderint nec iis nocere quos signum immortale munierit tamquam inexpugnabilis murus, lacessunt eos per homines et manibus persecuntur alienis.

But since they can neither approach those on whom they have seen the heavenly mark, nor harm those whom the immortal sign has fortified like an impregnable wall, they harass them through men and persecute them with others' hands.

4.27.9CSEL 19:386

quos profecto si esse conStentur, uicimus. necesse est enim ueram esse hanc religionem, quae et rationem daemonum nouit et astutiam intellegit et uim retundit et eos spiritalibus armis domitos ac subactos cedere sibi cogit.

If they confess that these demons exist, we have won. For that religion must be true which knows the nature of demons, understands their cunning, blunts their force, and compels them, tamed and subdued by spiritual arms, to yield to it.

4.27.10CSEL 19:386

si negant, testimoniis poetarum ac philosophorum refellentur. quodsi esse et malos esse infitias non eunt, quid superest nisi ut alios esse dicant deos, alios daemonas?

If they deny it, they will be refuted by the testimonies of poets and philosophers. But if they do not deny that they exist and are evil, what remains but to say that some are gods and others demons?

4.27.11CSEL 19:386

exponant igitur nobis differentiam generis utriusque, ut sciamus quid colendum, quid exsecrandum sit, habeantne inter se aliquod consortium an uero inimici sint. si sunt aliqua necessitudine copulati, quatenus eos discernemus aut quomodo utriusque generis honorem cultumque (non) miscebimus? si autem sunt inimici, cur aut daemones deos non timent aut dii daemonas fugare non possunt?

Let them explain to us, then, the difference between the two kinds, so that we may know what is to be worshipped and what abhorred; whether they have some fellowship with each other or are enemies. If they are joined by some bond, how far shall we distinguish them, or how shall we ⟨not⟩ mix the honour and worship of the two kinds? But if they are enemies, why do the demons not fear the gods, or why can the gods not put the demons to flight?

4.27.12CSEL 19:386–387

ecce aliquis instinctu daemonis percitus dementit effertur insanit: ducamus hunc in Iouis Optimi Maximi templum uel, quia sanare homines Iuppiter nescit, in Aesculapi uel Apollinis fanum. iubeat utriuslibet sacerdos dei sui nomine ut nocens ille spiritus excedat ex homine: nullo id pacto fieri potest.

See, someone, driven by a demon's instigation, raves, is carried away, goes mad: let us take him to the temple of Jupiter Best and Greatest, or, since Jupiter does not know how to heal men, to the shrine of Aesculapius or Apollo. Let the priest of either command in the name of his god that the harmful spirit depart from the man: it can in no way be done.

4.27.13CSEL 19:387

quae igitur uis deorum est, si subiectos sibi daemonas non habent? at uero idem daemones adiurati per nomen dei ueri protinus fugiunt.

What power, then, do the gods have, if they do not have the demons subject to them? But these same demons, adjured by the name of the true God, flee at once.

4.27.14CSEL 19:387

quae ratio est ut Christum timeant, Iouem non timeant, nisi quod idem sunt daemones quos uulgus deos esse opinatur? denique si constituantur in medio et is quem constat incursum daemonis perpeti et Delphici Apollinis uates, eodem modo dei nomen horrebunt et tam celeriter excedet de uate suo Apollo quam ex homine spiritus ille daemonicus et adiurato fugatoque deo suo uates in perpetuum conticescet. ergo idem sunt daemones quos fatentur execrandos esse, idem dii, quibus supplicant.

What reason is there for them to fear Christ and not fear Jupiter, unless the demons are the same as those whom the crowd believes to be gods? Finally, if there were set in the middle both one who is known to suffer the attack of a demon and the prophet of Delphic Apollo, they will dread the name of God in the same way, and Apollo will depart from his prophet as quickly as that demonic spirit from the man, and, their god adjured and put to flight, the prophet will be silent forever. So the demons whom they confess must be abhorred are the same as the gods to whom they pray.

4.27.15CSEL 19:387

si nobis credendum esse non putant, credant Homero, qui summum illum Iouem daemonibus adgregauit, sed et aliis poetis ac philosophis, qui eosdem modo daemonas, modo deos nuncupant, quorum alterum uerum, alterum falsum est.

If they think we should not be believed, let them believe Homer, who numbered that supreme Jupiter among the demons, and other poets and philosophers too, who call the same beings now demons, now gods; one of which is true, the other false.

4.27.16CSEL 19:387

illi enim nequissimi spiritus ubi adiurantur, ibi se daemonas confitentur, ubi coluntur, ibi se deos mentiuntur, ut errores hominibus immittant et auocent a ueri dei notione, per quam solam potest mors aeterna uitari. idem sunt qui deiciendi hominis causa;

For those most wicked spirits, when they are adjured, confess themselves demons; when they are worshipped, they falsely claim to be gods, so as to cast errors upon men and call them away from the knowledge of the true God, through which alone eternal death can be avoided. They are the same who, to cast man down,

4.27.17CSEL 19:387–388

uarios sibi cultus per diuersa regionum condiderunt, mentitis tamen adsumptisque nominibus ut fallerent. nam quia diuinitatem per se ipsos adfectare non poterant, adsciuerunt sibi nomina potentium regum, sub quorum titulis honores sibi deorum uindicarent.

established various cults for themselves in different regions, yet with false and assumed names in order to deceive. For since they could not aspire to divinity by themselves, they took for themselves the names of powerful kings, under whose titles they might claim the honours of gods.

4.27.18CSEL 19:388

qui error discuti potest et in lucem ueritas protrahi. nam si quis studet altius inquirere, congreget eos quibus peritia est ciere ab inferis animas. euocent Iouem Neptunum Volcanum Mercurium Apollinem patremque omnium Saturnum: respondebunt ab inferis omnes et interrogati loquentur et de se ac deo fatebuntur.

This error can be dispelled and the truth drawn out into the light. For if anyone wishes to inquire more deeply, let him gather those who have the skill to summon souls from the underworld. Let them call up Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Mercury, Apollo, and Saturn the father of all: all will answer from the underworld, and when questioned will speak and confess about themselves and about God.

4.27.19CSEL 19:388

post haec euocent Christum: non aderit, non adparebit, quia non amplius quam biduo aput inferos fuit.

After this let them call up Christ: he will not be present, he will not appear, because he was not more than two days in the underworld.

4.27.20CSEL 19:388

quid hac probatione certius proferri potest? ego uero non dubito quin ad ueritatem Trismegistus hac aliqua ratione peruenerit, qui de deo patre omnia, de filio locutus est multa quae diuinis continentur arcanis.

What more certain proof than this can be brought forward? I do not doubt that Trismegistus arrived at the truth by some such method, who spoke of God the Father in everything, and of the Son many things which are contained in the divine mysteries.

Divine 4, chapter 28

4.28.1CSEL 19:388

Quae cum ita se habeant ut ostendimus, apparet nullam aliam spem uitae homini esse propositam, nisi abiectis uanitatibus et errore miserabili deum cognoscat et deo seruiat, nisi huic temporali renuntiet uitae ac se rudimentis iustitiae ad cultum uerae religionis instituat.

Since these things are as we have shown, it is clear that no other hope of life is set before man, except that, casting off vanities and wretched error, he know God and serve God, renounce this temporal life, and train himself in the rudiments of justice for the worship of the true religion.

4.28.2CSEL 19:388–389

hac enim condicione gignimur, ut generanti nos deo iusta et debita obsequia praebeamus, hunc solum nouerimus, hunc sequamur.

For we are born on this condition: that we render just and due obedience to God who begets us, know him alone, and follow him.

4.28.3CSEL 19:389

hoc uinculo pietatis obstricti deo et religati sumus: unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non ut Cicero interpretatus est a relegendo, qui libro de natura deorum secundo ita dixit:

We are bound and tied to God by this bond of piety; from which religion itself received its name, not, as Cicero interpreted it, from relegere ('to go over again'), who said thus in the second book On the Nature of the Gods:

4.28.4CSEL 19:389

non enim philosophi solum, uerum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separauerunt. nam qui totos dies precabantur et immolabant, ut sibi sui liberi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati,

'For not only the philosophers but our ancestors too separated superstition from religion. For those who prayed and sacrificed whole days that their children might survive them (superstites) were called superstitious;

4.28.5CSEL 19:389

qui autem omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, retractarent et tamquam relegerent, ii sunt dicti religiosi ex relegendo, tamquam ex eligendo elegantes, ex diligendo diligentes, ex intellegendo intellegentes. his enim uerbis omnibus inest uis legendi eadem quae in religioso. ita factum est in superstitioso et religioso alterum uitii nomen, alterum laudis.

but those who reconsidered and, as it were, went over again (relegerent) everything that pertained to the worship of the gods were called religious, from relegere, as elegant from eligere, diligent from diligere, intelligent from intellegere; for in all these words there is the same force of legere as in religiosus. So it came about that of superstitious and religious, the one is a name of vice, the other of praise.'

4.28.6CSEL 19:389–390

haec interpretatio quam inepta sit, ex re ipsa licet noscere. nam si in isdem diis colendis et superstitio et religio uersatur, exigua uel potius nulla distantia est.

How absurd this interpretation is can be known from the thing itself. For if both superstition and religion are concerned with worshipping the same gods, there is little or rather no difference.

4.28.7CSEL 19:390

quid enim mihi adferet causae cur precari pro salute filiorum semel religiosi et idem decies facere superstitiosi esse hominis arbitretur? si enim semel facere optimum est, quanto magis saepius? si hora prima, ergo et toto die, si una hostia placabilis, placabiliores utique hostiae plures, quia multiplicata obsequia demerentur potius quam offendunt.

For what reason will he give me why he judges it the part of a religious man to pray once for the safety of his children, and of a superstitious man to do the same ten times? For if to do it once is best, how much more to do it often? If at the first hour, then all day too; if one victim is propitiating, surely many victims are more propitiating, because multiplied services win favour rather than offend.

4.28.8CSEL 19:390

non enim nobis odiosi uidentur ii famuli qui adsidui et frequentes ad obsequium fuerint, sed magis cari. cur igitur sit in culpa et nomen reprehensibile suscipiat qui aut filios suos magis diligit aut deos magis honorat, laudetur autem qui minus?

For those servants do not seem hateful to us who are assiduous and frequent in service, but rather dearer. Why then should he be at fault and receive a blameworthy name who either loves his children more or honours the gods more, while he is praised who does so less?

4.28.9CSEL 19:390

quod argumentum etiam ex contrario ualet. si enim totos dies precari et immolare criminis est, ergo et semel; si superstites filios subinde optare uitiosum est, superstitiosus igitur et ille qui etiam raro id optauerit. aut cur uitii nomen sit ex eo tractum quo nihil honestius, nihil iustius optari potest?

This argument is valid from the contrary too. For if to pray and sacrifice whole days is a crime, then so is once; if to wish repeatedly for children to survive is vicious, then he too is superstitious who wishes it even rarely. Or why should the name of a vice be drawn from that than which nothing more honourable, nothing more just can be wished?

4.28.10CSEL 19:390

nam quod ait religiosos a relegendo appellatos qui retractent ea diligenter quae ad cultum deorum pertineant, cur ergo illi qui hoc saepe in die faciant religiosorum nomen amittant, cum multo utique diligentius ex adsiduitate ipsa relegant ea quibus dii coluntur?

And as for his saying that the religious were named from relegere, as those who carefully go over the things pertaining to the worship of the gods, why then do those who do this often in a day lose the name of religious, when by their very assiduity they go over much more carefully the things by which the gods are worshipped?

4.28.11CSEL 19:390–391

quid ergo est? nimirum religio ueri cultus est, superstitio falsi. et omnino quid colas interest, non quemadmodum colas aut quid precere. sed quia deorum cultores religiosos se putant, cum sint superstitiosi, nec religionem possunt a superstitione discernere nec significantiam nominum exprimere.

What then? Surely religion is the worship of the true, superstition of the false. And it altogether matters what you worship, not how you worship or what you pray for. But since the worshippers of the gods think themselves religious, though they are superstitious, they can neither distinguish religion from superstition nor express the meaning of the names.

4.28.12CSEL 19:391

diximus nomen religionis a uinculo pietatis esse deductum, quod hominem sibi deus religauerit et pietate constrinxerit, quia seruire nos ei ut domino et obsequi ut patri necesse est.

We have said that the name of religion is derived from the bond of piety, because God has bound (religauerit) man to himself and tied him with piety; since we must serve him as Lord and obey him as Father.

4.28.13CSEL 19:391

eo melius ergo id nomen Lucretius interpretatus est, qui ait religionum se nodos soluere. superstitiosi autem uocantur non qui filios superstites optant — omnes enim optamus —, sed aut ii qui superstitem memoriam defunctorum colunt aut qui parentibus suis superstites colebant imagines eorum domi tamquam deos penates.

So Lucretius interpreted that name better, who says he is loosing the knots of religions. But those are called superstitious not who wish their children to survive (for we all wish it), but either those who worship the surviving memory of the dead, or those who, surviving their parents, worshipped their images at home as household gods.

4.28.14CSEL 19:391

nam qui nouos sibi ritus adsumebant, ut deorum uice mortuos honorarent quos ex hominibus in caelum receptos putabant, hos superstitiosos uocabant,

For those who took up new rites for themselves, so as to honour in place of gods the dead whom they thought had been received from among men into heaven, they called superstitious;

4.28.15CSEL 19:391

eos uero qui publicos et antiquos deos colerent, religiosos nominabant. unde Vergilius: uana superstitio ueterumque ignara deorum.

but those who worshipped the public and ancient gods they named religious. Hence Virgil: 'Empty superstition, ignorant of the ancient gods.'

4.28.16CSEL 19:391

sed cum ueteres quoque deos inueniamus eodem modo consecratos esse post obitum, superstitiosi ergo qui multos ac falsos deos colunt, nos autem religiosi qui uni et uero deo supplicamus.

But since we find that the ancient gods too were consecrated in the same way after death, then those are superstitious who worship many false gods, and we are religious who pray to the one true God.

Divine 4, chapter 29

4.29.1CSEL 19:391–392

Fortasse quaerat aliquis quomodo, cum deum nos unum colere dicamus, duos tamen esse adseueremus, deum patrem et deum filium. quae adseueratio plerosque in maximum inpingit errorem.

Perhaps someone may ask how, when we say that we worship one God, we nevertheless assert that there are two, God the Father and God the Son. This assertion drives many into the greatest error.

4.29.2CSEL 19:392

quibus cum probabilia uideantur esse quae dicimus, in hoc uno labare nos arbitrantur, quod et alterum et mortalem deum fateamur. de mortalitate iam diximus: nunc de unitate doceamus.

To them what we say seems probable, but they think we stumble in this one point, that we confess both another God and a mortal one. Of the mortality we have already spoken; now let us teach about the unity.

4.29.3CSEL 19:392

cum dicimus deum patrem et deum filium, non diuersum dicimus nec utrumque secernimus, quia nec pater a filio potest nec filius a patre secerni, siquidem nec pater sine filio nuncupari nec filius potest sine patre generari.

When we say God the Father and God the Son, we do not speak of different ones nor separate each, because neither can the Father be separated from the Son nor the Son from the Father, since the Father cannot be named without the Son, nor the Son begotten without the Father.

4.29.4CSEL 19:392

cum igitur et pater filium faciat et filius patrem, una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est: sed ille quasi exuberans fons est, hic tamquam defluens ex eo riuus, ille tamquam sol, hic quasi radius ex sole porrectus.

Since, then, the Father makes the Son and the Son the Father, both have one mind, one spirit, one substance; but the one is like an overflowing spring, the other like a stream flowing from it; the one like the sun, the other like a ray extended from the sun.

4.29.5CSEL 19:392

qui quoniam summo patri et fidelis et carus est, non separatur, sicut nec riuus a fonte nec radius a sole, quia et aqua fontis in riuo est et solis lumen in radio; aeque nec uox ab ore seiungi nec uirtus aut manus a corpore diuelli potest.

Since he is both faithful and dear to the supreme Father, he is not separated, as neither the stream from the spring nor the ray from the sun; for both the water of the spring is in the stream and the light of the sun in the ray; likewise neither can the voice be severed from the mouth, nor the power or the hand be torn from the body.

4.29.6CSEL 19:392

cum igitur a prophetis idem manus dei et uirtus et sermo dicatur, utique nulla discretio est, quia et lingua, sermonis ministra, et manus, in qua est uirtus, indiuiduae sunt corporis portiones.

Since, then, the same one is called by the prophets the hand and power and word of God, there is certainly no division, because both the tongue, the minister of the word, and the hand, in which is power, are undivided parts of the body.

4.29.7CSEL 19:392–393

propiore uti exemplo libet. cum quis habet filium quem unice diligat, qui tamen sit in domo et in manu patris, licet ei nomen domini potestatemque concedat, ciuili tamen iure et domus una et unus dominus nominatur.

I would like to use a nearer example. When someone has a son whom he loves uniquely, who is still in the household and under the father's hand, even if he grants him the name and power of master, yet by civil law there is said to be one household and one master.

4.29.8CSEL 19:393

sic hic mundus una dei domus est et filius ac pater, qui unanimes incolunt mundum, deus unus, quia et unus est tamquam duo et duo tamquam unus.

So this world is one house of God, and the Son and the Father, who dwell in the world with one mind, are one God, because the one is as two and the two as one.

4.29.9CSEL 19:393

neque id mirum, cum et filius sit in patre, quia pater diligit filium, et pater in filio, quia uoluntati patris fideliter paret, nec umquam faciat aut fecerit nisi quod pater aut uoluit aut iussit.

Nor is this strange, since the Son is in the Father, because the Father loves the Son, and the Father is in the Son, because he faithfully obeys the Father's will, and never does or has done anything but what the Father either willed or commanded.

4.29.10CSEL 19:393

denique unum deum esse tam patrem quam filium Esaias in illo exemplo quod superius posuimus ostendit, cum diceret: adorabunt te et in te precabuntur: quoniam in te deus est, et non est deus alius praeter te. sed et alio loco similiter ait: sic dicit deus rex Israhel et qui eruit eum deus aeternus: ego primus et ego nouissimus et praeter me non est deus.

Finally, that both the Father and the Son are one God, Isaiah shows in that example we set out above, when he said: 'They will worship you and pray to you: for God is in you, and there is no other God besides you.' And in another place he likewise says: 'Thus says God, the King of Israel, and the eternal God who rescued him: I am the first and I am the last, and besides me there is no God.'

4.29.11CSEL 19:393

cum duas personas proposuisset, dei regis, id est Christi, et dei patris, qui eum post passionem ab inferis excitauit, sicut ostendisse diximus Osee prophetam qui ait: et de manu inferorum eruam eum, tamen ad utramque personam referens intulit: et praeter me non est deus, cum posset dicere praeter nos: sed fas non erat plurali numero separationem tantae necessitudinis fieri.

Though he had set forth two persons, of God the King, that is, Christ, and of God the Father, who raised him from the underworld after his passion, as we said the prophet Hosea showed, who says, 'And from the hand of the underworld I will rescue him', yet, referring to both persons, he added, 'and besides me there is no God', though he could have said 'besides us'; but it was not right that the separation of so close a bond should be made by the plural number.

4.29.12CSEL 19:393–394

unus est enim, solus, liber, deus summus, carens origine, quia ipse est origo rerum et in eo simul et filius et omnia continentur.

For he is one, alone, free, the supreme God, without origin, because he himself is the origin of things, and in him both the Son and all things are contained.

4.29.13CSEL 19:394

quapropter cum mens et uoluntas alterius in altero sit uel potius una in utroque, merito unus deus uterque appellatur, quia quidquid est in patre, ad filium transfluit et quidquid est in filio, a patre descendit.

Therefore, since the mind and will of the one is in the other, or rather is one in both, both are rightly called one God, because whatever is in the Father flows over to the Son, and whatever is in the Son comes down from the Father.

4.29.14CSEL 19:394

non potest igitur summus ille ac singularis deus nisi per filium coli. qui solum patrem se colere putat, sicut filium non colit ita ne patrem quidem.

So that supreme and only God cannot be worshipped except through the Son. He who thinks he worships the Father alone, as he does not worship the Son, so does not worship the Father either.

4.29.15CSEL 19:394

qui autem filium suscipit et nomen eius gerit, is uero cum filio simul et patrem colit, quoniam legatus et nuntius et sacerdos summi patris est filius. hic templi maximi ianua est, hic lucis uia, hic dux salutis, hic ostium uitae.

But he who receives the Son and bears his name truly worships the Father together with the Son, since the Son is the envoy and messenger and priest of the supreme Father. He is the gate of the greatest temple, he the way of light, he the leader of salvation, he the door of life.

Divine 4, chapter 30

4.30.1CSEL 19:394

Sed quoniam multae haereses extiterunt et instinctibus daemonum populus dei scissus est, determinanda est nobis ueritas breuiter et in suo proprio domicilio conlocanda, ut si quis aquam uitae cupiet haurire, non ad detritos lacus deferatur qui non habent uenam, sed uberrimum dei nouerit fontem quo inrigatus perenni luce potiatur.

But since many heresies have arisen and the people of God has been split by the instigations of demons, the truth must be briefly defined by us and placed in its own proper dwelling, so that if anyone desires to draw the water of life, he may not be brought to broken cisterns which have no spring, but may know the most abundant fountain of God, watered by which he may enjoy perpetual light.

4.30.2CSEL 19:394–395

ante omnia scire nos conuenit et ipsum et legatos eius praedixisse quod plurimae sectae haberent exsistere quae concordiam sancti corporis rumperent, ac monuisse ut summa prudentia caueremus, ne quando in laqueos et fraudes illius aduersarii nostri cum quo nos luctari deus uoluit incideremus;

Above all, we should know that both he himself and his envoys foretold that very many sects would arise that would break the concord of the holy body, and warned us to beware with the utmost prudence lest we ever fall into the snares and frauds of that adversary of ours with whom God willed us to wrestle;

4.30.3CSEL 19:395

tum dedisse certa mandata, quae in perpetuum custodire debemus: quorum plerique immemores deserto itinere caelesti uias sibi deuias per anfractus et praecipitia condiderunt, per quas partem plebis incautam et simplicem ad tenebras mortemque deducerent. quod quatenus acciderit exponam.

then that they gave definite commands which we must keep forever; forgetting which, very many, having left the heavenly road, built for themselves roads astray through windings and precipices, by which to lead the unwary and simple part of the people to darkness and death. How this happened I will explain.

4.30.4CSEL 19:395

fuerunt quidam nostrorum uel minus stabilita fide uel minus docti uel minus cauti, qui discidium facerent unitatis et ecclesiam dissiparent.

There were some of our own who, either less firm in faith, or less learned, or less cautious, caused a division of unity and scattered the church.

4.30.5CSEL 19:395

sed ii quorum fides fuit lubrica, cum deum nosse se et colere simularent, augendis opibus et honori studentes adfectabant maximum sacerdotium. et a potioribus uicti secedere cum suffragatoribus suis maluerunt quam eos ferre praepositos quibus concupierant ipsi ante praeponi.

But those whose faith was slippery, while pretending to know and worship God, eager to increase their wealth and honour, aimed at the highest priesthood; and, defeated by stronger candidates, they preferred to withdraw with their supporters rather than bear as their superiors those over whom they had themselves desired to be set.

4.30.6CSEL 19:395

quidam uero non satis caelestibus litteris eruditi cum ueritatis accusatoribus respondere non possent, obicientibus uel inpossibile uel incongruens esse ut deus in uterum se mulieris includeret nec caelestem illam maiestatem ad tantam infirmitatem potuisse deduci, ut hominibus contemtui derisui contumeliae ludibrio esset, postremo etiam cruciamenta perferret atque exsecrabili patibulo figeretur,

Some, not well enough instructed in the heavenly writings, when they could not answer the accusers of the truth who objected that it was impossible or unfitting for God to enclose himself in a woman's womb, and that that heavenly majesty could not have been brought down to such weakness as to be an object of contempt, derision, insult, and mockery to men, and at last even to endure tortures and be fixed to an accursed gibbet,

4.30.7CSEL 19:395

quae omnia cum neque ingenio neque doctrina defendere ac refutare possent — nec enim uim rationemque penitus peruidebant —, deprauati sunt ab itinere recto et caelestes litteras corruperunt, ut nouam sibi doctrinam sine ulla radice ac stabilitate conponerent.

since they could neither defend nor refute all these things by talent or learning (for they did not see through their force and reason), were turned aside from the right road and corrupted the heavenly writings, so as to compose for themselves a new teaching without any root or stability.

4.30.8CSEL 19:395–396

nonnulli autem falsorum prophetarum uaticinio inlecti, de quibus et ueri prophetae et ipse praedixerat, exciderunt a doctrina dei et traditionem ueram reliquerunt.

And some, enticed by the prophesying of false prophets, of whom both the true prophets and he himself had foretold, fell away from God's teaching and abandoned the true tradition.

4.30.9CSEL 19:396

sed illi omnes daemonicis fraudibus inretiti, quas prospicere et cauere debuerant, diuinum nomen et cultum per inprudentiam perdiderunt.

But all of these, entangled in demonic frauds which they should have foreseen and guarded against, lost through imprudence the divine name and worship.

4.30.10CSEL 19:396

cum enim Phryges aut Nouatiani aut Valentiniani aut Marcionitae aut Anthropiani seu quilibet alii nominantur, Christiani esse desierunt, qui Christi nomine amisso humana et externa uocabula induerunt.

For when they are named Phrygians or Novatians or Valentinians or Marcionites or Anthropians or anything else, they have ceased to be Christians, who, having lost the name of Christ, have put on human and foreign names.

4.30.11CSEL 19:396

sola igitur catholica ecclesia est quae uerum cultum retinet. hic est fons ueritatis, hoc domicilium fidei, hoc templum dei: quo si quis non intrauerit uel a quo si quis exierit, a spe uitae ac salutis alienus est. neminem sibi oportet pertinaci concertatione blandiri.

The catholic church alone, then, is the one that retains true worship. This is the fountain of truth, this the dwelling of faith, this the temple of God; whoever does not enter it, or whoever goes out from it, is a stranger to the hope of life and salvation. No one ought to flatter himself by obstinate contention.

4.30.12CSEL 19:396

agitur enim de uita et salute: cui nisi caute ac diligenter consulatur, amissa et extincta erit.

For it is a question of life and salvation: unless it is cared for cautiously and diligently, it will be lost and extinguished.

4.30.13CSEL 19:396

sed tamen quia singuli quique coetus haereticorum se potissimum Christianos et suam esse catholicam ecclesiam putant, sciendum est illam esse ueram in qua est confessio et paenitentia, quae peccata et uulnera quibus subiecta est inbecillitas carnis salubriter curat.

But yet, since each and every gathering of heretics thinks that they above all are Christians and theirs is the catholic church, it must be known that that is the true one in which there is confession and penance, which wholesomely cures the sins and wounds to which the weakness of the flesh is subject.

4.30.14CSEL 19:396–397

haec interim paucis admonendi gratia rettuli, ne quis errorem fugere cupiens maiore inplicetur errore, dum penetrale ueritatis ignorat: postea plenius et uberius contra omnes mendaciorum sectas proprio separatoque opere pugnabimus.

I have set down these things briefly for the moment by way of warning, lest anyone wishing to flee error be entangled in greater error while he does not know the inner sanctuary of truth. Later we shall fight more fully and abundantly against all the sects of lies in a separate work of its own.

4.30.15CSEL 19:397

Sequitur ut quoniam satis de religione uera et sapientia locuti sumus, in proximo libro de iustitia disseramus.

It follows, since we have spoken enough about true religion and wisdom, that in the next book we discuss justice.

Divine 5, chapter 1

5.1.1CSEL 19:398

Non est aput me dubium quin hoc opus nostrum, quo singularis ille rerum conditor et huius inmensi rector adseritur, si quis attigerit ex istis inepte religiosis, ut sunt nimia superstitione inpatientes, insectetur etiam maledictis et uix lecto fortasse principio adfligat proiciat exsecretur seque inexpiabili scelere contaminari atque adstringi putet, si haec aut legat patienter aut audiat.

I have no doubt that if any of those foolishly religious people, impatient as they are from excessive superstition, lays hands on this work of ours, in which the one Maker of all things and Ruler of this vast world is defended, he will even assail it with abuse, and perhaps, having barely read the beginning, will dash it down, throw it away, and curse it, and will think himself defiled and bound by an inexpiable crime if he reads or hears these things with patience.

5.1.2CSEL 19:398

ab hoc tamen si fieri potest humanitatis iure postulamus, ut non prius damnet quam uniuersa cognouerit. nam si sacrilegis et proditoribus et ueneficis potestas defendendi sui datur nec praedamnari quemquam incognita causa licet, non iniuste petere uidemur, ut si quis erit ille qui inciderit in haec, si leget, perlegat, si audiet, sententiam differat in extremum.

Yet from such a person we ask, if it can be done, by the right of common humanity, that he not condemn before he has learned the whole. For if the sacrilegious, traitors, and poisoners are given the opportunity to defend themselves, and no one may be condemned in advance with his case unheard, we do not seem to ask unjustly that whoever comes upon these pages should, if he reads, read to the end, and if he hears, defer his judgment until the conclusion.

5.1.3CSEL 19:398

sed noui hominum pertinaciam: numquam inpetrabimus. timent enim ne a nobis reuicti manus dare aliquando clamante ipsa ueritate cogantur.

But I know the obstinacy of men: we will never obtain this. For they are afraid that, refuted by us, they will at some point be forced to give in, as truth itself cries out.

5.1.4CSEL 19:398–399

obstrepunt igitur et intercedunt, ne audiant, et oculos suos opprimunt, ne lumen uideant quod offerimus: quo plane ipsi diffidentiam suae perditae rationis ostendunt, cum neque cognoscere neque congredi audent, quia sciunt se facile superari.

So they make an uproar and interrupt, so as not to hear, and they shut their eyes, so as not to see the light we offer. By this they plainly show their own distrust of their lost system, since they dare neither to examine nor to engage, because they know they are easily overcome.

5.1.5CSEL 19:399

et idcirco disceptatione sublata pellitur e medio sapientia, ui geritur res, ut ait Ennius. et quia student damnare tamquam nocentes quos utique sciunt innocentes, constare de ipsa innocentia nolunt: quasi uero maior iniquitas sit probatam innocentiam damnasse quam inauditam.

And therefore, with discussion removed, "wisdom is driven from the field, the matter is settled by force," as Ennius says. And because they are eager to condemn as guilty those whom they certainly know to be innocent, they do not want innocence itself established, as though it were a greater injustice to condemn innocence once proved than innocence unheard.

5.1.6CSEL 19:399

sed ut dixi uerentur, ne si audierint, damnare non possint, et ideo cultores dei summi hoc est iustos homines torquent interficiunt exterminant. nec causas odiorum reddere ipsi possunt qui tam uehementer oderunt:

But, as I said, they fear that if they hear they will be unable to condemn, and so they torture, kill, and banish the worshippers of the supreme God, that is, righteous people. Nor can those who hate so fiercely give the reasons for their hatred.

5.1.7CSEL 19:399

quia ipsi errant, irascuntur iis qui ueram uiam secuntur, et cum corrigere se possint, errores suos insuper crudelibus factis coaceruant, innocentium cruore maculantur et dicatas deo mentes euisceratis corporibus extorquent.

Because they themselves are in error, they are angry with those who follow the true way; and though they could correct themselves, they pile cruel deeds on top of their errors, stain themselves with the blood of the innocent, and wrench out minds dedicated to God from disemboweled bodies.

5.1.8CSEL 19:399

cum talibus nunc congredi et disputare contendimus, hos ad ueritatem ab inepta persuasione traducere, qui sanguinem facilius hauserint quam uerba iustorum. quid igitur? operamne perdemus?

It is with such people that we now set out to engage and argue, to bring them over from a foolish persuasion to the truth, people who would sooner drink blood than the words of the righteous. What then? Shall we waste our labor?

5.1.9CSEL 19:399–400

minime. nam si lucrari hos a morte, ad quam concitatissime tendunt, non potuerimus, si ab illo itinere deuio ad uitam lucemque reuocare, quoniam ipsi saluti suae repugnant, nostros tamen confirmabimus, quorum non est stabilis ac solidis radicibus fundata et fixa sententia. nutant enim plurimi ac maxime qui litterarum aliquid attigerunt.

Not at all. For even if we cannot win these men from the death toward which they are rushing headlong, even if we cannot call them back from that wandering road to life and light, since they themselves fight against their own salvation, we will still strengthen our own people, whose conviction is not yet firm, founded, and fixed with solid roots. For very many waver, and especially those who have had some contact with literature.

5.1.10CSEL 19:400

nam et in hoc philosophi et oratores et poetae perniciosi sunt, quod incautos animos facile inretire possunt suauitate sermonis et carminum dulci modulatione currentium.

For in this respect philosophers, orators, and poets are dangerous: they can easily ensnare unwary minds with the charm of their speech and the sweet rhythm of flowing verse.

5.1.11CSEL 19:400

ob eamque causam uolui sapientiam cum religione coniungere, ne quid studiosis inanis illa doctrina possit officere, ut iam scientia litterarum non modo nihil noceat religioni atque iustitiae, sed etiam prosit quam plurimum, si is qui eas didicerit, sit in uirtutibus instructior, in ueritate sapientior.

For this reason I wished to join wisdom with religion, so that empty learning could do no harm to the studious, and so that literary knowledge would not only do no harm to religion and justice but would even be of the greatest help, if the one who has learned letters becomes better furnished in virtue and wiser in truth.

5.1.12CSEL 19:400

praeterea etiamsi nulli alii, nobis certe proderit: delectabit se conscientia, gaudebitque mens in ueritatis se luce uersari, quod est animae pabulum incredibili quadam iucunditate perfusum.

Besides, even if it benefits no one else, it will certainly benefit us: the conscience will take delight in itself, and the mind will rejoice to dwell in the light of truth, which is the food of the soul, filled with an unbelievable sweetness.

5.1.13CSEL 19:400–401

uerum non est desperandum, fortasse non canimus surdis. nec enim tam in malo statu res est, ut desint sanae mentes, quibus et ueritas placeat et monstratum sibi rectum iter et uideant et sequantur.

But we must not despair; perhaps "we are not singing to the deaf." Things are not in so bad a state that there are no sound minds to whom truth is pleasing, and who, when the right road is shown them, will both see it and follow it.

5.1.14CSEL 19:401

circumlinatur modo poculum caelesti melle sapientiae, ut possint ab inprudentibus amara remedia sine offensione potari, dum inliciens prima dulcedo acerbitatem saporis asperi sub praetexto suauitatis occultat.

Only let the cup be smeared around the rim with the heavenly honey of wisdom, so that the bitter medicine may be drunk by the unsuspecting without offense, while the first sweetness entices them and hides the harshness of the bitter taste under a cover of pleasantness.

5.1.15CSEL 19:401

nam haec in primis causa est cur aput sapientes et doctos et principes huius saeculi scriptura sancta fide careat, quod prophetae communi ac simplici sermone ut ad populum sunt locuti.

For this is the chief reason why Holy Scripture lacks credit among the wise, the learned, and the princes of this age: the prophets spoke in plain and simple language, as to the people.

5.1.16CSEL 19:401

contemnuntur itaque ab iis qui nihil audire uel legere nisi expolitum ac disertum uolunt nec quicquam haerere animis eorum potest nisi quod aures blandiore sono mulcet, illa uero quae sordida uidentur, anilia inepta uulgaria existimantur.

So they are despised by those who want to hear or read nothing but what is polished and eloquent; nothing can stick in their minds except what soothes the ears with a more flattering sound, while whatever seems plain is judged old wives' talk, silly, and vulgar.

5.1.17CSEL 19:401

adeo nihil uerum putant nisi quod auditu suaue est, nihil credibile nisi quod potest incutere uoluptatem: nemo rem ueritate ponderat, sed ornatu.

They think nothing true except what is pleasant to hear, nothing credible except what can stir pleasure; no one weighs a matter by its truth, but by its ornament.

5.1.18CSEL 19:401

non credunt ergo diuinis, quia fuco carent, sed ne illis quidem qui ea interpretantur, quia sunt et ipsi aut omnino rudes aut certe parum docti. nam ut plane sint eloquentes, perraro contingit: cuius rei causa in aperto est.

So they do not believe the divine writings, because they lack cosmetic paint; nor do they even believe those who interpret them, because these too are either entirely unlearned or at least not learned enough. For it very rarely happens that they are truly eloquent, and the reason is obvious.

5.1.19CSEL 19:401–402

eloquentia enim saeculo seruit, populo se iactare et in rebus malis placere gestit, siquidem ueritatem saepius expugnare conatur, ut uim suam monstret: opes expetit, honores concupiscit, summum denique gradum dignitatis exposcit.

For eloquence serves the world; it longs to show itself off before the people and to please in evil causes, since it often tries to overthrow the truth in order to display its power. It seeks wealth, covets honors, and in the end demands the highest rank of dignity.

5.1.20CSEL 19:402

ergo haec quasi humilia despicit, arcana tamquam contraria sibi fugit, quippe quae publico gaudeat et multitudinem celebritatemque desideret:

So it looks down on these things as lowly and shuns what is hidden as contrary to itself, since it delights in publicity and craves crowds and fame.

5.1.21CSEL 19:402

eo fit ut sapientia et ueritas idoneis praeconibus indigeat. et si qui forte litteratorum se ad eam contulerunt, defensioni eius non suffecerunt.

Hence wisdom and truth lack suitable heralds. And if any literary men have perhaps come over to it, they have not been adequate for its defense.

5.1.22CSEL 19:402

ex iis qui mihi noti sunt Minucius Felix non ignobilis inter causidicos loci fuit. huius liber, cui Octauio titulus est, declarat quam idoneus ueritatis adsertor esse potuisset, si se totum ad id studium contulisset.

Of those known to me, Minucius Felix held no mean place among advocates. His book, titled Octavius, shows how fit a defender of the truth he could have been had he given himself wholly to that pursuit.

5.1.23CSEL 19:402

Septimius quoque Tertullianus fuit omni genere litterarum peritus, sed in eloquendo parum facilis et minus comptus et multum obscurus fuit. ergo ne hic quidem satis celebritatis inuenit.

Septimius Tertullian too was skilled in every kind of literature, but in expression he was not fluent, not polished enough, and very obscure. So he too did not win enough fame.

5.1.24CSEL 19:402

unus igitur praecipuus et clarus extitit Cyprianus, quoniam et magnam sibi gloriam ex artis oratoriae professione quaesierat et admodum multa conscripsit in suo genere miranda.

The one outstanding and famous figure, then, was Cyprian, since he had won great glory for himself from his profession of the art of oratory and wrote a great many things admirable of their kind.

5.1.25CSEL 19:402

erat enim ingenio facili copioso suaui et, quae sermonis maxima est uirtus, aperto, ut discernere non queas, utrumne ornatior in eloquendo an felicior in explicando an potentior in persuadendo fuerit.

For his talent was ready, abundant, pleasant, and, what is the greatest virtue of speech, clear, so that you could not decide whether he was more ornate in expression, more successful in explanation, or more powerful in persuasion.

5.1.26CSEL 19:402–403

hic tamen placere ultra uerba sacramentum ignorantibus non potest, quoniam mystica sunt quae locutus est et ad id praeparata, ut a solis fidelibus audiantur: denique a doctis huius saeculi, quibus forte scripta eius innotuerunt, derideri solet.

Yet beyond his words he cannot please those who do not know the mystery, since what he said is mystical and meant to be heard by the faithful alone. In fact he is usually mocked by the learned of this age to whom his writings happen to become known.

5.1.27CSEL 19:403

audiui ego quendam hominem sane disertum, qui eum inmutata una littera Coprianum uocaret, quasi quod elegans ingenium et melioribus rebus aptum ad aniles fabulas contulisset.

I myself heard a man, quite eloquent, who by changing one letter called him "Coprianus," as though he had spent an elegant talent, fit for better things, on old wives' tales.

5.1.28CSEL 19:403

quodsi accidit hoc ei cuius eloquentia non insuauis est, quid tandem putemus accidere eis quorum sermo ieiunus est et ingratus? qui neque uim persuadendi neque subtilitatem argumentandi neque ullam prorsus acerbitatem ad reuincendum habere potuerunt.

If this happened to one whose eloquence is not unpleasing, what must we think happens to those whose style is meager and unattractive, who could have had neither power of persuasion, nor subtlety in argument, nor any sharpness at all for refutation?

Divine 5, chapter 2

5.2.1CSEL 19:403

Ergo quia defuerunt aput nos idonei peritique doctores, qui uehementer, qui acriter errores publicos redarguerent, qui causam omnem ueritatis ornate copioseque defenderent, prouocauit quosdam haec ipsa penuria, ut auderent scribere contra ignotam sibi ueritatem.

So, because we have lacked capable and skilled teachers to refute public errors forcefully and keenly and to defend the whole cause of truth with ornament and fullness, this very lack provoked some to dare to write against a truth unknown to them.

5.2.2CSEL 19:403

omitto eos qui prioribus eam temporibus nequicquam lacessierunt. ego cum in Bithynia oratorias litteras accitus docerem contigissetque ut eodem tempore dei templum euerteretur, duo extiterunt ibidem qui iacenti atque abiectae ueritati nescio utrum superbius an inportunius insultarent.

I pass over those who assailed it in vain in earlier times. When I had been summoned to Bithynia and was teaching rhetoric there, and it happened that at that same time the temple of God was overthrown, two men arose in that very place who insulted the truth as it lay prostrate and cast down, I do not know whether more arrogantly or more offensively.

5.2.3CSEL 19:403–404

quorum alter antistitem se philosophiae profitebatur, uerum ita uitiosus, ut continentiae magister non minus auaritia quam libidinibus arderet, in uictu tam sumptuosus, ut in schola uirtutis adsertor, parsimoniae paupertatisque laudator, in palatio peius cenaret quam domi. tamen uitia sua capillis et pallio et, quod maximum est uelamentum, diuitiis praetegebat: quas ut augeret, ad amicitias iudicum miro ambitu penetrabat eosque sibi repente auctoritate falsi nominis obligabat, non modo ut eorum sententias uenderet, uerum etiam ut confines suos, quos sedibus agrisque pellebat, a suo repetendo hac potentia retardaret.

One of them professed himself a high priest of philosophy, but was so vicious that, a teacher of self-restraint, he burned no less with greed than with lusts; so extravagant in his table that, though in the school he championed virtue and praised frugality and poverty, he dined worse at the palace than at home. Still, he screened his vices with his hair and his cloak and, the greatest cover of all, with his wealth. To increase it he made his way with remarkable scheming into the friendships of the judges, and quickly bound them to himself by the authority of a false name, not only to sell their verdicts but also to use this influence to hinder his neighbors, whom he was driving from their homes and fields, from recovering their property.

5.2.4CSEL 19:404

hic uero qui suas disputationes moribus destruebat uel mores suos disputationibus arguebat ipse aduersum se grauis censor et accusator acerrimus, eodem ipso tempore quo iustus populus nefarie lacerabatur tres libros euomuit contra

This man, who destroyed his arguments by his conduct or condemned his conduct by his arguments, a stern censor and fierce accuser against himself, at the very time when the righteous people were being wickedly torn to pieces, vomited out three books against

5.2.5CSEL 19:404

religionem nomenque Christianum, professus ante omnia philosophi officium esse erroribus hominum subuenire atque illos ad ueram uiam reuocare id est ad cultus deorum, quorum numine ac maiestate mundus gubernetur, nec pati, homines inperitos quorundam fraudibus inlici, ne simplicitas eorum praedae ac pabulo sit hominibus astutis:

the Christian religion and name. He declared first of all that it is a philosopher's duty to come to the aid of human errors and to call people back to the true way, that is, to the worship of the gods, by whose divine power and majesty the world is governed, and not to allow the unskilled to be lured by the tricks of certain people, lest their simplicity become prey and food for clever men.

5.2.6CSEL 19:404

itaque se suscepisse hoc munus philosophia dignum, ut praeferret non uidentibus lumen sapientiae, non modo ut susceptis deorum cultibus resanescant, sed etiam ut pertinaci obstinatione deposita corporis cruciamenta deuitent neu saeuas membrorum lacerationes frustra perpeti uelint.

So, he said, he had taken up this task, worthy of philosophy, to hold out the light of wisdom to those who do not see, not only so that they might recover their health by taking up the worship of the gods, but also so that, laying aside their stubborn obstinacy, they might avoid the tortures of the body and not choose to endure cruel mangling of their limbs for nothing.

5.2.7CSEL 19:404–405

ut autem appareret cuius rei gratia opus illut elaborasset, effusus est in principum laudes, quorum pietas et prouidentia, ut quidem ipse dicebat, cum in ceteris rebus tum praecipue in defendendis deorum religionibus claruisset: consultum esse tandem rebus humanis, ut cohibita inpia et anili superstitione uniuersi homines legitimis sacris uacarent ac propitios sibi deos experirentur.

And so that it would be clear for whose sake he had worked out that book, he poured himself out in praise of the emperors, whose piety and foresight, as he put it, had shone in other matters and especially in defending the religion of the gods: at last the interests of mankind had been provided for, so that with the impious old wives' superstition restrained, all people might devote themselves to lawful rites and find the gods favorable to them.

5.2.8CSEL 19:405

ubi autem religionis eius contra quam perorabat infirmare uoluit rationem, ineptus uanus ridiculus apparuit, quia grauis ille consultor utilitatis alienae non modo quid obpugnaret, sed etiam quid loqueretur nesciebat.

But when he tried to weaken the reasoning of the religion against which he was declaiming, he showed himself inept, empty, and ridiculous, because that serious counselor of other people's welfare did not know not only what he was attacking but even what he was saying.

5.2.9CSEL 19:405

nam si qui nostrorum adfuerunt, quamuis temporis gratia coniuerent, animo tamen derisere utpote cum uiderent hominem profitentem se inluminaturum alios, cum ipse caecus esset, reducturum alios ab errore, cum ipse ignoraret ubi pedes suos poneret, eruditurum alios ad ueritatem, cuius ille ne scintillam quidem unam uidisset aliquando, quippe cum sapientiae professor profligare sapientiam niteretur.

For if any of our people were present, though they kept silent because of the times, they laughed at him inwardly, seeing a man who claimed he would enlighten others though he himself was blind, lead others back from error though he did not know where to put his own feet, and instruct others in the truth though he had never seen even one spark of it, since a professor of wisdom was striving to overthrow wisdom.

5.2.10CSEL 19:405

omnes tamen id arguebant, quod illo potissimum tempore id operis esset adgressus quo furebat odiosa crudelitas. o philosophum adulatorem ac tempori seruientem!

Everyone, however, blamed him for this: that he undertook the work precisely at the time when hateful cruelty was raging. What a flattering philosopher, a slave to the times!

5.2.11CSEL 19:405

uerum hic pro sua inanitate contemptus est, qui et gratiam quam sperauit non adeptus est et gloria quam captauit in culpam reprehensionemque conuersa est.

But he was despised as his emptiness deserved: he did not gain the favor he hoped for, and the glory he chased was turned into blame and reproach.

5.2.12CSEL 19:405–406

alius eandem materiam mordacius scripsit, qui erat tum e numero iudicum et qui auctor in primis faciendae persecutionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus etiam scriptis eos quos adflixerat insecutus est.

Another wrote on the same subject more bitingly. He was then one of the judges and was a leading instigator of the persecution; not content with that crime, he also pursued with writings those whom he had afflicted.

5.2.13CSEL 19:406

conposuit enim libellos duos, non contra Christianos, ne inimice insectari uideretur, sed ad Christianos, ut humane ac benigne consulere putaretur: in quibus ita falsitatem scripturae sacrae arguere conatus est, tamquam sibi esset tota contraria.

He composed two little books, not against the Christians, so as not to seem to attack them as an enemy, but to the Christians, so as to be thought to give them humane and kindly advice. In them he tried to prove Holy Scripture false, as though it were wholly self-contradictory.

5.2.14CSEL 19:406

nam quaedam capita quae repugnare sibi uidebantur exposuit adeo multa, adeo intima enumerans, ut aliquando ex eadem disciplina fuisse uideatur.

For he set out certain passages that seemed to conflict, listing so many and such inward matters that at times he seems to have once belonged to the same discipline.

5.2.15CSEL 19:406

quod si fuit, quis eum Demosthenes poterit ab inpietate defendere, qui religionis cui fuerat accensus et fidei cuius nomen induerat et sacramenti quod acceperat proditor factus est? nisi forte casu in manus eius diuinae litterae inciderunt.

If he was, what Demosthenes could defend him from the charge of impiety, a man who became a traitor to the religion to which he had been admitted, to the faith whose name he had put on, and to the sacrament he had received? Unless perhaps the divine writings fell into his hands by chance.

5.2.16CSEL 19:406

quae igitur temeritas erat id audere dissoluere quod illi nemo interpretatus est? bene, quod aut nihil didicit aut nihil intellexit. tantum enim abest a diuinis litteris repugnantia, quantum ille afuit a fide et ueritate.

What rashness, then, to dare to dismantle what no one had interpreted for him! Just as well that he either learned nothing or understood nothing. For contradiction is as far from the divine writings as he was from faith and truth.

5.2.17CSEL 19:406

praecipue tamen Paulum Petrumque lacerauit ceterosque discipulos tamquam fallaciae seminatores, quos eosdem tamen rudes et indoctos fuisse testatus est: nam quosdam eorum piscatorio artificio fecisse quaestum; quasi aegre ferret quod illam re(ligione)m non Aristophanes aliquis aut Aristarchus commentatus sit.

Above all, though, he tore at Paul and Peter and the other disciples as sowers of deceit, while testifying that they were uneducated and unlearned, for he said that some of them had earned their living by the fisherman's trade; as if he were annoyed that some Aristophanes or Aristarchus had not composed that religion.

Divine 5, chapter 3

5.3.1CSEL 19:406–407

Afuit ergo ab his fingendi uoluntas et astutia, quoniam rudes fuerunt. aut quis possit indoctus apta inter se et cohaerentia fingere, cum philosophorum doctissimi, Plato et Aristoteles et Epicurus et Zenon, ipsi sibi repugnantia et contraria dixerint? haec est enim mendaciorum natura, ut cohaerere non possint.

So these men lacked both the will and the cunning to invent, since they were unlearned. Or what uneducated person could invent things fitting and coherent with each other, when the most learned philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Zeno, said things that contradict and oppose themselves? For this is the nature of lies, that they cannot hold together.

5.3.2CSEL 19:407

illorum autem traditio quia uera est, quadrat undique ac sibi tota consentit et ideo persuadet, quia constanti ratione subfulta est.

But their tradition, because it is true, fits on every side and agrees with itself throughout, and so it persuades, because it rests on consistent reasoning.

5.3.3CSEL 19:407

non igitur quaestus et commodi gratia religionem istam conmenti sunt, quippe qui et praeceptis et re ipsa eam uitam secuti sint, quae et uoluptatibus caret et omnia quae habentur in bonis spernit, et qui non tantum pro fide mortem subierint, sed etiam morituros esse se et scierint et praedixerint et postea uniuersos qui eorum disciplinam secuti essent acerba et nefanda passuros.

So they did not invent this religion for gain and advantage, since both in teaching and in fact they followed a life that lacks pleasures and despises all that is counted as goods; and they not only underwent death for the faith but also knew and foretold that they would die, and that afterward all who followed their teaching would suffer bitter and monstrous things.

5.3.4CSEL 19:407

ipsum autem Christum adfirmauit a Iudaeis fugatum collecta nongentorum hominum manu latrocinia fecisse.

He claimed that Christ himself, driven out by the Jews, gathered a band of nine hundred men and committed robberies.

5.3.5CSEL 19:407

quis tantae auctoritati audeat repugnare? credamus hoc plane, nam fortasse illi hoc in somnis Apollo aliquis nuntiauit. tot semper latrones perierunt et cottidie pereunt, utique multos et ipse damnasti: quis eorum post crucem suam non dicam deus,

Who would dare to resist such great authority? Let us believe it outright, for perhaps some Apollo announced it to him in his dreams. So many robbers have always perished and perish every day; you yourself have certainly condemned many. Which of them after his cross has been called, I will not say a god,

5.3.6CSEL 19:407

sed homo appellatus est? uerum tu forsitan ex eo credidisti, quia uos homicidam Martem consecrastis ut deum: quod tamen non fecissetis, si illum Ariopagitae in crucem sustulissent.

but even a man? But perhaps you believed it because you consecrated Mars, a murderer, as a god; which you would not have done if the Areopagites had crucified him.

5.3.7CSEL 19:407–408

idem cum facta eius mirabilia destrueret nec tamen negaret, uoluit ostendere Apollonium uel paria uel etiam maiora fecisse. mirum quod Apuleium praetermisit, cuius solent et multa et mira memorari.

The same man, while trying to demolish his miracles, yet without denying them, wanted to show that Apollonius had done equal or even greater things. Strange that he left out Apuleius, of whom many marvels are commonly related.

5.3.8CSEL 19:408

cur igitur, o delirum caput, nemo Apollonium pro deo colit? nisi forte tu solus, illo scilicet deo dignus, cum quo te in sempiternum uerus deus puniet.

Why then, you lunatic, does no one worship Apollonius as a god? Unless perhaps you alone do, worthy of that god indeed, with whom the true God will punish you forever.

5.3.9CSEL 19:408

si magus Christus, quia mirabilia fecit, peritior utique Apollonius, qui ut describis cum Domitianus eum punire uellet, repente in iudicio non conparuit. quam ille qui et conprehensus est et cruci adfixus.

If Christ was a magician because he did wonders, then Apollonius was surely more skillful, since, as you describe, when Domitian wanted to punish him he suddenly vanished from the court, than he who was both arrested and fastened to a cross.

5.3.10CSEL 19:408

at enim ex hoc ipso fortasse insolentiam Christi uoluit arguere, quod deum se constituerit, ut ille uerecundior fuisse uideatur, qui cum maiora faceret, ut hic putat, tamen id sibi non adrogauerit.

But perhaps he wanted by this very point to prove Christ's arrogance, in that he made himself God, so that Apollonius might seem more modest, since though he did greater things, as this man thinks, he did not claim this for himself.

5.3.11CSEL 19:408

omitto nunc ipsa opera conparare, quia in secundo et in superiore libro de fraude ac praestigiis artis magicae dixi.

I pass over comparing the works themselves for now, since I spoke of the fraud and illusions of the magic art in the second book and the one before this.

5.3.12CSEL 19:408

nego esse quemquam qui non optet in primis id sibi post mortem contingere quod etiam reges maximi concupiscunt.

I say there is no one who does not wish above all for what even the greatest kings desire to befall them after death.

5.3.13CSEL 19:408

cur enim sibi homines sepulchra magnifica, cur statuas, cur imagines conparant? cur aliquibus claris factis aut etiam pro ciuibus morte suscepta student opiniones hominum promereri? cur denique ipse ingenii tui monumentum hoc detestabile stultitia tamquam caeno aedificatum constituere uoluisti, nisi quod inmortalitatem de memoria nominis speras?

For why do people get themselves magnificent tombs, statues, and images? Why do they strive to win people's esteem by famous deeds, or even by death undergone for their fellow citizens? Why, finally, did you yourself want to set up this monument of your talent, this detestable thing built of folly as if of mud, except that you hope for immortality from the memory of your name?

5.3.14CSEL 19:408–409

stultum igitur est id putare Apollonium noluisse quod optaret utique, si posset, quia nemo est qui inmortalitatem recuset, maxime cum eum dicas et adoratum esse a quibusdam sicut deum et simulacrum eius sub Herculis Alexicaci nomine constitutum ab Ephesiis etiam nunc honorari.

It is foolish, then, to think that Apollonius did not want what he would certainly have wished for if he could, since no one refuses immortality, especially when you say that he was worshipped by some as a god and that his statue, set up under the name of Hercules Alexicacus, is still honored by the Ephesians.

5.3.15CSEL 19:409

non potuit ergo post mortem deus credi, quia et hominem et magum fuisse constabat, et ideo alieni nominis titulo adfectauit diuinitatem, quia suo nec poterat nec audebat. noster uero et potuit deus credi, quia magus non fuit, et creditus est, quia uere fuit.

So he could not be believed to be a god after death, because it was well known that he had been a man and a magician; and therefore he grasped at divinity under the title of another's name, because under his own he neither could nor dared. But ours both could be believed to be God, because he was not a magician, and was believed to be, because he truly was.

5.3.16CSEL 19:409

non inquit hoc dico, idcirco Apollonium non haberi deum, quia noluerit, sed ut appareat nos sapientiores esse, qui mirabilibus factis non statim fidem diuinitatis adiunximus, quam uos, qui ob exigua portenta deum credidistis.

"I do not say this," he says, "to claim that Apollonius is not held to be a god because he did not want it, but to make it clear that we are wiser, who did not at once attach belief in divinity to wonderful deeds, than you, who believed him a god because of slight marvels."

5.3.17CSEL 19:409

non est mirum si tu, qui a dei sapientia longe remotus es, nihil prorsus intellegis eorum quae legisti, cum Iudaei, qui a principio prophetas lectitauerant quibusque sacramentum dei fuerat adsignatum, tamen quid legerent ignorauerint.

It is no wonder if you, far removed as you are from God's wisdom, understand nothing at all of what you have read, since the Jews, who had been reading the prophets from the beginning and to whom the mystery of God had been assigned, still did not know what they were reading.

5.3.18CSEL 19:409

disce igitur, si quid tibi cordis est, non idcirco a nobis deum creditum, quia mirabilia fecit, sed quia uidimus in eo facta esse omnia quae nobis adnuntiata sunt uaticinio prophetarum.

Learn, then, if you have any sense, that he was believed by us to be God not because he did wonders, but because we saw that everything announced to us by the prophecy of the prophets was fulfilled in him.

5.3.19CSEL 19:409–410

fecit mirabilia: magum putassemus, ut et uos nunc putatis et Iudaei tunc putauerunt, si non illa ipsa facturum prophetae omnes uno spiritu praedixissent.

He did wonders: we would have thought him a magician, as you now think and as the Jews then thought, if all the prophets with one Spirit had not foretold that he would do those very things.

5.3.20CSEL 19:410

itaque deum credimus non magis ex factis operibusque mirandis quam ex illa ipsa cruce, quam uos sicut canes lambitis, quoniam simul et illa praedicta est.

So we believe him to be God no more from his deeds and wonderful works than from that very cross, which you lick at like dogs, since that too was foretold together with them.

5.3.21CSEL 19:410

non igitur suo testimonio — cui enim de se dicenti potest credi? —, sed prophetarum testimonio, qui omnia quae fecit ac passus est multo ante cecinerunt, fidem diuinitatis accepit, quod neque Apollonio neque Apuleio neque cuiquam magorum potuit aut potest aliquando contingere.

So he gained belief in his divinity not by his own testimony (for who can be believed speaking about himself?) but by the testimony of the prophets, who sang long before of all that he did and suffered; and this could not happen, and never can happen, to Apollonius, to Apuleius, or to any magician.

5.3.22CSEL 19:410

cum igitur talia ignorantiae suae deliramenta fudisset, cum ueritatem penitus excindere conisus esset, ausus est libros suos nefarios ac dei hostes φιλαληθεῖς; adnotare.

When he had poured out such ravings of his ignorance and had striven to cut truth out completely, he dared to entitle his wicked books, enemies of God, Philalethes, "Lover of Truth."

5.3.23CSEL 19:410

o caecum pectus, o mentem Cimmeriis ut aiunt tenebris atriorem! discipulus hic fortasse Anaxagorae fuerit, cui niues atramentum fuerunt. atquin eadem caecitas est et uero falsitatis et mendacio ueritatis nomen inponere. uidelicet homo subdolus uoluit lupum sub ouis pelle celare, ut fallaci titulo posset inretire lectorem.

O blind heart, O mind darker than Cimmerian darkness, as they say! Perhaps he was a disciple of Anaxagoras, for whom snow was black. Yet it is the same blindness to give falsehood the name of truth and truth the name of lie. Clearly the crafty man wanted to hide the wolf under a sheep's skin, to ensnare the reader with a deceptive title.

5.3.24CSEL 19:410

uerum esto, inscitia hoc, non malitia feceris: quam tandem nobis adtulisti ueritatem, nisi quod adsertor deorum eos ipsos ad ultimum prodidisti?

But suppose you did this out of ignorance, not malice: what truth, then, have you brought us, except that as the champion of the gods you ended by betraying them?

5.3.25CSEL 19:410–411

prosecutus enim summi dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factorem altoremque uiuentium confessus es, ademisti Ioui tuo regnum eumque summa potestate depulsum in ministrorum numerum redegisti. epilogus itaque te tuus arguit stultitiae uanitatis erroris.

For after proclaiming the praises of the supreme God, whom you confessed to be king, greatest, maker of the world, fountain of good things, parent of all, creator and sustainer of the living, you took the kingdom from your Jupiter, drove him from supreme power, and reduced him to the ranks of servants. So your own conclusion convicts you of folly, emptiness, and error.

5.3.26CSEL 19:411

adfirmas enim deos esse et illos tamen subicis et mancipas ei deo cuius religionem conaris euertere.

For you affirm that the gods exist, and yet you subject and hand them over as slaves to that God whose religion you are trying to overturn.

Divine 5, chapter 4

5.4.1CSEL 19:411

Hi ergo de quibus dixi cum praesente me ac dolente sacrilegas suas litteras explicassent, et illorum superba inpietate stimulatus et ueritatis ipsius conscientia et, ut ego arbitror, deo, suscepi hoc munus, ut omnibus ingenii mei uiribus accusatores iustitiae refutarem, non ut contra hos scriberem qui paucis uerbis obteri poterant, sed ut omnes qui ubique idem operis efficiunt aut effecerunt, uno semel inpetu profligarem.

So when these men I have mentioned had set out their sacrilegious writings in my presence and to my grief, I was spurred both by their proud impiety and by my awareness of the truth itself and, as I believe, by God, and I took up this task: to refute the accusers of justice with all the strength of my talent, not so as to write against these two, who could be crushed in a few words, but so as to rout in one single attack all who anywhere are doing or have done the same work.

5.4.2CSEL 19:411

non dubito enim quin et alii plurimi et multis in locis et non modo Graecis, sed etiam Latinis litteris monumentum iniustitiae suae struxerint. quibus singulis quoniam respondere non poteram, sic agendam mihi hanc causam putaui, ut et priores cum suis omnibus scriptis peruerterem et futuris omnem facultatem scribendi aut respondendi amputarem. praebeant modo aures: efficiam profecto ut quicumque ista cognouerit, aut suscipiat quod ante damnauit aut, quod est proximum, deridere aliquando desistat.

For I do not doubt that very many others, in many places, and not only in Greek but also in Latin literature, have built a monument to their injustice. Since I could not answer each of them, I thought I should conduct this case so as both to overturn the earlier writers with all their writings and to cut off from future ones every means of writing or replying. Only let them lend their ears: I will surely bring it about that whoever learns these things will either embrace what he formerly condemned or, what is next best, at last stop mocking.

5.4.3CSEL 19:411–412

quamquam Tertullianus eandem causam plene perorauerit in eo libro cui Apologeticum nomen est, tamen quoniam aliut est accusantibus respondere, quod in defensione aut negatione sola positum est, aliut instituere, quod nos facimus, in quo necesse est doctrinae totius substantiam contineri, non defugi hunc laborem, ut inplerem materiam, quam Cyprianus non est exsecutus in ea oratione, qua Demetrianum sicut ipse ait oblatrantem atque obstrepentem ueritati redarguere conatur.

Although Tertullian pleaded the same case fully in the book called the Apology, still, since it is one thing to answer accusers, which consists only in defense or denial, and another to give instruction, as we do, in which the substance of the whole teaching must be contained, I did not shrink from this labor, so as to complete the subject that Cyprian did not follow through in the speech in which he tries to refute Demetrianus, who, as he himself says, was barking and clamoring against the truth.

5.4.4CSEL 19:412

qua materia non est usus ut debuit: non enim scripturae testimoniis, quam ille utique uanam fictam commenticiam putabat, sed argumentis et ratione fuerat refellendus.

He did not handle that subject as he ought: for Demetrianus should have been refuted not by testimonies from Scripture, which he certainly thought empty, fictitious, and made up, but by arguments and reason.

5.4.5CSEL 19:412

nam cum ageret contra hominem ueritatis ignarum, dilatis paulisper diuinis lectionibus formare hunc a principio tamquam rudem debuit eique paulatim lucis principia monstrare, ne toto lumine obiecto caligaret.

For since he was dealing with a man ignorant of the truth, he should have set aside the divine readings for a while and formed him from the beginning as a novice, showing him the first principles of the light little by little, so that he would not be dazzled by the whole light thrown at him.

5.4.6CSEL 19:412

nam sicut infans solidi ac fortis cibi capere uim non potest ob stomachi teneritudinem, sed liquore lactis ac mollitudine alitur, donec firmatis uiribus uesci fortioribus possit, ita et huic oportebat, quia nondum poterat capere diuina, prius humana testimonia offerri id est philosophorum et historicorum, ut suis potissimum refutaretur auctoribus.

For just as an infant cannot take the strength of solid, strong food because of the tenderness of its stomach, but is nourished on liquid, soft milk until, its strength confirmed, it can eat stronger things, so to this man too, since he could not yet take in divine things, human testimonies should first have been offered, that is, those of philosophers and historians, so that he might be refuted above all by his own authorities.

5.4.7CSEL 19:412

quod quia ille non fecit raptus eximia eruditione diuinarum litterarum, ut iis solis contentus esset quibus fides constat, accessi deo inspirante, ut ego facerem et simul ut uiam ceteris ad imitandum pararem.

Because he did not do this, carried away by his outstanding learning in the divine writings so that he was content with those alone on which faith rests, I have come forward, with God's inspiration, to do it myself and at the same time to prepare a road for others to follow.

5.4.8CSEL 19:412–413

ac si hortatu nostro docti homines ac diserti huc se conferre coeperint et ingenia sua uimque dicendi in hoc ueritatis campo iactare maluerint, euanituras breui religiones falsas et occasuram esse omnem philosophiam nemo dubitauerit, si fuerit omnibus persuasum cum hanc solam religionem, tum etiam solam ueram esse sapientiam. sed euagatus sum longius quam uolebam.

And if at our urging learned and eloquent men begin to turn to this and prefer to display their talents and power of speech in this field of truth, no one could doubt that false religions will soon vanish and all philosophy will fall, once everyone is persuaded that this alone is religion and also the only true wisdom. But I have wandered further than I intended.

Divine 5, chapter 5

5.5.1CSEL 19:413

Nunc reddenda est de iustitia proposita disputatio. quae aut ipsa est summa uirtus aut fons est ipse uirtutis: quam non modo philosophi quaesierunt, sed poetae quoque, qui priores multo fuerunt et ante natum philosophiae nomen pro sapientibus habebantur.

Now I must give the promised discussion of justice. It is either itself the highest virtue or the very fountain of virtue. Not only philosophers sought it, but also the poets, who were much earlier and were held to be the wise before the name of philosophy was born.

5.5.2CSEL 19:413

hi plane intellexerunt abesse hanc a rebus humanis eamque finxerunt offensam uitiis hominum cessisse terra in caelumque migrasse. atque ut doceant quid sit iuste uiuere — solent enim praecepta per ambages dare —, a Saturni temporibus, quae illi uocant aurea, repetunt exempla iustitiae narrantque in quo statu fuerit humana uita, dum illa in terra moraretur.

They clearly understood that justice was absent from human affairs, and they imagined that, offended by human vices, she withdrew from the earth and moved to heaven. And to teach what it is to live justly (for they usually give precepts in riddles), they go back for examples of justice to the times of Saturn, which they call golden, and tell in what state human life was while she lingered on earth.

5.5.3CSEL 19:413–414

quod quidem non pro poetica fictione, sed pro uero habendum est. Saturno enim regnante, nondum deorum cultibus institutis nec adhuc illa gente ad diuinitatis opinionem consecrata, deus utique colebatur.

This should be taken not as poetic fiction but as true. For in Saturn's reign, before the worship of gods had been established and before that family had been consecrated as divine, God was certainly worshipped.

5.5.4CSEL 19:414

et ideo non erant neque dissensiones neque inimicitiae neque bella, nondum uesanos rabies nudauerat enses, ut Germanicus Caesar in Arateo loquitur carmine, nec consanguineis fuerat discordia nota, immo ne alienigenis quidem, sed neque ulli omnino gladii qui nudarentur fuerunt.

And so there were no dissensions, no enmities, no wars; "not yet had madness bared the frenzied swords," as Germanicus Caesar says in his poem on Aratus, "nor was discord known among kin"; indeed, not even with foreigners; there were no swords at all to be bared.

5.5.5CSEL 19:414

quis enim praesente ac uigente iustitia aut de tutela sui, cum nemo insidiaretur, aut de pernicie alterius cogitaret, cum nemo quicquam concupisceret? malebant tenui contenti uiuere cultu, ut Cicero in suo narrat: quod est proprium nostrae religionis. ne signare quidem aut partiri limite campum fas erat: in medium quaerebant,

For with justice present and strong, who would think about protecting himself, when no one lay in wait, or about ruining another, when no one coveted anything? "They preferred to live content with a simple way of life," as Cicero relates in his poem, which is characteristic of our religion. "It was not even lawful to mark out or divide the field with a boundary; they sought for the common store,"

5.5.6CSEL 19:414

quippe cum deus communem omnibus terram dedisset, ut communem degerent uitam, non ut rabida et furens auaritia sibi omnia uindicaret, nec ulli deesset quod omnibus nasceretur.

since God had given the earth to all in common, so that they might lead a common life, not so that raging, furious greed might claim everything for itself, and so that no one would lack what was produced for all.

5.5.7CSEL 19:414–415

quod poetae dictum sic accipi oportet, non ut existimemus nihil omnino tum fuisse priuati, sed more poetico figuratum, ut intellegamus tam liberales fuisse homines, ut natas sibi fruges non includerent nec soli absconditis incubarent, sed pauperes ad communionem proprii laboris admitterent. flumina iam lactis, iam flumina nectaris ibant.

The poet's saying must be taken not so as to think that nothing at all was private then, but as a poetic figure, so that we understand that people were so generous that they did not lock up the crops produced for them or brood over hidden stores alone, but admitted the poor to share in the fruit of their own labor. "Now rivers of milk, now rivers of nectar flowed."

5.5.8CSEL 19:415

nec mirum, cum promptuaria iustorum benigne paterent omnibus nec auaritia intercipiens beneficia diuina famem sitimque uulgo faceret, sed omnes aequaliter abundarent, cum habentes non habentibus large copioseque donarent.

No wonder, since the storehouses of the just stood kindly open to all, and greed did not intercept God's gifts and cause widespread hunger and thirst, but all had plenty equally, since those who had gave freely and abundantly to those who had not.

5.5.9CSEL 19:415

sed postquam Saturnus a filio pulsus in Latiumque delatus est arma Iouis fugiens et regnis exul ademptis, cum iam populus uel noui regis metu uel sua sponte deprauatus deum colere desisset regemque pro deo habere coepisset, cum ipse propemodum parricida exemplo ceteris esset ad uiolandam pietatem, deseruit propere terras iustissima uirgo, sed non, ut ait Cicero, et Iouis in regno caelique in parte resedit.

But after Saturn was driven out by his son and brought to Latium, "fleeing the arms of Jupiter, an exile stripped of his kingdom," when the people, whether from fear of the new king or corrupted of their own accord, had stopped worshipping God and had begun to regard the king as a god, since he himself, very nearly a parricide, set an example to the rest for violating piety, "the most just virgin quickly left the earth," but did not, as Cicero says, "settle in Jupiter's kingdom and in a part of heaven."

5.5.10CSEL 19:415–416

quomodo enim poterat in eius regno residere aut commorari qui patrem regno expulit, bello persecutus est, exulem toto orbe iactauit? ille malum uirus serpentibus addidit atris praedarique lupos iussit, id est odium et inuidiam et dolum hominibus inseuit, ut tam essent quam serpentes uenenati, tam rapaces quam lupi.

For how could she settle or stay in the kingdom of one who drove his father from the throne, pursued him with war, and tossed him as an exile over the whole world? "He added deadly venom to black serpents and bade wolves prey"; that is, he implanted hatred, envy, and deceit in human beings, so that they became as poisonous as serpents and as rapacious as wolves.

5.5.11CSEL 19:416

quod quidem uere faciunt ii qui iustos ac fideles deo persecuntur dantque iudicibus saeuiendi aduersus innoxios potestatem.

This is truly what those do who persecute the just and faithful to God and give judges power to rage against the innocent.

5.5.12CSEL 19:416

fortasse aliquid eiusmodi Iuppiter fecerit ad expugnandam tollendamque iustitiam et idcirco efferasse serpentes ac lupos acuisse tradatur. tum belli rabies et amor successit habendi.

Perhaps Jupiter did something of this kind to attack and abolish justice, and that is why he is said to have made serpents savage and sharpened wolves. "Then came the madness of war and the love of possessing."

5.5.13CSEL 19:416

neque inmerito. sublata enim dei religione boni quoque ac mali scientiam perdiderunt. sic hominibus intercidit communitas uitae et diremptum est foedus societatis humanae.

And not undeservedly. For once the religion of God was removed, they also lost the knowledge of good and evil. So the shared life of mankind perished and the bond of human fellowship was broken.

5.5.14CSEL 19:416

tum inter se manus conserere coeperunt et insidiari et gloriam sibi ex humano sanguine conparare.

Then they began to come to blows with one another, to lay ambushes, and to win glory for themselves from human blood.

Divine 5, chapter 6

5.6.1CSEL 19:416–417

Quorum omnium malorum fons cupiditas erat, quae scilicet ex contemptu uerae maiestatis erupit. non tantum enim non participabant alios quibus aliquid afluebat, sed aliena quoque rapiebant in priuatum lucrum trahentes omnia, et quae antea in usus omnium etiam singuli laborabant, in paucorum domos conferebantur.

The source of all these evils was greed, which burst out from contempt for the true majesty. For those who had plenty not only did not share with others, but also seized what belonged to others, dragging everything off for private gain; and what even individuals had formerly worked for, for the use of all, was gathered into the houses of a few.

5.6.2CSEL 19:417

ut enim seruitio ceteros subiugarent, in primis necessaria uitae subducere et colligere coeperunt eaque firmiter conclusa seruare, ut beneficia caelestia facerent sua, non propter humanitatem, quae nulla in eis erat, sed ut omnia cupiditatis et auaritiae instrumenta conraderent.

For to subjugate the rest in slavery, they first began to withdraw and collect the necessities of life and keep them firmly locked up, so as to make the gifts of heaven their own, not out of humanity, of which they had none, but to scrape together every instrument of greed and avarice.

5.6.3CSEL 19:417

leges etiam sibi iustitiae nomine iniquissimas iniustissimasque sanxerunt, quibus rapinas et auaritiam suam contra uim multitudinis tuerentur. tantum igitur auctoritate, quantum uiribus aut opibus aut malitia praeualebant.

They also enacted for themselves, in the name of justice, most unfair and unjust laws, by which to protect their plunder and greed against the force of the many. So they prevailed by authority as much as by strength, wealth, or malice.

5.6.4CSEL 19:417

et quoniam nullum in iis uestigium iustitiae fuit, cuius officia sunt humanitas aequitas misericordia, iam superba et tumida inaequalitate gaudebant altioresque se ceteris hominibus satellitum comitatu et ferro et insigni ueste faciebant.

And since there was no trace in them of justice, whose duties are humanity, fairness, and mercy, they now delighted in proud and swollen inequality and made themselves higher than other people with a retinue of guards, with steel, and with distinctive dress.

5.6.5CSEL 19:417

hinc honores sibi et purpuras et fasces inuenerunt, ut securium gladiorumque terrore subnixi quasi iure dominorum perculsis ac pauentibus imperarent.

From this they devised honors for themselves, purple robes, and the fasces, so that, relying on the terror of axes and swords, they might command the stricken and frightened as if by the right of masters.

5.6.6CSEL 19:417–418

in hac condicione humanam uitam rex ille constituit, qui debellato ac fugato parente non regnum, sed impiam tyrannidem ui et hominibus armatis occupauit et aureum illud iustumque saeculum sustulit coegitque homines malos et inpios fieri uel ex hoc ipso, quod eos auertit a deo ad se adorandum: quod terror insolentissimae potestatis expresserat.

Human life was put in this condition by that king who, having defeated and driven off his father, seized not a kingdom but an impious tyranny by force and armed men, abolished that golden and just age, and forced people to become wicked and impious by this very act, that he turned them from God to worship himself, something the terror of his most insolent power had extorted.

5.6.7CSEL 19:418

quis enim non metueret eum quem arma cingebant, quem ferri et gladiorum fulgor insuetus circumdabat? aut cui parceret alieno qui ne patri quidem suo pepercerat? quem uero metueret qui Titanum robustam et excellentem uiribus gentem bello uicerat, occisione deleuerat?

For who would not fear the one surrounded by arms, encircled by the unaccustomed gleam of steel and swords? Or whom of others would he spare who had not spared even his own father? And whom would he fear who had conquered in war and wiped out by slaughter the sturdy race of Titans, outstanding in strength?

5.6.8CSEL 19:418

quid mirum si omnis multitudo insolito metu pressa in unius adulationem concesserat? hunc uenerabantur, huic honorem maximum deferebant.

What wonder if the whole multitude, pressed by unfamiliar fear, gave way to flattery of one man? They revered him, they paid him the highest honor.

5.6.9CSEL 19:418

et quoniam mores ac uitia regis imitari genus obsequii iudicatur, abiecerunt omnes pietatem, ne exprobrare regi scelus uiderentur, si pie uiuerent.

And since imitating the manners and vices of a king is thought a kind of deference, all threw away piety, so as not to seem to reproach the king for his crime by living piously.

5.6.10CSEL 19:418

sic adsidua imitatione corrupti diuinum fas reliquerunt et paulatim male uiuendi consuetudo mos factus est. nec iam quicquam ex antecedentis saeculi pio atque optimo statu mansit, sed explosa iustitia et ueritatem secum trahens reliquit hominibus errorem ignorantiam caecitatem.

So, corrupted by constant imitation, they abandoned divine right, and little by little the habit of living badly became custom. Nothing remained any longer of the pious and excellent state of the former age, but justice, driven out and drawing truth with her, left mankind error, ignorance, and blindness.

5.6.11CSEL 19:418

inprudenter igitur poetae, qui eam confugisse cecinerunt ad Iouis regnum. si enim saeculo quod uocant aureum iustitia in terra fuit, a Ioue utique pulsa est, qui aureum saeculum commutauit.

So the poets were unwise who sang that she took refuge in Jupiter's kingdom. For if justice was on earth in the age they call golden, she was certainly driven out by Jupiter, who changed the golden age.

5.6.12CSEL 19:418–419

saeculi autem commutatio et expulsio iustitiae nihil aliut ut dixi quam desertio diuinae religionis putanda est, quae sola efficit ut homo hominem carum habeat eumque sibi fraternitatis uinculo sciat esse constrictum, siquidem pater idem omnibus deus est, ut dei patrisque communis beneficia cum iis qui non habent partiatur, nulli noceat, nullum premat, non forem claudat hospiti, non aurem precanti, sed sit largus beneficus liberalis: quas regias esse laudes Tullius existimauit.

But the change of the age and the expulsion of justice must be considered, as I said, nothing other than the abandonment of divine religion, which alone makes a person hold another dear and know that he is bound to him by the bond of brotherhood, since God is the same Father to all, so that he shares the gifts of the common God and Father with those who lack, harms no one, oppresses no one, does not shut his door to the stranger or his ear to the one who asks, but is generous, beneficent, and liberal, qualities that Tullius considered the praises of kings.

5.6.13CSEL 19:419

haec est profecto iustitia et hoc aureum saeculum, quod Ioue primum regnante corruptum, mox et ipso et omni eius progenie consecrata deorumque multorum suscepto cultu fuerat omne sublatum.

This indeed is justice, and this is the golden age, which was first corrupted when Jupiter reigned, and soon, when he and all his offspring were consecrated and the worship of many gods was taken up, was wholly abolished.

Divine 5, chapter 7

5.7.1CSEL 19:419

Sed deus ut parens indulgentissimus adpropinquante ultimo tempore nuntium misit, qui uetus illut saeculum fugatamque iustitiam reduceret, ne humanum genus maximis et perpetuis agitaretur erroribus.

But God, as a most indulgent parent, as the last time drew near, sent a messenger to bring back that ancient age and banished justice, so that the human race would not be driven about by the greatest and endless errors.

5.7.2CSEL 19:419

rediit ergo species illius aurei temporis et reddita quidem terrae, sed paucis adsignata iustitia est, quae nihil aliut est quam dei unici pia et religiosa cultura.

So the likeness of that golden time returned, and justice was indeed restored to the earth, but assigned to few; and justice is nothing other than the pious and religious worship of the one God.

5.7.3CSEL 19:419

sed moueat aliquem fortasse, cur si haec sit iustitia, non omni humano generi sit data nec in eam multitudo uniuersa consenserit. magnae hoc disputationis est, cur a deo, cum iustitiam terrae daret, sit retenta diuersitas: quod et alio loco declaraui et ubicumque opportune inciderit explicabitur.

But perhaps someone may be troubled why, if this is justice, it was not given to the whole human race, and the entire multitude did not agree to it. It is a matter for long discussion why, when God gave justice to the earth, diversity was retained; I have explained this elsewhere, and it will be explained wherever it fits.

5.7.4CSEL 19:419

nunc designare id breuissime satis est, uirtutem aut cerni non posse, nisi habeat uitia contraria, aut non esse perfectam, nisi exerceatur aduersis.

For now it is enough to point this out very briefly: virtue either cannot be seen unless it has opposing vices, or is not perfect unless exercised by adversity.

5.7.5CSEL 19:419–420

hanc enim deus bonorum ac malorum uoluit esse distantiam, ut qualitatem boni ex malo sciamus, item mali ex bono: nec alterius ratio intellegi sublato altero potest. deus ergo non exclusit malum, ut ratio uirtutis constare posset.

For God willed this distinction between good and evil, so that we may know the quality of good from evil and of evil from good; the nature of neither can be understood if the other is removed. So God did not exclude evil, so that the principle of virtue could stand.

5.7.6CSEL 19:420

quomodo enim patientia uim suam nomenque retineret, si nihil esset quod pati cogeremur? quomodo laudem mereretur deuota deo suo fides, nisi esset aliquis qui a deo uellet auertere? nam ideo potentiores esse iniustos permisit, ut cogere ad malum possent, ideo plures, ut uirtus esset pretiosa, quod rara est. quod quidem ipsum Quintilianus egregie ac breuiter ostendit in Capite obuoluto.

For how could patience keep its force and name if there were nothing we were compelled to endure? How would faith devoted to its God earn praise unless there were someone who wished to turn it away from God? For he allowed the unjust to be more powerful so that they could compel to evil, and more numerous so that virtue might be precious because rare. Quintilian showed this very point excellently and briefly in The Veiled Head.

5.7.7CSEL 19:420

nam quae inquit uirtus esset innocentia, nisi laudem raritas dedisset? uerum quia natura sic conparatum est, ut odium cupiditas ira in id quod incubuerunt agant caecos, supra hominem uidetur culpa uacare. alioquin si natura pares omnibus adfectus dedisset, pietas nihil erat.

"For what virtue," he says, "would innocence be, if rarity had not given it praise? But since nature has so arranged it that hatred, desire, and anger drive people blindly toward what they have set upon, to be free from fault seems beyond human. Otherwise, if nature had given all people equal feelings, piety would be nothing."

5.7.8CSEL 19:420

hoc quam uerum sit, docet necessitas ipsa rationis. si enim uirtus est malis ac uitiis fortiter repugnare, apparet sine malo ac uitio nullam esse uirtutem. quam deus ut absolutam perfectamque redderet, retinuit id quod erat ei contrarium, cum quo depugnare posset:

How true this is, the very necessity of reason teaches. For if virtue is bravely resisting evils and vices, it is clear that without evil and vice there is no virtue. To make it complete and perfect, God kept what was contrary to it, so that it would have something to fight against.

5.7.9CSEL 19:420

agitata enim malis quatientibus stabilitatem capit et quanto frequenter inpellitur, tanto firmiter roboratur.

For when shaken by assailing evils it gains steadiness, and the more often it is struck, the more firmly it is strengthened.

5.7.10CSEL 19:420–421

haec nimirum causa efficit ut quamuis sit hominibus missa iustitia, tamen aureum saeculum non esse dicatur, quia malum non sustulit, ut retineret diuersitatem, quae sacramentum diuinae religionis continet sola.

This, surely, is why, though justice has been sent to mankind, it is still not said to be a golden age: because he did not remove evil, so as to retain the diversity which alone contains the mystery of divine religion.

Divine 5, chapter 8

5.8.1CSEL 19:421

Qui ergo putant iustum esse neminem, ante oculos habent iustitiam, sed eam nolunt cernere. quid est enim cur illam uel in carminibus uel in omni sermone describant conquerentes eius absentiam, cum sit facillimum bonos esse, si uelint?

So those who think that no one is just have justice before their eyes but refuse to see it. For why do they describe it in poems and in all their talk, complaining of its absence, when it is very easy to be good if they wish?

5.8.2CSEL 19:421

quid nobis inanem iustitiam depingitis et optatis cadere de caelo tamquam in aliquo simulacro figuratam? ecce in conspectu uestro est: suscipite si potestis eamque in domicilio uestri pectoris conlocate, nec difficile aut alienum a temporibus existimetis.

Why do you paint us an empty justice and wish it would fall from heaven, shaped as in some statue? Look, it is before your eyes: take it up if you can and settle it in the dwelling of your heart; and do not think it difficult or out of keeping with the times.

5.8.3CSEL 19:421

estote aequi ac boni, et sequetur uos sua sponte iustitia quam quaeritis. deponite omnem malam cogitationem de cordibus uestris, et statim uobis tempus illut aureum reuertetur: quod aliter consequi non potestis, quam si deum uerum colere coeperitis.

Be fair and good, and the justice you seek will follow you of its own accord. Put every evil thought out of your hearts, and at once that golden time will return to you; and you cannot obtain it otherwise than by beginning to worship the true God.

5.8.4CSEL 19:421

uos autem manente cultu deorum iustitiam desideratis m terra, quod fieri nullo pacto potest. sed ne tum quidem potuit, cum putatis, quia nondum natis diis istis quos inpie colitis necesse est unius dei cultum fuisse per terram, eius scilicet qui execratur malitiam exigitque bonitatem, cuius templum est non lapides aut lutum, sed homo ipse, qui figuram dei gestat: quod templum non auri et gemmarum donis corruptibilibus, sed aeternis uirtutum muneribus ornatur.

But you want justice on earth while the worship of the gods remains, which can in no way happen. It could not happen even then, when you think, for since these gods you impiously worship had not yet been born, there must have been the worship of the one God throughout the earth, the God who curses wickedness and demands goodness, whose temple is not stones or clay but man himself, who bears the image of God, a temple adorned not with the perishable gifts of gold and gems but with the eternal gifts of the virtues.

5.8.5CSEL 19:421–422

discite igitur, si quid uobis reliquae mentis est, homines ideo malos et iniustos esse, quia dii coluntur, et ideo mala omnia rebus humanis cottidie ingrauescere, quia deus mundi huius effector et gubernator derelictus est, quia susceptae sunt contra quam fas est inpiae religiones, postremo quia ne coli quidem uel a paucis deum sinitis.

Learn, then, if you have any mind left, that people are evil and unjust because gods are worshipped, and that all evils grow worse in human affairs every day because God, the maker and governor of this world, has been abandoned, because impious religions have been adopted against what is right, and finally because you do not allow God to be worshipped even by a few.

5.8.6CSEL 19:422

quodsi solus deus coleretur, non essent dissensiones et bella, cum scirent homines unius se dei filios esse ideoque diuinae necessitudinis sacro et inuiolabili uinculo copulatos, nullae fierent insidiae, cum scirent cuiusmodi poenas deus animarum interfectoribus praepararet, qui clandestina scelera et ipsas etiam cogitationes peruidet, non essent fraudes et rapinae, si deo praecipiente didicissent et suo et paruo esse contenti, ut fragilibus et caducis solida et aeterna praeferrent,

If God alone were worshipped, there would be no dissensions and wars, since people would know that they are sons of one God and therefore joined by the sacred and inviolable bond of divine kinship; there would be no plots, since they would know what punishments God prepares for the killers of souls, he who sees through secret crimes and even thoughts themselves; there would be no frauds and robberies, if they had learned by God's command to be content with their own, even if little, so as to prefer the solid and eternal to the fragile and perishable;

5.8.7CSEL 19:422

non essent adulteria et stupra et mulierum prostitutiones, si esset omnibus notum damnari a deo quidquid adpetitur ultra generandi cupiditatem, nec feminam necessitas cogeret pudorem suum profanare, ut uictum sibi obscenissimum quaerat, cum et mares libidinem continerent et habentium pia et religiosa conlatio non habentibus subueniret:

there would be no adulteries, acts of sexual immorality, and prostitution of women, if all knew that God condemns whatever is sought beyond the desire of begetting; nor would necessity compel a woman to profane her modesty to seek a most shameful living, since men would restrain their lust and the pious and religious contribution of those who have would relieve those who have not.

5.8.8CSEL 19:422

non essent igitur, ut dixi, haec omnia in terris mala, si ab omnibus in legem dei coniuraretur, si ab uniuersis fierent quae unus noster populus operatur. quam beatus esset quamque aureus humanarum rerum status, si per totum orbem mansuetudo et pietas et pax et innocentia et aequitas et temperantia et fides moraretur!

So, as I said, there would not be all these evils on earth if all conspired together in God's law, if everyone did what our people alone does. How blessed, how golden the state of human affairs would be if gentleness, piety, peace, innocence, fairness, self-control, and faithfulness dwelt throughout the world!

5.8.9CSEL 19:422–423

denique ad regendos homines non opus esset tam multis et tam uariis legibus, cum ad perfectam innocentiam dei lex una sufficeret, neque carceribus neque gladiis praesidum neque terrore poenarum, cum praeceptorum caelestium salubritas humanis pectoribus infusa ultro ad iustitiae opera homines erudiret. nunc autem mali sunt ignoratione recti ac boni.

Finally, to govern people there would be no need of so many and such varied laws, since the one law of God would suffice for perfect innocence; nor of prisons, nor of governors' swords, nor of the terror of punishments, since the wholesomeness of the heavenly precepts, poured into human hearts, would of itself train people to works of justice. But now they are evil through ignorance of what is right and good.

5.8.10CSEL 19:423

quod quidem Cicero uidit. disputans enim de legibus sicut una inquit eademque natura mundus omnibus partibus inter se congruentibus cohaeret ac nititur, sic omnes homines inter se natura confusi prauitate dissentiunt neque se intellegunt esse consanguineos et subiectos omnes sub unam eandemque tutelam: quod si teneretur, deorum profecto uitam homines uiuerent.

Cicero indeed saw this. For discussing the laws, he says: "Just as the world holds together and rests on one and the same nature, all its parts agreeing among themselves, so all people, joined together by nature, disagree through depravity and do not understand that they are of one blood and all subject to one and the same protection. If this were held fast, people would surely live the life of the gods."

5.8.11CSEL 19:423–424

uniuersa igitur mala, quibus humanum genus se ipsum inuicem conficit, iniustus atque inpius deorum cultus induxit. nec enim poterant retinere pietatem qui communem omnium patrem deum tamquam perfidi ac rebelles liberi abnegassent.

So all the evils by which the human race destroys itself were brought in by the unjust and impious worship of the gods. For those could not keep piety who, like faithless and rebellious children, had denied God, the common Father of all.

Divine 5, chapter 9

5.9.1CSEL 19:424

Nonnumquam tamen sentiunt se malos esse et ueterum saeculorum statum laudant et de suis moribus meritisque coniectant abesse iustitiam: quam obuersantem oculis suis non tantum non suscipiunt nec adgnoscunt, uerum etiam uiolenter oderunt et persecuntur et exterminare contendunt.

Sometimes, however, they feel that they are evil; they praise the state of former ages and infer from their own conduct and deserts that justice is absent. Yet when it is before their eyes, they not only do not take it up or recognize it, but even hate it violently, persecute it, and strive to wipe it out.

5.9.2CSEL 19:424

fingamus hanc interim non esse iustitiam quam nos sequimur: quomodo si illa uenerit quam ueram putant, eam recipient? qui laniant et occidunt eos quos et ipsi fatentur imitatores esse iustorum, quia bona operentur et iusta, cum si tantummodo malos occiderent, digni essent ad quos iustitia non ueniret: cui nulla fuit alia causa linquendi terram quam humani cruoris effusio.

Let us suppose for now that this justice which we follow is not justice: how will they receive that one they think true, if it comes? They mangle and kill those whom they themselves admit to be imitators of the just, because they do good and just works; whereas even if they killed only the wicked, they would deserve that justice never come to them, since she had no other reason for leaving the earth than the shedding of human blood.

5.9.3CSEL 19:424

quanto magis, cum pios interficiant et ipsos iustitiae sectatores pro hostibus ducant, immo uero plus quam pro hostibus? quibus utique, cum animas eorum et opes et liberos ferro et igni adpetant, tamen parcitur uictis et est locus inter arma clementiae, aut si adeo saeuiri placuit, nihil plus in eos fit quam ut occidantur uel in seruitutem abducantur.

How much more, when they kill the pious and treat the followers of justice as enemies, and indeed worse than enemies? For even with enemies, though they attack their lives, wealth, and children with sword and fire, the conquered are spared and there is room for mercy among arms; or if it is decided to be so savage, nothing more is done to them than to kill them or lead them into slavery.

5.9.4CSEL 19:424–425

hoc uero inenarrabile est quod fit aduersus eos qui malefacere nesciunt, et nulli nocentiores habentur quam qui sunt ex omnibus innocentes. audent igitur homines inprobissimi iustitiae facere mentionem, qui feras inmanitate uincunt, qui placidissimum dei gregem uastant lupi ceu raptores atra in nebula, quos inproba uentris exegit caecos rabies.

But what is done against those who do not know how to do evil is indescribable, and no one is held more guilty than those who are the most innocent of all. So the most wicked of men dare to mention justice, men who surpass wild beasts in savagery, who lay waste God's most peaceful flock "like ravening wolves in a black fog, whom the shameless madness of the belly has driven out blind."

5.9.5CSEL 19:425

uerum hos non uentris, sed cordis rabies efferauit nec atra in nebula, sed aperta praedatione grassantur nec eos umquam conscientia scelerum reuocat, ne sanctum ac pium nomen iustitiae ore illo uiolent quod cruore innocentium tamquam rictus bestiarum madet.

But these are made savage not by the madness of the belly but of the heart, and they rage not in a black fog but by open plunder; nor does consciousness of their crimes ever hold them back from violating the holy and pious name of justice with that mouth which drips with innocent blood like the jaws of beasts.

5.9.6CSEL 19:425

huius tanti et tam pertinacis odii quam potissimum causam esse dicamus? utrumne ueritas odium parit, ut ait poeta quasi diuino spiritu instinctus, an erubescunt coram iustis et bonis esse nequam, an potius utrumque? nam et ueritas ideo semper inuisa est, quod is qui peccat uult habere liberum peccandi locum nec aliter se putat malefactorum uoluptate securius perfrui posse, quam si nemo sit cui delicta non placeant.

What shall we say is the chief cause of such great and stubborn hatred? Does "truth breed hatred," as the poet says, as though moved by a divine spirit? Or are they ashamed to be worthless in the presence of the just and good? Or rather both? For truth is always hated for this reason: the one who sins wants to have free room for sinning, and thinks he cannot enjoy the pleasure of his misdeeds more securely than if there is no one whom his offenses displease.

5.9.7CSEL 19:425

ergo tamquam scelerum et malitiae suae testes extirpare funditus nituntur et tollere grauesque sibi putant, tamquam uita eorum coarguatur.

So they strive to root out and remove them entirely as witnesses of their crimes and wickedness, and think them burdensome, as if their own life were being rebuked.

5.9.8CSEL 19:425

cur enim sint aliqui intempestiue boni, qui corruptis moribus publicis conuicium bene uiuendo faciant? cur non omnes sint aeque mali rapaces inpudici adulteri periuri cupidi fraudulenti? quin potius auferantur quibus coram male uiuere pudet, qui peccantium frontem etsi non uerbis, quia tacent, tamen ipso uitae genere dissimili feriunt et uerberant. castigare enim uidetur quicumque dissentit.

"For why should there be some who are untimely good, who reproach the corrupt public morals by living well? Why should not all be equally wicked, rapacious, unchaste, adulterers, perjurers, covetous, and deceitful? Rather, let those be removed before whom it is shameful to live badly, who strike and lash the brow of sinners, if not with words, since they are silent, yet by their very different way of life." For whoever differs seems to rebuke.

5.9.9CSEL 19:425–426

nec est magnopere mirandum, si aduersus homines ista fiunt, cum aduersus ipsum deum propter eandem causam insurrexerit etiam populus in spe constitutus nec dei nescius, sequiturque iustos eadem necessitas quae ipsum iustitiae uiolauit auctorem.

Nor is it very surprising if these things are done against men, since for the same reason even a people established in hope and not ignorant of God rose up against God himself; and the same fate follows the just which struck the very author of justice.

5.9.10CSEL 19:426

uexant ergo et exquisitis poenarum generibus excruciant parumque habent interficere quos oderunt, nisi etiam crudelitas corporibus inludat.

So they harass and torture with refined kinds of punishment, and think it too little to kill those they hate unless cruelty also makes sport of their bodies.

5.9.11CSEL 19:426

si qui autem doloris uel mortis metu uel suapte perfidia caeleste sacramentum deseruerint et ad funesta sacrificia consenserint, eos laudant et honoribus mactant, ut eorum exemplo ceteros inliciant.

But if any, from fear of pain or death or by their own faithlessness, have deserted the heavenly sacrament and consented to the deadly sacrifices, these they praise and load with honors, to entice others by their example.

5.9.12CSEL 19:426

qui autem magni aestimauerint fidem cultoresque se dei non abnegauerint, in eos uero totis carnificinae suae uiribus, ueluti sanguinem sitiant, incumbunt et desperatos uocant, quia corpori suo minime parcunt: quasi quicquam desperatius esse possit quam torquere ac dilaniare eum quem scias esse innocentem.

But those who have valued faith highly and have not denied that they are worshippers of God, on these they throw themselves with the full force of their butchery, as if thirsting for blood, and they call them desperate, because they do not spare their own bodies; as if anything could be more desperate than to torture and tear apart one whom you know to be innocent.

5.9.13CSEL 19:426

adeo nec pudor ullus aput eos superest a quibus abest omnis humanitas et retorquent in homines iustos conuicia sibi congruentia.

So no shame at all remains in those from whom all humanity is gone, and they turn back upon righteous people the insults that fit themselves.

5.9.14CSEL 19:426

inpios enim uocant, ipsi scilicet pii et ab humano sanguine abhorrentes, cum si et actus suos considerent et illorum quos tamquam inpios damnant, iam intellegant quam mendaces sint et iis omnibus quae aduersus bonos aut dicunt aut faciunt digniores.

For they call them impious, they themselves being of course pious and shrinking from human blood! Yet if they considered their own deeds and those of the people they condemn as impious, they would at once understand how false they are and how much more deserving of all they say or do against the good.

5.9.15CSEL 19:426–427

non enim de nostro, sed ex illorum numero semper existunt qui uias obsideant armati, maria praedentur, uel si palam grassari non licuit, uenena clam temperent, qui uxores necent, ut dotes earum lucrentur, aut maritos, ut adulteris nubant, qui natos ex se pueros aut strangulent aut, si nimium pii fuerint, exponant, qui libidines incestas nec a filia nec sorore nec

For it is not from our number but from theirs that there always arise those who beset the roads armed, who plunder the seas, or, if they cannot rob openly, mix poisons in secret; who murder their wives to gain their dowries, or their husbands to marry adulterers; who strangle the children born of them or, if they are very pious, expose them; who do not hold back incestuous lusts from daughter or sister or

5.9.16CSEL 19:427

matre nec sacerdote contineant, qui aduersus ciues suos patriamque coniurent, qui nec culleum metuant, qui denique sacrilegia committant et deorum quos colunt templa despolient, et, ut quae levia sunt atque usitata dicamus, qui hereditates captent, testamenta supponant, iustos heredes uel auferant uel excludant, qui corpora sua libidinibus prostituant,

mother or priestess; who conspire against their fellow citizens and their country; who do not fear even the sack; who, finally, commit sacrilege and strip the temples of the very gods they worship; and, to mention what is light and common, who hunt legacies, forge wills, and rob or shut out the lawful heirs; who prostitute their own bodies to lusts;

5.9.17CSEL 19:427–428

qui denique inmemores quid nati sint, cum feminis patientia certent, qui sanctissimam quoque corporis sui partem contra fas omne polluant ac profanent, qui uirilia sua ferro metant et, quod est sceleratius, ut sint religionis antistites, qui ne uitae quidem suae parcant, sed extinguendas publice animas suas uendant, qui si iudices sedeant, aut inmeritos perdant mercede corrupti aut noxios inpune dimittant, qui caelum quoque ipsum ueneficiis adpetant, tamquam illorum malitiam terra non capiat:

who, finally, forgetting what they were born, compete with women in passivity; who pollute and profane even the most sacred part of their body against all right; who cut off their manhood with a knife and, what is more wicked, do so to be priests of religion; who do not even spare their own lives but sell their souls to be put out in public; who, if they sit as judges, either destroy the undeserving when bribed or let the guilty go unpunished; who even assail heaven itself with sorceries, as though the earth could not hold their wickedness.

5.9.18CSEL 19:428

haec, inquam, et his plura scelera utique ab iis fiunt qui deos colunt. quis inter haec tot et tanta iustitiae locus est? et ego de multis pauca collegi, non ut arguerem, sed ut ostenderem.

These crimes, I say, and more than these, are certainly committed by those who worship the gods. Among so many and such great crimes, what place is there for justice? And I have gathered a few out of many, not to accuse but to show.

5.9.19CSEL 19:428

qui uolet scire omnia, Senecae libros in manum sumat, qui morum uitiorumque publicorum et descriptor uerissimus et insectator acerrimus fuit.

Whoever wants to know them all, let him take up the books of Seneca, who was both a most truthful describer and a most sharp attacker of public morals and vices.

5.9.20CSEL 19:428–429

sed et Lucilius tenebrosam istam uitam circumscripte breuiterque depinxit his uersibus: nunc uero a mani ad noctem, festo atque profesto, totus item pariterque die populusque patresque iactare indu foro se omnes, decedere nusquam, uni se atque eidem studio omnes dedere et arti, uerba dare ut caute possint, pugnare dolose; blanditia certare, bonum simulare uirum se; insidias facere, ut si hostes sint omnibus omnes.

Lucilius too painted this dark life concisely and briefly in these verses: "But now from morning to night, on holiday and workday, the whole people and the senators alike, all of them, throw themselves about in the forum and never leave it; all give themselves to one and the same pursuit and art: to deceive cautiously, to fight craftily, to compete in flattery, to pretend to be a good man, to lay traps, as if all were enemies to all."

5.9.21CSEL 19:429

nostro autem populo quid horum potest obici, cuius omnis religio est sine scelere ac sine macula uiuere?

But which of these things can be charged against our people, whose whole religion is to live without crime and without stain?

5.9.22CSEL 19:429

cum igitur uideant se ac suos ea quae diximus gerere, nostros autem nihil aliut operari nisi aecum et bonum, poterant, si quid saperent, ex hoc intellegere et illos qui bonum faciunt pios esse et se inpios qui nefanda committunt.

So since they see that they and their own do the things we have mentioned, while ours do nothing but what is fair and good, they could, if they had any sense, understand from this that those who do good are pious and that they themselves, who commit abominations, are impious.

5.9.23CSEL 19:429

neque enim fieri potest ut qui in omnibus uitae suae actibus non errant, in ipsa summa errent, hoc est in religione, quae rerum omnium caput est:

For it cannot be that those who do not go wrong in all the actions of their life go wrong in the highest matter, that is, in religion, which is the head of all things.

5.9.24CSEL 19:429

inpietas enim suscepta in eo quod est summum per cetera uniuersa sequeretur. aeque fieri non potest ut ipsi qui errant in omni uita, non et in religione fallantur, quoniam pietas in summo regulam tenens tenorem suum seruaret in ceteris. ita fit ut in utraque parte de condicione rerum quae geruntur qualis sit summa ipsa noscatur.

For impiety taken up in what is highest would follow through everything else. Equally, it cannot be that those who go wrong in all their life are not also deceived in religion, since piety, holding the rule in the highest matter, would keep its course in the rest. So it comes about that on each side the quality of the highest matter itself is known from the character of the deeds done.

Divine 5, chapter 10

5.10.1CSEL 19:429

Operae pretium est cognoscere illorum pietatem, ut ex iis quae clementer ac pie faciunt possit intellegi, qualia sint quae ab iis contra iura pietatis geruntur.

It is worth knowing their piety, so that from what they do mercifully and piously one may understand what the things are that they do against the laws of piety.

5.10.2CSEL 19:429

ac ne quem uidear inclementer incessere, aliquam mihi personam poeticam sumam, quae sit uel maximum pietatis exemplum.

And so as not to seem to attack anyone harshly, I will take a figure from poetry, who is supposed to be the greatest example of piety.

5.10.3CSEL 19:429–430

aput Maronem rex ille, quo iustior alter nec pietate fuit nec bello maior et armis, quae nobis documenta iustitiae protulit? uinxerat et post terga manus, quos mitteret umbris inferias, caeso sparsurus sanguine flammas.

In Maro, that king "than whom no other was more just, nor greater in piety, war, and arms": what proofs of justice did he offer us? "He had bound behind their backs the hands of those he would send as offerings to the shades, to sprinkle the flames with the blood of the slain."

5.10.4CSEL 19:430

quid potest hac pietate clementius, quam mortuis humanas uictimas immolare et ignem cruore hominum tamquam oleo pascere?

What could be more merciful than this piety, than to sacrifice human victims to the dead and feed the fire with human blood as with oil?

5.10.5CSEL 19:430

sed fortasse hoc non ipsius uitium fuerit, sed: poetae, qui insignem pietate uirum insigni scelere foedauerit. ubi est igitur, o poeta, pietas illa quam saepissime laudas? ecce pius Aeneas Sulmone creatos quattuor hic iuuenes, totidem quos educat Ufens, uiuentis rapit, inferias quos immolet umbris captiuoque rogi perfundat sanguine flammas.

But perhaps this was not his own fault but the poet's, who stained a man outstanding in piety with an outstanding crime. Where then, poet, is that piety you praise so often? "See, pious Aeneas seizes alive four young men, sons of Sulmo, and as many reared by Ufens, to sacrifice as offerings to the shades and drench the pyre's flames with captive blood."

5.10.6CSEL 19:430–431

cur ergo dicebat eodem ipso tempore quo uinctos homines ad immolationem mittebat: equidem et uiuis concedere uellem, cum uiuos quos habebat in potestate uice pecudum iuberet occidi?

Why then did he say, at the very time he was sending bound men to be sacrificed, "Indeed I would wish to grant it to the living too," when he ordered the living men he had in his power to be killed like cattle?

5.10.7CSEL 19:431

sed haec, ut dixi, culpa non illius fuit, qui litteras fortasse non didicerat, sed tua: qui cum esses eruditus, ignorasti tamen quid esset pietas, et illut ipsum quod nefarie, quod detestabiliter fecit, pietatis esse officium credidisti; uidelicet ob hoc unum pius uocatur, quod patrem dilexit.

But this, as I said, was not the fault of him, who perhaps had not learned letters, but yours: though you were learned, you did not know what piety was, and you believed that the very thing he did wickedly and detestably was a duty of piety. Evidently he is called pious for this one reason, that he loved his father.

5.10.8CSEL 19:431

quid quod bonus Aeneas haut aspernanda precantis trucidauit? adiuratus enim per eundem patrem et spes surgentis Iuli, nequaquam pepercit furiis accensus et ira.

What of the fact that good Aeneas slaughtered men "praying for what was not to be despised"? For though adjured "by that same father and the hopes of rising Iulus," he did not spare them at all, "inflamed with fury and rage."

5.10.9CSEL 19:431

quisquamne igitur hunc putet aliquid in se uirtutis habuisse, qui et furore tamquam stipula exarserit et manium patris per quem rogabatur oblitus iram frenare non quiuerit? nullo igitur modo pius, qui non tantum non repugnantes, sed etiam precantes interemit.

Would anyone think, then, that this man had any virtue in him, who flared up with fury like straw, and, forgetting the shade of his father by whom he was being entreated, could not rein in his anger? In no way, then, was he pious, who killed not only those who did not resist but even those who begged.

5.10.10CSEL 19:431

dicet hic aliquis: quae ergo aut ubi aut qualis est pietas? nimirum aput eos qui bella nesciunt, qui concordiam cum omnibus seruant, qui amici sunt etiam inimicis, qui omnes homines pro fratribus diligunt, qui cohibere iram sciunt omnemque animi furorem tranquilla moderatione lenire.

Here someone will say: What, then, or where, or of what kind is piety? Surely among those who know nothing of wars, who keep harmony with all, who are friends even to enemies, who love all people as brothers, who know how to restrain anger and to soothe every fury of the mind with calm self-control.

5.10.11CSEL 19:431

quanta igitur caligo, quanta tenebrarum et errorum nubes hominum pectora obduxit, qui cum se maxime pios putant, tum maxime fiunt inpii? quanto enim religiosius terrenis istis simulacris inseruiunt, tanto magis scelerati aduersus nomen uerae diuinitatis exsistunt.

What darkness, then, what cloud of shadows and errors has covered human hearts, that when they think themselves most pious they become most impious? For the more devoutly they serve these earthly images, the more wicked they prove against the name of the true divinity.

5.10.12CSEL 19:431–432

itaque pro merito inpietatis suae grauioribus malis saepe negantur: quorum causam quia nesciunt, fortunae culpa omnis adscribitur, et locum inuenit Epicuri philosophia nihil ad deos pertinere censentis nec gratia eos tangi nec ira moueri, quia et contemptores eorum saepe uideant beatos et cultores saepe miseros.

So, as their impiety deserves, they are often overwhelmed by heavier evils; and since they do not know the cause, all the blame is assigned to fortune, and the philosophy of Epicurus finds room, which holds that nothing concerns the gods, that they are neither touched by favor nor moved by anger, since people often see those who despise them happy and those who worship them wretched.

5.10.13CSEL 19:432

quod eo fit quia cum religiosi uideantur et natura boni, nihil tale creduntur mereri quale saepe patiuntur. consolantur se tamen accusatione fortunae nec sentiunt quod si esset ulla, cultoribus suis numquam noceret.

This happens because, since they seem religious and good by nature, they are not believed to deserve anything like what they often suffer. Yet they console themselves by accusing fortune, and do not perceive that if there were any such thing, it would never harm its worshippers.

5.10.14CSEL 19:432

merito igitur huiusmodi pietatem poena consequitur et offensa diuinitas scelere hominum praue religiosorum graui eos infortunio mactat: qui licet sanctis moribus uiuant in summa fide atque innocentia, tamen quia deos colunt, quorum ritus inpios ac profanos deus uerus odio habet, a iustitia et a nomine uerae pietatis alieni sunt.

Rightly, then, punishment follows piety of this kind, and the divinity, offended by the crime of wrongly religious people, strikes them with heavy misfortune. Though they live with holy morals in the highest faithfulness and innocence, yet because they worship gods whose impious and profane rites the true God hates, they are strangers to justice and to the name of true piety.

5.10.15CSEL 19:432

nec est difficile docere cur deorum cultores boni et iusti esse non possint. quomodo enim sanguine abstinebunt qui colunt cruentos deos Martem atque Bellonam? quomodo aut parentibus parcent qui expulsorem patris sui Iouem aut natis ex se infantibus qui Saturnum? quomodo pudicitiam tuebuntur qui colunt deam nudam et adulteram et quasi aput deos prostitutam?

Nor is it hard to show why worshippers of the gods cannot be good and just. For how will they keep from blood who worship the bloody gods Mars and Bellona? Or how will they spare their parents who worship Jupiter, who drove out his father, or the infants born to them who worship Saturn? How will they guard chastity who worship a goddess naked, adulterous, and as it were prostituted among the gods?

5.10.16CSEL 19:432–433

quomodo se rapinis et fraudibus abstinebunt qui Mercuri furta nouerunt docentis non fraudis esse decipere, sed astutiae? quomodo libidines cohercebunt qui Iouem Herculem Liberum Apollinem ceterosque uenerantur, quorum adulteria et stupra in mares et feminas non tantum doctis nota sunt, sed exprimuntur etiam in theatris atque cantantur, ut sint omnibus notiora?

How will they keep from robbery and fraud who know the thefts of Mercury, who teaches that to deceive is not fraud but cleverness? How will they curb their lusts who revere Jupiter, Hercules, Liber, Apollo, and the rest, whose adulteries and acts of sexual immorality with males and females are not only known to the learned but are even acted out and sung in the theaters, so that they are better known to all?

5.10.17CSEL 19:433

possuntne inter haec iusti esse homines, qui etiamsi natura sint boni, ab ipsis tamen diis erudiantur ad iniustitiam? ad placandum enim deum quem colas iis rebus opus est, quibus illum gaudere ac delectari scias.

Amid all this, can people be just, who, even if they are good by nature, are trained in injustice by the gods themselves? For to appease the god you worship you need the things in which you know he rejoices and delights.

5.10.18CSEL 19:433

sic fit ut uitam colentium deus pro qualitate numinis sui formet, quoniam religiosissimus est cultus imitari.

So it happens that a god shapes the life of his worshippers according to the character of his divinity, since the most devout worship is imitation.

Divine 5, chapter 11

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iis igitur hominibus qui deorum suorum moribus congruunt, quia grauis est et acerba iustitia, eandem inpietatem suam qua in ceteris rebus utuntur, aduersus iustos uiolenter exercent, nec inmerito a prophetis bestiae nominantur.

So these people, who conform to the morals of their gods, since justice is heavy and bitter to them, exercise violently against the just the same impiety they use in everything else; and not undeservedly are they called beasts by the prophets.

5.11.2CSEL 19:433

praeclare itaque M. Tullius: etenim si nemo est inquit quin emori malit quam conuerti in aliquam figuram bestiae, quamuis hominis mentem sit habiturus, quanto est miserius in hominis figura animo esse efferato? mihi quidem tanto uidetur, quanto praestabilior est animus corpore.

So Marcus Tullius put it excellently: "For if there is no one who would not rather die than be turned into some shape of a beast, even though he would keep a human mind, how much more wretched is it to have a savage soul in human shape? To me, indeed, it seems as much worse as the soul is more excellent than the body."

5.11.3CSEL 19:433–434

aspernantur itaque corpora beluarum, quibus sunt ipsi saeuiores, sibique adeo placent, quod homines nati sint, quorum nihil nisi lineamenta et summam figuram gerunt.

So they scorn the bodies of beasts, though they are more savage than beasts, and are so pleased with themselves for being born human, though they bear nothing of it but the outlines and outward shape.

5.11.4CSEL 19:434

nam quis Caucasus, quae India, quae Hyrcania tam inmanes, tam sanguinarias umquam bestias aluit? quoniam ferarum omnium rabies usque ad uentris satietatem furit fameque sedata protinus conquiescit.

For what Caucasus, what India, what Hyrcania ever bred beasts so monstrous, so bloodthirsty? For the rage of all wild beasts goes on only until the belly is full, and once hunger is satisfied it at once subsides.

5.11.5CSEL 19:434

illa, illa est uera bestia, cuius una iussione funditur ater ubique cruor: crudelis ubique luctus, ubique pauor et plurima mortis imago.

That, that is the true beast, at whose single command "black blood is poured out everywhere: everywhere cruel grief, everywhere fear, and many a form of death."

5.11.6CSEL 19:434

nemo huius tantae beluae inmanitatem potest pro merito describere, quae uno loco recubans tamen per totum orbem ferreis dentibus saeuit et non tantum artus hominum dissipat, sed et ossa ipsa comminuit et in cineres furit, ne quis extet sepulturae locus: quasi uero id adfectent qui deum confitentur; ut ad eorum sepulchra ueniatur, ac non ut ipsi ad deum ueniant.

No one can describe as it deserves the savagery of so great a beast, which, though lying in one place, rages with iron teeth through the whole world, and not only scatters human limbs but grinds the very bones and rages even against the ashes, so that no place of burial may remain; as if those who confess God were concerned that people should come to their tombs, rather than that they themselves should come to God.

5.11.7CSEL 19:434

quaenam illa feritas, quae rabies, quae insania est lucem uiuis, terram mortuis denegasse? dico igitur nihil esse miserius iis hominibus quos ministros furoris alieni, quos satellites inpiae iussionis necessitas aut inuenit aut fecit.

What savagery, what rage, what madness is this, to deny light to the living and earth to the dead? I say, then, that nothing is more wretched than those men whom necessity has found or made the servants of another's fury, the attendants of an impious command.

5.11.8CSEL 19:434

non enim honor ille aut prouectio dignitatis fuit, sed hominis damnatio ad carnificinam, dei uero ad poenam sempiternam.

For that was no honor or promotion in rank, but a condemnation: by men, to the work of butchery; by God, to eternal punishment.

5.11.9CSEL 19:434–435

quae autem per totum orbem singuli gesserint, enarrare inpossibile est. quis enim uoluminum numerus capiet tam infinita, tam uaria genera crudelitatis? accepta enim potestate pro suis moribus quisque saeuiuit.

What individual officials have done throughout the world is impossible to recount. For what number of volumes will hold such endless and varied kinds of cruelty? Once given power, each raged according to his own character.

5.11.10CSEL 19:435

alii prae nimia timiditate plus ausi sunt quam iubebantur, alii suo proprio aduersus iustos odio, quidam naturali mentis feritate, nonnulli, ut placerent et hoc officio uiam sibi ad altiora munirent; aliqui ad occidendum praecipites extiterunt, sicut unus in Phrygia, qui uniuersum populum cum ipso pariter conuenticulo concremauit. sed hic quanto saeuior, tanto clementior inuenitur:

Some, out of excessive timidity, dared more than they were ordered; others from their own hatred of the just; some from natural savagery of mind; some to please and pave their way by this service to higher office. Some were quick to kill, like one in Phrygia who burned a whole people together with their very meeting-place. But the more savage he was, the more merciful he is found to be.

5.11.11CSEL 19:435

illut uero pessimum genus est cui clementiae species falsa blanditur, ille grauior, ille saeuior est carnifex qui neminem statuit occidere.

But that is the worst kind, which is flattered by a false appearance of mercy; that is the harsher and more savage executioner who has decided to kill no one.

5.11.12CSEL 19:435

itaque dici non potest huiusmodi iudices quanta et quam grauia tormentorum genera excogitauerint, ut ad effectum propositi sui peruenirent.

So it cannot be told how many and how severe the kinds of torture such judges have devised to achieve their aim.

5.11.13CSEL 19:435

haec autem non tantum ideo faciunt, ut gloriari possint nullum se innocentium peremisse — nam et ipse audiui aliquos gloriantes quod administratio sua in hac parte fuerit incruenta —, sed et inuidiae causa, ne aut ipsi uincantur aut illi uirtutis suae gloriam consequantur.

They do this not only so that they can boast that they have put none of the innocent to death (for I myself have heard some boasting that their administration had been bloodless in this respect), but also out of envy, so that they are not defeated themselves and the others do not win the glory of their virtue.

5.11.14CSEL 19:435

itaque in excogitandis poenarum generibus nihil aliut quam uictoriam cogitant: sciunt enim certamen esse illud et pugnam.

So in devising kinds of punishment they think of nothing but victory, for they know that it is a contest and a battle.

5.11.15CSEL 19:435

uidi ego in Bithynia praesidem gaudio mirabiliter elatum tamquam barbarorum gentem aliquam subegisset, quod unus qui per biennium magna uirtute restiterat, postremo cedere uisus esset.

I myself saw in Bithynia a governor wonderfully elated with joy, as if he had subdued some barbarian nation, because one man who had resisted with great courage for two years finally seemed to give way.

5.11.16CSEL 19:435–436

contendunt igitur ut uincant et exquisitos dolores corporibus inmittunt et nihil aliut deuitant quam ut ne torti moriantur: quasi uero mors tantummodo beatos faciat ac non etiam tormenta quanto fuerint grauiora, tanto maiorem uirtutis gloriam pariant.

So they strive to win, and inflict refined pains on bodies, and avoid nothing so much as that the tortured should die; as though death alone made people blessed, and as though tortures too did not produce greater glory of virtue the heavier they were.

5.11.17CSEL 19:436

illi autem pertinaci stultitia iubent curam tortis diligenter adhiberi, ut ad alios cruciatus membra renouentur et reparetur nouus sanguis ad poenam. quid tam pium, tam beneficum, tam humanum fieri potest? non curassent tam sollicite quos amarent.

But with stubborn folly they order that the tortured be carefully tended, so that their limbs may be renewed for further torments and fresh blood restored for punishment. What could be done more piously, more kindly, more humanely? They would not have cared so anxiously for those they loved.

5.11.18CSEL 19:436

haec est deorum disciplina, ad haec opera cultores suos erudiunt, haec sacra desiderant. quin etiam sceleratissimi homicidae contra pios iura inpia condiderunt: nam et constitutiones sacrilegae et disputationes iuris peritorum leguntur iniustae.

This is the discipline of the gods; to these works they train their worshippers; these are the rites they desire. Moreover, the most wicked murderers have drawn up impious laws against the pious: for sacrilegious ordinances and unjust discussions of jurists are read.

5.11.19CSEL 19:436

Domitius de officio proconsulis libro septimo rescripta principum nefaria collegit, ut doceret quibus poenis adfici oporteret eos qui se cultores dei confiterentur.

Domitius, in the seventh book On the Duty of a Proconsul, collected the wicked rescripts of emperors, to teach what penalties ought to be inflicted on those who confessed themselves worshippers of God.

Divine 5, chapter 12

5.12.1CSEL 19:436

Quid iis facias qui ius uocant carnificinas ueterum tyrannorum aduersus innocentes rabide saeuientium? et cum sint iniustitiae crudelitatisque doctores, iustos se tamen ac prudentes uideri uolunt, caeci et hebetes et rerum et ueritatis ignari.

What can you do with people who call "law" the butcheries of ancient tyrants raging madly against the innocent? And though they are teachers of injustice and cruelty, they want to seem just and prudent, blind and dull and ignorant of reality and truth.

5.12.2CSEL 19:436–437

adeone uobis, o perditae mentes, inuisa iustitia est, ut eam summis sceleribus adaequetis? adeone aput uos perit innocentia, ut ne morte quidem simplici dignam iudicetis, sed supra omnia facinora habeatur nullum facinus admittere pectusque parum ab omni sceleris contagione praestare?

Is justice so hateful to you, you lost minds, that you equate it with the greatest crimes? Is innocence so dead among you that you judge it unworthy even of a simple death, but it is held worse than all crimes to commit no crime and to keep one's heart free from all contagion of wrongdoing?

5.12.3CSEL 19:437

et quoniam communiter cum deorum cultoribus loquimur, liceat per uos bene facere uobiscum: haec est enim lex nostra, hoc opus, haec religio. si uobis sapientes uidemur, imitamini, si stulti, contemnite aut etiam ridete, si libet: nobis enim stultitia nostra prodest. quid laceratis? quid adfligitis?

And since we are speaking generally with the worshippers of the gods, let us be allowed by you to do good to you: for this is our law, this our work, this our religion. If we seem wise to you, imitate us; if foolish, despise us or even laugh, if you like; for our folly profits us. Why do you tear us? Why do you afflict us?

5.12.4CSEL 19:437

non inuidemus sapientiae uestrae: hanc stultitiam malumus, hanc amplectimur, hoc nobis credimus expedire, ut uos diligamus et in uos ipsos qui odistis omnia conferamus.

We do not envy your wisdom: we prefer this folly, we embrace it, we believe this is good for us: to love you and to bestow everything on you who hate us.

5.12.5CSEL 19:437

est apud Ciceronem non abhorrens a uero locus in ea disputatione quae habetur a Furio contra iustitiam. quaero inquit, si duo sint, quorum alter optimus uir, aequissimus, summa iustitia, singulari fide, alter insigni scelere et audacia, et si in eo sit errore ciuitas, ut bonum illum uirum sceleratum facinerosum nefarium putet, contra autem (eum) qui sit inprobissimus, existimet esse summa probitate ac fide, proque hac opinione omnium ciuium bonus ille uir uexetur rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur uinciatur uratur exterminetur egeat,

There is a passage in Cicero, not far from the truth, in the discussion Furius holds against justice. "I ask," he says, "if there were two men, one the best of men, most fair, of the highest justice and singular faithfulness, the other of notable crime and audacity; and if the city were in such error that it thought that good man wicked, criminal, and abominable, and on the other hand thought the one who is most wicked to be of the highest integrity and faithfulness; and if, in keeping with this opinion of all the citizens, that good man were harassed, seized, and finally had his hands cut off, his eyes gouged out, were condemned, bound, burned, banished, and left in want,

5.12.6CSEL 19:437–438

postremo iure etiam optimo omnibus miserrimus esse uideatur, contra autem ille inprobus laudetur colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes undique copiae conferantur, uir denique optimus omnium existimatione et dignissimus omni fortuna iudicetur: quis tandem erit tam demens qui dubitet utrum se esse malit?

and finally seemed, even with the best right, to all to be most wretched; while on the other hand that wicked man were praised, honored, and loved by all, all honors, all commands, all wealth, all resources from every side were bestowed on him, and he were judged in everyone's estimation the best of men and most worthy of every fortune: who will be so mad as to doubt which of the two he would rather be?"

5.12.7CSEL 19:438

profecto quasi diuinaret quae nobis mala et quo modo euentura essent propter iustitiam, hoc posuit exemplum. haec enim populus noster patitur omnia errantium prauitate.

Surely he set out this example as if foreseeing what evils would befall us on account of justice, and how. For our people suffer all these things through the perversity of those in error.

5.12.8CSEL 19:438

ecce in eo est errore ciuitas uel potius orbis ipse totus, ut bonos et iustos uiros tamquam malos et impios persequatur excruciet damnet occidat.

See, the city, or rather the whole world, is in such error that it persecutes, tortures, condemns, and kills good and just men as if they were wicked and impious.

5.12.9CSEL 19:438

nam quod ait neminem esse tam dementem qui dubitet utrum se esse malit, ille quidem ut is qui contra iustitiam disserebat, hoc sensit, malle sapientem malum esse cum bona existimatione quam bonum cum mala.

As for his saying that no one is so mad as to doubt which he would rather be, he, as one arguing against justice, meant that the wise man would rather be bad with a good reputation than good with a bad one.

5.12.10CSEL 19:438

a nobis autem absit haec amentia, ut falsum uero anteponamus. an boni nostri qualitas ex populi pendebit erroribus quam ex conscientia nostra et iudicio dei? aut aliqua nos felicitas inliciet umquam, ut non potius ueram bonitatem cum omni malo quam falsam cum omni prosperitate malimus?

But far from us be this madness, that we should put the false before the true. Will the quality of our goodness depend on the errors of the people rather than on our conscience and the judgment of God? Or will any happiness ever entice us not to prefer true goodness with every evil to false goodness with every prosperity?

5.12.11CSEL 19:438

sua sibi habeant regna reges, suas diuitias diuites, ut loquitur Plautus, suam uero prudentiam prudentes: relinquant nobis stultitiam nostram, quam uel ex hoc apparet esse sapientiam quod eam nobis inuident.

Let kings keep their kingdoms, the rich their riches, as Plautus says, and the prudent their prudence: let them leave us our folly, which is shown to be wisdom by this very fact, that they envy us for it.

5.12.12CSEL 19:438–439

quis enim stulto inuideat nisi qui ipse sit stultissimus? illi autem non sunt adeo stulti ut stultis inuideant, sed ex eo quod accurate, quod sollicite persecuntur, stultos non esse concedunt.

For who would envy a fool except one who is himself a greater fool? But they are not such fools as to envy fools; rather, by persecuting us so carefully and anxiously, they concede that we are not fools.

5.12.13CSEL 19:439

cur enim tam crudeliter saeuiant nisi quia metuunt, ne in dies inualescente iustitia cum diis suis cariosis relinquantur? si ergo cultores deorum sapientes sunt et nos stulti, quid metuant ne sapientes inliciantur a stultis?

For why would they rage so cruelly unless they fear that, as justice grows stronger day by day, they will be left alone with their worm-eaten gods? If, then, the worshippers of the gods are wise and we are fools, why should they fear that the wise will be lured away by fools?

Divine 5, chapter 13

5.13.1CSEL 19:439

Cum autem noster numerus semper de deorum cultoribus augeatur, numquam uero, ne in ipsa quidem persecutione minuatur — quoniam peccare homines et inquinari sacrificio possunt, auerti autem non possunt a deo: ualet enim ui sua ueritas — quis est tandem tam excors tamque caecus quin uideat in utra sit parte sapientia?

But since our number is always increased from the worshippers of the gods and never diminished, not even in persecution itself (for people can sin and be defiled by sacrifice, but they cannot be turned away from God, since truth prevails by its own strength), who is so senseless and so blind as not to see on which side wisdom lies?

5.13.2CSEL 19:439

sed illi malitia et furore caecantur, ne uideant, stultosque esse arbitrantur qui cum habeant in potestate supplicia uitare, cruciari tamen et emori malunt, cum possint ex eo ipso peruidere non esse stultitiam in quam tanta hominum milia per orbem totum una et pari mente consentiant.

But they are blinded by malice and fury so as not to see, and they think those are fools who, though it is in their power to avoid punishment, still prefer to be tortured and to die; whereas they could see from this very fact that it is not folly to which so many thousands of people throughout the world agree with one and the same mind.

5.13.3CSEL 19:439

si enim feminae sexus infirmitate labuntur - nam interdum isti muliebrem aut anilem superstitionem uocant — uiri certe sapiunt. si pueri, si adulescentes inprouidi sunt per aetatem, maturi certe ac senes habent stabile iudicium.

For if women slip through the weakness of their sex (for sometimes these men call it a womanish or old wives' superstition), men at least are wise. If boys and youths are thoughtless because of their age, surely the mature and the old have steady judgment.

5.13.4CSEL 19:439–440

si una ciuitas desipit, ceterae utique innumerabiles stultae esse non possunt. si una prouincia, una natio prudentia caret, ceteras omnes habere intellegentiam recti necesse est.

If one city is foolish, the countless others certainly cannot be fools. If one province, one nation lacks prudence, all the rest must have an understanding of what is right.

5.13.5CSEL 19:440

cum uero ab ortu solis usque ad occasum lex diuina suscepta sit et omnis sexus, omnis aetas et gens et regio unis ac paribus animis deo seruiat, eadem sit ubique patientia, idem contemtus mortis, intellegere debuerant aliquid in ea re esse rationis quod non sine causa usque ad mortem defendatur, aliquid fundamenti ac soliditatis quod eam religionem non tantum iniuriis et uexatione non soluat, sed augeat semper et faciat firmiorem.

But since the divine law has been received from the rising of the sun to its setting, and every sex, every age, race, and region serves God with one and the same mind, and there is everywhere the same patience, the same contempt of death, they ought to have understood that there is some reason in this thing, which is not without cause defended even to death, some foundation and solidity, which not only keeps this religion from being dissolved by injuries and harassment but always increases it and makes it firmer.

5.13.6CSEL 19:440

nam et in hoc quoque illorum malitia conuincitur, quod euertisse se funditus religionem dei opinantur, si homines inquinauerint, cum et deo satisfacere liceat et nullus sit tam malus dei cultor quin data facultate ad placandum deum reuertatur et quidem deuotione maiore.

For in this too their malice is convicted: they think they have overturned the religion of God from its foundations if they have defiled people, when it is possible to make satisfaction to God, and no worshipper of God is so bad that, given the chance, he does not return to appease God, and indeed with greater devotion.

5.13.7CSEL 19:440

peccati enim conscientia et metus poenae religiosiorem facit et semper multo firmior est fides quam reponit paenitentia.

For awareness of sin and fear of punishment make a person more religious, and the faith that repentance restores is always much firmer.

5.13.8CSEL 19:440

si ergo ipsi cum deos sibi arbitrantur iratos, tamen donis et sacrificiis et odoribus placari eos credunt, quid est tandem cur deum nostrum tam inmitem, tam inplacabilem putent, ut uideatur is iam Christianus esse non posse qui diis eorum coactus inuitusque libarit? nisi forte contaminatos semel putant animum translaturos, ut sua sponte iam facere incipiant quod per tormenta fecerunt.

If, then, they themselves, when they think the gods are angry with them, still believe they can be appeased with gifts, sacrifices, and incense, why do they think our God so harsh and implacable that one who has poured a libation to their gods under compulsion and against his will seems no longer able to be a Christian? Unless perhaps they think that those once defiled will change their minds, so as to begin doing of their own accord what they did under torture.

5.13.9CSEL 19:440–441

quis id officium libens obeat quod ab iniuria coepit? quis cum uideat laterum suorum cicatrices, non magis oderit deos, propter quos aeterna poenarum insignia et inpressas uisceribus suis notas gestet?

Who would willingly undertake a duty that began with injury? Who, when he sees the scars on his sides, will not hate the gods all the more, on whose account he bears lasting badges of punishment and marks pressed into his flesh?

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ita fit ut data diuinitus pace et qui fugerunt uniuersi redeant et alius propter miraculum uirtutis nouus populus accedat.

So it happens that when peace is granted by God, all who fled return, and another, new people joins because of the wonder of such courage.

5.13.11CSEL 19:441

nam cum uideat uulgus dilacerari homines uariis tormentorum generibus et inter fatigatos carnifices inuictam tenere patientiam, existimant, id quod res est, nec consensum tam multorum nec perseuerantiam morientium uanam esse nec ipsam patientiam sine deo cruciatus tantos posse superare.

For when the crowd sees people torn apart by various kinds of torture and keeping unconquered patience amid exhausted executioners, they conclude, as is the truth, that neither the agreement of so many nor the perseverance of the dying is vain, and that patience itself could not overcome such tortures without God.

5.13.12CSEL 19:441

latrones et robusti corporis uiri eiusmodi lacerationes perferre non queunt, exclamant et gemitus edunt, uincuntur enim dolore, quia deest illis inspirata patientia: nostri autem, ut de uiris taceam, pueri et mulierculae tortores suos taciti uincunt et exprimere illis gemitum nec ignis potest.

Robbers and men of strong body cannot endure such mangling; they cry out and groan, for they are overcome by pain, because they lack inspired patience. But ours, to say nothing of men, boys and weak women silently overcome their torturers, and not even fire can wring a groan from them.

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eant Romani et Mucio glorientur aut Regulo, quorum alter necandum se hostibus tradidit, quod captiuum puduit uiuere, alter ab hostibus deprehensus cum uideret mortem se uitare non posse, manum foco iniecit, ut pro facinore suo satisfaceret hosti quem uoluit occidere, eaque poena ueniam quam non meruerat accepit:

Let the Romans go and boast of Mucius or Regulus, one of whom gave himself up to the enemy to be killed because he was ashamed to live as a captive, while the other, caught by the enemy, when he saw he could not escape death, thrust his hand into the fire to make satisfaction to the enemy he had wanted to kill for his deed, and by that punishment received a pardon he had not earned.

5.13.14CSEL 19:441

ecce sexus infirmus et fragilis aetas dilacerari se toto corpore urique perpetitur non necessitate, quia licet uitare si uelint, sed uoluntate, quia confidunt deo.

See, the weaker sex and fragile age endure being torn apart and burned over the whole body, not by necessity, since they could avoid it if they wished, but by choice, because they trust in God.

5.13.15CSEL 19:441–442

haec est uera uirtus, quam philosophi quoque gloriabundi non re, sed uerbis inanibus iactant disserentes nihil esse tam congruens uiri sapientis grauitati atque constantiae quam nullis terroribus de sententia et proposito posse depelli, sed tanti esse cruciari et emori, ne fidem prodat, ne ab officio discedat, ne metu mortis aut dolore acerbo subactus aliquid faciat iniustum:

This is true virtue, which the philosophers too boast of, not in reality but in empty words, arguing that nothing so fits the dignity and constancy of a wise man as to be driven from his opinion and purpose by no terrors, but to count it worth being tortured and dying rather than betray his faith, abandon his duty, or, overcome by fear of death or bitter pain, do anything unjust;

5.13.16CSEL 19:442

nisi forte delirare illis uidetur Flaccus in lyricis, cum dicit: iustum et tenacem propositi uirum non ciuium ardor praua iubentium, non uultus instantis tyranni mente quatit solida.

unless perhaps they think Flaccus is raving in his lyrics when he says: "The man who is just and firm of purpose is not shaken in his solid mind by the passion of citizens commanding what is wrong, nor by the face of a threatening tyrant."

5.13.17CSEL 19:442

quo nihil uerius dici potest, si hoc ad eos referatur qui nullos cruciatus, nullam mortem recusant, ne a fide iustitiaque declinent, qui non tyrannicas iussiones, non praesidum gladios tremunt, quominus ueram et solidam libertatem constanti mente defendant, quae in hoc solo tuenda sapienti est.

Nothing truer can be said, if it is applied to those who refuse no tortures and no death so as not to turn from faith and justice, who do not tremble at tyrants' commands or governors' swords so as to fail to defend with steady mind true and solid freedom, which for the wise must be guarded in this alone.

5.13.18CSEL 19:442

quis enim tam insolens, tam elatus est qui me uetet oculos in caelum tollere, qui inponat mihi necessitatem uel colendi quod nolim uel quod uelim non colendi?

For who is so insolent, so exalted, as to forbid me to raise my eyes to heaven, or to impose on me the necessity either of worshipping what I do not wish or of not worshipping what I wish?

5.13.19CSEL 19:442–443

quid iam nobis ulterius relinquatur, si etiam hoc quod uoluntate fieri oportet libido extorqueat aliena? nemo istut efficiet, si quid nobis ad contemnendam mortem doloremque uirtutis est. quam constantiam si tenemus, cur stulti iudicamur facientes ea quae philosophi laudant?

What further would be left to us, if even this, which ought to be done by will, another's whim could extort? No one will achieve that, if we have any virtue for despising death and pain. If we hold to this constancy, why are we judged fools for doing what the philosophers praise?

5.13.20CSEL 19:443

recte igitur Seneca incongruentiam hominibus obiectans ait: summa uirtus illis uidetur magnus animus, et idem eum qui contemnit mortem pro furioso habent: quod est utique summae peruersitatis.

So Seneca rightly, reproaching people for their inconsistency, says: "The highest virtue seems to them a great soul, and yet they hold the man who despises death to be mad"; which is surely the height of perversity.

5.13.21CSEL 19:443

sed hi uanarum religionum cultores eadem stultitia id obiciunt qua uerum deum non intellegunt: quos Sibylla Erythraea xuxpoy? et avoTQVOj; uocat, surdos scilicet et excordes, qui nec audiant diuina nec sentiant, sed terram digitis suis imaginatam metuant et adorent.

But these worshippers of vain religions raise this objection with the same folly by which they do not understand the true God. The Erythraean Sibyl calls them "deaf" and "senseless," that is, people who neither hear nor perceive divine things but fear and adore earth shaped by their own fingers.

Divine 5, chapter 14

5.14.1CSEL 19:443

Quae uero causa sit ut eos qui sapientes sunt stultos putent, magna ratio est — nec enim frustra falluntur —: quae nobis diligenter est explicanda, ut errores suos tandem si fieri possit adgnoscant.

But there is a weighty reason why they think the wise are fools (for they are not deceived for nothing); and we must explain it carefully, so that they may at last, if possible, recognize their errors.

5.14.2CSEL 19:443–444

iustitia suapte natura speciem quandam stultitiae habet, quod ego et diuinis et humanis testimoniis confirmare possum. sed nihil fortasse aput istos agamus, nisi eos de suis doceamus auctoribus non posse quemquam iustum esse, quod est coniunctum cum uera sapientia, nisi idem stultus esse uideatur.

Justice by its very nature has a certain appearance of folly, which I can confirm by both divine and human testimonies. But perhaps we would achieve nothing with these people unless we teach them from their own authors that no one can be just, which is joined with true wisdom, without also seeming a fool.

5.14.3CSEL 19:444

Carneades Academicae sectae philosophus, cuius in disserendo quae uis fuerit, quae eloquentia, quod acumen, qui nescit ipsum, ex praedicatione Ciceronis intelleget aut Lucilii, aput quem disserens Neptunus de re difficillima ostendit non posse id explicari, non Carneaden si ipsum Orcus remittat, cum legatus ab Atheniensibus Romam missus esset, disputauit de iustitia copiose audiente Galba et Catone Censorio maximis tunc oratoribus.

Carneades, a philosopher of the Academic school (whoever does not know what force, what eloquence, what sharpness he had in argument will learn it from the praise of Cicero or of Lucilius, in whose poem Neptune, discussing a very difficult matter, shows it cannot be explained, "not if Orcus sent back Carneades himself"), when he was sent by the Athenians as an envoy to Rome, discoursed at length on justice in the hearing of Galba and Cato the Censor, the greatest orators of the time.

5.14.4CSEL 19:444

sed idem disputationem suam postridie contraria disputatione subuertit et iustitiam quam pridie laudauerat sustulit, non quidem philosophi grauitate, cuius firma et stabilis debet esse sententia, sed quasi oratorio exercitii genere in utramque partem disserendi. quod ille facere solebat, ut alios quidlibet adserentes posset refutare.

But the next day he overturned his argument with a contrary argument and demolished the justice he had praised the day before, not with the seriousness of a philosopher, whose opinion ought to be firm and steady, but as a kind of orator's exercise in arguing both sides. He used to do this so that he could refute others whatever they asserted.

5.14.5CSEL 19:444–445

eam disputationem, qua iustitia euertitur, aput Ciceronem Lucius Furius recordatur, credo quoniam de re publica disserebat, ut defensionem laudationemque eius induceret, sine qua putabat regi non posse rem publicam. Carneades autem ut Aristotelen refelleret ac Platonem iustitiae patronos, prima illa disputatione collegit ea omnia quae pro iustitia dicebantur, ut posset illam, sicut fecit, euertere.

That argument, by which justice is overturned, is recalled by Lucius Furius in Cicero, because, I believe, he was discussing the commonwealth, so as to introduce a defense and praise of justice, without which he thought a commonwealth could not be governed. But Carneades, to refute Aristotle and Plato, the patrons of justice, gathered in that first argument everything that was said for justice, so that he could overturn it, as he did.

5.14.6CSEL 19:445

erat enim facillimum iustitiam radices non habentem labefactare, quia tum nulla in terra fuit, ut quid esset aut qualis a philosophis cerneretur.

For it was very easy to shake a justice that had no roots, since then there was none on earth, so that philosophers might see what it was or of what kind.

5.14.7CSEL 19:445

atque utinam tot ac tales uiri quantum eloquentiae, quantum animi, tantum etiam scientiae ad inplendam defensionem summae uirtutis habuissent, cuius origo in religione, ratio in aequitate est! sed ii qui primam illam partem nescierunt, ne secundam quidem tenere potuerunt.

And would that so many and such great men had had as much knowledge as they had eloquence and spirit, to complete the defense of the highest virtue, whose origin is in religion and whose principle is in equity! But those who did not know the first part could not hold the second either.

5.14.8CSEL 19:445

uolo autem prius circumscripte ac breuiter quid sit ostendere, ut intellegatur philosophos ignorasse iustitiam nec id quod minime nouerant potuisse defendere.

But first I want to show concisely and briefly what it is, so that it may be understood that the philosophers did not know justice and could not defend what they hardly knew.

5.14.9CSEL 19:445

iustitia quamuis omnes simul uirtutes amplectatur, tamen duae sunt omnium principales quae ab ea diuelli separarique non possunt, pietas et aequitas. nam fides temperantia probitas innocentia integritas et cetera eiusmodi uel natura uel institutis parentum possunt esse in iis hominibus qui iustitiam nesciunt, sicuti semper fuerunt:

Though justice embraces all the virtues together, there are two chief ones among them all that cannot be torn or separated from it: piety and equity. For faithfulness, self-control, uprightness, innocence, integrity, and the like can exist, by nature or by the training of parents, in people who do not know justice, as they always have.

5.14.10CSEL 19:445

nam Romani ueteres, qui iustitia gloriari solebant, iis utique uirtutibus gloriabantur quae, ut dixi, proficisci a iustitia possunt et ab ipso fonte secerni.

For the ancient Romans, who used to boast of justice, were in fact boasting of those virtues which, as I said, can come from justice and be separated from the source itself.

5.14.11CSEL 19:446

pietas uero et aequitas quasi uenae sunt eius, his enim duobus fontibus constat tota iustitia: sed caput eius et origo in illo primo est, in secundo uis omnis ac ratio. pietas autem nihil aliut est quam dei notio, sicut Trismegistus uerissime definiuit, ut alio loco diximus.

But piety and equity are, as it were, its veins; for all justice consists of these two springs. But its head and origin lie in the first, and all its force and principle in the second. Piety is nothing other than the knowledge of God, as Trismegistus most truly defined it, as we said elsewhere.

5.14.12CSEL 19:446

si ergo pietas est cognoscere deum, cuius cognitionis haec summa est ut colas, ignorat utique iustitiam qui religionem dei non tenet. quomodo enim potest eam ipsam nosse qui unde oriatur ignorat?

If, then, piety is knowing God, and the sum of this knowledge is to worship him, whoever does not hold the religion of God certainly does not know justice. For how can one know it who does not know where it comes from?

5.14.13CSEL 19:446

Plato quidem multa de uno deo locutus est, a quo ait constitutum esse mundum, sed nihil de religione: somniauerat enim deum, non cognouerat. quodsi iustitiae defensionem uel ipse uel quilibet alius implere uoluisset, in primis deorum religiones euertere debuit, quia contrariae sunt pietati.

Plato indeed said much about the one God, by whom he says the world was established, but nothing about religion; for he had dreamed of God, not known him. But if he or anyone else had wanted to complete a defense of justice, he ought first of all to have overturned the religions of the gods, since they are contrary to piety.

5.14.14CSEL 19:446

quod quidem Socrates quia facere temptauit, in carcerem coniectus est, ut iam tunc appareret quid esset futurum iis hominibus qui iustitiam ueram defendere deoque singulari seruire coepissent.

Because Socrates tried to do this, he was thrown into prison, so that it was already clear then what would happen to those who began to defend true justice and serve the one God.

5.14.15CSEL 19:446

altera est iustitiae pars aequitas: aequitatem dico non utique bene iudicandi, quod et ipsum laudabile est in homine iusto, sed se cum ceteris coaequandi, quam Cicero aequabilitatem uocat.

The other part of justice is equity. By equity I do not mean that of judging well, though that too is praiseworthy in a just man, but that of making oneself equal with others, which Cicero calls "equability."

5.14.16CSEL 19:446

deus enim, qui homines et generat et inspirat, omnes aequos id est pares esse uoluit, eandem condicionem uiuendi omnibus posuit, omnes ad sapientiam genuit, omnibus inmortalitatem spopondit: nemo a beneficiis eius caelestibus segregatur.

For God, who begets and breathes life into human beings, willed that all should be equal, that is, alike; he set the same condition of life for all, begot all for wisdom, promised immortality to all; no one is shut out from his heavenly gifts.

5.14.17CSEL 19:446–447

nam sicut omnibus unicum suum lumen aequaliter diuidit, emittit omnibus fontes, uictum sum ministrat, quietem somni dulcissimam tribuit, sic omnibus aequitatem uirtutemque largitur. nemo aput eum seruus est, nemo dominus: si enim cunctis idem pater est, aequo iure omnes liberi sumus.

For just as he shares his one light equally with all, sends forth springs for all, supplies food, and grants the sweetest rest of sleep, so he bestows equity and virtue on all. With him no one is a slave, no one a master; for if the same Father belongs to all, we are all children by equal right.

5.14.18CSEL 19:447

nemo deo pauper est nisi qui iustitia indiget, nemo diues nisi qui uirtutibus plenus est, nemo denique egregius nisi qui bonus et innocens fuerit, nemo clarissimus nisi qui opera misericordiae largiter fecerit, nemo perfectissimus nisi qui omnes gradus uirtutis inpleuerit.

No one is poor before God except the one who lacks justice; no one rich except the one full of virtues; no one distinguished except the one who has been good and innocent; no one most illustrious except the one who has done works of mercy generously; no one most perfect except the one who has completed every step of virtue.

5.14.19CSEL 19:447

quare neque Romani neque Graeci iustitiam tenere potuerunt, quia dispares multis gradibus homines habuerunt, a pauperibus ad diuites, ab humilibus ad potentes, a priuatis denique usque ad regum sublimissimas potestates.

So neither the Romans nor the Greeks could hold justice, because they had people unequal by many degrees, from the poor to the rich, from the lowly to the powerful, and finally from private persons up to the loftiest powers of kings.

5.14.20CSEL 19:447

ubi enim non sunt uniuersi pares, aequitas non est, et excludit inaequalitas ipsa iustitiam, cuius uis omnis in eo est, ut pares faciat eos qui ad huius uitae condicionem pari sorte uenerunt.

For where all are not equal, there is no equity, and inequality itself shuts out justice, whose whole force lies in making equal those who came into the condition of this life by an equal lot.

Divine 5, chapter 15

5.15.1CSEL 19:447

Duobus igitur illis iustitiae fontibus immutatis omnis uirtus et omnis ueritas tollitur et ipsa iustitia remigrat in caelum. ideo non est uerum illut bonum a philosophis repertum, quia ignorabant uel unde oreretur uel quid efficeret: quod nullis aliis praeterquam nostro populo reuelatum est.

So when those two springs of justice are changed, all virtue and all truth are removed, and justice itself goes back to heaven. That is why that true good was not found by the philosophers: they did not know either where it arises or what it produces; and this has been revealed to no one but our people.

5.15.2CSEL 19:447

meet aliquis: nonne sunt aput uos alii pauperes, alii diuites, alii serui, alii domini? nonne aliquid inter singulos interest? nihil, nec alia causa est cur nobis inuicem fratrum nomen inpertiamus, nisi quia pares esse nos credimus.

Someone will say: "Are there not among you some poor and some rich, some slaves and some masters? Is there no difference between individuals?" None; and there is no other reason why we give one another the name of brothers than that we believe we are equals.

5.15.3CSEL 19:447–448

nam cum omnia humana non corpore, sed spiritu metiamur, tametsi corporum sit diuersa condicio, nobis tamen serui non sunt, sed eos et habemus et dicimus spiritu fratres, religione conseruos.

For since we measure all human things not by the body but by the spirit, though the condition of bodies differs, to us they are not slaves; we regard them and call them brothers in spirit and fellow servants in religion.

5.15.4CSEL 19:448

diuitiae quoque non faciunt insignes, nisi quod possunt bonis operibus facere clariores. diuites sunt enim non quia diuitias habent, sed quia utuntur illis ad opera iustitiae, et qui pauperes uidentur, eo tamen diuites sunt, quia et non egent et nihil concupiscunt.

Riches too do not make people distinguished, except that they can make them more illustrious by good works. For people are rich not because they have riches but because they use them for works of justice; and those who seem poor are rich in that they neither lack nor covet anything.

5.15.5CSEL 19:448

cum igitur et liberi seruis et diuites pauperibus humilitate animi pares simus, aput deum tamen uirtute discernimur: tanto quisque sublimior est quanto iustior.

So though free and slave, rich and poor, are equal in humility of mind, yet before God we are distinguished by virtue: each is the more exalted the more just he is.

5.15.6CSEL 19:448

si enim iustitia est parem se etiam minoribus facere, quamquam hoc ipso praecellit, quod se inferioribus coaequauit, tamen si non tantum quasi parem, sed etiam quasi minorem se gesserit, utique multo altiorem dignitatis gradum deo iudice consequetur.

For if justice is to make oneself equal even to lesser people, though one excels by this very fact, that he has made himself equal to his inferiors, yet if he conducts himself not only as an equal but even as a lesser, he will surely attain a much higher degree of dignity with God as judge.

5.15.7CSEL 19:448

nam profecto in hac uita saeculari quoniam breuia et caduca sunt omnia, et praeferunt se alteris homines et de dignitate contendunt, quo nihil foedius, nihil adrogantius, nihil a sapientiae ratione submotius: rebus enim caelestibus contraria sunt ista uniuersa terrena.

For in this worldly life, since all things are brief and perishable, people put themselves before one another and contend for rank; nothing is fouler, more arrogant, more remote from the principle of wisdom than this: for all these earthly things are contrary to the heavenly.

5.15.8CSEL 19:448

sicut enim sapientia hominum summa stultitia est aput deum, stultitia, ut docui, summa sapientia est, sic deo humilis et abiectus est qui fuerit conspicuus et sublimis in terra.

For just as human wisdom is the height of folly with God, and folly, as I have taught, is the height of wisdom, so the one who has been conspicuous and exalted on earth is lowly and abject before God.

5.15.9CSEL 19:448–449

nam ut taceam quod haec praesentia terrae bona, quibus magnus honos tribuitur, uirtuti contraria sunt et uigorem mentis eneruant, quae tandem potest firma esse nobilitas, quae opes, quae potentia, cum possit deus reges quoque ipsos inferiores etiam infimis facere? et ideo consulens nobis deus inter diuina praecepta illut praecipue posuit: qui se extollit, humiliabitur, et qui se humiliat, exaltabitur.

For, to say nothing of the fact that these present goods of the earth, to which great honor is paid, are contrary to virtue and weaken the vigor of the mind, what nobility, what wealth, what power can be firm, when God can make even kings lower than the lowest? And so God, providing for us, set this above all among his divine precepts: "Whoever exalts himself will be humbled, and whoever humbles himself will be exalted."

5.15.10CSEL 19:449

cuius praecepti salubritas docet quod qui se aput homines planum fecerit humilemque praebuerit, hic aput deum praecellens et insignis habeatur.

The wholesomeness of this precept teaches that whoever has made himself level with others and shown himself humble among men will be held outstanding and distinguished before God.

5.15.11CSEL 19:449

neque enim falsa est illa sententia quae aput Euripidem fertur in hunc modum: quae hic mala putantur, haec sunt in caelo bona.

Nor is that saying false which is reported from Euripides in this way: "What are thought evils here are goods in heaven."

Divine 5, chapter 16

5.16.1CSEL 19:449

Exposui causam cur philosophi nec inuenire iustitiam nec defendere potuerunt: nunc redeo ad id quod intenderam.

I have set out why the philosophers could neither find nor defend justice; now I return to what I had in view.

5.16.2CSEL 19:449

Carneades ergo, quoniam erant infirma quae a philosophis adserebantur, sumpsit audaciam refellendi, quia refelli posse intellexit.

So Carneades, since what the philosophers asserted was weak, took courage to refute it, because he saw that it could be refuted.

5.16.3CSEL 19:449

eius disputationis summa haec fuit: iura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet uaria pro moribus, et aput eosdem pro temporibus saepe mutata, ius autem naturale esse nullum; omnes et homines et alias animantes ad utilitates suas natura ducente ferri; proinde aut nullam esse iustitiam aut, si sit aliqua, summam esse stultitiam, quoniam sibi noceret alienis commodis consulens.

The sum of his argument was this: people made laws for themselves for their advantage, varying with customs and often changed among the same people with the times; there is no natural law; all people and other living things are carried, with nature as guide, toward their own advantage; therefore either there is no justice, or, if there is any, it is the height of folly, since it harms itself in looking after others' interests.

5.16.4CSEL 19:449–450

et inferebat haec argumenta: omnibus populis qui florerent inperio et Romanis quoque ipsis, qui totius orbis potirentur, si iusti uelint esse, hoc est si aliena restituant, ad casas esse redeundum et in egestate ac miseriis iacendum.

And he brought these arguments: all peoples flourishing in empire, including the Romans themselves, who ruled the whole world, would have to go back to huts and lie in want and misery if they wished to be just, that is, to give back what belongs to others.

5.16.5CSEL 19:450

tum omissis communibus ad propria ueniebat. bonus uir inquit si habeat seruum fugitiuum uel domum insalubrem ac pestilentem, quae uitia solus sciat, et ideo proscribat ut uendat, utrumne profitebitur fugitiuum se seruum uel pestilentem domum uendere an celabit emptorem?

Then, leaving general matters, he came to particulars. "If a good man," he said, "has a runaway slave or an unhealthy, plague-ridden house, faults which he alone knows, and so advertises it for sale, will he declare that he is selling a runaway slave or a plague-ridden house, or will he conceal it from the buyer?

5.16.6CSEL 19:450

si profitebitur, bonus quidem, quia non fallet, sed tamen stultus iudicabitur, quia uel paruo uendet uel omnino non uendet; si celabit, erit quidem sapiens, quia rei consulet, sed idem malus, quia fallet.

If he declares it, he will be judged good, since he will not deceive, but a fool, since he will sell cheaply or not at all; if he conceals it, he will be wise, since he looks after his interest, but also bad, since he will deceive.

5.16.7CSEL 19:450

rursus si reperiat aliquem qui orichalcum se putet uendere, cum sit illut aurum, aut plumbum, cum sit argentum, tacebitne, ut id paruo emat, an indicabit, ut magno?

Again, if he finds someone who thinks he is selling brass when it is gold, or lead when it is silver, will he keep quiet so as to buy it cheaply, or point it out so as to pay much?"

5.16.8CSEL 19:450

stultum plane uidetur malle magno. unde intellegi uolebat et eum qui sit iustus ac bonus stultum esse et eum qui sapiens, malum, et tamen sine pernicie fieri posse ut sint homines paupertate contenti.

It plainly seems foolish to prefer to pay much. From this he wanted it understood both that the just and good man is a fool and that the wise man is bad, and yet that it is possible without ruin for people to be content with poverty.

5.16.9CSEL 19:450–451

transcendebat ergo ad maiora, in quibus nemo posset sine periculo uitae iustus esse. dicebat enim: nempe iustitia est hominem non occidere, alienum prorsus non attingere.

So he went on to greater cases, in which no one could be just without danger to life. For he said: "Justice, surely, is not to kill a human being and not to touch what belongs to another at all.

5.16.10CSEL 19:451

quid ergo iustus faciet, si forte naufragium fecerit et aliquis inbecillior uiribus tabulam ceperit? nonne illum tabula deturbabit, ut ipse conscendat eaque nixus euadat, maxime cum sit nullus medio mari testis? si sapiens est, faciet: ipsi enim pereundum est, nisi fecerit; si autem mori maluerit quam manus inferre alteri, iam iustus ille, sed (idem) stultus est, qui uitae suae non parcat, dum parcit alienae.

What then will the just man do if he happens to be shipwrecked and someone weaker has seized a plank? Will he not push him off the plank so that he can climb on and escape by clinging to it, especially since there is no witness in mid-sea? If he is wise, he will do it, for he must perish unless he does; but if he prefers to die rather than lay hands on another, then he is just, but also a fool, since he does not spare his own life while he spares another's.

5.16.11CSEL 19:451

item si acie suorum fusa hostes insequi coeperint, et iustus ille nanctus fuerit aliquem saucium equo insidentem, eine parcet, ut ipse occidatur, an deiciet ex equo, ut ipse hostem possit effugere? quod si fecerit, sapiens, sed idem malus, si non fecerit, iustus, sed idem stultus sit necesse est.

Likewise, if his side's line is routed and the enemy begins to pursue, and that just man comes upon a wounded man sitting on a horse, will he spare him and be killed himself, or throw him from the horse so that he himself can escape the enemy? If he does that, he is wise but also bad; if he does not, he must be just but also a fool."

5.16.12CSEL 19:451

ita ergo iustitiam cum in duas partes diuisisset, alteram ciuilem esse dicens, alteram naturalem, utramque subuertit, quod illa ciuilis sapientia sit quidem, sed iustitia non sit, naturalis autem illa iustitia sit quidem, sed non sit sapientia.

So, having divided justice into two parts, calling one civil and the other natural, he overturned both: the civil kind is wisdom indeed but not justice, while the natural kind is justice indeed but not wisdom.

5.16.13CSEL 19:451–452

arguta haec plane ac uenenata sunt et quae Marcus Tullius non potuerit refellere. nam cum faciat Laelium Furio respondentem pro iustitiaque dicentem, inrefutata haec tamquam foueam praetergressus est, ut uideatur idem Laelius non naturalem, quae in crimen stultitiae uenerat, sed illam ciuilem defendisse iustitiam, quam Furius sapientiam quidem esse concesserat, sed iniustam.

These arguments are plainly subtle and poisonous, and Marcus Tullius could not refute them. For when he makes Laelius answer Furius and speak for justice, he passed these by unrefuted as if stepping around a pit, so that Laelius seems to have defended not natural justice, which had been charged with folly, but the civil kind, which Furius had granted to be wisdom but unjust.

Divine 5, chapter 17

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Quod ad praesentem disputationem pertinebat ostendi quomodo iustitia similitudinem stultitiae gerat, ut adpareat non sine causa decipi eos qui putant nostrae religionis homines stultos esse, qui talia facere uideantur qualia ille proposuit.

As far as concerned the present discussion, I have shown how justice bears a likeness to folly, so that it may be clear that those are not deceived without reason who think the people of our religion fools, since they seem to do such things as he proposed.

5.17.2CSEL 19:452

nunc maius a me exigi sentio, ut ostendam quare iustitiam deus stultitiae specie conuolutam et oculis hominum uoluerit auferre, si prius Furio respondero, quia parum plene respondit Laelius. qui profecto licet sapiens fuerit, ut uocabatur, patrocinari tamen uerae iustitiae nullo modo poterat, quia caput ipsum fontemque iustitiae non tenebat.

Now I sense that more is required of me: to show why God willed that justice, wrapped in the appearance of folly, be hidden from human eyes; but first I will answer Furius, since Laelius answered him too incompletely. Though he was indeed wise, as he was called, he could in no way plead for true justice, because he did not hold the very head and source of justice.

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nobis autem facilior est ista defensio, quibus caelesti beneficio familiaris est ac penitus nota iustitia quique illam non nomine, sed re nouimus.

But this defense is easier for us, to whom by heaven's gift justice is familiar and thoroughly known, and who know it not in name but in reality.

5.17.4CSEL 19:452

nam Plato et Aristoteles honesta quidem uoluntate iustitiam defendere cupierunt effecissentque aliquid, si conatus eorum bonos, si eloquentiam, si uirtutem ingenii diuinarum quoque rerum doctrina iuuisset.

For Plato and Aristotle, with honorable intent, wanted to defend justice, and they would have achieved something if knowledge of divine things had also assisted their good efforts, their eloquence, and the strength of their genius.

5.17.5CSEL 19:452–453

itaque opus illorum inane atque inutile iacuit nec cuiquam hominum persuadere potuerunt ut eorum praescripto uiueret, quia fundamentum a caelo disciplina illa non habuit.

So their work lay empty and useless, and they could persuade no one to live by their rule, because that teaching had no foundation from heaven.

5.17.6CSEL 19:453

nostrum opus certius sit necesse est, quos deus docuit. illi enim depingebant uerbis et imaginabantur iustitiam quae in conspectu non erat, nec praesentibus exemplis confirmare poterant quae adserebant.

Our work must be surer, since God has taught us. For they painted in words and imagined a justice that was not in view, and they could not confirm what they asserted with present examples.

5.17.7CSEL 19:453

responderi enim posset ab audientibus non posse ita uiui, sicut illi sua disputatione praescriberent, adeo ut nulli adhuc extiterint qui id genus uitae sequerentur.

For their hearers could reply that it was impossible to live as they prescribed in their discussion, so much so that no one had yet appeared who followed that kind of life.

5.17.8CSEL 19:453

nos autem non uerbis modo, sed etiam exemplis ex uero petitis uera esse quae a nobis dicuntur ostendimus.

But we show that what we say is true not only by words but also by examples drawn from reality.

5.17.9CSEL 19:453

sensit igitur Carneades quae sit natura iustitiae, nisi quod parum alte perspexit stultitiam [non] esse: quamquam intellegere mihi uideor qua mente id fecerit. non enim uere existimauit eum stultum esse qui iustus est, sed cum sciret non esse et rationem tamen cur ita uideretur non conprehenderet, uoluit ostendere latere in abdito ueritatem, ut decretum disciplinae suae tueretur, cuius summa sententia est nihil percipi posse.

So Carneades perceived what the nature of justice is, except that he did not look deeply enough into why it seems folly; though I think I understand with what intention he did it. For he did not truly think that the just man is a fool, but since he knew he was not, yet did not grasp the reason why he seemed so, he wanted to show that truth lies hidden, so as to uphold the doctrine of his school, whose chief tenet is that nothing can be perceived.

5.17.10CSEL 19:453

uideamus ergo utrumne iustitia foedus aliquod habere cum stultitia possit. iustus inquit si aut ecum saucio aut tabulam naufrago non ademerit, ut ipse animam suam liberet, stultus est.

Let us see, then, whether justice can have any alliance with folly. "The just man," he says, "if he does not take the horse from the wounded man or the plank from the shipwrecked, to save his own life, is a fool."

5.17.11CSEL 19:453–454

primum omnium nego ullo modo fieri posse ut homini, qui quidem uere iustus sit, eiusmodi casus eueniat, quia iustus neque cuiquam nato inimicus est neque quicquam omnino adpetit alienum.

First of all, I deny that it can in any way happen that such an accident befalls a man who is truly just, because the just man is an enemy to no one born and seeks nothing at all that belongs to another.

5.17.12CSEL 19:454

cur enim nauiget aut quid petat ex aliena terra cui sufficiat sua? cur autem belligeret ac se alienis furoribus misceat in cuius

For why would he sail, or what would he seek from a foreign land, when his own is enough for him? And why would he wage war and mix himself in others' frenzies, in whose

5.17.13CSEL 19:454

animo pax cum hominibus perpetua uersetur? scilicet peregrinis mercibus aut humano sanguine delectabitur qui nec lucrum sciat adpetere, cui sufficiat uictus, et non modo ipse caedem facere, sed interesse facientibus ac spectare ducat nefas. sed omitto ista, quoniam fieri potest ut uel inuitus ad haec subeunda cogatur.

mind perpetual peace with all people dwells? Will he, forsooth, delight in foreign merchandise or in human blood, who does not know how to seek gain, for whom food suffices, and who considers it wrong not only to commit slaughter himself but even to be present and watch others do it? But I pass over these points, since it may happen that he is compelled even against his will to undergo them.

5.17.14CSEL 19:454

adeone ergo iustitiam, O Furi uel potius O Carneade, cuius est illa omnis oratio, tam inanem, tam superuacuam tamque contemptam deo putas, ut nihil possit nihilque habeat in sese quod ad custodiam sui ualeat?

Do you, then, Furius, or rather Carneades, whose whole speech that is, think justice so empty, so superfluous, and so despised by God that it can do nothing and has nothing in itself strong enough to guard it?

5.17.15CSEL 19:454

sed uidelicet qui sacramentum hominis ignorant ideoque ad hanc temporalem uitam referunt omnia, quanta sit uis iustitiae scire non possunt.

But evidently those who do not know the mystery of man and therefore refer everything to this temporal life cannot know how great the power of justice is.

5.17.16CSEL 19:454

nam et cum de uirtute disputant, quamuis intellegant aerumnis ac miseriis esse plenissimam, tamen expetendam esse aiunt sua causa: eius enim praemia, quae sunt aeterna et inmortalia, nullo modo uident. sic rebus omnibus ad hanc praesentem uitam relatis uirtutem plane ad stultitiam redigunt, siquidem tantos huius uitae labores frustra et inaniter suscipit sed haec alio loco plenius, interim de iustitia, ut coepimus:

For even when they discuss virtue, though they understand that it is full of hardships and miseries, they say it must be sought for its own sake; for they do not see its rewards at all, which are eternal and immortal. So by referring everything to this present life they reduce virtue plainly to folly, since it takes on the great labors of this life in vain and to no purpose. But more fully on this elsewhere; for now, about justice, as we began.

5.17.17CSEL 19:454

cuius tanta uis est, ut cum oculos in caelum sustulerit, a deo mereatur omnia.

Its power is so great that when it lifts its eyes to heaven, it obtains everything from God.

5.17.18CSEL 19:454–455

recte igitur Flaccus tantam esse dixit innocentiae uim, ut ad tutelam sui non egeat nec armis nec uiribus, quacumque iter fecerit: integer uitae scelerisque purus non eget Mauris iaculis nec arcu nec uenenatis grauida sagittis, Fusce, pharetra, siue per Syrtis iter aestuosas siue facturus per inhospitalem Caucasum uel quae loca fabulosus lambit Hydaspes.

So Flaccus rightly said that the power of innocence is so great that it needs neither arms nor strength to protect it, wherever it travels: "The man upright in life and clean of crime has no need of Moorish javelins or bow or quiver heavy with poisoned arrows, Fuscus, whether he is to journey through the sweltering Syrtes, or through the inhospitable Caucasus, or the places washed by the storied Hydaspes."

5.17.19CSEL 19:455

non potest ergo fieri quin hominem iustum inter discrimina tempestatum atque bellorum caelestis tutela custodiat ac non, etiamsi cum parricidis et nocentibus nauiget, aut malis quoque parcatur, ut una iusta et innocens anima liberetur, aut certe pereuntibus ceteris sola seruetur.

So it cannot be that heaven's protection does not guard the just man amid the dangers of storms and wars, and that, even if he sails with parricides and criminals, either the wicked too are spared so that one just and innocent soul may be saved, or at least, while the rest perish, he alone is preserved.

5.17.20CSEL 19:455

sed concedamus posse fieri quod proponit philosophus: quid ergo iustus faciet, si nactus fuerit aut in equo saucium aut in tabula naufragum? non inuitus confiteor: morietur potius quam occidat.

But let us grant that what the philosopher proposes can happen. What then will the just man do if he comes upon a wounded man on a horse or a shipwrecked man on a plank? I confess, not unwillingly: he will die rather than kill.

5.17.21CSEL 19:455

nec ideo tamen iustitia, quod est singulare hominis bonum, stultitiae nomen accipiet. quid enim melius, quid carius esse homini debet quam innocentia? quae utique tanto perfectior sit necesse est, quanto illam perduxeris ad extremum morique malueris, ne quid de innocentiae ratione minuatur.

Yet not for that reason will justice, which is man's singular good, receive the name of folly. For what should be better, what dearer to a human being than innocence? And it must surely be the more perfect the further you carry it to the extreme and prefer to die rather than diminish anything of the principle of innocence.

5.17.22CSEL 19:455–456

stultitia est inquit alienae animae parcere cum pernicie suae. num etiam pro amicitia perire stultum iudicabis? quid ergo illi familiares Pythagorei laudantur a uobis, quorum alter se tyranno uadem mortis pro altero dedit, alter ad praestitutum tempus, cum iam sponsor eius duceretur, praesentiam sui fecit eumque interuentu suo liberauit? quorum uirtus in tanta gloria non haberetur, quod alter pro amico, alter etiam pro fide mori uoluit, si stulti putarentur.

"It is folly," he says, "to spare another's life at the cost of one's own." Will you judge it foolish even to die for friendship? Why then do you praise those Pythagorean friends, one of whom gave himself to the tyrant as surety for the other's death, while the other appeared at the appointed time, when his surety was already being led away, and freed him by his arrival? Their virtue would not be held in such glory, since one was willing to die for a friend and the other for his word, if they were thought fools.

5.17.23CSEL 19:456

denique ob hanc ipsam uirtutem tyrannus iis gratiam rettulit utrumque seruando et hominis crudelissimi natura mutata est. quin etiam deprecatus esse dicitur ut se tertium in amicitiam reciperent, non utique tamquam stultos, sed tamquam bonos et sapientes uiros.

In the end, for this very virtue the tyrant repaid them by saving both, and the nature of a most cruel man was changed. He is even said to have begged them to receive him as a third into their friendship, certainly not as fools but as good and wise men.

5.17.24CSEL 19:456

itaque non uideo quare, cum pro amicitia et fide mori summa gloria conputetur, non etiam pro innocentia perire sit homini gloriosum. ergo stultissimi sunt qui nobis crimini dant mori uelle pro deo, cum ipsi eum qui pro homine mori uoluit, in caelum summis laudibus tollant.

So I do not see why, when dying for friendship and good faith is counted the highest glory, perishing for innocence should not also be glorious for a man. They are the greatest fools, then, who charge us with wanting to die for God, when they themselves exalt to heaven with the highest praise the one who was willing to die for a man.

5.17.25CSEL 19:456

denique, ut concludam disputationem, non posse eundem iustum esse ac stultum, eundem sapientem et iniustum docet ipsa ratio. qui enim stultus est, quid sit iustum ac bonum nescit et ideo semper peccat. ducitur enim quasi captiuus a uitiis nec resistere ullo modo potest, quia caret uirtute, quam nescit.

Finally, to conclude the discussion, reason itself teaches that the same person cannot be just and foolish, or wise and unjust. For the fool does not know what is just and good, and therefore always sins. He is led as a captive by vices and can in no way resist, because he lacks virtue, which he does not know.

5.17.26CSEL 19:456–457

iustus autem ab omni se peccato abstinet, quod aliter facere non potest quam si habeat recti prauique notitiam. rectum autem discernere a prauo quis potest nisi sapiens? ita fit ut numquam possit iustus esse qui stultus est, neque sapiens qui fuerit iniustus.

But the just man abstains from all sin, which he cannot do unless he has knowledge of right and wrong. And who can distinguish right from wrong except the wise? So it comes about that one who is a fool can never be just, and one who has been unjust can never be wise.

5.17.27CSEL 19:457

quod si est uerissimum, manifestum est eum qui aut naufrago tabulam aut ecum saucio non ademerit stultum non esse, quia haec facere peccatum est, a quo se sapiens abstinet.

If this is most true, it is clear that the one who does not take the plank from the shipwrecked man or the horse from the wounded one is not a fool, because to do these things is a sin, from which the wise man abstains.

5.17.28CSEL 19:457

uideri tamen et ipse confiteor per hominum errorem ignorantium cuiusque rei proprietatem. itaque omnis haec quaestio non tam argumentis quam definitione dissoluitur.

I myself admit, though, that he seems a fool, through the error of people who do not know the proper nature of each thing. So this whole question is settled not so much by arguments as by definition.

5.17.29CSEL 19:457

stultitia igitur est in factis dictisque per ignorantiam recti ac boni erratio. ergo stultus non est qui ne sibi quidem parcit, dum ne noceat alteri, quod est malum. quod quidem nobis et ratio et ueritas ipsa praescribit.

Folly, then, is going astray in deeds and words through ignorance of what is right and good. So he is not a fool who does not spare even himself, provided he does not harm another, which is evil. This is what reason and truth itself prescribe to us.

5.17.30CSEL 19:457

in omnibus enim uidemus animalibus, quia sapientia carent, conciliatricem sui esse naturam. nocent igitur aliis, ut sibi prosint: nesciunt enim quia malum est nocere.

For in all animals we see that nature, since they lack wisdom, makes them look after themselves. So they harm others to benefit themselves; for they do not know that harming is evil.

5.17.31CSEL 19:457

homo uero quia scientiam boni ac mali habet, abstinet se a nocendo etiam cum incommodo suo, quod animal inrationale facere non potest, et ideo inter summas hominis uirtutes innocentia numeratur. quibus rebus apparet sapientissimum esse qui mauult, perire ne noceat, ut id officium quo a mutis discernitur seruet.

But a human being, since he has knowledge of good and evil, abstains from harming even to his own cost, which an irrational animal cannot do; and therefore innocence is counted among the highest human virtues. From this it is clear that the wisest is the one who prefers to perish rather than harm, so as to keep that duty by which he is distinguished from dumb animals.

5.17.32CSEL 19:457

nam qui uendentis errorem non redarguit, ut aurum paruo emat, aut qui non profitetur fugitiuum seruum uel pestilentem se domum uendere lucro et commodo suo consulens, non est ille sapiens, ut Carneades uideri uolebat, sed callidus et astutus.

For the one who does not correct the seller's mistake so as to buy gold cheaply, or who does not declare that he is selling a runaway slave or a plague-ridden house, looking after his own gain and advantage, is not wise, as Carneades wanted him to seem, but crafty and cunning.

5.17.33CSEL 19:457–458

calliditas autem et astutia in mutis quoque animalibus sunt, uel cum insidiantur aliis et dolo capiunt, ut deuorent, uel cum insidias aliorum uario genere deludunt, sapientia uero in hominem solum cadit.

Craft and cunning exist in dumb animals too, whether when they lie in wait for others and catch them by trickery to devour them, or when they elude others' traps in various ways; but wisdom belongs to man alone.

5.17.34CSEL 19:458

sapientia est enim intellegentia uel ad bonum rectumque faciendum uel ad abstinentiam dictorum factorumque inproborum. lucro autem numquam sapiens studet, quia bona haec terrena contemnit, nec quemquam falli patitur, quia boni uiri officium est errores hominum corrigere eosque in uiam reducere, siquidem socialis est hominis ac benefica natura, quo solo cognationem cum deo habet.

For wisdom is understanding directed either to doing what is good and right or to abstaining from wicked words and deeds. The wise man never pursues gain, because he despises these earthly goods, nor does he allow anyone to be deceived, because it is the duty of a good man to correct people's errors and bring them back to the way, since human nature is social and beneficent, and by this alone it has kinship with God.

Divine 5, chapter 18

5.18.1CSEL 19:458

Sed nimirum haec causa efficit ut stultus esse uideatur qui egere aut mori malit quam noceat uel eripiat aliquid alteri, quod hominem morte deleri putant. ex qua persuasione omnes cum uulgi tum etiam philosophorum nascuntur errores.

But no doubt the reason why the one who would rather be in want or die than harm or rob another seems a fool is that people think a human being is destroyed by death. From this conviction arise all the errors both of the crowd and of the philosophers.

5.18.2CSEL 19:458

si enim post mortem nihil sumus, profecto stultissimi est hominis non huic uitae consulere, ut sit quam diutina et commodis omnibus plena.

For if we are nothing after death, it is surely the mark of the greatest fool not to look after this life, so that it may be as long as possible and full of every advantage.

5.18.3CSEL 19:458

quod qui faciet, a iustitiae regula discedat necesse est. si autem superest homini uita melior et longior, quod et philosophorum magnorum argumentis et uatum responsis et prophetarum diuinis uocibus discimus, hanc praesentem cum bonis suis contemnere sapientis est, cuius omnis iactura inmortalitate pensatur.

Whoever does this must depart from the rule of justice. But if a better and longer life remains for a human being, as we learn from the arguments of great philosophers, the answers of seers, and the divine voices of the prophets, then it is the mark of the wise man to despise this present life with its goods, since every loss of his is repaid with immortality.

5.18.4CSEL 19:458–459

aput Ciceronem idem ille iustitiae defensor Laelius uult inquit paene uirtus honorem nec est uirtutis ulla alia merces. est plane et quidem uirtute dignissima, quam tu, Laeli, numquam poteras suspicari: nihil enim diuinarum noueras litterarum. quam tamen illa inquit accipit facile, exigit non acerbe. erras uehementer, si putas ab homine praemium solui posse uirtuti, cum ipse alio loco uerissime dixeris: huic tu uiro quas diuitias obicies? quae imperia? quae regna? qui ista putat humana, sua bona diuina iudicat.

In Cicero, that same defender of justice, Laelius, says: "Virtue almost wants honor, and there is no other reward for virtue." There plainly is, and one most worthy of virtue, which you, Laelius, could never suspect, for you knew nothing of the divine writings. "Yet it accepts it easily," he says, "and does not demand it harshly." You are badly mistaken if you think a reward can be paid to virtue by man, when you yourself said very truly elsewhere: "What riches will you offer this man? What commands? What kingdoms? He considers those things human and judges his own goods divine."

5.18.5CSEL 19:459

quis ergo te sapientem, Laeli, putet, cum ipse tibi loquare contraria et paulo post uirtuti adimas quae dedisti? sed uidelicet ignorantia ueri facit incertam labantemque sententiam.

Who, then, would think you wise, Laelius, when you contradict yourself and shortly afterward take from virtue what you had given it? But evidently ignorance of the truth makes one's opinion uncertain and wavering.

5.18.6CSEL 19:459

deinde quid adiungis? sed si aut ingrati uniuersi aut inuidi multi aut inimici potentes suis uirtutem praemiis spoliant, —

Then what do you add? "But if either everyone is ungrateful, or many are envious, or powerful enemies strip virtue of its rewards…"

5.18.7CSEL 19:459

o quam fragilem, quam inanem uirtutem induxisti, si spoliari praemio suo potest! quae si bona sua diuina iudicat, ut aiebas, qui possunt existere tam ingrati, tam inuidi, tam potentes, qui uirtutem spoliare ualeant iis bonis quae fuerint in eam conlata diuinitus?

O how fragile, how empty a virtue you have presented, if it can be robbed of its reward! If it judges its goods divine, as you said, who can be so ungrateful, so envious, so powerful as to be able to rob virtue of goods conferred on it by God?

5.18.8CSEL 19:459

— ne illa se inquit multis solaciis oblectat maximeque suo decore se ipsa sustentat. quibus solaciis? quo decore? cum in crimen saepe ueniat et in poenam decor ille uertatur.

"…surely," he says, "it delights itself with many consolations and sustains itself above all by its own beauty." What consolations? What beauty? When it often comes under accusation and that beauty is turned into punishment?

5.18.9CSEL 19:459–460

quid enim, si, ut Furius dicebat, rapiatur uexetur exterminetur egeat, auferantur ei manus, effodiantur oculi, damnetur uinciatur uratur, miseris etiam modis necetur. perdetne suum praemium uirtus aut potius peribit ipsa? minime, sed et mercedem suam deo iudice accipiet et uiuet ac semper uigebit.

For what if, as Furius said, it is seized, harassed, banished, left in want, has its hands cut off and its eyes gouged out, is condemned, bound, burned, and even killed in wretched ways? Will virtue lose its reward, or rather perish itself? Not at all; it will receive its wages with God as judge, and it will live and flourish forever.

5.18.10CSEL 19:460

quae si tollas, nihil potest in uita hominum tam inutile, tam stultum uideri esse quam uirtus: cuius naturalis bonitas et honestas docere nos potest animam non esse mortalem diuinumque illi a deo praemium constitutum.

If you take these away, nothing in human life can seem so useless, so foolish, as virtue; whose natural goodness and honor can teach us that the soul is not mortal and that a divine reward has been appointed for it by God.

5.18.11CSEL 19:460

sed idcirco uirtutem ipsam deus sub persona stultitiae uoluit esse celatam, ut mysterium ueritatis ac religionis suae esset arcanum, ut has religiones sapientiamque terrenam extollentem se altius sibique multum placentem uanitatis errorisque damnaret, ut proposita denique difficultate angustissimus trames ad immortalitatis praemium sublime perduceret.

But God willed that virtue itself be hidden under the mask of folly, so that the mystery of his truth and religion might be secret, so that he might condemn these religions and earthly wisdom, which exalts itself highly and is much pleased with itself, of emptiness and error, and finally so that, with difficulty set before it, a very narrow path might lead up to the lofty reward of immortality.

5.18.12CSEL 19:460

Docui, ut opinor, cur populus noster aput stultos stultus habeatur. nam cruciari atque interfici malle quam tura tribus digitis conprehensa in focum iacere tam ineptum uidetur quam in periculo uitae alterius animam magis curare quam suam.

I have shown, I think, why our people are held fools by fools. For to prefer being tortured and killed to throwing incense held in three fingers onto the altar-fire seems as silly as caring more for another's life than one's own when one's life is in danger.

5.18.13CSEL 19:460

nesciunt enim quantum sit nefas adorare aliud praeterquam deum, qui condidit caelum atque terram, qui humanum genus finxit inspirauit luce donauit.

For they do not know how great a crime it is to worship anything other than God, who made heaven and earth, who formed the human race, breathed life into it, and gave it light.

5.18.14CSEL 19:460–461

quodsi seruorum nequissimus habetur qui dominum suum fuga deseruit isque uerberibus et uinculis et ergastulo et cruce et omni malo dignissimus iudicatur, et si filius eodem modo perditus atque inpius existimatur qui patrem suum dereliquit ne illi obsequatur, ob eamque causam dignus putatur qui sit exheres et cuius nomen in perpetuum de familia deleatur, quanto magis qui deum deserit, in quem duo uocabula domini et patris aeque ueneranda conueniunt?

If the most worthless of slaves is thought to be the one who has deserted his master by flight, and he is judged most deserving of lashes, chains, the workhouse, the cross, and every evil; and if a son is likewise considered lost and impious who has abandoned his father so as not to obey him, and for that reason is thought to deserve disinheritance and to have his name blotted out of the family forever; how much more the one who deserts God, to whom the two titles of Lord and Father, equally venerable, both belong?

5.18.15CSEL 19:461

nam ille qui seruum pretio conparat, quid in eum beneficii confert praeter alimenta, quae illi utilitatis suae gratia subministrat? et qui filium generat, non habet in potestate ut concipiatur, ut nascatur, ut uiuat: unde apparet non esse illum patrem, sed tantummodo generandi ministrum.

For the one who buys a slave for a price, what benefit does he confer on him besides food, which he supplies for his own advantage? And the one who begets a son does not have it in his power that he be conceived, be born, or live; from which it is clear that he is not a father but only an agent of begetting.

5.18.16CSEL 19:461

quibus ergo suppliciis dignus est desertor eius qui et dominus uerus et pater est, nisi quae deus ipse constituit, qui spiritibus iniustis aeternum parauit ignem, quod ipse per uates suos inpiis ac rebellibus comminatur?

What punishments, then, does one deserve who deserts him who is both true Lord and Father, other than those God himself has appointed, who has prepared eternal fire for unjust spirits, as he himself threatens the impious and rebellious through his prophets?

Divine 5, chapter 19

5.19.1CSEL 19:461

Discant igitur et suarum et alienarum interfectores animarum quam inexpiabile facinus admittant, primum quod se ipsos iugulant perditissimis daemonibus seruiendo, quos deus in aeterna supplicia damnauit, deinde quod nec ab aliis deum coli patiuntur, sed auertere homines ad mortifera sacra contendunt nitunturque summa diligentia ne qua sit anima incolumis in terra quae saluo statu suo spectet in caelum.

Let the killers of their own souls and of others', then, learn what an inexpiable crime they commit: first, that they cut their own throats by serving the most depraved demons, whom God has condemned to eternal punishments; then, that they do not allow God to be worshipped by others either, but strive to turn people to deadly rites and labor with the greatest care that no soul on earth remain unharmed that looks to heaven with its state secure.

5.19.2CSEL 19:461

quid aliut dicam quam miseros qui praedonum suorum instigationibus parent, quos deos esse opinantur? quorum neque condicionem neque originem neque nomina neque rationem sciunt, sed inhaerente persuasione uulgari libenter errant et stultitiae suae fauent.

What else shall I call them but wretched, who obey the promptings of their robbers, whom they think gods? They know neither their condition nor their origin nor their names nor their nature, but, clinging to popular belief, they gladly go astray and favor their own folly.

5.19.3CSEL 19:461–462

a quibus si persuasionis eius rationem requiras, nullam possint reddere, sed ad maiorum iudicia confugiant, quod illi sapientes fuerint, illi probauerint, illi scierint quid esset optimum, seque ipsos sensibus spoliant, ratione abdicant, dum alienis erroribus credunt.

If you ask them the reason for this belief, they can give none, but take refuge in the judgment of their ancestors: that they were wise, that they approved it, that they knew what was best. So they strip themselves of their senses and renounce reason, while they trust in others' errors.

5.19.4CSEL 19:462

sic inplicati rerum omnium ignorantia nec se nec deos suos norunt. atque utinam soli errare, soli desipere uellent! alios etiam in consortium mali sui rapiunt quasi habituri solacium de perditione multorum.

So, entangled in ignorance of all things, they know neither themselves nor their gods. And would that they wished to go astray and be foolish alone! They drag others too into partnership in their evil, as if they would find comfort in the ruin of many.

5.19.5CSEL 19:462

sed haec ipsa ignoratio efficit ut in persequendis sapientibus tam mali sint fingantque se illis consulere, illos ad bonam mentem uelle reuocare.

But this very ignorance makes them so wicked in persecuting the wise, and makes them pretend that they are looking after them and want to call them back to a sound mind.

5.19.6CSEL 19:462

num igitur hoc sermone aut aliqua ratione reddita facere nituntur? minime, sed ui atque tormentis. o mira et caeca dementia! in iis putatur mala mens esse qui fidem seruare conantur, in carnificibus autem bona!

Do they try to do this, then, by speech or by giving some reason? Not at all, but by force and torture. O strange and blind madness! Those who try to keep faith are thought to have an evil mind, but the executioners a good one!

5.19.7CSEL 19:462

in iisne mala mens est qui contra ius humanitatis, contra fas omne lacerantur, an potius in iis qui ea faciunt in corporibus innocentium, quae nec saeuissimi latrones nec iratissimi hostes nec immanissimi barbari aliquando fecerunt? adeone etiam sibi mentiuntur, ut uicissim boni ac mali nomina transferant et inmutent?

Is the evil mind in those who are mangled against the law of humanity and against all right, or rather in those who do to the bodies of the innocent what neither the most savage robbers nor the angriest enemies nor the most monstrous barbarians have ever done? Do they so lie even to themselves that they swap and exchange the names of good and evil?

5.19.8CSEL 19:462–463

quid ergo non diem noctem uocant, solem tenebras? alioquin eadem inpudentia est bonis malorum nomen imponere, sapientibus stultorum, iustis inpiorum: quin immo si qua illis fiducia est uel in philosophia uel in eloquentia, arment se ac refellant haec nostra, si possunt, congrediantur comminus et singula quaeque discutiant.

Why then do they not call day night and the sun darkness? It is the same shamelessness to give the good the name of the wicked, the wise that of fools, the just that of the impious. Rather, if they have any confidence in philosophy or eloquence, let them arm themselves and refute these arguments of ours if they can; let them meet us at close quarters and examine each point.

5.19.9CSEL 19:463

decet eos suscipere defensionem deorum suorum, ne si nostra inualuerint, ut cottidie inualescunt, cum delubris ac ludibriis suis deserantur. et quoniam ui nihil possunt — augetur enim religio dei quanto magis premitur —, oratione potius et hortamentis agant.

It befits them to take up the defense of their gods, lest, if our cause grows strong, as it grows stronger daily, they be deserted along with their shrines and mockeries. And since they can do nothing by force (for the religion of God increases the more it is oppressed), let them act rather by speech and exhortation.

5.19.10CSEL 19:463

procedant in medium pontifices seu minores seu maximi, flamines augures, item reges sacrificuli quique sunt sacerdotes et antistites religionum, conuocent nos ad contionem, cohortentur ad suscipiendos cultus deorum, persuadeant multos esse quorum numine ac prouidentia regantur omnia, ostendant origines et initia sacrorum ac deorum quomodo sint mortalibus tradita, qui fons, quae ratio sit explicent, proferant quae merces in cultu, quae poena in contemptu maneat, quare ab hominibus coli se uelint, quid illis, si beati sunt, humana pietas conferat: quae omnia non adseueratione propria — nec enim ualet quicquam mortalis hominis auctoritas — sed diuinis aliquibus testimoniis confirment, sicuti nos facimus.

Let the pontiffs, lesser or greatest, come forward, the flamens and augurs, likewise the sacrificial kings and all who are priests and overseers of religions; let them call us to an assembly and urge us to take up the worship of the gods; let them persuade us that there are many by whose divine power and providence all things are ruled; let them show the origins and beginnings of the rites and the gods, how they were handed down to mortals; let them explain their source and principle; let them set out what reward awaits worship and what punishment contempt, why the gods want to be worshipped by human beings, and what human piety adds to them if they are blessed; and let them confirm all this not by their own assertion (for the authority of a mortal man counts for nothing) but by some divine testimonies, as we do.

5.19.11CSEL 19:463–464

non est opus ui et iniuria, quia religio cogi non potest, uerbis potius quam uerberibus res agenda est, ut sit uoluntas. destringant aciem ingeniorum suorum: si ratio eorum uera est, adseratur. parati sumus audire, si doceant: tacentibus certe nihil credimus, sicut ne saeuientibus quidem cedimus.

There is no need of force and injury, because religion cannot be compelled; the matter must be handled with words rather than blows, so that there may be free will. Let them draw the sharp edge of their minds: if their reasoning is true, let it be asserted. We are ready to listen if they teach; to the silent we certainly give no credit, just as we do not yield even to those who rage.

5.19.12CSEL 19:464

imitentur nos, ut rationem rei totius exponant: nos enim non inlicimus, ut ipsi obiectant, sed docemus probamus ostendimus.

Let them imitate us in setting out the reasoning of the whole matter: for we do not entice, as they charge, but we teach, prove, and demonstrate.

5.19.13CSEL 19:464

itaque nemo a nobis retinetur inuitus — inutilis est enim deo qui deuotione ac fide caret — et tam nemo discedit ipsa ueritate retinente.

So no one is kept by us against his will (for one who lacks devotion and faith is of no use to God); and yet no one leaves, since truth itself holds them.

5.19.14CSEL 19:464

doceant isti hoc modo, si qua illis fiducia ueritatis est, loquantur hiscant, audeant inquam disputare nobiscum aliquid eiusmodi: iam profecto ab aniculis quas contemnunt et a pueris nostratibus error illorum ac stultitia ridebitur.

Let them teach in this way, if they have any confidence in truth; let them speak, let them open their mouths; let them dare, I say, to debate something of this kind with us: their error and folly will surely be laughed at by the old women they despise and by our children.

5.19.15CSEL 19:464

cum enim sint peritissimi deorumque progeniem et res gestas et imperia et interitus et sepulcra de libris nouerint ipsosque ritus quibus sunt initiati uel ex rebus gestis hominum uel ex casibus uel etiam ex mortibus natos sciant, incredibilis dementia est deos putare quos fuisse mortales negare non audeant: uel si tam inpudentes fuerint ut negent, suae illos ac suorum litterae coarguant, ipsa denique illos sacrorum initia conuincant.

For since they are very learned and know from books the birth of the gods, their deeds, reigns, deaths, and tombs, and know that the very rites into which they have been initiated arose from human deeds or misfortunes or even deaths, it is unbelievable madness to think gods those whom they dare not deny were mortal; or if they are so shameless as to deny it, let their own writings and those of their people refute them, and finally let the very origins of the rites convict them.

5.19.16CSEL 19:464

sciant igitur ex hoc ipso quantum intersit inter uerum atque falsum, quando ipsi cum sint eloquentes, persuadere non possunt, inperiti ac rudes possunt, quia res ipsa et ueritas loquitur.

Let them learn from this very fact how great the difference is between true and false: they, eloquent as they are, cannot persuade, while the unskilled and rough can, because the thing itself and the truth speak.

5.19.17CSEL 19:464–465

quid ergo saeuiunt? ut stultitiam suam dum minuere uolunt augeant. longe diuersa sunt carnificina et pietas nec potest aut ueritas cum ui aut iustitia cum crudelitate coniungi.

Why then do they rage? So that, while they want to lessen their folly, they increase it. Butchery and piety are far apart, and neither truth can be joined with force nor justice with cruelty.

5.19.18CSEL 19:465

sed merito non audent de rebus quicquam docere diuinis, ne et a nostris derideantur et a suis deserantur.

But they rightly do not dare to teach anything about divine things, lest they be laughed at by our people and deserted by their own.

5.19.19CSEL 19:465

nam fere uulgus, cui simplex incorruptumque iudicium est, si mysteria illa cognoscat in memoriam mortuorum constituta, damnabit aliutque uerius quod colat quaeret. hinc fida silentia sacris instituta sunt ab hominibus callidis, ne sciat populus quid colat.

For the common people, whose judgment is simple and uncorrupted, if they learned that those mysteries were instituted in memory of the dead, would condemn them and seek something truer to worship. That is why "faithful silence" was imposed on the rites by clever men, so that the people would not know what they worship.

5.19.20CSEL 19:465

cum autem nos in eorum doctrinis uersemur, cur nobis aut non credunt, qui utrumque nouimus, aut inuident, quia falsis uera praetulimus? sed defendenda sunt inquiunt suscepta publice sacra: o quam honesta uoluntate miseri errant!

But since we are versed in their teachings, why do they either not believe us, who know both sides, or envy us because we have preferred the true to the false? "But the rites publicly adopted must be defended," they say. O with what honorable intent the wretches go astray!

5.19.21CSEL 19:465

sentiunt enim nihil esse in rebus humanis religione praestantius eamque summa ui oportere defendi, sed ut in ipsa religione sic in defensionis genere falluntur.

For they feel that nothing in human affairs is more excellent than religion and that it ought to be defended with all strength; but as in religion itself, so in the manner of defense they are deceived.

5.19.22CSEL 19:465

defendenda enim religio est non occidendo sed moriendo, non saeuitia sed patientia, non scelere sed fide: illa enim malorum sunt, haec bonorum, et necesse est bonum in religione uersari, non malum.

For religion must be defended not by killing but by dying, not by savagery but by patience, not by crime but by faith: for the former belong to the wicked, the latter to the good, and it is necessary that good, not evil, have its place in religion.

5.19.23CSEL 19:465

nam si sanguine, si tormentis, si malo religionem defendere uelis, iam non defendetur illa, sed polluetur atque uiolabitur. nihil est enim tam uoluntarium quam religio, in qua si animus sacrificantis auersus est, iam sublata, iam nulla est.

For if you want to defend religion with blood, with tortures, with evil, it will no longer be defended but polluted and violated. For nothing is so voluntary as religion; if the mind of the one sacrificing is turned away, it is already taken away, it is already nothing.

5.19.24CSEL 19:465–466

recta igitur ratio est ut religionem patientia uel morte defendas; in quo fides conseruata et ipsi deo grata est et religioni addit auctoritatem.

So the right way is to defend religion by patience or death; in which faithfulness kept is both pleasing to God himself and adds authority to religion.

5.19.25CSEL 19:466

nam si is qui in hac terrestri militia regi suo fidem seruat in aliquo egregio facinore, si post uixerit, (et) acceptior fit et carior, si perierit, summam consequitur gloriam, quod pro duce suo morte occubuerit, quanto magis imperatori omnium deo fides seruanda est, qui non tantum uiuentibus, sed etiam mortuis praemium potest uirtutis exsoluere?

For if one who in this earthly military service keeps faith with his king in some outstanding deed becomes more welcome and dearer if he survives, and, if he perishes, wins the highest glory for having fallen for his commander, how much more must faith be kept with God, the Commander of all, who can pay the reward of virtue not only to the living but also to the dead?

5.19.26CSEL 19:466

igitur dei cultus, quoniam militiae caelestis est, deuotionem maximam fidemque desiderat. quomodo enim deus aut amabit colentem, si ipse non ametur ab eo, aut praestabit precanti quidquid orauerit, cum ad precandum neque ex animo neque obseruanter accedat?

So the worship of God, since it is a heavenly military service, requires the greatest devotion and faithfulness. For how will God either love the worshipper if he is not loved by him, or grant the one who prays whatever he asks, when he comes to pray neither from the heart nor reverently?

5.19.27CSEL 19:466

isti autem cum ad sacrificandum ueniunt, nihil intimum, nihil proprium diis suis offerunt, non integritatem mentis, non reuerentiam, non timorem. peractis itaque sacrificiis inanibus omnem religionem in templo et cum templo sicut inuenerant relincunt nihilque secum ex ea neque adferunt neque referunt.

But these people, when they come to sacrifice, offer their gods nothing inward, nothing of their own, no integrity of mind, no reverence, no fear. So when the empty sacrifices are finished, they leave all their religion in the temple and with the temple, just as they found it, and they bring nothing of it with them and take nothing away.

5.19.28CSEL 19:466

inde est quod eiusmodi religiones neque bonos facere possunt neque firmae atque inmutabiles esse. traducuntur itaque ab his homines facile, quia nihil ibi ad uitam, nihil ad sapientiam, nihil ad fidem discitur.

That is why religions of this kind can neither make people good nor be firm and unchangeable. So people are easily drawn away from them, because nothing is learned there for life, nothing for wisdom, nothing for faith.

5.19.29CSEL 19:466–467

quae est enim superstitio illorum deorum? quae uis? quae disciplina? quae origo? quae ratio? quod fundamentum? quae substantia? quo tendit aut quid pollicetur, ut ab homine possit fideliter seruari fortiterque defendi? in qua nihil aliut uideo quam ritum ad solos digitos pertinentem.

For what is the superstition of those gods? What is its power, its teaching, its origin, its principle, its foundation, its substance? Where does it tend, or what does it promise, that a person could faithfully keep it and bravely defend it? In it I see nothing but a rite that concerns the fingers alone.

5.19.30CSEL 19:467

nostra uero religio eo firma est et solida et inmutabilis, quia iustitiam docet, quia nobiscum semper est, quia tota in animo colentis est, quia mentem ipsam pro sacrificio habet. illic nihil exigitur aliut quam sanguis pecudum et fumus et inepta libatio, hic bona mens, purum pectus, innocens uita; illuc ueniunt sine dilectu adulterae inpudicae, lenae procaces, obscenae meretrices, ueniunt gladiatores latrones fures uenefici et precantur nihil aliut quam ut scelera inpune committant.

But our religion is firm, solid, and unchangeable because it teaches justice, because it is always with us, because it is wholly in the heart of the worshipper, because it has the mind itself as its sacrifice. There nothing else is required but the blood of cattle, smoke, and silly libations; here a good mind, a pure heart, an innocent life. To those rites come without distinction adulteresses and unchaste women, brazen procuresses, obscene prostitutes; gladiators, robbers, thieves, and poisoners come, and pray for nothing else than to commit their crimes with impunity.

5.19.31CSEL 19:467

quid enim latro sacrificans aut gladiator roget nisi ut occidant? quid uenenarius nisi ut fallat? quid meretrix nisi ut plurimum peccet? quid adultera nisi aut mortem uiri aut ut sua inpudicitia celetur? quid lena nisi ut multos bonis exuat? quid fur nisi ut plura conpilet?

For what would a robber or a gladiator ask when sacrificing but to kill? What a poisoner, but to deceive? What a prostitute, but to sin as much as possible? What an adulteress, but either her husband's death or that her unchastity be hidden? What a procuress, but to strip many of their goods? What a thief, but to pilfer more?

5.19.32CSEL 19:467

hic uero etiam leni communique peccato locus nullus est et si quis ad sacrificium non integra conscientia uenerit, audit quae illi deus comminetur, ille qui latebras cordis uidet, qui peccatis semper infestus est, qui exigit iustitiam, qui fidem poscit. quis hic malae menti aut malae preci locus est?

But here there is no room even for a light and common sin, and if anyone comes to the sacrifice without a sound conscience, he hears what God threatens him with, God who sees the hiding places of the heart, who is always hostile to sins, who demands justice and requires faithfulness. What room is there here for an evil mind or an evil prayer?

5.19.33CSEL 19:467–468

at illi infelices nec ex sceleribus suis intellegunt quam malum sit quod colunt, quandoquidem flagitiis omnibus inquinati ueniunt ad precandum et se pie sacrificasse opinantur, si cutem lauerint, tamquam libidines intra pectus inclusas ulli amnes abluant aut ulla maria purificent.

But those unhappy people do not understand even from their own crimes how evil is what they worship, since they come to pray defiled with every outrage and think they have sacrificed piously if they have washed their skin, as though any rivers could wash away or any seas purify the lusts shut up within the heart.

5.19.34CSEL 19:468

quanto satius est mentem potius eluere, quae malis cupiditatibus sordidatur, et uno uirtutis ac fidei lauacro uniuersa uitia depellere! quod qui fecerit, quamlibet inquinatum ac sordidum corpus gerat, satis purus est.

How much better to wash the mind, which is soiled by evil desires, and drive out all vices by the one washing of virtue and faith! Whoever does this, however defiled and dirty a body he bears, is pure enough.

Divine 5, chapter 20

5.20.1CSEL 19:468

Isti autem quia nesciunt uel quid uel quomodo sit colendum, caeci et inprudentes in contrarium cadunt. adorant itaque hostes suos, latrones et interfectores suos uictimis placant et animas suas cum ture ipso cremandas aris detestabilibus inponunt.

But because they do not know either what or how one should worship, they fall blindly and unwisely into the opposite. So they adore their enemies, appease their robbers and murderers with victims, and place their own souls on detestable altars to be burned together with the incense.

5.20.2CSEL 19:468

irascuntur etiam miseri quod non simul et alii pereant, incredibili mentium caecitate. quid enim uideant qui solem non uident? quasi uero si dii essent, indigerent hominum auxilio aduersus contemptores suos. quid ergo nobis irascuntur, si illi nihil possunt? nisi quod ipsi deos suos destruunt, quorum potestate diffidunt, magis inreligiosi quam qui omnino non colunt.

The wretches are even angry that others do not perish along with them, with unbelievable blindness of mind. For what would they see who do not see the sun? As though, if they were gods, they would need human help against those who despise them! Why then are they angry with us, if those gods can do nothing? Unless it is that they themselves destroy their gods, whose power they distrust, being more irreligious than those who do not worship at all.

5.20.3CSEL 19:468

Cicero in suis Legibus cum caste ad sacrificia praeciperet accedere, pietatem inquit adhibento, opes amouento. qui secus faxit, deus ipse uindex erit.

Cicero in his Laws, when directing that people approach sacrifices chastely, says: "Let them bring piety, let them put away wealth. Whoever does otherwise, God himself will be the avenger."

5.20.4CSEL 19:468–469

recte hoc quidem: neque enim fas est desperare de deo, quem ideo colas, quia potentem putes. nam quomodo uindicare iniuriam colentis potest, si suam non potest?

Rightly said: for it is wrong to despair of the God whom you worship precisely because you think him powerful. For how can he avenge the wrong done to his worshipper if he cannot avenge his own?

5.20.5CSEL 19:469

libet igitur ex iis quaerere cui potissimum praestare se putent cogendo inuitos ad sacrificium. ipsisne quos cogunt? at non est beneficium quod ingeritur recusanti.

I would like to ask them, then, whom they think they chiefly benefit by forcing the unwilling to sacrifice. Those whom they force? But what is forced on someone who refuses is no benefit.

5.20.6CSEL 19:469

sed consulendum est etiam nolentibus, quando quid sit bonum nesciunt. cur ergo tam crudeliter uexant cruciant debilitant, si saluos uolunt? aut unde pietas tam impia, ut eos miseris modis aut perdant aut inutiles faciant quibus uelint esse consultum? an uero diis praestant?

"But one must look after people even against their will, since they do not know what is good." Why then do they harass, torture, and maim them so cruelly, if they want them safe? Or where does such impious piety come from, that they either ruin in wretched ways or make useless those whom they wish to help? Or do they benefit the gods?

5.20.7CSEL 19:469

at non est sacrificium quod exprimitur inuito. nisi enim sponte atque ex animo fiat, execratio est, cum homines proscriptione iniuriis carcere tormentis adacti faciunt.

But a sacrifice extorted from the unwilling is no sacrifice. For unless it is done freely and from the heart, it is a curse, when people do it driven by proscription, injuries, prison, and tortures.

5.20.8CSEL 19:469

si dii sunt isti qui sic coluntur, uel propter hoc solum colendi non sunt, quod sic coli uolunt, digni scilicet detestatione hominum, quibus cum lacrimis, cum gemitu, cum sanguine de membris omnibus fluente libatur.

If those who are worshipped in this way are gods, they ought not to be worshipped for this reason alone, that they want to be worshipped so; they are surely worthy of human loathing, to whom libations are poured with tears, with groans, with blood flowing from every limb.

5.20.9CSEL 19:469

at nos contra non expetimus ut deum nostrum, qui est omnium uelint nolint, colat aliquis inuitus, nec si non coluerit, irascimur. confidimus enim maiestate eius, qui tam contemptum sui possit ulcisci quam etiam seruorum suorum labores et iniurias.

We, on the contrary, do not demand that anyone worship our God, who is God of all whether they will or not, against his will; nor are we angry if he does not worship. For we trust in the majesty of him who can avenge contempt of himself as well as the sufferings and injuries of his servants.

5.20.10CSEL 19:469–470

et ideo cum nefanda perpetimur, ne uerbo quidem reluctamur, sed deo remittimus ultionem, non ut ii faciunt qui defensores se deorum suorum uideri uolunt et saeuiunt efferate aduersus non colentes.

And so when we suffer abominable things, we do not resist even with a word, but leave vengeance to God; not as those do who want to be seen as defenders of their gods and rage savagely against those who do not worship.

5.20.11CSEL 19:470

ex quo intellegi datur quam non sit bonum deos colere, quoniam bono potius adducendi homines ad bonum fuerant, non malo: sed quia illut malum est, etiam officium eius bono caret.

From this it can be understood how far from good it is to worship the gods, since people ought to have been led to good by good, not by evil; but because that is evil, even its service lacks good.

5.20.12CSEL 19:470

at enim puniendi sunt qui destruunt religiones. num peius nos destruimus quam natio Aegyptiorum, qui turpissimas bestiarum ac pecudum figuras colunt, quaedam etiam pudenda dictu tamquam deos adorant? num peius quam idem ipsi, qui cum deos colere se dicant, tamen eos publice turpiterque derident, de quibus etiam mimos agi cum risu et uoluptate patiuntur?

"But those who destroy religions must be punished." Do we destroy them worse than the nation of the Egyptians, who worship the most shameful shapes of beasts and cattle, and even adore as gods some things shameful to mention? Worse than those very people who, though they say they worship the gods, still mock them publicly and shamefully, and allow mimes about them to be acted with laughter and pleasure?

5.20.13CSEL 19:470

qualis haec religio aut quanta maiestas putanda est quae adoratur in templis, inluditur in theatris? et qui haec fecerint, non poenas uiolati numinis pendunt, sed honorati etiam laudatique discedunt.

What kind of religion, what majesty, should be thought of that which is adored in temples and mocked in theaters? And those who have done these things do not pay the penalty for outraging divinity, but even go away honored and praised.

5.20.14CSEL 19:470

num peius nos destruimus quam quidam philosophi, qui omnino nullos esse deos aiunt, sed omnia sua sponte nata, omnia fortuito fieri quae geruntur? num peius quam Epicurei, qui esse quidem deos, sed curare quicquam negant, neque irasci eos neque gratia commoueri?

Do we destroy them worse than certain philosophers, who say there are no gods at all, but that everything was born of itself and everything that happens happens by chance? Worse than the Epicureans, who say that gods exist but deny that they care for anything, or are angered or moved by favor?

5.20.15CSEL 19:470

quibus dictis utique persuadent colendos omnino non esse, siquidem nec colentes respiciunt neque non colentibus irascuntur. praeterea cum contra metus disserunt, nihil aliut efficere conantur quam ut nemo deos timeat. et haec tamen ab hominibus et audiuntur libenter et disseruntur inpune.

By these sayings they certainly persuade people that the gods need not be worshipped at all, since they neither regard those who worship nor are angry with those who do not. Moreover, when they argue against fear, they try to do nothing else than make sure no one fears the gods. And yet people listen to these things gladly and they are argued with impunity.

Divine 5, chapter 21

5.21.1CSEL 19:470–471

Non ergo ideo aduersus nos insaniunt, quia dii non coluntur a nobis — a multis enim non coluntur — sed quia ueritas penes nos est, quae, ut est uerissime dictum, odium parit.

So they do not rage against us because the gods are not worshipped by us (for they are not worshipped by many), but because the truth is with us, which, as has been said most truly, breeds hatred.

5.21.2CSEL 19:471

quid igitur existimabimus nisi nescire illos quid patiantur? pergitur enim caeco et inrationabili furore, quem nos uidemus, illi nesciunt.

What then shall we think, except that they do not know what they are suffering? For they are driven on by a blind and irrational fury, which we see and they do not know.

5.21.3CSEL 19:471

non enim ipsi homines persecuntur, qui causam cur irascantur innocentibus non habent, sed illi spiritus contaminati ac perditi, quibus ueritas et nota est et inuisa, insinuant se mentibus eorum et instigant nescios in furorem.

For it is not the men themselves who persecute, since they have no reason to be angry with the innocent, but those defiled and lost spirits, to whom the truth is both known and hateful, worm their way into their minds and goad them, unknowing, into fury.

5.21.4CSEL 19:471

hi enim, quamdiu pax est in populo dei, fugitant iustos et pauent, et cum corpora hominum occupant animasque diuexant, adiurantur ab iis et nomine dei ueri fugantur.

For as long as there is peace among the people of God, these spirits shun and fear the just; and when they take possession of human bodies and torment souls, they are adjured by them and put to flight by the name of the true God.

5.21.5CSEL 19:471

quo audito tremunt et exclamant et uri se uerberarique testantur et interrogati qui sint, quando uenerint, quomodo in hominem inrepserint, confitentur. sic extorti et excruciati uirtute diuini nominis exulantur.

On hearing it they tremble and cry out and testify that they are being burned and beaten, and when asked who they are, when they came, and how they crept into the person, they confess. So, wrung out and tortured by the power of the divine name, they are driven into exile.

5.21.6CSEL 19:471

propter haec uerbera et minas sanctos et iustos uiros semper oderunt. et quia per se nocere iis nihil possunt, publicis eos odiis persecuntur, quos sibi graues sentiunt, exercentque saeuitiam quam uiolentissime possunt, ut aut eorum fidem minuant per dolorem aut, si id efficere non quiuerint, auferant omnino de terra, ne sint qui possint eorum nequitiam coercere.

Because of these blows and threats they always hate holy and just men. And since they can do nothing to harm them by themselves, they persecute with public hatred those they feel as a burden, and exercise cruelty as violently as they can, either to weaken their faith through pain or, if they cannot, to remove them altogether from the earth, so that there may be none able to curb their wickedness.

5.21.7CSEL 19:471–472

non me fugit quid responderi e contrario possit: cur ergo deus ille singularis, ille magnus, quem rerum potentem, quem dominum omnium confiteris, haec fieri patitur nec cultores suos aut uindicat aut tuetur? cur denique qui eum non colunt, et opulenti et potentes et beati sunt et honoribus regnoque potiuntur eosque ipsos dicioni suae ac potestati sub-

I am well aware what can be answered on the other side: Why then does that one, great God, whom you confess to be the ruler of the world and Lord of all, allow these things to happen, and neither avenge nor protect his worshippers? Why, finally, are those who do not worship him wealthy, powerful, and happy, holding honors and royal power, and keeping these very people

5.21.8CSEL 19:472

iectos habent? reddenda et huius rei ratio est, ne quid remaneat erroris. nam in primis haec causa est cur existimetur religio dei uim non habere, quod inducuntur homines specie terrenorum ac praesentium bonorum, quae ad curam mentis nullo modo pertinent. quibus quia carere iustos uident et afluere iniustos, et dei cultum inanem arbitrantur, in quo inesse illa non cernunt, et deorum ritus aestimant ueros, quoniam cultores eorum et diuitiis et honoribus et regnis fruantur.

subject to their rule and power? The reason for this too must be given, so that no error remains. For the first reason why the religion of God is thought to have no power is that people are misled by the appearance of earthly and present goods, which have nothing to do with the care of the mind. Because they see that the just lack these and the unjust abound in them, they think the worship of God empty, since they do not see these things in it, and consider the rites of the gods true, since their worshippers enjoy wealth, honors, and royal power.

5.21.9CSEL 19:472

uerum ii qui sunt in hac existimatione non perspiciunt altius uim rationemque hominis, quae tota non in corpore, sed in mente est.

But those who hold this view do not look more deeply into the force and nature of man, which lies wholly not in the body but in the mind.

5.21.10CSEL 19:472

nihil enim uident amplius quam (quod oculis uidetur, corpus scilicet. quod quia oculis manuque tractabile est, inbecillum fragile mortale est: cuius sunt illa omnia bona quae cupiditati ac miraculo sunt, opes honores imperia, quoniam corpori adferunt uoluptates, et ideo tam caduca sunt quam corpus ipsum.

For they see nothing more than what is seen with the eyes, namely the body. Because it can be handled by eyes and hand, it is weak, fragile, and mortal; to it belong all those goods that are objects of desire and wonder, wealth, honors, and power, since they bring pleasures to the body; and so they are as perishable as the body itself.

5.21.11CSEL 19:472

animus uero, in quo solo est homo, quoniam subiectus oculis non est, nec bona eius aspici possunt, quae in sola uirtute sunt posita, et ideo tam stabilis et constans et perpetuus sit necesse est sicut ipsa uirtus, in qua est animi bonum.

But the soul, in which alone the human being consists, since it is not subject to the eyes, cannot have its goods seen either, which are placed in virtue alone; and so it must be as stable, constant, and lasting as virtue itself, in which the good of the soul lies.

Divine 5, chapter 22

5.22.1CSEL 19:472–473

Longum est uniuersas uirtutis species promere, ut de singulis doceam, quam necesse sit sapientem ac iustum uirum longe ab illis bonis abhorrere: quibus quia fruuntur iniusti, deorum cultus ueri et efficaces esse creduntur.

It would take long to set out all the forms of virtue, so as to show for each one how necessary it is that the wise and just man stand far off from those goods; and because the unjust enjoy them, the worship of the gods is believed to be true and effective.

5.22.2CSEL 19:473

quod ad praesentem pertinet quaestionem, satis est si ex una uirtute id probemus quod intendimus. nempe magna et praecipua uirtus est patientia, quam pariter et uulgi publicae uoces et philosophi et oratores summis laudibus celebrant.

For the present question it is enough if we prove our point from one virtue. Patience is surely a great and outstanding virtue, which the common talk of the people, the philosophers, and the orators all alike celebrate with the highest praise.

5.22.3CSEL 19:473

quodsi negari non potest quin summa sit uirtus, necesse est iustum et sapientem uirum in potestate esse hominis iniusti, ut capiat patientiam. patientia est enim malorum quae aut inferuntur aut accidunt cum aequanimitate perlatio.

If it cannot be denied that it is the highest virtue, the just and wise man must be in the power of the unjust man, in order to possess patience. For patience is bearing with equanimity the evils that are inflicted or that befall.

5.22.4CSEL 19:473

ergo iustus ac sapiens quia uirtutem capit, habet in se patientiam: qua carebit omnino, si nihil patietur aduersi.

So the just and wise man, since he possesses virtue, has patience in himself, which he would lack entirely if he suffered nothing adverse.

5.22.5CSEL 19:473

contra qui in rebus prosperis agit, inpatiens est et uirtute maxima caret: inpatientem dico, quia nihil patitur. innocentiam quoque seruare non potest, quae et ipsa iusto et sapienti uiro propria uirtus est,

On the other hand, one who lives in prosperity is impatient and lacks the greatest virtue; I call him impatient because he suffers nothing. He cannot keep innocence either, which is itself a virtue proper to the just and wise man,

5.22.6CSEL 19:473

sed et nocet saepe et concupiscit aliena et rapit quae cupierit per iniuriam, quia uirtutis expers uitio peccatoque subiectus est et fragilitatis oblitus animo insolenter elato tumet. inde iniusti ac deum nescientes et diuitiis et potentia et honoribus florent. haec enim cuncta iniustitiae praemia sunt, quia et perpetua esse non possunt et per cupiditatem uiolentiamque quaeruntur.

but he often does harm, covets what belongs to others, and seizes by wrongdoing what he has desired, because, having no share in virtue, he is subject to vice and sin, and forgetting his frailty he swells with an insolently exalted mind. That is why the unjust and those who do not know God flourish in wealth, power, and honors. For all these are the rewards of injustice, since they cannot be lasting and are sought through greed and violence.

5.22.7CSEL 19:473–474

iustus uero ac sapiens quia illa omnia humana, ut est a Laelio dictum, sua bona diuina iudicat, nec alienum quicquam concupiscit, ne quem contra ius humanitatis laedat omnino, nec ullam potentiam honoremue desiderat, ne cui faciat iniuriam — scit enim cunctos ab eodem deo et eadem condi-

But the just and wise man, since he judges all those things human and his own goods divine, as Laelius said, neither covets anything of another's, so as not to harm anyone at all against the law of humanity, nor desires any power or honor, so as to wrong no one (for he knows that all, begotten by the same God and in the same

5.22.8CSEL 19:474

cione generatos iure fraternitatis esse coniunctos —, sed et suo contentus et paruo, quia fragilitatis suae memor, non amplius quaerit quam unde uitam sustentet, et ex eo ipso quod habuerit inpertit etiam non habenti, quia pius est; pietas autem summa uirtus est.

condition, are joined by the right of brotherhood), but, content with his own even if little, since he is mindful of his frailty, he seeks no more than what sustains life, and from what he has he shares even with the one who has not, because he is pious; and piety is the highest virtue.

5.22.9CSEL 19:474

accedit quod uoluptates caducas uitiosasque contemnit, quarum causa opes adpetuntur, quoniam continens est ac libidinum uictor. idem nihil tumoris atque insolentiae gerens non extollit se altius nec erigit superbum caput, sed placidus et concors et communis et planus est, quia condicionem suam nouit.

Besides, he despises the fleeting and vicious pleasures for whose sake wealth is sought, since he is self-controlled and conqueror of lusts. Likewise, bearing no swelling pride or insolence, he does not exalt himself nor lift a proud head, but is gentle, peaceable, sociable, and plain, because he knows his condition.

5.22.10CSEL 19:474

cum ergo iniuriam nulli faciat nec aliena cupiat nec sua quoque si ui auferantur defendat, cum sciat etiam inlatam iniuriam moderate ferre, quia uirtute praeditus est, necesse est iustum hominem subiectum esse iniusto et contumeliis adfici ab insipiente sapientem, ut et ille peccet, quia

Since, then, he does wrong to no one, does not desire others' goods, and does not defend even his own if they are taken by force, and since he knows how to bear with moderation even a wrong done to him, because he is endowed with virtue, it is necessary that the just man be subject to the unjust and the wise man be insulted by the foolish, so that the one may sin, because he

5.22.11CSEL 19:474–475

iniustus est, et hic in se uirtutem habeat, quia iustus est si quis autem uolet scire plenius cur malos et iniustos deus potentes beatos diuites fieri sinat, pios contra humiles miseros inopes esse patiatur, sumat eum Senecae librum cui titulus est Quare bonis uiris multa mala accidant, cum sit prouidentia. in quo ille multa non plane inperitia saeculari, sed sapienter ac paene diuinitus elocutus est.

is unjust, and the other may have virtue in himself, because he is just. But if anyone wants to know more fully why God allows the wicked and unjust to become powerful, happy, and rich, and lets the pious, on the contrary, be lowly, wretched, and poor, let him take up that book of Seneca's titled Why Many Evils Befall Good Men, Though There Is a Providence. In it he said many things, not with worldly ignorance at all, but wisely and almost divinely.

5.22.12CSEL 19:475

deus inquit homines pro liberis habet, sed corruptos et uitiosos luxuriose ac delicate patitur uiuere, quia non putat emendatione sua dignos. bonos autem, quos diligit, castigat saepius et adsiduis laboribus ad usum uirtutis exercet nec eos caducis ac mortalibus bonis conrumpi ac deprauari sinit.

"God," he says, "holds human beings as his children, but he lets the corrupt and vicious live in luxury and softness, because he does not think them worthy of his correction. But the good, whom he loves, he chastises more often and exercises in the practice of virtue with constant labors, and does not allow them to be corrupted and depraved by fleeting and mortal goods."

5.22.13CSEL 19:475

unde nemini debet mirum uideri si pro nostris saepe delictis castigamur a deo. immo uero cum uexamur ac premimur, tum maxime gratias agimus indulgentissimo patri, quod corruptelam nostram non patitur longius procedere, sed plagis ac uerberibus emendat. ex quo intellegimus esse nos deo curae, quibus, quoniam peccamus, irascitur.

So it should seem strange to no one if we are often chastised by God for our sins. Rather, when we are harassed and oppressed, then above all we give thanks to our most indulgent Father, because he does not let our corruption go further but corrects it with blows and lashes. From this we understand that we are God's concern, since he is angry with us because we sin.

5.22.14CSEL 19:475

nam cum posset populo suo et opes et regna largiri sicut dederat ante Iudaeis, quorum nos successores ac posteri sumus, idcirco eum uoluit sub aliena dicione atque imperio degere, ne rerum prosperarum felicitate corruptus in luxuriam laberetur ac dei praecepta contemneret sicut illi maiores nostri, qui saepe terrenis ac fragilibus his bonis eneruati aberrarunt a disciplina et legis uincla ruperunt.

For though he could have lavished wealth and kingdoms on his people, as he had formerly given them to the Jews, whose successors and descendants we are, he willed that they live under the rule and power of others for this reason: so that, corrupted by the happiness of prosperity, they might not slide into luxury and despise God's precepts, as those ancestors of ours did, who, often weakened by these earthly and fragile goods, strayed from discipline and broke the bonds of the law.

5.22.15CSEL 19:475

prouidit ergo quatenus cultoribus suis praestaret quietem, si mandata seruassent, et tamen eos emendaret, si praeceptis non obtemperassent.

So he provided how far to grant rest to his worshippers if they kept his commands, and yet to correct them if they did not obey his precepts.

5.22.16CSEL 19:475–476

itaque ne tam corrumperentur otio quam patres eorum licentia, premi eos uoluit ab iis in quorum manibus eos conlocauit, ut et labentes confirmet et corruptos ad fortitudinem reparet et fidos experiatur ac temptet.

So, lest they be corrupted by ease as their fathers were by license, he willed that they be oppressed by those into whose hands he placed them, so as to strengthen the wavering, restore the corrupted to fortitude, and prove and test the faithful.

5.22.17CSEL 19:476

quomodo enim potest imperator militum suorum probare uirtutem, nisi habuerit hostem? et illi tamen aduersarius exsurgit inuito, quia mortalis est et uinci potest, deo autem quia repugnari non potest, ipse aduersarios nomini suo excitat, non qui contra ipsum deum pugnent, sed contra milites eius, ut deuotionem ac fidem suorum uel probet uel conroboret, donec pressurae uerberibus diffluentem corrigat disciplinam.

For how can a commander prove his soldiers' courage unless he has an enemy? And yet for him an adversary arises against his will, because he is mortal and can be defeated; but God, since he cannot be resisted, himself raises up adversaries to his name, not to fight against God himself but against his soldiers, so as to prove or strengthen the devotion and faithfulness of his own, until he corrects by the lashes of pressure a discipline that is falling apart.

5.22.18CSEL 19:476

est et alia causa cur aduersus nos persecutiones fieri sinat, ut dei populus augeatur: nec est difficile monstrare cur aut quomodo id fiat.

There is another reason too why he allows persecutions against us: that the people of God may increase. And it is not hard to show why or how this happens.

5.22.19CSEL 19:476

primum fugantur a deorum cultibus plurimi odio crudelitatis: qui enim talia sacrificia non horreant? deinde placet quibusdam uirtus ac fides ipsa. nonnulli suspicantur deorum cultum non sine causa malum putari a tam multis hominibus, ut emori malint quam id facere quod alii faciunt, ut uiuant.

First, very many are driven away from the worship of the gods by hatred of the cruelty; for who would not shudder at such sacrifices? Then some are pleased by the courage and faithfulness itself. Some suspect that the worship of the gods is not without reason thought evil by so many people that they prefer to die rather than do what others do in order to live.

5.22.20CSEL 19:476

aliquis cupit scire quodnam sit illut bonum quod ad mortem usque defenditur, quod omnibus quae in hac uita iucunda sunt et cara praefertur, a quo nec bonorum nec lucis amissio nec dolor corporis nec uiscerum cruciamenta deterrent.

Someone wants to know what that good is which is defended even to death, which is preferred to everything pleasant and dear in this life, from which neither the loss of goods or of the light, nor bodily pain, nor the torture of the inward parts deters.

5.22.21CSEL 19:476–477

ualent haec plurimum, sed illae maxime causae nostrorum numerum semper auxerunt: audit circumstans populus inter ipsa tormenta dicentes non sacrificare se lapidibus humana manu factis, sed deo uiuo qui sit in caelo. multi hoc uerum esse intellegunt et in pectus admittunt.

These count for very much, but the following causes above all have always increased our numbers. The people standing around hear them saying amid the very tortures that they do not sacrifice to stones made by human hand but to the living God who is in heaven. Many understand that this is true and take it into their hearts.

5.22.22CSEL 19:477

deinde, ut fieri solet in rebus incertis, dum inter se inuicem quaerant quae sit huius perseuerantiae causa, multa quae ad religionem pertinent diuulgata ac per rumorem uicissim aucupata discuntur: quae quia bona sunt, placeant necesse est.

Then, as usually happens in uncertain matters, while they ask one another what the cause of this perseverance is, many things that belong to religion, spread abroad and picked up in turn by rumor, are learned; and since they are good, they cannot but please.

5.22.23CSEL 19:477

praeterea ultio consecuta, sicut semper accidit, ad credendum uehementer inpellit. ne haec quidem leuis causa est quod inmundi daemonum spiritus accepta licentia multorum se corporibus inmergunt, quibus postea eiectis omnes qui resanati fuerint adhaerent religioni cuius potentiam senserunt.

Moreover, the vengeance that follows, as always happens, strongly drives people to believe. Nor is this a slight cause, that the unclean spirits of demons, given license, plunge into the bodies of many; and when they have afterward been cast out, all who have been healed attach themselves to the religion whose power they have felt.

5.22.24CSEL 19:477

hae tot causae in unum conlatae magnam deo multitudinem mirabiliter adquirunt.

These many causes, brought together, wonderfully win a great multitude for God.

Divine 5, chapter 23

5.23.1CSEL 19:477

Quidquid ergo aduersus nos mali principes moliuntur fieri ipse permittit. et tamen iniustissimi persecutores, quibus dei nomen contumeliae ac ludibrio fuit, non se putent inpune laturos quia indignationis aduersus nos eius quasi ministri fuerunt.

Whatever evil rulers attempt against us, then, he himself permits to happen. And yet let the most unjust persecutors, to whom the name of God was an object of insult and mockery, not think they will go unpunished because they were, as it were, the ministers of his indignation against us.

5.23.2CSEL 19:477

punientur enim iudicio dei qui accepta potestate supra humanum modum fuerint abusi et insultauerint etiam deo superbius eiusque nomen aeternum uestigiis suis subiecerint impie nefarieque calcandum.

For those will be punished by the judgment of God who, having received power, abused it beyond human measure, insulted even God himself too proudly, and put his eternal name under their feet to be trampled impiously and wickedly.

5.23.3CSEL 19:477–478

propterea uindicaturum se in eos celeriter pollicetur et exterminaturum bestias malas de terra. sed idem quamuis populi sui uexationes et hic in praesenti soleat uindicare, tamen iubet nos expectare patienter illum caelestis iudicii diem, quo ipse pro suis quemque meritis aut honoret aut puniat.

So he promises that he will quickly take vengeance on them and destroy the evil beasts from the earth. But though he is accustomed to avenge the harassment of his people even here in the present, yet he commands us to wait patiently for that day of heavenly judgment, on which he himself will either honor or punish each according to his merits.

5.23.4CSEL 19:478

quapropter non sperent sacrilegae animae contemptos et inultos fore quos sic obterunt. ueniet rabiosis ac uoracibus lupis merces sua, qui iustas et simplices animas nullis facinoribus admissis excruciauerunt.

So let the sacrilegious souls not hope that those they thus trample will be despised and unavenged. Their reward will come to the raging and ravenous wolves who have tortured just and simple souls that had committed no crimes.

5.23.5CSEL 19:478

nos tantummodo laboremus ut ab hominibus nihil aliut in nobis nisi sola iustitia puniatur, demus operam totis uiribus ut mereamur a deo simul et ultionem passionis et praemium.

Let us only labor that nothing else in us be punished by men except justice alone; let us strive with all our strength to deserve from God both vengeance for our suffering and a reward.

Divine 6, chapter 1

6.1.1CSEL 19:479

Quod erat officium suscepti muneris diuino spiritu instruente ac suffragante ipsa ueritate conpleuimus: cuius adserendae atque inlustrandae causam mihi et scientia et fides et ipse dominus noster inposuit, sine quo nec sciri quicquam potest nec explicari.

We have completed the duty of the task we took up, with the divine Spirit instructing us and truth itself supporting us. Knowledge and faith and our Lord himself laid on me the task of asserting and illustrating it; without him nothing can be known or explained.

6.1.2CSEL 19:479

uenio nunc ad id quod est summum operis huius et maximum, ut doceam quo ritu quoue sacrificio deum coli oporteat. id enim est hominis officium in eoque solo summa rerum et omnis beatae uitae ratio consistit, quandoquidem propterea ficti et inspirati ab eo sumus, non ut caelum uideremus et solem, quod Anaxagoras putauit, sed ut artificem solis et caeli deum pura et integra mente coleremus.

I come now to what is the chief and greatest part of this work: to teach with what rite and what sacrifice God ought to be worshipped. For this is the duty of man, and in it alone consists the sum of things and the whole principle of the happy life, since we were formed and given breath by him for this reason, not to look at the sky and the sun, as Anaxagoras thought, but to worship God, the maker of sun and sky, with a pure and whole mind.

6.1.3CSEL 19:479

quamuis autem praecedentibus libris pro ingenii mediocritate defenderim ueritatem, tamen ex ritu quoque ipso elucere uel maxime potest.

Although in the preceding books I have defended the truth as far as my modest talent allows, it can shine out most of all from the rite itself.

6.1.4CSEL 19:479

nihil enim sancta et singularis illa maiestas aliut ab homine desiderat quam solam innocentiam: quam si quis obtulerit deo, satis pie, satis religiose litabit.

For that holy and unique majesty desires nothing else from man but innocence alone; whoever offers this to God will sacrifice piously and religiously enough.

6.1.5CSEL 19:479–480

omnes autem neglecta iustitia cum sint omnibus flagitiis ac sceleribus inquinati, religiosos se putant, si templa et aras hostiarum sanguine cruentauerint, si focos odorati ac ueteris uini profusione madefecerint.

But all, neglecting justice, though stained with every outrage and crime, think themselves religious if they have bloodied temples and altars with the blood of victims and drenched the hearths with sprinklings of perfume and old wine.

6.1.6CSEL 19:480

quin etiam sacras dapes apparant et exquisitas epulas quasi aliquid inde libaturis offerunt. quidquid aspectu rarum, quidquid opere aut odore pretiosum est, haec grata esse diis suis non ex aliqua diuinitatis ratione, quam nesciunt, sed ex suis cupiditatibus iudicant nec intellegunt terrenis opibus deum non indigere. nihil enim sapiunt nisi terram bonaque et mala solius corporis sensu ac uoluptate perpendunt.

They even prepare sacred feasts and offer choice banquets, as though the gods would taste something of them. Whatever is rare to see, whatever is costly in workmanship or fragrance, they judge pleasing to their gods, not from any understanding of divinity, which they do not have, but from their own desires; nor do they understand that God does not need earthly wealth. For they have no taste for anything but earth, and weigh good and evil by the sense and pleasure of the body alone.

6.1.7CSEL 19:480

huius arbitrio ut religionem ponderant, sic totius uitae suae acta disponunt. et quoniam se semel a caeli contemplatione auerterunt sensumque illum caelestem corpori mancipauerunt, libidinibus frena permittunt tamquam secum ablaturi uoluptatem, quam momentis omnibus capere festinant, cum animus ministerio corporis, non corpus ministerio animi uti debeat.

By its judgment they weigh religion, and by it they arrange all the acts of their life. And since they have once turned away from the contemplation of heaven and made that heavenly sense a slave to the body, they give their lusts free rein, as if they would take with them the pleasure they hasten to seize at every moment; whereas the soul ought to use the service of the body, not the body the service of the soul.

6.1.8CSEL 19:480–481

idem maximum bonum iudicant opes: quas si bonis artibus adsequi non possunt, malis adsecuntur. fraudant rapiunt spoliant insidiantur abiurant, nihil denique moderati aut pensi habent, dummodo auro coruscent, argento gemmis uestibus fulgeant, auidissimo uentri opes ingerant, stipati familiarum gregibus per dimotum populum semper incedant.

They also judge wealth the greatest good; if they cannot get it by good means, they get it by bad. They defraud, rob, despoil, lay ambushes, forswear themselves, and in short keep no measure or scruple, so long as they gleam with gold, shine with silver, gems, and clothing, pile wealth into a most greedy belly, and always walk through a parted crowd surrounded by herds of servants.

6.1.9CSEL 19:481

sic addicti et seruientes uoluptatibus uim uigoremque mentis extinguunt et cum uiuere se maxime putant, ad mortem concitatissime properant.

So, given over and enslaved to pleasures, they extinguish the strength and vigor of the mind, and when they think they are most alive, they are hurrying most swiftly to death.

6.1.10CSEL 19:481

nam sicut in secundo libro docuimus, caeli ratio in animo, terrae autem in corpore est. qui bona neclegunt animi, corporis adpetunt, in tenebris ac morte uersantur, quae sunt terrae atque corporis, quia uita et lumen a caelo est. cuius quoniam expertes sunt corpori seruiendo, longe absunt ab intellectu rerum diuinarum.

For, as we showed in the second book, the principle of heaven is in the soul, that of earth in the body. Those who neglect the goods of the soul and seek those of the body dwell in darkness and death, which belong to earth and the body, because life and light are from heaven. Since, by serving the body, they have no share in it, they are far from understanding divine things.

6.1.11CSEL 19:481

eadem miseros ubique caecitas premit. sicut enim qui sit uerus deus, ita qui sit uerus cultus ignorant.

The same blindness everywhere oppresses the wretched. For as they do not know who the true God is, so they do not know what true worship is.

Divine 6, chapter 2

6.2.1CSEL 19:481

Mactant igitur opimas ac pingues hostias deo quasi esurienti, profundunt uina tamquam sitienti, accendunt lumina uelut in tenebris agenti.

So they slaughter rich, fat victims to God as though he were hungry, pour out wine as though he were thirsty, and light lamps as though he lived in darkness.

6.2.2CSEL 19:481–482

quodsi suspicari aut percipere animo possint quae sint bona illa caelestia, quorum magnitudinem terreno adhuc corpore obuoluti sensu capere non possumus, iam se cum his officiis inanibus stultissimos esse cognoscant,

But if they could guess or grasp in their minds what those heavenly goods are, whose greatness we, still wrapped in an earthly body, cannot take in with our senses, they would at once recognize that they are utter fools with these empty services;

6.2.3CSEL 19:482

uel si caeleste lumen quod dicimus solem contemplari uelint, iam sentiant quam non indigeat lucernis eorum deus, qui ipse in usum hominis tam claram, tam candidam lucem dedit.

or if they were willing to contemplate the heavenly light we call the sun, they would at once perceive how little their God needs their lamps, who himself gave so bright and so pure a light for human use.

6.2.4CSEL 19:482

et tamen cum in tam paruo circulo, qui propter longinquitatem non amplius quam humani capitis uidetur habere mensuram, tantum sit fulgoris, ut eum mortalium luminum acies non queat contueri et si paulisper intenderis, hebetatos oculos caligo ac tenebrae consequantur, quid tandem luminis, quid claritatis aput ipsum deum, penes quem nulla nox est, esse arbitremur? qui hanc ipsam lucem sic moderatus est, ut neque nimio fulgore neque calore uehementi noceret animantibus tantumque istarum rerum dedit ei, quantum aut mortalia corpora pati possent aut frugum maturitas postularet.

And yet, since in so small a circle, which because of its distance seems to be no bigger than a human head, there is so much brilliance that the sharpness of mortal eyes cannot look at it, and if you gaze for a moment, dimness and darkness follow in the dazzled eyes, how much light, how much brightness must we think there is with God himself, with whom there is no night? He so tempered this very light that it would harm living things neither by excessive brilliance nor by fierce heat, and gave it only so much of these as mortal bodies could bear or the ripening of crops required.

6.2.5CSEL 19:482

num igitur mentis suae compos putandus est qui auctori et datori luminis candelarum aut cerarum lumen offert pro munere?

Should anyone be thought in his right mind, then, who offers the author and giver of light the light of candles or tapers as a gift?

6.2.6CSEL 19:482

aliut uero ille a nobis exigit lumen et quidem non fumidum, sed, ut ait poeta, liquidum atque clarum, mentis scilicet, propter quod a poetis φῶτες nuncupamur: quod exhibere non potest nisi qui deum agnouerit.

He requires another light from us, and not smoky, but, as the poet says, "clear and bright": that of the mind, for which reason we are called phōtes by the poets. And no one can show this except the one who has acknowledged God.

6.2.7CSEL 19:482–483

illorum autem dii quia terreni sunt, egent luminibus, ne in tenebris sint: quorum cultores quia caeleste nihil sapiunt, etiam religiones quibus deseruiunt ad terram reuocant: in ea enim lumine opus est, quia ratio eius et natura tenebrosa est.

But their gods, because they are earthly, need lamps, so as not to be in the dark; and their worshippers, because they have no taste for anything heavenly, bring even the religions they serve back down to earth: for there light is needed, since its nature and character are dark.

6.2.8CSEL 19:483

itaque diis non caelestem sensum, sed humanum potius adtribuunt ideoque illis necessaria et grata credunt esse quae nobis, quibus aut esurientibus opus est cibo aut sitientibus potu aut ueste algentibus aut cum sol decesserit lumine, ut uidere possimus.

So they attribute to the gods not a heavenly but a human sense, and therefore believe that what is necessary and pleasing to us is so to them: we need food when hungry, drink when thirsty, clothing when cold, and light when the sun has set, so that we can see.

6.2.9CSEL 19:483

nullis igitur ex rebus tam probari et intellegi potest deos istos, cum aliquando uixerint, mortuos esse quam ex ipso ritu, qui est totus e terra. quid enim caelestis in se boni potest habere pecudum sanguis effusus, quo aras inquinant? nisi forte deos existimant eo uesci quod homines aspernantur attingere.

So nothing can prove and show so well that these gods, having once lived, are dead, as the rite itself, which is wholly of the earth. For what heavenly good can the poured-out blood of cattle have in it, with which they defile the altars? Unless perhaps they think the gods feed on what people scorn to touch.

6.2.10CSEL 19:483

et quisquis illis hanc saginam praestiterit, quamuis ille grassator adulter ueneficus parricida sit, beatus ac felix erit, hunc diligunt, hunc tuentur, huic omnia quae optauerit praestant.

And whoever provides them with this fattening, though he be a bandit, an adulterer, a poisoner, a parricide, will be blessed and happy; him they love, him they protect, to him they grant all he desires.

6.2.11CSEL 19:483

merito ergo Persius huiusmodi superstitiones suo more deridet: qua tu inquit mercede deorum emeris auriculas? pulmone et lactibus unctis?

Rightly, then, Persius mocks such superstitions in his own way: "At what price," he says, "have you bought the ears of the gods? With lungs and greasy guts?"

6.2.12CSEL 19:483–484

sentiebat uidelicet non carne opus esse ad placandam caelestem maiestatem, sed mente sancta et iusto animo et pectore, ut ipse ait, quod naturali sit honestate generosum.

He clearly felt that flesh is not needed to appease the heavenly majesty, but a holy mind, a just soul, and a heart, as he himself says, "noble with natural honor."

6.2.13CSEL 19:484

haec est religio caelestis, non quae constat ex rebus corruptis, sed quae uirtutibus animi qui oritur e caelo, hic uerus est cultus, in quo mens colentis se ipsam deo inmaculatam uictimam sistit.

This is heavenly religion, which consists not of corruptible things but of the virtues of the soul, which springs from heaven; this is true worship, in which the mind of the worshipper presents itself to God as a spotless victim.

6.2.14CSEL 19:484

id autem ipsum quomodo consequendum, quomodo praestandum sit, docebit huius libri disputatio. nihil enim tam praeclarum hominique conueniens potest esse quam erudire homines ad iustitiam.

How this is to be attained and how it is to be performed, the argument of this book will teach. For nothing can be so excellent and fitting for man as to train people in justice.

6.2.15CSEL 19:484

aput Ciceronem Catulus in Hortensio philosophiam rebus omnibus praeferens malle se dicit uel unum paruum de officio libellum quam longam orationem pro seditioso homine Cornelio. quae sententia non utique Catuli, qui illut fortasse non dixit, sed Ciceronis est putanda, qui scripsit, credo ut libros quos de officiis erat scripturus commendaret: in quibus ipsis nihil esse testatur in omni philosophia melius et fructuosius quam praecepta uitae dare.

In Cicero's Hortensius, Catulus, preferring philosophy to everything, says he would rather have even one little book on duty than a long speech for the seditious Cornelius. This view should surely be thought not Catulus's, who perhaps did not say it, but Cicero's, who wrote it, I suppose to recommend the books he was going to write On Duties, in which he testifies that nothing in all philosophy is better or more fruitful than giving precepts for life.

6.2.16CSEL 19:484

quodsi hoc illi faciunt quibus non est ueritas cognita, quanto magis nos facere debemus qui a deo eruditi et inluminati possumus uera praecipere! nec tamen sic docebimus ut quasi prima uirtutis elementa tradamus, quod est infinitum, sed tamquam docendum susceperimus eum qui aput illos iam perfectus esse uideatur.

If those do this who have not known the truth, how much more ought we to do it, who, taught and enlightened by God, can give true precepts! Yet we will not teach as though handing down the first elements of virtue, which would be endless, but as though we had undertaken to teach one who among them already seems perfect.

6.2.17CSEL 19:484–485

manentibus enim praeceptis eorum quae solent ad probitatem recte dare, ignota illis superstruemus ad perficiendam consummandamque iustitiam, quam non tenent.

For, keeping the precepts they usually give rightly for uprightness, we will build on them things unknown to them, to perfect and complete justice, which they do not hold.

6.2.18CSEL 19:485

ea uero quae possunt cum illis esse communia praetermittam, ne quid ab iis uidear mutuari quorum errores coarguere atque aperire decreuerim.

But I will pass over what can be common with them, so as not to seem to borrow anything from those whose errors I have resolved to refute and expose.

Divine 6, chapter 3

6.3.1CSEL 19:485

Duae sunt uiae per quas humanam uitam progredi necesse est, una quae in caelum ferat, altera quae ad inferos deprimat: quas et poetae in carminibus et philosophi in disputationibus suis induxerunt.

There are two ways by which human life must proceed: one that carries up to heaven, the other that presses down to the underworld. Both the poets in their verses and the philosophers in their discussions have introduced them.

6.3.2CSEL 19:485

et quidem philosophi alteram uirtutum esse noluerunt, alteram uitiorum, eamque quae sit assignata uirtutibus; primo aditu esse arduam et confragosam: in qua si quis difficultate superata in summum eius euaserit, habere eum de cetero planum iter, lucidum amoenumque campum et omnium laborum suorum capere fructus uberes atque iucundos;

The philosophers indeed held that one is the way of the virtues and the other of the vices; and that the one assigned to the virtues is steep and rough at its first approach, but that if anyone overcomes the difficulty and reaches its top, he then has a level road, a bright and pleasant plain, and reaps rich and delightful fruits of all his labors;

6.3.3CSEL 19:485–486

quos autem primi aditus difficultas deterruerit, eos in illam uitiorum uiam labi atque deflectere, quae primo ingressu sit quasi amoena multoque tritior, deinde cum in ea paulo ulterius processerint, amoenitatis illius speciem repente subduci, exoriri autem uiam praecipitem, nunc saxis asperam nunc obductam sentibus nunc gurgitibus intercisam uel torrentibus rapidam, ut laborare haerere labi cadere sit necesse.

while those whom the difficulty of the first approach has frightened off slip and turn aside into that way of vices, which at first entry is pleasant, as it were, and much more trodden; then, when they have gone a little further in it, the appearance of pleasantness is suddenly withdrawn and a precipitous road rises up, now rough with rocks, now overgrown with thorns, now cut by whirlpools or swept by torrents, so that they must struggle, stick, slip, and fall.

6.3.4CSEL 19:486

quae omnia eo proferuntur, ut appareat in uirtutibus capiendis labores esse maximos, in perceptis autem maximos fructus et solidas atque incorruptas uoluptates, uitia uero quibusdam delenimentis naturalibus inlicere animos hominum et inanium iucunditatum specie captos ad acerbas amaritudines miseriasque perducere.

All this is put forward to show that the labors in acquiring the virtues are very great, but once they are acquired the fruits are very great and the pleasures solid and incorruptible; while the vices entice human minds with certain natural charms and, capturing them with the appearance of empty delights, lead them to bitter griefs and miseries.

6.3.5CSEL 19:486

sapiens prorsus disputatio, si uirtutum ipsarum formas ac terminos scirent. non enim didicerant uel quae sint uel quid eas mercedis a deo maneat: quod nos his duobus libris docebimus. hi uero quia ignorabant aut dubitabant animas hominum inmortales esse, et uirtutes et uitia terrenis honoribus aut poenis aestimauerunt.

A wise discussion indeed, if they knew the forms and limits of the virtues themselves. For they had not learned either what they are or what reward awaits them from God, which we will teach in these two books. But because they did not know or doubted that human souls are immortal, they measured both virtues and vices by earthly honors or punishments.

6.3.6CSEL 19:486

omnis ergo haec de duabus uiis disputatio ad frugalitatem ac luxuriam spectat. dicunt enim humanae uitae cursum Y litterae similem, quod unus quisque hominum cum primae adulescentiae limen adtigerit et in eum locum uenerit, partis ubi se uia findit in ambas, haereat nutabundus ac nesciat in quam se partem potius inclinet;

So all this discussion of the two ways looks to frugality and luxury. For they say that the course of human life is like the letter Y, because each person, when he reaches the threshold of early youth and comes to the place "where the road splits into two parts," halts, wavering, and does not know to which side he should rather turn;

6.3.7CSEL 19:486–487

si ducem nactus fuerit qui dirigat ad meliora titubantem, hoc est si aut philosophiam didicerit aut eloquentiam aut aliquid honestae artis quo euadat ad bonam frugem, quod fieri sine labore maximo non potest, honestam et copiosam uitam disputant peracturum;

if he finds a guide to direct him, faltering, to the better way, that is, if he learns philosophy or eloquence or some honorable skill by which he may turn out well, which cannot happen without the greatest labor, they argue that he will lead an honorable and prosperous life;

6.3.8CSEL 19:487

si uero doctorem frugalitatis non inuenerit, in sinistram uiam quae melioris speciem mentiatur incidere, id est desidiae inertiae luxuriae se tradere, quae suauia quidem uidentur ad tempus uera bona ignoranti, post autem amissa omni dignitate ac re familiari in omnibus miseriis ignominiaque uicturum.

but if he does not find a teacher of frugality, he falls into the left-hand way, which falsely wears the appearance of the better, that is, he gives himself to idleness, sloth, and luxury, which seem pleasant for a time to one ignorant of true goods, but afterward, having lost all dignity and property, he will live in every misery and disgrace.

6.3.9CSEL 19:487

ad corpus ergo et ad hanc uitam quam in terra ducimus fines earum uiarum rettulerunt. poetae fortasse melius, qui hoc biuium aput inferos esse uoluerunt, sed in eo falluntur quod eas uias mortuis proposuerunt. utrique ergo uere, sed tamen utrique non recte, quia oportuit uias ipsas ad uitam, fines earum ad mortem referri.

So they referred the ends of these ways to the body and to this life we lead on earth. The poets perhaps did better, who placed this fork in the underworld; but they are mistaken in setting these ways before the dead. So both are true, and yet both are not right, because the ways themselves should have been referred to life and their ends to death.

6.3.10CSEL 19:487

nos igitur melius et uerius, qui duas istas uias caeli et inferorum esse dicimus, quia iustis inmortalitas, iniustis poena aeterna proposita est.

We then speak better and more truly, who say that these two ways are of heaven and of hell, because immortality is set before the just and eternal punishment before the unjust.

6.3.11CSEL 19:487

quomodo autem hae uiae uel in caelum tollant uel ad inferna praecipitent explicabo, aperiamque quae sint uirtutes quas philosophi nescierunt; tum earum quae sint praemia, simul etiam quae sint uitia quaeue eorum supplicia monstrabo.

I will explain how these ways either raise to heaven or cast down to hell, and I will disclose what the virtues are that the philosophers did not know; then I will show what their rewards are, and at the same time what the vices are and what their punishments.

6.3.12CSEL 19:487–488

nam fortasse aliquis expectet ut separatim de uitiis ac uirtutibus dicam, cum de bono aut malo disserentibus nobis etiam quod est contrarium possit intellegi.

Perhaps someone expects me to speak separately of vices and virtues, although when we discuss good or evil, what is contrary can also be understood.

6.3.13CSEL 19:488

sine enim uirtutes inseras, uitia sua sponte decedent, siue uitia eximas, uirtutes ultro subibunt: sic bonorum ac malorum constituta natura est, ut se inuicem semper obpugnent, semper expellant. ita fit ut neque uitia detrahi sine uirtutibus possint nec uirtutes inseri sine detractione uitiorum.

For if you plant virtues, vices will depart of their own accord; or if you remove vices, virtues will come in unbidden. So the nature of good and evil has been set that they always fight and always drive each other out. So it comes about that neither can vices be removed without virtues nor virtues planted without removing vices.

6.3.14CSEL 19:488

has igitur uias longe aliter inducimus quam induci a philosophis solent, primum quod utrique praepositum esse dicimus ducem utrumque inmortalem, sed alterum honoratum, qui uirtutibus ac bonis praesit, alterum damnatum, qui uitiis ac malis.

So we present these ways very differently from how the philosophers usually do. First, because we say that over each a guide is set, both immortal, but one honored, who presides over the virtues and goods, and the other condemned, who presides over the vices and evils.

6.3.15CSEL 19:488

illi autem in dexteriore tantum uia ducem ponunt neque unum neque perpetuum, siquidem quemlibet doctorem bonae artis inducunt, qui a desidia reuocet homines et frugi esse doceat. sed neque ingredi faciunt in eam uiam nisi pueros et adulescentes, uidelicet quod artes in his discantur aetatibus.

But they place a guide only on the right-hand way, and not one, nor perpetual, since they bring in any teacher of a good art to call people back from idleness and teach them to be sober. And they have only boys and youths enter that way, evidently because skills are learned at those ages.

6.3.16CSEL 19:488

nos autem (homines) omnis sexus et generis et aetatis in hoc caeleste iter inducimus, quia deus, qui eius uiae dux est, immortalitatem nulli homini nato negat. forma quoque ipsarum uiarum non ita est ut illi putauerunt.

But we lead people of every sex, rank, and age onto this heavenly road, because God, who is the guide of this way, denies immortality to no human being born. The shape of the ways, too, is not as they thought.

6.3.17CSEL 19:488–489

quid enim opus est Y littera in rebus contrariis atque diuersis? sed altera illa melior conuersa est ad solis ortum, altera illa deterior ad occasum, quoniam qui ueritatem ac iustitiam sequitur, is accepto immortalitatis praemio perenni luce potietur, qui autem ab illo malo duce inlectus praetulerit uitia uirtutibus, mendacium ueritati, necesse est ad occasum et tenebras deferatur (aeternas).

For what need is there of the letter Y in things that are contrary and opposed? Rather, the one, the better, is turned toward the rising of the sun, the other, the worse, toward its setting, since whoever follows truth and justice will receive the reward of immortality and possess perpetual light, while whoever, lured by that evil guide, has preferred vices to virtues and falsehood to truth must be carried to the setting and to eternal darkness.

6.3.18CSEL 19:489

describam igitur utramque et earum proprietates habitusque monstrabo.

So I will describe each and show their characteristics and features.

Divine 6, chapter 4

6.4.1CSEL 19:489

Una est itaque uirtutis ac bonorum uia, quae fert non in Elysios campos, ut poetae loquuntur, sed ad ipsam mundi arcem, at laeua malorum exercet poenas et ad impia Tartara mittit.

So there is one way of virtue and goods, which leads not to the Elysian fields, as the poets say, but to the very citadel of the world; "but the left exacts the punishments of the wicked and sends them to impious Tartarus."

6.4.2CSEL 19:489

est enim criminatoris illius, qui prauis religionibus institutis auertit homines ab itinere caelesti et in uiam perditionis inducit.

For it belongs to that accuser who, by establishing perverse religions, turns people away from the heavenly road and leads them into the way of perdition.

6.4.3CSEL 19:489

cuius uiae species et figura sic est conposita in aspectum, ut plana et patens et omni genere florum atque fructuum delectabilis esse uideatur. in ea enim posuit deus omnia quae pro bonis habentur in terra, opulentiam dico, honorem quietem uoluptatem inlecebras omnes, sed cum his pariter iniustitiam crudelitatem superbiam perfidiam libidinem cupiditatem discordiam ignorantiam mendacium stultitiam ceteraque uitia. exitus autem huius uiae talis est.

The appearance and shape of this way are so arranged to the eye that it seems level, open, and delightful with every kind of flower and fruit. For God placed in it all that is counted good on earth, I mean wealth, honor, ease, pleasure, all enticements; but together with these, injustice, cruelty, pride, faithlessness, lust, greed, discord, ignorance, falsehood, folly, and the other vices. The end of this way is as follows.

6.4.4CSEL 19:489–490

cum uentum fuerit ad extremum, unde iam regredi non licet, cum omni sua pulchritudine tam subito praeciditur, ut non ante quis fraudem prospicere possit quam praecipitatus in altitudinem profundam cadat.

When one has come to the end, from which there is no turning back, it is cut off so suddenly, with all its beauty, that no one can see the trap before he falls headlong into a deep abyss.

6.4.5CSEL 19:490

quisquis enim praesentium bonorum specie captus et in his consequendis ac fruendis occupatus non praeuiderit ea quae post mortem secutura sunt seque a deo auerterit, is uero ad inferos deiectus in aeternam damnabitur poenam.

For whoever, captivated by the appearance of present goods and busy acquiring and enjoying them, has not foreseen what will follow after death and has turned away from God, will be cast down to hell and condemned to eternal punishment.

6.4.6CSEL 19:490

uia uero caelestis difficilis et cliuosa proposita est uel spinis horrentibus aspera uel saxis extantibus impedita, ut cum summo labore ac pedum tritu cumque magna cadendi sollicitudine sit cuique gradiendum.

But the heavenly way has been set out difficult and steep, either rough with bristling thorns or blocked by jutting rocks, so that everyone must walk with the greatest labor and wearing of the feet and with great anxiety of falling.

6.4.7CSEL 19:490

in hac posuit iustitiam temperantiam patientiam fidem castitatem abstinentiam concordiam scientiam ueritatem sapientiam ceterasque uirtutes, sed simul cum his paupertatem ignominiam laborem dolorem amaritudines omnes.

In it he placed justice, self-control, patience, faithfulness, chastity, abstinence, harmony, knowledge, truth, wisdom, and the other virtues, but together with them poverty, disgrace, labor, pain, and every bitterness.

6.4.8CSEL 19:490

quisquis enim spem suam porrexerit longius et meliora maluerit, carebit his terrae bonis, ut expeditus ac leuis difficultatem uiae superet. nec enim potest qui se adparatu regio circumdederit aut diuitiis onerauerit, angustias illas uel ingredi uel tenere.

For whoever has stretched his hope further and preferred better things will go without these goods of the earth, so as to overcome the difficulty of the way unencumbered and light. For one who has surrounded himself with royal pomp or loaded himself with riches cannot enter or keep to those narrow places.

6.4.9CSEL 19:490–491

unde intellegitur idcirco malis et iniustis facilius prouenire quae cupiant, quia prona et decliuis est eorum uia, bonis autem quae optent difficile procedere, quia difficili et arduo itinere gradiuntur.

From this it is understood why the wicked and unjust more easily get what they desire, since their way is downhill and sloping, while for the good what they wish comes with difficulty, since they walk a hard and steep road.

6.4.10CSEL 19:491

iustus ergo quoniam durum asperumque iter ingressus est, contemptui derisui odio sit necesse est. omnes enim quos cupiditas aut uoluptas praecipites trahit, inuident ei qui uirtutem capere potuit et inique ferunt id habere aliquem quod ipsi non habent.

So the just man, since he has entered on a hard and rough road, must be an object of contempt, mockery, and hatred. For all whom greed or pleasure drags headlong envy the one who has been able to acquire virtue, and resent that anyone should have what they do not have.

6.4.11CSEL 19:491

erit itaque pauper humilis ignobilis subiectus iniuriae et tamen omnia quae amara sunt perferens, (s)et si patientiam iugem ad summum illum gradum finemque perduxerit, dabitur ei corona uirtutis et a deo pro laboribus quos in uita propter iustitiam pertulit inmortalitate donabitur.

So he will be poor, lowly, obscure, exposed to injury, and yet bearing all that is bitter; but if he carries his unbroken patience to that highest step and end, the crown of virtue will be given him, and he will be rewarded by God with immortality for the labors he endured in life for the sake of justice.

6.4.12CSEL 19:491–492

hae sunt uiae quas deus humanae uitae adsignauit: in quibus singulis et bona ostendit et mala, sed ordine praepostero atque conuerso. in sua enim monstrauit temporaria prius mala cum aeternis bonis, qui est ordo melior, in altera temporaria prius bona cum aeternis malis, qui est ordo deterior, ut quicumque praesentia mala cum iustitia delegerit, maiora et certiora consequatur bona quam fuerunt illa quae spreuit, quisquis autem praesentia bona praeposuerit iustitiae, in maiora et longiora incidat mala quam fuerunt illa quae fugit.

These are the ways God has assigned to human life. In each he has shown both goods and evils, but in reversed and inverted order. In his own way he showed temporary evils first with eternal goods, which is the better order; in the other, temporary goods first with eternal evils, which is the worse order; so that whoever has chosen present evils along with justice obtains greater and surer goods than those he spurned, while whoever has preferred present goods to justice falls into greater and longer evils than those he fled.

6.4.13CSEL 19:492

haec enim uita corporalis quia breuis est, idcirco et mala eius et bona breuia sint necesse est, illa uero spiritalis quae huic terrenae contraria est quoniam sempiterna est, idcirco et bona eius et mala sempiterna sunt.

For since this bodily life is brief, its evils and goods must also be brief; but that spiritual life, which is opposite to this earthly one, since it is everlasting, has everlasting goods and evils.

6.4.14CSEL 19:492

ita fit ut et bonis breuibus mala aeterna et malis breuibus bona aeterna succedant. itaque cum simul proposita sint homini bona et mala, considerare unum quemque secum decet quanto satius sit perpetuis bonis mala breuia pensare quam pro breuibus et caducis bonis mala perpetua sustinere.

So it comes about that eternal evils follow brief goods, and eternal goods follow brief evils. Since, then, goods and evils are set before a person together, each should consider within himself how much better it is to repay brief evils with perpetual goods than to endure perpetual evils for brief and perishable goods.

6.4.15CSEL 19:492

nam sicut in hoc saeculo cum est propositum cum hoste certamen, prius laborandum est, ut sis postmodum in otio, esuriendum sitiendum, aestus frigora perferenda, humi quiescendum uigilandum periclitandum est, ut saluis pignoribus et domo et re familiari et omnibus pacis ac

For just as in this world, when a battle with an enemy is set, one must labor first so as to be at ease afterward; one must go hungry and thirsty, endure heat and cold, sleep on the ground, keep watch, and face danger, so that with one's children, home, property, and all the goods of peace and

6.4.16CSEL 19:492–493

uictoriae bonis perfrui possis, sin autem praesens otium malueris quam laborem, malum tibi maximum facias necesse est — praeoccupabit enim aduersarius non resistentem, uastabuntur agri, diripietur domus, in praedam uxor ac liberi uenient, ipse interficiere aut capiere: quae omnia ne accidant, praesens commodum differendum est, ut maius longiusque pariatur —:

victory safe, one may enjoy them; but if you prefer present ease to labor, you inevitably do yourself the greatest harm (for the adversary will overtake you when you do not resist, the fields will be laid waste, the house plundered, wife and children will become booty, and you yourself will be killed or captured; to prevent all this, present advantage must be postponed so that a greater and longer one may be won);

6.4.17CSEL 19:493

sic in omni hac uita, quia nobis aduersarium deus reseruauit, ut possemus capere uirtutem, omittenda est praesens uoluptas, ne hostis opprimat, uigilandum, stationes agendae, militares expeditiones obeundae, fundendus ad ultimum cruor, omnia denique amara et grauia patienter ferenda, eo quidem promptius, quod nobis imperator noster deus praemia pro laboribus aeterna constituit.

so in this whole life, since God has kept an adversary for us so that we could acquire virtue, present pleasure must be given up lest the enemy overwhelm us; we must keep watch, stand guard, go on campaigns, shed our blood to the last, and in short bear patiently everything bitter and heavy, and all the more readily since God our Commander has appointed eternal rewards for our labors.

6.4.18CSEL 19:493

et cum in hac terrena militia tantum homines laboris exhauriant, ut ea sibi pariant quae possunt eodem modo perire quo parta sunt, certe nobis nullus labor recusandus est, quibus id adquiritur quod nullo modo possit amitti.

And since in this earthly warfare people spend so much labor to win for themselves what can perish the same way it was won, surely we must refuse no labor, by which we gain what can in no way be lost.

6.4.19CSEL 19:493

uoluit enim deus, qui hominem ad hanc militiam genuit, expeditos in acie stare et intentis acriter animis ad unius hostis insidias uel apertos impetus uigilare, qui nos, sicut periti et exercitati duces solent, uariis artibus captat pro cuiusque natura et moribus saeuiens.

For God, who begot man for this warfare, willed that we stand in the battle line unencumbered and, with minds keenly alert, watch for the ambushes or open attacks of one enemy, who, as skilled and experienced commanders do, tries to catch us by various arts, raging according to each person's nature and character.

6.4.20CSEL 19:493–494

aliis enim cupiditatem insatiabilem inmittit, ut opibus suis tamquam conpedibus inligatos a uia ueritatis excutiat, alios inflammat irae stimulis, ut ad nocendum potius intentos a dei contemplatione detorqueat, alios inmoderatis libidinibus inmergit, ut uoluptati et corpori seruientes ad uirtutem respicere non possint, aliis uero inspirat inuidiam, ut suis ipsi tormentis occupati nihil cogitent aliut nisi eorum quos oderint felicitatem.

For on some he sends insatiable greed, to shake them off the way of truth bound by their wealth as by fetters; others he inflames with the goads of anger, to twist them, bent on harming, away from the contemplation of God; others he plunges into immoderate lusts, so that, serving pleasure and the body, they cannot look back to virtue; and into others he breathes envy, so that, occupied with their own torments, they think of nothing but the happiness of those they hate.

6.4.21CSEL 19:494

alios inflat ambitionibus: ii sunt qui ad gerendos magistratus omnem uitae suae operam curamque conuertunt, ut fastos signent et annis nomen inponant.

Others he puffs up with ambitions: these are the ones who turn all the effort and care of their life to holding magistracies, so as to mark the calendars and give their name to years.

6.4.22CSEL 19:494

quorundam cupiditas tendit altius, non ut prouincias temporali gladio regant, sed ut infinita et perpetua potestate dominos se dici uelint uniuersi generis humani.

The desire of some reaches higher: not to rule provinces with a temporary sword, but to wish to be called masters of the whole human race with infinite and perpetual power.

6.4.23CSEL 19:494

quos autem pios uiderit, uariis inplicat religionibus, ut impios faciat. iis uero qui sapientiam quaerunt, philosophiam in oculos inpingit, ut specie lucis excaecet, ne quis conprehendat ac teneat ueritatem.

Those he sees to be pious he entangles in various religions, to make them impious. And to those who seek wisdom he thrusts philosophy before their eyes, to blind them with the appearance of light, so that no one may grasp and hold the truth.

6.4.24CSEL 19:494

sic hominibus obstruxit aditus omnes et obsaepsit uias publicis laetus erroribus. quos ut discutere possemus ipsumque auctorem malorum uincere, inluminauit nos deus et armauit uera caelestique uirtute. de qua nunc mihi disserendum est.

So he has blocked all approaches for mankind and hedged the roads, glad at public errors. So that we might dispel them and conquer the author of evils himself, God has enlightened us and armed us with true and heavenly virtue, which I must now discuss.

Divine 6, chapter 5

6.5.1CSEL 19:494

Sed priusquam singulas uirtutes exponere incipio, determinanda est ipsa uirtus, quam non recte philosophi definierunt, quid esset aut in quibus rebus, quid operis, quid haberet officii. nomen itaque solum retinuerunt, uim uero et rationem et effectum perdiderunt.

But before I begin to set out the individual virtues, virtue itself must be defined, which the philosophers did not rightly define: what it is, in what things it lies, what its work and duty are. So they kept only the name, but lost its force, principle, and effect.

6.5.2CSEL 19:494–495

quaecumque autem in definitionem uirtutis solent dicere, paucis uersibus colligit et enarrat Lucilius, quos malo equidem ponere, ne dum multorum sententias refello, sim longior quam necesse est.

Whatever they usually say in defining virtue, Lucilius gathers and relates in a few verses, which I prefer to quote, lest, while I refute the views of many, I be longer than necessary.

6.5.3CSEL 19:495–496

uirtus, Albine, est pretium persoluere uerum quis in uersamur, quis uiuimus rebus potesse: uirtus est homini scire id quod quaeque habeat res, uirtus, scire homini rectum utile quid sit, honestum, quae bona, quae mala item, quid inutile turpe inhonestum: uirtus, quaerendae finem rei scire modumque, uirtus, diuitiis pretium persoluere posse, uirtus, id dare quod re ipsa debetur honori: hostem esse atque inimicum hominum morumque malorum, contra defensorem hominum morumque bonorum, hos magni facere, his bene uelle, his uiuere amicum: commoda praeterea patriai prima putare, deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra.

"Virtue, Albinus, is to be able to pay the true price for the things amid which we move and live; virtue is for a man to know what each thing holds; virtue is for a man to know what is right, useful, honorable, what things are good and likewise bad, what is useless, shameful, dishonorable; virtue is to know the limit and measure of acquiring; virtue is to be able to pay wealth its due price; virtue is to give what is truly owed to honor; to be the foe and enemy of bad men and bad ways, and on the other hand the defender of good men and good ways, to value these highly, wish them well, live as their friend; and besides, to hold the interests of one's country first, then those of one's parents, third and last our own."

6.5.4CSEL 19:496

ab his definitionibus, quas poeta breuiter conprehendit, Marcus Tullius traxit officia uiuendi Panaetium Stoicum secutus eaque tribus uoluminibus inclusit. haec autem quam falsa sint mox uidebimus, ut appareat quantum in nos dignatio diuina contulerit, quae nobis aperuit ueritatem.

From these definitions, which the poet briefly summed up, Marcus Tullius drew his duties of living, following Panaetius the Stoic, and set them out in three volumes. How false these are we shall soon see, so that it may be clear how much the divine favor has bestowed on us in opening the truth to us.

6.5.5CSEL 19:496

uirtutem esse dixit scire quid sit bonum et malum, quid turpe, quid honestum, quid utile, quid minus. breuius facere potuit, si tantum bonum ac malum diceret, quia nihil potest esse utile uel honestum quod non idem bonum sit, nihil inutile ac turpe quod non idem malum. quod et philosophis uidetur et idem Cicero in tertio supra dicti operis ostendit.

He said that virtue is knowing what is good and bad, what shameful, what honorable, what useful, what less so. He could have been briefer if he had said only good and bad, since nothing can be useful or honorable that is not also good, and nothing useless and shameful that is not also bad. This is the view of the philosophers too, and Cicero himself shows it in the third book of the work mentioned.

6.5.6CSEL 19:496

uerum scientia non potest esse uirtus, quia non est intus in nobis, sed ad nos extrinsecus uenit. quod autem transire ab altero ad alterum potest, uirtus non est, quia uirtus sua cuique est. scientia igitur alieni beneficii est, quia posita est in audiendo, uirtus tota nostra est, quia posita est in uoluntate faciendi boni.

But knowledge cannot be virtue, because it is not within us but comes to us from outside. And what can pass from one person to another is not virtue, because virtue is each person's own. So knowledge is a benefit received from another, since it lies in hearing; virtue is wholly ours, since it lies in the will to do good.

6.5.7CSEL 19:496

sicut ergo in itinere celebrando nihil prodest uiam nosse, nisi conatus ac uires suppetant ambulandi, ita uero scientia nihil prodest, si uirtus propria deficiat.

So just as in making a journey it does no good to know the way unless the effort and strength to walk are present, so knowledge does no good if one's own virtue is lacking.

6.5.8CSEL 19:496

nam fere etiam ii qui peccant, etsi non perfecte, tamen quid sit bonum et malum sentiunt, et quotiens aliquid improbe faciunt, peccare se sciunt et ideo celare nituntur.

For generally even those who sin perceive, if not perfectly, what is good and bad; and whenever they do something wicked, they know they are sinning and therefore try to hide it.

6.5.9CSEL 19:496–497

sed cum eos boni et mali natura non fallat, cupiditate mala uincuntur, ut peccent, quia deest illis uirtus, id est cupiditas recta et honesta faciendi.

But though the nature of good and evil does not deceive them, they are overcome by evil desire and sin, because they lack virtue, that is, the right desire to do what is honorable.

6.5.10CSEL 19:497

ex hoc igitur apparet aliut esse scientiam boni malique, aliut uirtutem, quod potest esse scientia sine uirtute, sicut in plurimis philosophorum fuit. in quo, quoniam recte ad culpam pertinet non fecisse quae scieris, recte uoluntas praua et uitiosus animus, quem ignoratio excusare non potest, punietur.

From this it is clear that knowledge of good and evil is one thing and virtue another, since there can be knowledge without virtue, as there was in very many philosophers. In this, since failing to do what you know is rightly counted a fault, the perverse will and vicious mind, which ignorance cannot excuse, will rightly be punished.

6.5.11CSEL 19:497

ergo sicut uirtus non est bonum ac malum scire, ita uirtus est bonum facere, malum non facere. et tamen scientia sic cum uirtute coniuncta est, ut scientia praecedat uirtutem, uirtus sequatur scientiam, quia nihil prodest cognitio, nisi et actio subsequatur. Horatius igitur paulo melius:

So just as virtue is not knowing good and evil, virtue is doing good and not doing evil. And yet knowledge is so joined with virtue that knowledge precedes virtue and virtue follows knowledge, because knowing is of no use unless action follows. So Horace put it a little better:

6.5.12CSEL 19:497

uirtus est uitium fugere et sapientia prima, sed inepte, quod eam contrario terminauit, ut si diceret: bonum est quod malum non est. cum enim quid sit uirtus nescio, ne uitium quidem quid sit scio. utrumque igitur indiget definitione, quia natura rei talis est, ut utrumque aut intellegi aut non intellegi sit necesse.

"Virtue is to flee vice, and the first wisdom"; but foolishly, because he defined it by its contrary, as if he were to say, "Good is what is not bad." For when I do not know what virtue is, I do not know what vice is either. So both need defining, since the nature of the thing is such that both must be either understood or not understood.

6.5.13CSEL 19:497–498

uerum nos faciamus quod ille debuit. uirtus est iram cohibere, cupiditatem conpescere, libidinem refrenare: id est enim uitium fugere. nam fere omnia quae fiunt iniuste atque inprobe, ab his oriuntur adfectibus.

But let us do what he ought to have done. Virtue is to restrain anger, to check greed, to rein in lust: for that is fleeing vice. For almost everything done unjustly and wickedly arises from these passions.

6.5.14CSEL 19:498

si enim commotionis huius quae ira dicitur impetus retundatur, omnes hominum contentiones malae sopientur, nemo insidiabitur, nemo prosiliet ad nocendum.

For if the impulse of this agitation called anger is blunted, all evil strife among people will be laid to rest; no one will plot, no one will leap forward to harm.

6.5.15CSEL 19:498

item si cupiditas temperetur, nemo terra marique grassabitur, nemo exercitum ducet, ut rapiat et uastet aliena.

Likewise, if greed is moderated, no one will rob on land and sea, no one will lead an army to seize and lay waste others' property.

6.5.16CSEL 19:498

item si ardor libidinum conprimatur, omnis aetas et sexus retinebit suam sanctitatem, nemo quidquam pudendum aut patietur aut faciet.

Likewise, if the heat of lusts is suppressed, every age and sex will keep its holiness; no one will suffer or do anything shameful.

6.5.17CSEL 19:498

ergo uniuersa scelera et flagitia his commotionibus uirtute sedatis ex hominum uita moribusque tollentur. quae sedatio commotionum et adfectuum hanc habet rationem, ut omnia recta faciamus.

So when these agitations are calmed by virtue, all crimes and outrages will be removed from human life and conduct. This calming of agitations and passions has this purpose: that we do everything rightly.

6.5.18CSEL 19:498

omne igitur uirtutis officium est non peccare. quo profecto fungi non potest qui deum nescit, quoniam ignoratio eius a quo bona oriuntur, inprudentem inpingat in uitia necesse est.

So the whole duty of virtue is not to sin. And one who does not know God certainly cannot fulfill it, since ignorance of him from whom goods arise necessarily drives the unwise into vices.

6.5.19CSEL 19:498

itaque ut breuius et significantius utriusque rei summa officia determinem, scientia est deum nosse, uirtus colere: in illo sapientia, in hoc iustitia continetur.

So, to define the chief duties of each more briefly and pointedly: knowledge is to know God, virtue is to worship him; in the former lies wisdom, in the latter justice.

Divine 6, chapter 6

6.6.1CSEL 19:498

Dixi, quod erat primum, scientiam boni non esse uirtutem, deinde, quid sit uirtus et in quo sit: sequitur ut id quoque ipsum, quid sit bonum et malum, nescisse philosophos breuiter ostendam, quia paene declaratum est in libro tertio, cum de summo bono disputarem.

I have said, first, that knowledge of the good is not virtue, and then what virtue is and in what it lies. It follows that I briefly show that the philosophers did not know even this, what good and evil are, since it was nearly made plain in the third book when I discussed the highest good.

6.6.2CSEL 19:498–499

qui autem quid esset summum nescierunt, et in ceteris bonis malisue, quae summa non sunt, errauerint necesse est: quae non potest uero iudicio examinare qui fontem ipsum non tenet unde illa descendunt.

Those who did not know what the highest good was must also have gone astray about the other goods and evils which are not the highest; for one who does not hold the very source from which they flow cannot examine them with true judgment.

6.6.3CSEL 19:499

fons autem bonorum deus est, malorum uero ille scilicet diuini nominis semper inimicus, de quo saepe diximus: ab his duobus principiis bona malaque oriuntur.

The source of goods is God; of evils, that one who is always the enemy of the divine name, of whom we have often spoken. From these two principles goods and evils arise.

6.6.4CSEL 19:499

quae ueniunt a deo, hanc habent rationem, ut inmortalitatem parent, quod est summum bonum: quae autem ab illo altero, id habent officium, ut a caelestibus auocatum terrenisque demersum ad poenam interficiant sempiternam, quod est summum malum.

Those that come from God have this purpose, to procure immortality, which is the highest good; those that come from the other have this task, to kill a person, called away from heavenly things and sunk in earthly ones, into eternal punishment, which is the highest evil.

6.6.5CSEL 19:499

num igitur dubium est quin illi omnes quid esset bonum et malum ignorauerint, qui nec deum nec aduersarium dei scierunt?

Can there be any doubt, then, that all those did not know what good and evil were who knew neither God nor God's adversary?

6.6.6CSEL 19:499

itaque finem bonorum ad corpus et ad hanc uitam breuem retulerunt, quam scilicet solui et occidere necesse est, non sunt progressi ulterius, sed omnia eorum praecepta et omnia quae inducunt bona, terrae inhaerent et humi iacent, quoniam simul cum corpore, quod est terra, moriuntur.

So they referred the end of goods to the body and to this short life, which must, of course, be dissolved and perish. They went no further; all their precepts and all the goods they present cling to the earth and lie on the ground, since they die together with the body, which is earth.

6.6.7CSEL 19:499–500

pertinent enim non ad uitam homini conparandam, sed ad quaerendas uel augendas opes honores gloriam potentiam: quae sunt uniuersa mortalia, tam scilicet quam ille qui ut ea sibi contingerent laborauit. hinc est illud: uirtus, quaerendae finem rei scire modumque.

For they concern not gaining life for a person but seeking or increasing wealth, honors, glory, and power, which are all mortal, just as mortal as the one who labored to obtain them. Hence that line: "Virtue is to know the limit and measure of acquiring."

6.6.8CSEL 19:500

praecipiunt enim quibus modis et quibus artibus res familiaris quaerenda sit, quia uident male quaeri solere. sed huiusmodi uirtus non est proposita sapienti: nec enim uirtus est opes quaerere, quarum neque inuentio neque possessio in nostra potestate est. itaque et quaesitu et obtentu faciliores sunt malis quam bonis.

For they teach by what means and arts property should be acquired, because they see that it is usually acquired badly. But virtue of this kind is not set before the wise man; for it is not virtue to seek wealth, whose finding and possession are not in our power. So it is easier for the wicked than for the good both to seek and to obtain.

6.6.9CSEL 19:500

non potest ergo uirtus esse in iis rebus quaerendis in quarum contemptu uis ac ratio uirtutis apparet, nec ad ea ipsa transfugiet quae magno et excelso animo calcare ac proterere gestit, neque fas est animam caelestibus intentam bonis, ut haec fragilia sibi conparet, ab inmortalibus suis opibus auocari, sed potissimum in iis rebus conparandis uirtutis ratio consistit quas nobis nec homo ullus nec mors ipsa possit auferre.

So virtue cannot lie in seeking those things in the contempt of which the force and principle of virtue appear; nor will it desert to the very things it longs to trample and crush with a great and lofty mind. Nor is it right for a soul intent on heavenly goods to be called away from its immortal riches to acquire these fragile ones; rather, the principle of virtue consists chiefly in acquiring those things which neither any man nor death itself can take from us.

6.6.10CSEL 19:500–501

cum haec ita se habeant, illut quod sequitur uerum est: uirtus, diuitiis pretium persoluere posse. qui uersus idem fere significat quod primi duo. sed neque ipse neque quisquam philosophorum scire potuit pretium ipsum uel quale uel quod sit. id enim poeta et illi omnes quos secutus est putauerunt recte opibus uti, hoc est frugi esse, non instruere conuiuia sumptuose, non largiri temere, non effundere in res superuacuas aut turpes rem familiarem.

This being so, what follows is true: "Virtue is to be able to pay wealth its due price." This verse means almost the same as the first two. But neither he nor any of the philosophers could know what or of what kind that price is. For the poet and all those he followed thought that using wealth rightly means being thrifty: not to lay on banquets lavishly, not to give away rashly, not to pour out one's property on superfluous or shameful things.

6.6.11CSEL 19:501

dicet aliquis fortasse: quid tu? negasne hanc esse uirtutem? non equidem nego, contraria enim uidear probare, si negem, sed ueram nego, quia non sit illa caelestis, sed tota terrena, quandoquidem nihil efficit nisi quod remaneat in terra. quid sit autem recte opibus uti et qui sit ex diuitiis fructus petendus declarabo apertius, cum de pietatis officio loqui coepero.

Someone may say: "What about you? Do you deny that this is virtue?" I certainly do not deny it, for I would seem to approve the opposite if I denied it; but I deny that it is true virtue, because it is not heavenly but wholly earthly, since it achieves nothing except what remains on earth. What it is to use wealth rightly, and what fruit should be sought from riches, I will explain more openly when I begin to speak of the duty of piety.

6.6.12CSEL 19:501

iam cetera quae sequuntur nullo modo uera sunt. nam inprobis inimicitias indicere, aut bonorum defensionem suscipere potest cum malis esse commune.

The rest that follows is in no way true. For declaring enmity on the wicked or taking up the defense of the good can be shared with the wicked.

6.6.13CSEL 19:501

quidam enim probitate ficta uiam sibi ad potentiam muniunt faciuntque multa quae boni solent, eo quidem promptius quod fallendi gratia faciunt. utinamque tam facile esset praestare quam facile est simulare bonitatem!

For some, by feigned uprightness, pave their way to power and do many things the good usually do, and all the more readily because they do them to deceive. Would that it were as easy to show goodness as it is to fake it!

6.6.14CSEL 19:501

sed hi cum esse coeperint propositi ac uoti sui conpotes et summum potentiae gradum ceperint, tum uero simulatione deposita mores suos detegunt, rapiunt omnia et uiolant et uexant eosque ipsos bonos quorum causam susceperant insequuntur et gradus per quos ascenderunt amputant, ne quis illos contra ipsos possit imitari.

But when they have begun to attain their aim and wish and have reached the highest rank of power, then they lay aside pretense and reveal their character: they seize everything, violate and harass, persecute the very good men whose cause they had taken up, and cut away the steps by which they climbed, so that no one may imitate them against themselves.

6.6.15CSEL 19:501–502

uerum tamen putemus hoc officium non nisi boni esse, ut bonos defendat. at id suscipere facile est, implere difficile, quia cum te certamini congressionique commiseris, in arbitrio dei, non tuo posita uictoria est, et plerumque inprobi et numero et conspiratione sunt potentiores quam boni, ut ad eos superandos non tam uirtus sit quam felicitas necessaria.

But let us suppose that this duty, defending the good, belongs only to the good man. Yet it is easy to undertake and hard to carry out, because once you have committed yourself to a contest and conflict, victory lies in God's decision, not yours; and the wicked are usually stronger than the good in number and conspiracy, so that to overcome them one needs not so much virtue as good fortune.

6.6.16CSEL 19:502

an aliquis ignorat quotiens melior iustiorque pars uicta sit? hinc semper dominationes acerbae in ciues extiterunt.

Or does anyone not know how often the better and more just side has been defeated? From this, harsh tyrannies over citizens have always arisen.

6.6.17CSEL 19:502

plena est exemplis omnis historia, sed nos contenti erimus uno. Gnaeus Pompeius bonorum uoluit esse defensor, siquidem pro re publica, pro senatu, pro libertate arma suscepit. idem tamen uictus cum ipsa libertate occidit et a spadonibus Aegyptiis detruncatus insepultus abiectus est.

All history is full of examples, but we will be content with one. Gnaeus Pompey wanted to be the defender of the good, since he took up arms for the commonwealth, for the senate, for liberty. Yet the same man, defeated, perished together with liberty itself, and was beheaded by Egyptian eunuchs and thrown aside unburied.

6.6.18CSEL 19:502

non est igitur uirtus aut hostem malorum esse aut defensorem bonorum, quia uirtus incertis casibus non potest esse subiecta.

So it is not virtue to be the enemy of the wicked or the defender of the good, because virtue cannot be subject to uncertain chances.

6.6.19CSEL 19:502–503

commoda praeterea patriai prima putare sublata hominum discordia nihil est omnino. quae sunt enim patriae commoda nisi alterius ciuitatis aut gentis incommoda, id est fines propagare aliis uiolenter ereptos, augere imperium, vectigalia facere maiora? quae omnia non utique uirtutes, sed uirtutum sunt euersiones.

Moreover, "to hold the interests of one's country first" is nothing at all once human discord is removed. For what are the interests of one's country except the disadvantages of another city or nation, that is, to extend borders violently seized from others, to increase the empire, to make revenues greater? All these things are surely not virtues but the overthrow of virtues.

6.6.20CSEL 19:503

in primis enim tollitur humanae societatis coniunctio, tollitur innocentia, tollitur alieni abstinentia, tollitur denique ipsa iustitia: quae discidium generis humani ferre non potest et ubicumque arma fulserint, hinc eam fugari et exterminari necesse est.

For first of all the bond of human fellowship is removed, innocence is removed, abstaining from others' property is removed, and finally justice itself is removed, which cannot bear the division of the human race, and wherever arms have flashed, it must be driven out and banished.

6.6.21CSEL 19:503

uerum est enim Ciceronis illut: qui autem ciuium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, dirimunt hi communem humani generis societatem, qua sublata beneficentia liberalitas bonitas iustitia funditus tollitur.

For Cicero's saying is true: "Those who say that account must be taken of citizens but deny it of foreigners break up the common fellowship of the human race; once that is removed, beneficence, generosity, goodness, and justice are utterly destroyed."

6.6.22CSEL 19:503

nam quomodo potest iustus esse qui nocet, qui odit, qui spoliat, qui occidit? quae omnia faciunt qui patriae prodesse nituntur. id enim ipsum prodesse quid sit, ignorant qui nihil putant utile, nihil commodum, nisi quod teneri manu potest: quod solum teneri non potest, quia eripi potest.

For how can he be just who harms, hates, despoils, kills? Those who strive to benefit their country do all these things. For they do not know what benefiting itself is, who think nothing useful, nothing advantageous, except what can be held in the hand; and that alone cannot be held, because it can be snatched away.

6.6.23CSEL 19:503–504

haec itaque ut ipsi appellant bona quisquis patriae adquisiuerit, hoc est qui euersis ciuitatibus gentibusque deletis aerarium pecunia referserit, agros ceperit, ciues suos locupletiores fecerit, hic laudibus fertur in caelum, in hoc putatur summa et perfecta esse uirtus. qui error non modo populi et imperitorum, sed etiam philosophorum est, qui praecepta quoque dant ad iniustitiam, ne stultitiae ac malitiae disciplina et auctoritas desit.

So whoever has acquired these "goods," as they call them, for his country, that is, whoever has overthrown cities, wiped out nations, filled the treasury with money, seized lands, and made his fellow citizens richer, is praised to the skies; in him highest and perfect virtue is thought to lie. This error belongs not only to the people and the unlearned but also to the philosophers, who even give precepts for injustice, so that folly and malice may not lack teaching and authority.

6.6.24CSEL 19:504

itaque cum de officiis ad rem militarem pertinentibus disputant, neque ad iustitiam neque ad ueram uirtutem adcommodatur illa omnis oratio, sed ad hanc uitam moremque ciuilem, quem non esse iustitiam et res indicat et ipse Cicero testatus est.

So when they discuss duties relating to military affairs, all that speech is adapted neither to justice nor to true virtue, but to this life and civil custom, which is not justice, as the facts show and Cicero himself has testified.

6.6.25CSEL 19:504

sed nos inquit ueri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur: easque ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ab optimis naturae et ueritatis exemplis. — umbra est igitur et imago iustitiae quam illi iustitiam putauerunt.

"But we," he says, "hold no solid and clear likeness of true law and genuine justice; we use shadow and images. Would that we followed even these! For they are drawn from the best examples of nature and truth." So what they thought justice is a shadow and image of justice.

6.6.26CSEL 19:504

quid? sapientiam nonne idem confitetur in philosophis esse nullam? aut cum Fabricius inquit aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum. nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem uolumus in-

Again, does not the same man confess that there is no wisdom in the philosophers? "Or when Fabricius," he says, "or Aristides is called just, an example of courage is sought from the one and of justice from the other as from a wise man. For none of these was wise in the way we want the wise man to be un-

6.6.27CSEL 19:504–505

tellegi, nec ii qui sapientes habiti et nominati, Marcus Cato et Gaius Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium.

derstood; nor were those who were held and named wise, Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius, wise, nor even those Seven; but from the frequent practice of intermediate duties they bore a certain likeness and appearance of wise men."

6.6.28CSEL 19:505

si ergo et philosophis ipsorum confessione adempta sapientia est et iis qui iusti habiti sunt adempta iustitia est, omnes igitur illae uirtutis descriptiones falsae sint necesse est, quia quae sit uera uirtus scire non potest nisi iustus ac sapiens. iustus autem ac sapiens nemo est nisi quem deus praeceptis caelestibus erudiuit.

If, then, by their own confession wisdom has been taken from the philosophers and justice from those held just, all those descriptions of virtue must be false, because no one can know what true virtue is except the just and wise man; and no one is just and wise except one whom God has taught with heavenly precepts.

Divine 6, chapter 7

6.7.1CSEL 19:505

Nam illi omnes qui per aliorum confessam stultitiam sapientes existimantur, specie uirtutis inducti umbras et imagines adprehendunt, nihil uerum. quod ea fit ratione, quoniam uia illa mendax, quae fert ad occasum, multos tramites habet propter studiorum et disciplinarum uarietatem, quae sunt in uita hominum dissimiles atque diuersae.

For all those who are thought wise because others confess their folly are led on by the appearance of virtue and grasp shadows and images, nothing true. This happens because that lying way, which leads to the setting sun, has many paths, owing to the variety of pursuits and disciplines, which are unlike and diverse in human life.

6.7.2CSEL 19:505

nam sicut uia illa sapientiae habet aliquid simile stultitiae, quod libro praecedente monstrauimus, ita haec cum sit tota stultitiae, habet aliquid simile sapientiae, quod adripiant ii qui stultitiam publicam intellegunt: et ut habet uitia manifesta, sic habet aliquid quod simile uideatur esse uirtuti, ut habet apertum scelus, sic imaginem quandam speciemque iustitiae.

For just as that way of wisdom has something like folly, as we showed in the preceding book, so this one, though it is wholly of folly, has something like wisdom, which those seize who understand the folly of the public; and as it has open vices, so it has something that seems like virtue; as it has open crime, so it has a certain image and appearance of justice.

6.7.3CSEL 19:505–506

quomodo enim praecursor eius uiae cuius uis et potestas omnis in fallendo est, uniuersos in fraudem posset inducere, nisi ueri similia hominibus ostentaret? deus enim, ut immortale illud arcanum eius in operto esset, posuit in uia sua quae homines pro malis et turpibus aspernarentur, ut auersi a sapientia et ueritate, quam sine ullo duce requirebant, in id ipsum inciderent quod uitare ac fugere cupiebant.

For how could the forerunner of that way, whose whole force and power lies in deceiving, lead all into fraud unless he displayed to people things resembling the truth? For God, so that that immortal secret of his might be hidden, placed in his own way things people would spurn as evil and shameful, so that, turned away from wisdom and truth, which they were seeking without any guide, they might fall into the very thing they wished to avoid and flee.

6.7.4CSEL 19:506

itaque illam perditionis ac mortis uiam multiplicem ostendit, uel quod multa sunt genera uitae uel quod dii multi qui coluntur.

So he showed that way of perdition and death to be manifold, either because there are many kinds of life or because many gods are worshipped.

6.7.5CSEL 19:506

huius dux praeuaricator ac subdolus, ut uideatur esse discrimen aliquod falsi et ueri, mali et boni, alia ducit luxuriosos alia eos qui frugi appellantur, alia inperitos alia doctos, alia inertes alia strenuos, alia stultos alia philosophos, et eos quidem non uno tramite.

Its guide, a deceiver and crafty, so that there may seem to be some distinction between false and true, evil and good, leads the luxurious by one road and those called thrifty by another, the unlearned by one and the learned by another, the idle by one and the active by another, fools by one and philosophers by another, and these not by a single path.

6.7.6CSEL 19:506

illos enim qui aut uoluptates aut diuitias non refugiunt, ab hac publica et celebri uia modice segregat, eos autem qui aut uirtutem sequi uolunt aut contemptum rerum profitentur, per confragosa quaedam praecipitia trahit.

For those who do not shun pleasures or riches he separates a little from this public and crowded way; but those who either want to follow virtue or profess contempt of the world he drags along certain rough precipices.

6.7.7CSEL 19:506

sed tamen illa omnia itinera quae speciem bonorum ostentant non sunt aliae uiae, sed deuerticula et semitae, quae uidentur quidem ab illa communi dextrouersum separari, ad eandem tamen et ad unum omnes exitum sub ipso fine referuntur.

Yet all those routes that display an appearance of goods are not other ways but byways and footpaths, which seem to branch off to the right from that common road, yet at the very end all are brought back to the same single exit.

6.7.8CSEL 19:506–507

ibi enim dux ille coniungit omnes ubi opus fuerat bonos a malis, fortes ab inertibus, sapientes a stultis separari, in deorum scilicet cultu, in quo ille uniuersos, quia sine ullo discrimine stulti fuerunt, uno mucrone iugulat et praecipitat in mortem.

For there that guide joins them all together, where the good should have been separated from the wicked, the brave from the idle, the wise from fools: namely, in the worship of the gods, in which, since they were all fools without distinction, he cuts all their throats with one blade and hurls them into death.

6.7.9CSEL 19:507

haec autem uia, quae est ueritatis et sapientiae et uirtutis et usae, quorum omnium fons unus est, una uis, una sedes, et simplex est, quo paribus animis summaque concordia unum sequamur et colamus deum, et angusta, quoniam paucioribus uirtus data est, et ardua, quoniam ad bonum quod est summum atque sublime nisi cum summa difficultate ac labore non potest perueniri.

But this way, which is of truth, wisdom, virtue, and justice, all of which have one source, one force, one seat, is both simple, so that with equal minds and the greatest harmony we may follow and worship one God; and narrow, since virtue has been given to fewer; and steep, since the good which is highest and loftiest can be reached only with the greatest difficulty and labor.

Divine 6, chapter 8

6.8.1CSEL 19:507

Haec est uia quam philosophi quaerunt, sed ideo non inueniunt, quia in terra potius ubi apparere non potest quaerunt.

This is the way the philosophers seek, but they do not find it because they seek it on earth, where it cannot appear.

6.8.2CSEL 19:507

errant ergo uelut in mari magno nec quo ferantur intellegunt, quia nec uiam cernunt nec ducem sequuntur ullum.

So they wander as on a great sea and do not know where they are carried, because they neither see the way nor follow any guide.

6.8.3CSEL 19:507

eadem namque ratione hanc uitae uiam quaeri oportet qua in alto iter nauibus quaeritur: quae nisi aliquod caeli lumen obseruent, incertis cursibus uagantur.

For this way of life must be sought in the same manner as a course is sought for ships on the deep: unless they watch some light in the sky, they wander on uncertain courses.

6.8.4CSEL 19:507

quisquis autem rectum iter uitae tenere nititur, non terram debet aspicere, sed caelum et, ut apertius loquar, non hominem sequi debet, sed deum, non his terrestribus simulacris, sed deo seruire caelesti, non ad corpus referre omnia, sed ad mentem, non huic uitae dare operam, sed aeternae.

Whoever strives to keep the right road of life must look not at the earth but at heaven; and, to speak more plainly, must follow not man but God, serve not these earthly images but the heavenly God, refer everything not to the body but to the mind, and devote himself not to this life but to the eternal one.

6.8.5CSEL 19:507–508

itaque si oculos in caelum semper intendas et solem qua oritur observes eumque habeas uitae quasi nauigii ducem, sua sponte in uiam pedes dirigentur et illut caeleste lumen, quod sanis mentibus multo clarior sol est quam hic quem carne mortali uidemus, sic reget, sic gubernabit, ut ad summum sapientiae uirtutisque portum sine ullo errore perducat.

So if you always fix your eyes on heaven and watch the sun where it rises and hold it as the guide of your life as of a ship, your feet will direct themselves into the way of their own accord; and that heavenly light, which to sound minds is a sun much brighter than this one we see with mortal flesh, will so rule and steer that it brings you without any error to the highest harbor of wisdom and virtue.

6.8.6CSEL 19:508

suscipienda igitur dei lex est, quae nos ad hoc iter dirigat, illa sancta, illa caelestis, quam Marcus Tullius in libro de re publica tertio paene diuina uoce depinxit: cuius ego, ne plura dicerem, uerba subieci.

So we must take up the law of God to direct us on this road, that holy, that heavenly law, which Marcus Tullius, in the third book On the Republic, portrayed with an almost divine voice. To say no more, I have added his words.

6.8.7CSEL 19:508

est quidem uera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnis, constans, sempiterna, quae uocet ad officium iubendo, uetando a fraude deterreat, quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut uetat nec inprobos iubendo aut uetando mouet.

"There is indeed a true law, right reason, agreeing with nature, spread among all, constant, everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding and deters from wrongdoing by forbidding; yet it does not command or forbid the upright in vain, nor does it move the wicked by commanding or forbidding.

6.8.8CSEL 19:508

huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari aliquid ex hac licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec uero aut per senatum aut per populum solui hac lege possumus, neque est quaerendus explanator aut inter-

It is not right to propose a law against this law, nor may anything be taken from it, nor can it be repealed as a whole; nor can we be released from this law by the senate or by the people; nor need we seek an expounder or inter-

6.8.9CSEL 19:508–509

pres Sextus Aelius, nec erit alia lex Romae alia Athenis, alia nunc alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et inmutabilis continebit unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus: ille legis huius inuentor disceptator lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet ac naturam hominis aspernatus hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiamsi cetera supplicia quae putantur effugerit.

preter of it, a Sextus Aelius; nor will there be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another hereafter, but one law, everlasting and unchangeable, will hold all nations at all times; and there will be one common master, as it were, and ruler of all, God: he is the author, judge, and giver of this law. Whoever does not obey it will flee from himself and, having scorned the nature of man, will by this very fact pay the greatest penalties, even if he escapes the other punishments that are commonly thought such."

6.8.10CSEL 19:509

quis sacramentum dei sciens tam significanter enarrare legem dei posset quam illam homo longe a ueritatis notitia remotus expressit? ego uero eos qui uera inprudentes loquuntur sic habendos puto, tamquam diuinent spiritu aliquo instincti.

Who that knew the mystery of God could describe the law of God so expressively as a man far removed from the knowledge of truth has expressed it? I think that those who speak truth unawares should be regarded as prophesying under the prompting of some spirit.

6.8.11CSEL 19:509

quodsi ut legis sanctae uim rationemque peruidit, ita illut quoque scisset aut explicasset, in quibus praeceptis lex ipsa consisteret, non philosophi functus fuisset officio, sed prophetae.

But if, just as he saw through the force and principle of the holy law, he had also known or explained in what precepts the law itself consists, he would have performed the office not of a philosopher but of a prophet.

6.8.12CSEL 19:509

quod quia facere ille non poterat, nobis faciendum est, quibus ipsa lex tradita est ab illo uno magistro et imperatore omnium deo.

Because he could not do this, we must do it, to whom the law itself has been handed down by that one master and ruler of all, God.

Divine 6, chapter 9

6.9.1CSEL 19:509–510

Huius legis caput primum est ipsum deum nosse, soli obtemperare, solum colere. non potest enim rationem hominis obtinere qui parentem animae suae deum nescit; quod est summum nefas. quae ignoratio facit ut diis aliis seruiat, quo nihil sceleratius committi potest.

The first head of this law is to know God himself, to obey him alone, to worship him alone. For one who does not know God, the parent of his soul, cannot keep the character of a human being; this is the greatest wickedness. This ignorance makes him serve other gods, and nothing more criminal can be committed.

6.9.2CSEL 19:510

hinc iam procliuis est ad malitiam gradus per ignorantiam ueri ac singularis boni, quia deus, quem nosse refugit, fons est ipse bonitatis: uel si iustitiam sequi uolet, diuini tamen iuris ignarus gentis suae leges, tamquam uerum ius amplectetur, quas non utique iustitia, sed utilitas repperit.

From here the step to wickedness is easy, through ignorance of the true and only good, because God, whom he refuses to know, is himself the source of goodness. Or if he wishes to follow justice, yet, ignorant of divine law, he will embrace the laws of his own nation as true law, which surely not justice but expediency devised.

6.9.3CSEL 19:510

cur enim per omnes populos diuersa et uana iura sunt condita, nisi quod una quaeque gens id sibi sanxit quod putauit rebus suis utile?

For why have different and empty laws been established among all peoples, except that each nation enacted for itself what it thought useful for its own affairs?

6.9.4CSEL 19:510

quantum autem ab iustitia recedat utilitas, populus ipse Romanus docet, qui per fetiales bella indicendo et legitime iniurias faciendo semperque aliena capiendo atque rapiendo possessionem sibi totius orbis comparauit.

How far expediency departs from justice, the Roman people itself teaches, which, by declaring wars through the fetial priests, doing injuries lawfully, and always seizing and snatching others' property, has won for itself possession of the whole world.

6.9.5CSEL 19:510

uerum hi iustos se putant, si contra leges suas nihil faciant: quod etiam timori adscribi potest, si praesentium poenarum metu sceleribus abstineant.

But these think themselves just if they do nothing against their own laws; and even this can be put down to fear, if they abstain from crimes for fear of present punishments.

6.9.6CSEL 19:510–511

sed concedamus sane ut id natura uel, ut ait philosophus, sua sponte faciant quod legibus facere coguntur. num idcirco iusti erunt, quia parent institutis hominum, qui ipsi aut errare aut iniusti esse potuerunt, sicut illi duodecim tabularum conditores, aut certe publicae utilitati pro condicione temporum seruierunt?

But let us grant that they do by nature, or, as the philosopher says, of their own accord, what they are compelled to do by laws. Will they be just for that reason, because they obey the institutions of men, who themselves could err or be unjust, like those makers of the Twelve Tables, or at least served public expediency according to the circumstances of the times?

6.9.7CSEL 19:511

aliut est igitur ciuile ius, quod pro moribus ubique uariatur, aliut uera iustitia, quam uniformem ac simplicem proposuit omnibus deus: quem qui ignorat, et ipsam iustitiam ignoret necesse est.

So civil law, which varies everywhere with customs, is one thing; true justice, which God has set before all uniform and simple, is another; and whoever does not know him must also be ignorant of justice itself.

6.9.8CSEL 19:511

sed putemus fieri posse ut aliquis naturali et ingenito bono ueras uirtutes capiat, qualem fuisse Cimonem Athenis accepimus, qui et egentibus stipem dedit et pauperes inuitauit et nudos induit, tamen cum illud unum quod est maximum deest, agnitio dei, iam bona illa omnia superuacua sunt et inania, ut frustra in iis adsequendis laborauerit.

But let us suppose it possible that someone, by a natural and inborn goodness, attains true virtues, as we are told Cimon was at Athens, who gave alms to the needy, invited the poor, and clothed the naked; yet when that one thing, the greatest, is lacking, the acknowledgment of God, all those goods are superfluous and empty, so that he labored in vain to attain them.

6.9.9CSEL 19:511

omnis enim iustitia eius similis erit humano corpori caput non habenti: in quo tametsi membra omnia et locis suis constent et figura et habitudine, tamen quoniam deest id quod est omnium principale, et uita et omni sensu caret.

For all his justice will be like a human body without a head: though all the limbs are in place in position, shape, and bearing, yet since what is chief among them all is lacking, it lacks life and all sensation.

6.9.10CSEL 19:511

itaque membra illa formam tantummodo membrorum habent, usum non habent, tam scilicet quam caput sine corpore. cui similis est qui cum deum non ignoret, uiuit iniuste: id enim solum habet quod est summum, sed frustra, quoniam uirtutibus tamquam membris eget.

So those limbs have only the form of limbs, not their use, just as a head without a body. Like this is one who, though not ignorant of God, lives unjustly: he has only what is highest, but in vain, since he lacks the virtues as limbs.

6.9.11CSEL 19:511–512

itaque ut sit uiuum ac sensibile corpus, et agnitio dei necessaria est quasi caput et uirtutes omnes quasi corpus. ita fiet homo perfectus ac uiuus, sed tamen summa omnis in capite est, quod quamuis constare non possit sine omnibus, sine quibusdam tamen potest.

So for the body to be alive and sensible, the acknowledgment of God is needed as the head and all the virtues as the body. So a person will be complete and alive; but still the whole sum lies in the head, which, though it cannot be complete without all the members, can live without some.

6.9.12CSEL 19:512

et erit quidem animal uitiosum ac debile, sed tamen uiuet, sicut is qui et deum nouit et in aliqua re peccat; dat enim ueniam peccatis deus. itaque sine membris aliquibus uiui potest, sine capite nullo modo.

And it will be a defective and weak living being, but it will live, like the one who knows God and sins in some matter; for God grants pardon to sins. So one can live without some limbs, but in no way without the head.

6.9.13CSEL 19:512

haec res efficit ut philosophi etiamsi natura sint boni, tamen nihil sciant, nihil sapiant. omnis doctrina et uirtus eorum sine capite est, quia deum nesciunt, qui est uirtutis ac doctrinae caput. quem qui non adgnoscit, licet uideat, caecus est, licet audiat, surdus, licet loquatur, elinguis est.

This is why the philosophers, even if they are good by nature, still know nothing and are wise in nothing. All their learning and virtue is headless, because they do not know God, who is the head of virtue and learning. Whoever does not acknowledge him, though he sees, is blind; though he hears, is deaf; though he speaks, is dumb.

6.9.14CSEL 19:512

cum uero conditorem rerum parentemque cognouerit, tunc et uidebit et audiet et loquetur. habere enim caput coepit, in quo sunt sensus omnes conlocati hoc est oculi et aures et lingua.

But when he has come to know the maker and parent of the world, then he will see, hear, and speak. For he has begun to have a head, in which all the senses are placed, that is, eyes, ears, and tongue.

6.9.15CSEL 19:512

nam profecto is uidet qui ueritatem, in qua deus est, uel deum, in quo ueritas est, oculis cordis aspexerit, is audit qui diuinas uoces ac praecepta uitalia pectori suo adfigit, is loquitur qui caelestia disserens uirtutem ac maiestatem dei singularis enarrat.

For surely he sees who has beheld with the eyes of the heart the truth in which God is, or God in whom truth is; he hears who fixes the divine words and life-giving precepts in his heart; he speaks who, discoursing on heavenly things, tells of the power and majesty of the one God.

6.9.16CSEL 19:512

quare non est dubium quin impius sit quisquis deum non adgnouerit, omnesque uirtutes eius, quas habere aut tenere se putat, in illa mortifera uia reperiuntur, quae est tota tenebrarum.

So there is no doubt that whoever has not acknowledged God is impious, and all his virtues, which he thinks he has or holds, are found on that deadly way, which is wholly of darkness.

6.9.17CSEL 19:512

quapropter nihil est quod sibi aliquis gratuletur, si has inanes uirtutes adeptus est, quia non tantum miser, qui bonis praesentibus careat, sed etiam stultus sit necesse est, qui labores in uita sua maximos suscipiat in cassum.

So there is no reason for anyone to congratulate himself if he has attained these empty virtues, because he must be not only wretched, lacking present goods, but also foolish, taking on the greatest labors in his life for nothing.

6.9.18CSEL 19:512–513

nam adempta spe immortalitatis quam deus pollicetur in sua religione uersantibus, cuius adsequendae gratia uirtus adpetenda est et quidquid malorum acciderit perferendum, maxima erit profecto uanitas obsequi uelle uirtutibus, quae frustra homini calamitates adferunt et labores.

For once the hope of immortality is taken away, which God promises to those who live in his religion, for the attainment of which virtue must be sought and whatever evils befall must be endured, it will surely be the height of vanity to want to comply with virtues which bring a person calamities and labors in vain.

6.9.19CSEL 19:513

nam si uirtus est egestatem exilium dolorem mortem, quae timentur a ceteris, pati fortiter ac subire, quid tandem in se boni habet, cur eam philosophi propter se ipsam dicant expetendam? nimirum superuacuis et inanibus poenis delectantur quibus licet agere tranquille.

For if virtue is bravely suffering and undergoing poverty, exile, pain, and death, which others fear, what good does it have in itself that the philosophers say it should be sought for its own sake? Surely they delight in superfluous and empty punishments when they could live in peace.

6.9.20CSEL 19:513

si enim mortales sunt animae, si uirtus dissoluto corpore nihil futura est, quid fugimus adtributa nobis bona quasi aut ingrati aut indigni qui diuinis muneribus perfruamur? quae bona ut habeamus, scelerate inpieque uiuendum est, quia uirtutem id est iustitiam paupertas sequitur.

For if souls are mortal, if virtue will be nothing once the body is dissolved, why do we flee the goods given us, as if ungrateful or unworthy to enjoy the divine gifts? To have these goods, one must live wickedly and impiously, because poverty follows virtue, that is, justice.

6.9.21CSEL 19:513

sanus igitur non est qui nulla spe maiore proposita iis bonis quibus ceteri utuntur in uita, labores et cruciatus et miserias anteponat.

So he is not sane who, with no greater hope set before him, prefers labors, tortures, and miseries to the goods others enjoy in life.

6.9.22CSEL 19:513

si autem uirtus, ut ab iis rectissime dicitur, capessenda est, quia constet ad eam nasci hominem, subesse debet spes aliqua maior, quae malorum et laborum, quos perferre uirtutis est, magnum adferat praeclarumque solacium. nec aliter uirtus cum per se dura sit, haberi pro bono potest, quam si acerbitatem suam maximo bono penset.

But if virtue must be embraced, as they most rightly say, because it is agreed that man is born for it, there must lie beneath it some greater hope, which brings great and splendid consolation for the evils and labors which it is virtue's part to endure. Nor can virtue, being hard in itself, be held a good in any other way than if it repays its bitterness with the greatest good.

6.9.23CSEL 19:513

aeque non aliter his bonis praesentibus abstinendum est, quam si sint alia maiora, propter quae tanti sit et uoluptates omittere et mala omnia sustinere. ea uero nulla sunt alia, ut in tertio docui, nisi perpetuae uitae. hanc autem praestare quis potest nisi deus, qui uirtutem ipsam proposuit?

Equally, one should not abstain from these present goods unless there are other, greater ones for whose sake it is worth giving up pleasures and bearing all evils. And these are no others, as I taught in the third book, than those of everlasting life. And who can grant this but God, who set virtue itself before us?

6.9.24CSEL 19:513–514

ergo in dei agnitione et cultu rerum summa uersatur: in hoc est spes omnis ac salus hominis, hic est sapientiae gradus primus, ut sciamus qui sit nobis uerus pater eumque solum pietate debita prosequamur, huic pareamus, huic deuotissime seruiamus, in eo promerendo actus omnis et cura et opera collocetur.

So the sum of things turns on the knowledge and worship of God: in this lies all hope and salvation for man; this is the first step of wisdom, to know who our true Father is, to honor him alone with due piety, to obey him, to serve him most devotedly, and to place every action, care, and work in winning his favor.

Divine 6, chapter 10

6.10.1CSEL 19:514

Dixi quid debeatur deo: dicam nunc quid homini tribuendum sit; quamquam id ipsum quod homini tribueris, deo tribuitur, quia homo dei simulacrum est.

I have said what is owed to God; I will now say what must be given to man; though what you give to man is given to God, because man is the image of God.

6.10.2CSEL 19:514

sed tamen primum iustitiae officium est coniungi cum deo, secundum, cum homine. set illut primum religio dicitur, hoc secundum misericordia uel humanitas nominatur. quae uirtus propria est iustorum et cultorum dei, quod ea sola uitae communis continet rationem.

Yet the first duty of justice is to be joined with God, the second with man. The first is called religion; the second is named mercy or humanity. This virtue is proper to the just and to the worshippers of God, because it alone contains the principle of common life.

6.10.3CSEL 19:514

deus enim qui ceteris animalibus sapientiam non dedit, naturalibus ea munimentis ab incursu et periculo tutiora generauit, hominem uero quia nudum fragilemque formauit, ut eum sapientia potius instrueret, dedit ei praeter cetera hunc pietatis adfectum, ut homo hominem tueatur diligat foueat contraque omnia pericula et accipiat et praestet auxilium.

For God, who did not give wisdom to the other animals, made them safer from attack and danger by natural defenses; but since he formed man naked and frail, so as to equip him rather with wisdom, he gave him, besides other things, this feeling of compassion, so that man might protect, love, and cherish man, and both receive and give help against all dangers.

6.10.4CSEL 19:514–515

summum igitur inter se hominum uinculum est humanitas: quod qui diruperit, nefarius et parricida existimandus est. nam si ab uno homine quem deus finxit omnes orimur, certe consanguinei sumus et ideo maximum scelus putandum est odisse hominem uel nocentem.

So the highest bond among human beings is humanity; whoever breaks it must be considered wicked and a parricide. For if we all spring from one man whom God formed, we are surely of one blood, and so it must be thought the greatest crime to hate a human being, even a guilty one.

6.10.5CSEL 19:515

propterea deus praecepit inimicitias per nos numquam faciendas, semper esse tollendas, scilicet ut eos qui sint nobis inimici necessitudinis admonitos mitigemus.

Therefore God commanded that we should never make enmities and should always remove them, namely, so that we may soften those who are our enemies by reminding them of our kinship.

6.10.6CSEL 19:515

item si ab uno deo inspirati omnes et animati sumus, quid aliut quam fratres sumus, et quidem coniunctiores, quod animis, quam qui corporibus?

Likewise, if we have all been breathed into and given life by one God, what are we but brothers, and indeed more closely joined, since in soul, than those who are brothers in body?

6.10.7CSEL 19:515

itaque non errat Lucretius, cum dicit: denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, omnibus ille idem pater est.

So Lucretius is not wrong when he says: "In short, we are all sprung from heavenly seed; all have that same father."

6.10.8CSEL 19:515

ergo pro beluis inmanibus sunt habendi qui homini nocent, qui contra IUS humanitatis et fas omne spoliant cruciant occidunt exterminant. ob hanc necessitudinem germanitatis docet nos deus malum numquam facere, semper bonum.

So those who harm a human being, who against the law of humanity and all right despoil, torture, kill, and banish, must be regarded as monstrous beasts. Because of this bond of brotherhood God teaches us never to do evil, always good.

6.10.9CSEL 19:515

id autem ipsum bene facere quid sit, idem ipse praescribit: praestare auxilium depressis et laborantibus, inpertiri uictum non habentibus.

And what doing good itself is, he himself prescribes: to give help to the oppressed and struggling, and to share food with those who have none.

6.10.10CSEL 19:515

deus enim quoniam pius est, animal nos uoluit esse sociale: itaque in aliis hominibus nos ipsos cogitare debemus. non meremur in periculo liberari, si non succurrimus, non meremur auxilium, si negamus.

For since God is compassionate, he willed us to be a social animal; so in other people we should think of ourselves. We do not deserve to be rescued in danger if we do not help; we do not deserve help if we refuse it.

6.10.11CSEL 19:515

ad hanc partem philosophorum nulla praecepta sunt, quippe qui falsae uirtutis specie capti misericordiam de homine sustulerunt et dum uolunt sanare, uitiauerunt.

On this part the philosophers have no precepts, since, captivated by the appearance of false virtue, they removed mercy from man, and in wishing to heal, they corrupted.

6.10.12CSEL 19:515–516

et cum idem plerumque fateantur societatis humanae communionem esse retinendam, ab ea plane se ipsos inhumanae uirtutis suae rigore dissociant. conuincendus ergo etiam hic error illorum est qui nihil cuiquam inpertiendum putant.

And though these same men generally admit that the fellowship of human society must be kept, they plainly cut themselves off from it by the rigidity of their inhuman virtue. So this error of theirs too must be refuted, who think that nothing should be shared with anyone.

6.10.13CSEL 19:516

urbis condendae originem atque causam non unam intulerunt, sed alii eos homines qui sint ex terra primitus nati, cum per siluas et campos erraticam degerent uitam, nec ullo inter se sermonis aut iuris uinculo cohaererent, sed frondes et herbam pro cubilibus, speluncas et antra pro domibus haberent, bestiis et fortioribus animalibus praedae fuisse commemorant.

They have given not one origin and cause for the founding of cities. Some relate that the first human beings born from the earth, when they led a wandering life through woods and fields, held together by no bond of speech or law, but had leaves and grass for beds and caves and grottoes for homes, were prey to beasts and stronger animals.

6.10.14CSEL 19:516

tum eos qui aut laniati effugerant aut laniari proximos uiderant, admonitos periculi sui ad alios homines decucurrisse, praesidium inplorasse et primo nutibus uoluntatem suam significasse, deinde sermonis initia temptasse ac singulis quibusque rebus nomina inprimendo paulatim loquendi perfecisse rationem.

Then those who had escaped being mangled, or had seen their neighbors mangled, warned of their danger, ran to other people, begged for protection, and at first showed their wishes by nods; then they attempted the beginnings of speech and, by fixing names on each thing, gradually perfected the art of speaking.

6.10.15CSEL 19:516

cum autem multitudinem ipsam uiderent contra bestias esse tutandam, oppida etiam coepisse munire, ut uel quietem noctis tutam sibi facerent uel ut incursiones atque impetus bestiarum non pugnando, sed obiectis aggeribus arcerent.

And when they saw that the multitude itself had to be protected against beasts, they began also to fortify towns, either to make the rest of the night safe for themselves or to keep off the raids and attacks of beasts not by fighting but by setting up earthworks.

6.10.16CSEL 19:516–517

o ingenia hominibus indigna, quae has ineptias protulerunt, miseros atque miserabiles, qui stultitiam suam litteris memoriaeque mandauerint!

O minds unworthy of human beings, which have produced these absurdities! Wretched and pitiable men, who have committed their folly to writing and memory!

6.10.17CSEL 19:517

qui cum uiderent mutis quoque animalibus ingenitam esse rationem uel conueniendi uel inuicem adpetendi uel periculi fugiendi uel mali cauendi uel cubilia sibi et latibula parandi, homines tamen ipsos existimauerint non nisi exemplis admoneri ac discere potuisse, quid metuere, quid cauere, quid facere deberent, aut numquam conuenturos inter se fuisse nec loquendi rationem reperturos, nisi eos bestiae comedissent.

For though they saw that even dumb animals have an inborn understanding of how to come together, seek one another, flee danger, avoid harm, and prepare lairs and hiding places, they still thought that human beings could only be warned and learn by examples what they should fear, beware of, and do, and that they would never have come together or discovered speech unless the beasts had eaten them.

6.10.18CSEL 19:517

haec aliis delira uisa sunt, ut fuerunt, dixeruntque non ferarum laniatus causam fuisse coeundi, sed ipsam potius humanitatem, itaque inter se congregatos, quod natura hominum solitudinis fugiens et communionis ac societatis adpetens esset. non magna inter eos disceptatio est, siquidem causae dispares sunt, res eadem est.

To others this seemed crazy, as it was, and they said that the cause of assembling was not the mauling of wild beasts but rather humanity itself; that they gathered together because human nature flees solitude and desires fellowship and society. The dispute between them is not great, since the causes differ but the result is the same.

6.10.19CSEL 19:517

potuit igitur utrumque, quia non repugnat, sed tamen utrumque nullo modo uerum est, quia non per omnem terram nati sunt homines e terra tamquam ex draconis alicuius dentibus proseminati, ut poetae ferunt, sed unus homo a deo fictus ab eoque uno terra omnis humano genere conpleta est, eadem scilicet ratione qua rursus post diluuium; quod certe negare non possunt.

Both, then, could be so, since they do not conflict; yet neither is at all true, because human beings were not born from the earth all over the world, as if sown from some dragon's teeth, as the poets tell, but one man was formed by God, and from that one man the whole earth was filled with the human race, in the same way, namely, as it was again after the flood; which they certainly cannot deny.

6.10.20CSEL 19:517–518

nulla igitur in principio facta est eiusmodi congregatio nec umquam fuisse homines in terra qui praeter infantiam non loquerentur, intelleget cui ratio non deest.

So no such assembling happened at the beginning, and anyone not lacking reason will understand that there were never human beings on earth who did not speak, except in infancy.

6.10.21CSEL 19:518

fingamus tamen illa uera esse quae otiosi et inepti senes fabulantur, ut eos suis potissimum sensibus et suis rationibus refellamus.

Yet let us suppose that what idle and foolish old men tell is true, so that we may refute them chiefly by their own views and reasonings.

6.10.22CSEL 19:518

si hac de causa sunt homines congregati, ut mutuis auxiliis inbecillitatem suam tuerentur, succurrendum est igitur homini qui egeat auxilio.

If people were gathered for this reason, to protect their weakness by mutual help, then help must be given to the person who needs it.

6.10.23CSEL 19:518

cum enim praesidii causa homines societatem cum hominibus inierint et sanxerint, foedus illut a principio sui ortus inter homines tutum aut uiolare aut non conseruare summum nefas putandum est.

For since people entered into and ratified fellowship with others for the sake of protection, to violate or fail to keep that compact, safe among people since the beginning of their origin, must be thought the greatest wickedness.

6.10.24CSEL 19:518

nam qui se a praestando auxilio remouet, etiam ab accipiendo remoueat necesse est, quia nullius opera indigere se putat qui alteri suam denegat.

For whoever withdraws from giving help must also withdraw from receiving it, because one who denies his help to another thinks he needs no one's help.

6.10.25CSEL 19:518

huic uero, qui se ipse dissociat ac secernit a corpore, non ritu hominis, sed ferarum more uiuendum est. quod si fieri non potest, retinendum igitur omni modo uinculum societatis humanae, quia homo sine homine nullo modo potest uiuere. retentio autem societatis est communitas, id est auxilium praestare, ut possimus accipere.

But one who cuts himself off and separates from the body must live not in the manner of a human being but in the way of wild beasts. If this cannot be, the bond of human society must be kept in every way, because a human being can in no way live without other human beings. And keeping society means sharing, that is, giving help so that we can receive it.

6.10.26CSEL 19:518

sin uero, ut illi alii disputant, humanitatis ipsius causa facta est hominum congregatio, homo certe hominem debet adgnoscere.

But if, as those others argue, the gathering of people was made for the sake of humanity itself, then a human being must surely recognize a human being.

6.10.27CSEL 19:518–519

quod si fecerunt illi rudes et adhuc feri homines et fecerunt nondum constituta loquendi ratione, quid putemus hominibus expolitis et sermonis rerumque omnium commercio inter se copulatis esse faciendum, qui adsueti hominibus solitudinem ferre non possunt?

If those rough and still wild people did this, and did it before speech was established, what should we think people must do who are refined and joined together by the exchange of speech and of all things, and who, used to human company, cannot bear solitude?

Divine 6, chapter 11

6.11.1CSEL 19:519

Conseruanda est igitur humanitas, si homines recte dici uelimus. id autem ipsum, conseruare humanitatem, quid aliut est quam diligere hominem, quia homo sit et idem quod nos sumus?

Humanity must be kept, then, if we wish rightly to be called human beings. And what else is keeping humanity than loving a human being because he is a human being and the same as we are?

6.11.2CSEL 19:519

discordia igitur ac dissensio non est secundum hominis rationem uerumque illut est Ciceronis, quod ait hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse. ergo si nocere homini contra naturam est, prodesse igitur homini secundum naturam sit necesse est.

Discord and dissension, then, are not in keeping with man's nature, and that saying of Cicero is true, that a man obedient to nature cannot harm a man. So if harming a human being is against nature, helping a human being must be according to nature.

6.11.3CSEL 19:519

quod qui non facit, hominis se appellatione despoliat, quia humanitatis officium est necessitati hominis ac periculo subuenire.

Whoever does not do this strips himself of the name of man, because it is the duty of humanity to come to the aid of a person's need and danger.

6.11.4CSEL 19:519

quaero igitur ab iis qui flecti et misereri non putant esse sapientis, si homo ab aliqua bestia conprehensus auxilium sibi armati hominis inploret, utrumne succurrendum putent an minime. non sunt tam inpudentes, ut negent fieri oportere quod flagitat, quod exposcit humanitas.

So I ask those who think that being moved and showing pity are not marks of the wise man: if a man seized by some beast begs an armed man for help, do they think he should be helped or not? They are not so shameless as to deny that what humanity demands and requires ought to be done.

6.11.5CSEL 19:519

item, si aliquis circumueniatur igni, ruina opprimatur, mergatur mari, flumine rapiatur, num putent hominis esse non auxiliari. non sint ipsi homines, si putent — nemo enim potest eiusmodi periculis non esse subiectus —, immo uero et hominis et fortis uiri esse dicent seruare periturum.

Likewise, if someone is surrounded by fire, crushed by a collapse, drowning in the sea, or swept away by a river, would they think it is not a human duty to help? They would not be human themselves if they thought so, for no one can be exempt from such dangers; indeed they will say it is the mark of a human being and a brave man to save one about to perish.

6.11.6CSEL 19:519–520

si ergo in eiusmodi casibus, quia periculum uitae homini adferunt, succurrere humanitatis esse concedunt, quid causae est cur, si homo esuriat sitiat algeat, succurrendum esse non putent? quae cum sint paria natura cum illis casibus fortuitis et unam eandemque humanitatem desiderent, tamen illa discernunt, quia non re ipsa uera, sed utilitate praesenti omnia metiuntur.

If, then, in such cases, because they bring danger to life, they grant that helping belongs to humanity, what reason is there why they do not think one must help a person who is hungry, thirsty, or cold? Though these are by nature equal to those chance accidents and require one and the same humanity, they still distinguish them, because they measure everything not by truth itself but by present advantage.

6.11.7CSEL 19:520

illos enim quos periculo subripiunt sperant sibi gratiam relaturos, egentes autem quia non sperant, perire arbitrantur quidquid eiusmodi hominibus inpertiant.

For those they snatch from danger they hope will return the favor; but because they do not hope this of the needy, they think that whatever they give to such people is lost.

6.11.8CSEL 19:520

hinc est illa Plauti detestanda sententia: male meretur qui mendico dat quod edat: nam et illut quod dat perit et illi producit uitam ad miseriam.

Hence that detestable saying of Plautus: "He does ill who gives a beggar something to eat; for what he gives is lost, and he prolongs the other's life for misery."

6.11.9CSEL 19:520

at enim poeta fortasse pro persona locutus est. quid? Marcus Tullius in suis officialibus libris nonne hoc idem suadet, non esse omnino largiendum? sic enim dixit: largitioque quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. ita benignitate benignitas tollitur: qua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis.

But perhaps the poet spoke in character. What then? Does not Marcus Tullius in his books On Duties urge the same, that one should not be generous at all? For he said: "Generosity from one's own property drains the very source of kindness. So kindness is removed by kindness: the more people you have used it on, the less you can use it on many."

6.11.10CSEL 19:520–521

et idem paulo post: quid autem est stultius quam quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutius facere non possis? uidelicet professor sapientiae refrenat homines ab humanitate monetque ut rem familiarem diligenter custodiant malintque arcam quam iustitiam conseruare.

And the same man a little later: "What is more foolish than to see to it that you can no longer do what you gladly do?" Clearly the professor of wisdom holds people back from humanity and advises them to guard their property carefully and prefer to preserve their strongbox rather than justice.

6.11.11CSEL 19:521

quod cum intellegeret inhumanum esse ac nefarium, mox alio capite quasi actus paenitentia sic ait: nonnumquam tamen est largiendum nec hoc benignitatis genus omnino repudiandum et saepe idoneis hominibus egentibus de re familiari inpertiendum. quid est idoneis?

When he understood that this was inhuman and wicked, soon in another chapter, as if moved by regret, he says: "Yet sometimes one must be generous, and this kind of kindness must not be rejected altogether, and one should often share from one's property with suitable people in need." What is "suitable"?

6.11.12CSEL 19:521

nempe iis qui restituere ac referre gratiam possint. si nunc Cicero uiueret, exclamarem profecto: hic, hic, Marce Tulli, aberrasti a uera iustitia eamque uno uerbo sustulisti, cum pietatis et humanitatis officia utilitate metitus es.

Surely those who can repay and return the favor. If Cicero were alive now, I would surely cry out: Here, here, Marcus Tullius, you have strayed from true justice and destroyed it with one word, when you measured the duties of piety and humanity by advantage.

6.11.13CSEL 19:521

non enim idoneis hominibus largiendum est, sed quantum potest non idoneis. id enim iuste, id pie, id humane fit, quod sine spe recipiendi feceris. haec est uera illa et germana iustitia, cuius solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenere uos dicis.

For one should give not to suitable people but, as much as possible, to unsuitable ones. For this is done justly, piously, humanely, which you do without hope of return. This is that true and genuine justice of which you say you hold no solid and clear likeness.

6.11.14CSEL 19:521

ipse pluribus locis clamas mercennariam non esse uirtutem faterisque in libris legum tuarum liberalitatem gratuitam esse his uerbis: nec est dubium quin is qui liberalis benignusque dicitur, officium, non fructum sequatur. cur ergo idoneis potius largiris, nisi ut postea mercedem recipias?

You yourself cry out in many places that virtue is not mercenary, and you admit in your books On the Laws that generosity is free, in these words: "Nor is there any doubt that one who is called generous and kind seeks duty, not profit." Why then do you give rather to the suitable, unless to receive a reward later?

6.11.15CSEL 19:521–522

te igitur auctore ac praeceptore iustitiae quisquis idoneus non erit, nuditate siti fame conficietur nec homines copiosi et usque ad delicias abundantes subuenient ultimae necessitati.

So with you as author and teacher of justice, whoever is not suitable will be worn out by nakedness, thirst, and hunger, and wealthy people abounding to the point of luxury will not relieve the utmost need.

6.11.16CSEL 19:522

si uirtus mercedem non exigit, si propter se, ut dicis, expetenda est, ergo iustitiam matrem principemque uirtutum suo pretio, non tuo commodo aestima, ei potissimum tribue a quo nihil speres.

If virtue demands no reward, if it is to be sought for its own sake, as you say, then value justice, the mother and chief of the virtues, at its own price, not by your advantage; give above all to the one from whom you hope for nothing.

6.11.17CSEL 19:522

quid personas eligis? quid membra inspicis? pro homine tibi habendus est quisquis ideo precatur, quia te hominem putet.

Why do you pick persons? Why do you inspect limbs? You must count as a human being whoever begs because he thinks you a human being.

6.11.18CSEL 19:522

abice umbras illas imaginesque iustitiae atque ipsa ueram et expressam tene. largire caecis debilibus claudis destitutis; quibus nisi largiare moriendum est. inutiles sunt hominibus, sed utiles deo, qui eos retinet in uita, qui spiritu donat, qui luce dignatur.

Throw away those shadows and images of justice and hold the true and clear justice itself. Give to the blind, the weak, the lame, the destitute, who must die unless you give. They are useless to men but useful to God, who keeps them alive, gives them breath, and deems them worthy of light.

6.11.19CSEL 19:522

foue quantum in te est et animas hominum ne extinguantur humanitate sustenta. qui succurrere perituro potest, si non succurrerit, occidit.

Cherish them as far as you can and sustain human lives with humanity so that they are not extinguished. Whoever can help one about to perish and does not, kills him.

6.11.20CSEL 19:522

uerum isti quia neque naturam retinent neque praemium in eo quod sit sciunt, dum perdere timent, perdunt et in id quod maxime cauent incidunt, ut quidquid largiuntur aut pereat omnino aut ad tempus breuissimum prosit.

But because these men neither keep to nature nor know that there is a reward in it, while they fear to lose, they lose, and fall into what they most beware of, so that whatever they give either perishes entirely or benefits for a very short time.

6.11.21CSEL 19:522–523

nam qui exiguam stipem miseris negant, qui(a) conseruare humanitatem sine damno suo nolunt, patrimonia sua effundunt, ut aut peritura et fragilia sibi conparent aut certe maximis suis damnis nihil consequantur.

For those who refuse a small coin to the wretched, because they will not keep humanity at their own expense, pour out their inheritances, either to get perishable and fragile things for themselves or at least to gain nothing at their greatest loss.

6.11.22CSEL 19:523

quid enim dicendum est de iis qui populari leuitate ducti uel magnis urbibus suffecturas opes exhibendis muneribus inpendunt, nisi eos dementes atque furiosos, qui praestent id populo quod et ipsi perdant et nemo eorum quibus praestatur accipiat?

For what must be said of those who, led by popular fickleness, spend on putting on shows wealth enough for great cities, except that they are mad and raving, since they provide the people with what they themselves lose and none of those for whom it is provided receives?

6.11.23CSEL 19:523

itaque ut est omnis uoluptas caduca et breuis, oculorum maxime et aurium, aut obliuiscuntur homines et alterius damna pro ingratis habent aut etiam offenduntur, si non est libidini uulgi satisfactum, ut etiam homines stultissimi malum sibi malo conparauerint, aut si adeo placuerant, nihil amplius quam inanem fauorem paucorumque dierum fabulas adsequantur: sic cotidie leuissimorum hominum patrimonia in res superuacuas prodiguntur.

So, since every pleasure is fleeting and brief, especially of eyes and ears, people either forget and count another's expense as nothing to be thankful for, or are even offended if the crowd's craving is not satisfied, so that even the greatest fools have bought themselves evil with evil; or, if they have pleased, they gain nothing more than empty favor and a few days' gossip. So daily the inheritances of the most frivolous people are squandered on superfluous things.

6.11.24CSEL 19:523–524

num ergo illi sapientius, qui utiliora et diuturniora ciuibus suis exhibent munera, ii scilicet qui publicis operibus extructis memoriam nomini suo quaerunt? ne isti quidem recte: bona sua in terra sepeliunt, quia nec memoria quicquam mortuis confert nec opera eorum sempiterna sunt, siquidem aut uno tremore terrae dissipantur et corruunt aut fortuito consumuntur incendio aut hostili aliquo impetu diruuntur aut certe uetustate ipsa dissoluta labuntur.

Are those, then, wiser who give their fellow citizens more useful and lasting gifts, namely those who seek memory for their name by erecting public works? Not even these act rightly: they bury their goods in the earth, because memory confers nothing on the dead and their works are not everlasting, since they are either scattered and collapse in one earthquake, or are consumed by an accidental fire, or are torn down by some enemy attack, or at least fall apart dissolved by age itself.

6.11.25CSEL 19:524

nihil est enim, ut ait orator, opere et manu factum quod non conficiat et consumat uetustas. at haec iustitia et lenitas florescet cottidie magis.

For "there is nothing made by work and hand," as the orator says, "that age does not wear out and consume. But this justice and gentleness will flourish more every day."

6.11.26CSEL 19:524

illi ergo melius, qui tribulibus suis aut clientibus largiuntur — aliquid enim praestant hominibus et prosunt — sed non est illa uera et iusta largitio. beneficentia enim nulla est ubicumque necessitas non est.

Those, then, do better who give to their fellow tribesmen or clients, for they provide something to people and help them; but that is not true and just giving. For there is no beneficence wherever there is no need.

6.11.27CSEL 19:524

perit ergo quidquid gratiae causa tribuitur non indigentibus aut cum faenore redit, et beneficentia non erit. quod etsi gratum est iis quibus datur, iustum tamen non est, quia si non fiat, nihil mali sequitur.

So whatever is given to the non-needy for the sake of favor either perishes or returns with interest, and it will not be beneficence. Though it is pleasing to those to whom it is given, it is still not just, because if it is not done, nothing bad follows.

6.11.28CSEL 19:524

unum igitur certum et uerum liberalitatis officium est egentes atque inutiles alere.

So the one sure and true duty of generosity is to feed the needy and the useless.

Divine 6, chapter 12

6.12.1CSEL 19:524

Haec est illa perfecta iustitia quae custodit humanam de qua philosophi locuntur societatem, hic diuitiarum maximus ac uerissimus fructus est, non uti opibus ad propriam unius uoluptatem, sed ad multorum salutem, non ad praesentem suum fructum, sed ad iustitiam, quae sola non interit.

This is that perfect justice which guards the human society of which the philosophers speak; this is the greatest and truest fruit of riches: to use wealth not for one person's own pleasure but for the welfare of many, not for one's own present profit but for justice, which alone does not perish.

6.12.2CSEL 19:524–525

tenendum est igitur omni modo ut ab officio misericordiae spes recipiendi absit omnino: huius enim operis et officii merces a deo est expectanda solo. nam si ab homine expectes, iam non humanitas erit illa, sed beneficii faeneratio, nec potest uideri bene meruisse qui quod facit non alteri, sed sibi praestat. et tamen res eodem redit, ut quod alteri quisque praestiterit nihil ab eo commodi sperans, uere sibi praestet, quia mercedem capiet a deo.

So it must be held in every way that the hope of repayment be wholly absent from the duty of mercy; for the reward of this work and duty must be awaited from God alone. For if you expect it from man, it will no longer be humanity but lending a kindness at interest, and one cannot seem to have deserved well who does what he does not for another but for himself. And yet the matter comes back to the same point: what anyone does for another, hoping for no advantage from him, he truly does for himself, because he will receive his reward from God.

6.12.3CSEL 19:525

item deus praecipit ut si quando cenam parauerimus, eos in conuictum adhibeamus qui reuocare non possint et uicem reddere, ut omnis actus uitae nostrae non careat misericordiae munere.

Likewise God commands that whenever we prepare a dinner, we invite to our table those who cannot invite us back and return the favor, so that every act of our life may not lack the gift of mercy.

6.12.4CSEL 19:525

nec tamen quisquam interdictum sibi putet aut communione cum amicis aut caritate cum proximis, sed notum nobis deus fecit quod sit uerum et iustum opus: ita nos oportet cum proximis uiuere, dummodo sciamus illut ad hominem, hoc ad deum pertinere.

Yet let no one think he is forbidden either fellowship with friends or affection for neighbors; but God has made known to us what the true and just work is. We ought to live with our neighbors in this way, provided we know that the one concerns man, the other God.

6.12.5CSEL 19:525

praecipua igitur uirtus hospitalitas, quod philosophi quoque aiunt, sed eam detorquent a uera iustitia et ad commodum rapiunt. recte inquit Cicero a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas. est enim, ut mihi quidem uidetur, ualde decorum patere domus hominum inlustrium hospitibus inlustribus.

Hospitality, then, is a chief virtue, as the philosophers also say; but they twist it away from true justice and snatch it toward advantage. "Rightly," says Cicero, "hospitality was praised by Theophrastus. For it is, as it seems to me at least, very becoming that the homes of illustrious men be open to illustrious guests."

6.12.6CSEL 19:525–526

eodem modo rursus errauit quo tum, cum idoneis esse diceret largiendum. non enim iusti et sapientis uiri domus inlustribus debet patere, sed humilibus et abiectis: nam inlustres illi ac potentes nulla re possunt indigere, quos opulentia sua et munit et honorat.

He erred again in the same way as when he said one should give to the suitable. For the home of a just and wise man should be open not to the illustrious but to the lowly and outcast; for those illustrious and powerful people can lack nothing, since their wealth both protects and honors them.

6.12.7CSEL 19:526

nihil autem a iusto uiro faciendum est nisi quod sit beneficum. beneficium autem si refertur, interit atque finitur: nec enim possumus id habere integrum cuius pretium nobis persolutum est.

Nothing should be done by a just man except what is beneficent. But if a benefit is repaid, it perishes and is ended; for we cannot keep intact that whose price has been paid to us.

6.12.8CSEL 19:526

in iis itaque beneficiis iustitiae ratio uersatur quae salua et incorrupta permanserint, permanent autem non aliter quam si praestentur iis hominibus qui prodesse nullo modo possunt.

So the principle of justice lies in those benefits which remain safe and uncorrupted; and they remain so only if they are given to people who can in no way be of use.

6.12.9CSEL 19:526

at ille in recipiendis inlustribus nihil spectauit aliut nisi utilitatem nec dissimulauit homo ingeniosus quid ex eo commodi speraret. ait enim, qui id faciat, potentem aput exteros futurum per gratiam principum, quos sibi hospitii et amicitiae iure constrinxerit.

But he, in receiving the illustrious, looked to nothing but advantage, and the clever man did not hide what profit he hoped from it. For he says that whoever does this will be powerful abroad through the favor of leading men, whom he has bound to himself by the right of hospitality and friendship.

6.12.10CSEL 19:526

o quam multis argumentis Ciceronis inconstantia, si id agerem, coargui posset! nec tam nostris quam suis uerbis refelleretur. idem quippe ait, ut quisque maxime ad suum commodum referat quaecumque agit, ita minime esse uirum bonum.

O by how many arguments Cicero's inconsistency could be shown, if I were doing that! And he would be refuted not so much by our words as by his own. For the same man says that the more anyone refers whatever he does to his own advantage, the less he is a good man.

6.12.11CSEL 19:526

idem etiam negat simplicis et aperti hominis esse ambire, simulare aliquid et praetendere, aliut agere uideri, cum aliut agat, praestare se alteri fingere quod sibi praestet, sed malitiosi potius et astuti et fallacis et subdoli.

He also denies that it is the mark of a simple and open man to canvass, to feign and pretend something, to seem to do one thing while doing another, to pretend to be doing for another what he is doing for himself; rather it is the mark of a malicious, crafty, deceitful, and sly one.

6.12.12CSEL 19:526–527

quomodo ergo defenderet quominus ambitiosa illa hospitalitas malitia esset? tu mihi per omnes portas circumcurses, ut aduenientes populorum atque urbium principes domum tuam inuites, ut per eos aput ciues eorum potentiam consequare, uelisque te iustum et humanum et hospitalem uideri, cum studeas utilitati tuae?

How then would he defend that ambitious hospitality from being malice? Are you to run around to all the gates to invite arriving leaders of peoples and cities to your house, so as to gain power among their citizens through them, and want to seem just, humane, and hospitable while you pursue your own advantage?

6.12.13CSEL 19:527

uerum hoc ille non potius incaute, — quid enim minus in Ciceronem conuenit? — sed ignorantia ueri iuris prudens ac sciens in hos se laqueos induit.

But he did not do this carelessly (for what fits Cicero less?); rather, through ignorance of true law, he put himself into these snares knowingly and wittingly.

6.12.14CSEL 19:527

quod ut ei possit ignosci, testificatus est non ad ueram iustitiam, quam non teneat, praecepta se dare, sed ad umbram imaginemque iustitiae. ignoscendum est igitur umbratico et imaginario praeceptori nec ab eo ueritas exigenda est qui se nescire fateatur.

So that he might be pardoned, he testified that he was giving precepts not for true justice, which he does not hold, but for the shadow and image of justice. So we must pardon a teacher of shadows and images, and truth must not be demanded of one who admits he does not know it.

6.12.15CSEL 19:527

— captiuorum redemptio magnum atque praeclarum iustitiae munus est, quod idem ipse Tullius adprobauit. atque haec benignitas inquit etiam rei publicae est utilis, redimi e seruitute captos, locupletari tenuiores. hanc ego consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe antepono, haec est grauium hominum atque magnorum.

The ransoming of captives is a great and splendid work of justice, which Tullius himself also approved. "And this kindness," he says, "is also useful to the commonwealth: that captives be redeemed from slavery and the poor enriched. This habit of kindness I put far above the giving of shows; this belongs to serious and great men."

6.12.16CSEL 19:527

proprium igitur iustorum opus est alere pauperes ac redimere captiuos, cum aput iniustos, si qui haec faciant, graues et magni appellentur: iis enim maxime laudis est bene facere quibus nemo sperauit esse facturos.

So it is the proper work of the just to feed the poor and ransom captives, since among the unjust, if any do these things, they are called serious and great; for the greatest praise belongs to those doing good from whom no one expected it.

6.12.17CSEL 19:527–528

nam qui bonum facit uel consanguineo uel proximo uel amico, aut nullam aut certe non magnam laudem meretur, quia facere debet sitque impius ac detestabilis, nisi fecerit id quod ab eo et natura ipsa et necessitudo exigit, et si facit, non tam gloriae adsequendae quam reprehensionis uitandae gratia facit.

For one who does good to a relative, neighbor, or friend deserves no praise, or at least not much, because he ought to do it, and he would be impious and detestable if he did not do what nature itself and kinship require of him; and if he does it, he does it not so much to gain glory as to avoid reproach.

6.12.18CSEL 19:528

qui autem facit alieno et ignoto, is uero dignus est laude, quoniam ut faceret sola ductus est humanitate. ibi ergo iustitia est ubi ad bene faciendum necessitatis uinculum nullum est.

But one who does it for a stranger and an unknown person is truly worthy of praise, since he was led to do it by humanity alone. So justice is where there is no bond of obligation to do good.

6.12.19CSEL 19:528

hoc igitur officium benignitatis ne anteponere quidem largitioni munerum debuit: quod est conparantis et e duobus bonis id quod sit melius eligentis.

So he ought not even to have put this duty of kindness above the giving of shows, which is the act of one comparing and choosing the better of two goods.

6.12.20CSEL 19:528

illa enim largitio hominum patrimonia sua in munera abicientium inanis et leuis et ab omni iustitia remotissima est. itaque ne dici quidem munera oportet in quibus nemo accipit nisi qui accipere non meretur.

For that lavishness of people throwing their inheritances away on shows is empty, frivolous, and very far from all justice. So they should not even be called gifts, in which no one receives except one who does not deserve to receive.

6.12.21CSEL 19:528

non minus magnum iustitiae opus est pupillos et uiduas destitutos et auxilio indigentes tueri atque defendere: quod adeo uniuersis diuina lex illa praescribit, quandoquidem boni quique iudices ad officium suum iudicant pertinere ut iis naturali humanitate faueant ac prodesse nitantur.

No less great a work of justice is to protect and defend orphans and widows who are destitute and in need of help. That divine law prescribes this to all, since all good judges judge that it belongs to their office to favor them out of natural humanity and to strive to help them.

6.12.22CSEL 19:528

uerum haec opera proprie nostra sunt, qui legem, qui uerba ipsius dei praecipientis accepimus. nam illi sentiunt quidem natura esse iustum tueri eos qui tutela carent, sed cur ita sit non perspiciunt.

But these works are properly ours, who have received the law and the words of God himself commanding. For they feel indeed that by nature it is just to protect those who lack protection, but they do not see why it is so.

6.12.23CSEL 19:528–529

deus enim, cuius perpetua clementia est, idcirco uiduas pupillosque defendi ac foueri iubet, ne quis respectu ac miseratione pignorum suorum retardetur quominus mortem pro iustitia fideque suscipiat, sed incunctanter ac fortiter subeat, cum sciat se caros suos deo relinquere nec iis umquam praesidium defuturum.

For God, whose mercy is everlasting, commands widows and orphans to be defended and cherished so that no one may be held back by regard and pity for his dear ones from undergoing death for justice and faith, but may undergo it without hesitation and bravely, knowing that he leaves his loved ones to God and that they will never lack protection.

6.12.24CSEL 19:529

aegros quoque quibus defuerit qui adsistat, curandos fouendosque suscipere summae humanitatis et magnae operationis est: quod qui fecerit, hic uiuam hostiam deo adquiret et quod alteri dederit ad tempus, ipse a deo accipiet in aeternum.

To undertake the care and nursing of the sick who have no one to stand by them is also a mark of the highest humanity and of great good work. Whoever does this will gain a living sacrifice for God, and what he has given to another for a time he himself will receive from God forever.

6.12.25CSEL 19:529

ultimum illud et maximum pietatis officium est peregrinorum et pauperum sepultura: quod illi uirtutis iustitiaeque doctores prorsus non attigerunt. nec enim poterant id uidere qui utilitate omnia officia metiebantur.

That last and greatest duty of piety is the burial of strangers and the poor; which those teachers of virtue and justice did not touch at all. Nor could they see it, since they measured all duties by advantage.

6.12.26CSEL 19:529

in ceteris enim quae supra dicta sunt quamuis uerum limitem non tenuerint, tamen quoniam commodi aliquid in iis deprehenderunt, quasi odore quodam ueritatis retenti propius aberrarunt, hoc autem, quia nihil uidere in eo commodi poterant, reliquerunt.

For in the other things mentioned above, though they did not hold the true limit, yet since they found some advantage in them, held back as it were by some scent of truth, they strayed less far; but this, because they could see no advantage in it, they left aside.

6.12.27CSEL 19:529

quin etiam non defuerunt qui superuacaneam facerent sepulturam nihilque esse dicerent mali iacere inhumatum et abiectum. quorum inpiam sapientiam cum omne humanum genus respuit, tum diuinae uoces, quae id fieri iubent.

Indeed, there were some who made burial superfluous and said it is no evil to lie unburied and cast out. Their impious wisdom is rejected both by the whole human race and by the divine voices, which command that it be done.

6.12.28CSEL 19:529

uerum illi non audent dicere id non esse faciendum, sed si forte non fiat, nihil esse incommodi. itaque in ea re non tam praecipientium quam consolantium funguntur officio, ut si forte id sapienti euenerit, ne se ob hoc miserum putet.

But they do not dare to say it should not be done, only that if by chance it is not done, there is no harm. So in this matter they perform the office not so much of those who instruct as of those who console, so that if it happens to the wise man, he will not think himself wretched on that account.

6.12.29CSEL 19:529–530

nos autem non quid sapienti ferendum sit dicimus, sed quid facere ipse debeat. itaque non quaerimus nunc utrumne tota sepeliendi ratio sit utilis necne, sed haec etiamsi sit inanis, ut illi existimant, tamen faciendum est uel ob hoc solum, quod aput homines bene et humane fieri uidetur; animus enim quaeritur et propositum ponderatur.

But we speak not of what the wise man must bear, but of what he himself ought to do. So we are not asking now whether the whole practice of burial is useful or not; rather, even if it is empty, as they think, it must still be done, if only because among people it is seen as done well and humanely; for it is the intention that is sought and the purpose that is weighed.

6.12.30CSEL 19:530

non ergo patiemur figuram et figmentum dei feris ac uolucribus in praedam iacere, sed reddemus id terrae, unde ortum est, et quamuis in homine ignoto necessariorum munus inplebimus, in quorum locum, quia desunt, succedet humanitas, et ubicumque homo desiderabitur, ibi exigi officium nostrum putabimus.

So we will not allow the image and handiwork of God to lie as prey for beasts and birds, but will return it to the earth from which it came; and even for an unknown person we will fulfill the duty of the relatives, in whose place, since they are absent, humanity will step in; and wherever a person is missed, there we will consider our duty required.

6.12.31CSEL 19:530

in quo autem magis iustitiae ratio consistit quam in eo, ut quod praestamus nostris per adfectum, praestemus alienis per humanitatem? quae est multo certior iustiorque, cum iam non homini praestatur, qui nihil sentit, sed deo soli, cui carissimum sacrificium est opus iustum.

In what does the principle of justice consist more than in doing for strangers out of humanity what we do for our own out of affection? This is much surer and juster, since it is then done not for a man, who feels nothing, but for God alone, to whom a just work is the dearest sacrifice.

6.12.32CSEL 19:530

dicet aliquis fortasse: si haec omnia fecero, nihil habebo. quid enim? si magnus hominum numerus egebit algebit capietur morietur, ut haec facientem uel uno die patrimonio exui sit necesse, perdamne rem familiarem meo aut maiorum labore quaesitam, ut iam ipsi mihi aliena misericordia uiuendum sit? quid?

Someone will perhaps say: "If I do all these things, I will have nothing. For what if a great number of people are in need, cold, captured, or dying, so that one doing these things would have to be stripped of his inheritance even in one day? Should I lose the property acquired by my own or my ancestors' labor, so that I myself must then live on others' mercy?" What?

6.12.33CSEL 19:530–531

tu tam pusillo animo paupertatem times, quam etiam uestri philosophi laudant nihilque hac tutius, nihil tranquillius esse testantur? hoc quod times sollicitudinum portus est.

Are you so small-minded as to fear poverty, which even your philosophers praise, testifying that nothing is safer, nothing more tranquil? What you fear is a harbor from anxieties.

6.12.34CSEL 19:531

an ignoras quot periculis, quot casibus cum his malis opibus subiaceas? quae tecum bene agent, si sine tuo cruore transierint. tu uero praeda onustus incedis et spolia geris, quae inritent animos etiam tuorum.

Or do you not know to how many dangers and chances you are exposed with this evil wealth? It will treat you well if it passes away without your blood. You walk loaded with booty and carry spoils that provoke the minds even of your own household.

6.12.35CSEL 19:531

quid ergo dubitas bene collocare id quod tibi forsan eripiet aut unum latrocinium aut existens repente proscriptio aut hostilis aliqua direptio? quid uerere fluxum et fragile bonum facere sempiternum aut thesauros tuos custodi deo credere, ubi non furem praedonemque timeas, non rubiginem, non tyrannum? qui aput deum diues est, pauper esse numquam potest.

Why then do you hesitate to invest well what one robbery, or a sudden proscription, or some enemy plundering may perhaps snatch from you? Why do you fear to make a fleeting and fragile good everlasting, or to entrust your treasures to God as guardian, where you need fear no thief or robber, no rust, no tyrant? Whoever is rich with God can never be poor.

6.12.36CSEL 19:531

si iustitiam tanti putas, sequere abiectis oneribus quae te premunt, libera te ipse conpedibus et catenis, ut expeditus ad deum curras. magni et excelsi animi est despicere et calcare mortalia.

If you value justice so highly, follow it, throwing off the burdens that weigh you down; free yourself from fetters and chains, so that you may run to God unencumbered. It is the mark of a great and lofty soul to look down on mortal things and trample them.

6.12.37CSEL 19:531

sed si hanc uirtutem non capis, ut diuitias tuas in aram dei conferas, ut fragilibus tibi conpares firmiora, liberabo te metu. omnia ista praecepta non tibi soli dantur, sed omni populo, qui mente coniunctus est et cohaeret sicut homo unus.

But if you do not have the virtue to bring your riches to God's altar, so as to gain for yourself firmer things in place of fragile ones, I will free you from fear. All these precepts are given not to you alone but to the whole people, which is joined in mind and holds together like one man.

6.12.38CSEL 19:531

si solus magnis operibus non sufficis, pro uirili parte operare usam, sic tamen ut quantum diuitiis inter ceteros, tantum opere praecellas.

If you alone are not sufficient for great works, practice justice according to your means, yet so that you excel others in good works as much as you excel them in riches.

6.12.39CSEL 19:531–532

neque nunc suaderi tibi putes ut rem familiarem tuam minuas uel exhaurias, sed quae in superuacua fueras inpensurus, ad meliora conuertas. unde bestias emis, hinc captos redime, unde feras pascis, hinc pauperes ale, unde homines ad gladium comparas, hinc innocentes mortuos sepeli.

And do not think you are now being urged to lessen or drain your property, but to turn to better uses what you were going to spend on superfluous things. With what you buy beasts, ransom captives; with what you feed wild animals, feed the poor; with what you procure men for the sword, bury the innocent dead.

6.12.40CSEL 19:532

quid prodest perditae nequitiae bestiarios facere locupletes et instruere ad flagitia? transfer ad magnum sacrificium male peritura, ut pro his ueris muneribus habeas a deo munus aeternum.

What good is it to make beast-fighters of lost wickedness rich and equip them for outrages? Transfer what will perish badly to the great sacrifice, so that in return for these true gifts you may have an eternal gift from God.

6.12.41CSEL 19:532

magna est misericordiae merces, cui deus pollicetur peccata se omnia remissurum. si audieris inquit preces supplicis tui, et ego audiam tuas: si misertus laborantium fueris, et ego in tuo labore miserebor. si autem non respexeris nec adiuueris, et ego animum tuum contra te geram tuisque te legibus iudicabo.

Great is the reward of mercy, to which God promises that he will forgive all sins. "If you hear," he says, "the prayers of your suppliant, I too will hear yours; if you have pity on those who labor, I too will have pity in your labor. But if you do not regard or help them, I too will set my mind against you and judge you by your own laws."

Divine 6, chapter 13

6.13.1CSEL 19:532

Quotiens igitur rogaris, temptari te a deo crede an sis dignus audiri. circumspice conscientiam tuam et quantum potes, medere uulneribus. nec tamen quia peccata largitione tolluntur, dari tibi licentiam peccandi putes: abolentur enim, si ideo largiare, quia peccaueris.

So whenever you are asked, believe that you are being tested by God as to whether you are worthy to be heard. Examine your conscience and, as far as you can, heal its wounds. Yet do not think, because sins are taken away by giving, that you are given license to sin: for they are wiped out if you give because you have sinned.

6.13.2CSEL 19:532

nam si fiducia largiendi pecces, non abolentur. deus enim purgari hominem a peccatis maxime cupit ideoque agi paenitentiam iubet: agere autem paenitentiam nihil aliut est quam profiteri et adfirmare se ulterius non peccaturum.

For if you sin trusting in giving, they are not wiped out. For God greatly desires that man be cleansed from sins, and therefore commands repentance; and to repent is nothing other than to profess and affirm that one will sin no further.

6.13.3CSEL 19:532–533

ignoscitur itaque iis qui ad peccatum inprudenter incauteque labuntur, ueniam non habet qui sciens peccat. nec tamen si aliquis purificatus fuerit ab omni labe peccati, temperandum sibi ab opere largitionis existimet, quia non habeat peccata quae deleat.

So pardon is given to those who slip into sin unwisely and unwarily; the one who sins knowingly has no pardon. Yet if someone has been purified from every stain of sin, let him not think he should hold back from the work of giving because he has no sins to blot out.

6.13.4CSEL 19:533

immo uero tum magis iustitiam debet operari, cum factus est iustus, ut quod ante in medellam uulnerum fecerat, postmodum faciat in laudem gloriamque uirtutis.

Rather, he ought to work justice all the more once he has been made just, so that what he formerly did to heal his wounds he may afterward do for the praise and glory of virtue.

6.13.5CSEL 19:533

eo accedit quod nemo esse sine delicto potest, quamdiu indumento carnis oneratus est. cuius infirmitas triplici modo subiacet dominio peccati, factis dictis cogitatione: per hos gradus ad summum columen iustitia procedit.

Besides, no one can be without fault as long as he is burdened with the garment of the flesh. Its weakness is subject to the dominion of sin in three ways: in deeds, words, and thought. Through these steps justice advances to its highest summit.

6.13.6CSEL 19:533

primus est uirtutis gradus malis operibus abstinere, secundus etiam malis uerbis, tertius etiam cogitatione rerum malarum.

The first step of virtue is to abstain from evil deeds; the second, also from evil words; the third, also from thinking of evil things.

6.13.7CSEL 19:533

qui primum gradum ascenderit, satis iustus est, qui secundum, iam perfectae uirtutis, siquidem neque factis neque sermone delinquat, qui tertium, is uero similitudinem dei adsecutus uidetur.

Whoever has climbed the first step is just enough; whoever the second, is now of perfect virtue, since he offends neither in deeds nor in speech; whoever the third seems truly to have attained likeness to God.

6.13.8CSEL 19:533

est enim paene supra humanum modum ne in cogitationem quidem admittere quod sit uel factu malum uel inprobum dictu.

For it is almost beyond human measure not even to admit into thought what is evil to do or wicked to say.

6.13.9CSEL 19:533

itaque etiam iusti homines, qui frenare se possunt ab omni opere iniusto, nonnumquam tamen ipsa fragilitate uincuntur, ut uel in ira malum dicant uel in aspectu rerum delectabilium cogitatione tacita concupiscant.

So even just people, who can restrain themselves from every unjust act, are sometimes overcome by frailty itself, so that they either speak evil in anger or at the sight of delightful things covet in silent thought.

6.13.10CSEL 19:533

quodsi mortalis condicio non patitur esse hominem ab omni macula purum, debent ergo largitione perpetua peccata carnis aboleri.

If, then, the mortal condition does not allow a person to be pure from every stain, the sins of the flesh ought to be wiped out by constant giving.

6.13.11CSEL 19:533–534

unum est enim sapientis et iusti et uitalis uiri opus diuitias suas in sola iustitia conlocare: qua profecto qui eget, licet ille Croesum aut Crassum diuitiis superet, hic pauper, hic nudus, hic mendicus putandus est.

For the one work of a wise, just, and living man is to place his riches in justice alone; and whoever lacks it, though he surpass Croesus or Crassus in riches, must be thought poor, naked, and a beggar.

6.13.12CSEL 19:534

danda igitur opera ut indumento iustitiae pietatisque uelemur, quo nos exuat nemo, quod nobis sempiternum praebeat ornatum.

So we must take care to be clothed with the garment of justice and piety, which no one can strip from us and which provides us everlasting adornment.

6.13.13CSEL 19:534

nam si deorum cultores simulacra insensibilia excolunt et quidquid pretiosi habent in ea conferunt, quibus nec uti possunt nec gratias agere, quod acceperint, quanto iustius est et uerius uiuentia dei simulacra excolere, ut promereare uiuentem?

For if the worshippers of the gods adorn senseless images and lavish on them whatever precious things they have, though these can neither use nor give thanks for what they receive, how much more just and true is it to adorn the living images of God, so as to win the favor of the living God?

6.13.14CSEL 19:534

quae sicut usui habent quidquid acceperint et gratias agunt, ita deus, in cuius conspectu bonum feceris, et probabit et mercedem pietatis exsoluet.

Just as these use whatever they have received and give thanks, so God, in whose sight you have done good, will approve it and pay the reward of piety.

Divine 6, chapter 14

6.14.1CSEL 19:534

Si ergo in homine praeclarum et excellens est bonum misericordia idque diuinis testimoniis et bonorum malorumque consensu optimum iudicatur, adparet philosophos longe afuisse ab humano bono, qui neque praeceperunt eiusmodi quicquam neque fecerunt, sed uirtutem quae in homine propemodum singularis est pro uitio semper habuerunt.

If, then, mercy is an illustrious and excellent good in man, and is judged the best by divine testimonies and by the agreement of good and bad alike, it is clear that the philosophers were far from the human good, since they neither taught nor did anything of this kind, but always held as a vice the virtue that is almost unique to man.

6.14.2CSEL 19:534

libet hic interponere unum de philosophia locum, ut illorum plenius coarguamus errores qui misericordiam cupiditatem metum morbos animi appellant.

I would like to insert here one topic from philosophy, so as to refute more fully the errors of those who call mercy, desire, and fear diseases of the soul.

6.14.3CSEL 19:534–535

conantur illi quidem uirtutes a uitiis distinguere: quod est sane facillimum. quis enim non possit liberalem a prodigo separare, ut illi faciunt, aut parcum a sordido aut quietum ab inerti aut cautum a timido, quod haec quae sunt bona fines suos habent? quos si excesserint, in uitia labuntur, ita ut constantia nisi pro ueritate suscepta sit, fit inpudentia.

They try indeed to distinguish virtues from vices, which is very easy. For who cannot separate the generous from the prodigal, as they do, or the thrifty from the stingy, the calm from the sluggish, the cautious from the timid, since these good things have their limits? If they exceed them, they slip into vices, so that constancy, unless taken up for truth, becomes shamelessness.

6.14.4CSEL 19:535

item fortitudo si nulla necessitate cogente aut non pro causa honesta certum periculum subierit, in temeritatem conuertitur. libertas quoque si alios insectetur potius quam insectantibus resistat, contumacia est. seueritas etiam nisi se intra congruentes nocentium poenas coerceat, fit saeua crudelitas.

Likewise courage, if it undergoes certain danger with no necessity compelling or not for an honorable cause, turns into rashness. Freedom of speech too, if it attacks others rather than resisting attackers, is insolence. Severity also, unless it confines itself within penalties fitting the guilty, becomes savage cruelty.

6.14.5CSEL 19:535

itaque dicunt eos qui mali uideantur non sua sponte peccare nec mala potius eligere, sed bonorum specie lapsos incidere in mala, dum bonorum ac malorum discrimen ignorant.

So they say that those who seem bad do not sin of their own accord or choose evils in preference, but, misled by the appearance of goods, fall into evils, since they do not know the difference between good and evil.

6.14.6CSEL 19:535

haec quidem falsa non sunt, sed ad corpus cuncta referuntur. nam parcum esse aut constantem aut cautum aut quietum aut fortem aut seuerum uirtutes sunt quidem, sed huius temporariae uitae. nos autem, qui hanc uitam contemnimus, alias nobis uirtutes propositas habemus, de quibus philosophi ne suspicari quidem ulla ratione potuerunt.

These things are not false, but all are referred to the body. For to be thrifty, constant, cautious, calm, brave, or severe are indeed virtues, but of this temporary life. But we, who despise this life, have other virtues set before us, of which the philosophers could not even suspect anything by any reasoning.

6.14.7CSEL 19:535

itaque et uirtutes quasdam pro uitiis et uitia quaedam pro uirtutibus habuerunt. nam Stoici adfectus omnes quorum inpulsu animus commouetur ex homine tollunt, cupiditatem laetitiam metum maestitiam, quorum duo priora ex bonis sint aut futuris aut praesentibus, posteriora ex malis.

So they held some virtues to be vices and some vices to be virtues. For the Stoics remove from man all the passions by whose impulse the soul is moved: desire, joy, fear, and sorrow, the first two of which arise from goods either future or present, the latter from evils.

6.14.8CSEL 19:535–536

eodem modo haec quattuor morbos, ut dixi, uocant non tam natura insitos quam praua opinione susceptos et idcirco eos censent extirpari posse radicitus, si bonorum malorumque opinio falsa tollatur.

In the same way they call these four diseases, as I said, not so much implanted by nature as taken up through wrong opinion; and so they think they can be torn out by the roots if the false opinion of goods and evils is removed.

6.14.9CSEL 19:536

si enim nihil censeat sapiens bonum, nihil malum, nec cupiditate ardescet nec laetitia gestiet nec metu terrebitur nec aegritudine contrahetur.

For if the wise man thinks nothing good and nothing bad, he will neither burn with desire nor leap with joy nor be terrified by fear nor shrink with grief.

6.14.10CSEL 19:536

mox uidebimus an efficiant quod uelint aut quid efficiant, interim propositum adrogans ac paene furios(or)um, qui se putent mederi et eniti posse contra uim rationemque naturae.

We shall soon see whether they achieve what they wish, or what they achieve; meanwhile their aim is arrogant and almost the aim of madmen, who think they can cure and strive against the force and order of nature.

Divine 6, chapter 15

6.15.1CSEL 19:536

Haec enim naturalia esse, non uoluntaria, omnium uiuentium ratio demonstrat, quae isdem omnibus quatitur adfectibus.

For that these are natural, not voluntary, is shown by the nature of all living things, which are shaken by all the same passions.

6.15.2CSEL 19:536

Peripatetici ergo rectius, qui haec omnia detrahi negant posse, quia nobiscum simul nata sint, et conantur ostendere quam prouidenter et quam necessario deus siue natura — sic enim dicunt — his nos armarit adfectibus: quos tamen, quia uitiosi plerumque fiunt, si nimii sint, posse ab homine adhibito modo salubriter temperari, ut tantum homini quantum naturae satis est relinquatur.

So the Peripatetics speak more rightly, who deny that all these can be removed, since they are born with us, and try to show how providently and how necessarily God, or nature (for so they say), has armed us with these passions; which, however, since they generally become vicious if excessive, can be healthily tempered by man by applying measure, so that only as much is left to man as is enough for nature.

6.15.3CSEL 19:536–537

non insipiens disputatio, si, ut dixi, non ad hanc uitam omnia referrentur. Stoici ergo furiosi, qui ea non temperant, sed abscidunt rebusque natura insitis castrare hominem quodammodo uolunt. quod tale est, quale si uelint aut metum detrahere ceruis aut uenenum anguibus aut iram feris aut placiditatem pecudibus. nam quae singula mutis animalibus data sunt, ea uero uniuersa homini simul.

Not a foolish argument, if, as I said, everything were not referred to this life. The Stoics, then, are mad, who do not temper them but cut them off and want, in a way, to castrate man of things implanted by nature. This is as if they wished to take fear from deer, venom from snakes, anger from wild beasts, or gentleness from cattle. For what has been given singly to dumb animals has all been given together to man.

6.15.4CSEL 19:537

quodsi, ut medici adfirmant, laetitiae adfectus in splene est, irae in felle, libidinis in iecore, timoris in corde, facilius est interficere animal ipsum quam ex corpore aliquid euellere: quod est animantis naturam uelle mutare.

And if, as physicians assert, the passion of joy is in the spleen, of anger in the gall, of lust in the liver, of fear in the heart, it is easier to kill the animal itself than to tear something out of its body; which is to want to change the nature of a living being.

6.15.5CSEL 19:537

sed homines prudentes non intellegunt, cum uitia ex homine tollunt, etiam uirtutem se tollere, cui soli locum faciunt. nam si uirtus est in medio irae inpetu se ipsum cohibere ac reprimere, quod negare non possunt, caret ergo uirtute quisque ira caret.

But these prudent men do not understand that when they remove vices from man, they also remove virtue, for which alone they make room. For if virtue is to check and restrain oneself amid the rush of anger, which they cannot deny, then whoever lacks anger lacks virtue.

6.15.6CSEL 19:537

si uirtus est libidinem corporis continere, uirtute careat necesse est qui libidinem quam temperet non habet. si uirtus est cupiditatem ab alieni adpetitione frenare, nullam certe uirtutem potest habere qui caret eo ad quod cohibendum uirtutis usus adhibetur.

If virtue is to restrain the lust of the body, one who has no lust to temper must lack virtue. If virtue is to curb desire from seeking what belongs to another, surely one who lacks that which the use of virtue is applied to restrain can have no virtue.

6.15.7CSEL 19:537

ubi ergo uitia non sunt, ne uirtuti quidem locus est, sicut ne uictoriae quidem, ubi aduersarius nullus est. ita fit ut bonum sine malo esse in hac uita non possit.

So where there are no vices, there is no room even for virtue, just as there is none for victory where there is no adversary. So it comes about that in this life good cannot exist without evil.

6.15.8CSEL 19:537

adfectus igitur quasi ubertas est naturalis animorum. nam sicut in senes ager qui est natura fecundus exuberat, sic animus incultus uitiis sua sponte inualescentibus uelut spinis obducitur. sed cum uerus cultor accesserit, statim cedentibus uitiis fruges uirtutis oriuntur.

So passion is, as it were, the natural fertility of souls. For just as a field that is fertile by nature runs riot when left untended, so the uncultivated soul is overgrown with vices springing up of their own accord like thorns. But when a true cultivator comes, at once the vices give way and the crops of virtue spring up.

6.15.9CSEL 19:537–538

deus itaque cum hominem primum fingeret, mirabili prouidentia ingenerauit ei prius istas animi commotiones, ut posset capere uirtutem sicut terra culturam, posuitque materiam uitiorum in adfectibus, uirtutis in uitiis. quae profecto aut nulla erit aut in usu esse non poterit, si desint ea per quae uis eius aut apparet aut constat.

So God, when he first formed man, with wonderful providence implanted in him beforehand these movements of the soul, so that he could take on virtue as the earth takes on cultivation; and he placed the material of vices in the passions and the material of virtue in the vices. Virtue would surely be nothing, or could not be exercised, if those things were absent through which its force either appears or subsists.

6.15.10CSEL 19:538

uideamus nunc, idem illi qui uitia penitus excidunt quid effecerint. quattuor illos adfectus, quos ex opinione bonorum malorumque nasci putant, quibus euulsis sanandum esse animum sapientis existimant, quoniam intellegunt et natura insitos esse et sine iis nihil moueri, nihil agi posse, alia quaedam in eorum locum uicemque subponunt. pro cupiditate substituunt uoluntatem, quasi uero non multo sit praestabilius bonum cupere quam [malum] uelle; item pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem.

Let us now see what those same people who cut out vices entirely have achieved. Those four passions, which they think arise from opinion about goods and evils and by whose removal they think the wise man's soul must be healed, since they understand that they are implanted by nature and that without them nothing can be moved or done, they replace with certain others in their place and stead. For desire they substitute will, as if it were not far better to desire good than to will; likewise joy for gladness, caution for fear.

6.15.11CSEL 19:538

at in illo quarto inmutandi nominis eos ratio deficit. itaque aegritudinem penitus id est maestitiam doloremque animi sustulerunt: quod fieri nequaquam potest.

But for that fourth one their method of changing the name failed them. So they removed grief entirely, that is, sorrow and pain of mind, which can in no way be done.

6.15.12CSEL 19:538

quis enim possit non dolere, si patriam aut pestilentia exhauserit aut hostis euerterit aut tyrannus oppresserit? potest aliquis non dolere, si sublatam uiderit libertatem, si proximos, si amicos, si bonos uiros aut exterminatos aut crudelissime trucidatos? nisi cuius mens ita obstipuerit, ut sit ei sensus omnis ereptus.

For who could fail to grieve if plague had emptied his country, or an enemy overthrown it, or a tyrant oppressed it? Can anyone not grieve if he sees liberty taken away, or his neighbors, friends, or good men banished or most cruelly slaughtered? Only one whose mind is so stunned that all feeling has been torn from him.

6.15.13CSEL 19:538–539

quare aut omnia tollere debuerunt aut inplenda fuerat curta haec ac debilis disputatio, id est etiam pro aegritudine aliquid reponendum, quoniam superioribus ita ordinatis hoc consequens erat. ut enim praesentibus laetamur bonis, sic malis angimur ac dolemus.

So they should either have removed them all, or this truncated and feeble argument should have been completed, that is, something should also have been put in place of grief, since that followed from the arrangement of the others. For as we rejoice in present goods, so we are distressed and grieve at evils.

6.15.14CSEL 19:539

si ergo laetitiae, quoniam uitiosam putabant, nomen aliut indiderunt, sic aegritudini, quoniam et ipsam uitiosam putant, aliut uocabulum tribui congruebat. unde apparet non illis rem defuisse, sed uerbum: cuius indigentia eum totum adfectum qui est uel maximus, contra quam natura pateretur auferre uoluerunt.

If, then, they gave joy another name because they thought it vicious, it would have been consistent to give grief, which they also think vicious, another word. From this it is clear that they lacked not the thing but the word, and through lack of it they wanted to remove, contrary to what nature allows, that whole passion, which is perhaps the greatest.

6.15.15CSEL 19:539

nam illas nominum commutationes poteram coarguere pluribus et ostendere aut sermonis ornandi augendaeque copiae gratia multa nomina isdem rebus inposita aut certe non multum inter se illa distare. nam et cupiditas a uoluntate incipit et cautio a metu oritur et laetitia nihil aliut est quam professum gaudium. sed putemus, ut ipsi uolunt, esse diuersa.

I could refute those changes of names at more length and show either that many names are given to the same things for the sake of adorning speech and enlarging vocabulary, or at least that they do not differ much from one another. For desire begins from will, caution arises from fear, and joy is nothing other than gladness openly shown. But let us suppose, as they wish, that they are different.

6.15.16CSEL 19:539

nempe igitur cupiditatem esse dicent perseuerantem ac perpetuam uoluntatem, laetitiam uero insolenter se efferens gaudium, metum autem nimiam et excedentem modum cautionem. ita fit ut ea quae tollenda esse censent non tollant, sed temperent, siquidem nomina tantummodo immutant, res ipsae manent.

Surely, then, they will say that desire is persistent and perpetual will, joy is gladness exalting itself immoderately, and fear is excessive caution beyond measure. So it comes about that they do not remove what they think must be removed but temper it, since they only change names and the things themselves remain.

6.15.17CSEL 19:539

eo igitur inprudentes reuoluuntur quo Peripatetici ratione perueniunt, ut uitia quoniam tolli non possunt, medie temperanda sint. errant ergo, quia non efficiunt quod uolunt, et longo asperoque circuitu in eandem uiam redeunt.

So without realizing it they roll back to where the Peripatetics arrive by reason: that vices, since they cannot be removed, must be moderately tempered. So they err, because they do not achieve what they want, and by a long and rough detour they return to the same road.

Divine 6, chapter 16

6.16.1CSEL 19:539–540

At ego ne Peripateticos quidem accessisse ad ueritatem puto, qui uitia esse concedunt, sed ea mediocriter temperant. carendum est enim uitiis etiam mediocribus.

But I do not think that even the Peripatetics have come near the truth, since they grant that there are vices but temper them moderately. For one must be free even of moderate vices.

6.16.2CSEL 19:540

quin potius efficiendum fuit primum, ne uitia essent: nec enim quicquam uitiosum nasci potest, sed uitia fieri, si male utamur adfectibus, uirtutes, si bene;

Rather, it should first have been brought about that there be no vices at all; for nothing vicious can be born in us, but vices arise if we use the passions badly, and virtues if well;

6.16.3CSEL 19:540

deinde monstrandum, non ipsos adfectus, sed eorum causas esse moderandas. non est inquiunt nimia laetitia gestiendum, sed modice ac temperate. hoc uero tale est, quale si dicerent non esse currendum concitate, sed gradiendum quiete. at potest et qui graditur errare et qui currit rectam uiam tenere.

then it should have been shown that not the passions themselves but their causes must be governed. "One must not exult," they say, "with excessive joy, but moderately and temperately." This is as if they said one must not run fast but walk quietly. But one who walks can go astray, and one who runs can keep to the right road.

6.16.4CSEL 19:540

quid? si ostendo esse aliquid ubi non tantum modicum, sed uel punctum gaudere uitiosum sit, et aliut contra in quo uel exultare laetitia minime criminosum, quid tandem nobis ista mediocritas proderit?

What if I show that there is a case where rejoicing not only moderately but even for an instant is vicious, and another, on the contrary, in which even to leap with joy is not at all blameworthy? What good will that moderation do us then?

6.16.5CSEL 19:540

quaero utrumne sapienti laetandum putent, si quid inimico suo mali uideat accidere, aut utrumne laetitiam frenare debeat, si uictis hostibus aut obpresso tyranno libertas et salus ciuibus parta sit.

I ask whether they think the wise man should rejoice if he sees some evil befall his enemy, or whether he ought to curb his joy if, with enemies conquered or a tyrant overthrown, liberty and safety have been won for the citizens.

6.16.6CSEL 19:540

nemo dubitat quin et in illo exiguum laetari et in hoc parum laetari sit maximum crimen. eadem de ceteris adfectibus licet dicere.

No one doubts that in the first case to rejoice a little, and in the second to rejoice too little, is a very great fault. The same can be said of the other passions.

6.16.7CSEL 19:540–541

sed, ut dixi, non in his moderandis sapientiae ratio uersatur, sed in causis eorum, quoniam extrinsecus commouentur, nec ipsis potissimum frenos inponi oportuit, quoniam et exigui possunt esse in maximo crimine, et maximi possunt esse sine crimine, sed adsignandi fuerunt certis temporibus et rebus et locis, ne uitia sint quibus uti recte licet.

But, as I said, the principle of wisdom lies not in moderating these but in their causes, since they are stirred from outside; nor should reins be put chiefly on them, since even small ones can be a very great fault and very great ones can be without fault; but they should have been assigned to definite times, matters, and places, so that the things we may rightly use do not become vices.

6.16.8CSEL 19:541

sicut enim recte ambulare bonum est, errare autem malum, sic moueri adfectibus in rectum bonum est, in prauum, malum.

For just as walking rightly is good and going astray is bad, so being moved by the passions toward what is right is good, and toward what is wrong is bad.

6.16.9CSEL 19:541

nam libido si extra legitimum torum non euagetur, licet sit uehemens, tamen culpa caret, sin uero adpetit alienum, licet sit mediocris, uitium tamen maximum est.

For lust, if it does not wander outside the lawful marriage bed, is without fault even if it is strong; but if it seeks another's, even if moderate, it is still a very great vice.

6.16.10CSEL 19:541

non est itaque morbus irasci nec cupere nec libidine commoueri, sed iracundum esse morbus est, cupidum, libidinosum. qui enim iracundus est, etiam cui non debet aut cum non oportet irascitur, qui cupidus, etiam quod non opus est concupiscit, qui libidinosus, etiam quod legibus uetatur adfectat.

So it is not a disease to be angry, to desire, or to be moved by lust; but it is a disease to be irascible, covetous, lustful. For the irascible person is angry even with one he should not be and when he should not; the covetous desires even what is not needed; the lustful seeks even what the laws forbid.

6.16.11CSEL 19:541

omnis igitur ratio in eo uersari debuit, ut quoniam earum rerum inpetus inhiberi nec potest nec debet, quia necessario est insitus ad tuenda officia uitae, derigeretur potius in uiam rectam, ubi etiam cursus offensione ac periculo careat.

So the whole principle should have been this: since the impulse of these things neither can nor should be checked, because it is necessarily implanted for guarding the duties of life, it should rather be directed onto the right road, where even running would be free of stumbling and danger.

Divine 6, chapter 17

6.17.1CSEL 19:541

Sed euectus sum coarguendi studio longius, cum sit mihi propositum ostendere ea quae uitia philosophi putauerunt non tantum uitia non esse, uerum etiam magnas esse uirtutes. ex his iis docendi gratia sumam quae pertinere ad rem maxime puto.

But I have been carried too far by zeal for refutation, since my aim is to show that what the philosophers thought vices are not only not vices but even great virtues. From these I will take, for the sake of teaching, those I think most relevant.

6.17.2CSEL 19:541–542

metum seu timorem in maximo uitio ponunt summamque inbecillitatem esse animi putant, cui sit contraria fortitudo; quae si sit in homine, locum timori esse nullum.

They place dread or fear among the greatest vices and think it the utmost weakness of the soul, whose opposite is courage; and if this is in a man, there is no room for fear.

6.17.3CSEL 19:542

creditne ergo aliquis fieri posse ut idem metus summa sit fortitudo? minime. neque enim uidetur capere natura ut aliquid in contrarium reccidat.

Would anyone believe, then, that the same fear can be the highest courage? Not at all; for nature does not seem to allow something to turn back into its opposite.

6.17.4CSEL 19:542

atquin ego non arguta aliqua conclusione, ut aput Platonem Socrates facit, qui eos quos contra disputat cogit ea quae negauerant confiteri, sed simpliciter ostendam summum metum summam esse uirtutem.

And yet, not by some clever syllogism, as Socrates does in Plato, forcing those he argues against to admit what they had denied, but simply, I will show that the greatest fear is the greatest virtue.

6.17.5CSEL 19:542

nemo dubitat quin timidi et inbecilli sit animi aut dolorem metuere aut egestatem aut exilium aut carcerem aut mortem: quae omnia quisquis non exhorruerit, fortissimus iudicatur. qui autem deum metuit, illa uniuersa non metuit.

No one doubts that it is the mark of a timid and weak soul to fear pain, want, exile, prison, or death; and whoever has not shuddered at all these is judged most brave. But whoever fears God fears none of these.

6.17.6CSEL 19:542

ad quod probandum argumentis opus non est: spectatae sunt enim semper spectanturque adhuc per orbem poenae cultorum dei, in quibus excruciandis noua et inusitata tormenta excogitata sunt.

No arguments are needed to prove this: the punishments of the worshippers of God have always been seen and are still seen throughout the world, in whose torture new and unheard-of torments have been devised.

6.17.7CSEL 19:542

nam de mortis generibus horret animus recordari, cum inmanium bestiarum ultra ipsam mortem carnificina saeuierit. has tamen exsecrabiles corporum lacerationes felix atque inuicta patientia sine ullo gemitu pertulit.

For the mind shudders to recall the kinds of death, when a butchery worse than that of savage beasts has raged beyond death itself. Yet a happy and unconquered patience has endured these accursed mutilations of bodies without a groan.

6.17.8CSEL 19:542

haec uirtus omnibus populis atque prouinciis et ipsis tortoribus miraculum maximum praebuit, cum patientia crudelitas uinceretur.

This virtue has offered the greatest wonder to all peoples and provinces and to the torturers themselves, when cruelty was conquered by patience.

6.17.9CSEL 19:542–543

atquin hanc uirtutem nihil aliut quam metus dei fecit. itaque, ut dicebam, non euellendus, ut Stoici, neque temperandus timor, ut Peripatetici uolunt, sed in ueram uiam dirigendus est auferendique sunt metus, sed ita ut hic solus relinquatur: qui quoniam legitimus ac uerus est, solus efficit ut possint cetera omnia non timeri.

And yet nothing else produced this virtue but the fear of God. So, as I was saying, fear should neither be torn out, as the Stoics wish, nor tempered, as the Peripatetics wish, but directed onto the true road; and fears must be removed, but in such a way that this one alone remains, which, since it is lawful and true, alone makes it possible for all the others not to be feared.

6.17.10CSEL 19:543

cupiditas quoque inter uitia numeratur: sed si haec quae terrena sunt concupiscat, uitium est, uirtus autem, si caelestia. qui enim iustitiam, qui deum, qui uitam perpetuam, qui lucem sempiternam eaque omnia quae deus homini pollicetur consequi cupit, opes istas et honores et potentatus et regna ipsa contemnet.

Desire too is counted among the vices; but if it desires these earthly things, it is a vice, while if heavenly ones, a virtue. For whoever desires to attain justice, God, perpetual life, everlasting light, and all that God promises man will despise wealth, honors, powers, and kingdoms themselves.

6.17.11CSEL 19:543

dicet fortasse Stoicus uoluntate opus esse ad haec consequenda, non cupiditate. immo uero parum est uelle. multi enim uolunt, sed cum dolor uisceribus accesserit, uoluntas cedit, cupiditas perseuerat: quae si efficit ut contemptui sint omnia quae a ceteris adpetuntur, summa uirtus est, siquidem continentiae mater est.

The Stoic will perhaps say that to attain these one needs will, not desire. On the contrary, willing is too little. For many will, but when pain reaches the inward parts, will gives way, desire persists; and if desire makes everything others seek contemptible, it is the highest virtue, since it is the mother of self-control.

6.17.12CSEL 19:543

ideoque illut potius efficere debemus, ut adfectus, quibus praue uti uitium est, derigamus in rectum.

So we should rather bring it about that we direct rightly the passions, whose bad use is vice.

6.17.13CSEL 19:543

nam istae concitationes animorum iuncto currui similes sunt, in quo recte moderando summum rectoris officium est ut uiam nouerit: quam si tenebit, quamlibet concitate ierit, non offendet, si autem aberrauerit, licet placide ac leniter eat, aut per confragosa uexabitur aut per praecipitia labetur aut certe quo non est opus deferetur.

For these agitations of the mind are like a yoked chariot, in the right steering of which the chief duty of the driver is to know the road; if he keeps to it, however fast he goes, he will not come to harm; but if he strays from it, though he goes calmly and gently, he will be jolted over rough ground, or slide over precipices, or at least be carried where he need not go.

6.17.14CSEL 19:543–544

sic currus ille uitae, qui adfectibus uelut equis pernicibus ducitur, si uiam rectam teneat, fungetur officio. metus igitur et cupiditas si proiciantur in terram, uitia fient, uirtutes autem, si ad diuina referantur.

So that chariot of life, drawn by the passions as by swift horses, will perform its duty if it keeps the right road. Fear and desire, then, if they are cast down to the earth, will become vices, but virtues if they are directed to divine things.

6.17.15CSEL 19:544

parsimoniam contra uirtutis loco habent: quae si studium est habendi, non potest esse uirtus, quia in augendis uel tuendis terrestribus bonis tota uersatur. nos autem summum bonum non referimus ad corpus, sed omne officium solius animae conseruatione metimur.

On the other hand, they count thrift as a virtue; but if it is zeal for possessing, it cannot be a virtue, because it is wholly occupied in increasing or guarding earthly goods. But we do not refer the highest good to the body; we measure every duty by the preservation of the soul alone.

6.17.16CSEL 19:544

quodsi, ut supra docui, patrimonio minime parcendum est, ut humanitatem iustitiamque teneamus, non est uirtus frugi esse: quod nomen specie uirtutis fallit ac decipit.

But if, as I taught above, one's inheritance should by no means be spared in order to keep humanity and justice, it is not a virtue to be thrifty; the name deceives and misleads by the appearance of virtue.

6.17.17CSEL 19:544

est enim frugalitas abstinentia quidem uoluptatum, sed eo uitium, quia ex habendi amore descendit, cum sit et uoluptatibus abstinendum et pecuniae minime temperandum. nam parce id est mediocriter uti pecunia quasi quaedam pusillitas animi est aut praetimentis ne sibi desit aut desperantis posse se illam reparare aut contemptum terrestrium non capientis.

For frugality is indeed abstinence from pleasures, but it is a vice in that it comes from love of possessing, whereas one should both abstain from pleasures and by no means be sparing of money. For to use money sparingly, that is, moderately, is a kind of smallness of soul, either of one who fears beforehand that he will lack, or of one who despairs of being able to replace it, or of one incapable of despising earthly things.

6.17.18CSEL 19:544

sed illi rursus eum qui rei familiari suae non parcat prodigum uocant. nam ita liberalem distinguunt a prodigo, quod is liberalis sit qui et bene meritis et cum oportet et quantum satis est largiatur, prodigus uero, qui et non meritis et cum opus non est et sine respectu rei familiaris effundat.

But they, on the other hand, call the one who does not spare his property prodigal. For they distinguish the generous from the prodigal thus: the generous man gives to the deserving, when it is fitting, and as much as is enough; the prodigal pours out to the undeserving, when there is no need, and without regard for his property.

6.17.19CSEL 19:544–545

quid ergo? prodigumne dicemus eum qui misericordiae causa tribuat egentibus uictum? atquin multum refert utrumne scortis propter libidinem largiare an miseris propter humanitatem, utrum pecuniam tuam perductores aleatores lenonesque diripiant an illam pietati ac deo praestes, utrumne illam uentri et gulae ingeras an in thesauro iustitiae reponas.

What then? Shall we call prodigal the one who gives food to the needy out of mercy? Yet it makes a great difference whether you give to prostitutes for lust or to the wretched for humanity; whether procurers, gamblers, and pimps plunder your money or you give it to piety and God; whether you stuff it into belly and gullet or store it in the treasury of justice.

6.17.20CSEL 19:545

ut ergo uitium est effundere in malam partem, sic in bonam uirtus. si uirtus est non parcere opibus quae possunt reparari, ut hominis uitam sustentes quae reparari non potest, uitium igitur parsimonia est. quare nihil aliut dixerim quam insanos qui hominem, mite ac sociale animal, orbant suo nomine,

So as it is a vice to pour money out in a bad direction, so it is a virtue in a good one. If it is a virtue not to spare wealth, which can be replaced, in order to sustain a human life, which cannot be replaced, then thrift is a vice. So I would call them nothing but mad, who rob man, a gentle and social animal, of his name,

6.17.21CSEL 19:545

qui euulsis adfectibus quibus omnis constat humanitas, ad immobilem stuporem mentis perducere uolunt, dum student animum perturbationibus liberare et, ut ipsi dicunt, quietum tranquillumque reddere.

who, having torn out the passions in which all humanity consists, want to bring him to an immovable numbness of mind, while they strive to free the soul from disturbances and, as they themselves say, make it quiet and tranquil.

6.17.22CSEL 19:545

quod fieri non tantum non potest, quia uis et ratio eius in motu est, sed ne oportet quidem, quia sicut aqua semper iacens et quieta insalubris et magis turbida est, sic animus inmotus ac torpens inutilis est etiam sibi, nec uitam ipsam tueri poterit, quia nec faciet quicquam nec cogitabit, cum cogitatio ipsa nihil aliut sit quam mentis agitatio.

This not only cannot be done, because the soul's force and nature lie in motion, but it ought not to be either. For just as water always lying still is unhealthy and more muddy, so a mind unmoved and torpid is useless even to itself, nor will it be able to preserve life itself, since it will neither do nor think anything, for thought itself is nothing other than the mind's activity.

6.17.23CSEL 19:545

denique qui hanc immobilitatem animi adserunt, priuare animum uita uolunt, quia uita actuosa est, mors quieta.

In short, those who assert this immobility of the soul want to deprive the soul of life, since life is active and death is quiet.

6.17.24CSEL 19:545

quaedam etiam recte pro uirtutibus habent, sed earum modum non tenent. uirtus est constantia, non ut inferentibus iniuriam resistamus — his enim cedendum est; quod cur fieri debeat mox docebo —, sed ut iubentibus facere nos contra legem dei contraque iustitiam nullis minis aut suppliciis terreamur, quominus dei iussionem iussioni hominis praeferamus.

Some things too they rightly count as virtues, but do not keep their measure. Constancy is a virtue, not so that we resist those who do us wrong (for we must yield to them, and why this should be done I will show shortly), but so that when people order us to act against the law of God and against justice, we are deterred by no threats or punishments from preferring God's command to man's.

6.17.25CSEL 19:545–546

item uirtus est mortem contemnere, non ut adpetamus eamque nobis ultro inferamus, sicut philosophorum plurimi et maximi saepe fecerunt, quod est sceleratum ac nefarium, sed ut coacti deum relinquere ac fidem prodere mortem suscipere malimus libertatemque defendamus aduersus inpotentium stultam uecordemque uiolentiam et omnes saeculi minas atque terrores fortitudine animi prouocemus.

Likewise it is a virtue to despise death, not so that we seek it and inflict it on ourselves of our own accord, as many and very great philosophers have often done, which is wicked and abominable, but so that when forced to abandon God and betray our faith, we choose to undergo death, defend our liberty against the foolish and senseless violence of the uncontrolled, and challenge all the threats and terrors of the world with fortitude of soul.

6.17.26CSEL 19:546

sic ea quae alii timent, excelsa et insuperabili mente dolorem mortemque calcabimus. haec est uirtus, haec uera constantia, in hoc tuenda et conseruanda solo, ut nullus nos terror, nulla uis a deo possit auertere.

So with a lofty and invincible mind we will trample on what others fear, pain and death. This is virtue, this is true constancy, to be guarded and kept in this alone: that no terror and no force can turn us away from God.

6.17.27CSEL 19:546

uera igitur Ciceronis illa sententia est: nemo inquit iustus potest esse qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet;

So that saying of Cicero is true: "No one," he says, "can be just who fears death, pain, exile, or want";

6.17.28CSEL 19:546

item Senecae in libris moralis philosophiae dicentis: hic est ille homo honestus, non apice purpuraue, non lictorum insignis ministerio, sed nulla re minor, qui cum mortem in uicinia uidit, non sic perturbatur tamquam rem nouam uiderit, qui siue toto corpore tormenta patienda sunt siue flamma ore rapienda est siue extendendae per patibulum manus, non quaerit quid patiatur, sed quam bene.

likewise that of Seneca, who says in his books of moral philosophy: "This is that honorable man, not distinguished by the priest's cap or purple or the attendance of lictors, but inferior in nothing, who, when he sees death near, is not disturbed as if he saw something new; who, whether tortures must be suffered with the whole body, or flame must be taken into the mouth, or the hands must be stretched out on the gibbet, asks not what he suffers but how well."

6.17.29CSEL 19:546–547

qui autem deum colit, haec patitur nec timet: ergo iustus est. his rebus efficitur ut neque uirtutes neque uirtutum exactissimos limites nosse aut tenere possit omnino quisquis est a religione dei singularis alienus.

But the one who worships God suffers these things and does not fear; therefore he is just. From these things it follows that whoever is a stranger to the religion of the one God can neither know nor hold at all either the virtues or their most exact limits.

Divine 6, chapter 18

6.18.1CSEL 19:547

Sed omittamus philosophos, qui aut nihil omnino sciunt idque ipsum pro summa scientia praeferunt aut qui non perspiciunt etiam quae sciunt aut qui quoniam se putant scire quae nesciunt, inepte adroganterque desipiunt.

But let us leave the philosophers, who either know nothing at all and present this very fact as the highest knowledge, or do not see through even what they know, or, because they think they know what they do not, are foolish in a silly and arrogant way.

6.18.2CSEL 19:547

nos ergo, ut ad propositum reuertamur, quibus solis a deo ueritas reuelata et caelitus missa sapientia est, faciamus quae iubet inluminator noster deus. sustineamus inuicem et labores huius uitae mutuis adiumentis perferamus nec tamen, si quid boni operis fecerimus, gloriam captemus ex eo.

So let us, to return to our purpose, to whom alone truth has been revealed by God and wisdom sent from heaven, do what God our enlightener commands. Let us bear with one another and endure the labors of this life with mutual help; yet if we have done any good work, let us not seek glory from it.

6.18.3CSEL 19:547

monet enim deus operatorem iustitiae non oportere esse iactantem, ne non tam mandatis caelestibus obsequendi quam studio placendi humanitatis officio functus esse uideatur habeatque iam pretium gloriae, quod captauit, nec praemium caelestis illius ac diuinae mercedis accipiat.

For God warns that the one who does justice must not boast, lest he seem to have performed the duty of humanity not so much to obey the heavenly commands as from a desire to please, and so already have the price of glory he sought and not receive the reward of that heavenly and divine payment.

6.18.4CSEL 19:547

cetera quae obseruare cultor dei debet facilia sunt illis uirtutibus conprehensis. non mentiatur umquam decipiendi aut nocendi causa.

The other things the worshipper of God must observe are easy once those virtues are grasped. Let him never lie for the sake of deceiving or harming.

6.18.5CSEL 19:547

est enim nefas eum qui ueritati studeat in aliqua re esse fallacem atque ab ipsa quam sequitur ueritate discedere: in hac iustitiae uirtutumque omnium uia nullus mendacio locus est.

For it is wrong for one devoted to truth to be deceitful in anything and to depart from the very truth he follows. On this way of justice and all the virtues there is no place for a lie.

6.18.6CSEL 19:547

itaque uiator ille uerus ac iustus non dicet illud Lucilianum: homini amico et familiari non est mentiri meum, sed etiam inimico atque ignoto existimabit non esse mentiri suum nec aliquando committet ut lingua interpres animi a sensu et cogitatione discordet.

So that true and just traveler will not say the line of Lucilius, "To lie to a man who is a friend and intimate is not my way," but will think it not his way to lie even to an enemy and a stranger, and will never allow his tongue, the interpreter of the mind, to disagree with his feeling and thought.

6.18.7CSEL 19:547–548

pecuniam si quam crediderit, non accipiat usuram, ut et beneficium sit incolume quod succurrit necessitati et abstineat se prorsus alieno.

If he lends any money, let him not take interest, so that the benefit which relieves need may remain intact; and let him keep entirely from what belongs to another.

6.18.8CSEL 19:548

in hoc enim genere officii debet suo esse contentus, quem oporteat alias ne proprio quidem parcere, ut bonum faciat: plus autem accipere quam dederit iniustum est. quod qui facit, insidiatur quodammodo, ut ei alterius necessitate praedetur.

For in this kind of duty he should be content with his own, since at other times he ought not to spare even his own in order to do good; and to receive more than one gave is unjust. Whoever does this lays a kind of ambush, so as to prey on another's need.

6.18.9CSEL 19:548

at iustus numquam praetermittet quominus aliquid misericorditer faciat, nec inquinabit se huiusmodi quaestu, sed efficiet ut sine ullo suo damno id ipsum quod commodat inter bona opera numeretur.

But the just man will never pass up doing something mercifully, nor will he defile himself with such gain, but will see to it that, without any loss to himself, the very thing he lends is counted among good works.

6.18.10CSEL 19:548

munus non accipiat a paupere, ut si quid ipse praestiterit, eo bonum sit, quod fuerit gratuitum. maledicenti benedicto respondeat, numquam ipse maledicat, ne uerbum malum procedat ex ore hominis qui colit uerbum bonum.

Let him not accept a gift from a poor man, so that whatever he himself has given may be good because it was free. Let him answer cursing with blessing and never curse himself, so that no evil word may come from the mouth of a man who worships the good Word.

6.18.11CSEL 19:548

quin etiam caueat diligenter ne quando inimicum sua culpa faciat, et si quis extiterit tam proteruus, qui bono et iusto faciat iniuriam, clementer ac moderate ferat et ultionem suam non sibi adsumat, sed iudicio dei reseruet.

Indeed, let him take great care never to make an enemy by his own fault; and if anyone is so insolent as to wrong a good and just man, let him bear it mildly and moderately, and not take vengeance for himself but reserve it for the judgment of God.

6.18.12CSEL 19:548–549

innocentiam semper et ubique custodiat. quod praeceptum non ad hoc tantum ualet, ut ipse iniuriam non inferat, sed ut inlatam sibi non uindicet. sedet enim maximus et aequissimus iudex, speculator ac testis omnium. hunc homini praeferat, hunc malit de causa sua pronuntiare, cuius sententiam nemo effugere potest nec defensione cuiusquam nec gratia.

Let him guard innocence always and everywhere. This precept applies not only to not inflicting injury himself, but to not avenging injury inflicted on him. For the greatest and most just Judge sits, the observer and witness of all. Let him prefer this Judge to man; let him rather have Him pronounce on his case, whose sentence no one can escape by anyone's defense or favor.

6.18.13CSEL 19:549

ita fit ut homo iustus contemptui sit omnibus, et quia putabitur se ipsum non posse defendere, habebitur pro segni et inerte. qui autem fuerit ultus inimicum, hic fortis, hic strenuus iudicatur, hunc omnes uerentur, hunc colunt.

So it happens that the just man is despised by all, and because he will be thought unable to defend himself, he will be held lazy and sluggish. But the one who has taken revenge on his enemy is judged brave and energetic; all respect him, all honor him.

6.18.14CSEL 19:549

bonus uero ille tametsi prodesse pluribus possit, illum tamen suspiciunt qui nocere quam qui prodesse possit. sed iustum prauitas hominum deprauare non poterit, quominus deo studeat obtemperare malitque contemni, dummodo semper boni fungatur officio, mali numquam.

And though the good man could benefit more people, they look up to the one who can harm rather than the one who can help. But the depravity of men cannot deprave the just man from striving to obey God; he prefers to be despised, provided he always does the duty of a good man and never of a bad one.

6.18.15CSEL 19:549

Cicero in isdem illis officialibus at uero si quis uoluerit inquit animi sui conplicatam notionem euoluere, iam se ipse doceat eum uirum bonum esse qui prosit quibus possit, noceat nemini, nisi lacessitus iniuria.

Cicero, in those same books On Duties, says: "But if anyone wishes to unfold the folded-up notion in his mind, he will at once teach himself that the good man is one who benefits whom he can and harms no one, unless provoked by injury."

6.18.16CSEL 19:549

o quam simplicem ueramque sententiam duorum uerborum adiectione corrupit! quid enim opus fuerat adiungere nisi lacessitus iniuria, ut uitium bono uiro quasi caudam turpissimam adponeret patientiaeque, quae omnium uirtutum maxima est, faceret expertem?

O how he spoiled a simple and true statement by adding two words! For what need was there to add "unless provoked by injury," so as to attach a vice to the good man like a most shameful tail and make him devoid of patience, which is the greatest of all virtues?

6.18.17CSEL 19:549–550

nociturum esse dixit bonum uirum, si fuerit lacessitus: iam ex hoc ipso boni uiri nomen amittat necesse est, si nocebit. non minus enim mali est referre iniuriam quam inferre.

He said the good man will harm if provoked; by this very fact he must lose the name of good man, if he harms. For it is no less evil to return an injury than to inflict one.

6.18.18CSEL 19:550

nam unde certamina inter homines, unde pugnae contentionesque nascuntur, nisi quod inprobitati opposita inpatientia magnas saepe concitat tempestates?

For where do contests among people, where do fights and quarrels arise from, except that impatience set against wickedness often stirs up great storms?

6.18.19CSEL 19:550

quodsi patientiam, qua uirtute nihil uerius, nihil homine dignius inueniri potest, inprobitati opposueris, extinguetur protinus, tamquam igni aquam superfuderis. sin autem prouocatrix illa inprobitas inpatientiam sibi comparem nacta est, tamquam perfusa oleo tantum excitabit incendium, ut id non flumen aliquod, sed effusio cruoris extinguat.

But if you set patience, than which no virtue truer or more worthy of man can be found, against wickedness, it will be put out at once, as if you poured water on fire. But if that provoking wickedness has found impatience its equal, it will stir up such a fire, as if drenched with oil, that no river but only the shedding of blood can put it out.

6.18.20CSEL 19:550

magna itaque patientiae ratio est, quam sapiens homo ademit bono uiro. ut enim nihil malorum fiat, haec sola efficit: quae si detur omnibus, nullum scelus, nulla fraus in rebus humanis erit.

So great is the principle of patience, which the wise man took away from the good man. For it alone brings it about that no evils are done; if it were given to all, there would be no crime and no fraud in human affairs.

6.18.21CSEL 19:550

quid igitur bono uiro potest esse tam calamitosum tamque contrarium quam irae frena permittere, quae illum non modo boni, sed etiam hominis appellatione despoliet, siquidem nocere alteri, ut ipse uerissime ait, non est secundum hominis naturam? nam

What then can be so ruinous and so contrary to a good man as to give free rein to anger, which strips him not only of the name of good man but even of man, since harming another, as he himself says most truly, is not in keeping with human nature? For

6.18.22CSEL 19:550

et pecudes si lacessas, aut calce aut cornu repugnant, et serpentes ac ferae, nisi persequare ut occidas, negotium non exhibent, et ut ad hominum exempla redeamus, inperiti quoque et insipientes si quando accipiunt iniuriam, caeco et inrationabili furore ducuntur et iis qui sibi nocent, uicem retribuere conantur.

even cattle, if you provoke them, fight back with hoof or horn; and snakes and wild beasts give no trouble unless you pursue them to kill them; and, to return to human examples, even the ignorant and foolish, when they receive an injury, are carried away by a blind and irrational fury and try to pay back those who harm them.

6.18.23CSEL 19:550–551

in quo igitur sapiens ac bonus uir a malis et insipientibus differt, nisi quod habet inuictam patientiam, qua stulti carent, nisi quod regere se ac mitigare iram suam nouit, quam illi quia uirtute indigent, frenare non possunt?

In what, then, does the wise and good man differ from the wicked and foolish, except that he has an unconquered patience, which fools lack, and knows how to govern himself and calm his anger, which they, lacking virtue, cannot rein in?

6.18.24CSEL 19:551

sed uidelicet haec illum res fefellit, quod cum de uirtute loqueretur, in quacumque contentione uincere putauit esse uirtutis nec uidere ullo modo potuit hominem dolori et irae succumbentem et iis adfectibus indulgentem quibus debet potius reluctari, et ruentem quacumque inprobitas prouocarit, uirtutis officium non tenere.

But evidently this deceived him: when he spoke of virtue, he thought it virtue to win in any contest; and he could in no way see that a man who gives in to pain and anger, indulges those passions he ought rather to resist, and rushes wherever wickedness provokes him, does not hold to the duty of virtue.

6.18.25CSEL 19:551

qui enim referre iniuriam nititur, eum ipsum a quo laesus est gestit imitari. ita qui malum imitatur, bonus esse nullo pacto potest.

For whoever strives to return an injury is eager to imitate the very person by whom he was hurt. So one who imitates a bad man can by no means be good.

6.18.26CSEL 19:551

duobus igitur uerbis duas uirtutes maximas bono et sapienti uiro, innocentiam patientiamque, detraxit. sed quia ipse caninam illam facundiam, sicut Sallustius ab Appio dictum refert, exercuit, uoluit hominem canino modo uiuere, ut remordeat lacessitus.

So with two words he took from the good and wise man two very great virtues, innocence and patience. But because he himself practiced that "canine eloquence," as Sallust reports Appius called it, he wanted man to live in a dog's way, biting back when provoked.

6.18.27CSEL 19:551

quae retributio contumeliae quam perniciosa sit et quas edere soleat strages, unde oportunius petetur exemplum quam ex ipsius praeceptoris tristissimo casu, qui dum his philosophorum praeceptis obtemperare gestit, ipse se perdidit?

How ruinous such returning of insults is, and what slaughter it usually produces, where could an example be sought more fittingly than from the most tragic fate of the teacher himself, who, eager to obey these precepts of the philosophers, destroyed himself?

6.18.28CSEL 19:551–552

quodsi lacessitus iniuria patientiam tenuisset, si dissimulare, si ferre contumeliam boni uiri esse didicisset nec illas nobiles orationes alieno titulo inscriptas inpatientia et leuitas et insania profudisset, numquam capite suo rostra, in quibus ante floruerat, cruentasset nec rem publicam funditus proscriptio illa delesset.

But if, when provoked by injury, he had kept patience, if he had learned that it is the part of a good man to overlook and bear an insult, and if impatience, levity, and madness had not poured out those famous speeches inscribed with another's title, he would never have stained with his own head the rostra where he had once flourished, nor would that proscription have utterly destroyed the commonwealth.

6.18.29CSEL 19:552

sapientis ergo ac boni uiri non est uelle certare ac se periculo committere, quoniam et uincere non est in nostra potestate et est anceps omne certamen, sed est sapientis atque optimi uiri non aduersarium uelle tollere, quod fieri sine scelere ac periculo non potest, sed certamen ipsum, quod fieri et utiliter et iuste potest.

So it is not the part of a wise and good man to want to fight and put himself in danger, since victory is not in our power and every contest is uncertain; but it is the part of a wise and excellent man to want to remove not the adversary, which cannot be done without crime and danger, but the contest itself, which can be done both usefully and justly.

6.18.30CSEL 19:552

summa igitur uirtus habenda patientia est, quam ut caperet homo iustus, uoluit illum deus, ut supra dictum est, pro inerte contemni. nisi enim contumeliis fuerit adfectus, quantum habeat fortitudinis in se ipso cohibendo ignorabitur.

So patience must be held the highest virtue; and so that the just man might have it, God willed, as was said above, that he be despised as sluggish. For unless he has been subjected to insults, how much strength he has in restraining himself will not be known.

6.18.31CSEL 19:552

si autem lacessitus iniuria laedentem persequi coeperit, uictus est: qui uero motum illum ratione conpresserit, hic plane imperat sibi, hic regere se potest.

But if, provoked by injury, he begins to pursue the one who hurt him, he is conquered; whereas the one who has checked that impulse with reason truly commands himself, he can govern himself.

6.18.32CSEL 19:552

quae sustentatio sui recte patientia nominatur, quae una uirtus omnibus est opposita uitiis et adfectibus. haec perturbatum ac fluctuantem animum ad tranquillitatem suam reuocat, haec mitigat, haec hominem sibi reddit.

This self-restraint is rightly called patience, the one virtue opposed to all vices and passions. It calls the disturbed and wavering mind back to its own tranquillity; it calms; it restores a man to himself.

6.18.33CSEL 19:552–553

ergo quoniam naturae repugnare inpossibile est et inutile, ut non commoueamur omnino, prius tamen quam commotio illa prosiliat ad nocendum, quod fieri potest maturius, sopiatur. praecipit deus non occidere solem super iram nostram, ne furoris nostri testis abscedat.

So since it is impossible and useless to fight nature so as not to be moved at all, yet before that agitation leaps out to harm, let it be put to sleep as soon as possible. God commands that the sun not go down on our anger, lest it depart as a witness of our fury.

6.18.34CSEL 19:553

denique Marcus Tullius contra suum praeceptum, de quo paulo ante dixi, obliuionem iniuriarum in magnis laudibus posuit. spero te inquit Caesari, qui obliuisci nihil soles nisi iniurias —.

Finally, Marcus Tullius, against his own precept of which I spoke a little before, placed forgetting of injuries among the highest praises. "I hope," he says, "Caesar, you who are accustomed to forget nothing but injuries…"

6.18.35CSEL 19:553

quodsi hoc ille faciebat, homo non a caelesti tantum, sed a publica quoque ciuilique iustitia remotissimus, quanto magis id nos facere debemus qui immortalitatis uelut candidati sumus?

If he did this, a man very far removed not only from heavenly justice but also from public and civil justice, how much more ought we to do it, who are, as it were, candidates for immortality?

Divine 6, chapter 19

6.19.1CSEL 19:553

Stoici cum adfectus ex homine tamquam morbos conantur euellere, Peripatetici se opponunt eosque non modo retinent, sed etiam defendunt nihilque in homine esse dicunt quod non magna ratione ac prouidentia sit innatum. recte id quidem, si singularum rerum ueros terminos scirent.

While the Stoics try to tear the passions out of man as diseases, the Peripatetics oppose them and not only keep them but also defend them, saying that nothing in man is innate that is not there by great reason and providence. That is right indeed, if they knew the true limits of each thing.

6.19.2CSEL 19:553

itaque hanc ipsam iram cotem dicunt esse uirtutis, tamquam nemo possit aduersus hostem fortiter dimicare, nisi fuerit ira concitatus.

So they say that anger itself is the whetstone of virtue, as if no one could fight bravely against an enemy unless stirred by anger.

6.19.3CSEL 19:553

quo plane ostendunt nec quid sit uirtus scire se nec cur homini tribuerit iram deus. quae si nobis ideo data est, ut ea utamur ad occidendos homines, quid inmanius homine, quid similius feris beluis existimandum est quam id animal quod ad communionem atque innocentiam deus fecit?

By this they plainly show that they know neither what virtue is nor why God gave man anger. If it was given to us so that we might use it to kill people, what should be thought more monstrous than man, more like savage beasts, than that animal which God made for fellowship and innocence?

6.19.4CSEL 19:553–554

tres sunt igitur adfectus qui homines in omnia facinora praecipites agant, ira cupiditas libido. propterea poetae tres Furias esse dixerunt, quae mentes hominum exagitent: ira ultionem desiderat, cupiditas opes, libido uoluptates.

There are three passions, then, that drive people headlong into every crime: anger, greed, and lust. That is why the poets said there are three Furies that torment human minds: anger desires vengeance, greed wealth, lust pleasures.

6.19.5CSEL 19:554

sed his omnibus deus certos limites statuit: quos si transcenderint maioresque esse coeperint, necesse est naturam suam deprauent et in morbos ac uitia uertantur. qui autem sint isti limites, non est magni laboris ostendere.

But God set definite limits to all of them; if they overstep these and begin to grow larger, they must corrupt their nature and turn into diseases and vices. What those limits are is not hard to show.

6.19.6CSEL 19:554

cupiditas ad ea conparanda nobis data est quae sunt ad uitam necessaria, libido ad subolem propagandam, irae adfectus ad coercenda peccata eorum qui sunt in nostra potestate, id est ut artiore disciplina minor aetas ad probitatem iustitiamque formetur: quae nisi metu cohibeatur, licentia pariet audaciam, quae ad omne flagitium et facinus euadet.

Desire was given us to obtain what is necessary for life; lust to propagate offspring; the passion of anger to restrain the sins of those in our power, that is, so that the younger may be formed to uprightness and justice by stricter discipline; for unless it is checked by fear, license will breed boldness, which will break out into every outrage and crime.

6.19.7CSEL 19:554

itaque ut ira uti aduersus minores et iustum est et necessarium, sic aduersus pares et perniciosum est et impium: impium, quod uiolatur humanitas, perniciosum, quod illis repugnantibus aut perdere necesse est aut perire.

So just as using anger against those under us is just and necessary, so using it against equals is ruinous and impious: impious, because humanity is violated; ruinous, because when they resist, one must either destroy or perish.

6.19.8CSEL 19:554–555

hanc autem quam dixi esse rationem cur homini sit irae adfectus datus, ex ipsius dei praeceptis intellegi potest, qui iubet uti maledicis et laedentibus non irascamur, manus autem nostras supra minores semper habeamus, hoc est ut peccantes eos adsiduis uerberibus corrigamus, ne amore inutili et indulgentia nimia educentur ad malum et ad uitia nutriantur.

That the reason I have given for why man was given the passion of anger is correct can be understood from the precepts of God himself, who commands us not to be angry with those who curse and hurt us, but always to keep our hand over those under us, that is, to correct them with constant blows when they do wrong, so that they are not brought up to evil by useless love and excessive indulgence and nourished in vices.

6.19.9CSEL 19:555

sed rerum imperiti et rationis ignari eos adfectus qui sunt homini ad usus bonos dati exterminauerunt et latius quam ratio postulat euagantur. inde iniuste atque impie uiuitur. utuntur ira

But people ignorant of reality and devoid of reason have driven those passions, given to man for good uses, out of bounds, and they wander further than reason demands. From this comes unjust and impious living. They use anger

6.19.10CSEL 19:555

contra pares: hinc discidia, hinc expulsiones, hinc bella contra iustitiam nata sunt. utuntur cupiditate ad congerendas opes: hinc fraudes, hinc latrocinia, hinc omnia scelerum genera exorta sunt. utuntur libidine ad capiendas tantum uoluptates: hinc stupra, hinc adulteria, hinc corruptelae omnes extiterunt.

against equals: hence divisions, hence banishments, hence wars have arisen against justice. They use greed to heap up wealth: hence frauds, hence robberies, hence every kind of crime have sprung up. They use lust only to seize pleasures: hence sexual immorality, hence adulteries, hence every corruption has arisen.

6.19.11CSEL 19:555

quicumque igitur illos adfectus intra fines suos redegerit, quod ignorantes deum facere non possunt, hic patiens, hic fortis, hic iustus est.

So whoever has brought those passions back within their limits, which those ignorant of God cannot do, is patient, brave, and just.

Divine 6, chapter 20

6.20.1CSEL 19:555

Restat ut contra quinque sensuum uoluptates dicam breuiter: nam et ipsius libri mensura iam modum flagitat. quae omnes quoniam uitiosae ac mortiferae sunt, uirtute superari atque opprimi debent uel, quod paulo ante dicebam de adfectibus, ad rationem suam reuocari.

It remains for me to speak briefly against the pleasures of the five senses, for the length of this book already demands a limit. Since all of them are vicious and deadly, they must be overcome and suppressed by virtue, or, as I was saying a little earlier about the passions, recalled to their proper purpose.

6.20.2CSEL 19:555–556

ceterae animantes praeter unam uoluptatem, quae ad generandum pertinet, nullam sentiunt. utuntur ergo sensibus ad naturae suae necessitatem: uident, ut adpetant ea quibus opus est ad uitam tuendam; audiunt inuicem seque dinoscunt, ut possint congregari; quae utilia sunt ad uictum aut ex odore inueniunt aut ex sapore percipiunt, inutilia respuunt ac recusant; edendi ac bibendi officium uentris plenitudine metiuntur.

Other living beings feel no pleasure except the one that belongs to reproduction. So they use their senses for the needs of their nature: they see so as to seek what they need to preserve life; they hear one another and recognize each other so that they can flock together; they find what is useful for food by smell or perceive it by taste, and reject and refuse what is useless; they measure eating and drinking by the fullness of the belly.

6.20.3CSEL 19:556

homini uero sollertissimi artificis prouidentia dedit uoluptatem infinitam et in uitium cadentem, quia proposuit ei uirtutem, quae cum uoluptate semper tamquam cum domestico hoste pugnaret.

But to man the providence of the most skillful Maker gave a pleasure that is unlimited and liable to fall into vice, because he set virtue before him, to fight always against pleasure as against an enemy in the house.

6.20.4CSEL 19:556

Cicero in Catone maiore stupra uero inquit et adulteria et omne flagitium nullis excitari aliis inlecebris nisi uoluptatis. cumque homini siue natura siue quis deus nihil mente praestabilius dedisset, huic diuino muneri ac dono nihil tam inimicum quam uoluptatem:

Cicero in his Cato the Elder says: "Acts of sexual immorality, adulteries, and every outrage are stirred up by no other enticements than those of pleasure. And since nature, or some god, has given man nothing more excellent than the mind, nothing is so hostile to this divine gift and present as pleasure;

6.20.5CSEL 19:556

nec enim libidine dominante temperantiae locum esse neque in uoluptatis regno uirtutem posse consistere. sed e contrario deus idcirco uirtutem dedit, ut expugnaret ac uinceret uoluptatem eamque egredientem fines sibi datos intra praescriptum coherceret, ne hominem suauitatibus delenitum atque captum dicioni suae subiceret ac sempiterna morte multaret.

for where lust rules there is no room for self-control, nor can virtue stand in the kingdom of pleasure." But on the contrary, God gave virtue precisely so that it might attack and conquer pleasure and, when pleasure goes beyond the limits given it, restrain it within what is prescribed, lest it subject man, soothed and captured by sweetness, to its rule and punish him with eternal death.

6.20.6CSEL 19:556–557

uoluptas oculorum uaria est et multiplex: quae capitur ex aspectu rerum quae sunt in usu hominum uel natura uel opere delectabiles. hanc philosophi rectissime sustulerunt.

The pleasure of the eyes is varied and manifold: it is taken from the sight of things in human use that are delightful by nature or workmanship. The philosophers very rightly did away with this.

6.20.7CSEL 19:557

aiunt enim multo esse praeclarius et homine dignius caelum potius quam caelata intueri et hoc pulcherrimum opus intermicantibus astrorum luminibus tamquam floribus adornatum quam picta et ficta et gemmis distincta mirari.

For they say it is much more excellent and worthy of man to gaze at the heavens rather than at engravings, and to admire this most beautiful work adorned with the twinkling lights of the stars as with flowers, rather than things painted, sculpted, and studded with gems.

6.20.8CSEL 19:557

sed cum diserte ad contemptum terrestrium nos exhortati sunt et ad caeli spectaculum excitauerunt, tamen spectacula haec publica non contemnunt.

But though they eloquently urged us to despise earthly things and roused us to the spectacle of heaven, they still do not despise these public spectacles.

6.20.9CSEL 19:557

itaque iis et delectantur et libenter intersunt: quae quoniam maxima sunt inritamenta uitiorum et ad corrumpendos animos potentissime ualent, tollenda sunt nobis, quia non modo ad beatam uitam nihil conferunt, sed etiam nocent plurimum.

So they both enjoy them and gladly attend them. But since these are the greatest incitements to vice and most powerful in corrupting minds, we must do away with them, because they not only contribute nothing to the happy life but even do very great harm.

6.20.10CSEL 19:557

nam qui hominem quamuis ob merita damnatum in conspectu suo iugulari pro uoluptate computat, conscientiam suam polluit, tam scilicet quam si homicidii quod fit occulte spectator et particeps fiat.

For whoever counts it a pleasure to see a man, even one justly condemned, have his throat cut in his sight defiles his conscience just as if he became a spectator and partner of a murder committed in secret.

6.20.11CSEL 19:557

hos tamen ludos uocant, in quibus humanus sanguis effunditur. adeo longe ab hominibus secessit humanitas, ut cum animas hominum interficiant, ludere se opinentur, nocentiores iis omnibus quorum sanguinem uoluptati habent.

Yet they call these "games," in which human blood is shed. Humanity has withdrawn so far from human beings that when they destroy human lives, they think they are playing, being more guilty than all those whose blood they take as a pleasure.

6.20.12CSEL 19:557–558

quaero nunc an possint pii et iusti homines esse qui constitutos sub ictu mortis ac misericordiam deprecantes non tantum patiuntur occidi, sed et flagitant feruntque ad mortem crudelia et inhumana suffragia nec uulneribus satiati nec cruore contenti. quin etiam percussos iacentesque repeti iubent et cadauera ictibus dissipari, ne quis illos simulata morte deludat.

I ask now whether those can be pious and just who not only allow men placed under the stroke of death and begging for mercy to be killed, but even demand it and cast cruel and inhuman votes for death, neither sated with wounds nor content with blood. Indeed, they even order the struck and fallen to be attacked again and their corpses hacked apart, so that no one may cheat them by feigning death.

6.20.13CSEL 19:558

irascuntur etiam pugnantibus, nisi celeriter e duobus alter occisus est, et tamquam humanum sanguinem sitiant, oderunt moras. alios illis conpares dari poscunt recentiores, ut quam primum oculos suos satient.

They are even angry with the fighters unless one of the two is quickly killed, and, as if thirsting for human blood, they hate delays. They demand that others be given to them as matched pairs, fresher ones, to sate their eyes as soon as possible.

6.20.14CSEL 19:558

hac consuetudine inbuti humanitatem perdiderunt. itaque non parcunt etiam innocentibus, sed exercent in omnes quod in malorum trucidatione didicerunt.

Steeped in this custom, they have lost their humanity. So they do not spare even the innocent, but practice on all what they learned in the slaughter of the wicked.

6.20.15CSEL 19:558

huius igitur publici homicidii socios et participes esse non conuenit eos qui iustitiae uiam tenere nituntur. non enim cum occidere deus uetat, latrocinari nos tantum prohibet, quod ne per leges quidem publicas licet, sed ea quoque ne fiant monet quae aput homines pro licitis habentur.

So it is not fitting that those who strive to keep the way of justice be partners and sharers in this public homicide. For when God forbids killing, he forbids not only robbery with violence, which is not permitted even by public laws, but warns that we should not do even those things which among men are held lawful.

6.20.16CSEL 19:558

ita neque militare iusto licebit, cuius militia est ipsa iustitia, neque uero accusare quemquam crimine capitali, quia nihil distat utrumne ferro an uerbo potius occidas, quoniam occisio ipsa prohibetur.

So it will not be permitted to the just man to serve as a soldier, since his military service is justice itself, nor to accuse anyone on a capital charge, because it makes no difference whether you kill with the sword or with a word, since killing itself is forbidden.

6.20.17CSEL 19:558

itaque in hoc dei praecepto nullam prorsus exceptionem fieri oportet, quin occidere hominem sit semper nefas, quem deus sacrosanctum animal esse uoluit.

So in this precept of God no exception at all should be made: it is always wrong to kill a human being, whom God willed to be a sacred living being.

6.20.18CSEL 19:558–559

ergo ne illut quidem concedi aliquis existimet, ut recens natos liceat oblidere, quae uel maxima est inpietas: ad uitam enim deus inspirat animas, non ad mortem.

So let no one think that even this is allowed: to strangle newborn children, which is the very greatest impiety; for God breathes souls into them for life, not for death.

6.20.19CSEL 19:559

uerum homines, ne quod sit facinus quo manus suas non polluant, rudibus adhuc et simplicibus animis abnegant lucem non a se datam.

But people, so that there may be no crime with which they do not pollute their hands, deny to souls still raw and simple a light which they themselves did not give.

6.20.20CSEL 19:559

expectet uero aliquis ut alieno sanguini parcant qui non parcunt suo? sed hi sine ulla controuersia scelerati et iniusti: quid illi quos falsa pietas cogit exponere?

Would anyone expect those to spare others' blood who do not spare their own? These, without any dispute, are wicked and unjust. What of those whom a false piety compels to expose their children?

6.20.21CSEL 19:559

num possunt innocentes existimari qui uiscera sua in praedam canibus obiciunt et quantum in ipsis est crudelius necant quam si strangulassent?

Can those be thought innocent who throw their own flesh and blood as prey to dogs and, as far as lies in them, kill it more cruelly than if they had strangled it?

6.20.22CSEL 19:559

quis dubitet quin impius sit qui alienae misericordiae locum tribuit? qui, etiamsi contingat ei quod uoluit, ut alatur, addixit certe sanguinem suum uel ad seruitutem uel ad lupanar.

Who would doubt that he is impious who leaves room for another's mercy? Even if what he wanted happens and the child is raised, he has certainly consigned his own blood either to slavery or to the brothel.

6.20.23CSEL 19:559

quae autem possint uel soleant accidere in utroque sexu per errorem, quis non intellegit, quis ignorat? quod uel unius Oedipodis declarat exemplum duplici scelere confusum. tam igitur nefarium est exponere quam necare.

And who does not understand, who does not know, what can happen, or usually does happen, in either sex through ignorance? The single example of Oedipus shows it, confounded by a double crime. So it is as wicked to expose as to kill.

6.20.24CSEL 19:559

at enim parricidae facultatum angustias conqueruntur nec se pluribus liberis educandis sufficere posse praetendunt: quasi uero aut facultates in potestate sint possidentium aut non cottidie deus et ex diuitibus pauperes et ex pauperibus diuites faciat.

But the parricides complain of their narrow means and plead that they cannot afford to raise more children; as if means were in the power of those who have them, or as if God did not daily make the rich poor and the poor rich.

6.20.25CSEL 19:559

quare si quis liberos ob pauperiem non poterit educare, satius est ut se ab uxoris congressione contineat quam sceleratis manibus dei opera corrumpat.

So if anyone cannot raise children because of poverty, it is better for him to abstain from intercourse with his wife than to spoil the works of God with criminal hands.

6.20.26CSEL 19:559–560

ergo si homicidium facere nullo modo licet, nec interesse omnino conceditur, ne conscientiam perfundat ullus cruor, siquidem populo sanguis ille praestatur.

So if it is in no way lawful to commit homicide, it is not permitted even to be present at all, lest any blood splash the conscience, since that blood is offered to the people as a show.

6.20.27CSEL 19:560

in scaenis quoque nescio an sit corruptela uitiosior. nam et comicae fabulae de stupris uirginum loquuntur aut amoribus meretricum, et quo magis sunt eloquentes qui flagitia illa finxerunt, eo magis sententiarum elegantia persuadent et facilius inhaerent audientium memoriae uersus numerosi et ornati.

I do not know whether corruption on the stage is not even more vicious. For comedies tell of the seduction of virgins or the loves of prostitutes; and the more eloquent those who invented these outrages, the more they persuade by the elegance of their sentences, and the more easily rhythmical and polished verses stick in the hearers' memory.

6.20.28CSEL 19:560

item tragicae historiae subiciunt oculis parricidia et incesta regum malorum et coturnata scelera demonstrant.

Likewise tragedies put before the eyes the parricides and incests of wicked kings and display crimes in buskins.

6.20.29CSEL 19:560

histrionum quoque inpudicissimi motus quid aliut nisi libidines et docent et instigant? quorum eneruata corpora et in muliebrem incessum habitumque mollita inpudicas feminas inhonestis gestibus mentiuntur.

And what do the most shameless movements of actors teach and incite but lusts? Their emasculated bodies, softened into a woman's gait and bearing, counterfeit unchaste women with indecent gestures.

6.20.30CSEL 19:560

quid de mimis loquar corruptelarum praeferentibus disciplinam, qui docent adulteria, dum fingunt, et simulacris erudiunt ad uera? quid iuuenes aut uirgines faciant, cum haec et fieri sine pudore et spectari libenter ab omnibus cernunt?

What shall I say of the mimes, who display a school of corruption, who teach adulteries while they feign them, and train by imitations for the real thing? What would young men or maidens do when they see these things done without shame and watched gladly by all?

6.20.31CSEL 19:560–561

admonentur utique quid facere possint et inflammantur libidine, quae aspectu maxime concitatur, ac se quisque pro sexu in illis imaginibus praefigurat probantque illa, dum rident, et adhaerentibus uitiis corruptiores ad cubicula reuertuntur, nec pueri modo, quos praematuris uitiis imbui non oportet, sed etiam senes, quos peccare iam non decet.

They are surely reminded of what they could do, and are inflamed with lust, which is stirred most by sight; each pictures himself in those images according to sex; they approve these things while they laugh, and, with the vices clinging to them, they return more corrupt to their bedrooms; and not only boys, who should not be steeped in premature vices, but also old men, whom sin no longer befits.

6.20.32CSEL 19:561

circensium quoque ludorum ratio quid aliut habet nisi leuitatem uanitatem insaniam? tanto namque impetu concitantur animi in furorem, quanto illic impetu curritur, ut iam plus spectaculi exhibeant qui spectandi gratia ueniunt, cum exclamare et efferri et exsilire coeperint.

And what does the business of the circus games contain but frivolity, vanity, and madness? For minds are roused to frenzy with as great a rush as the race is run there, so that those who come to watch make more of a show than the show, when they begin to shout, get carried away, and leap up.

6.20.33CSEL 19:561

uitanda ergo spectacula omnia, non solum ne quid uitiorum pectoribus insidat, quae sedata et pacifica esse debent, sed ne cuius nos uoluptatis consuetudo deleniat et a deo atque a bonis operibus auertat.

So all spectacles must be avoided, not only so that no vices may settle in our hearts, which ought to be calm and peaceful, but so that the habit of some pleasure may not soothe us and turn us away from God and good works.

6.20.34CSEL 19:561

nam ludorum celebrationes deorum festa sunt, siquidem ob natales eorum uel templorum nouorum dedicationes sunt constituti.

For the celebrations of the games are festivals of the gods, since they were established for their birthdays or for the dedication of new temples.

6.20.35CSEL 19:561

et primitus quidem uenationes, quae uocantur munera, Saturno sunt attributae, ludi autem scaenici Libero, circenses uero Neptuno. paulatim tamen et ceteris diis idem honos tribui coepit singulique ludi nominibus eorum consecrati sunt, sicut Sinnius Capito in libris spectaculorum docet.

And at first the hunts, called "gifts" (munera), were assigned to Saturn, the stage plays to Liber, and the circus races to Neptune. Gradually, however, the same honor began to be given to the other gods too, and individual games were consecrated to their names, as Sinnius Capito teaches in his books on spectacles.

6.20.36CSEL 19:561–562

si quis igitur spectaculis interest ad quae religionis gratia conuenitur, discessit a dei cultu et ad deos se contulit, quorum natales et festa celebrauit.

So if anyone attends spectacles at which people gather for the sake of religion, he has departed from the worship of God and gone over to the gods whose birthdays and festivals he has celebrated.

Divine 6, chapter 21

6.21.1CSEL 19:562

Aurium uoluptas ex uocum et cantuum suauitate percipitur, quae scilicet tam uitiosa est quam oblectatio illa de qua diximus oculorum.

The pleasure of the ears is taken from the sweetness of voices and songs, and it is just as vicious as that delight of the eyes of which we have spoken.

6.21.2CSEL 19:562

quis enim non luxuriosum ac nequam putet eum qui scaenicas artes domi habeat? atquin nihil refert utrumne luxuriam solus domi an cum populo exerceas in theatro.

For who would not think a man luxurious and worthless who keeps stage performers at home? Yet it makes no difference whether you indulge in luxury alone at home or with the people in the theater.

6.21.3CSEL 19:562

sed iam de spectaculis dictum est. restat unum quod est nobis expugnandum, ne capiamur iis quae ad sensum intimum penetrant. nam illa omnia quae uerbis carent, id est aeris ac neruorum suaues soni possunt facile contemni, quia non adhaerent nec scribi possunt.

But enough has been said of spectacles. One thing remains which we must overcome, lest we be captured by what penetrates to our inmost sense. For all those things that lack words, that is, the sweet sounds of brass and strings, can easily be disregarded, because they do not stick and cannot be written down.

6.21.4CSEL 19:562

carmen autem compositum et oratio cum suauitate decurrens capit mentes et quo uoluerit inpellit. inde homines litterati cum ad religionem dei accesserint ab aliquo inperito doctore fundati, minus credunt.

But a well-composed poem and a speech flowing sweetly capture minds and drive them wherever they wish. That is why literary men, when they come to the religion of God, if grounded by some unskilled teacher, believe less.

6.21.5CSEL 19:562

adsueti enim dulcibus et politis siue orationibus siue carminibus diuinarum litterarum simplicem communemque sermonem pro sordido aspernantur. id enim quaerunt quod sensum demulceat, persuadet autem quidquid suaue est et animo penitus, dum delectat, insidit.

For, used to sweet and polished speeches or poems, they scorn the simple and common language of the divine writings as vulgar. For they seek what soothes the sense; and whatever is sweet persuades and, while it delights, settles deep in the soul.

6.21.6CSEL 19:562–563

num igitur deus et mentis et uocis et linguae artifex diserte loqui non potest? immo uero summa prouidentia carere fuco uoluit ea quae diuina sunt, ut omnes intellegerent quae ipse omnibus loquebatur.

Can God, then, the maker of mind, voice, and tongue, not speak eloquently? On the contrary, with the highest providence he willed divine things to lack cosmetic paint, so that all might understand what he himself was saying to all.

6.21.7CSEL 19:563

ergo qui ueritati studet, qui non uult se ipse deicere, abiciat inimicas ac noxias uoluptates, quae animam uitiant ut corpus cibi dulces: praeferantur uera falsis, aeterna breuibus, utilia iucundis.

So whoever is devoted to truth and does not want to cast himself down, let him throw away hostile and harmful pleasures, which spoil the soul as sweet foods spoil the body: let the true be preferred to the false, the eternal to the brief, the useful to the pleasant.

6.21.8CSEL 19:563

nihil aspectu gratum sit nisi quod iuste, quod pie fieri uideas, nihil auditu suaue nisi quod alit animam melioremque te reddit, maximeque hic sensus non est ad uitium detorquendus, qui nobis ideo datus est, ut doctrinam dei percipere possemus.

Let nothing be pleasing to the sight except what you see done justly and piously; nothing sweet to the hearing except what nourishes the soul and makes you better; and above all this sense must not be twisted to vice, since it was given to us so that we could receive the teaching of God.

6.21.9CSEL 19:563

itaque si uoluptas est audire cantus et carmina, dei laudes canere et audire iucundum sit.

So if it is a pleasure to hear songs and poems, let it be a delight to sing and hear the praises of God.

6.21.10CSEL 19:563

haec est uoluptas uera quae comes est et socia uirtutis, haec non est caduca et breuis ut illae quas adpetunt qui corpori ut pecudes seruiunt, sed perpetua et sine ulla intermissione delectans.

This is the true pleasure, which is the companion and partner of virtue; this is not fleeting and brief like those sought by people who serve the body like cattle, but perpetual and delighting without any interruption.

6.21.11CSEL 19:563

cuius terminos si quis excesserit nihilque aliut ex uoluptate petierit nisi ipsam uoluptatem, hic mortem meditatur, quia sicut uita perpetua in uirtute est, ita mors in uoluptate.

If anyone oversteps its limits and seeks nothing from pleasure but pleasure itself, he is contemplating death; for just as perpetual life lies in virtue, so death lies in pleasure.

6.21.12CSEL 19:563–564

qui enim temporalia maluerit, carebit aeternis, qui terrena praetulerit, caelestia non habebit.

For whoever prefers temporal things will lack eternal ones; whoever puts earthly things first will not have heavenly ones.

Divine 6, chapter 22

6.22.1CSEL 19:564

Ad uoluptates autem saporis et odoris, qui duo sensus ad solum corpus pertinent, nihil est quod a nobis disputetur, nisi forte quis exigit ut dicamus turpe esse sapienti ac bono, si uentri et gulae seruiat, si unguentis oblitus aut floribus coronatus incedat: quae qui facit, utique insipiens et ineptus et nihili est et quem ne odor quidem uirtutis attigerit.

About the pleasures of taste and smell, two senses that concern the body alone, there is nothing for us to discuss, unless perhaps someone demands that we say it is shameful for a wise and good man to serve his belly and gullet, or to go about smeared with perfumes or crowned with flowers. Whoever does these things is surely foolish, silly, and worthless, and not even the scent of virtue has touched him.

6.22.2CSEL 19:564

fortasse quispiam dixerit cur ergo illa facta sunt, nisi ut iis fruamur? at enim saepe iam dictum est uirtutem nullam futuram fuisse, nisi haberet quae opprimeret. itaque fecit omnia deus ad instruendum certamen rerum duarum.

Perhaps someone will say: "Why then were these things made, if not for us to enjoy them?" But it has often been said already that there would have been no virtue unless it had something to overcome. So God made all things to set up a contest between two things.

6.22.3CSEL 19:564

ergo inlecebrae istae uoluptatum arma sunt illius cuius unum opus est expugnare uirtutem iustitiamque ab hominibus excludere. his blandimentis et suauitatibus titillat animas: scit enim quia mortis est fabricatrix uoluptas.

So these enticements of pleasures are the weapons of the one whose sole work is to overcome virtue and shut justice out from human beings. With these charms and sweetnesses he tickles souls, for he knows that pleasure is the maker of death.

6.22.4CSEL 19:564

nam sicut deus hominem ad uitam non nisi per uirtutem ac laborem uocat, ita ille ad mortem per delicias ac uoluptates, et sicut ad uerum bonum per fallacia mala, sic ad uerum malum per fallacia bona peruenitur.

For just as God calls man to life only through virtue and labor, so the other calls him to death through delights and pleasures; and as one reaches the true good through deceptive evils, so one reaches the true evil through deceptive goods.

6.22.5CSEL 19:564

cauenda sunt igitur oblectamenta ista tamquam laquei et plagae, ne suauitudinum mollitie capti sub dicionem mortis cum ipso corpore redigamur, cui nos manciparimus.

So these delights must be avoided as snares and nets, lest, captured by the softness of sweetness, we be brought under the rule of death together with the body itself, to which we have made ourselves slaves.

Divine 6, chapter 23

6.23.1CSEL 19:564–565

Venio nunc ad eam quae percipitur ex tactu uoluptatem: qui sensus est quidem totius corporis. sed ego non de ornamentis ac uestibus, sed de sola libidine dicendum mihi puto, quae maxime coercenda est, quia maxime nocet.

I come now to the pleasure perceived through touch, a sense which belongs to the whole body. But I think I must speak not of ornaments and clothing but of lust alone, which must be restrained most, because it does the most harm.

6.23.2CSEL 19:565

cum excogitasset deus duorum sexuum rationem, adtribuit iis ut se inuicem adpeterent et coniunctione gauderent. itaque ardentissimam cupiditatem cunctarum animantium corporibus admiscuit, ut in hos adfectus auidissime ruerent eaque ratione propagari et multiplicari genera possent.

When God had devised the plan of two sexes, he gave them to desire one another and to delight in union. So he mixed into the bodies of all living beings a most ardent desire, so that they would rush most eagerly into these feelings and by this means the kinds could be propagated and multiplied.

6.23.3CSEL 19:565

quae cupiditas et adpetentia in homine uehementior et acrior inuenitur, uel quia hominum multitudinem uoluit esse maiorem uel quoniam uirtutem soli homini dedit, ut esset laus et gloria in coercendis uoluptatibus et abstinentia sui.

This desire and appetite is found stronger and keener in man, either because God willed the number of human beings to be greater, or because he gave virtue to man alone, so that there might be praise and glory in restraining pleasures and in self-control.

6.23.4CSEL 19:565

scit ergo aduersarius ille noster quanta sit uis huius cupiditatis, quam quidam necessitatem dicere maluerunt, eamque a recto et bono ad prauum et malum transfert.

So our adversary knows how great the force of this desire is, which some have preferred to call a necessity, and he turns it from what is right and good to what is perverse and evil.

6.23.5CSEL 19:565

inlicita enim desideria inmittit, ut aliena contaminent quibus habere propria sine delicto licet. obicit quippe oculis inritabiles formas suggeritque fomenta et uitiis pabulum subministrat;

For he sends unlawful desires, so that those who may have their own without sin defile what belongs to others. He sets provocative forms before the eyes, supplies fuel, and provides food for vices;

6.23.6CSEL 19:565

tum in intimis uisceribus stimulos omnes conturbat et commouet et naturalem illum incitat atque inflammat ardorem, donec inretitum hominem inplicatumque decipiat.

then he stirs and disturbs all the goads in the inmost parts, and rouses and inflames that natural heat, until he ensnares, entangles, and deceives the man.

6.23.7CSEL 19:565

ac ne quis esset qui poenarum metu abstineret alieno, lupanaria quoque constituit et pudorem infelicium mulierum publicauit, ut ludibrio haberet tam eos qui faciunt quam quas pati necesse est.

And so that there would be no one who kept from another's wife through fear of punishment, he also set up brothels and made public the shame of unhappy women, so as to make sport of both the men who do it and the women who must suffer it.

6.23.8CSEL 19:565–566

his obscenitatibus animas ad sanctitatem genitas uelut in caeni gurgite demersit, pudorem extinxit, pudicitiam flagitauit. idem etiam mares maribus adplicuit et nefandos coitus contra naturam contraque institutum dei machinatus est. sic imbuit homines et armauit ad nefas omne.

With these obscenities he plunged souls born for holiness as into a whirlpool of mud, extinguished modesty, and outraged chastity. He also joined males to males and contrived unspeakable acts of intercourse against nature and against the ordinance of God. So he steeped people in every wickedness and armed them for it.

6.23.9CSEL 19:566

quid enim potest esse sanctum iis qui aetatem inbecillam et praesidio indigentem libidini suae depopulandam foedandamque

For what can be holy to those who have subjected a weak age, needing protection, to their lust, to be ravaged and defiled?

6.23.10CSEL 19:566

substrauerint? non potest haec res pro magnitudine sceleris enarrari. nihil amplius istos appellare possum quam inpios et parricidas, quibus non sufficit sexus a deo datus, nisi etiam suum sexum profane ac petulanter inludant. haec tamen apud illos leuia et quasi honesta sunt.

This thing cannot be described as the greatness of the crime deserves. I can call these men nothing more than impious and parricides, for whom the sex given by God is not enough, but who must also make profane and wanton sport of their own sex. Yet among them these things are light and almost honorable.

6.23.11CSEL 19:566

quid dicam de iis qui abominandam non libidinem, sed insaniam potius exercent? piget dicere, sed quid iis fore credamus quos non piget facere? et tamen dicendum est, quia fit: de istis loquor quorum teterrima libido et execrabilis furor ne capiti quidem parcit.

What shall I say of those who practice not lust but rather an abominable madness? It is painful to say, but what shall we think awaits those who are not pained to do it? And yet it must be said, because it is done: I speak of those whose most foul lust and accursed fury does not spare even the head.

6.23.12CSEL 19:566

quibus hoc uerbis aut qua indignatione tantum nefas prosequar? uincit officium linguae sceleris magnitudo. cum igitur libido haec edat opera et haec facinora designet, armandi aduersus eam uirtute maxima sumus.

With what words or with what indignation shall I pursue so great a wickedness? The greatness of the crime overcomes the power of the tongue. Since, then, lust produces these works and devises these crimes, we must be armed against it with the greatest virtue.

6.23.13CSEL 19:566

quisquis affectus illos frenare non potest, cohibeat eos intra praescriptum legitimi tori, ut et illut quod auide expetit consequatur et tamen in peccatum non incidat.

Whoever cannot rein in those feelings, let him keep them within the bounds of the lawful marriage bed, so that he both obtains what he eagerly desires and yet does not fall into sin.

6.23.14CSEL 19:566

nam quid sibi homines perditi nolunt? nempe honesta opera uoluptas sequitur: si ipsam per se adpetunt, iusta et legitima frui licet.

For what do lost men want for themselves? Surely pleasure follows honorable works; if they seek pleasure for itself, they may enjoy what is just and lawful.

6.23.15CSEL 19:566–567

quodsi aliqua necessitas prohibebit, tum uero maxime adhibenda uirtus erit, ut cupiditati continentia reluctetur. nec tantum alienis toris quaeque attingere non licet, uerum etiam publicis uulgatisque corporibus abstinendum deus praecipit docetque nos, cum duo inter se corpora fuerint copulata, unum corpus efficere.

But if some necessity prevents it, then indeed virtue must be applied most of all, so that self-control may resist desire. And not only is it forbidden to touch anyone in another's bed, but God commands that we abstain also from public and common bodies, and teaches us that when two bodies are joined together, they make one body.

6.23.16CSEL 19:567

ita qui se caeno inmerserit, caeno sit oblitus necesse est. et corpus quidem cito ablui potest, mens autem contagione inpudici corporis inquinata non potest nisi et longo tempore et multis bonis operibus ab ea quae inhaeserit conluuione purgari.

So whoever has plunged himself into mud must be smeared with mud. The body indeed can quickly be washed, but the mind, defiled by contact with an unchaste body, can be purged of the filth that has stuck to it only over a long time and by many good works.

6.23.17CSEL 19:567

oportet ergo sibi quemque proponere duorum sexuum coniunctionem generandi causa datam esse uiuentibus eamque legem his affectibus positam, ut successionem parent.

So each person should set before himself that the union of the two sexes was given to living beings for the sake of begetting, and that this law was laid on these feelings, that they should produce offspring.

6.23.18CSEL 19:567

sicut autem dedit nobis oculos deus non ut spectemus uoluptatemque capiamus, sed ut uideamus propter eos actus qui pertinent ad uitae necessitatem, ita genitalem corporis partem, quod nomen ipsum docet, nulla alia causa nisi efficiendae subolis accepimus.

For just as God gave us eyes not to gaze and take pleasure but to see for the sake of those actions that belong to the needs of life, so we received the genital part of the body, as its very name teaches, for no other reason than to produce offspring.

6.23.19CSEL 19:567

huic diuinae legi summa deuotione parendum est. sint omnes qui se discipulos dei profitebuntur ita morati et instituti, ut inperare sibi possint.

This divine law must be obeyed with the greatest devotion. Let all who profess themselves disciples of God be so disciplined and trained that they can command themselves.

6.23.20CSEL 19:567

nam qui uoluptatibus indulgent, qui libidini obsecuntur, hi animam suam corpori mancipant ad mortemque condemnant, quia se corpori addixerunt, in quod habet mors potestatem.

For those who indulge pleasures and obey lust make their soul a slave to the body and condemn it to death, because they have given themselves over to the body, over which death has power.

6.23.21CSEL 19:567

unus quisque igitur quantum potest formet se ad verecundiam, pudorem colat, castitatem conscientia et mente tueatur: nec tantum legibus publicis pareat, sed sit supra omnes leges qui legem dei sequitur.

So let each person, as far as he can, train himself to modesty, cultivate shame, and guard chastity in conscience and mind; and let him not only obey public laws, but let one who follows the law of God be above all laws.

6.23.22CSEL 19:567–568

quibus bonis si adsueuerit, iam pudebit eum ad deteriora desciscere: modo placeant recta et honesta, quae melioribus iucundiora sunt quam praua et inhonesta peioribus.

If he has grown used to these goods, he will be ashamed to fall away to worse things; only let right and honorable things please him, which are more delightful to the better than perverse and dishonorable things are to the worse.

6.23.23CSEL 19:568

nondum omnia castitatis officia exsecutus sum: quam deus non modo intra priuatos parietes, sed etiam praescripto lectuli terminat, ut cum quis habeat uxorem, neque seruam neque liberam habere insuper uelit, sed matrimonio fidem seruet.

I have not yet gone through all the duties of chastity. God limits it not only within private walls but even by the rule of the marriage bed, so that when a man has a wife, he may not wish to have in addition either a slave woman or a free woman, but may keep faith with his marriage.

6.23.24CSEL 19:568

non enim, sicut iuris publici ratio est, sola mulier adultera est quae habet alium, maritus autem etiamsi plures habeat, a crimine adulterii so-

For it is not, as the reasoning of public law has it, that only the woman who has another man is an adulteress, while the husband, even if he has several women, is free from the charge of adultery;

6.23.25CSEL 19:568

lutus est, sed diuina lex ita duos in matrimonium, quod est in corpus unum, pari iure coniungit, ut adulter habeatur quisquis compagem corporis in diuersa distraxerit.

but the divine law joins the two in marriage, that is, into one body, with equal right, so that whoever tears apart the union of the body in different directions is held an adulterer.

6.23.26CSEL 19:568

nec ob aliam causam deus cum ceteras animantes suscepto fetu maribus repugnare uoluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem uiri fecit, scilicet ne feminis repugnantibus libido cogeret uiros aliut adpetere eoque facto castitatis gloriam non tenerent.

And for no other reason, while God willed that other animals resist the males once they have conceived, did he make woman alone of all to be receptive to her husband: namely, lest, if women refused, lust should drive men to seek something else, and by doing so they would not keep the glory of chastity.

6.23.27CSEL 19:568

sed neque mulier uirtutem pudicitiae caperet, si peccare non posset. nam quis mutum animal pudicum esse dixerit, quia suscepto fetu mari repugnat? quod ideo facit, quia necesse est in dolorem atque in periculum ueniat, si admiserit.

But neither would a woman possess the virtue of modesty if she could not sin. For who would call a dumb animal chaste because it resists the male once it has conceived? It does so because it would necessarily come to pain and danger if it admitted him.

6.23.28CSEL 19:568

nulla igitur laus est non facere quod facere non possis. ideo autem pudicitia in homine laudatur, quia non naturalis est, sed uoluntaria.

There is no praise, then, in not doing what you cannot do. And modesty is praised in human beings precisely because it is not natural but voluntary.

6.23.29CSEL 19:569

seruanda igitur fides ab utroque alteri est, immo exemplo continentiae docenda uxor ut se caste gerat. iniquum est enim ut id exigas quod praestare ipse non possis. quae iniquitas effecit profecto ut essent adulteria, feminis aegre ferentibus praestare se fidem non exhibentibus mutuam caritatem.

So faith must be kept by each to the other; indeed, the wife must be taught by the example of the husband's continence to conduct herself chastely. For it is unfair to demand what you yourself cannot give. This unfairness has certainly produced adulteries, since women resent keeping faith with those who do not show them mutual love.

6.23.30CSEL 19:569

denique nulla est tam perditi pudoris adultera quae non hanc causam uitiis suis praetendat, iniuriam se peccando non facere, sed referre. quod optime Quintilianus expressit. homo inquit neque alieni matrimonii abstinens neque sui custos — quae inter se natura conexa sunt.

In short, there is no adulteress of such lost modesty that she does not put forward this excuse for her vices: that by sinning she does not do an injury but returns one. Quintilian expressed this excellently: "A man neither keeping from another's marriage nor guarding his own"; things which are by nature bound together.

6.23.31CSEL 19:569

nam neque maritus circa corrumpendas aliorum coniuges occupatus potest uacare domesticae sanctitati et uxor cum in tale incidit matrimonium, exemplo ipso concitata aut imitari se putat aut uindicare.

For neither can a husband busy with corrupting other men's wives have leisure for the holiness of his own home, and the wife, when she has fallen into such a marriage, roused by his very example, thinks she is either imitating him or taking revenge.

6.23.32CSEL 19:569

cauendum igitur, ne occasionem uitiis nostra intemperantia demus, sed adsuescant inuicem mores duorum et iugum paribus animis ferant: nos ipsos in altero cogitemus. nam fere in hoc iustitiae summa consistit, ut non facias alteri quidquid ipse ab altero pati nolis.

So we must take care not to give occasion to vices by our own lack of self-control; rather, let the characters of the two grow used to each other and bear the yoke with equal minds; let us think of ourselves in the other. For the sum of justice lies almost entirely in this: that you do not do to another whatever you would not wish to suffer from another.

6.23.33CSEL 19:569–570

haec sunt quae ad continentiam praecipiuntur a deo. sed tamen ne quis diuina praecepta circumscribere se putet posse, adduntur illa, ut omnis calumnia et occasio fraudis remoueatur, adulterum esse qui a marito dimissam duxerit et eum qui praeter crimen adulterii uxorem dimiserit, ut alteram ducat: dissociari enim corpus et distrahi deus noluit;

These are the precepts God gives for continence. But lest anyone think he can get around the divine precepts, these are added, so that every false pretext and occasion for fraud may be removed: that he is an adulterer who marries a woman dismissed by her husband, and so is he who, apart from the charge of adultery, dismisses his wife in order to marry another; for God did not will that one body be separated and torn apart.

6.23.34CSEL 19:570

praeterea non tantum adulterium esse uitandum, uerum etiam cogitationem, ne quis aspiciat alienam et animo concupiscat: adulteram enim fieri mentem, si uel imaginem uoluptatis sibi ipsa depinxerit.

Moreover, not only adultery must be avoided but even the thought of it, so that no one looks at another's wife and desires her in his mind; for the mind becomes adulterous even if it merely paints for itself an image of the pleasure.

6.23.35CSEL 19:570

mens est enim profecto quae peccat, quae immoderatae libidinis fructum cogitatione conplectitur, in hac crimen est, in hac omne delictum.

For it is surely the mind that sins, which embraces in thought the fruit of immoderate lust; in it lies the crime, in it every offense.

6.23.36CSEL 19:570

nam etsi corpus nulla sit labe maculatum, non constat tamen pudicitiae ratio, si animus incestus est, nec inlibata castitas uideri potest, ubi conscientiam cupiditas inquinauit.

For even if the body is marked by no stain, the principle of modesty does not stand if the soul is unchaste, nor can chastity seem unimpaired where desire has defiled the conscience.

6.23.37CSEL 19:570

nec uero aliquis existimet difficile esse frenos inponere uoluptati eamque uagam et errantem castitatis pudicitiaeque limitibus includere, cum propositum sit hominibus eam uincere ac plurimi beatam atque incorruptam corporis integritatem retinuerint multique sint qui hoc caelesti genere uitae felicissime perfruantur.

Nor let anyone think it difficult to put reins on pleasure and to confine it, wandering and straying, within the bounds of chastity and modesty, since it has been set before human beings to conquer it, and very many have kept the blessed and uncorrupted integrity of the body, and there are many who enjoy this heavenly kind of life most happily.

6.23.38CSEL 19:570

quod quidem deus non ita fieri praecipit tamquam adstringat, quia generari homines oportet, sed tamquam sinat. scit enim quantam his adfectibus inposuerit necessitatem. si quis hoc inquit facere potuerit, habebit eximiam inconparabilemque mercedem.

God does not command this to be done as if binding us, since human beings must be begotten, but as permitting it. For he knows how great a necessity he has laid on these feelings. "If anyone," he says, "is able to do this, he will have an outstanding and incomparable reward."

6.23.39CSEL 19:570–571

quod continentiae genus quasi fastigium est omnium consummatioque uirtutum. ad quam si quis eniti atque eluctari potuerit, hunc seruum dominus, hunc discipulum magister adgnoscet: hic terram triumphabit, hic erit consimilis deo, qui uirtutem dei cepit.

This kind of continence is, as it were, the summit and consummation of all the virtues. If anyone can strive and struggle up to it, the Lord will recognize him as servant, the Master as disciple; he will triumph over the earth; he will be like God, having taken on the virtue of God.

6.23.40CSEL 19:571

haec quidem difficilia uidentur, sed de eo loquimur cui calcatis omnibus terrenis iter in caelum paratur. nam quia uirtus in dei agnitione consistit, omnia grauia sunt, dum ignores, ubi cognoris, facilia: per ipsas difficultates nobis exeundum est, qui ad summum bonum tendimus.

These things seem difficult indeed, but we are speaking of one for whom, all earthly things trampled underfoot, the road to heaven is being prepared. For since virtue consists in the knowledge of God, all things are hard while you do not know him, easy once you have known him. Through these very difficulties we must make our way, we who strive toward the highest good.

Divine 6, chapter 24

6.24.1CSEL 19:571

Nec tamen deficiat aliquis aut de se ipse desperet, si aut cupiditate uictus aut libidine inpulsus aut errore deceptus aut ui coactus ad iniustitiae uiam lapsus est. potest enim reduci ac liberari, si eum paeniteat actorum et ad meliora conuersus satis deo faciat.

Yet let no one lose heart or despair of himself if, overcome by greed, driven by lust, deceived by error, or forced by violence, he has slipped onto the way of injustice. For he can be brought back and set free if he repents of what he has done and, turned to better things, makes satisfaction to God.

6.24.2CSEL 19:571

quod fieri posse Cicero non putauit, cuius haec in Academico tertio uerba sunt: quodsi liceret ut iis qui in itinere deerrauissent, sic uitam deuiam secutis corrigere errorem paenitendo, facilior esset emendatio temeritatis. licet plane.

Cicero did not think this possible; these are his words in the third book of the Academics: "But if, as those who have gone astray on a journey may, so those who have followed a devious life could correct their error by repenting, the amendment of rashness would be easier." It plainly is possible.

6.24.3CSEL 19:571–572

nam si liberos nostros, cum delictorum suorum cernimus paenitere, correctos esse arbitramur et abdicatos abiectosque rursus tamen suscipimus fouemus amplectimur, cur desperemus clementiam ueri

For if, when we see our children repent of their faults, we consider them corrected, and though we had disowned and cast them off, we take them back again, cherish, and embrace them, why should we despair that the mercy of the true

6.24.4CSEL 19:572

patris paenitendo posse placari? ergo idem dominus ac parens indulgentissimus remissurum se paenitentibus peccata promittit et obliteraturum omnes iniquitates eius qui iustitiam denuo coeperit operari.

Father can be won by repentance? So the same Lord and most indulgent Parent promises that he will forgive the sins of those who repent and will blot out all the iniquities of the one who has begun again to do justice.

6.24.5CSEL 19:572

sicut enim nihil prodest male uiuenti ante actae uitae probitas, quia superueniens nequitia iustitiae opera deleuit, ita nihil officiunt peccata uetera correcto, quia superueniens iustitia labem uitae prioris aboleuit.

For just as the uprightness of his former life is of no benefit to one who lives badly, because the wickedness that followed has wiped out the works of justice, so old sins do no harm to one who has been corrected, because the justice that followed has abolished the stain of his former life.

6.24.6CSEL 19:572

quem enim facti sui paenitet, errorem suum pristinum intellegit, ideoque Graeci melius et significantius μετάνοιαν dicunt quam nos Latine possumus resipiscentiam dicere. resipiscit enim ac mentem suam quasi ab insania recipit quem errati piget, castigatque se ipsum dementiae et confirmat animum suum ad rectius uiuendum: tum illud ipsum maxime cauet, ne rursus in eosdem laqueos induatur.

For whoever repents of his deed understands his former error; and so the Greeks say metanoia, better and more expressively than we can say resipiscentia in Latin. For one who regrets his error comes to his senses and recovers his mind as if from madness; he rebukes himself for his folly and strengthens his mind to live more rightly; then he takes the greatest care not to be caught again in the same snares.

6.24.7CSEL 19:572

denique muta quoque animalia cum fraude capiuntur, si aliquo se modo in fugam extricauerint, fiunt postmodum cautiora uitantque semper ea omnia in quibus dolos insidiasque senserunt.

Even dumb animals, when caught by a trick, if they have somehow got free and fled, become more cautious afterward and always avoid all the places in which they have sensed tricks and traps.

6.24.8CSEL 19:572

sic hominem paenitentia cautum ac diligentem facit ad euitanda peccata in quae semel fraude deciderit.

So repentance makes a person cautious and careful to avoid the sins into which he once fell by deceit.

6.24.9CSEL 19:572–573

nemo enim potest esse tam prudens, tam circumspectus, ut non aliquando labatur. et idcirco deus inbecillitatem nostram sciens pro sua pietate aperuit homini portum salutis, ut huic necessitati, cui fragilitas nostra subiecta est, medicina paenitentiae subueniret. ergo quicumque aberrauerit, referat pedem seque quam primum recipiat ac reformet.

For no one can be so prudent, so circumspect, as not to slip at some time. And so God, knowing our weakness, in his compassion opened to man a harbor of salvation, so that the medicine of repentance might come to the aid of this necessity to which our frailty is subject. So whoever has gone astray, let him turn back his foot and recover and reform himself as soon as possible.

6.24.10CSEL 19:573

sed reuocare gradum superasque euadere ad auras, hoc opus, hic labor est. degustatis enim male iucundis uoluptatibus uix diuelli ab iis possunt: facilius recta sequerentur, si earum suauitates non attigissent. sed eripiant se malae seruituti: condonabitur iis error omnis, si errorem suum uita meliore correxerint. nec lucrari se quisquam putet, si delicti conscium non habebit:

"But to retrace one's steps and escape to the upper air, this is the task, this the labor." For once they have tasted wickedly pleasant pleasures, they can hardly be torn from them; they would follow the right more easily if they had never touched their sweetness. But let them snatch themselves from an evil slavery: every error will be pardoned them if they correct their error by a better life. Nor let anyone think he gains anything if he has no witness to his fault:

6.24.11CSEL 19:573

scit ille omnia in cuius conspectu uiuimus, nec si uniuersos homines celare possumus, deum possumus, cui nihil absconditum, nihil potest esse secretum.

he knows all things in whose sight we live; and even if we can hide from all human beings, we cannot hide from God, to whom nothing can be hidden, nothing secret.

6.24.12CSEL 19:573

Exhortationes suas Seneca mirabili sententia terminauit. magnum inquit nescio quid maiusque quam cogitari potest numen est, cui uiuendo operam damus. huic nos adprobemus. nihil prodest inclusam esse conscientiam, patemus deo.

Seneca ended his Exhortations with a wonderful sentence: "It is some great divinity," he says, "greater than can be imagined, for whom we labor in living. Let us approve ourselves to him. It does no good to have one's conscience shut up; we lie open to God."

6.24.13CSEL 19:573–574

quid uerius dici potuit ab eo qui deum nosset quam dictum est ab homine uerae religionis ignaro? nam et maiestatem dei expressit maiorem esse dicendo quam ut eam cogitatio mentis humanae capere posset, et ipsum ueritatis attigit fontem sentiendo uitam hominum superuacuam non esse, ut Epicurei uolunt, sed deo ab iis operam uiuendo dari, siquidem iuste ac pie uixerint.

What truer thing could have been said by one who knew God than was said by a man ignorant of true religion? For he expressed the majesty of God by saying that it is greater than the thought of the human mind can grasp, and he touched the very source of truth by perceiving that human life is not superfluous, as the Epicureans hold, but that in living people labor for God, provided they have lived justly and piously.

6.24.14CSEL 19:574

potuit esse uerus dei cultor, si quis illi monstrasset, et contempsisset profecto Zenonem et magistrum suum Sotionem, si uerae sapientiae ducem nactus esset.

He could have been a true worshipper of God if someone had shown him, and he would surely have despised Zeno and his teacher Sotion if he had found a guide to true wisdom.

6.24.15CSEL 19:574

huic nos inquit adprobemus: caelestis prorsus oratio, nisi antecederet ignorantiae confessio. nihil prodest inclusam esse conscientiam, patemus deo: nullus ergo mendacio, nullus dissimulationi locus est, quia parietibus oculi hominum submoventur, dei autem diuinitas nec uisceribus submoueri potest, quominus totum hominem perspiciat et norit.

"Let us approve ourselves to him," he says: a thoroughly heavenly saying, were it not preceded by the confession of ignorance. "It does no good to have one's conscience shut up; we lie open to God": so there is no room for lying or pretense, because human eyes are kept out by walls, but God's divinity cannot be kept out even by our inward parts from seeing through and knowing the whole person.

6.24.16CSEL 19:574

idem in eiusdem operis primo quid agis? inquit quid machinaris? quid abscondis? custos te tuus sequitur. alium tibi peregrinatio subduxit, alium mors, alium ualitudo: haeret hic quo carere numquam potes.

The same man, in the first book of the same work: "What are you doing? What are you plotting? What are you hiding? Your guardian follows you. One companion travel has taken from you, another death, another sickness: this one clings to you, whom you can never be without.

6.24.17CSEL 19:574–575

quid locum abditum legis et arbitros remoues? puta tibi contigisse ut oculos omnium effugias, demens: quid tibi prodest non habere conscium habenti conscientiam?

Why do you choose a hidden place and send away witnesses? Suppose you have managed to escape the eyes of all, madman: what good is it to you to have no witness when you have a conscience?"

6.24.18CSEL 19:575

non minus mirabiliter de conscientia et deo Tullius. meminerit inquit deum se habere testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse diuinius.

No less wonderfully Tullius speaks of conscience and God: "Let him remember," he says, "that he has God as witness," that is, as I think, his own mind, than which God himself has given man nothing more divine.

6.24.19CSEL 19:575

item cum de iusto ac bono uiro loqueretur, itaque talis uir inquit non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam audebit quod non audeat praedicare.

Likewise, when he spoke of the just and good man: "So such a man," he says, "will dare not only to do, but even to think, nothing that he would not dare to proclaim."

6.24.20CSEL 19:575

purgemus igitur conscientiam, quae oculis dei peruia est, et, ut ait idem, semper ita uiuamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur, putemusque nos momentis omnibus non in aliquo, ut ille dixit, orbis terrae theatro ab hominibus, sed desuper spectari ab eo qui et iudex et testis idem futurus est, cui rationem uitae reposcenti actus suos infitiari non licebit.

So let us purify the conscience, which lies open to God's eyes, and, as the same man says, let us always live as if we thought we must render an account; and let us think that at every moment we are watched not, as he said, in some theater of the world by human beings, but from above by him who will be both judge and witness, and to whom, when he demands an account of our life, we will not be able to deny our deeds.

6.24.21CSEL 19:575

ergo satius est aut effugere conscientiam aut nos ipsos ultro aperire animum et perniciem rescissis uulneribus effundere: quibus nemo alius mederi potest nisi solus ille qui gressum claudis, uisum caecis reddidit, maculata membra purgauit, mortuos excitauit.

So it is better either to escape the conscience or ourselves to open our soul of our own accord and let out the poison by lancing the wounds; which no one else can heal but he alone who gave walking to the lame, sight to the blind, cleansed stained limbs, and raised the dead.

6.24.22CSEL 19:575–576

ille ardorem cupiditatis extinguet, extirpabit libidines, inuidiam detrahet, iram mitigabit, ille reddet ueram et perpetuam sanitatem.

He will extinguish the heat of greed, root out lusts, remove envy, soothe anger; he will restore true and lasting health.

6.24.23CSEL 19:576

adpetenda est haec omnibus medicina, quoniam maiore periculo uexatur anima quam corpus et quam primum latentibus morbis adhibenda curatio est.

This medicine must be sought by all, since the soul is troubled by greater danger than the body, and treatment must be applied to hidden diseases as soon as possible.

6.24.24CSEL 19:576

neque enim si utatur aliquis oculorum acie clara, membris omnibus integris, firmissima totius corporis ualitudine, tamen eum dixerim sanum, si efferatur ira, superbia tumidus infletur, libidini seruiat, cupiditatibus inardescat:

For even if someone has clear sight, all his limbs sound, and the firmest health of his whole body, I would still not call him healthy if he is carried away by anger, swollen with pride, a slave to lust, burning with greed;

6.24.25CSEL 19:576

sed eum potius qui ad alienam felicitatem non attollat oculos, opes non admiretur, alienam mulierem sancte uideat, nihil omnino adpetat, nihil concupiscat alienum, non inuideat ulli, non fastidiat quemquam, sit humilis misericors beneficus mitis humanus, pax in animo eius perpetua uersetur: ille homo sanus, ille iustus, ille perfectus est.

but rather the one who does not lift his eyes to another's prosperity, does not admire wealth, looks on another's wife with purity, seeks nothing at all, covets nothing of another's, envies no one, despises no one, is humble, merciful, beneficent, gentle, humane, and in whose soul perpetual peace dwells: that man is healthy, that man is just, that man is perfect.

6.24.26CSEL 19:576

quisquis igitur his omnibus praeceptis caelestibus obtemperauerit, hic cultor est uerus dei, cuius sacrificia sunt mansuetudo animi et uita innocens et actus boni:

So whoever obeys all these heavenly precepts is a true worshipper of God, whose sacrifices are gentleness of soul, an innocent life, and good deeds.

6.24.27CSEL 19:576–577

quae omnia qui exhibet, totiens sacrificat, quotiens bonum aliquid ac pium fecerit. deus enim non desiderat uictimam neque muti animalis neque mortis ac sanguinis, sed hominis et uitae.

Whoever displays all these offers sacrifice as often as he does something good and pious. For God desires a victim not of a dumb animal, nor of death and blood, but of man and of life.

6.24.28CSEL 19:577

ad quod sacrificium neque uerbenis opus est neque februis neque cespitibus, quae sunt utique uanissima, sed iis quae de intimo pectore proferuntur.

For this sacrifice there is no need of sacred boughs, purifications, or altars of turf, which are surely most empty, but of those things that are brought forth from the inmost heart.

6.24.29CSEL 19:577

itaque in aram dei, quae uere maxima est et quae in corde hominis conlocata inquinari non potest sanguine, iustitia imponitur, patientia fides innocentia castitas abstinentia. hic est uerissimus ritus, haec illa lex dei, ut a Cicerone dictum est, praeclara et diuina, semper quae recta et honesta iubet, uetat praua et turpia: cui parentem sanctissimae ac certissimae legi iuste ac legitime necesse est uiuere.

So upon the altar of God, which is truly the greatest and which, set in the human heart, cannot be defiled with blood, are laid justice, patience, faith, innocence, chastity, and abstinence. This is the truest rite; this is that law of God, as Cicero said, "excellent and divine, which always commands what is right and honorable and forbids what is wrong and shameful"; whoever obeys this most holy and most certain law must live justly and lawfully.

6.24.30CSEL 19:577

cuius legis pauca equidem capita posui, quod sum pollicitus ea me tantummodo esse dicturum quae summum fastigium uirtuti et iustitiae imponerent.

I have set down only a few heads of this law, since I promised to speak only of those things that would put the highest summit on virtue and justice.

6.24.31CSEL 19:577

si quis uolet cetera omnia comprehendere, ex fonte ipso petat unde ad nos riuus iste manauit.

If anyone wishes to grasp all the rest, let him seek it from the very source from which this stream has flowed to us.

Divine 6, chapter 25

6.25.1CSEL 19:577

Nunc de sacrificio ipso pauca dicamus. ebur inquit Plato non castum donum deo. quid ergo? picta scilicet et texta pretiosa? immo uero non castum donum deo quidquid corrumpi, quidquid subripi potest.

Now let us say a few things about sacrifice itself. "Ivory," says Plato, "is not a chaste gift to God." What then? Paintings, no doubt, and costly weavings? On the contrary, whatever can be corrupted or stolen is not a chaste gift to God.

6.25.2CSEL 19:577

sed sicut hoc uidit, non oportere uiuenti offerri aliquid quod sit ex mortuo corpore, cur illud non uidit, non debere incorporali corporale munus offerri?

But just as he saw that nothing from a dead body should be offered to the living God, why did he not see that a bodily gift should not be offered to an incorporeal God?

6.25.3CSEL 19:577–578

quanto melius et uerius Seneca uultisne uos inquit deum cogitare magnum et placidum et maiestate leni uerendum, amicum et semper in proximo, non immolationibus nec sanguine multo colendum — quae enim ei trucidatione immerentium uoluptas est? —, sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito? non templa illi congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique consecrandus est pectore.

How much better and more truly Seneca: "Do you wish," he says, "to think of God as great and calm and to be revered with a gentle majesty, a friend always near, to be worshipped not with sacrifices and much blood (for what pleasure does he take in the slaughter of the innocent?) but with a pure mind and a good and honorable purpose? Temples are not to be built for him with stones piled high: he is to be consecrated in each one's own heart."

6.25.4CSEL 19:578

uestes igitur et gemmas et cetera quae habentur in pretio si quis putat deo cara, is plane quid sit deus nescit: cui putat uoluptati esse eas res quas etiam homo si contempserit, iure laudabitur.

So if anyone thinks that clothing, gems, and the other things held valuable are dear to God, he plainly does not know what God is, since he thinks those things please him which a man too will rightly be praised for despising.

6.25.5CSEL 19:578

quid ergo castum, quid deo dignum nisi quod ipse in illa diuina lege sua poposcit? duo sunt quae offerri debeant, donum et sacrificium, donum in perpetuum, sacrificium ad tempus.

What, then, is pure and worthy of God except what he himself has asked for in that divine law of his? There are two things that must be offered, a gift and a sacrifice: the gift for all time, the sacrifice for a time.

6.25.6CSEL 19:578

uerum apud istos, qui nullo modo rationem diuinitatis intellegunt, donum est quidquid auro argentoque fabricatur, item quidquid purpura et serico texitur, sacrificiumque uictima et quaecumque in ara cremantur.

But among these people, who in no way understand the nature of divinity, a gift is whatever is made of gold and silver, or woven of purple and silk; and a sacrifice is a victim and whatever is burned on the altar.

6.25.7CSEL 19:578

sed utroque non utitur deus, quia et ipse incorruptus est et illud totum corruptibile. itaque deo utrumque incorporale offerendum est, quo utitur. donum est integritas animi, sacrificium laus et hymnus; si enim deus non uidetur, ergo his rebus coli debet quae non uidentur. nulla igitur alia religio uera est nisi quae uirtute et iustitia constat.

But God uses neither, because he himself is incorruptible and all that is corruptible. So both must be offered to God in incorporeal form, which he can use. The gift is integrity of soul; the sacrifice is praise and a hymn. For if God is not seen, he must be worshipped with things that are not seen. So no other religion is true except that which consists of virtue and justice.

6.25.8CSEL 19:578

quomodo autem deus iustitia hominis utatur, intellectu facile est. si enim iustus fuerit homo, accepta immortalitate in aeternum deo seruiet.

How God uses man's justice is easy to understand. For if a man has been just, having received immortality he will serve God forever.

6.25.9CSEL 19:578–579

omnes autem non nisi ad iustitiam nasci cum philosophi ueteres tum etiam Cicero suspicatur. disserens enim de legibus sed omnium inquit quae in hominum doctorum disputatione uersantur, nihil est profecto praestabilius quam plane intellegi nos ad iustitiam esse natos. id ergo solum deo exhibere atque offerre debemus ad quod capiendum nos ipse generauit.

That all are born for nothing but justice was suspected both by the ancient philosophers and by Cicero. For in discussing the laws he says: "But of all that is discussed among learned men, nothing is surely more excellent than to understand clearly that we are born for justice." So we should display and offer to God that alone for the receiving of which he himself begot us.

6.25.10CSEL 19:579

hoc autem duplex sacrificii genus quam sit uerissimum, Trismegistus Hermes idoneus testis est, qui nobiscum, id est cum prophetis quos sequimur, tam re quam uerbis congruit. de iustitia sic locutus est: hoc uerbum, o fili, adora et cole. cultus autem dei unus est malum non esse.

How very true this twofold kind of sacrifice is, Hermes Trismegistus is a fit witness, who agrees with us, that is, with the prophets whom we follow, both in substance and in words. He spoke thus of justice: "This word, my son, adore and worship. And the worship of God is one: not to be evil."

6.25.11CSEL 19:579

item in illo sermone perfecto, cum exaudisset Asclepium quaerentem a filio suo utrum placeret patri eius proferri tus et alios odores ad sacrificium dei, exclamauit: bene, bene ominare, o Asclepi. est enim maxima inpietas tale quid de uno illo ac singulari bono in animum inducere. haec et his similia huic non conueniunt: omnium enim quaecumque sunt plenus est et omnium minime indigens. nos uero gratias agentes adoremus: huius enim sacrificium sola benedictio est. et recte.

Likewise in that Perfect Discourse, when he heard Asclepius asking his son whether it would please his father for incense and other perfumes to be brought for the sacrifice to God, he exclaimed: "Hush, hush, Asclepius! It is the greatest impiety to entertain any such thought about that one and only good. These things and things like them do not befit him; for he is full of all things that exist and least in need of any. But let us adore him giving thanks; for his sacrifice is blessing alone." And rightly.

6.25.12CSEL 19:579–580

uerbo enim sacrificari oportet deo, siquidem deus uerbum est, ut ipse confessus est. summus igitur colendi dei ritus est ex ore iusti hominis ad deum directa laudatio, quae tamen ipsa ut deo sit accepta, et humilitate et timore et deuotione maxima opus est, ne quis forte integritatis atque innocentiae fiduciam gerens tumoris et adrogantiae crimen incurrat eoque facto gratiam uirtutis amittat.

For sacrifice must be offered to God by word, since God is the Word, as he himself has confessed. So the highest rite of worshipping God is praise directed to God from the mouth of a just man; yet for this to be acceptable to God there is need of humility, fear, and the greatest devotion, lest anyone, trusting in his integrity and innocence, incur the charge of pride and arrogance and thereby lose the grace of virtue.

6.25.13CSEL 19:580

sed ut sit deo carus omnique macula careat, misericordiam dei semper inploret nihilque aliut precetur nisi peccatis suis ueniam, licet nulla sint.

But to be dear to God and free from every stain, let him always implore God's mercy and pray for nothing but pardon for his sins, even if he has none.

6.25.14CSEL 19:580

si quid aliut desiderauerit, non est opus dicto scienti quid uelimus: si quid ei boni euenerit, gratias agat, si quid mali, satisfaciat et id sibi ob peccata sua euenisse fateatur. et nihilo minus etiam in malis gratias agat et in bonis satisfaciat, ut idem sit semper et stabilis et immutabilis et inconcussus. nec tantum hoc in templo putet sibi esse faciendum, sed et domi et in ipso etiam cubili suo.

If he desires anything else, there is no need to say it to one who knows what we want. If anything good befalls him, let him give thanks; if anything bad, let him make satisfaction and confess that it befell him because of his sins. And nonetheless let him give thanks even in evils and make satisfaction in goods, so that he may be always the same, steady, unchangeable, and unshaken. Nor let him think he must do this only in the temple, but also at home and even in his own bed.

6.25.15CSEL 19:580

secum denique habeat deum semper in corde suo consecratum, quoniam ipse est dei templum.

In short, let him have God with him always, consecrated in his heart, since he himself is the temple of God.

6.25.16CSEL 19:580

quodsi deo, patri ac domino, hac adsiduitate, hoc obsequio, hac deuotione seruierit, consummata et perfecta iustitia est: quam qui tenuerit, hic, ut ante testati sumus, deo paruit, hic religioni atque officio suo satisfecit.

If he has served God, the Father and Lord, with this constancy, this obedience, this devotion, justice is complete and perfect; and whoever holds it, as we testified before, has obeyed God and has fulfilled his religion and his duty.

Divine 7, chapter 1

7.1.1CSEL 19:581

Bene habet, iacta sunt fundamenta, ut ait eximius orator. uerum nos non fundamenta solum iecimus quae firma et idonea essent operi perferendo, sed magnis robustisque molibus aedificium totum paene usque ad summa perduximus.

All is well: "the foundations have been laid," as the outstanding orator says. But we have not only laid foundations firm and fit to carry the work, but with great and strong masses have brought the whole building almost to the top.

7.1.2CSEL 19:581

restat, id quod est multo facilius, uel tegere uel ornare, sine quo tamen priora opera et inutilia sunt et ingrata.

What remains, which is much easier, is to roof it or adorn it; yet without this the earlier work is both useless and unwelcome.

7.1.3CSEL 19:581

nam quid prodest aut falsis religionibus liberari aut intellegere ueram? quid aut uanitatem falsae sapientiae peruidere aut quae sit uera cognoscere? quid, inquam, prodest caelestem illam iustitiam defendere? quid cum magnis difficultatibus cultum dei tenere, quae est summa uirtus, nisi eam diuinum praemium beatitudinis perpetuae subsequatur?

For what good is it to be freed from false religions or to understand the true one? What good to see through the emptiness of false wisdom or to know what the true is? What good, I say, to defend that heavenly justice, or to keep the worship of God, the highest virtue, with great difficulties, unless the divine reward of perpetual happiness follows it?

7.1.4CSEL 19:581

de qua nobis est in hoc libro disserendum, ne priora omnia irrita et infructuosa uideantur, si hoc cuius causa illa suscepta sunt incertum relinquamus, ne quis forte arbitretur tantos labores in cassum suscipi, dum eorum caelesti mercede diffidit, quam deus statuit ei qui haec suauia terrae bona prae sola nudaque uirtute contempserit.

We must discuss this in this book, lest all that went before seem vain and fruitless if we leave uncertain that for whose sake it was undertaken; lest anyone perhaps think such great labors are undertaken in vain, while he distrusts their heavenly reward, which God has appointed for the one who has despised these sweet goods of the earth in favor of bare and simple virtue.

7.1.5CSEL 19:581–582

satis et huic parti faciamus cum testimoniis diuinarum litterarum tum etiam probabilibus argumentis, ut aeque clarum sit et futura praesentibus et diuina terrenis et perpetua breuibus esse anteponenda, quoniam temporalia sunt praemia uitiorum, sempiterna uirtutum.

Let us satisfy this part too, both with testimonies from the divine writings and with probable arguments, so that it may be equally clear that the future is to be preferred to the present, the divine to the earthly, and the everlasting to the brief, since the rewards of vices are temporal and those of virtues everlasting.

7.1.6CSEL 19:582

exponam igitur rationem mundi, ut facile possit intellegi et quando et quare sit effectus a deo, quod Plato, qui de mundi fabricatione disseruit, nec scire poterat nec explicare: quippe qui caeleste mysterium, quod non nisi prophetis ac deo docente discitur, ignorabat ideoque in perpetuum dixit esse fabricatum. quod longe secus est, quoniam quidquid est solido et graui corpore ut initium cepit aliquando, ita finem capiat necesse est.

So I will set out the plan of the world, so that it can easily be understood both when and why it was made by God; which Plato, who discussed the making of the world, could neither know nor explain, since he did not know the heavenly mystery, which is learned only from the prophets with God teaching; and so he said it was made to last forever. That is far from true, since whatever consists of solid and heavy body, as it once took a beginning, must also come to an end.

7.1.7CSEL 19:582

nam Aristoteles, qui cum non uideret quemadmodum posset tanta rerum magnitudo interire, et hanc praescriptionem uellet effugere, semper ait fuisse mundum ac semper fu-

For Aristotle, since he did not see how so great a mass of things could perish and wished to escape this objection, said that the world always was and always will

7.1.8CSEL 19:582

turum, prorsus nihil uidit, quia quidquid est necesse est habuerit aliquando principium nec omnino quicquam potest esse nisi coeperit. nam cum terram et aquam et ignem disperire consumi extinguique uideamus, quae sunt utique mundi partes, intellegitur id totum esse mortale cuius sunt membra mortalia.

be, and saw nothing at all, because whatever exists must have had a beginning at some time, and nothing at all can exist unless it began. For since we see earth, water, and fire perish, be consumed, and be extinguished, which are certainly parts of the world, it is understood that the whole whose members are mortal is mortal.

7.1.9CSEL 19:582

ita fit ut natum sit quidquid potest interire. sed et omne quod sub uisum oculorum uenit, et corporale, ut ait Plato, et solubile sit necesse est.

So it follows that whatever can perish was born. And everything that comes under the sight of the eyes must also be, as Plato says, bodily and dissoluble.

7.1.10CSEL 19:582–583

unus igitur Epicurus auctore Democrito ueridicus in hac re fuit, qui ait et ortum aliquando et aliquando esse periturum. nec tamen rationem reddere ullam potuit aut quibus de causis tantum hoc opus aut quo tempore resoluatur.

So Epicurus alone, following Democritus, spoke the truth in this matter, saying that the world both arose at some time and will at some time perish. Yet he could give no reason why or at what time so great a work will be dissolved.

7.1.11CSEL 19:583

quod quoniam nobis deus reuelauit nec coniecturis id adsequimur sed traditione caelesti, docebimus sedulo, ut tandem studiosis ueritatis appareat non uidisse neque conprehendisse philosophos ueritatem, sed ita leuiter odoratos, ut tamen unde eos odor ille sapientiae tam suauis, tam iucundus adflauerit, nullo modo senserint.

Since God has revealed this to us and we reach it not by conjectures but by heavenly tradition, we will teach it carefully, so that it may at last be clear to those eager for truth that the philosophers did not see or grasp the truth, but caught so faint a scent of it that they in no way perceived from where that so sweet, so pleasant fragrance of wisdom had wafted to them.

7.1.12CSEL 19:583

interim necessarium puto admonere lecturos quod haec nostra quae tradimus prauae uitiosaeque mentes aut omnino non intellegent — hebetatur enim acies eorum terrenis cupiditatibus, quae sensus omnes grauant inbecillosque reddunt — aut etiamsi intellegent, dissimulabunt tamen et haec uera esse nolent, quia trahuntur a uitiis et scientes malis suis fauent, quorum suauitate capiuntur, et uirtutis uiam deserunt, cuius acerbitate offenduntur.

Meanwhile I think it necessary to warn readers that depraved and vicious minds will either not understand at all what we are handing on (for their keenness is dulled by earthly desires, which weigh down all the senses and make them weak), or, even if they understand, will pretend not to and will not want these things to be true, because they are dragged by vices and knowingly favor their evils, captured by their sweetness, and abandon the way of virtue, offended by its bitterness.

7.1.13CSEL 19:583–584

nam quia auaritia et opum inexplebili quadam siti flagrant, quia non possunt uenditis aut dilargitis quae amant tenui cultu uitam degere, sine dubio malunt id esse fictum quo desideriis suis renuntiare coguntur.

For since they burn with avarice and an insatiable thirst for wealth, and cannot sell or give away what they love and live a plain life, they doubtless prefer that to be fiction which would force them to renounce their desires.

7.1.14CSEL 19:584

item qui libidinum stimulis incitati, ut ait poeta, in furias ignemque ruunt, utique incredibilia nos adferre dicunt, quia uulnerant aures eorum praecepta continentiae, quae illos uoluptatibus suis prohibent quibus animam suam cum corpore adiudicauerunt.

Likewise those who, spurred by the goads of lust, "rush into frenzy and fire," as the poet says, surely say that we bring incredible things, because the precepts of self-control wound their ears, forbidding them the pleasures to which they have handed over their soul along with their body.

7.1.15CSEL 19:584

qui uero ambitione inflati aut amore potentiae inflammati omne studium suum ad honores adquirendos contulerunt, ne si solem quidem ipsum gestemus in manibus, fidem commodabunt ei doctrinae quae illos iubet omni potentia et honore contempto humiles uiuere atque ita humiles, ut et accipere iniuriam possint et referre nolint, si acceperint.

And those puffed up with ambition or inflamed with love of power, who have given all their effort to acquiring honors, would not trust a teaching that bids them despise all power and honor and live humbly, so humbly that they can receive injury and refuse to return it if they receive it, not even if we carried the sun itself in our hands.

7.1.16CSEL 19:584

hi sunt homines qui contra ueritatem clausis oculis quoquo modo latrant. qui autem sani erunt, id est non ita uitiis inmersi, ut insanabiles sint, et credent his et libenter accedent, et quaecumque dicimus aperta plana simplicia et, quod maxime opus est, uera et inexpugnabilia illis uidebuntur.

These are the people who bark against the truth with closed eyes in any way they can. But those who are sound, that is, not so sunk in vices as to be incurable, will both believe these things and gladly come to them, and whatever we say will seem to them open, plain, simple, and, what is most needed, true and unassailable.

7.1.17CSEL 19:584

nemo uirtuti fauet nisi qui sequi potest, sequi autem non facile est omnibus: ii possunt quos paupertas et rerum indigentia exercuit et capaces uirtutis effecit.

No one favors virtue except one who can follow it; and following is not easy for all. Those can whom poverty and want have trained and made capable of virtue.

7.1.18CSEL 19:584

nam si uirtus est tolerantia malorum, non capiunt ergo uirtutem qui semper in bonis fuerunt, quia mala neque experti sunt neque ferre possunt adsuetudine ac desiderio bonorum, quae sola nouerunt.

For if virtue is the endurance of evils, those who have always been among goods do not possess virtue, because they have not experienced evils and cannot bear them, through habit and longing for the goods, which alone they have known.

7.1.19CSEL 19:584–585

eo fit ut pauperes et humiles deo credant facilius, qui sunt expediti, quam diuites, qui sunt inpedimentis pluribus inplicati. immo uero catenati et conpediti seruiunt ad nutum dominae cupiditatis, quae illos inextricabilibus uinculis inretiuit, nec possunt in caelum aspicere, quoniam mens eorum in terram prona humique defixa est.

So it happens that the poor and lowly believe God more easily, being unencumbered, than the rich, who are entangled in many impediments; indeed, chained and fettered, they serve at the nod of their mistress, desire, who has ensnared them in inextricable bonds; nor can they look up to heaven, since their mind is bent toward the earth and fixed on the ground.

7.1.20CSEL 19:585

uirtutis autem uia non capit magna onera gestantes: angustus admodum trames est per quem iustitia hominem deducit in caelum, hunc tenere non potest nisi qui fuerit expeditus ac nudus.

But the way of virtue does not admit those carrying great burdens: very narrow is the path by which justice leads man to heaven; no one can keep to it unless he is unencumbered and bare.

7.1.21CSEL 19:585

nam isti locupletes multis et ingentibus sarcinis onerati per uiam mortis incedunt, quae latissima est, quoniam late perditio dominatur.

For those rich men, loaded with many huge packs, walk along the way of death, which is very broad, since perdition rules widely.

7.1.22CSEL 19:585

his acerba sunt, his uenena quae deus ad iustitiam praecipit quaeque nos dei magisterio de uirtute ac ueritate disserimus. quibus si repugnare audebunt, hostes se necesse est uirtutis iustitiaeque fateantur.

To them the things God commands for justice, and the things we discuss about virtue and truth under God's teaching, are bitter, are poison. If they dare to oppose them, they must confess themselves enemies of virtue and justice.

7.1.23CSEL 19:585

Adgrediar nunc quod superest, ut finis operi possit inponi, id autem superest ut de iudicio dei disseramus: quod tum constituetur, cum dominus noster redierit in terram, ut uni cuique pro merito aut praemium persoluat aut poenam.

I will now approach what remains, so that an end may be put to the work. What remains is to discuss the judgment of God, which will be established when our Lord returns to earth to pay each one, according to his merit, either reward or punishment.

7.1.24CSEL 19:585

itaque ut in quarto libro de primo aduentu eius diximus, sic in hoc secundum referemus aduentum, quem Iudaei quoque et confitentur et sperant, sed frustra, quoniam necesse est ad eos consolandos reuertatur ad quos conuocandos prius uenerat.

So as in the fourth book we spoke of his first coming, so in this we will report the second coming, which the Jews too both confess and hope for, but in vain, since he must return to console those whom he had first come to call together.

7.1.25CSEL 19:585

nam qui uiolarunt impie humilem, sentient in potestate uictorem eaque omnia quae legunt et non intellegunt deo repensante patientur, quippe qui peccatis omnibus inquinati et insuper sancto cruore perfusi ab illo ipso cui nefandas manus intulerunt sint ad aeterna supplicia destinati.

For those who impiously violated him when humble will feel him victorious in power, and they will suffer, with God repaying, all that they read and do not understand, since, stained with every sin and moreover drenched with holy blood, they are destined to eternal punishments by the very one on whom they laid their wicked hands.

7.1.26CSEL 19:585

sed erit nobis contra Iudaeos separata materia, in qua illos erroris et sceleris reuincemus.

But we will have a separate work against the Jews, in which we will convict them of error and crime.

Divine 7, chapter 2

7.2.1CSEL 19:585–586

Nunc ignaros ueritatis instruamus. dispositione summi dei sic ordinatum, ut iniustum hoc saeculum decurso temporum spatio terminum sumat extinctaque protinus omni malitia et piorum animis ad beatam uitam reuocatis quietum tranquillum pacificum, aureum denique ut poetae uocant saeculum deo ipso regnante florescat.

Now let us instruct those ignorant of the truth. By the arrangement of the supreme God it has been ordained that this unjust age, when its span of time has run out, will come to an end; and, with all wickedness immediately extinguished and the souls of the pious called back to a happy life, a quiet, tranquil, peaceful age, golden, as the poets call it, will flourish with God himself reigning.

7.2.2CSEL 19:586

in primis causa errorum omnium philosophis haec fuit, quod rationem mundi, quae totam sapientiam continet, non conprehenderunt.

In the first place, the cause of all the philosophers' errors was that they did not grasp the plan of the world, which contains all wisdom.

7.2.3CSEL 19:586

ea uero sensu proprio et interna intellegentia non potest conprehendi: quod illi sine doctore per se ipsos facere noluerunt. itaque in uarias sibique saepe contrarias sententias inciderunt ex quibus exitum non haberent, et in eodem luto, sicut comicus ait, haesitauerunt, scilicet adsumtionibus eorum non respondente ratione, cum adsumpsissent quidem uera, sed quae adfirmari probarique non possent sine scientia ueritatis rerumque caelestium: quae, ut saepe iam dixi, non potest esse in homine nisi deo docente percepta.

That cannot be grasped by one's own sense and inner understanding, which they were unwilling to do without a teacher, by themselves. So they fell into various and often contradictory opinions from which they had no way out, and they stuck, as the comic poet says, "in the same mud," since reasoning did not correspond to their premises; for they had assumed true things, but ones that could not be affirmed and proved without knowledge of the truth and of heavenly things, which, as I have often said, cannot be found in man unless received with God teaching.

7.2.4CSEL 19:586

nam si potest homo intellegere diuina, poterit et facere: nam intellegere est quasi e uestigio subsequi. non potest autem facere quae deus, quia mortali corpore indutus est, ergo ne intellegere quidem potest quae facit deus: quod an fieri possit, ex inmensitate rerum atque operum diuinorum facile est uni cuique metiri.

For if man could understand divine things, he could also do them; for to understand is, as it were, to follow in the footsteps. But he cannot do what God does, because he is clothed in a mortal body; so neither can he understand what God does. Whether this can be done, each can easily measure from the immensity of things and of divine works.

7.2.5CSEL 19:586

nam si mundum cum omnibus quae sunt in eo contemplari uelis, intellegas profecto quantum dei opus humanis operibus antistet. ita quantum inter opera diuina et humana interest, tantum distare inter dei hominisque sapientiam necesse est.

For if you wish to contemplate the world with all that is in it, you will surely understand how far God's work surpasses human works. So as great as the difference between divine and human works is, so far must the wisdom of God and of man differ.

7.2.6CSEL 19:586–587

nam quia deus incorruptus atque inmortalis est et ideo perfectus, quia sempiternus est, sapientia quoque eius perinde ut ipse perfecta est nec obstare illi quicquam potest, quia nulli rei deus ipse subiectus est.

For since God is incorruptible and immortal, and therefore perfect because everlasting, his wisdom too is perfect as he is, and nothing can hinder it, since God himself is subject to nothing.

7.2.7CSEL 19:587

homo autem quia subiectus est passioni, subiecta est et sapientia eius errori, et sicut hominis uitam multae res inpediunt, quominus possit esse perpetua, ita sapientiam quoque eius multis rebus inpediri necesse est, quominus in perspicienda penitus ueritate perfecta sit.

But man, since he is subject to suffering, has his wisdom subject to error; and just as many things hinder human life from being perpetual, so his wisdom must be hindered by many things from being perfect in seeing the truth thoroughly.

7.2.8CSEL 19:587

ergo nulla est humana sapientia, si per se ad notionem ueri scientiamque nitatur, quoniam mens hominis cum fragili corpore inligata et in tenebroso domicilio inclusa neque liberius euagari neque clarius perspicere ueritatem potest, cuius notitia diuinae condicionis est. deo enim soli opera sua nota sunt.

So there is no human wisdom if it strives by itself toward the knowledge and understanding of truth, since the human mind, bound to a fragile body and shut in a dark dwelling, can neither roam more freely nor see more clearly the truth, knowledge of which belongs to the divine condition. For to God alone his works are known.

7.2.9CSEL 19:587

homo autem non cogitando aut disputando adsequi eam potest, sed discendo et audiendo ab eo qui scire solus potest et docere.

But man can attain it not by thinking or arguing but by learning and hearing from him who alone can know and teach.

7.2.10CSEL 19:587

ideo Marcus Tullius sententiam Socratis de Platone transferens dicentis uenisse tempus ut ipse migraret e uita, illos autem aput quos causam suam perorabat agere uitam, utrum melius sit, inquit dii immortales sciunt, hominem arbitror scire neminem.

So Marcus Tullius, translating from Plato the saying of Socrates, who said the time had come for him to depart from life and for those before whom he had pleaded his case to go on living, says: "Which is better, the immortal gods know; I think no man knows."

7.2.11CSEL 19:587

quare necesse est omnes philosophiae sectas alienas esse a ueritate, quia homines erant qui eas constituerunt, nec ullum fundamentum aut firmitatem possunt habere quae nullis diuinarum uocum fulciuntur oraculis.

So all schools of philosophy must be strangers to truth, because they were men who founded them, and those things can have no foundation or firmness which are supported by no oracles of divine voices.

Divine 7, chapter 3

7.3.1CSEL 19:587–588

Et quoniam de philosophorum erroribus loquimur, Stoici naturam in duas partes diuidunt, unam quae efficiat, alteram quae se ad faciendum tractabilem praebeat: in illa prima esse uim sentiendi, in hac materiam nec alterum sine altero (quicquam) posse.

And since we are speaking of the errors of the philosophers, the Stoics divide nature into two parts, one that acts and the other that lends itself to be acted on: in the first is the power of sensation, in the second matter, and neither can do anything without the other.

7.3.2CSEL 19:588

quomodo potest idem esse quod tractat et quod tractatur? si quis dicat idem esse figulum quod lutum aut lutum idem esse quod figulum, nonne aperte insanire uideatur?

How can the same thing be what handles and what is handled? If anyone said the potter is the same as the clay, or the clay the same as the potter, would he not plainly seem mad?

7.3.3CSEL 19:588

at isti uno naturae nomine duas res diuersissimas conprehendunt, deum et mundum, artificem et opus, dicuntque alterum sine altero nihil posse, tamquam natura sit deus mundo permixtus. nam interdum sic confundunt, ut sit deus ipse mens mundi et mundus sit corpus dei, quasi uero simul esse coeperint mundus et deus ac non ipse mundum fecerit.

But these men include under the one name of nature two very different things, God and the world, the maker and the work, and say that neither can do anything without the other, as if nature were God mixed with the world. For sometimes they so confuse them that God is the mind of the world and the world is the body of God; as if the world and God began to exist together, and he did not make the world.

7.3.4CSEL 19:588

quod et ipsi fatentur alias, cum hominum causa praedicant esse fabricatum, et esse sine mundo, si uelit, possit, siquidem deus est diuina et aeterna mens, a corpore soluta et libera. cuius uim maiestatemque quoniam intellegere non poterant, miscuerunt eum mundo id est operi suo.

This they themselves admit elsewhere, when they proclaim that it was made for the sake of human beings, and that he could exist without the world if he wished, since God is a divine and eternal mind, released and free from body. Since they could not understand his power and majesty, they mixed him with the world, that is, with his own work.

7.3.5CSEL 19:588

unde est illud Vergilianum: totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet.

Hence that line of Virgil: "and mind, poured through the limbs, moves the whole mass and mingles with the great body."

7.3.6CSEL 19:588

ubi est ergo illud quod idem ipsi aiunt, et factum esse diuina prouidentia et regi? si enim fecit mundum, fuit ergo sine mundo; si regit, non utique sicut mens corpus regit, sed tamquam domum dominus, nauem gubernator, auriga currum, nec tamen mixti sunt iis rebus quas regunt.

Where then is what they themselves say, that the world was both made and is ruled by divine providence? For if he made the world, then he existed without the world; if he rules it, surely not as a mind rules a body, but as a master rules a house, a helmsman a ship, a driver a chariot; yet these are not mixed with the things they rule.

7.3.7CSEL 19:588–589

nam si haec omnia quae uidemus dei membra sunt, iam insensibilis ab his constituitur deus, quoniam membra sensu carent, et mortalis, quoniam uidemus membra esse mortalia.

For if all these things we see are members of God, then God is made insensible by them, since members lack sensation, and mortal, since we see that the members are mortal.

7.3.8CSEL 19:589

possum enumerare quotiens repentinis quassatae motibus uel hiauerint terrae uel desederint in abruptum, quotiens demersae fluctibus et urbes et insulae abierint in profundum, frugiferos campos paludes inundauerint, flumina et stagna siccauerint, montes etiam uel deciderint abrupti uel planis fuerint adaequati; plurimas regiones et multorum fundamenta montium latens et internus ignis absumit.

I could list how often lands, shaken by sudden quakes, have gaped open or sunk into chasms; how often cities and islands, overwhelmed by waves, have gone down into the deep; how often marshes have flooded fruitful fields, and rivers and lakes have dried up; how mountains have fallen away or been leveled with the plains; hidden inner fire consumes many regions and the foundations of many mountains.

7.3.9CSEL 19:589

et hoc parum est si membris suis non parcit deus, nisi etiam homini liceat aliquid in dei corpus: maria extruuntur, montes exciduntur et ad eruendas opes interiora terrae uiscera effodiuntur. quid quod ne arari quidem sine laceratione diuini corporis potest? ut iam scelerati atque impii simus, qui dei membra uiolemus.

And this is too little, if God does not spare his own members, unless man too may do something against the body of God: seas are built over, mountains cut away, and the inner parts of the earth dug out to extract wealth. What of the fact that the ground cannot even be ploughed without tearing the divine body? So we are already wicked and impious for violating the members of God.

7.3.10CSEL 19:589

patiturne ergo uexari corpus suum deus et debilem se uel ipse facit uel ab homine fieri sinit? nisi forte diuinus ille sensus qui mundo et omnibus mundi partibus mixtus est, primam terrae superficiem reliquit ac se in ima demersit, ne quid doloris de adsidua laceratione sentiret.

Does God then allow his body to be harassed, and does he either make himself weak or let man make him so? Unless perhaps that divine sense, mixed with the world and all its parts, has left the surface of the earth and sunk itself into the depths, so as to feel no pain from the constant laceration.

7.3.11CSEL 19:589

quodsi hoc uanum et absurdum est, tam igitur ipsi eguerunt quam haec indigent sensu, qui non perspexerunt diuinum quidem spiritum esse ubique diffusum eoque omnia contineri, non tamen ita, ut deus ipse, qui est incorruptus, grauibus et corruptibilibus elementis misceatur.

But if this is empty and absurd, then they themselves lacked sense as much as these things lack it, since they did not perceive that the divine spirit is indeed spread everywhere and all things are held together by it, yet not so that God himself, who is incorruptible, is mixed with heavy and corruptible elements.

7.3.12CSEL 19:589–590

illut ergo rectius quod a Platone sumpserunt, a deo factum esse mundum et eiusdem prouidentia gubernari. oportebat igitur et Platonem et eos qui idem senserunt, docere atque explicare quae causa, quae ratio fuerit tanti operis fabricandi, quare hoc aut cuius gratia fecerit.

So what they took from Plato is more correct, that the world was made by God and is governed by his providence. Plato and those who thought the same should then have taught and explained what the cause and reason was for making so great a work, why he made it, or for whose sake.

7.3.13CSEL 19:590

at idem Stoici hominum inquiunt causa mundus effectus est. audio. sed Epicurus ignorat ipsos homines quare aut quis effecerit. nam Lucretius cum mundum diceret non esse a diis constitutum, sic ait: dicere porro hominum causa uoluisse parare praeclaram mundi naturam deinde intulit desipere est. quid enim inmortalibus atque beatis gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, ut nostra quicquam causa gerere adgrediantur?

"But," the same Stoics say, "the world was made for the sake of human beings." I hear it. But Epicurus does not know why or by whom human beings themselves were made. For Lucretius, saying the world was not established by the gods, speaks thus: "To say, moreover, that they wished to prepare the glorious nature of the world for the sake of men"; then he added: "is folly. For what profit could our thanks bestow on immortal and blessed beings, that they should undertake to do anything for our sake?"

7.3.14CSEL 19:590

merito. illi enim nullam rationem adferebant cur humanum genus uel creatum uel constitutum esset a deo: nostrum hoc officium est, sacramentum mundi et hominis exponere, cuius illi expertes sacrarium ueritatis nec attingere nec uidere potuerunt.

Rightly so. For they gave no reason why the human race was created or established by God. This is our task: to set out the mystery of the world and of man, which they did not share, and so could neither touch nor see the sanctuary of truth.

7.3.15CSEL 19:590

ergo, ut paulo ante dicebam, cum adsumpsissent id quod erat uerum, id est mundum a deo (factum) et hominum causa esse factum, tamen quoniam eos in consequentibus ratio defecit, non potuerunt defendere id quod adsumpserant.

So, as I was saying a little before, though they assumed what was true, namely that the world was made by God and made for the sake of human beings, yet since reasoning failed them in what followed, they could not defend what they had assumed.

7.3.16CSEL 19:590–591

denique Plato ne dei opus inbecillum et ruinosum faceret, in aeternum dixit esse mansurum. si hominum causa factus est et ita factus est, ut esset aeternus, cur ergo ipsi quorum causa factus est non sunt sempiterni? si mortales, propter quos factus est, ergo et ipse mortalis atque solubilis: neque enim pluris est ipse quam ii quorum gratia factus est.

Finally Plato, so as not to make God's work weak and ruinous, said it would last forever. If it was made for the sake of human beings, and made so as to be eternal, why then are those for whose sake it was made not everlasting? If those for whom it was made are mortal, then it too is mortal and dissoluble; for it is not worth more than those for whose sake it was made.

7.3.17CSEL 19:591

quodsi ei ratio quadraret, intellegeret periturum esse quia factus est, nec posse in aeternum manere nisi quod tangi non potest.

But if his reasoning had fitted together, he would have understood that it will perish because it was made, and that nothing can last forever except what cannot be touched.

7.3.18CSEL 19:591

qui autem negat hominum causa factum, hic nullam rationem tenet. si enim dicit ipsum fabricatorem sua causa tanta haec opera esse molitum, cur ergo nos nati sumus? cur mundo ipso fruimur? quid sibi uult humani generis ceterarumque animantium fictio? cur aliena commoda intercipimus? cur denique augemur minuimur interimus?

But whoever denies it was made for human beings holds no reason at all. For if he says that the maker himself undertook these great works for his own sake, why then were we born? Why do we enjoy the world itself? What is the point of forming the human race and other living beings? Why do we take advantages meant for another? Why, finally, do we grow, decline, and die?

7.3.19CSEL 19:591

quid habet rationis ipsa generatio? quid perpetua successio? nimirum uidere deus uoluit et suis uariis imaginibus tamquam sigilla confingere quibus se oblectaret: et nihilominus tamen, si ita esset, curae haberet animantes praecipueque hominem, cuius imperio cuncta subiecit.

What reason does generation itself have? What does perpetual succession have? No doubt God wanted to watch and to fashion his various images like figurines to amuse himself; and yet even if that were so, he would care for living beings and especially for man, to whose rule he subjected all things.

7.3.20CSEL 19:591

qui autem dicunt semper fuisse mundum — omitto illut, quod esse ipsum sine aliquo principio non potest; unde se extricare non queunt — sed hoc dico: si mundus semper fuit, nullam potest habere rationem.

As for those who say the world always existed (I pass over the fact that it cannot exist without some beginning, from which they cannot extricate themselves), I say this: if the world always existed, it can have no reason.

7.3.21CSEL 19:591–592

quid enim potuit in eo ratio moliri quod numquam sumpsit exordium? nam priusquam fiat aliquid aut struatur, opus est consilio, ut disponi possit quemadmodum fiat, nec incipi quicquam potest sine prouisione rationis.

For what could reason accomplish in what never took a beginning? For before anything is made or built, planning is needed so that it can be arranged how it is to be made; nothing can be begun without the forethought of reason.

7.3.22CSEL 19:592

itaque omne opus ratio praecedit: non habet ergo rationem quod factum non est. atquin mundus habet rationem, quia et constat et regitur: ergo factus est; si factus est, et resoluetur.

So reason precedes every work: what was not made has no reason. But the world has reason, because it both stands and is governed; so it was made; if it was made, it will also be dissolved.

7.3.23CSEL 19:592

reddant ergo isti rationem, si possunt, cur aut factus in principio sit aut postea resoluatur. quod quia docere non poterat Epicurus siue Democritus, sua sponte natum esse dixit seminibus inter se passim coeuntibus: quibus iterum resolutis discidium atque interitum secuturum.

So let them give the reason, if they can, why it was made in the beginning or will afterward be dissolved. Because Epicurus, or Democritus, could not teach this, he said it arose of its own accord from seeds coming together at random, and that when they came apart again, separation and destruction would follow.

7.3.24CSEL 19:592

corrupit ergo quod recte uiderat et totam rationem penitus ignorantia rationis euertit redegitque mundum et omnia quae in eo geruntur ad similitudinem cuiusdam uanissimi somnii, siquidem rebus humanis ratio nulla subsistet.

So he spoiled what he had seen rightly, and through ignorance of reason overturned the whole reason completely, and reduced the world and all that happens in it to the likeness of some most empty dream, since no reason would remain in human affairs.

7.3.25CSEL 19:592–593

cum uero mundum omnesque partes eius ut uidemus mirabilis ratio gubernet, cum caeli temperatio et aequalis in ipsa uarietate cursus astrorum luminumque caelestium, temporum constans ac mira descriptio, terrarum uaria fecunditas, plana camporum, munimenta et aggeres montium, uiriditas ubertasque siluarum, fontium saluberrima eruptio, fluminum opportuna inundatio, maris opulenta et copiosa interfusio, uentorum diuersa et utilis aspiratio ceteraque omnia ratione summa constent, quis tam caecus est ut existimet sine causa esse facta in quibus mira dispositio prouidentissimae rationis elucet?

But since, as we see, a wonderful reason governs the world and all its parts; since the temperate climate of heaven, the regular course, amid variety itself, of the stars and heavenly lights, the constant and wonderful ordering of the seasons, the varied fertility of lands, the level plains, the defenses and ramparts of mountains, the greenness and richness of forests, the most healthful bursting forth of springs, the timely flooding of rivers, the rich and abundant spreading of the sea, the diverse and useful blowing of winds, and all the rest consist by the highest reason, who is so blind as to think these made without cause, in which the wonderful arrangement of a most provident reason shines forth?

7.3.26CSEL 19:593

si ergo sine causa nec est nec fit omnino quicquam, si et prouidentia summi dei ex dispositione rerum et uirtus ex magnitudine et potestas ex gubernatione manifesta est, hebetes ergo et insani qui prouidentiam non esse dixerunt. non inprobarem, si deos idcirco non esse dicerent ut unum dicerent, cum autem ideo ut nullum, qui eos delirasse non putat, ipse delirat.

If, then, nothing at all exists or happens without cause, if the providence of the supreme God is manifest from the arrangement of things, his power from their greatness, and his might from their government, then those who said there is no providence are dull and mad. I would not disapprove if they said there are no gods in order to say there is one; but when they say so in order to say there is none, whoever does not think them raving is raving himself.

Divine 7, chapter 4

7.4.1CSEL 19:593

Sed de prouidentia satis in primo libro diximus: quae si est, ut apparet ex mirabilitate operum suorum, necesse est etiam hominem ceterasque animantes eadem prouidentia creauerit.

But we spoke enough about providence in the first book. If it exists, as is clear from the wonder of its works, then the same providence must also have created man and the other living beings.

7.4.2CSEL 19:593

uideamus ergo quae ratio fuerit fingendi generis humani, quoniam constat, id quod Stoici aiunt, hominum causa mundum esse fabricatum; quamquam in hoc ipso non mediocriter peccent, quod non hominis causa dicunt, sed hominum: unius enim singularis appellatio totum conprehendit humanum genus.

Let us see, then, what was the reason for forming the human race, since it is agreed, as the Stoics say, that the world was made for the sake of human beings; although in this very point they err not a little, in saying "for the sake of men" rather than "of man"; for the singular name of one man comprehends the whole human race.

7.4.3CSEL 19:593

sed hoc ideo, quia ignorant unum hominem a deo esse formatum putantque homines in omnibus terris et agris tamquam fungos esse generatos. at Hermes non ignorauit hominem et a deo et ad dei similitudinem fictum. sed redeo ad propositum.

But they say this because they do not know that one man was formed by God, and they think that men sprang up in all lands and fields like mushrooms. But Hermes was not ignorant that man was formed both by God and in the likeness of God. But I return to my purpose.

7.4.4CSEL 19:593

nihil est, ut opinor, quod sit propter se ipsum factum, sed quidquid omnino fit, ad usum aliquem fieri necesse est. quis est enim uel tam ineptus uel tam otiosus, ut adgrediatur aliquid facere frustra ex quo nullam utilitatem, nullum commodum speret?

Nothing, in my view, is made for its own sake; whatever is made at all must be made for some use. For who is so foolish or so idle as to set about making something in vain, from which he hopes for no use and no benefit?

7.4.5CSEL 19:593–594

qui domum aedificat, non idcirco aedificat, ut tantummodo domus sit, sed ut in ea possit habitari; qui nauem fabricat, non ideo insumit operam, ut tantum nauis appareat, sed ut in ea nauigetur;

Whoever builds a house does not build it only so that it may be a house, but so that it may be lived in; whoever builds a ship does not spend his labor only so that a ship may appear, but so that people may sail in it;

7.4.6CSEL 19:594

item qui uas aliquod instituit ac format, non propterea id facit, ut tantum fecisse uideatur, sed ut uas illut effectum capiat aliquod necessarium. similiter cetera quaecumque fiunt, non utique in superuacuum, sed ad usus aliquos utiles laborantur.

likewise whoever designs and shapes a vessel does not do it only to seem to have made it, but so that the finished vessel may hold something necessary. Similarly all other things that are made are worked on not in vain but for some useful purposes.

7.4.7CSEL 19:594

mundus igitur a deo factus est non utique propter ipsum mundum: neque enim aut calore solis aut lumine lunae aut adspiratione uentorum aut umore imbrium aut alimonia frugum, cum sensu careat, indiget.

So the world was made by God certainly not for the sake of the world itself; for since it lacks sensation, it does not need the heat of the sun, the light of the moon, the breath of the winds, the moisture of rains, or the nourishment of crops.

7.4.8CSEL 19:594

sed ne illut quidem dici potest, quod deus propter se ipsum fecerit mundum, quoniam potest esse sine mundo, sicut fuit antea, et iis omnibus quae in eo sunt quaeque generantur deus ipse non utitur.

But neither can it be said that God made the world for his own sake, since he can exist without the world, as he did before, and God himself does not use all the things that are in it and are produced.

7.4.9CSEL 19:594

apparet ergo animantium causa mundum esse constructum, quoniam rebus iis quibus constat animantes fruuntur: quae ut uiuere, ut constare possint, omnia iis necessaria temporibus certis sumministrantur.

So it is clear that the world was built for the sake of living beings, since living beings enjoy the things of which it consists; and so that they can live and subsist, all that they need is supplied at fixed times.

7.4.10CSEL 19:594

rursus ceteras animantes hominis causa esse fictas ex eo clarum est, quod homini seruiunt et tutelae eius atque usibus datae sunt, quoniam, siue terrenae sunt siue aquatiles, non sentiunt mundi rationem, sicut homo.

Again, that the other living beings were formed for the sake of man is clear from this: they serve man and were given for his protection and use, since, whether land or water creatures, they do not perceive the plan of the world as man does.

7.4.11CSEL 19:594

respondendum est hoc loco philosophis maximeque Ciceroni, qui ait: cur deus omnia nostra causa cum faceret, tantam uim natricum uiperarumque fecerit? cur tam multa pestifera terra marique disperserit?

Here we must answer the philosophers, and especially Cicero, who says: "Why, when God made all things for our sake, did he make such a multitude of water snakes and vipers? Why did he scatter so many harmful things over land and sea?"

7.4.12CSEL 19:594–595

ingens ad disputandum locus, sed ut in transcursu breuiter stringendus est. quoniam homo ex rebus diuersis ac repugnantibus configuratus est, anima et corpore, id est caelo atque terra, tenui et conprehensibili, aeterno ac temporali, sensibili atque bruto, luce praedito atque tenebroso, ipsa ratio ac necessitas exigebat et bona homini proponi et mala, bona, quibus utatur, mala, quae uitet et caueat.

A huge field for discussion, but it must be touched briefly, as in passing. Since man is formed of different and opposing things, soul and body, that is, heaven and earth, the subtle and the tangible, the eternal and the temporal, the sensate and the brute, the endowed with light and the dark, reason itself and necessity required that both goods and evils be set before man: goods for him to use, evils for him to avoid and beware of.

7.4.13CSEL 19:595

idcirco enim data est illi sapientia, ut cognita bonorum malorumque natura et in adpetendis bonis et in malis declinandis uim suae rationis exerceat. nam ceteris animalibus quia sapientia non data est, et munita indumentis naturalibus et armata sunt, homini autem pro his omnibus, quod erat praecipuum, rationem solam dedit.

For wisdom was given him so that, knowing the nature of goods and evils, he might exercise the power of his reason both in seeking goods and in turning from evils. For since wisdom was not given to the other animals, they were both protected with natural coverings and armed; but to man, in place of all these, God gave what was chief: reason alone.

7.4.14CSEL 19:595

itaque nudum formauit et inermem, ut eum sapientia et muniret et tegeret: munimenta et ornatum eius non foris, sed intus, non in corpore, sed in corde constituit. nisi ergo essent mala, quae caueret, quae a bonis utilibusque distingueret, non esset ei sapientia necessaria.

So he formed him naked and unarmed, so that wisdom might both protect and cover him; he set his defenses and adornment not outside but within, not in the body but in the heart. So unless there were evils for him to beware of and distinguish from goods and useful things, he would not need wisdom.

7.4.15CSEL 19:595

sciat ergo Marcus Tullius aut ideo homini datam esse rationem, ut et pisces caperet usus sui gratia et natrices uiperasque uitaret salutis suae causa, aut idcirco ei bona malaque proposita, quia sapientiam acceperat, cuius uis omnis in discernendis bonis malisque uersatur.

So let Marcus Tullius know that either reason was given to man so that he might catch fish for his use and avoid water snakes and vipers for his safety, or goods and evils were set before him because he had received wisdom, whose whole force lies in distinguishing goods and evils.

7.4.16CSEL 19:595

magna igitur et recta et admirabilis est uis et ratio et potestas hominis, propter quem mundum ipsum et uniuersa quaecumque sunt deus fecit tantumque illi honoris habuit, ut eum praeficeret uniuersis, quoniam solus poterat dei opera mirari.

Great, then, and right and admirable is the power, reason, and might of man, for whose sake God made the world itself and all that exists, and whom he held in such honor as to set him over all things, since he alone could admire the works of God.

7.4.17CSEL 19:595–596

optime igitur Asclepiades noster de prouidentia summi dei disserens in eo libro quem scripsit ad me, atque ideo inquit merito quis arbitretur proximum sibi locum diuinam prouidentiam dedisse ei qui potuerit intellegere ordinationem suam.

So our friend Asclepiades, discussing the providence of the supreme God in the book he wrote to me, said excellently: "And therefore one may rightly think that divine providence gave the place nearest to itself to the one who could understand its ordering.

7.4.18CSEL 19:596

nam sol iste est: quis eum uidet ita, ut intellegat quia sol est et quantum gratiae adferat ceteris institutis? hoc caelum est: quis id suspicit? terra haec: quis eam colit? hoc pelagus: quis id nauigat?

For there is the sun: who sees it so as to understand that it is the sun and how much benefit it brings to the rest of creation? This is the sky: who looks up at it? This is the earth: who tills it? This is the sea: who sails it?

7.4.19CSEL 19:596

hic ignis est: quis eo utitur? instituit ergo <cuncta.> summus deus non propter se, quia nihilo eget, sed propter hominem, qui iis congruenter uteretur.

This is fire: who uses it?" So the supreme God established all things not for his own sake, since he needs nothing, but for the sake of man, who would use them fittingly.

Divine 7, chapter 5

7.5.1CSEL 19:596

Reddamus nunc rationem quare hominem ipsum fecerit: quod si philosophi scissent, aut defendissent illa quae uera inuenerant aut in maximos errores non incidissent.

Let us now give the reason why he made man himself; if the philosophers had known it, they would either have defended the true things they had found or not have fallen into the greatest errors.

7.5.2CSEL 19:596

haec enim summa, hic cardo rerum est, quem qui non tenuerit, ueritas illi omnis elabitur, hoc est denique, quod efficiat illis non quadrare rationem: quae illis si adfulsisset, si sacramentum hominis omne cognossent, numquam disputationes eorum et omnem philosophiam de transuerso Academia iugulasset.

For this is the sum, this the hinge of things; whoever does not hold it lets all truth slip away. This, in short, is what makes their reasoning not fit together; if it had shone upon them, if they had known the whole mystery of man, the Academy would never have cut the throat of their arguments and all philosophy from the side.

7.5.3CSEL 19:596

sicut ergo mundum non propter se deus fecit, quia commodis eius non indiget, sed propter hominem, qui eo utitur, ita ipsum hominem propter se.

So just as God made the world not for his own sake, since he does not need its advantages, but for man, who uses it, so he made man himself for his own sake.

7.5.4CSEL 19:596–597

quae utilitas deo in homine, inquit Epicurus ut eum propter se faceret? scilicet ut esset qui opera eius intellegeret, qui prouidentiam disponendi, rationem faciendi, uirtutem consummandi et sensu admirari et uoce proloqui posset: quorum omnium summa haec est, ut deum colat.

"What use is man to God," says Epicurus, "that he should make him for his own sake?" Namely, that there might be one who would understand his works, who could admire with his mind and proclaim with his voice the providence of his arranging, the reason of his making, the power of his completing; and the sum of all these is that he worship God.

7.5.5CSEL 19:597

is enim colit qui haec intellegit, is artificem rerum omnium, is uerum patrem suum debita ueneratione prosequitur qui uirtutem maiestatis eius de suorum operum inuentione inceptione perfectione metitur.

For he worships who understands these things; he honors with due veneration the maker of all things, his true Father, who measures the power of his majesty by the discovery, beginning, and completion of his works.

7.5.6CSEL 19:597

quod planius argumentum proferri potest et mundum hominis et hominem sua causa deum fecisse, quam quod ex omnibus animantibus solus ita formatus est, ut oculi eius ad caelum directi, facies ad deum spectans, uultus cum suo parente communis sit uideaturque hominem deus quasi porrecta manu adleuatum ex humo ad contemplationem sui excitasse?

What plainer argument can be offered that God made the world for man and man for himself than that, of all living beings, man alone is so formed that his eyes are directed to heaven, his face looks toward God, his countenance is shared with his Parent, and God seems to have raised man from the ground as with outstretched hand and roused him to contemplate him?

7.5.7CSEL 19:597

quid ergo inquit deo cultus hominis confert beato et nulla re indigenti? uel si tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipsius causa mundum fabricaret, ut instrueret eum sapientia, ut dominum uiuentium faceret eumque diligeret tamquam filium, cur mortalem fragilemque constituit? cur omnibus malis quem diligebat obiecit, cum oporteret et beatum esse hominem tamquam coniunctum ac proximum deo et perpetuum, sicut est ipse, ad quem colendum et contemplandum figuratus est?

"What then," he says, "does man's worship bring to God, who is blessed and needs nothing? Or if he held man in such honor as to build the world for his sake, to equip him with wisdom, to make him lord of living things, and to love him as a son, why did he make him mortal and fragile? Why did he expose to all evils one whom he loved, when man ought to have been blessed, as joined and nearest to God, and everlasting, as God himself is, for whose worship and contemplation he was formed?"

7.5.8CSEL 19:597

quamquam haec fere in prioribus libris sparsim docuimus, tamen quoniam proprie id materia nunc exigit, qua de uita beata disserere propositum est, explicanda sunt ista diligentius et plenius, ut dispositio dei et opus uoluntasque noscatur.

Although we have taught these things, scattered through the earlier books, yet since the subject now properly requires it, as we propose to discuss the happy life, they must be explained more carefully and fully, so that God's arrangement, work, and will may be known.

7.5.9CSEL 19:597–598

cum posset semper spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare, sicut angelos genuit, quibus inmortalitas sine ullo malorum periculo ac metu constat, excogitauit tamen inenarrabile opus, quemadmodum infinitam multitudinem crearet animarum, quas primo fragilibus et inbecillis corporibus inligatas constitueret inter bonum malumque medias, ut constantibus ex utrisque natura uirtutem proponeret, ne immortalitatem delicate adsequerentur ac molliter, sed ad illut aeternae uitae ineloquibile praemium cum summa difficultate ac magnis laboribus peruenirent.

Though he could always have produced countless souls by his immortal spirits, as he begot the angels, for whom immortality stands firm without any danger or fear of evils, he nevertheless devised an indescribable work: how he might create an infinite multitude of souls which he would first bind to fragile and weak bodies and set midway between good and evil, so that he might set virtue before them, made up of both natures; so that they would not attain immortality delicately and softly, but would come to that unspeakable reward of eternal life with the greatest difficulty and great labors.

7.5.10CSEL 19:598

ergo ut eas grauibus et uexabilibus membris indueret, quoniam consistere in medio inani non poterant ponderibus et grauitate corporis deorsum premente, sedem illis ac domicilium primo condendum esse decreuit.

So, to clothe them with heavy and easily troubled limbs, since they could not stand in the empty middle air, with the weight and heaviness of the body pressing down, he decided first to found a seat and dwelling for them.

7.5.11CSEL 19:598

itaque ineffabili uirtute ac potentia praeclara mundi opera molitus est: suspensis in altitudinem leuibus elementis et grauibus in ima depressis et caelestia firmauit et terrena constituit.

So with indescribable power and might he undertook the splendid works of the world: suspending the light elements on high and pressing the heavy ones down to the depths, he made firm the heavenly things and established the earthly.

7.5.12CSEL 19:598

non est necesse nunc exsequi singula, quoniam in secundo libro uniuersa exsecuti sumus. lumina igitur posuit in caelo, quorum moderatio et claritas et motus aptissime ad utilitates uiuentium temperatus est, terrae autem, quam sedem uoluit esse, fecunditatem uaria gignendi ac proferendi dedit, ut ubertate frugum et herbarum et uirentium pro natura et usu cuiusque generis alimoniam ministraret.

There is no need now to go through each thing, since we went through them all in the second book. So he placed lights in the heaven, whose ordering, brightness, and motion are most fittingly tempered to the needs of the living; and to the earth, which he wished to be their seat, he gave fertility for producing and bringing forth various things, so that by abundance of crops, herbs, and green things it might supply food according to the nature and use of each kind.

7.5.13CSEL 19:598–599

tum perfectis omnibus quae ad condicionem mundi pertinebant, hominem finxit ex ipsa terra, quam illi a principio in habitaculum praeparauit, id est spiritum suum terreno corpore induit et inuoluit, ut conpactus ex rebus diuersis ac repugnantibus bonum ac malum caperet.

Then, when all things belonging to the constitution of the world were complete, he formed man from the very earth which he had prepared from the beginning as his dwelling, that is, he clothed and wrapped his spirit in an earthly body, so that, joined together from different and opposing things, he might receive good and evil.

7.5.14CSEL 19:599

et sicut terra ipsa fecunda est ad fruges pariendas, ita corpus hominis, quod adsumptum est e terra, generandi copiam facultatemque prodendae subolis accepit, ut quoniam (e) fragili materia formatus in aeternum manere non poterat, peracto temporalis uitae spatio cederet et illut, quod fragile atque inbecillum gerebat, perpetua successione renouaret.

And just as the earth itself is fertile for bearing crops, so the human body, taken from the earth, received the power and faculty of begetting and producing offspring, so that, since formed of fragile matter he could not last forever, he might give way when the span of temporal life was finished and renew by perpetual succession what he bore that was fragile and weak.

7.5.15CSEL 19:599

cur igitur eum mortalem finxit et fragilem, cum illius causa mundum aedificasset? primum, ut infinita uis animarum gigneretur omnemque terram multitudine obpleret, deinde, ut proponeret homini uirtutem id est tolerantiam malorum ac laborum, per quam posset praemium inmortalitatis adipisci.

Why then did he make him mortal and fragile, when he had built the world for his sake? First, so that an infinite number of souls might be begotten and fill the whole earth with their multitude; then, so that he might set before man virtue, that is, endurance of evils and labors, by which he could obtain the reward of immortality.

7.5.16CSEL 19:599

nam quia homo ex duabus rebus constat, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum est, alterum caeleste, duae uitae homini adtributae sunt, una temporalis, quae corpori adsignatur, altera sempiterna, quae animae subiacet.

For since man consists of two things, body and soul, one earthly and the other heavenly, two lives have been assigned to man: one temporal, which is assigned to the body, the other everlasting, which belongs to the soul.

7.5.17CSEL 19:599–600

illam nascendo accipimus, hanc adsequimur laborando ne immortalitas homini, ut ante diximus, sine ulla difficultate constaret; illa terrena est sicut corpus et ideo finitur, haec uero caelestis sicut anima et ideo terminum non habet; illam primam nescientes accipimus, hanc secundam scientes: uirtuti enim, non naturae datur, quia uoluit nos deus uitam nobis in uita conparare.

The first we receive by being born; the second we attain by laboring, so that immortality would not, as we said before, come to man without any difficulty. The first is earthly like the body and so ends; the second is heavenly like the soul and so has no end. The first we receive unknowing; the second knowingly: for it is given to virtue, not to nature, since God willed that we should gain life for ourselves in life.

7.5.18CSEL 19:600

idcirco hanc praesentem dedit, ut illam ueram et perpetuam aut uitiis amittamus aut uirtute mereamur. in hac corporali non est summum bonum, quoniam sicut necessitate diuina nobis data est, ita rursus diuina necessitate soluetur: ita quod finem habet, summum bonum non habet.

So he gave this present life so that we might either lose that true and perpetual life by vices or earn it by virtue. The highest good is not in this bodily life, since as it was given us by divine necessity, so it will be dissolved again by divine necessity; so what has an end does not hold the highest good.

7.5.19CSEL 19:600

in illa uero spiritali, quam per nos ipsi adquirimus, summum bonum continetur, quia nec malum potest habere nec finem. cui rei argumentum natura et ratio corporis praebet.

But in that spiritual life, which we acquire by ourselves, the highest good is contained, because it can have neither evil nor end. The nature and structure of the body offer proof of this.

7.5.20CSEL 19:600

cetera namque animalia in humum uergunt, quia terrena sunt, nec capiunt immortalitatem, quae de caelo est, homo autem rectus in caelum spectat, quia proposita est illi immortalitas, nec tamen uenit, nisi tribuatur homini a deo: nam nihil interesset inter iustum et iniustum, siquidem omnis homo natus immortalis fieret. ergo immortalitas non sequella naturae, sed merces praemiumque uirtutis est.

For other animals bend toward the ground, because they are earthly and do not receive immortality, which is from heaven; but man, upright, looks to heaven, because immortality has been set before him. Yet it does not come unless it is granted to man by God; for there would be no difference between the just and the unjust if every human being born became immortal. So immortality is not a consequence of nature but the wage and reward of virtue.

7.5.21CSEL 19:600

denique homo non statim quam natus est rectus ingreditur, sed quadrupes primo, quia ratio corporis et huius praesentis uitae communis est nobis cum mutis animalibus: post deinde confirmatis uiribus erigitur et lingua eius in eloquium soluitur et mutum animal esse desinit.

In fact man does not walk upright as soon as he is born, but first on all fours, because the constitution of the body and of this present life is common to us with dumb animals; then, when his strength is established, he stands up, his tongue is loosed for speech, and he ceases to be a dumb animal.

7.5.22CSEL 19:600

quae ratio docet mortalem nasci hominem, postea uero inmortalem fieri, cum coeperit ex deo uiuere id est iustitiam sequi, quae continetur in dei cultu, cum excitauerit hominem deus ad aspectum caeli ac sui. quod tum fit, cum homo caelesti lauacro purificatus exponit infantiam cum omni labe uitae prioris et incremento diuini uigoris accepto fit homo perfectus ac plenus.

This reasoning teaches that man is born mortal and afterward becomes immortal, when he begins to live from God, that is, to follow justice, which is contained in the worship of God, when God has roused man to look at heaven and at himself. This happens when man, purified by the heavenly washing, lays aside his infancy with every stain of his former life and, receiving the increase of divine vigor, becomes a complete and full man.

7.5.23CSEL 19:600–601

ergo quia uirtutem proposuit homini deus, licet anima et corpus consociata sint, tamen contraria sunt et inpugnant inuicem. animi bona mala sunt corporis, id est opum fuga, uoluptatum interdictio, doloris mortisque contemptus. item corporis bona mala sunt animi, hoc est cupiditas et libido, quibus et opes adpetuntur et suauitates uariarum uoluptatum, quibus eneruatus animus extinguitur.

So because God set virtue before man, though soul and body are joined, they are contrary and fight each other. The goods of the soul are evils to the body, namely, shunning wealth, forbidding pleasures, despising pain and death. Likewise the goods of the body are evils to the soul, namely greed and lust, by which wealth and the sweetness of various pleasures are sought, and by which the soul, weakened, is extinguished.

7.5.24CSEL 19:601

ideo necesse est iustum et sapientem in omnibus malis esse, quoniam malorum uictrix est fortitudo, iniustos autem in diuitiis, in honore, in potestate: haec enim bona corporalia et terrena sunt; illi autem terrenam uitam agunt nec adsequi immortalitatem queunt, quia se uoluptatibus dediderunt, quae sunt uirtutis inimicae. itaque uita haec temporalis illi aeternae debet esse subiecta sicut corpus animae.

So the just and wise must be amid all evils, since fortitude is the conqueror of evils, while the unjust are in riches, honor, and power; for these are bodily and earthly goods. They lead an earthly life and cannot attain immortality, because they have given themselves to pleasures, which are enemies of virtue. So this temporal life must be subject to that eternal one, as the body to the soul.

7.5.25CSEL 19:601

quisquis ergo animae uitam maluerit, uitam corporis contemnat necesse est nec aliter eniti ad summum poterit, nisi quae sunt ima despexerit. qui autem corporis uitam fuerit amplexus et cupiditates suas in terram deiecerit, illam superiorem uitam consequi non potest.

So whoever prefers the life of the soul must despise the life of the body, and cannot strive up to the highest except by looking down on what is lowest. But whoever has embraced the life of the body and cast his desires on the earth cannot attain that higher life.

7.5.26CSEL 19:601

sed qui mauult bene uiuere in aeternum, male uiuet ad tempus et adficietur omnibus molestiis et laboribus quamdiu fuerit in terra, ut habeat diuinum et caeleste solacium. et qui maluerit bene uiuere ad tempus, male uiuet in aeternum: damnabitur enim sententia dei ad aeternam poenam, quia caelestibus bonis terrena praeposuit.

But whoever prefers to live well forever will live badly for a time and be afflicted with all troubles and labors while he is on earth, so as to have divine and heavenly consolation. And whoever prefers to live well for a time will live badly forever; for he will be condemned by God's sentence to eternal punishment, because he preferred earthly things to heavenly goods.

7.5.27CSEL 19:601–603

propterea igitur coli se deus expetit et honorari ab homine tamquam pater, ut uirtutem ac sapientiam teneat, quae sola inmortalitatem parit. nam quia nullus alius praeter ipsum donare eam potest, quia solus possidet, pietatem hominis qua deum honorauerit hoc adficit praemio, ut sit in aeternum beatus sitque aput deum et cum deo semper.

For this reason, then, God seeks to be worshipped and honored by man as a father, so that man may hold virtue and wisdom, which alone produce immortality. For since no one but he can grant it, because he alone possesses it, he rewards the piety with which man has honored God with this reward: that he be blessed forever and be with God and in God's presence always.

Divine 7, chapter 6

7.6.1CSEL 19:603–604

Nunc totam rationem breui circumscriptione signemus. idcirco mundus factus est, ut nascamur: ideo nascimur, ut adgnoscamus factorem mundi ac nostri deum: ideo adgnoscimus, ut colamus: ideo colimus, ut immortalitatem pro laborum mercede capiamus, quoniam maximis laboribus cultus dei constat: ideo praemio immortalitatis adficimur, ut similes angelis effecti summo patri ac domino in perpetuum seruiamus et simus aeternum deo regnum.

Now let us mark out the whole plan in a brief outline. The world was made so that we might be born; we are born so that we may acknowledge God, the maker of the world and of ourselves; we acknowledge him so that we may worship him; we worship him so that we may receive immortality as the reward of our labors, since the worship of God consists of the greatest labors; we are given the reward of immortality so that, made like the angels, we may serve the supreme Father and Lord forever and be an eternal kingdom for God.

7.6.2CSEL 19:604

haec summa rerum est, hoc arcanum dei, hoc mysterium mundi, a quo sunt alieni qui sequentes praesentem uoluptatem terrestribus et fragilibus se bonis addixerunt et animas ad caelestia genitas suauitatibus mortiferis tamquam luto caenoue demerserunt.

This is the sum of things, this the secret of God, this the mystery of the world, from which those are strangers who, following present pleasure, have given themselves over to earthly and fragile goods and have sunk souls born for heavenly things in deadly sweetness as in mud and mire.

7.6.3CSEL 19:604–605

quaeramus nunc uicissim an in cultu deorum ratio ulla subsistat. qui si multi sunt, si ideo tantum ab hominibus coluntur, ut praestent illis opes uictorias honores quaeque alia non nisi ad praesens ualent, si sine causa gignimur, si in hominibus procreandis prouidentia nulla uersatur, si casu nobismet ipsis ac uoluptatis nostrae gratia nascimur, si nihil post mortem sumus, quid potest esse tam superuacuum, tam inane, tam uanum quam humana res et quam mundus ipse, qui cum sit incredibili magnitudine, tum mirabili ratione constructus, tamen rebus ineptis uacet?

Let us now ask in turn whether any reason stands in the worship of the gods. If they are many, if they are worshipped by people only so that they may grant them wealth, victories, honors, and other things that avail only for the present; if we are born without cause, if no providence is at work in the begetting of human beings, if we are born by chance for ourselves and for our pleasure, if we are nothing after death, what can be so superfluous, so empty, so vain as human affairs and as the world itself, which, though of incredible size and built with wonderful reason, would yet be empty of anything but silly things?

7.6.4CSEL 19:605

cur etenim uentorum spiritus citent nubes? cur emicent fulgura, tonitrua mugiant, imbres cadant? cur fruges terra producat, uarios fetus alat? cur denique omnis natura rerum laboret, ne quid desit earum rerum quibus uita hominis sustinetur, si est inanis, si ad nihilum interimus, si nihil est in nobis maioris emolumenti deo?

For why do the winds' breaths drive the clouds? Why do lightnings flash, thunders roar, rains fall? Why does the earth produce crops and nourish various offspring? Why, finally, does all nature labor so that nothing may be lacking of the things by which human life is sustained, if it is empty, if we perish into nothing, if there is nothing in us of greater benefit to God?

7.6.5CSEL 19:605

quod si est dictu nefas nec putandum est fieri posse ut non ob aliquam maximam rationem fuerit constitutum quod uideas maxima ratione constare, quae potest esse ratio in his erroribus prauarum religionum et in hac persuasione philosophorum qua putant animas interire? profecto nulla.

But if it is wrong to say, and should not be thought possible, that what you see to be constituted by the greatest reason was not established for some very great reason, what reason can there be in these errors of depraved religions and in this conviction of the philosophers by which they think souls perish? Surely none.

7.6.6CSEL 19:605

quid enim habent dicere cur dii hominibus tam diligenter suis quaeque temporibus exhibeant? an ut illis far et merum demus et odorem turis et sanguinem pecudum? quae neque inmortalibus grata esse possunt, quia sunt fragilia, neque usui esse expertibus corporum, quia haec ad usum corporalium data sunt: et tamen si ea desiderarent, sibi ipsi possent exhibere, cum uellent.

For what can they say about why the gods so carefully supply human beings with everything in its season? That we may give them grain and wine, the scent of incense, and the blood of cattle? These can neither please immortals, since they are fragile, nor be of use to beings without bodies, since they are given for the use of the embodied; and yet, if they desired them, they could supply them to themselves when they wished.

7.6.7CSEL 19:605

siue igitur intereunt animae siue in aeternum manent, quam rationem continet cultus deorum aut a quo mundus constitutus est? cur aut quando aut quousque, quatenus homines aut quam ob rem procreati? cur nascuntur intereunt succedunt renouantur? quid dii ex cultibus eorum adsecuntur qui post mortem nihil futuri sunt? quid praestant, quid pollicentur, quid minantur aut hominibus aut diis dignum?

So whether souls perish or remain forever, what reason does the worship of the gods contain, or by whom was the world established? Why, or when, or how long, or to what end, or for what reason were human beings produced? Why are they born, why do they die, succeed, and renew? What do the gods gain from the worship of those who will be nothing after death? What do they grant, promise, or threaten that is worthy of either human beings or gods?

7.6.8CSEL 19:605–606

uel si manent animae post obitum, quid de iis faciunt facturiue sunt? quid illis opus est thesauro animarum? ipsi illi ex quo fonte oriuntur?

Or if souls remain after death, what do they do or intend to do with them? What need have they of a treasury of souls? From what source do they themselves arise?

7.6.9CSEL 19:606

quomodo aut quare aut unde multi sunt? ita fit ut si ab illa rerum summa quam superius conprehendimus aberraueris, omnis ratio intereat et ad nihilum omnia reuoluantur.

How, or why, or from where are there many? So it happens that if you stray from that sum of things which we set out above, all reason perishes and everything collapses into nothing.

Divine 7, chapter 7

7.7.1CSEL 19:606

Quam summam quia philosophi non conprehenderunt, nec ueritatem conprehendere potuerunt, quamuis ea fere quibus summa ipsa constat et uiderint et explicauerint. sed diuersi ac diuerse illa omnia protulerunt non adnectentes nec causas rerum nec consequentias nec rationes, ut summam illam quae continet uniuersa et conpingerent et inplerent.

Because the philosophers did not grasp this sum, they could not grasp the truth either, although they saw and explained almost all the things of which that sum consists. But they put all these forward separately and in different ways, not linking the causes of things, their consequences, or their reasons, so as to fit together and complete that sum which contains everything.

7.7.2CSEL 19:606

facile est autem docere paene uniuersam ueritatem per philosophos et sectas esse diuisam. non enim sic philosophiam nos euertimus, ut Academici solent, quibus ad omnia respondere propositum est, quod est potius cauillari et inludere, sed docemus nullam sectam fuisse tam deuiam neque philosophorum quemquam tam inanem qui non uiderit aliquid ex uero.

It is easy to show that almost the whole truth has been divided among the philosophers and their schools. For we do not overturn philosophy as the Academics do, whose aim is to answer everything, which is rather quibbling and mockery; but we teach that no school was so astray, and no philosopher so empty, that he did not see something of the truth.

7.7.3CSEL 19:606

sed dum contradicendi studio insaniunt, dum sua etiam falsa defendunt, aliorum etiam uera subuertunt, non tantum elapsa illis ueritas est quam se quaerere simulabant, sed ipsi eam potissimum suo uitio perdiderunt.

But while they rave in their zeal to contradict, defending even their own falsehoods and overturning even others' truths, not only has the truth they pretended to seek slipped away from them, but they themselves lost it chiefly by their own fault.

7.7.4CSEL 19:606–607

quodsi extitisset aliquis qui ueritatem sparsam per singulos per sectasque diffusam colligeret in unum ac redigeret in corpus, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis. sed hoc nemo facere nisi ueri peritus ac sciens potest, uerum autem scire non nisi eius est qui sit doctus a deo.

But if someone had arisen to gather into one the truth scattered among individuals and spread through the schools, and to reduce it to a body, he would surely not disagree with us. But no one can do this except one skilled in and knowing the truth; and to know the truth belongs only to one who has been taught by God.

7.7.5CSEL 19:607

neque enim potest aliter repudiare quae falsa sunt, eligere ac probare quae uera: sed si uel casu id efficeret, certissime philosopharetur, et quamuis non posset diuinis testimoniis illa defendere, tamen se ipsa ueritas inlustraret suo lumine.

For otherwise one cannot reject what is false and choose and approve what is true; but if someone did this even by chance, he would philosophize most surely, and though he could not defend these things with divine testimonies, truth itself would illuminate itself by its own light.

7.7.6CSEL 19:607

quare incredibilis est error illorum qui cum aliquam sectam probauerint eique se addixerint, ceteras damnant tamquam falsas et inanes armantque se ad proeliandum nec quid defendere debeant scientes nec quid refutare incursantque passim sine dilectu omnia quae adferunt quicumque dissentiunt.

So incredible is the error of those who, having approved some school and devoted themselves to it, condemn the rest as false and empty and arm themselves for battle, knowing neither what they should defend nor what refute, and attack indiscriminately everything brought forward by whoever disagrees.

7.7.7CSEL 19:607

ob has eorum pertinacissimas contentiones nulla extitit philosophia quae ad uerum propius accederet: nam particulatim ueritas ab iis tota conprehensa est. factum esse a deo mundum dixit Plato:

Because of these most stubborn disputes of theirs, no philosophy has arisen that came nearer to the truth; for taken piece by piece, the whole truth was grasped by them. Plato said that the world was made by God;

7.7.8CSEL 19:607

idem prophetae locuntur idemque ex Sibyllae carminibus apparet. errant igitur qui uel omnia sua sponte nata esse dixerunt uel minutis seminibus conglobatis, quoniam tanta res, tam ornata, tam magna neque fieri neque disponi et ordinari sine aliquo prudentissimo auctore potuit et ea ipsa ratio qua constare ac regi omnia sentiuntur, sollertissimae mentis artificem confitetur.

the prophets say the same, and the same appears from the verses of the Sibyl. So those are wrong who said that all things arose of their own accord or from tiny seeds clustered together, since so great, so ordered, so vast a thing could neither be made nor be arranged and ordered without some most wise maker; and the very reason by which all things are perceived to stand and be ruled confesses the maker of a most skillful mind.

7.7.9CSEL 19:607

hominum causa mundum et omnia quae in eo sunt esse facta Stoici loquuntur: idem nos diuinae litterae docent. errauit ergo Democritus, qui uermiculorum modo putauit effusos esse de terra nullo auctore nullaque ratione.

The Stoics say the world and all that is in it were made for the sake of human beings; the divine writings teach us the same. So Democritus erred, who thought that men were poured out of the earth like little worms, with no maker and no reason.

7.7.10CSEL 19:607–608

cur enim formatus sit homo, diuini sacramenti est, quod quia ille scire non poterat, humanam uitam deduxit ad nihilum.

For why man was formed belongs to the divine mystery; and since he could not know it, he reduced human life to nothing.

7.7.11CSEL 19:608

ad uirtutem capessendam nasci homines Ariston disseruit: idem nos monemur ac discimus a prophetis. falsus igitur Aristippus, qui hominem uoluptati hoc est malo tamquam pecudem subiugauit.

Ariston argued that human beings are born to take up virtue; we are warned and taught the same by the prophets. So Aristippus was wrong, who subjected man to pleasure, that is, to evil, like a beast.

7.7.12CSEL 19:608

inmortales esse animas Pherecydes et Plato disputauerunt: haec uero propria est in nostra religione doctrina. ergo Dicaearchus cum Democrito errauit, qui perire cum corpore ac dissolui argumentatus est.

Pherecydes and Plato argued that souls are immortal; but this is the teaching proper to our religion. So Dicaearchus erred, together with Democritus, who argued that the soul perishes and is dissolved with the body.

7.7.13CSEL 19:608

esse inferos Zeno Stoicus docuit et sedes piorum ab inpiis esse discretas et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones, hos uero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in caeni uoraginibus horrendis: idem nobis prophetae palam faciunt. ergo Epicurus errauit, qui poetarum id esse figmentum putauit et illas inferorum poenas quae ferantur in hac esse uita interpretatus est.

Zeno the Stoic taught that there is an underworld and that the dwellings of the pious are separated from the impious, and that the former inhabit quiet and delightful regions, while the latter pay penalties in dark places and in horrible pits of mud; the prophets make the same plain to us. So Epicurus erred, who thought this a fiction of the poets and interpreted the punishments said to be in the underworld as belonging to this life.

7.7.14CSEL 19:608

totam igitur ueritatem et omne diuinae religionis arcanum philosophi attigerunt, sed aliis refellentibus defendere id quod inuenerant nequiuerunt, quia singulis ratio non quadrauit, nec ea quae uera senserant in summam redigere potuerunt, sicut nos superius fecimus.

So the philosophers touched the whole truth and every secret of divine religion, but when others refuted them they could not defend what they had found, because the reasoning did not fit the particulars, nor could they bring into a sum the things they had perceived to be true, as we did above.

Divine 7, chapter 8

7.8.1CSEL 19:608

Unum est igitur summum bonum inmortalitas, ad quam capiendam et formati a principio et nati sumus. ad hanc tendimus, hanc spectat humana natura, ad hanc nos prouehit uirtus: quod bonum quia deprehendimus, superest ut etiam de ipsa inmortalitate dicamus.

So the one highest good is immortality, for receiving which we were both formed from the beginning and born. Toward this we strive, to this human nature looks, to this virtue carries us. Since we have found this good, it remains for us to speak also of immortality itself.

7.8.2CSEL 19:608–609

Platonis argumenta quamuis ad rem multum conferant, tamen parum habent firmitatis ad probandam et inplendam ueritatem, quoniam nec rationem totius mysterii magni consummauerat in unumque collegerat nec summum bonum conprehenderat. nam licet uerum de animae inmortalitate sentiret, tamen non ita de illa tamquam de summo bono disserebat.

Plato's arguments, though they contribute much to the matter, still have too little firmness to prove and complete the truth, since he had neither completed the reasoning of the whole great mystery and gathered it into one nor grasped the highest good. For though he thought truly about the immortality of the soul, he did not discuss it as the highest good.

7.8.3CSEL 19:609

nos igitur certioribus signis eligere possumus ueritatem, qui eam non ancipiti suspicione colligimus, sed diuina traditione cognouimus.

So we can choose the truth by surer signs, since we gather it not by doubtful conjecture but have learned it by divine tradition.

7.8.4CSEL 19:609

Plato autem sic argumentatus est: immortale esse quicquid per se ipsum et sentit et semper mouetur; quod enim principium motus non habet, nec finem habiturum, quia deseri a semet ipso non potest. quod argumentum etiam mutis animalibus aeternitatem daret, nisi adiectione sapientiae discreuisset.

Plato argued thus: whatever both perceives by itself and is always in motion is immortal; for what has no beginning of motion will have no end either, since it cannot be abandoned by itself. This argument would give eternity even to dumb animals, had he not distinguished them by adding wisdom.

7.8.5CSEL 19:609

addidit ergo, ut effugeret hanc communitatem, fieri non posse quin sit inmortalis animus humanus, cuius miranda sollertia inueniendi et celeritas cogitandi et facilitas percipiendi atque discendi et memoria praeteritorum et prouidentia futurorum et artium rerumque innumerabilium scientia, qua ceterae careant animantes, diuina et caelestis appareat,

So, to escape this sharing, he added that the human mind cannot fail to be immortal, since its wonderful skill in discovering, quickness in thinking, ease in perceiving and learning, memory of the past and foresight of the future, and knowledge of arts and countless things, which the other animals lack, appear divine and heavenly;

7.8.6CSEL 19:609–610

quia et origo animi, qui tanta capiat, tanta contineat, nulla reperiatur in terra, siquidem ex concretione terrena nihil habeat admixtum: sed necesse esse in terram resolui quod est in homine ponderosum et dissolubile, quod autem tenue atque suptile, id uero esse indiuiduum ac domicilio corporis uelut carcere liberatum ad caelum et ad naturam suam peruolare.

and because no origin can be found on earth for a mind that grasps and holds so much, since it has nothing mixed in from earthly compound; but what is heavy and dissoluble in man must be dissolved into earth, while what is subtle and fine is indivisible and, freed from the dwelling of the body as from a prison, flies to heaven and to its own nature.

7.8.7CSEL 19:610

haec fere Platonis collecta breuiter, quae aput ipsum late copioseque explicantur. in eadem sententia fuit etiam Pythagoras antea eiusque praeceptor Pherecydes, quem Cicero tradidit primum de aeternitate animarum disputauisse.

These are Plato's points gathered briefly, which he explains at length and fully. Pythagoras too held the same view before him, and his teacher Pherecydes, who, Cicero records, was the first to argue for the eternity of souls.

7.8.8CSEL 19:610

qui omnes licet eloquentia excellerent, tamen in hac dumtaxat contentione non minus auctoritatis habuerunt qui contra hanc sententiam disserebant, Dicaearchus primo, deinde Democritus, postremo Epicurus, adeo ut res ipsa de qua inter se pugnabant in dubium uocaretur.

Though all these excelled in eloquence, yet in this dispute at least those who argued against this view had no less authority: first Dicaearchus, then Democritus, finally Epicurus; so much so that the very matter they fought over was called into doubt.

7.8.9CSEL 19:610

denique Tullius expositis horum omnium de inmortalitate ac morte sententiis nescire se quid sit uerum pronuntiauit. harum inquit sententiarum quae uera sit, deus aliqui uiderit. et rursus alibi quoniam utraque inquit earum sententiarum doctissimos habuit auctores nec quid certi sit diuinari potest —.

In the end Tullius, having set out the opinions of all these on immortality and death, declared that he did not know which was true. "Which of these opinions is true," he says, "some god will see." And again elsewhere: "Since each of these opinions has had most learned authorities, and nothing certain can be divined…"

7.8.10CSEL 19:610

uerum nobis diuinatione opus non est, quibus ueritatem diuinitas ipsa patefecit.

But we have no need of divining, to whom divinity itself has revealed the truth.

Divine 7, chapter 9

7.9.1CSEL 19:610

Aliis itaque argumentis, quae nec Plato nec ullus alius inuenit, animarum aeternitas probari ac perspici potest: quae nos breuiter colligemus, quoniam properat oratio ad enarrandum iudicium dei maximum, quod in terra propinquante saeculorum fine celebrabitur.

So by other arguments, which neither Plato nor anyone else found, the eternity of souls can be proved and seen. We will gather them briefly, since the discourse hastens to describe the great judgment of God, which will be held on earth as the end of the ages approaches.

7.9.2CSEL 19:610–611

ante omnia, quoniam deus ab homine uideri non potest, ne quis tamen ex eo ipso putaret deum non esse, quia mortalibus oculis non uidetur, inter cetera institutorum suorum miracula fecit etiam multa quorum uis quidem apparet, substantia tamen non uidetur, sicut est uox odor uentus, ut harum rerum argumento et exemplo etiam deum, licet sub oculos non ueniret, de sua tamen ui et effectu et operibus cerneremus.

First of all, since God cannot be seen by man, yet so that no one might think from this very fact that God does not exist because he is not seen by mortal eyes, among the other wonders of his institution he also made many things whose power appears though their substance is not seen, such as voice, smell, and wind; so that by the argument and example of these things we might discern God too, though he does not come under our eyes, from his power, effect, and works.

7.9.3CSEL 19:611

quid uoce clarius aut uento fortius aut odore uiolentius? haec tamen cum per aerem feruntur ad sensusque nostros ueniunt et eos potentia sua inpellunt, non cernuntur acie luminum, sed aliis corporis partibus sentiuntur.

What is clearer than a voice, stronger than wind, more forceful than smell? Yet when these are carried through the air and reach our senses and strike them with their power, they are not seen by the eye but perceived by other parts of the body.

7.9.4CSEL 19:611

similiter deus non aspectu nobis alioue fragili sensu conprehendendus est, sed mentis oculis intuendus, cum opera eius praeclara et miranda uideamus.

Likewise God is not to be grasped by us by sight or another fragile sense, but beheld with the eyes of the mind, when we see his splendid and wonderful works.

7.9.5CSEL 19:611

nam illos qui nullum omnino deum esse dixerunt non modo philosophos, sed ne homines quidem fuisse dixerim, qui mutis simillimi ex solo corpore constiterunt nihil cernentes animo et ad sensum corporis cuncta referentes, qui nihil putabant esse nisi quod oculis contuebantur.

For those who said there is no god at all I would say were not only not philosophers but not even human beings; like dumb animals, they consisted of body alone, seeing nothing with the mind and referring everything to bodily sense, thinking nothing exists except what they saw with their eyes.

7.9.6CSEL 19:611

et quia uidebant aut bonis accidere aduersa aut malis prospera, fortuito geri omnia crediderunt et natura mundum, non prouidentia constitutum. hinc iam prolapsi sunt ad deliramenta, quae talem sententiam necessario sequebantur.

And because they saw adversity befall the good or prosperity the wicked, they believed that everything happens by chance and that the world was established by nature, not providence. From here they slid into the ravings that necessarily followed such a view.

7.9.7CSEL 19:611

quodsi est deus et incorporalis et inuisibilis et aeternus, ergo non idcirco interire animam credibile est, quia non uidetur, postquam recessit a corpore, quoniam constat esse aliquid sentiens ac uigens quod non ueniat sub aspectum.

But if God is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal, then it is not credible that the soul perishes because it is not seen after it has left the body, since it is agreed that something sensing and vigorous exists which does not come under sight.

7.9.8CSEL 19:611–612

at enim difficile est animo comprehendere quemadmodum possit anima retinere sensum sine iis partibus corporis in quibus inest officium sentiendi.

"But it is hard to grasp in the mind how the soul can retain sensation without those parts of the body in which the function of sensing resides."

7.9.9CSEL 19:612

quid de deo? num facile est comprehendere quemadmodum uigeat sine corpore? quodsi deos esse credunt, qui si sunt, utique animae sunt expertes corporum, necesse est humanas animas eadem ratione subsistere, quoniam ex ipsa ratione ac prudentia intellegitur esse quaedam in homine ac deo similitudo.

What of God? Is it easy to grasp how he lives without a body? If they believe there are gods, who, if they exist, are surely souls without bodies, human souls must subsist in the same way, since from reason and wisdom itself it is understood that there is a certain likeness between man and God.

7.9.10CSEL 19:612

denique illut argumentum, quod etiam Marcus Tullius uidit, satis firmum est, ex eo aeternitatem animae posse dinosci, quia nullum sit aliud animal quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei, religioque sit paene sola quae hominem discernat a mutis: quae cum in hominem solum cadit, profecto testatur id adfectare nos, id desiderare, id colere quod nobis familiare, quod proximum sit futurum.

Finally, that argument which Marcus Tullius also saw is quite firm, that the eternity of the soul can be discerned from this: that there is no other animal with any knowledge of God, and religion is almost the only thing that distinguishes man from the dumb animals. Since it belongs to man alone, it surely testifies that we aspire to, desire, and worship what will be familiar to us and nearest to us.

7.9.11CSEL 19:612–613

an aliquis cum ceterarum animantium naturam considerauerit, quas pronis corporibus abiectas in terramque prostratas summi dei prouidentia effecit, ut ex hoc intellegi possit nihil eas rationis habere cum caelo, potest non intellegere solum ex omnibus caeleste ac diuinum animal esse hominem, cuius corpus ab humo excitatum, uultus sublimis, status rectus originem suam quaerit et quasi contempta humilitate terrae ad altum nititur, quia sentit summum bonum in summo sibi esse quaerendum memorque condicionis suae, qua deus illum fecit eximium, ad artificem suum spectat? quam spectationem Trismegistus θεοπτίαν rectissime nominauit: quae in mutis animalibus nulla est.

When anyone considers the nature of the other animals, which the providence of the supreme God made prone in body, cast down and stretched out on the ground, so that it might be understood that they have nothing in common with heaven, can he fail to understand that man alone of all is a heavenly and divine animal, whose body, raised from the ground, lofty face, and upright stance seek his origin and, as if despising the lowness of the earth, strive upward, because he feels that the highest good must be sought on high, and, mindful of his condition by which God made him outstanding, looks to his Maker? This looking Trismegistus most rightly called theoptia, "the vision of God"; there is none in dumb animals.

7.9.12CSEL 19:613

cum autem sapientia, quae soli homini data est, nihil aliut sit quam notitia dei, apparet animam non interire neque dissolui, sed manere in sempiternum, quia deum, qui sempiternus est, et quaerit et diligit, ipsa cogente natura sentiens uel unde orta sit uel quo reuersura.

And since wisdom, given to man alone, is nothing other than the knowledge of God, it is clear that the soul does not perish or dissolve but remains forever, because it seeks and loves God, who is everlasting, sensing under nature's own compulsion from where it arose or where it will return.

7.9.13CSEL 19:613

praeterea non exiguum inmortalitatis argumentum est quod homo solus caelesti elemento utitur. nam cum rerum natura his duobus elementis, quae repugnantia sibi atque inimica sunt, constet, igni et aqua, quorum alterum caelo, alterum terrae adscribitur, ceterae animantes quia terrenae mortalesque sunt, terreno et graui utuntur elemento, homo solus ignem in usu habet, quod est elementum leue sublime caeleste.

Moreover, it is no small argument for immortality that man alone uses the heavenly element. For since the nature of things consists of these two elements, which are opposed and hostile to each other, fire and water, one assigned to heaven, the other to earth, the other animals, being earthly and mortal, use the earthly and heavy element, while man alone has fire in use, which is the light, lofty, and heavenly element.

7.9.14CSEL 19:613

ea uero quae ponderosa sunt, ad mortem deprimunt, et quae leuia sunt, ad uitam subleuant, quia uita in summo est, mors in imo. et ut lux esse sine igni non potest, sic uita sine luce. ignis igitur elementum est lucis ac uitae: unde apparet hominem qui eo utitur, immortalem sortitum esse condicionem, quia id illi familiare est quod facit uitam.

Heavy things press down to death, and light things lift up to life, because life is above and death below. And as light cannot exist without fire, so life cannot exist without light. So fire is the element of light and life; from which it is clear that man, who uses it, has been allotted an immortal condition, since what makes life is familiar to him.

7.9.15CSEL 19:613

uirtus quoque soli homini data magno argumento est inmortales animas esse. quae non erit secundum naturam, si anima extinguitur; huic enim praesenti uitae nocet. nam uita ista terrena, quam communem cum mutis animalibus ducimus, et uoluptatem expetit, cuius fructibus uariis ac suauibus delectatur, et dolorem fugit, cuius asperitas naturam uiuentium acerbis sensibus laedit et ad mortem perducere nititur, quae dissoluit animantem.

Virtue too, given to man alone, is a great argument that souls are immortal. It would not be according to nature if the soul were extinguished, for it harms this present life. For this earthly life, which we lead in common with dumb animals, both seeks pleasure, delighting in its varied and sweet fruits, and flees pain, whose harshness wounds the nature of the living with bitter feelings and tends to lead to death, which dissolves the living being.

7.9.16CSEL 19:613–614

si ergo uirtus et prohibet iis bonis hominem quae naturaliter adpetuntur et ad sustinenda mala inpellit quae naturaliter fugiuntur, ergo malum est uirtus et inimica naturae stultumque iudicari necesse est qui eam sequitur, quoniam se ipse laedit et fugiendo bona praesentia et adpetendo aeque mala sine spe fructus amplioris.

If, then, virtue both keeps man from the goods naturally sought and drives him to endure the evils naturally fled, then virtue is an evil and hostile to nature, and whoever follows it must be judged a fool, since he harms himself both by fleeing present goods and by seeking evils, without hope of greater fruit.

7.9.17CSEL 19:614

nam cum liceat nobis iucundissimis frui uoluptatibus, nonne sensu carere uideamur, si malimus in humilitate, in egestate, in contemptu, in ignominia uiuere aut ne uiuere quidem, sed dolore cruciari et emori, ex quibus malis nihil amplius adsequamur quo possit uoluptas omissa pensari?

For when we could enjoy the most delightful pleasures, would we not seem senseless if we preferred to live in lowliness, want, contempt, and disgrace, or not even to live, but to be tortured with pain and die, gaining nothing further from these evils to repay the pleasure we gave up?

7.9.18CSEL 19:614

si autem uirtus malum non est facitque honeste, quod uoluptates uitiosas turpesque contemnit, et fortiter, quod nec dolorem nec mortem timet, ut officium seruet, ergo aliquod maius bonum adsequatur necesse est quam sunt illa quae spernit. at uero morte suscepta quod ulterius bonum sperari potest nisi aeternitas?

But if virtue is not an evil, and acts honorably in despising vicious and shameful pleasures, and bravely in fearing neither pain nor death so as to keep its duty, then it must attain some greater good than those it spurns. But once death has been undergone, what further good can be hoped for except eternity?

Divine 7, chapter 10

7.10.1CSEL 19:614

Transeamus nunc uicissim ad ea quae uirtuti repugnant, ut etiam ex his inmortalitas animae colligatur.

Let us now pass in turn to what opposes virtue, so that the immortality of the soul may be inferred from these too.

7.10.2CSEL 19:614

uitia omnia temporalia sunt: ad praesens enim commouentur. irae impetus recepta ultione sedatur, libidinis uoluptas corporis finis est, cupiditatem aut satietas earum rerum quas expetit aut aliorum affectuum commotiones interimunt, ambitio postquam honores quos uoluit adepta est, consenescit; item cetera uitia consistere ac permanere non possunt, sed ipso fructu quem expetunt finiuntur.

All vices are temporary, for they are stirred for the present. The rush of anger subsides once vengeance is taken; the pleasure of lust ends with the body; greed is killed either by satiety of what it seeks or by the stirrings of other passions; ambition, once it has gained the honors it wanted, grows old; likewise the other vices cannot stand and remain, but end with the very fruit they seek.

7.10.3CSEL 19:614–615

recedunt ergo et redeunt. uirtus autem sine ulla intermissione perpetua est nec discedere ab eo potest qui eam semel cepit. nam si habeat interuallum, si aliquando carere ea possumus, redibunt protinus uitia, quae uirtutem semper inpugnant.

So they withdraw and return. But virtue is perpetual without any interruption and cannot depart from one who has once taken it up. For if it had an interval, if we could sometimes be without it, the vices, which always attack virtue, would at once return.

7.10.4CSEL 19:615

non est igitur conprehensa, si deserit, si aliquando secedit: cum uero sibi domicilium stabile conlocauit, in omni actu uersari eam necesse est nec potest fideliter depellere uitia et fugare, nisi pectus quod insedit perpetua statione munierit.

So it has not been grasped if it deserts, if it sometimes withdraws; but when it has set up a stable dwelling for itself, it must be active in every act, and it cannot faithfully drive out and put to flight the vices unless it guards the heart it has occupied with a perpetual watch.

7.10.5CSEL 19:615

ipsa ergo uirtutis perpetuitas indicat humanum animum, si uirtutem ceperit, permanere, quia et uirtus perpetua est et solus animus humanus uirtutem capit.

So the very perpetuity of virtue shows that the human soul, if it has taken up virtue, remains, because virtue is perpetual and the human soul alone takes up virtue.

7.10.6CSEL 19:615

quoniam igitur contraria sunt uitia uirtuti, omnis ratio diuersa et contraria sit necesse est. quia uitia commotiones et perturbationes animi sunt, uirtus e contrario lenitudo et tranquillitas animi est; quia uitia temporalia et breuia sunt, uirtus perpetua et constans et par sibi semper; quia uitiorum fructus id est uoluptates aeque ut ipsa breues temporalesque sunt, uirtutis ergo fructus ac praemium sempiternum est;

Since, then, vices are contrary to virtue, their whole nature must be different and contrary. Because vices are agitations and disturbances of the soul, virtue on the contrary is the calm and tranquillity of the soul; because vices are temporary and brief, virtue is perpetual, constant, and always equal to itself; because the fruits of vices, that is, pleasures, are brief and temporary like the vices themselves, the fruit and reward of virtue is everlasting;

7.10.7CSEL 19:615

quia uitiorum commodum in praesenti est, uirtutis igitur in futuro. ita fit ut in hac uita uirtutis praemium nullum sit, quia uirtus adhuc ipsa est.

because the advantage of vices is in the present, that of virtue is in the future. So it comes about that in this life there is no reward for virtue, because virtue itself is still in progress.

7.10.8CSEL 19:615

nam sicut uitia cum in actu suo finiuntur, uoluptas et praemia eorum secuntur, ita uirtus cum finita est, merces eius insequitur. uirtus autem numquam nisi morte finitur, quoniam et in morte suscipienda summum eius officium est. ergo praemium uirtutis post mortem est.

For just as pleasure and reward follow vices when they end in their act, so when virtue has ended, its wage follows. But virtue never ends except by death, since its highest duty lies in undergoing death. So the reward of virtue is after death.

7.10.9CSEL 19:615–616

denique Cicero in Tusculanis quamuis dubitanter tamen sensit summum homini bonum non nisi post mortem contingere. fidenti animo, inquit si ita res feret, gradietur ad mortem, in qua aut summum bonum aut nullum malum esse cognouimus. mors igitur non extinguit hominem, sed ad praemium uirtutis admittit.

In fact Cicero in the Tusculans, though doubtfully, still felt that the highest good comes to man only after death. "With confident mind," he says, "if it so turns out, he will go to death, in which we have learned there is either the highest good or no evil." So death does not extinguish man but admits him to the reward of virtue.

7.10.10CSEL 19:616

qui autem se, ut ait idem, uitiis ac sceleribus contaminauerit uoluptatique seruierit, is uero damnatus aeternam luet poenam, quam diuinae litterae secundam mortem nominant: quae est et perpetua et grauissimis cruciatibus plena.

But whoever, as the same author says, has defiled himself with vices and crimes and served pleasure, he indeed, condemned, will pay an eternal penalty, which the divine writings call the second death, which is both perpetual and full of the heaviest torments.

7.10.11CSEL 19:616

nam sicuti duae uitae propositae sunt homini, quarum altera est animae, altera corporis, ita et mortes duae propositae sunt, una pertinens ad corpus, qua cunctos secundum naturam fungi necesse est, altera pertinens ad animam, quae scelere adquiritur, uirtute uitatur. ut uita haec temporalis est certosque terminos habet, quia corporis est, sic et mors aeque temporalis est certumque habet finem, quia corpus attingit.

For just as two lives are set before man, one of the soul and the other of the body, so two deaths are set before him: one belonging to the body, which all must undergo according to nature, the other belonging to the soul, which is incurred by crime and avoided by virtue. As this life is temporary and has fixed limits, because it is of the body, so death too is equally temporary and has a fixed end, because it touches the body.

Divine 7, chapter 11

7.11.1CSEL 19:616

Inpletis igitur temporibus quae deus morti statuit terminabitur ipsa mors. et quia temporalem uitam temporalis mors sequitur, consequens est ut resurgant animae ad uitam perennem, quia finem mors temporalis accepit.

So when the times God has appointed for death are fulfilled, death itself will be ended. And since temporal death follows temporal life, it follows that souls rise again to everlasting life, since temporal death has received its end.

7.11.2CSEL 19:616

rursus sicut uita animi sempiterna est, in qua diuinos et ineloquibiles inmortalitatis suae fructus capit, ita et mors eius perpetua sit necesse est, in qua perennes poenas et infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pendit.

Again, just as the life of the soul is everlasting, in which it receives the divine and unspeakable fruits of its immortality, so its death must also be perpetual, in which it pays everlasting penalties and endless torments for its sins.

7.11.3CSEL 19:616

ergo in ea condicione res posita est, ut qui beati sunt in hac uita corporali atque terrena, semper miseri sint futuri, quia iam bonis quae maluerunt potiti sunt,

So the matter is set in this condition: those who are happy in this bodily and earthly life will always be wretched, because they have already enjoyed the goods they preferred,

7.11.4CSEL 19:616–617

quod iis euenit qui deos adorant ac deum neglegunt, deinde qui iustitiam sequentes in hac uita miseri fuerint et contempti et inopes et ob ipsam iustitiam contumeliis et iniuriis saepe uexati, quia nec aliter uirtus teneri potest, semper beati sint futuri, ut quia mala iam pertulerunt, etiam bonis fruantur: quod iis utique contingit qui contemptis terrestribus diis et fragilibus bonis caelestem religionem dei secuntur, cuius bona sicut ipse qui tribuit sempiterna sunt. quid?

which happens to those who adore gods and neglect God; while those who, following justice, have been wretched in this life, despised and poor, and often harassed with insults and injuries for the sake of justice itself, since virtue cannot be kept otherwise, will always be happy, so that, having already endured evils, they may also enjoy goods; which surely happens to those who, despising earthly gods and fragile goods, follow the heavenly religion of God, whose goods, like himself who gives them, are everlasting. What then?

7.11.5CSEL 19:617

opera corporis atque animi nonne indicant esse animam mortis expertem? nam corpus quia ipsum fragile est atque mortale, quaecumque opera molitur, aeque caduca sunt. nihil enim Tullius ait esse quod sit manibus humanis laboratum, quod non aliquando ad interitum redigatur uel iniuria hominum uel ipsa confectrice rerum omnium uetustate.

Do not the works of body and soul show that the soul is free from death? For the body, since it is fragile and mortal, whatever works it undertakes are equally perishable. For nothing, Tullius says, has been made by human hands that is not at some time brought to ruin, either by human violence or by age itself, the consumer of all things.

7.11.6CSEL 19:617

at uero animi opera uidemus aeterna. nam quicumque contemptu praesentium studentes in memoriam monumenta ingeniorum factorumque magnorum reliquerunt, hi plane mentis ac uirtutis suae nomen indelebile quaesierunt. ergo si opera corporis ideo mortalia sunt, quia ipsum mortale est, sequitur ut anima ex eo inmortalis appareat, quia uidemus opera eius non esse mortalia.

But we see the works of the soul are eternal. For all who, despising present things, have left monuments of their talents and great deeds to memory have plainly sought an indelible name for their mind and virtue. So if the works of the body are mortal because it is mortal, it follows that the soul appears immortal from this, that we see its works are not mortal.

7.11.7CSEL 19:617–618

eodem modo desideria quoque corporis animique declarant alterum esse mortale, alterum sempiternum. corpus enim nihil nisi temporale desiderat id est cibum potum indumentum quietem uoluptatem, et tamen haec ipsa sine nutu et adminiculo animi nec cupere nec adsequi potest: animus autem per se multa desiderat quae ad officium fructumue corporis non redundent, eaque non fragilia, sed aeterna sunt, ut fama uirtutis, ut memoria nominis.

In the same way the desires of body and soul show that one is mortal and the other everlasting. For the body desires nothing but temporal things, that is, food, drink, clothing, rest, pleasure; and yet it can neither desire nor obtain even these without the nod and help of the soul. But the soul desires by itself many things that do not serve the body's duty or profit, and these are not fragile but eternal, like the fame of virtue and the memory of a name.

7.11.8CSEL 19:618

nam cultum dei, qui constat abstinentia cupiditatum ac libidinum, patientia doloris, contemptu mortis, etiam contra corpus anima concupiscit. unde credibile est non interire animam, sed dissociari a corpore, quia corpus sine animo nihil potest, animus uero potest multa et magna sine corpore.

For the soul desires the worship of God, which consists in abstaining from desires and lusts, enduring pain, and despising death, even against the body. From this it is credible that the soul does not perish but is separated from the body, because the body can do nothing without the soul, but the soul can do many great things without the body.

7.11.9CSEL 19:618

quid quod ea quae uisibilia sunt oculis et tangibilia manu, quia externam uim pati possunt, aeterna esse non possunt, ea uero quae neque sub tactum neque sub uisum ueniunt, sed tantummodo uis eorum et ratio et effectus apparet, aeterna sunt, quia nullam uim patiuntur extrinsecus?

What of the fact that things visible to the eyes and tangible to the hand cannot be eternal, since they can suffer external force, while things that come under neither touch nor sight, but only their force, principle, and effect appear, are eternal, because they suffer no force from outside?

7.11.10CSEL 19:618

corpus autem si ideo mortale est, quia uisui pariter et tactui subiacet, ergo et anima idcirco inmortalis est, quia nec tangi potest nec uideri.

And if the body is mortal because it is subject to both sight and touch, then the soul is immortal because it can be neither touched nor seen.

Divine 7, chapter 12

7.12.1CSEL 19:618

Nunc argumenta eorum qui contra disserunt refellamus: quae Lucretius tertio libro executus est. quoniam cum corpore inquit anima nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est.

Now let us refute the arguments of those who argue the contrary, which Lucretius set out in his third book. "Since the soul," he says, "is born with the body, it must perish with the body."

7.12.2CSEL 19:618

at non est par utriusque ratio. solidum enim et conprehensibile corpus est et oculis et manu, anima uero tenuis et tactum uisumque fugiens. corpus e terra fictum atque solidatum est, anima nihil in se concreti, nihil ponderis terreni habet, ut Plato disserebat. nec enim tantam posset habere sollertiam, tantam uim, tantam celeritatem, nisi originem traheret e caelo.

But the nature of the two is not the same. For the body is solid and graspable by eyes and hand, while the soul is subtle and escapes touch and sight. The body was formed and made solid from earth; the soul has nothing compact in it, nothing of earthly weight, as Plato argued. Nor could it have such skill, such power, such speed, unless it drew its origin from heaven.

7.12.3CSEL 19:618–619

corpus igitur quoniam fictum ex ponderoso et corruptibili elemento et tangibile est et uisibile, corrumpitur atque occidit nec uim repellere potest, quia sub aspectum et sub tactum uenit, anima autem quia tenuitate sua omnem tactum fugit, nullo ictu dissolui potest.

So the body, since it is formed of a heavy and corruptible element and is tangible and visible, is corrupted and dies and cannot repel force, because it comes under sight and touch; but the soul, since by its subtlety it escapes all touch, cannot be dissolved by any blow.

7.12.4CSEL 19:619

ergo quamuis inter se coniuncta et sociata nascantur et alterum, quod est de terrena concretione formatum, quasi uasculum sit alterius, quod est a caelesti suptilitate deductum, cum uis aliqua utrumque discreuerit, quae discretio mors uocatur, utrumque in naturam suam recedit: quod ex terra fuit, id in terram resoluitur, quod ex caelesti spiritu, id constat ac uiget semper, quoniam diuinus spiritus sempiternus est.

So though they are born joined and united with each other, and the one, formed of earthly compound, is like a little vessel for the other, which is drawn from heavenly subtlety, when some force separates the two, and this separation is called death, each returns to its own nature: what was from the earth is dissolved into earth, and what is from the heavenly spirit stands and lives forever, since the divine spirit is everlasting.

7.12.5CSEL 19:619

denique idem Lucretius oblitus quid adsereret et quod dogma defenderet, hos uersus posuit: cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante, in terram, sed quod missum est ex aetheris oris, id rursum caeli fulgentia templa receptant. quod eius non erat dicere qui perire animas cum corporibus disserebat: sed uictus est ueritate et inprudenti ratio uera subrepsit.

In fact the same Lucretius, forgetting what he was asserting and what doctrine he was defending, wrote these verses: "Likewise what was from earth before goes back into the earth, but what was sent from the shores of the ether, that the shining temples of heaven receive again." That was not for one to say who argued that souls perish with bodies; but he was overcome by truth, and true reasoning crept up on him unawares.

7.12.6CSEL 19:619

praeterea id ipsum quod colligit, dissolui animam, hoc est simul cum corpore interire, quoniam simul nascantur, et falsum est et in contrarium conuerti potest. non enim simul interit, sed anima discedente integrum per multos dies manet et plerumque medicatum diutissime durat.

Moreover, what he infers, that the soul is dissolved, that is, perishes together with the body, because they are born together, is both false and can be turned the other way. For it does not perish at the same time; when the soul departs, the body remains intact for many days, and often, when embalmed, lasts a very long time.

7.12.7CSEL 19:619–620

nam si ut simul nascuntur, simul interirent, non discederet repente anima corpusque desereret, sed uno temporis puncto utrumque pariter dissiparetur et tam celeriter etiam corpus adhuc spiritu in eo manente deliquesceret ac periret, quam celeriter anima secedit, immo uero dissoluto corpore anima uanesceret uelut umor fracto uase diffusus.

For if, as they are born together, they perished together, the soul would not suddenly depart and leave the body; both would be scattered alike in one moment, and the body would melt and perish, even while the spirit remained in it, as quickly as the soul withdraws; indeed, when the body was dissolved, the soul would vanish like liquid spilled from a broken vessel.

7.12.8CSEL 19:620

nam si terrenum et fragile corpus post secessum animae non statim diffluit in terramque tabescit, ex qua illi origo est, ergo anima, quae fragilis non est, in aeternum manet, quoniam origo eius aeterna est.

For if the earthly and fragile body does not immediately dissolve after the soul's departure and waste away into the earth from which it originates, then the soul, which is not fragile, remains forever, since its origin is eternal.

7.12.9CSEL 19:620

quoniam crescit inquit mens in pueris et in iuuenibus uiget et in senibus deminuitur, apparet esse mortalem. primum non idem est anima et mens: aliut est enim quo uiuimus, aliut quo cogitamus. nam dormientium mens, non anima sopitur, et in furiosis mens extinguitur, anima manet, et ideo non exanimes, sed dementes appellantur.

"Since the mind," he says, "grows in children, flourishes in youth, and declines in the old, it is clearly mortal." First, soul and mind are not the same: that by which we live is one thing, that by which we think is another. For in the sleeping it is the mind, not the soul, that is put to sleep; and in the mad the mind is extinguished while the soul remains, and so they are called not lifeless but out of their minds.

7.12.10CSEL 19:620

mens ergo id est intellegentia uel augetur uel minuitur pro aetate. anima in statu suo semper est, et ex quo tempore spirandi accipit facultatem, eadem usque ad ultimum durat, donec emissa corporis claustro ad sedem suam reuolet.

So the mind, that is, the understanding, either grows or diminishes with age; the soul is always in its own state, and from the time it receives the power of breathing it remains the same until the end, until, released from the prison of the body, it flies back to its home.

7.12.11CSEL 19:620

deinde, quod anima quamuis a deo sit inspirata, tamen quia tenebroso domicilio terrenae carnis inclusa est, scientiam non habet, quae est diuinitatis.

Next, although the soul is breathed in by God, yet because it is shut in the dark dwelling of earthly flesh, it does not have knowledge, which belongs to divinity.

7.12.12CSEL 19:620–621

audit igitur ac discit omnia et sapientiam discendo et audiendo capit, et senectus non minuit sapientiam, sed auget, si tamen iuuenilis aetas uirtute decursa est, et si nimia senectus fregerit membra, non est animae uitium, si uisus euanuit, si lingua torpuit, si auditus obsurduit, sed corporis.

So it hears and learns everything and acquires wisdom by learning and hearing; and old age does not diminish wisdom but increases it, if youth has been spent in virtue; and if extreme old age has broken the limbs, it is not a fault of the soul if the sight has faded, the tongue grown sluggish, the hearing gone deaf, but of the body.

7.12.13CSEL 19:621

at enim memoria deficit. quid mirum si labentis domicilii ruina premitur mens et praeterita obliuiscitur, non aliter futura diuina quam si carcerem quo cohibetur effugerit?

"But memory fails." What wonder if the mind is weighed down by the ruin of its collapsing dwelling and forgets the past, and does not divine the future except when it has escaped the prison in which it is confined?

7.12.14CSEL 19:621

uerum eadem inquit dolori et luctui obnoxia est et ebrietate dementit, unde fragilis ac mortalis adparet.

"But," he says, "the same is subject to pain and grief and goes mad with drunkenness, from which it appears fragile and mortal."

7.12.15CSEL 19:621

idcirco igitur uirtus et sapientia necessaria est, ut et maeror, qui contrahitur indigna patiendo ac uidendo, fortitudine repellatur et uoluptas non modo potandi, sed etiam rerum ceterarum abstinentia superetur. nam (anima) si careat uirtute, si uoluptatibus dedita molliatur, morti fiet obnoxia, quoniam et uirtus, ut docuimus, inmortalitatis est fabricatrix et uoluptas mortis.

That is precisely why virtue and wisdom are necessary: so that the sorrow contracted by suffering and seeing unworthy things may be driven back by fortitude, and the pleasure not only of drinking but of other things may be overcome by abstinence. For if the soul lacks virtue, if it is softened by giving itself to pleasures, it will become liable to death, since virtue, as we have taught, is the maker of immortality, and pleasure of death.

7.12.16CSEL 19:621

mors autem, sicut ostendi, non funditus perimit ac delet, sed aeternis afficit cruciatibus. nam interire prorsus anima non potest, quoniam ex dei spiritu qui aeternus est originem cepit.

But death, as I have shown, does not destroy and blot out entirely, but inflicts eternal torments. For the soul cannot perish utterly, since it took its origin from the Spirit of God, which is eternal.

7.12.17CSEL 19:621

anima inquit etiam morbum corporis sentit et obliuionem sui patitur et sicut aegrescit, ita etiam saepe sanatur.

"The soul," he says, "also feels the disease of the body and suffers forgetfulness of itself, and just as it falls sick, so it is often healed."

7.12.18CSEL 19:621–622

hoc est ergo cur maxime uirtus adhibenda sit, ne ullo corporis dolore frangatur et obliuionem sui non anima, sed mens patiatur. quae quoniam certa corporis regione consistit, cum eam partem uis aliqua morbi uitiauerit, mouetur loco et quasi conquassata sede sua emigrat reditura scilicet, cum medella et sanitas domicilium suum reformauerit.

This is why virtue must above all be applied, so that it is not broken by any bodily pain, and it is not the soul but the mind that suffers forgetfulness of itself. Since it resides in a definite region of the body, when some force of disease has damaged that part, it is moved from its place and, as if its seat were shaken, it moves out, evidently to return when healing and health have restored its dwelling.

7.12.19CSEL 19:622

nam quia iuncta est anima cum corpore, si uirtute careat, contagio eius aegrescit et inbecillitas de societate fragilitatis redundat ad mentem, cum autem dissociata fuerit a corpore, uigebit ipsa per se nec ulla iam fragilitatis condicione temptabitur, quia indumentum fragile proiecit.

For because the soul is joined with the body, if it lacks virtue, it sickens by contact with the body, and weakness overflows from its association with frailty onto the mind; but when it has been separated from the body, it will flourish by itself and will no longer be tried by any condition of frailty, because it has thrown off its fragile garment.

7.12.20CSEL 19:622

sicut oculus inquit eunlsus ac separatus a corpore nihil potest uidere, ita et anima separata nihil sentire, quia et ipsa pars est corporis.

"Just as an eye," he says, "torn out and separated from the body can see nothing, so the soul separated can feel nothing, since it too is part of the body."

7.12.21CSEL 19:622

falsum hoc et absurdum est: anima enim non pars corporis, sed in corpore est. sicut id quod uase continetur, uasis pars non est nec ea quae in domo sunt, partes domus esse dicuntur, ita nec anima pars est corporis, quia corpus uel uas est animae uel receptaculum.

This is false and absurd: for the soul is not part of the body but is in the body. Just as what is held in a vessel is not part of the vessel, and the things in a house are not called parts of the house, so the soul is not part of the body, since the body is the soul's vessel or receptacle.

7.12.22CSEL 19:622

iam illut argumentum multo magis inane est, quod ait animam, quia non citius emittatur ex corpore, mortalem uideri, sed paulatim se ex omnibus membris explicet a summis pedibus incipiens: tamquam si esset aeterna, uno temporis momento erumperet, quod fit in iis qui ferro intereunt. quos autem morbus interimit, spiritum diutius exhalant, ut paulatim frigescentibus membris anima effletur.

That argument is much emptier still in which he says the soul seems mortal because it is not released from the body all at once but gradually withdraws from all the limbs, beginning from the tips of the feet; as though, if it were eternal, it would burst out in one moment of time, which happens to those who die by the sword. But those whom disease kills breathe out their spirit more slowly, so that the soul is breathed out as the limbs gradually grow cold.

7.12.23CSEL 19:622–623

quae cum materia sanguinis contineatur sicut lumen oleo, ea materia febrium calore consumpta necesse est membrorum summa quaeque frigescere, quoniam uenae exiliores in extrema corporis porriguntur et extremi ac tenuiores riui deficiente uena fontis arescunt.

Since it is held in the substance of the blood as light is in oil, when that substance is consumed by the heat of fevers, the extremities of the limbs must grow cold, since the finer veins stretch to the extremities of the body, and the farthest and thinnest streams dry up when the source vein fails.

7.12.24CSEL 19:623

nec tamen quia sensus corporis deficit, animae sensum extingui et occidere putandum est. non enim anima corpore deficiente, sed corpus anima decedente brutescit, quia sensum omnem trahit secum.

Yet it must not be thought that because the body's sensation fails, the soul's sensation is extinguished and dies. For the soul does not become senseless when the body fails, but the body becomes senseless when the soul departs, because it takes all sensation with it.

7.12.25CSEL 19:623

cum autem praesens anima sensum tribuat corpori et uiuere m efficiat, fieri non potest ut non ipsa per se et uiuat et sentiat, quoniam ipsa est et sensus et uita. nam quod ait:

But since the soul, when present, gives sensation to the body and makes it live, it cannot be that it does not itself live and feel by itself, since it is itself both sensation and life. For as to what he says:

7.12.26CSEL 19:623

quodsi inmortalis nostra foret mens, non tam se moriens dissolui conquereretur, sed magis ire foras uestemque relinquere, ut anguis, equidem numquam uidi qui se quereretur in morte dissolui:

"If our mind were immortal, it would not so complain at dying that it is being dissolved, but rather that it is going out and leaving its garment, like a snake": for my part I have never seen anyone complain at death that he was being dissolved.

7.12.27CSEL 19:623

sed ille fortasse Epicureum aliquem uiderat etiam dum moritur philosophantem ac de sui dissolutione in extremo spiritu disserentem.

But perhaps he had seen some Epicurean philosophizing even while dying and discoursing with his last breath about his own dissolution.

7.12.28CSEL 19:623

quomodo sciri potest utrum dissolui se sentiat an corpore liberari, cum in exitu lingua mutescat? nam dum sentit et loqui potest, nondum dissolutus est, ubi dissolutus est, nec sentire iam nec loqui potest: ita queri de dissolutione aut nondum potest aut iam non potest.

How can it be known whether he feels himself dissolved or freed from the body, since at the end the tongue falls silent? For while he feels and can speak, he is not yet dissolved; when he is dissolved, he can no longer feel or speak. So he can either not yet or no longer complain of dissolution.

7.12.29CSEL 19:623–624

at enim priusquam dissoluatur, intellegit se dissolutuiri. quid quod uidemus plerosque morientium non dissolui conquerentes, ut ait, sed exire se et proficisci et ambulare testantes idque aut gestu significant aut si adhuc possunt, et uoce pronuntiant? unde apparet non dissolutionem fieri, sed separationem, quae declarat animam permanere.

"But before he is dissolved, he understands that he is going to be dissolved." What of the fact that we see many of the dying not complaining that they are being dissolved, as he says, but testifying that they are going out, setting off, and walking away, and they show this by gesture or, if they still can, declare it with the voice? From this it is clear that it is not dissolution that happens but separation, which shows that the soul remains.

7.12.30CSEL 19:624

cetera Epicurei dogmatis argumenta Pythagorae repugnant disserenti migrare animas de corporibus uetustate ac morte confectis et insinuare se nouis ac recens natis et easdem semper renasci modo in homine modo in pecude modo in bestia modo in uolucre et hac ratione inmortales esse, quod saepe uariorum ac dissimilium corporum domicilia commutent.

The other arguments of the Epicurean doctrine oppose Pythagoras, who taught that souls move out of bodies worn out by age and death and insinuate themselves into new and newborn ones, and that the same souls are always reborn, now in a man, now in cattle, now in a beast, now in a bird, and are immortal in this way, since they often change their dwellings among various and unlike bodies.

7.12.31CSEL 19:624

quae sententia deliri hominis quoniam ridicula et mimo dignior quam scola fuit, ne refelli quidem serio debuit: quod qui facit, uidetur uereri ne quis id credat.

Since this view of a raving man was ridiculous and more worthy of the mime than of the school, it should not even have been refuted seriously; whoever does so seems afraid that someone might believe it.

7.12.32CSEL 19:624

praetereunda sunt igitur nobis ea quae pro falso contra falsum disserebantur: satis est ea refutasse quae contra uerum disputata sunt.

So we must pass over the arguments made for a falsehood against a falsehood; it is enough to have refuted those argued against the truth.

Divine 7, chapter 13

7.13.1CSEL 19:624

Declaraui, ut opinor, animam non esse solubilem: superest citare testes, quorum auctoritate argumenta firmentur.

I have shown, I think, that the soul is not dissoluble; it remains to cite witnesses by whose authority the arguments may be confirmed.

7.13.2CSEL 19:624

neque nunc prophetas in testimonium uocabo, quorum ratio et diuinatio in hoc solo posita est, ut ad cultum dei et ad inmortalitatem ab eo accipiendam creari hominem doceant, sed eos potius quibus istos qui respuunt ueritatem credere sit necesse.

Nor will I now call the prophets as witnesses, whose whole reasoning and prophecy lies in this alone, to teach that man was created for the worship of God and to receive immortality from him; but rather those whom these rejecters of truth must believe.

7.13.3CSEL 19:624–625

Hermes naturam hominis describens, ut doceret quemadmodum esset a deo factus, haec intulit: καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐξ ἑκατέρων φύσεων, τῆς τε ἀθανάτου καὶ τῆς θνητῆς, μίαν ἐποίει φύσιν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸν αὐτὸν πὴ μὲν ἀθάνατον, πὴ δὲ θνητὸν ποιήσας, καὶ τοῦτον φέρων ἐν μέσῳ τῆς θείας και ἀθανάτου φύσεως καὶ τῆς θνητῆς καὶ μεταβλητῆς ἵδρυσεν, ἵνα πάντα μὲν ὁρῶν πάντα θαυμάζῃ.

Hermes, describing the nature of man in order to teach how he was made by God, added this: "And from both natures, the immortal and the mortal, he made one nature, that of man, making the same being in one respect immortal and in another mortal; and bringing him, he set him in the middle between the divine and immortal nature and the mortal and changeable, so that, seeing all things, he might marvel at all."

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sed hunc fortasse aliquis in numero philosophorum conputet, quamuis in deos relatus Mercurii nomine ab Aegyptiis honoretur, nec plus ei auctoritatis tribuat quam Platoni aut Pythagorae.

But perhaps someone may count him among the philosophers, though he was deified and is honored by the Egyptians under the name of Mercury, and may attribute to him no more authority than to Plato or Pythagoras.

7.13.5CSEL 19:625–626

maius igitur testimonium requiramus. Polites quidam consuluit Apollinem Milesium utrumne maneat anima post mortem an dissoluatur, et respondit his uersibus:

Let us seek, then, a greater testimony. A certain Polites consulted Milesian Apollo whether the soul remains after death or is dissolved, and he answered in these verses:

7.13.6CSEL 19:626–627

Ψυχὴ μὲν μέχρις οὖ δεσμοῖς πρὸς σῶμα κρατεῖται, φθαρτὰ νοοῦσα πάθη θνηταῖς ἀλγηδόσιν εἴκει· ἡνίκα δ᾽ ἀνάλυσιν βροτέην μετὰ σῶμα μαρανθὲν ὡκίστην εὔρηται, ἐς αἰθέρα πᾶσα φορεῖται αἰὲν ἀγήραος οὖσα, μένει δ᾽ εἰς πάμπαν ἀπειρὴς. πρωτόγονος γὰρ τοῦτο Θεοῦ διέταξε πρόνοια. quid? carmina Sibyllina nonne hoc ita esse declarant, cum fore aliquando denuntiant ut a deo de uiuis ac mortuis iudicetur? quorum exempla paulo post inferemus.

"The soul, as long as it is held by bonds to the body, perceiving corruptible passions, yields to mortal pains; but when, after the body has withered, it finds its swiftest mortal release, it is borne wholly into the ether, being ever ageless, and remains forever unwearied; for the first-born providence of God ordained this." What then? Do not the Sibylline verses declare that this is so, when they announce that there will one day be a judgment of the living and the dead by God? Examples of these we will give a little later.

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falsa est ergo Democriti et Epicuri et Dicaearchi de animae dissolutione sententia. qui profecto non auderent de interitu animarum mago aliquo praesente disserere, qui sciret certis carminibus cieri ab inferis animas et adesse et praebere se humanis oculis uidendas et loqui et futura praedicere, et si auderent, re ipsa et documentis praesentibus uincerentur.

So the view of Democritus, Epicurus, and Dicaearchus on the dissolution of the soul is false. They certainly would not dare to argue about the destruction of souls in the presence of some magician who knew that by certain spells souls are summoned from the underworld, appear, show themselves to human eyes, speak, and foretell the future; and if they dared, they would be defeated by the fact itself and by present proofs.

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sed quia non peruiderant animae rationem, quae tam suptilis est, ut oculos humanae mentis effugiat, interire dixerunt.

But because they did not perceive the nature of the soul, which is so subtle that it escapes the eyes of the human mind, they said it perishes.

7.13.9CSEL 19:627

quid Aristoxenus, qui negauit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum uiuit in corpore? sed sicut in fidibus ex intentione neruorum effici, concordem sonum atque cantum, quem musici harmoniam uocant, ita in corporibus ex conpage uiscerum ac uigore membrorum uim sentiendi exsistere: quo nihil dici delirius potest.

What of Aristoxenus, who denied that there is any soul at all, even while it lives in the body? He said that just as on a lyre a concordant sound and melody, which musicians call harmony, is produced from the tension of the strings, so in bodies the power of sensing arises from the joining of the organs and the vigor of the limbs; nothing madder can be said.

7.13.10CSEL 19:627

uerum ille oculos quidem habuit incolumes, cor tamen caecum, quo uiuere se et habere mentem, qua id ipsum cogitauerat, non uidebat.

He had sound eyes, but a blind heart, by which he did not see that he lived and had a mind with which he had thought that very thing.

7.13.11CSEL 19:627

sed plerisque hoc philosophis accidit, ut putarent omnino non esse quicquid oculis non apparet, cum mentis acies multo clarior debeat esse quam corporis ad ea perspicienda quorum uis ac ratio sentitur potius quam uidetur.

But this happened to most philosophers: they thought that whatever does not appear to the eyes does not exist at all, when the sight of the mind ought to be much clearer than that of the body for seeing things whose force and nature are felt rather than seen.

Divine 7, chapter 14

7.14.1CSEL 19:627–628

Quoniam de immortalitate animae diximus, sequitur ut doceamus quatenus homini et quando tribuatur, ut in hoc quoque prauitatis ac stultitiae suae perspiciant errores qui mortales quosdam decretis placitisque mortalium deos esse factos opinantur, uel quod artes inuenerant uel quod usum quarundam frugum docuerant uel quod utilia uitae hominum prodiderant uel quod inmanes bestias interemerant.

Since we have spoken of the immortality of the soul, it follows that we teach how far and when it is granted to man, so that in this too those may see the errors of their depravity and folly who think that certain mortals were made gods by the decrees and resolutions of mortals, either because they had invented arts, or had taught the use of certain crops, or had brought useful things to human life, or had killed savage beasts.

7.14.2CSEL 19:628

quae merita quam longe ab inmortalitate semota sint, et docuimus in prioribus libris et nunc docebimus, ut appareat solam esse iustitiam quae uitam homini pariat aeternam, et solum deum qui aeternae uitae praemium largiatur.

How far these merits are removed from immortality we have taught in the earlier books and will teach now, so that it may be clear that justice alone produces eternal life for man, and God alone bestows the reward of eternal life.

7.14.3CSEL 19:628

nam illi qui suis meritis inmortales facti esse dicuntur, quia nec iustitia nec ulla in his uera uirtus fuit, non inmortalitatem sibi, sed mortem peccatis ac libidinibus quaesierunt neque caeleste praemium, sed inferna supplicia meruerunt, quae pendent simul cum iis omnibus qui eos coluerunt. cuius iudicii propinquare tempus ostendam, ut et iustis merces digna soluatur et poena merita inpiis inrogetur.

For those who are said to have been made immortal by their merits, since there was neither justice nor any true virtue in them, sought for themselves not immortality but death by their sins and lusts, and earned not a heavenly reward but the punishments of hell, which they pay together with all who worshipped them. I will show that the time of this judgment is approaching, so that a fitting wage may be paid to the just and deserved punishment inflicted on the impious.

7.14.4CSEL 19:628

Plato et multi alii philosophorum cum ignorarent originem rerum supremumque illut tempus quo mundus esset effectus, multa milia saeculorum fluxisse dixerunt, ex quo hic pulcherrimus mundi extiterit ornatus, secuti fortasse Chaldaeos, qui, ut Cicero tradit in libro de diuinatione primo, quadringenta septuaginta milia annorum monumentis conprehensa se habere delirant: in quo se quia posse argui non putabant, liberum sibi crediderunt esse mentiri.

Plato and many other philosophers, since they did not know the origin of things and that first time at which the world was made, said that many thousands of ages had passed since this most beautiful adornment of the world came to be; following perhaps the Chaldeans, who, as Cicero records in the first book On Divination, rave that they have 470,000 years contained in their records; and because they thought they could not be refuted in this, they believed they were free to lie.

7.14.5CSEL 19:628

nos autem, quos diuinae litterae ad scientiam ueritatis erudiunt, principium mundi, finemque cognouimus: de quo nunc in fine operis disseremus, quoniam de principio in secundo libro explicauimus.

But we, whom the divine writings train in the knowledge of truth, know the beginning of the world and its end; of this we will now speak at the end of the work, since we explained the beginning in the second book.

7.14.6CSEL 19:628–629

sciant igitur philosophi qui ab exordio mundi saeculorum milia enumerant, nondum sextum millesimum annum esse conclusum. quo numero expleto consummationem fieri necesse est et humanarum rerum statum in melius reformari: cuius rei argumentum prius enarrandum est, quo ratio eluceat.

So let the philosophers who count thousands of ages from the beginning of the world know that the six thousandth year has not yet been completed. When this number is fulfilled, the consummation must come and the state of human affairs be reformed for the better. The argument for this must first be told, so that its reason may shine out.

7.14.7CSEL 19:629

Mundum deus et hoc rerum naturae admirabile opus, sicut arcanis sacrae scripturae continetur, sex dierum spatio consummauit diemque septimum, quo ab operibus suis requieuerat, sanxit.

God completed the world and this wonderful work of nature, as is contained in the secrets of Holy Scripture, in the space of six days, and hallowed the seventh day, on which he had rested from his works.

7.14.8CSEL 19:629

hic est autem dies sabbati, qui lingua Hebraeorum a numero nomen accepit, unde septenarius numerus legitimus ac plenus est. nam et dies septem sunt quibus per uicem reuolutis orbes conficiuntur annorum et septem stellae quae non occidunt et septem sidera quae uocantur errantia, quorum dispares cursus et inaequabiles motus rerum ac temporum uarietates efficere creduntur.

This is the day of the sabbath, which in the Hebrew language took its name from the number; hence the number seven is lawful and full. For there are seven days by whose turning in order the circles of the years are completed, and seven stars that do not set, and seven heavenly bodies called wandering, whose unequal courses and irregular motions are believed to produce the variations of things and times.

7.14.9CSEL 19:629

ergo quoniam sex diebus cuncta dei opera perfecta sunt, per saecula sex id est annorum sex milia manere in hoc statu mundum necesse est. dies enim magnus dei mille annorum circulo terminatur, sicut indicat propheta, qui dicit: ante oculos tuos, domine, mille anni tamquam dies unus.

So since all the works of God were completed in six days, the world must remain in this state for six ages, that is, six thousand years. For the great day of God is bounded by a circle of a thousand years, as the prophet indicates, who says: "Before your eyes, O Lord, a thousand years are as one day."

7.14.10CSEL 19:629

et sicut deus sex illos dies in tantis rebus fabricandis laborauit, ita et religio eius et ueritas in his sex milibus annorum laboret necesse est, malitia praeualente atque dominante.

And just as God labored those six days in making such great things, so his religion and truth must labor in these six thousand years, while wickedness prevails and rules.

7.14.11CSEL 19:629–630

et rursus quoniam perfectis operibus requieuit die septimo eumque benedixit, necesse est ut in fine sexti millesimi anni malitia omnis aboleatur e terra et regnet per annos mille iustitia sitque tranquillitas et requies a laboribus quos mundus iam diu perfert.

And again, since he rested on the seventh day when his works were completed and blessed it, at the end of the six thousandth year all wickedness must be abolished from the earth, and justice reign for a thousand years, and there be tranquillity and rest from the labors the world has long endured.

7.14.12CSEL 19:630

uerum quatenus id eueniat, ordine suo explicabo. saepe diximus minora et exigua magnorum figuras et praemonstrationes esse, ut hunc diem nostrum, qui ortu solis occasuque finitur, diei magni speciem gerere, quem circuitus annorum mille determinat.

But how this will come about I will explain in its order. We have often said that small and slight things are figures and foreshadowings of great ones, as this day of ours, bounded by the rising and setting of the sun, bears the likeness of the great day, which the circuit of a thousand years determines.

7.14.13CSEL 19:630

eodem modo etiam figuratio terreni hominis caelestis populi praeferebat in posterum fictionem. nam sicut perfectis omnibus quae in usum hominis molitus est deus ipsum hominem sexto die ultimum fecit eumque induxit in hunc mundum tamquam in domum iam diligenter instructam, ita nunc sexto die magno uerus homo uerbo dei fingitur, id est sanctus populus doctrina et praeceptis dei ad iustitiam figuratur.

In the same way the forming of earthly man foreshadowed the future forming of a heavenly people. For just as, when all things he had made for man's use were complete, God made man himself last, on the sixth day, and brought him into this world as into a house already carefully furnished, so now on the great sixth day the true man is being formed by the Word of God, that is, a holy people is being shaped for justice by the teaching and precepts of God.

7.14.14CSEL 19:630

et sicut tunc mortalis atque inperfectus e terra fictus est, ut mille annis in hoc mundo uiueret, ita nunc ex hoc terrestri saeculo perfectus homo fingitur, ut uiuificatus a deo in hoc eodem mundo per annos mille dominetur.

And just as then a mortal and imperfect man was formed from the earth to live a thousand years in this world, so now from this earthly age a perfect man is being formed, so that, made alive by God, he may rule in this same world for a thousand years.

7.14.15CSEL 19:630

quomodo autem consummatio futura sit et qualis exitus humanis rebus inpendeat, si quis diuinas litteras fuerit scrutatus, inueniet.

How the consummation will come and what end hangs over human affairs, anyone who has searched the divine writings will find.

7.14.16CSEL 19:630

sed et saecularium prophetarum congruentes cum caelestibus uoces finem rerum et occasum post breue tempus adnuntiant describentes quasi fatigati et dilabentis mundi ultimam senectutem.

But the voices of the secular prophets too, agreeing with the heavenly ones, announce the end and fall of things after a short time, describing, as it were, the final old age of a tired and failing world.

7.14.17CSEL 19:630–631

quae uero a prophetis et uatibus futura esse dicantur, priusquam superueniat extrema illa conclusio, collecta ex omnibus et coaceruata subnectam.

What the prophets and seers say will happen before that final conclusion comes, I will append, gathered and assembled from all of them.

Divine 7, chapter 15

7.15.1CSEL 19:631

Est in arcanis sanctarum litterarum transcendisse in Aegyptum cogente inopia rei frumentariae principem Hebraeorum cum omni domo et cognatione.

It is in the secrets of the holy writings that the chief of the Hebrews, compelled by shortage of grain, crossed into Egypt with all his household and kin.

7.15.2CSEL 19:631

cuius posteri cum diutius in Aegypto commorantes in magnam gentem creuissent et graui atque intolerando seruitutis iugo premerentur, percussit Aegyptum deus insanabili plaga et populum suum liberauit traductum medio mari, cum discissis fluctibus et in utramque partem dimotis per siccum populus graderetur.

When his descendants, staying long in Egypt, had grown into a great nation and were oppressed by a heavy and intolerable yoke of slavery, God struck Egypt with an incurable plague and freed his people, leading them through the middle of the sea, when the waves were parted and moved to either side and the people walked across on dry ground.

7.15.3CSEL 19:631

conatusque rex Aegyptiorum profugos insequi coeunte in statum suum pelago cum omnibus copiis interceptus est.

And the king of the Egyptians, trying to pursue the fugitives, was caught with all his forces as the sea came back together into its place.

7.15.4CSEL 19:631

quod facinus tam clarum tamque mirabile quamuis ad praesens uirtutem dei hominibus ostenderet, tamen praesignificatio et figura maioris rei fuit, quam deus idem in extrema temporum consummatione facturus est: liberabit enim plebem suam de graui seruitute mundi.

This deed, so famous and wonderful, though for the present it showed God's power to human beings, was nevertheless a foreshadowing and figure of a greater thing, which the same God will do at the final consummation of the times: for he will free his people from the heavy slavery of the world.

7.15.5CSEL 19:631

sed quoniam tunc una plebs dei et aput unam gentem fuit, Aegyptus sola percussa est, nunc autem quia populus dei ex omnibus linguis congregatus aput omnes gentes commoratur et ab his dominantibus premitur, necesse est uniuersas nationes id est orbem totum caelestibus plagis uerberari, ut iustus et cultor dei populus liberetur.

But since then God's people was one and in one nation, Egypt alone was struck; now, however, because the people of God, gathered from all languages, lives among all nations and is oppressed by those who rule them, all nations, that is, the whole world, must be lashed with heavenly plagues, so that the just people who worship God may be set free.

7.15.6CSEL 19:631

et sicut tunc signa facta sunt quibus futura clades Aegyptiis ostenderetur, ita in ultimo fient prodigia miranda per omnia elementa mundi, quibus imminens exitus uniuersis gentibus intellegatur.

And just as then signs were given by which the coming disaster was shown to the Egyptians, so at the last there will be wonderful portents throughout all the elements of the world, by which all nations will understand that the end is at hand.

7.15.7CSEL 19:631–632

propinquante igitur huius saeculi termino humanarum rerum statum commutari necesse est et in deterius nequitia inualescente prolabi, ut iam nostra haec tempora, quibus iniquitas et malitia usque ad summum gradum creuit, in illius tamen insanabilis mali conparatione felicia et prope aurea possint iudicari.

So as the end of this age approaches, the state of human affairs must change and slide toward the worse as wickedness grows strong, so that these our times, in which iniquity and malice have grown to the highest degree, may still be judged happy and almost golden in comparison with that incurable evil.

7.15.8CSEL 19:632

ita enim iustitia rarescet, ita inpietas et auaritia et cupiditas et libido crebrescet, ut si qui forte tum fuerint boni, praedae sint sceleratis ac diuexentur undique ab iniustis, soli autem mali opulenti sint, boni uero in omnibus contumeliis atque in egestate iactentur. confundetur omne ius et leges interibunt.

For justice will become so rare, and impiety, greed, desire, and lust so common, that if there happen to be any good people then, they will be prey to the wicked and harassed on every side by the unjust, while only the wicked will be rich, and the good tossed about in every insult and in want. All right will be confounded and laws will perish.

7.15.9CSEL 19:632

nihil quisquam tunc habebit nisi aut quaesitum aut defensum manu, audacia et uis omnia possidebunt. non fides in hominibus, non pax, non humanitas, non pudor, non ueritas erit atque ita neque securitas neque regimen neque requies a malis ulla.

No one will then have anything except what he has won or defended by his own hand; boldness and force will possess everything. There will be no faith among people, no peace, no humanity, no shame, no truth, and so no security, no government, no rest from evils.

7.15.10CSEL 19:632

omnis enim terra tumultuabitur, frement ubique bella, omnes gentes in armis erunt et se inuicem obpugnabunt: ciuitates inter se finitimae proeliabuntur et prima omnium Aegyptus stultarum superstitionum luet poenas et sanguine uelut flumine operietur.

For the whole earth will be in tumult, wars will roar everywhere, all nations will be in arms and attack one another; neighboring cities will fight each other, and Egypt first of all will pay the penalty for its foolish superstitions and be covered with blood as with a river.

7.15.11CSEL 19:632

tum peragrabit gladius orbem metens omnia et tamquam messem cuncta prosternens. cuius uastitatis et confusionis haec erit causa, quod Romanum nomen, quo nunc regitur orbis — horret animus dicere, sed dicam, quia futurum est — tolletur e terra et inperium in Asiam reuertetur ac rursus oriens dominabitur atque occidens seruiet.

Then the sword will traverse the world, mowing down everything and laying all low like a harvest. And the cause of this devastation and confusion will be this: that the Roman name, by which the world is now ruled (my mind shudders to say it, but I will say it, because it will happen), will be taken from the earth, and power will return to Asia, and again the East will rule and the West serve.

7.15.12CSEL 19:632

nec mirum cuiquam debet uideri, si regnum tanta mole fundatum ac tamdiu per tot et tales uiros auctum, tantis denique opibus confirmatum aliquando tamen conruet. nihil est enim humanis uiribus laboratum quod non humanis aeque uiribus destrui possit, quoniam mortalia sunt opera mortalium.

Nor should it seem strange to anyone if a kingdom founded on so great a mass, increased so long by so many and such great men, and strengthened by such great resources, will nevertheless one day collapse. For nothing built by human strength cannot equally be destroyed by human strength, since the works of mortals are mortal.

7.15.13CSEL 19:632–633

sic et alia prius regna cum diutius floruissent, nihilominus tamen occiderunt. nam et Aegyptios et Persas et Graecos et Assyrios proditum est regimen habuisse terrarum: quibus omnibus destructis ad Romanos quoque rerum summa peruenit. qui quanto ceteris omnibus regnis magnitudine antistant, tanto maiore decident lapsu, quia plus habent ponderis ad ruinam quae sunt ceteris altiora.

So other kingdoms before, though they flourished for a long time, nonetheless fell. For it is recorded that the Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, and Assyrians held rule over the earth; and when all these were destroyed, supreme power came to the Romans too. As much as they surpass all other kingdoms in size, so much greater will be their fall, because what is higher than the rest has more weight to bring it down.

7.15.14CSEL 19:633

non inscite Seneca Romanae urbis tempora distribuit in aetates. primam enim dixit infantiam sub rege Romulo fuisse, a quo et genita et quasi educata sit Roma; deinde pueritiam sub ceteris regibus, a quibus et aucta sit et disciplinis pluribus institutisque formata; at uero Tarquinio regnante cum iam quasi adulta esse coepisset, seruitium non tulisse et reiecto superbae dominationis iugo maluisse legibus obtemperare quam regibus; cumque esset adulescentia eius fine Punici belli terminata, tum denique confirmatis uiribus coepisse iuuenescere.

Not unskillfully did Seneca divide the times of the city of Rome into ages. He said its first age, infancy, was under King Romulus, by whom Rome was begotten and, as it were, reared; then childhood under the other kings, by whom it was enlarged and shaped by many disciplines and institutions; but under Tarquin, when it had begun to be almost grown up, it did not bear slavery, and, throwing off the yoke of proud domination, preferred to obey laws rather than kings; and when its adolescence ended with the end of the Punic war, then at last, its strength confirmed, it began to be a young man.

7.15.15CSEL 19:633–634

sublata enim Carthagine, quae tam diu aemula imperii fuit, manus suas in totum orbem terra marique porrexit, donec regibus cunctis et nationibus imperio subiugatis cum iam bellorum materia deficeret, uiribus suis male uteretur, quibus se ipsa confecit.

For once Carthage was removed, which had so long been a rival for empire, it stretched its hands over the whole world by land and sea, until, when all kings and nations had been subjected to its rule and material for wars was lacking, it used its strength badly and wore itself out.

7.15.16CSEL 19:634

haec fuit prima eius senectus, cum bellis lacerata ciuilibus atque intestino malo pressa rursus ad regimen singularis imperii reccidit quasi ad alteram infantiam reuoluta. amissa enim libertate, quam Bruto duce et auctore defenderat, ita consenuit, tamquam sustentare se ipsa non ualeret, nisi adminiculo regentium niteretur.

This was its first old age, when, torn by civil wars and pressed by internal evil, it fell back again to the rule of a single sovereign, as if returned to a second infancy. For having lost the liberty it had defended under Brutus as leader and founder, it grew old as though it could not support itself unless it leaned on the prop of rulers.

7.15.17CSEL 19:634

quodsi haec ita sunt, quid restat nisi ut sequatur interitus senectutem? et id futurum breui contiones prophetarum denuntiant sub ambage aliorum nominum, ne facile quis intellegat.

If this is so, what remains but that death should follow old age? And that this will happen soon the declarations of the prophets announce, under the cover of other names, so that no one may easily understand.

7.15.18CSEL 19:634

Sibyllae tamen aperte interituram esse Romam locuntur et quidem iudicio dei, quod nomen eius habuerit inuisum et inimica iustitiae alumnum ueritatis populum trucidarit.

The Sibyls, however, say openly that Rome will perish, and indeed by the judgment of God, because it held his name hateful and, as an enemy of justice, slaughtered the people nurtured by truth.

7.15.19CSEL 19:634–635

Hystaspes quoque, qui fuit Medorum rex antiquissimus, a quo amnis nomen accepit qui nunc Hydaspes dicitur, admirabile somnium sub interpretatione uaticinantis pueri ad memoriam posteris tradidit: sublatuiri ex orbe imperium nomenque Romanum multo ante praefatus est quam illa Troiana gens conderetur.

Hystaspes too, a most ancient king of the Medes, from whom the river now called Hydaspes took its name, handed down to the memory of posterity a wonderful dream, interpreted by a prophesying boy: he foretold that the empire and name of Rome would be taken from the world, long before that Trojan race was founded.

Divine 7, chapter 16

7.16.1CSEL 19:635

Quomodo autem id futurum sit, ne quis incredibile arbitretur, ostendam. in primis multiplicabitur regnum et summa rerum potestas per plurimos dissipata et concisa minuetur. tum discordiae ciuiles in perpetuum serentur nec ulla requies bellis exitialibus erit, donec reges decem pariter existant, qui orbem terrae non ad regendum, sed ad consumendum partiantur.

But lest anyone think it incredible, I will show how this will happen. First the kingdom will be multiplied, and supreme power, scattered among very many and cut up, will be diminished. Then civil discords will be sown perpetually, and there will be no rest from deadly wars, until ten kings arise at the same time, who will divide the world not to rule it but to consume it.

7.16.2CSEL 19:635

hi exercitibus in immensum auctis et agrorum cultibus destitutis, quod est principium euersionis et cladis, disperdent omnia et comminuent et uorabunt.

These, with armies increased beyond measure and the cultivation of the fields abandoned, which is the beginning of overthrow and disaster, will ruin, crush, and devour everything.

7.16.3CSEL 19:635

tum repente aduersus eos hostis potentissimus ab extremis finibus plagae septentrionalis orietur, qui tribus ex eo numero deletis qui tunc Asiam obtinebunt, adsumetur in societatem a ceteris ac princeps omnium constituetur.

Then suddenly a most powerful enemy will arise against them from the farthest borders of the northern region; having destroyed three of that number who then hold Asia, he will be taken into alliance by the rest and made chief of all.

7.16.4CSEL 19:635

hic insustentabili dominatione uexabit orbem, diuina et humana miscebit, infanda dictu et exsecrabilia molietur, noua consilia in pectore suo uolutabit, ut proprium sibi constituat imperium, leges commutet et suas sanciat, contaminabit diripiet spoliabit occidet: denique inmutato nomine atque imperii sede translata confusio ac perturbatio humani generis consequetur.

He will harass the world with unbearable tyranny, confound things divine and human, undertake deeds unspeakable and accursed, and turn over new plans in his heart to establish his own empire; he will change the laws and ordain his own; he will defile, plunder, despoil, and kill; and finally, with the name changed and the seat of empire transferred, confusion and disturbance of the human race will follow.

7.16.5CSEL 19:635

tum uero detestabile atque abominandum tempus existet, quo nulli hominum sit uita iucunda. eruentur funditus ciuitates atque interibunt non modo ferro atque igni, uerum etiam terrae motibus adsiduis et eluuie aquarum et morbis frequentibus et fame crebra.

Then indeed a detestable and abominable time will come, in which life will be pleasant for no one. Cities will be utterly overthrown and perish, not only by sword and fire, but also by constant earthquakes, floods of water, frequent diseases, and repeated famine.

7.16.6CSEL 19:635–636

aer enim uitiabitur et corruptus ac pestilens fiet modo inportunis imbribus modo inutili siccitate, nunc frigoribus nunc aestibus nimiis, nec terra homini dabit fructum: non seges quicquam, non arbor, non uitis feret, sed cum in flore spem maximam dederint, in fruge decipient.

For the air will be corrupted and become foul and pestilent, now with unseasonable rains, now with useless drought, now with cold, now with excessive heat; nor will the earth give man its fruit: no crop, no tree, no vine will bear anything, but after giving the greatest hope in flower, they will disappoint in fruit.

7.16.7CSEL 19:636

fontes quoque cum fluminibus arescent, ut ne potus quidem suppetat, et aquae in sanguinem aut amaritudinem mutabuntur.

Springs too will dry up with the rivers, so that there will not even be drink enough, and waters will be changed into blood or bitterness.

7.16.8CSEL 19:636

propter haec deficient et in terra quadrupedes et in aere uolucres et in mari pisces. prodigia quoque in caelo mirabilia mentes hominum maximo terrore confundent, et crines cometarum et solis tenebrae et color lunae et cadentium siderum lapsus.

Because of these things four-footed animals on land, birds in the air, and fish in the sea will fail. Wonderful portents in the sky too will confound human minds with the greatest terror: the tails of comets, the darkenings of the sun, the color of the moon, and the falling of stars.

7.16.9CSEL 19:636

nec tamen haec usitato modo fient, sed existent subito ignota et inuisa oculis astra. sol in perpetuum fuscabitur, ut uix inter noctem diemque discernat, luna iam non tribus deficiet horis, sed perpetuo sanguine offusa meatus extraordinarios peraget, ut non sit homini promptum aut siderum cursus aut rationem temporum agnoscere: fiet enim uel aestas in hieme uel hiemps in aestate.

Nor will these happen in the usual way, but stars unknown and unseen will suddenly appear. The sun will be darkened perpetually, so that it will hardly distinguish between night and day; the moon will no longer be eclipsed for three hours, but, covered with perpetual blood, will make unusual courses, so that it will not be easy for man to recognize the courses of the stars or the reckoning of seasons; for there will be summer in winter or winter in summer.

7.16.10CSEL 19:636

tunc annus breuiabitur et mensis minuetur et dies in angustum coartabitur, stellae uero creberrimae cadent, ut caelum omne caecum sine ullis luminibus appareat.

Then the year will be shortened, the month diminished, and the day narrowed into a small space; and stars will fall in great numbers, so that the whole sky will appear dark without any lights.

7.16.11CSEL 19:636–637

montes quoque altissimi decident et planis aequabuntur, mare innauigabile constituetur. ac ne quid malis hominum terraeque desit, audietur e caelo tuba: quod hoc modo Sibylla denuntiat: σάλπιγξ οὐρανόθεν φωνὴν πολύθρηνον ἀφήσει. itaque trepidabunt omnes et ad luctuosum illum sonitum contremescent.

The highest mountains too will fall and be leveled with the plains; the sea will be made unnavigable. And that nothing may be lacking to the evils of men and the earth, a trumpet will be heard from heaven, which the Sibyl announces thus: "A trumpet from heaven will send forth a voice of much lamenting." So all will tremble and quake at that mournful sound.

7.16.12CSEL 19:637

tum uero per iram dei aduersus homines qui iustitiam non adgnouerint, saeuiet ferrum ignis fames morbus, et super omnia metus semper inpendens. tunc orabunt deum et non exaudiet, optabitur mors et non ueniet. ne nox quidem requiem timori dabit nec ad oculos somnus accedet, sed animas hominum sollicitudo ac uigilia macerabit, plorabunt et gement et dentibus strident, gratulabuntur mortuis et uiuos plangent.

Then indeed, through the wrath of God against people who did not acknowledge justice, sword, fire, famine, and disease will rage, and over all, fear always hanging over them. Then they will pray to God and he will not hear; death will be longed for and will not come. Not even night will give rest to fear, nor will sleep come to the eyes, but anxiety and wakefulness will waste human souls; they will weep, groan, and gnash their teeth, congratulate the dead and lament the living.

7.16.13CSEL 19:637–638

his et aliis pluribus malis solitudo fiet in terra et erit deformatus orbis atque desertus: quod in carminibus Sibyllinis ita dicitur: ἔσται ϰόσμος ἄϰοσμος ἀπολλυμένων άνθρώπων.

By these and many other evils there will be desolation on the earth, and the world will be disfigured and deserted, which is said thus in the Sibylline verses: "The world will be no world, as men perish."

7.16.14CSEL 19:638

ita enim conficietur humanum genus, ut uix decima pars hominum relinquatur, et unde mille processerant, uix prodient centum. de cultoribus etiam dei duae partes interibunt et tertia quae fuerit probata remanebit.

For the human race will be so worn away that scarcely a tenth part of people will be left, and where a thousand went forth, scarcely a hundred will come out. Of the worshippers of God too, two parts will perish, and the third, which has been proved, will remain.

Divine 7, chapter 17

7.17.1CSEL 19:638

Sed planius quomodo id eueniat exponam. imminente iam temporum conclusione propheta magnus mittetur a deo, qui conuertat homines ad dei agnitionem, et accipiet potestatem mirabilia faciendi.

But I will explain more plainly how this will happen. When the conclusion of the times is already at hand, a great prophet will be sent by God to turn people to the knowledge of God, and he will receive power to do wonders.

7.17.2CSEL 19:638

ubicumque homines non audierint eum, claudet caelum et abstinebit imbres, aquam conuertet in sanguinem et cruciabit illos siti ac fame, et quicumque conabitur eum laedere, procedet ignis de ore eius atque conburet illum. his prodigiis ac uirtutibus conuertet multos ad dei cultum. peractisque operibus ipsius alter rex orietur e Syria malo spiritu genitus, euersor ac perditor generis humani, qui reliquias illius prioris mali cum ipso simul deleat.

Wherever people do not listen to him, he will shut the sky and withhold the rains, turn water into blood, and torment them with thirst and hunger; and whoever tries to harm him, fire will come out of his mouth and burn him. By these portents and powers he will turn many to the worship of God. And when his works are finished, another king will arise from Syria, begotten of an evil spirit, the overthrower and destroyer of the human race, who will destroy the remnants of that former evil together with itself.

7.17.3CSEL 19:638

hic pugnabit aduersus prophetam dei et uincet et interficiet eum et insepultum iacere patietur, sed post diem tertium reuiuiscet atque inspectantibus et mirantibus cunctis rapietur in caelum.

He will fight against the prophet of God, defeat him, kill him, and let him lie unburied; but after the third day he will come to life again and, while all look on and marvel, be caught up into heaven.

7.17.4CSEL 19:638–639

rex uero ille taeterrimus erit quidem et ipse, sed mendaciorum propheta, et se ipsum constituet ac uocabit deum, se coli iubebit ut dei filium. et dabitur ei potestas, ut faciat signa et prodigia, quibus uisis inretiat homines, ut adorent eum.

That king will be most foul, and himself a prophet, but of lies; he will set himself up and call himself God, and will order himself to be worshipped as the Son of God. And power will be given him to do signs and wonders, by the sight of which he will ensnare people to worship him.

7.17.5CSEL 19:639

iubebit ignem descendere a caelo et solem a suis cursibus stare et imaginem loqui, et fient haec sub uerbo eius: quibus miraculis etiam sapientium plurimi adlicientur ab eo.

He will command fire to come down from heaven, the sun to stand still in its course, and an image to speak, and these things will happen at his word; by these miracles even very many of the wise will be enticed by him.

7.17.6CSEL 19:639

tunc eruere templum dei conabitur et iustum populum persequetur et erit pressura et contritio qualis numquam fuit a principio mundi.

Then he will try to overthrow the temple of God and persecute the just people, and there will be distress and affliction such as there never was from the beginning of the world.

7.17.7CSEL 19:639

quicumque crediderint atque accesserint ei, signabuntur ab eo tamquam pecudes, qui autem recusauerint notam eius, aut in montes fugient aut conprehensi exquisitis cruciatibus necabuntur.

Whoever believe and join him will be marked by him like cattle; but those who refuse his mark will either flee to the mountains or, if caught, be put to death with refined tortures.

7.17.8CSEL 19:639

idem iustos homines obuoluet libris prophetarum atque ita cremabit. et dabitur ei desolare orbem terrae mensibus quadraginta duobus.

He will also wrap just men in the books of the prophets and so burn them. And it will be given him to lay waste the world for forty-two months.

7.17.9CSEL 19:639

id erit tempus quo iustitia proicietur et innocentia odio erit, quo mali bonos hostiliter praedabuntur. non lex aut ordo aut militiae disciplina seruabitur, non canos quisquam reuerebitur, non officium pietatis adgnoscet, non sexus aut infantiae miserebitur: confundentur omnia et miscebuntur contra fas, contra iura naturae. ita quasi uno communique latrocinio terra uniuersa uastabitur.

That will be the time when justice is cast out and innocence hated, when the wicked will prey on the good as enemies. No law or order or military discipline will be kept; no one will respect gray hairs, acknowledge the duty of piety, or pity sex or infancy; everything will be confounded and mixed against right and against the laws of nature. So the whole earth will be laid waste as by one common robbery.

7.17.10CSEL 19:639–640

cum haec facta erunt, tum iusti et sectatores ueritatis segregabunt se a malis et fugient in solitudines. quo audito inpius inflammatus ira ueniet cum exercitu magno et admotis omnibus copiis circumdabit montem in quo iusti morabuntur, ut eos conprehendat.

When these things have been done, then the just and the followers of truth will separate themselves from the wicked and flee into solitary places. When he hears this, the impious one, inflamed with anger, will come with a great army and, bringing up all his forces, will surround the mountain where the just are staying, in order to seize them.

7.17.11CSEL 19:640

illi uero ubi se clausos undique atque obsessos uiderint, exclamabunt ad deum uoce magna et auxilium caeleste inplorabunt, et exaudiet eos deus et mittet regem magnum de caelo, qui eos eripiat ac liberet omnesque inpios ferro ignique disperdat.

But when they see themselves shut in and besieged on every side, they will cry to God with a loud voice and implore heavenly help; and God will hear them and send a great King from heaven to rescue and free them and destroy all the impious with sword and fire.

Divine 7, chapter 18

7.18.1CSEL 19:640

Haec ita futura esse cum prophetae omnes ex dei spiritu tum etiam uates ex instinctu daemonum cecinerunt.

That these things will be so, both all the prophets have sung from the Spirit of God and also seers from the prompting of demons.

7.18.2CSEL 19:640

Hystaspes enim, quem superius nominaui, descripta iniquitate saeculi huius extremi pios ac fideles a nocentibus segregatos ait cum fletu et gemitu extenturos esse ad caelum manus et inploraturos fidem Iouis: Iouem respecturum ad terram et auditurum uoces hominum atque inpios extincturum. quae omnia uera sunt praeter unum, quod Iouem dixit illa facturum quae deus faciet.

For Hystaspes, whom I named above, having described the iniquity of this last age, says that the pious and faithful, separated from the guilty, will stretch out their hands to heaven with weeping and groaning and implore the protection of Jupiter; that Jupiter will look down on the earth, hear the voices of men, and destroy the impious. All of this is true except one thing: that he said Jupiter would do what God will do.

7.18.3CSEL 19:640–641

sed et illut non sine daemonum fraude subtractum, missuiri a patre tunc filium dei, qui deletis omnibus malis pios liberet. quod Hermes tamen non dissimulauit. in eo enim libro qui λόγος τέλειος inscribitur, post enumerationem malorum de quibus diximus subiecit haec:

But this too was removed, not without the deceit of demons: that the Son of God would then be sent by the Father to destroy all evils and free the pious. Hermes, however, did not conceal it. For in that book entitled The Perfect Discourse, after the list of evils of which we have spoken, he added this:

7.18.4CSEL 19:641–642

ἐπὰν δὴ ταῦτα γένηται, ὦ Ἀσκλήπιε. τότε ὁ κύριος καὶ πατὴρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἑνὸς θεοῦ δημιουργὸς ἐπιβλέψας τοῖς γενομένοις καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν τοῦτ ἔστιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀντερείσας τῆ ἀταξίᾳ καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενος τὴν πλάνην καὶ τὴν κακίαν ἐκκαθαρας πὴ μὲν ὕδατι πολλῷ κατακλύσας, πὴ δὲ πυρὶ ὀξυτάτῳ διακαύσας, ἑνίοτε δὲ πολέμοις καὶ λοιμοῖς ἐκπαίσας, ἤγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ ἀποκατέστησεν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κόσμον.

"When these things have happened, Asclepius, then the Lord and Father and God, the maker of the first and one god, looking on what has happened and setting his own will, that is, the good, against the disorder, recalling error and cleansing wickedness, now drowning it in much water, now burning it with sharpest fire, and at times striking it with wars and plagues, brought back and restored his own world to its ancient state."

7.18.5CSEL 19:642

Sibyllae quoque non aliter fore ostendunt quam ut dei filius a summo patre mittatur, qui et iustos liberet de manibus inpiorum et iniustos cum tyrannis saeuientibus deleat.

The Sibyls too show that it will be no other way than that the Son of God will be sent by the supreme Father to free the just from the hands of the impious and destroy the unjust together with the raging tyrants.

7.18.6CSEL 19:642–643

e quibus una sic tradit: ἥξει καὶ μακάρων ἐθέλων πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξαι. καί κέν τις θεόθεν βασιλεὺς πεμφθεὶς ἐπὶ τοῦτον πάντας ὀλεῖ βασιλεῖς μεγάλους καὶ φῶτας ἀρίστους; εἰθ᾽ οὕτως κρίσις ἔσται ὑπ᾽ ἀφθίτου ἀνθρώποισιν. item alia:

One of them teaches thus: "He will come, wishing to sack the city of the blessed; and a king sent from God against him will destroy all the great kings and the best men; and thus there will be judgment by the Imperishable One upon men." Likewise another:

7.18.7CSEL 19:643

καὶ τότ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἠελίου θεὸς πέμψει βασιλῆα, ὃς πᾶσαν γαῖαν παύσει πολέμοιο κακοῖο. et rursus alia:

"And then God will send a king from the sun, who will stop the whole earth from evil war." And again another:

7.18.8CSEL 19:643–644

ὃς ῥά κε πραὺς ἰδοὺ ἤξει, ἴνα τὸ ζυγὸν ἡμῶν δοῦλον δυσβάστακτον ἐπ᾽ αὐχένι κείμενον ἄρῃ, καὶ θεσμοὺς ἀθέους λύσει, δεσμούς τε βιαίους.

"Who, behold, will come gentle, to lift our yoke of slavery, hard to bear, that lies on our neck, and will loosen godless ordinances and violent bonds."

Divine 7, chapter 19

7.19.1CSEL 19:644

Oppresso igitur orbe terrae cum ad destruendam inmensarum uirium tyrannidem humanae opes defecerint, siquidem capto mundo cum magnis latronum exercitibus incubabit, diuino auxilio tanta illa calamitas indigebit.

So when the world is oppressed, since human resources will fail to destroy a tyranny of immense strength, because he will lie upon the captured world with great armies of robbers, so great a calamity will need divine help.

7.19.2CSEL 19:644–645

commotus igitur deus et periculo ancipiti et miseranda conploratione iustorum mittet protinus liberatorem. tum aperietur caelum medium intempesta et tenebrosa nocte, ut in orbe toto lumen descendentis dei tamquam fulgur appareat; quod Sibylla his uersibus elocuta est: ὁππόταν ἔλθῃ, πῦρ ἔσται ψολόεν τι μέσσῃ ἐνὶ νυκτὶ μελαίνῃ.

So God, moved both by the doubtful danger and by the pitiable lament of the just, will at once send a deliverer. Then the middle of heaven will be opened in the dead of a dark night, so that the light of God descending may appear like lightning in the whole world; which the Sibyl expressed in these verses: "When he comes, there will be a smoky fire in the middle of black night."

7.19.3CSEL 19:645

haec est nox quae a nobis propter aduentum regis ac dei nostri peruigilio celebratur: cuius noctis duplex ratio est, quod in ea et uitam tum recepit, cum passus est, et postea regnum orbis terrae recepturus est.

This is the night which we celebrate with a vigil because of the coming of our King and God. That night has a twofold meaning: in it he then received back life after he had suffered, and afterward he will receive the kingdom of the world.

7.19.4CSEL 19:645

hic est enim liberator et iudex et ultor et rex et deus, quem nos Christum uocamus, qui priusquam descendat, hoc signum dabit.

For this is the deliverer, judge, avenger, king, and God, whom we call Christ, who before he descends will give this sign.

7.19.5CSEL 19:645

cadet repente gladius e caelo, ut sciant iusti ducem sanctae militiae descensurum, et descendet comitantibus angelis in medium terrae et antecedet eum flamma inextinguibilis et uirtus angelorum tradet in manus iustorum multitudinem illam quae montem circumsederit et concidetur ab hora tertia usque in uesperum et fluet sanguis more torrentis: deletisque omnibus copiis inpius solus effugiet et peribit ab eo uirtus sua.

A sword will suddenly fall from heaven, so that the just may know that the leader of the holy army is about to descend; and he will descend with angels accompanying him into the midst of the earth, and an unquenchable flame will go before him, and the power of the angels will deliver into the hands of the just that multitude which has surrounded the mountain; and it will be cut down from the third hour until evening, and blood will flow like a torrent; and when all his forces are destroyed, the impious one alone will escape, and his power will perish from him.

7.19.6CSEL 19:645–646

hic est autem qui appellatur Antichristus, sed se ipse Christum mentietur et contra uerum dimicabit et uictus effugiet et bellum saepe renouabit et saepe uincetur, donec quarto proelio confectis omnibus impiis debellatus et captus tandem scelerum suorum luat poenas.

This is the one called Antichrist; but he will falsely claim to be Christ, will fight against the true one, will flee when defeated, will often renew the war and often be beaten, until in the fourth battle, all the impious having been destroyed, he is defeated and captured and at last pays the penalty of his crimes.

7.19.7CSEL 19:646

sed et ceteri principes ac tyranni, qui contriuerunt orbem, simul cum eo uincti adducentur ad regem, et increpabit eos et coarguet et exprobrabit iis facinora ipsorum et damnabit eos ac meritis cruciatibus tradet.

And the other princes and tyrants who crushed the world will be brought bound to the King together with him; and he will rebuke them, convict them, reproach them with their crimes, condemn them, and hand them over to deserved torments.

7.19.8CSEL 19:646

sic extincta malitia et inpietate conpressa requiescet orbis, qui per tot saecula subiectus errori ac sceleri nefandam pertulit seruitutem.

So, with wickedness extinguished and impiety suppressed, the world will rest, which for so many ages, subject to error and crime, endured an unspeakable slavery.

7.19.9CSEL 19:646–647

non colentur ulterius dii manu facti, sed a templis ac puluinaribus suis deturbata simulacra igni dabuntur et cum donis suis mirabilibus ardebunt: quod etiam Sibylla cum prophetis congruens futurum esse praedixit: ῥίψωσιν δ εἴδωλα βρότοι καὶ πλοῦτον ἄπαντα. Erythraea quoque idem spopondit: ἔργα δὲ χειροποιητὰ θεῶν κατακαυθήσονται.

Gods made by hand will no longer be worshipped, but the images, thrown down from their temples and couches, will be given to the fire and will burn with their wonderful gifts; which the Sibyl too, agreeing with the prophets, foretold: "Mortals will cast away idols and all wealth." The Erythraean Sibyl also promised the same: "The handmade works of gods will be burned up."

Divine 7, chapter 20

7.20.1CSEL 19:647

Post haec aperientur inferi et surgent mortui, de quibus iudicium magnum idem ipse rex ac deus faciet cui summus pater et iudicandi et regnandi dabit maximam potestatem. de quo iudicio et regno aput Erythraeam Sibyllam sic inuenitur:

After this the underworld will be opened and the dead will rise, over whom the same King and God will hold the great judgment, to whom the supreme Father will give the greatest power both of judging and of reigning. Of this judgment and reign this is found in the Erythraean Sibyl:

7.20.2CSEL 19:647–648

ὁππότε δὴ καὶ τοῦτο λάβῃ τέλος αἴσιμον ἦμαρ, εἰς δὲ βροτοὺς ἥξει κρίσις ἀθανάτοιο θεοῖο, ἥξει ἑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπους μεγάλη κρίσις ἡδὲ καὶ ἀρχή.

"When this fated day too reaches its end, and the judgment of immortal God comes upon mortals, a great judgment and rule will come upon men."

7.20.3CSEL 19:648

deinde aput aliam: ταρτάρεον δὲ χάος δείξει τότε γαῖα χανοῦσα ἥξουσιν δὲ ἐπὶ βῆμα θεοῦ βασιλῆος ἄπαντες.

Then in another: "Then the earth, gaping open, will show the chaos of Tartarus, and all will come to the judgment seat of God the King."

7.20.4CSEL 19:648–649

et alio loco apud eamdem: οὐρανὸν εἱλίξω, γαίης κευθμῶνας ἀνοίξω, και τότ᾽ ἀναστήσω νεκροὺς μοῖραν ἀναλύσας καὶ θανάτου κέντρον. καὶ ὕστερον εἰς κρίσιν ἄξω, κρίνων εὐσεβέων καὶ δυσσεβέων βίον ἀνδρῶν.

And in another place in the same: "I will roll up heaven, I will open the hollows of the earth, and then I will raise the dead, loosing fate and the sting of death; and afterward I will bring them to judgment, judging the life of pious and impious men."

7.20.5CSEL 19:649

nec tamen uniuersi tunc a deo iudicabuntur, sed ii tantum qui sunt in dei religione uersati. nam qui deum non adgnouerunt, quoniam sententia de his in absolutionem ferri non potest, iam iudicati damnatique sunt, sanctis litteris contestantibus non resurrecturos esse inpios in iudicium.

Yet not all will then be judged by God, but only those who have been engaged in the religion of God. For those who did not acknowledge God, since sentence cannot be passed on them for acquittal, have already been judged and condemned, as the holy writings testify that the impious will not rise to judgment.

7.20.6CSEL 19:649

iudicabuntur ergo qui deum scierunt et facinora eorum id est mala opera cum bonis conlata ponderabuntur, ut si plura et graui(or)a fuerint bona iustaque, dentur ad uitam beatam, si autem mala superauerint, condemnentur ad poenam.

So those who knew God will be judged, and their deeds, that is, their evil works compared with the good, will be weighed, so that if the good and just are more numerous and weightier, they may be given to the blessed life; but if the evil have prevailed, they may be condemned to punishment.

7.20.7CSEL 19:649

hic fortasse dixerit quispiam: si est inmortalis anima, quomodo patibilis inducitur ac poenae sentiens? si enim ob merita punietur, sentiet utique dolorem atque ita etiam mortem: si morti non est obnoxia, ne dolori quidem: patibilis igitur non est. huic quaestioni siue argumento a Stoicis ita occurritur:

Here someone may say: "If the soul is immortal, how is it represented as capable of suffering and feeling punishment? For if it is punished for its deserts, it will surely feel pain, and so also death; if it is not liable to death, neither is it to pain; so it is not capable of suffering." To this question or argument the Stoics reply thus:

7.20.8CSEL 19:649

animas quidem hominum permanere nec interuentu mortis in nihilum resolui, sed eorum qui iusti fuerint puras et inpatibiles et beatas ad sedem caelestem, unde illis origo sit, remeare uel in campos quosdam fortunatos rapi, ubi fruantur miris uoluptatibus,

that the souls of human beings indeed endure and are not dissolved into nothing by the coming of death, but that those of the just return, pure, free from suffering, and blessed, to the heavenly seat from which they originated, or are carried off into certain fortunate fields, where they enjoy wonderful pleasures;

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impias uero, quoniam se malis cupiditatibus inquinauerint, mediam quandam gerere inter immortalem mortalemque naturam et habere aliquid inbecillitatis ex contagione carnis, cuius desideriis ac libidinibus addictae ineluibilem quendam fucum trahant labemque terrenam: quae cum temporis diuturnitate penitus inhaeserit, eius naturae reddi animas, ut si non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex deo sint, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quae peccatis inusta sensum doloris adtribuit.

but that the souls of the impious, since they have defiled themselves with evil desires, bear a nature midway between immortal and mortal and have some weakness from contact with the flesh, to whose desires and lusts they were enslaved, and so draw an indelible stain and earthly blemish; and when this has clung deeply over a long time, souls are brought to that nature that, though not wholly extinguishable, since they are from God, they become capable of torment through the stain of the body, which, burned in by sins, gives the sense of pain.

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quam sententiam poeta sic explicauit: quin et supremo cum lumine uita reliquit, non tamen omne malum miseris nec funditus omnes corporeae excedunt pestes, penitusque necesse est multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris. ergo exercentur poenis ueterumque malorum supplicia expendunt.

This view the poet expressed thus: "Moreover, when life has left them at their last light, still not all evil nor all the plagues of the body depart wholly from the wretched, and it must be that many things long hardened in grow deep within in wondrous ways. So they are exercised with punishments and pay the penalty of old evils."

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haec propemodum uera sunt. anima enim cum diuortium fecit a corpore, est, ut ait idem poeta, par leuibus uentis uolucrique simillima somno, quia spiritus est et ipsa tenuitate inconprehensibilis, sed nobis, qui sumus corporales, deo autem, cui subiacet posse omnia, conprehensibilis.

This is almost true. For when the soul has separated from the body, it is, as the same poet says, "like the light winds and most like fleeting sleep," because it is spirit and, by its very subtlety, ungraspable; but ungraspable to us, who are bodily, while graspable to God, to whom all power is subject.

Divine 7, chapter 21

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Primum ergo dicimus tantam esse dei potestatem, ut etiam incorporalia conprehendat et quemadmodum uoluerit adficiat. nam et angeli deum metuunt, quia castigari ab eo possunt inenarrabili quodam modo, et daemones reformidant, quia torquentur ab eo ac puniuntur.

First, then, we say that the power of God is so great that he grasps even incorporeal things and affects them as he wills. For angels too fear God, because they can be chastised by him in some indescribable way; and demons dread him, because they are tortured and punished by him.

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quid ergo mirum, si cum sint inmortales animae, tamen patibiles sint deo? nam cum in se nihil habeant solidum et contrectabile, a solidis et corporalibus nullam uim pati possunt: sed quia in solis spiritibus uiuunt, a solo deo tractabiles sunt, cui uirtus ac substantia spiritalis est.

What wonder, then, if souls, though immortal, are still capable of suffering before God? For since they have nothing solid and tangible in themselves, they can suffer no force from solid and bodily things; but because they live only as spirits, they can be handled only by God, whose power and substance is spiritual.

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sed tamen docent uos sanctae litterae quemadmodum poenas impii sint daturi. nam quia peccata in corporibus contraxerunt, rursus carne induentur, ut in corporibus piaculum soluant: et tamen non erit caro illa, quam deus homini superiecerit, huic terrenae similis, sed insolubilis ac permanens in aeternum, ut sufficere possit cruciatibus et igni sempiterno, cuius natura diuersa est ab hoc nostro, quo ad uitae necessaria utimur, qui nisi alicuius materiae fomite alatur, extinguitur.

But the holy writings teach you how the impious will pay the penalty. For because they contracted sins in bodies, they will again be clothed with flesh, so that they may pay the penalty in bodies; and yet that flesh which God will put on man will not be like this earthly flesh, but indissoluble and lasting forever, so that it can endure torments and everlasting fire, whose nature is different from this fire of ours, which we use for life's needs and which is extinguished unless fed by the fuel of some material.

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at ille diuinus per se ipsum semper uiuit ac uiget sine ullis alimentis nec admixtum habet fumum, sed est purus ac liquidus et in aquae modum fluidus: non enim ui aliqua sursum uersus urguetur sicut noster, quem labes terreni corporis quo tenetur et fumus intermixtus exsilire cogit et ad caelestem naturam cum trepidatione mobili subuolare.

But that divine fire always lives and thrives by itself without any fuel, and has no smoke mixed with it, but is pure and clear and flowing like water; for it is not driven upward by any force, as ours is, which the stain of the earthly body by which it is held and the smoke mixed with it force to leap up and fly toward the heavenly nature with restless motion.

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idem igitur diuinus ignis una eademque ui ac potentia et cremabit inpios et recreabit et quantum e corporibus absumet, tantum reponet ac sibi ipse aeternum pabulum sumministrabit: quod poetae in uulturem Tityi transtulerunt. ita sine ullo reuirescentium corporum detrimento aduret tantum ac sensu doloris adficiet.

So the same divine fire, with one and the same force and power, will both burn the impious and restore them, and as much as it consumes from their bodies it will replace, and will supply eternal food to itself; which the poets transferred to the vulture of Tityus. So, without any loss to the bodies that grow again, it will only scorch them and afflict them with the sense of pain.

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sed et iustos cum iudicauerit deus, etiam igni eos examinabit. tum quorum peccata uel pondere uel numero praeualuerint, perstringentur igni atque amburentur, quos autem plena iustitia et maturitas uirtutis incoxerit, ignem illum non sentient: habent enim aliquid in se dei, quod uim flammae repellat ac respuat.

But when God has judged the just too, he will also test them with fire. Then those whose sins have prevailed in weight or number will be grazed and scorched by the fire; but those whom full justice and ripeness of virtue have seasoned will not feel that fire, for they have something of God in them that repels and rejects the force of the flame.

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tanta est uis innocentiae, ut ab ea ignis ille refugiat innoxius, quia accepit a deo hanc potentiam, ut impios urat, iustis temperet. nec tamen quisquam putet animas post mortem protinus iudicari: omnes in una communique custodia detinentur, donec tempus adueniat quo maximus iudex meritorum faciat examen.

So great is the power of innocence that that fire flees from it harmlessly, because it has received from God this power: to burn the impious and to spare the just. Yet let no one think that souls are judged immediately after death: all are held in one common custody until the time comes when the greatest Judge will make an examination of their deserts.

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tum quorum fuerit probata iustitia, hi praemium immortalitatis accipient, quorum autem peccata et scelera detecta, non resurgent, sed cum inpiis in easdem tenebras recondentur ad certa supplicia destinati.

Then those whose justice has been approved will receive the reward of immortality; but those whose sins and crimes have been exposed will not rise again, but will be hidden away with the impious in the same darkness, destined to certain punishments.

Divine 7, chapter 22

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Figmenta haec esse poetarum quidam putant ignorantes unde illa poetae acceperint, ac negant haec fieri posse: nec mirum est ita illis uideri.

Some think these are fictions of the poets, not knowing where the poets got them, and deny that they can happen; and no wonder it seems so to them.

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aliter enim quam res habet traditur a poetis: qui licet sint multo antiquiores quam historici et oratores et cetera genera scriptorum, tamen quia mysterium diuini sacramenti nesciebant et ad eos mentio resurrectionis futurae obscuro rumore peruenerat, eam uero temere ac leuiter auditam in modum commenticiae fabulae prodiderunt.

For the poets hand it on otherwise than it is. Though they are much older than historians, orators, and other kinds of writers, yet since they did not know the mystery of the divine sacrament, and a mention of the future resurrection had reached them by obscure rumor, they published it, heard rashly and lightly, in the manner of an invented tale.

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et tamen idem testati sunt non auctorem se certum, sed opinionem sequi, ut Maro qui ait: sit mihi fas audita loqui.

And yet they testified that they followed not a sure authority but opinion, like Maro, who says: "Let it be lawful for me to tell what I have heard."

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quamuis igitur ueritatis arcana in parte corruperint, tamen ipsa res eo uerior inuenitur, quod cum prophetis in parte consentiunt: quod nobis ad probationem rei satis est.

So though they partly corrupted the secrets of truth, the thing itself is found all the truer in that they partly agree with the prophets; which is enough for us to prove the matter.

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errori tamen eorum subest ratio non nulla. nam cum prophetae adsiduis contionibus praedicarent iudicaturum esse de mortuis filium dei et haec adnuntiatio non lateret, quoniam rectorem caeli deum non alium putabant esse quam Iouem, iudicare aput inferos Iouis filium tradiderunt, sed tamen non Apollinem aut Liberum aut Mercurium, qui caelestes putantur, sed eum, qui et mortalis fuerit et iustus, uel Minoem uel Aeacum uel Rhadamanthum.

Yet there is some reason beneath their error. For since the prophets proclaimed in constant preaching that the Son of God would judge the dead, and this announcement was not hidden, since they thought the ruler of heaven was no other god than Jupiter, they handed down that a son of Jupiter judges in the underworld; not, however, Apollo or Liber or Mercury, who are thought heavenly, but one who was both mortal and just: Minos, or Aeacus, or Rhadamanthus.

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corruperunt igitur poetica licentia quod acceperant, uel opinio ueritatem per diuersa ora sermonesque uarios dissipatam mutauit.

So they corrupted by poetic license what they had received, or else rumor changed the truth as it was scattered through different mouths and various accounts.

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nam quod peractis ad inferos mille annis rursus ad uitam restitui cecinerunt, Marone ita dicente: has omnis, ubi mille rotam uoluere per annos, Lethaeum ad fluuium deus euocat agmine magno, scilicet inmemores supera ut conuexa reuisant rursus et incipiant in corpora uelle reuerti,

For as to their singing that after a thousand years spent in the underworld souls are restored again to life, as Maro says: "All these, when they have turned the wheel through a thousand years, God calls to the river Lethe in a great throng, so that, forgetful, they may see again the vault above and begin to wish to return into bodies,"

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haec eos ratio fefellit, quod resurgent defuncti non post mille annos mortis suae, sed ut restituti rursus in uitam mille annis cum deo regnent. deus enim ueniet, ut orbe hoc ab omni labe purgato rediuiuas iustorum animas corporibus innouatis ad sempiternam beatitudinem suscitet.

this reasoning misled them: the dead will rise not a thousand years after their death, but so that, restored again to life, they may reign with God for a thousand years. For God will come so that, having purged this world of every stain, he may raise the revived souls of the just, with renewed bodies, to everlasting blessedness.

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itaque praeter aquam obliuionis uera sunt cetera; quam idcirco finxerunt, ne quis illis opponeret: cur ergo non meminerint se aliquando uixisse aut qui fuerint aut quae gesserint? sed nihilominus tamen ueri simile non putatur et res tota uelut licenter ac fabulose ficta respuitur.

So apart from the water of forgetfulness, the rest is true; and they invented that so that no one could object: "Why then do they not remember that they once lived, or who they were, or what they did?" But nonetheless it is not thought probable, and the whole thing is rejected as invented with license and fable.

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nobis autem de resurrectione adfirmantibus et docentibus animas ad alteram uitam non oblitas sui, sed in eodem sensu ac figura esse redituras illut opponitur: tot iam saecula transierunt: quis umquam unus ab inferis resur-

But when we affirm the resurrection and teach that souls will return to another life not forgetful of themselves but in the same sense and form, this is objected: "So many ages have passed already: who has ever risen from the underworld,

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rexit, ut exemplo eius fieri posse credamus? at enim resurrectio fieri non potest dominante adhuc iniustitia. hoc enim saeculo necantur homines ui ferro insidiis uenenis et adficiuntur iniuriis egestate carceribus tormentis proscriptionibus.

so that by his example we may believe it can happen?" But resurrection cannot happen while injustice still rules. For in this age people are killed by violence, the sword, ambushes, and poisons, and are afflicted with injuries, want, prisons, tortures, and proscriptions.

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eo accedit quod iustitia inuisa est, quod omnes, qui deum sequi uolunt, non tantum odio habentur, sed uexantur omnibus contumeliis et excruciantur multiplici genere poenarum et ad inpios cultus manu factorum deorum non ratione aut ueritate, sed nefanda corporum laceratione coguntur.

Besides, justice is hated, since all who want to follow God are not only held in hatred but harassed with every insult and tortured with many kinds of punishment, and are forced to the impious worship of handmade gods not by reason or truth but by abominable mangling of their bodies.

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num igitur oportet ad haec eadem resurgere aut reuerti homines ad uitam, in qua tuti esse non possunt? cum ergo iusti tam uiles habeantur, tam facile tollantur, quid putemus futurum fuisse, si quis ab inferis rediens uitam postliminio recepisset?

Must people, then, rise again to these same things or return to a life in which they cannot be safe? Since the just are held so cheap and so easily killed, what should we think would have happened if anyone, returning from the underworld, had recovered life by the right of return?

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auferretur profecto ab oculis hominum, ne uiso eo uel audito deos uniuersi relinquerent et ad unius se dei cultum religionemque conuerterent.

He would certainly be removed from human sight, lest, when he was seen or heard, everyone should abandon the gods and turn to the worship and religion of the one God.

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ergo semel fieri resurrectionem necesse est, cum malum fuerit ablatum, quoniam eos qui resurrexerint nec mori iam ulterius nec uiolari ullo modo fas est, ut beatam possint agere uitam quorum mors resignata est.

So the resurrection must happen once, when evil has been removed, since those who have risen may no longer die or be harmed in any way, so that they may live a blessed life whose death has been canceled.

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poetae uero cum scirent hoc saeculum malis omnibus redundare, obliuionis amnem induxerunt, ne malorum ac laborum memores animae reuerti ad superos recusarent.

But the poets, knowing that this age overflows with every evil, introduced the river of forgetfulness, so that souls remembering their evils and labors would not refuse to return to the upper world.

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unde Vergilius: o pater, anne aliquas ad caelum hinc ire putandum est sublimis animas iterumque ad tarda reuerti corpora? quae lucis miseris tam dira cupido?

Hence Virgil: "O father, must we think that some souls go hence up to the sky and return again to sluggish bodies? What is this so dire desire of the wretched for the light?"

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ignorabant enim quomodo aut quando id fieri oporteret, itaque ] renasci eas putauerunt et denuo ad uterum reuolui atque ad infantiam regredi.

For they did not know how or when this was to happen, and so they thought souls were reborn, rolled back into the womb, and returned to infancy.

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unde etiam Plato de anima disserens ex hoc ait posse cognosci animas esse inmortales atque diuinas, quod in pueris mobilia sint ingenia et ad percipiendum facilia, quod ea quae discant ita celeriter rapiant, ut non tunc primum discere illa uideantur, sed recognoscere atque reminisci: in quo uir sapiens poetis ineptissime credidit.

Hence Plato too, discussing the soul, says it can be known from this that souls are immortal and divine: that in children minds are quick and ready to perceive, and seize what they learn so quickly that they seem not to be learning it for the first time but to be recognizing and remembering it; in which the wise man most foolishly believed the poets.

Divine 7, chapter 23

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Non igitur renascentur, quod fieri non potest, sed resurgent et a deo corporibus induentur et prioris uitae factorumque omnium memores erunt et in bonis caelestibus conlocati ac fruentes iucunditate innumerabilium copiarum praesenti deo gratias agent, quod malum omne deleuerit, quod eos ad regnum uitamque perpetuam suscitarit.

So they will not be reborn, which cannot happen, but will rise again and be clothed by God with bodies, and will remember their former life and all their deeds; and, placed among heavenly goods and enjoying the delight of countless riches, they will give thanks to God, present with them, for having destroyed all evil and raised them to the kingdom and perpetual life.

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qua de anastasi philosophi quoque dicere aliquid conati sunt tam corrupte quam poetae. nam Pythagoras transire animas in noua corpora disputauit, sed inepte, quod ex hominibus in pecudes et ex pecudibus in homines et se ipsum ex Euphorbo esse reparatum.

About this anastasis the philosophers too tried to say something, as corruptly as the poets. For Pythagoras argued that souls pass into new bodies, but foolishly, since from men into cattle and from cattle into men, and that he himself was restored from Euphorbus.

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melius Chrysippus, quem Cicero ait fulcire porticum Stoicorum: qui in libris quos de prouidentia scripsit cum de innouatione mundi loqueretur, haec intulit: τούτου δέ οὕτως ἔχοντος δῆλον, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμᾶς μετά τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδῳ τινὶ χρόνου εἰς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐσμεν ἀποκαταστῆναι σχῆμα.

Chrysippus did better, whom Cicero says props up the Stoic porch. In the books he wrote On Providence, speaking of the renewal of the world, he added this: "This being so, it is clear that nothing is impossible, and that we too, after we have died, will be restored again after some period of time to this form in which we now are."

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sed nos ab humanis ad diuina redeamus. Sibylla dicit haec: δύσπιστον γὰρ ἅπαν μερόπων γένος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἠδὴ κόσμου καὶ θνητῶν ἔλθῃ κρίσις, ἣν θεὸς αὐτὸς ποιήσει κρίνων ἀσεβεῖς θ᾽ ἅμα εὐσεβέας τε, καὶ τότε δυσσεβέας μὲν ἐπὶ ζόφον ἐν πυρὶ πέμψει. ὅσσοι δ᾽ εὐσεβέουσι, πάλιν ζήσουσ᾽ ἐπὶ γαίης, πνεῦμα θεοῦ δόντος τιμὴν ἅμα καὶ βίον αὐτοῖς.

But let us return from human to divine things. The Sibyl says this: "For the whole race of mortals is faithless. But when the judgment of the world and of mortals comes, which God himself will make, judging the impious and the pious together, then he will send the impious into darkness in fire; but as many as are pious will live again upon the earth, God's Spirit giving them honor and life together."

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quodsi non modo prophetae, sed etiam uates et poetae et philosophi anastasim mortuorum futuram esse consentiunt, nemo quaerat a nobis quemadmodum fieri possit. nec enim diuinorum operum reddi potest ratio: sed si a principio deus hominem nescio quo inenarrabili modo instituit, credamus ab eodem restitui ueterem posse qui nouum fecit.

If, then, not only the prophets but also seers, poets, and philosophers agree that the anastasis of the dead will come, let no one ask us how it can happen. For no account can be given of divine works; but if God in the beginning formed man in some indescribable way, let us believe that the old man can be restored by the one who made him new.

Divine 7, chapter 24

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Nunc reliqua subnectam. ueniet igitur summi et maximi dei filius, ut uiuos ac mortuos iudicet, Sibylla testante atque dicente: πάσης γὰρ γαίης τότε θνητῶν σύγχυσις ἔσται, αὐτὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ ὅταν ἐλθῃ βήματι κρῖναι ζώντων καὶ νεκύων ψυχὰς καὶ κόσμον ἅπαντα.

Now I will add the rest. The Son of the highest and greatest God will come to judge the living and the dead, as the Sibyl testifies and says: "For then there will be confusion of mortals over all the earth, when the Almighty himself comes to his judgment seat to judge the souls of the living and the dead and the whole world."

7.24.2CSEL 19:658

uerum ille cum deleuerit iniustitiam iudiciumque maximum fecerit ac iustos qui a principio fuerunt ad uitam instaurauerit, mille annos inter homines uersabitur eosque iustissimo imperio reget. quod alia Sibylla uaticinans furensque proclamat: κλῦτε δέ μου, μέροπες, βασιλεὺς αἰώνιος ἄρχει.

But when he has destroyed injustice, held the great judgment, and restored to life the just who have lived from the beginning, he will dwell among men for a thousand years and rule them with most just authority. Another Sibyl, prophesying and raving, proclaims this: "Hear me, mortals: an everlasting King rules."

7.24.3CSEL 19:658–659

tum qui erunt in corporibus uiui, non morientur, sed per eosdem mille annos infinitam multitudinem generabunt et erit suboles eorum sancta et deo cara: qui autem ab inferis suscitabuntur, hi praeerunt uiuentibus uelut iudices.

Then those who are alive in their bodies will not die, but through those same thousand years will beget an infinite multitude, and their offspring will be holy and dear to God; while those who are raised from the underworld will preside over the living as judges.

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gentes uero non extinguentur omnino, sed quaedam relinquentur in uictoriam dei, ut triumphentur a iustis ac subiugentur perpetuae seruituti.

The nations, however, will not be wholly extinguished, but some will be left for God's victory, so that they may be triumphed over by the just and subjected to perpetual servitude.

7.24.5CSEL 19:659

sub idem tempus etiam princeps daemonum, qui est machinator omnium malorum, catenis uincietur et erit in custodia mille annis caelestis imperii, quo iustitia in orbe regnabit, ne quod malum aduersus populum dei moliatur.

At the same time the prince of demons too, the contriver of all evils, will be bound with chains and kept in custody for the thousand years of the heavenly rule, during which justice will reign in the world, so that he may contrive no evil against the people of God.

7.24.6CSEL 19:659–660

post cuius aduentum congregabuntur iusti ex omni terra peractoque iudicio ciuitas sancta constituetur in medio terrae, in qua ipse conditor deus cum iustis dominantibus commoretur. quam ciuitatem Sibylla designat, cum dicit: καὶ πόλιν, ἥν ἐπόθησε θεὸς, ταύτην ἐποίησεν λαμπροτέραν ἄστρων ἠδ ἡλίου ἠδὲ σελήνης.

After his coming the just will be gathered from all the earth, and when the judgment is finished, a holy city will be established in the midst of the earth, in which God the Maker himself will dwell with the just who rule. The Sibyl indicates this city when she says: "And the city which God desired, this he made brighter than the stars and the sun and the moon."

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tunc auferentur a mundo tenebrae illae quibus obfundetur atque occaecabitur caelum, et luna claritudinem solis accipiet nec minuetur ulterius, sol autem septies tanto quam nunc est clarior fiet. terra uero aperiet fecunditatem suam et uberrimas fruges sua sponte generabit, rupes montium melle sudabunt, per riuos uina decurrent et flumina lacte inundabunt: mundus denique ipse gaudebit et omnis rerum natura laetabitur erepta et liberata dominio mali et impietatis et sceleris et erroris.

Then the darkness by which the sky will be covered and blinded will be removed from the world, and the moon will receive the brightness of the sun and will no longer wane, while the sun will become seven times brighter than it is now. The earth will open its fertility and produce the richest crops of its own accord; the rocks of the mountains will sweat honey, wines will run down the streams, and rivers will overflow with milk; in short, the world itself will rejoice and all nature will be glad, snatched and freed from the dominion of evil, impiety, crime, and error.

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non bestiae per hoc tempus sanguine alentur, non aues praeda, sed quieta et placida erunt omnia. leones et uituli ad praesepe simul stabunt, lupus ouem non rapiet, canis non uenabitur, accipitres et aquilae non nocebunt, infans cum serpentibus ludet.

In this time beasts will not be fed on blood nor birds on prey, but all things will be quiet and peaceful. Lions and calves will stand together at the manger, the wolf will not seize the sheep, the dog will not hunt, hawks and eagles will not harm, the infant will play with serpents.

7.24.9CSEL 19:660

denique tum fient illa quae poetae aureis temporibus facta esse iam Saturno regnante dixerunt. quorum error hinc ortus est, quod prophetae futurorum pleraque sic proferunt et enuntiant quasi iam peracta. uisiones enim diuino spiritu offerebantur oculis eorum et uidebant illa in conspectu suo quasi fieri ac terminari.

In short, then will happen those things which the poets said had already happened in the golden times when Saturn reigned. Their error arose from this: that the prophets set forth and announce most future things as if already accomplished. For visions were presented to their eyes by the divine Spirit, and they saw those things in their sight as if being done and completed.

7.24.10CSEL 19:660–661

quae uaticinia eorum cum paulatim fama uulgasset, quoniam profani a sacramento ignorabant quatenus dicerentur, conpleta esse iam ueteribus saeculis illa omnia putauerunt, quae utique fieri conplerique non poterant homine regnante.

When report had gradually spread these prophecies, since the profane, strangers to the mystery, did not know how far they applied, they thought all those things had already been fulfilled in ancient ages, which certainly could not be done and fulfilled while man reigned.

7.24.11CSEL 19:661

cum uero deletis religionibus impiis et scelere compresso subiecta erit deo terra, cedet et ipse mari uector nec nautica pinus mutabit merces, omnis feret omnia tellus. non rastros patietur humus, non uinea falcem; robustus quoque iam tauris iuga soluet arator. tunc et molli paulatim flauescet campus arista incultisque rubens pendebit sentibus uua et durae quercus sudabunt roscida mella. nec uarios discet mentiri lana colores, ipse sed in pratis aries iam suaue rubenti murice, iam croceo mutabit uellera luto, sponte sua sandyx pascentis uestiet agnos. ipsae lacte domum referent distenta capellae ubera nec magnos metuent armenta leones. quae poeta secundum Cymaeae Sibyllae carmina prolocutus est.

But when, with impious religions destroyed and crime suppressed, the earth is subject to God, "the trader himself will quit the sea, nor will the ship's pine exchange wares; every land will bear all things. The soil will not suffer the harrow, nor the vine the pruning-hook; the sturdy ploughman too will now loose the yoke from his bulls. Then the plain will slowly turn golden with soft ears of grain, the reddening grape will hang from wild brambles, and hard oaks will sweat dewy honey. Nor will wool learn to feign varied colors, but the ram himself in the meadows will change his fleece, now to sweetly blushing purple, now to saffron yellow; of its own accord scarlet will clothe the grazing lambs. The goats themselves will bring home udders swollen with milk, nor will the herds fear great lions." These things the poet uttered following the verses of the Cumaean Sibyl.

7.24.12CSEL 19:661–662

Erythraea uero sic ait: οἱ δὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ἐν οὔρεσιν ἄμμιγ ἔδονται χόρτον παρδάλιες τ᾽ ἐρίφοις ἄμα βοσκήσονται· ἄρκτοι σὺν μόσχοισιν ὁμοῦ καὶ πᾶσι βροτοῖσιν σαρκοβόρος τε λέων φάγεται ἄχυρον παρὰ φάτνῃ, σὺν βρέφεσίν τε δράκοντες ἄμ ἀσπίσι κοιμήσονται.

And the Erythraean Sibyl says thus: "Wolves and lambs will eat grass together on the mountains, and leopards will graze with kids; bears together with calves and with all mortals; and the flesh-eating lion will eat straw at the manger, and serpents will lie down with infants, together with asps."

7.24.13CSEL 19:662–663

et alio loco de ubertate rerum: καὶ τότε δὴ χάρμην μεγάλην θεὸς ἀνδράσι δώσει. καὶ γὰρ γῆ καὶ δένδρα καὶ ἄσπετα θρέμματα γαίης δώσουσι καρπὸν τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἀνθρώποισιν οἴνου καὶ μέλιτος γλυκεροῦ λευκοῦ τε γάλακτος καὶ σίτου, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βροτοῖς κάλλιστον ἁπάντων. et alia eodem modo:

And in another place on the abundance of things: "And then God will give great joy to men; for the earth and trees and countless flocks of the earth will give men the true fruit of wine and sweet honey and white milk and grain, which is the most excellent of all for mortals." And another in the same way:

7.24.14CSEL 19:663

εὐσεβέων δὲ μόνων ἁγία χθὼν πάντα τάδ᾽ οἴσει, νᾶμα μελισταγέης ἀπὸ πέτρης ἠδ᾽ ἀπὸ πηγῆς καὶ γάλα τ᾽ ἀμβροσίης ῥεύσει πάντεσσι δικαίοις.

"The holy earth of the pious alone will bear all these things: a stream dripping with honey from the rock and from the spring, and milk of ambrosia will flow for all the just."

7.24.15CSEL 19:663

uiuent itaque homines tranquillissimam et copiosissimam uitam et regnabunt cum deo pariter, reges gentium uenient a finibus terrae cum donis ac muneribus, ut adorent et honorificent regem magnum, cuius nomen erit praeclarum ac uenerabile uniuersis nationibus quae sub caelo erunt et regibus qui dominabuntur in terra.

So people will live a most tranquil and abundant life and will reign together with God; kings of the nations will come from the ends of the earth with gifts and offerings to adore and honor the great King, whose name will be illustrious and venerable to all the nations under heaven and to the kings who rule on the earth.

Divine 7, chapter 25

7.25.1CSEL 19:663–664

Haec sunt quae a prophetis futura dicuntur: quorum testimonia et uerba ponere opus esse non duxi, quoniam esset infinitum nec tantam rerum multitudinem mensura libri caperet tam multis uno spiritu similia dicentibus simulque ne fastidium legentibus fieret, si ex omnibus collecta et translata congererem, praeterea ut ea ipsa quae dicerem non nostris, sed alienis potissimum litteris confirmarem doceremque non modo aput nos, uerum etiam aput eos ipsos qui nos insectantur, ueritatem consignatam teneri, quam recusent adgnoscere.

These are the things the prophets say will happen. I did not think it necessary to set down their testimonies and words, since it would be endless and the length of the book could not hold such a multitude of things, with so many saying similar things with one Spirit; and at the same time so as not to weary readers if I heaped together what was collected and translated from all; and besides, so that I might confirm the very things I said not by our writings but chiefly by others', and show that the truth is held sealed not only among us but even among those very people who persecute us, though they refuse to acknowledge it.

7.25.2CSEL 19:664

si quis autem diligentius haec uoluerit scire, ex ipso fonte hauriat et plura quam nos in his libris conplexi sumus admirabilia reperiet.

But if anyone wants to know these things more carefully, let him draw from the source itself, and he will find more wonderful things than we have included in these books.

7.25.3CSEL 19:664

Fortasse quispiam nunc requirat quando ista quae diximus sint futura. iam superius ostendi conpletis annorum sex milibus mutationem istam fieri oportere et iam propinquare summum illum conclusionis extremae diem.

Perhaps someone may now ask when these things we have spoken of will happen. I have already shown above that this change must happen when six thousand years are completed, and that that highest day of the final conclusion is already approaching.

7.25.4CSEL 19:664

de signis quae praedicta sunt a prophetis licet noscere: praedixerunt enim signa, quibus consummatio temporum et expectanda sit nobis in dies singulos et timenda.

It can be known from the signs foretold by the prophets; for they foretold signs by which the consummation of the times is to be expected by us from day to day and feared.

7.25.5CSEL 19:664

quando tamen conpleatur haec summa, docent ii qui de temporibus scripserunt, colligentes ex litteris sanctis et ex uariis historiis quantus sit numerus annorum ab exordio mundi. qui licet uarient et aliquantum numeri eorum summa dissentiant, omnis tamen expectatio non amplius quam ducentorum uidetur annorum.

When this sum is completed, however, those who have written on chronology teach, gathering from the holy writings and various histories how great the number of years is from the beginning of the world. Though they vary and differ somewhat in the sum of their numbers, yet the whole expectation seems to be not more than two hundred years.

7.25.6CSEL 19:664

etiam res ipsa declarat lapsum ruinamque rerum breui fore, nisi quod incolumi urbe Roma nihil istius uidetur esse metuendum.

The situation itself also declares that the fall and ruin of things will come soon, except that while the city of Rome is safe, nothing of this seems to be feared.

7.25.7CSEL 19:664

at uero cum caput illut orbis occiderit et ῥύμη esse coeperit, quod Sibyllae fore aiunt, quis dubitet uenisse iam finem rebus humanis orbique terrarum?

But when that head of the world has fallen and has begun to be a rhymē, a mere street, as the Sibyls say will happen, who would doubt that the end has come for human affairs and the world?

7.25.8CSEL 19:664–665

illa est ciuitas quae adhuc sustentat omnia, precandusque nobis et adorandus est deus caeli, si tamen statuta eius et placita differri possunt, ne citius quam putamus tyrannus ille abominabilis ueniat, qui tantum facinus moliatur ac lumen illut effodiat, cuius interitu mundus ipse lapsurus est.

That is the city which still holds everything up, and we must pray and entreat the God of heaven, if indeed his decrees and decisions can be delayed, that that abominable tyrant may not come sooner than we think, to undertake so great a crime and put out that light, at whose destruction the world itself will fall.

7.25.9CSEL 19:665

nunc ad cetera exequenda redeamus quae deinceps secutura sunt.

Now let us return to setting out the rest of what will follow.

Divine 7, chapter 26

7.26.1CSEL 19:665

Diximus paulo ante in principio regni sancti fore ut a deo princeps daemonum uinciatur. sed idem, cum mille anni regni hoc est septem milia coeperint terminari, soluetur denuo et custodia emissus exibit atque omnes gentes quae tunc erunt sub dicione iustorum concitabit, ut inferant bellum sanctae ciuitati. et colligetur ex omni orbe terrae innumerabilis populus nationum et obsidebit et circumdabit ciuitatem.

We said a little before that at the beginning of the holy kingdom the prince of demons would be bound by God. But when the thousand years of the kingdom, that is, seven thousand years, begin to come to an end, he will be loosed again and, released from custody, will go out and stir up all the nations then under the rule of the just to make war on the holy city. And an innumerable people of nations will be gathered from the whole world and will besiege and surround the city.

7.26.2CSEL 19:665–666

tum ueniet nouissima ira dei super gentes, et debellabit eas usque ad unum. ac primum concutiet terram quam ualidissime et a motu eius scindentur montes Syriae et subsident ualles in abruptum et muri omnium ciuitatum concident. et statuet deus solem triduo ne occidat et inflammabit eum, et descendet aestus nimius et adustio magna super perduelles et impios populos et imbres sulphuris et grandines lapidum et guttae ignis, et liquescent spiritus eorum in calore et corpora conterentur in grandine et ipsi se inuicem gladio ferient: et replebuntur montes cadaueribus et campi operientur ossibus.

Then the last wrath of God will come upon the nations, and he will destroy them to the last man. First he will shake the earth most violently, and by its motion the mountains of Syria will be split, the valleys will sink into chasms, and the walls of all cities will fall. And God will make the sun stand still for three days so that it does not set, and will set it ablaze, and excessive heat and great burning will come down on the rebellious and impious peoples, with showers of sulfur, hailstones, and drops of fire; and their spirits will melt in the heat and their bodies be crushed by the hail, and they will strike one another with the sword; and the mountains will be filled with corpses and the fields covered with bones.

7.26.3CSEL 19:666

populus autem dei tribus illis diebus sub concauis terrae occultabitur, donec ira dei aduersus gentes et extremum iudicium terminetur.

But the people of God will be hidden in the hollows of the earth during those three days, until the wrath of God against the nations and the final judgment is ended.

7.26.4CSEL 19:666

tunc exibunt iusti de latebris suis et inuenient omnia cadaueribus atque ossibus tecta. sed et genus omne impiorum radicitus interibit nec erit in hoc mundo ulla iam natio amplius praeter solam gentem dei. tum per annos septem perpetes intactae erunt siluae nec excidetur de montibus lignum, sed arma gentium comburentur, et iam non erit bellum, sed pax ac requies sempiterna.

Then the just will come out of their hiding places and find everything covered with corpses and bones. And the whole race of the impious will perish root and branch, and there will no longer be any nation in this world except the one nation of God. Then for seven continuous years the forests will be untouched and no wood will be cut from the mountains, but the weapons of the nations will be burned; and there will no longer be war, but everlasting peace and rest.

7.26.5CSEL 19:666

cum uero conpleti fuerint mille anni, renouabitur mundus a deo et caelum conplicabitur et terra mutabitur. et transformabit deus homines in similitudinem angelorum et erunt candidi sicut nix et uersabuntur semper in conspectu omnipotentis et domino suo sacrificabunt et seruient in aeternum.

But when the thousand years are completed, the world will be renewed by God, the sky will be folded up, and the earth changed. And God will transform human beings into the likeness of angels, and they will be white as snow and will always be in the sight of the Almighty, and will sacrifice to their Lord and serve him forever.

7.26.6CSEL 19:666

eodem tempore fiet secunda illa et publica omnium resurrectio, in qua excitabuntur iniusti ad cruciatus sempiternos. hi sunt qui manu facta coluerunt, qui dominum mundi ac parentem uel nescierunt uel abnegauerunt.

At the same time that second and general resurrection of all will take place, in which the unjust will be raised to everlasting torments. These are those who worshipped things made by hand, who either did not know or denied the Lord and Parent of the world.

7.26.7CSEL 19:666–667

sed et dominus illorum cum ministris suis conprehendetur ad poenamque damnabitur, cum quo pariter omnis turba impiorum pro suis facinoribus in conspectu angelorum atque iustorum perpetuo igni cremabitur in aeternum.

And their lord too, with his ministers, will be seized and condemned to punishment; and together with him the whole crowd of the impious, for their crimes, will be burned in the sight of the angels and the just with perpetual fire forever.

7.26.8CSEL 19:667

haec est doctrina sanctorum prophetarum, quam Christiani sequimur, haec nostra sapientia, quam isti qui uel fragilia colunt uel inanem philosophiam tuentur, tamquam stultitiam uanitatemque derident, quia nos defendere hanc publice atque adserere non solemus, deo iubente ut quieti ac silentes arcanum eius in abdito atque intra nostram conscientiam teneamus nec aduersus istos ueri profanos, qui non discendi, sed arguendi atque inludendi gratia inclementer deum ac religionem eius inpugnant, pertinaci contentione certemus.

This is the teaching of the holy prophets, which we Christians follow; this is our wisdom, which those who either worship fragile things or defend an empty philosophy mock as folly and vanity, because we are not accustomed to defend and assert it publicly, since God commands us, quiet and silent, to keep his secret hidden and within our own conscience, and not to contend in stubborn dispute with these profane enemies of truth, who attack God and his religion harshly not in order to learn but to accuse and mock.

7.26.9CSEL 19:667

abscondi enim tegique mysterium quam fidelissime oportet, maxime a nobis, qui nomen fidei gerimus.

For the mystery must be hidden and covered as faithfully as possible, above all by us, who bear the name of faith.

7.26.10CSEL 19:667

uerum illi hanc taciturnitatem nostram ueluti malam conscientiam criminantur: unde etiam quasdam exsecrabiles opiniones de pudicis et innocentibus fingunt et libenter iis quae finxerint credunt.

But they accuse this silence of ours as a bad conscience; and from this they even invent certain abominable rumors about chaste and innocent people, and gladly believe what they have invented.

Divine 7, chapter 27

7.27.1CSEL 19:667

Quoniam decursis propositi operis septem spatiis ad metam peruecti sumus, superest ut exhortemur omnes ad suscipiendam cum uera religione sapientiam, cuius uis et officium in eo uertitur, ut contemptis terrestribus et abiectis erroribus quibus antea tenebamur, fragilibus seruientes et fragilia concupiscentes, ad aeterna caelestis thesauri praemia derigamur: quae ut capere possimus, quam primum omittendae sunt huius praesentis uitae inlicibiles uoluptates, quae animas hominum perniciosa suauitate deleniunt.

Since, having run the seven laps of the course we set out, we have reached the goal, it remains to exhort all to take up wisdom together with true religion, whose force and task lie in this: that, despising earthly things and casting off the errors by which we were formerly held, serving fragile things and desiring fragile things, we may be directed toward the eternal rewards of the heavenly treasure. So that we may receive these, the enticing pleasures of this present life, which soothe human souls with a ruinous sweetness, must be abandoned as soon as possible.

7.27.2CSEL 19:667–669

quanta felicitas aestimanda est subtractum his labibus terrae proficisci ad illum aequissimum iudicem parentemque indulgentissimum, qui pro laboribus requiem, pro morte uitam, pro tenebris claritatem, pro terrenis ac breuibus bonis aeterna et caelestia largiatur: cum qua mercede acerbitates ac miseriae quas perpetimur in hoc mundo facientes opera iustitiae, conferri et coaequari nullo modo possunt

How great a happiness it must be thought, taken away from these stains of earth, to set out to that most just Judge and most indulgent Parent, who grants rest for labors, life for death, brightness for darkness, eternal and heavenly goods for earthly and brief ones; with which reward the bitternesses and miseries we endure in this world while doing the works of justice can in no way be compared or equated.

7.27.3CSEL 19:669

proinde si sapientes, si beati esse uolumus, cogitanda et proponenda sunt nobis non tantum Terentiana illa: molendum esse usque in pistrino, uapulandum, habendae compedes, sed his multo atrociora, carcer catenae tormenta patienda, sustinendi dolores, mors denique ipsa et suscipienda est et ferenda, cum liqueat conscientiae nostrae nec fragilem istam uoluptatem sine poena nec uirtutem sine diuino praemio fore.

So if we want to be wise and blessed, we must consider and set before ourselves not only those words of Terence, "one must grind on in the mill, be beaten, wear fetters," but things much more dreadful than these: prison, chains, and tortures must be endured, pains borne, and finally death itself undergone and suffered, since it is clear to our conscience that neither will that fragile pleasure be without punishment nor virtue without divine reward.

7.27.4CSEL 19:669

uniuersos igitur oportet operam dare, ut uel se quam primum ad rectam uiam dirigant uel susceptis operatisque uirtutibus et huius uitae laboribus patienter exactis consolatorem deum habere mereantur.

So all must strive either to direct themselves as soon as possible onto the right road, or, having taken up and practiced the virtues and patiently completed the labors of this life, to deserve to have God as their consoler.

7.27.5CSEL 19:669–670

pater enim noster ac dominus, qui condidit firmauitque caelum, qui solem cum ceteris sideribus induxit, qui libratam magnitudine sua terram uallauit montibus, mari circumdedit amnibusque distinxit et quidquid est in hoc opere mundi conflauit ac perfecit e nihilo, perspectis erroribus hominum ducem misit qui nobis iustitiae uiam panderet.

For our Father and Lord, who established and made firm the heaven, who brought in the sun with the other stars, who, having balanced the earth by his greatness, walled it with mountains, surrounded it with the sea, and divided it with rivers, and who produced and perfected out of nothing whatever is in this work of the world, having seen the errors of men, sent a guide to open for us the way of justice.

7.27.6CSEL 19:670

hunc sequamur omnes, hunc audiamus, huic deuotissime pareamus, quoniam solus, ut ait Lucretius, ueridicis hominum purgauit pectora dictis et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris exposuitque bonum summum, quo tendimus omnes, quid foret, atque uiam monstrauit, limite paruo qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu.

Let us all follow him, listen to him, and obey him most devotedly, since he alone, as Lucretius says, "cleansed human hearts with truthful words, set a limit to desire and fear, and set out what the highest good is toward which we all strive, and showed the way by which, along a narrow path, we might strive toward it on a straight course."

7.27.7CSEL 19:670

nec monstrauit tantum, sed etiam praecessit, ne quis difficultatis gratia iter uirtutis horreret. deseratur si fieri potest uia perditionis et fraudis, in qua mors uoluptatis inlecebris adoperta celatur.

Nor did he only show it, but also went before, so that no one might shrink from the road of virtue because of its difficulty. Let the way of perdition and deceit be abandoned, if possible, in which death lies hidden, covered by the enticements of pleasure.

7.27.8CSEL 19:670

et quanto quisque annis in senectutem uergentibus adpropinquare cernit illum diem quo sit ei ex hac uita demigrandum, cogitet quam purus abscedat, quam innocens ad iudicem ueniat, non ut faciunt quidam caecis mentibus nixi, qui iam deficientibus corporis uiribus in hoc admonentur instantis ultimae necessitatis, ut cupidius et ardentius hauriendis libidinibus intendant.

And the more anyone, as his years tend toward old age, sees that day approaching on which he must depart from this life, let him consider how pure he may depart, how innocent he may come to the Judge; not as some do, relying on blind minds, who, as their bodily strength fails, are prompted by the approach of the final necessity to devote themselves more greedily and ardently to draining their lusts.

7.27.9CSEL 19:670–671

qua ex uoragine liberet se quisque, dum licet, dum facultas adest, seque ad deum tota mente conuertat, ut illum diem securus expectet, quo praeses dominusque mundi deus de singulorum factis et cogitationibus iudicabit. quaecumque hic expetuntur, non tantum neglegat, sed et fugiat potioremque animam suam iudicet quam bona ista fallacia, quorum incerta et caduca possessio est:

Let each free himself from this abyss while he may, while the opportunity is present, and turn to God with his whole mind, so that he may await without fear that day on which God, the ruler and Lord of the world, will judge the deeds and thoughts of each. Whatever is sought here, let him not only neglect but also flee, and judge his soul more valuable than these deceptive goods, whose possession is uncertain and perishable:

7.27.10CSEL 19:671

migrant enim cotidie et multo uelocius exeunt quam intrauerant et tamen, si nobis usque ad ultimum liceat istis frui, aliis certe relinquenda sunt. nihil nobiscum ferre possumus nisi uitam bene atque innocenter actam.

for they move away daily and go out much faster than they came in; and even if we are allowed to enjoy them to the end, they must certainly be left to others. We can take nothing with us except a life lived well and innocently.

7.27.11CSEL 19:671

ille ad deum copiosus, ille opulentus adueniet, cui adstabunt continentia misericordia patientia caritas fides. haec est hereditas nostra quae nec eripi cuiquam nec transferri ad alterum potest.

That one will come to God rich and wealthy, beside whom stand self-control, mercy, patience, love, and faith. This is our inheritance, which can neither be snatched from anyone nor transferred to another.

7.27.12CSEL 19:671

ecquis est qui haec bona parare et adquirere sibi uelit? ueniant qui esuriunt, ut caelesti cibo saturati sempiternam famem ponant, ueniant qui sitiunt, ut aquam salutarem de perenni fonte plenissimis faucibus trahant.

Is there anyone who wishes to prepare and acquire these goods for himself? Let those who hunger come, so that, filled with heavenly food, they may put away their hunger forever; let those who thirst come, so that they may draw the water of salvation from the everlasting spring with full throats.

7.27.13CSEL 19:671

hoc cibatu atque potu dei et caeci uidebunt et surdi audient et muti loquentur et clodi ambulabunt et stulti sapient et aegroti ualebunt et mortui reuiuescent.

By this food and drink of God the blind will see, the deaf will hear, the dumb will speak, the lame will walk, the foolish will be wise, the sick will be well, and the dead will live again.

7.27.14CSEL 19:671

quisquis enim corruptelas terrae uirtute calcauerit, hunc arbiter ille summus et uerax ad uitam lucemque perpetuam suscitabit.

For whoever has trampled the corruptions of the earth by virtue, the highest and true Judge will raise to perpetual life and light.

7.27.15CSEL 19:671

nemo diuitiis, nemo fascibus, nemo etiam regia potestate confidat: inmortalem ista non faciunt. nam quicumque rationem hominis abiecerit ac praesentia secutus in humum se ipse prostrauerit, tamquam desertor domini et imperatoris et patris sui punietur.

Let no one trust in riches, no one in the fasces, no one even in royal power: these do not make one immortal. For whoever has cast away the reason of man, followed present things, and prostrated himself on the ground will be punished as a deserter of his Lord, Commander, and Father.

7.27.16CSEL 19:671–672

intendamus ergo iustitiae, quae nos inseparabilis comes ad deum sola perducet, et dum spiritus hos regit artus, infatigabilem militiam deo militemus, stationes uigiliasque celebremus, congrediamur cum hoste quem nouimus fortiter, ut uictores ac deuicto aduersario triumphantes praemium uirtutis quod ipse promisit a domino consequamur.

So let us strive for justice, which alone, as an inseparable companion, will lead us to God; and "while breath rules these limbs," let us serve God in tireless military service, keep our posts and watches, and engage bravely with the enemy we know, so that, as victors and triumphing over the conquered adversary, we may obtain from the Lord the reward of virtue which he himself has promised.