On Free Will

The old man of Ithaca, according to the Greeks’ myth, wishing to hear the Sirens’ song for the licentious pleasure of their voice, sailed to Sicily bound as a prisoner and stopped up his companions’ ears, not because he begrudged them the hearing, nor because he desired to put himself in bonds, but because the end of their song for those who heard it was death; for such were the songs the Sirens sang, according to the Greeks.

But I do not become a hearer of such a song, nor do I wish to hear Sirens singing a funeral dirge for men, whose silence is more useful to men than their voice. I pray rather to enjoy a divine voice which, however often I hear it, I long to hear again, not from some licentious pleasure in the voice, but because I am being taught divine mysteries and expect as the end not death but eternal salvation.

For the song is sung not by the death-bringing Sirens of the Greeks but by a divine choir of prophets, with whom there is no need to stop up one’s companions’ ears or to put oneself in bonds for fear of the penalty for hearing. For the hearer of the one ceases to live together with their voice, but one who listens more to the others will enjoy the better life, led by the hand by the divine Spirit.

Let everyone come, come, and hear the divine song without any fear. We have no Sirens of Sicily among us, nor Odysseus’ bonds, nor wax melted into men’s ears, but complete release from bonds, and free hearing for each of those who come. For such a song is worth hearing, and such singers, it seems to me, are to be prayed for.

And if anyone wishes to hear the choir of the apostles too, he will find the same harmony of song. For the prophets sang beforehand, in mysteries, the divine dispensation, and the apostles sing, interpreting what the prophets announced in mysteries. O concordant harmony, composed by the divine Spirit! O fair choir of those who sing the mysteries! With these I too pray to sing.

Let us too, then, sing the like song and send up the hymn to the holy Father, glorifying in the Spirit Jesus who is in his bosom. Do not flee a spiritual hymn, man, nor be hostile to hearing it. It holds no death; the song we have is a story of salvation.

I for my part already seem to be enjoying better things in discussing such matters, especially when such a meadow of flowers is before me, that is, your assembly of those who both hear and sing together the divine mysteries.

From this I am bold to say that you offer me ears pure of all envy, not imitating the jealousy of Cain, not persecuting your brother like Esau, not like Joseph’s brothers, who hated their brother for what he said. You stand far from all these, so that each of you regards his neighbor’s words as his own. And so there is no evil jealousy among you, since you have been taught to make up what is lacking to your brother.

O fair audience, august banquet, and spiritual food! With such I would rightly pray always to be.

Valentinian: Yesterday evening, my friend, as I was walking along the seashore and gazing at it rather intently, I saw an extraordinary display of divine power and an art of wise knowledge, if indeed such a thing should be called art. For as that Homeric line says, “As two winds stir up the fish-filled sea, Boreas and Zephyrus, that blow from Thrace, coming suddenly; and at once the dark wave rears its crest and pours much seaweed along the shore,”

so it seemed to me to happen yesterday. For I saw waves like mountain peaks, reaching, so to speak, to heaven itself. From then on I expected nothing else than that the whole earth would be flooded, and I was picturing in my mind a place of refuge and Noah’s ark. But it was not as I thought.

Rather, where the sea had arched itself up, it dissolved back into itself, not overstepping its own place, as though, so to speak, it feared some divine command.

And just as one of the servants, compelled by his master to do something against his will, often obeys the command out of fear, yet dares not say what he suffers in doing what he does not want to do, but inwardly is full of anger, so the sea seemed to me somehow to be angry, as it were, shutting its wrath up within itself and mastering itself, unwilling to make its anger plain to its master.

Considering these things as they happened, I began to gaze, and wished to measure in my mind the heaven and its circuit. I inquired where it begins and where it ends, and what motion it has, whether motion of passing, that is, from place to place, or circular movement, and how it has its steady base.

It seemed good to me to inquire about the sun too: what the manner of its position in the heaven is, what the period of its course, and where it goes shortly afterwards; and that it too does not overstep its own course, but itself, one may say, keeps the command of a greater one, and shines among us when it is permitted, and departs as though called away.

While I was examining these things, I saw the sun’s light ceasing and the daylight failing, and darkness coming at once, and the moon succeeding the sun, at first rising smaller, but afterwards, as it advanced in its course, presenting the appearance of a larger one. I did not stop inquiring about it too, and searched out the cause of its waning and waxing, and how it too keeps the cycle of days.

And from this it seemed to me that there is a divine order and a power of greater things that holds all things together, which we might rightly call God. And thereafter I began to praise the Creator, seeing the earth firmly fixed, and the variety of living creatures, and the many-colored blossoms of plants.

But my mind did not stop at these things alone; I began to inquire from what these things have their constitution: whether from something always existing with God, or from him alone, with nothing coexisting with him. For it did not seem right to me that anything should have come into being from things that are not, since that account is entirely unconvincing to most people; for things that come to be naturally have their constitution from things that are. And yet it seemed to me equally true to say that nothing other than himself always exists with God, but that the things that exist came from him alone; and the good order of the elements and the fair arrangement of nature in them somehow persuaded me of this.

Thinking that I had come to a good view in this way, I went back to my own house. But on the next day, that is, today, as I came, I saw two of my own kind (I mean men) abusing each other, and another again trying to strip his neighbor of his clothes. And some were already beginning to dare even worse things.

For one robbed a corpse, exposing again to the sun the body already hidden in the earth, and outraged the image like his own, leaving the corpse as food for dogs.

Another drew a sword and went at a man like himself. The one wanted to save himself by flight, but the other did not stop pursuing, nor would he master his anger. Why say more? He went at him and at once struck him with the sword. The other became a suppliant to his neighbor and stretched out his hands in supplication, willing to give up his clothes and asking only to keep his life. But the other did not break off his anger, nor pity his kinsman, nor wish to see himself in him through the image, but like a savage beast began to make his meal with the sword, and was already putting his mouth to the body like his own, so great was his rage. And one could see the one already lying there, and the other stripping him and not even covering with earth the body he had stripped of its clothing.

Besides these there was another who wanted to sport with his neighbor’s wife, plundering another man’s marriage and urging her to turn to an unlawful bed, not wishing the husband to become a true father.

From this I began to believe the tragedies too: the supper of Thyestes truly seemed to me to have happened; I believe also in the unlawful union of Oedipus, and I do not disbelieve the brothers’ rivalry by the sword.

Having been a spectator of so many such things, I began to inquire where they come from, what the origin of their motion is, who devised such great evils for men, where their invention came from, and who teaches them. I could not bring myself to dare to say that God is their maker, nor indeed that they have their subsistence, or the constitution of their being, from him. For how could one think such things of God?

For he is good and the maker of better things, and nothing base belongs to him. Indeed, it is not his nature to rejoice in such things; he forbids them to come into being, rejects those who delight in them, and receives those who flee them. How, then, would it not be absurd to call God the creator of these things, when he refuses them? For he would not wish them not to exist if he himself were their first maker; and he wishes those who approach him to become imitators of him.

Therefore it seemed to me unreasonable to attach these things to him, either as having come from him, or (even if one must grant above all that it is possible for something to come into being from what is not) to say that he himself made evil things. For he who made them “from not being into being” would not destroy them again from being into no longer being. Or is one to say that there was once a time when God rejoiced in evils, but now no longer? That seems to me impossible to say of God; for it is foreign to his nature to attach this to him.

Therefore it seemed to me that something coexists with him, whose name is matter, out of which he crafted the things that exist, distinguishing and ordering them well with wise art; and from it evils too seem to come. For since it was without quality and without form, and moreover was borne about in disorder and needed God’s art, he did not begrudge it, so as to leave it always to be borne about in this way, but began to craft it and wished to separate its finest parts from its worst; and so he crafted from it whatever it befitted God to craft. But whatever parts of it were, so to say, dregs, these, being unfit for crafting, he left as they were, since they were in no way fitting for him; and from them, it seems to me, evils now flow among men. This is how I thought it right to think.

But you, my friend, if anything seems to you not well said by me, bring it up and say so; for I very much long to hear about such things.

Orthodox: I welcome your readiness, my friend, and praise your zeal for the discussion. That you have come to think about the things that exist in this way, namely that God crafted them out of some underlying substance, I do not much blame you. For truly the origin of evils makes most people think so.

Indeed, before you and me many able men made the greatest inquiry about this. Some thought as you do; others again declared God the creator of these things, fearing to grant a substance coeval with him; and the former, from fear of calling God the maker of evils, thought fit to grant matter coeval with him. And it happened to both, through fearing God not according to knowledge of the truth, that they did not speak rightly.

Others refused from the outset even to inquire about such a matter, as a question that has no end. But the bond of our common friendship does not allow me to refuse the inquiry, especially when you declare your intention, saying that you are not held by a prejudice (even though you thought, from what you supposed, that things were somewhat like this) but stand in desire of knowledge of the truth. So I too will gladly turn to the discussion of the inquiry.

I want this companion here also to be a hearer of our discussion, for he seems in some respect to hold opinions about these things like yours. That is why I want to address the discussion to you both in common; what I say to you, holding this view, I will say likewise to him. If, then, you truly wish to speak about the better course with good feeling, answer each of my questions; for from this it will come about that you learn the truth and that I do not address my words to you in vain.

Valentinian: I am ready to do what you said, and so ask with all readiness the questions from which you think I can learn knowledge of the better. For my aim is not to win wrongly but to learn the truth rightly; so take up the rest of the discussion.

Orthodox: That two unbegotten things cannot exist together, I think you yourself are not unaware, even though you seem to have anticipated this and added to your account that one of two things must necessarily be said: either that God is separate from matter, or again that he is indivisible from it.

If, then, someone wishes to say that he is united with it, he will be saying that the unbegotten is one. For each of these will be part of the other; and being parts of each other, they will not be two unbegottens, but one thing composed of different parts. For neither do we cut a man, who has different limbs, up into many begotten things. But if, as reason requires, we say that man has been made by God as one begotten thing with many parts, so it is necessary, if God is not separate from matter, to say that what exists is one.

But if someone says that they are separated, there must be something between the two, which also shows their separation. For it is impossible for one thing to be examined as standing apart from another unless there is something else in respect of which the separation of each comes about.

And this does not stop at this point alone, but goes on to ever so many. For the argument we stated about two unbegottens must necessarily proceed likewise if three unbegottens are granted. For about these too I would ask whether they are separated from one another, or again each is united with its neighbor.

If someone wishes to say that they are united, he will hear the same argument as the first; if again that they are separated, he will not escape the necessary existence of what separates them.

And if someone says that there is a third account fitting to be given about the unbegottens, namely that God is neither separated from matter nor again united to it as parts, but that God is in matter as in a place, or matter in God, let him hear that if we call matter God’s place, we must necessarily say that he is contained and circumscribed by matter.

Moreover, he must likewise be borne about in disorder together with matter, and necessarily neither stand still nor remain by himself, since that in which he is is borne about now one way and now another. Besides this, one must say that God was once among worse things. For if matter was once unordered, and he ordered it, choosing to turn it to the better, there was a time when God was among unordered things.

I might rightly ask this too: whether God filled matter or was in some part of it. If someone wishes to say that God was in some part of matter, he makes him far smaller than matter, if indeed a part of it contained the whole of God. If he says that he was in all of it and pervaded the whole of matter, let him explain how he crafted it. For one must say either that there was some contraction of God, after which he crafted that from which he had withdrawn, or that he crafted himself together with matter, having no place to withdraw to.

If someone says that matter is in God, we must likewise examine whether it is as though he were separated from himself and divided and parted to receive the things that come to be in him, as kinds of living creatures exist in the air, or as in a place, that is, as water in earth.

For if we said “as in the air,” we must say that God is divisible; but if “as water in earth,” then, since matter was disordered and unarranged and moreover contained evils, we must say that God is the place of unordered things and of evils. That seems to me not reverent, but rather dangerous. For you want matter to exist so that you may not call God the maker of evils; and choosing to avoid this, you say that he is the receptacle of evils.

If, then, you had said that you suppose matter to be unbegotten on the basis of the begotten things that have come into existence, I would have spoken at length about it to prove that it cannot be unbegotten. But since you say that the origin of evils is the reason for such a supposition, I think I should come to the examination of these. For when the argument makes clear in what way evils exist, and that it is not possible to call God guiltless of evils by supposing matter alongside him, such a supposition seems to me to be done away with.

Do you say, then, that matter without qualities coexists with God, out of which he crafted the coming into being of the world? Valentinian: So I think.

Orthodox: Then if matter was without qualities, and the world came into being from God, and the qualities are in the world, God has become the maker of the qualities? Valentinian: That is so.

Orthodox: Since I heard you say earlier that it is impossible for anything to come into being from things that are not, answer my question. Do you think that the qualities of the world did not come from underlying qualities? Valentinian: I do. Orthodox: And that they are something other than substances? Valentinian: That is so.

Orthodox: Then if God neither crafted the qualities from underlying qualities, nor do they exist from the substances, since they are not substances, we must say that they came into being from God out of things that are not. So it seemed to me that you spoke needlessly in saying that it is impossible to hold that anything came into being from God out of things that are not.

But let the argument on this point stand thus. For among ourselves too we see men making some things out of things that are not, even though they seem above all to be making them in something. Let us take the example of builders: they make cities not out of cities, and likewise temples not out of temples.

But if you think that because substances underlie these things they make them out of things that are, you are mistaken in your reasoning. For it is not the substance that makes the city, or again the temples, but the art applied to the substance; and the art does not come from some art underlying in the substances, but comes from what is not in them.

You seem likely to meet the argument this way: that the craftsman makes the art in the substance from the art he has. To this it seems to me well to say that in man too it does not come from some underlying art. For it is not possible for art to be given as existing by itself; for it belongs to the accidents and to things that receive being only when they come to be in some substance.

For a man will exist even without the art of building, but it will not exist unless there is first a man. Hence one must say that the arts naturally come to be in men out of things that are not.

If, then, we have shown this to be so in the case of men, why was it not fitting to say that God can make not only qualities but also substances out of things that are not? For by its appearing possible for something to come into being out of things that are not, it is shown that the same holds for substances.

But since you long to inquire about the origin of evils, I will come to the discussion of these, and I want to ask you a few questions. Do evils seem to you to be substances, or qualities of substances? Valentinian: It seems to me right to say qualities of substances. Orthodox: And matter was without qualities and without form? Valentinian: So I stated earlier in the discussion.

Orthodox: Then if evils are qualities of substances, and matter was without qualities, and you said that God is the maker of the qualities, God will be the creator of evils too. Since, then, it is not possible even in this way to call God guiltless of evils, it seems to me superfluous to attach matter to him. But if you have something to say to this, begin. — If our inquiry were being conducted out of love of victory, I would not ask to define the matter of evils a second time; but since we are examining the arguments rather for friendship’s sake and for the benefit of our neighbor, I ask you to allow us to define these things from the beginning.

Valentinian: I think my intention and my zeal in the discussion have long been plain to you: I do not wish to win by speaking falsehood persuasively, but for the truth to be shown with careful examination; and I know clearly that you are of the same mind. So use whatever method you think can find the truth, without any hesitation. For in using the better course you will benefit not only yourself but surely me too about what I do not know.

Orthodox: You seem to me to be maintaining that evils too are certain substances; for I do not see them existing apart from substances. Since, then, my good man, you say that evils too are substances, we must examine the definition of substance. Does substance seem to you to be some bodily constitution? Valentinian: It does.

Orthodox: And does the bodily constitution exist by itself, not needing anything in which it comes to be in order to receive its being? Valentinian: That is so.

Orthodox: And do evils seem to you to be activities of someone? Valentinian: So it appears to me.

Orthodox: And do activities receive their being only when the one acting is present? Valentinian: That is so.

Orthodox: And if the one acting does not exist, neither will what he does ever exist? Valentinian: It will not.

Orthodox: Then if substance is some bodily constitution, and the bodily constitution does not need anything in which it comes to be in order to receive its being, while evils are activities of someone, and activities need something in which they come to be in order to receive their being, evils will not themselves be substances.

And if evils are substances, and murder is an evil, murder is a substance; but murder is an activity of someone; murder, then, is not a substance. If you want the one acting to be a substance, I agree too. For example, the murderer is a man: in so far as he is a man, he is a substance; but the murder he commits is not a substance, but a work of the substance.

We call a man sometimes evil because he murders, and again sometimes good because he does good. And these names are attached to the substance from its accidents, which it is not itself. For the substance is neither murder nor again adultery, nor any of the like evils. But just as the grammarian is named from grammar, the orator from oratory, and the physician from medicine, though the substance is neither medicine nor oratory nor grammar but receives its title from its accidents, from which it seems to be named while being neither of them, so too the substance appears to take a name from what seem to be evils, while being neither of them.

And consider likewise, if you picture in your mind some other being as the cause of evils to men, that he too, in so far as he acts in them and suggests that they do evil, is himself evil from what he does. For that one too is called evil for this reason, that he is the maker of evils. But what someone does is not himself, but his activities, from which he receives the title of being called evil.

For if we were to say that he is what he does, and he does murders and adulteries and thefts and whatever is like them, he himself will be these things. But if he is these things, and these things have their constitution when they happen, and when they do not happen cease to be, and these things are done by men, then men will be their makers and the causes of his being and no longer being.

But if you say that these are his activities, he has his being evil from what he does, not from what he is as a substance. And we said that evil is so called from the accidents of the

substance, which the substance is not, as the physician is named from medicine. But if he is evil from what he does, and what he does receives a beginning of being, then he too began to be evil, and these evils also began. And if this is so, he will not be evil without beginning, nor will evils be unbegotten, since they are said to come into being from him.

Companion: You seem to me, my friend, to have answered our companion sufficiently. You appeared to draw your conclusions well from what he had granted beforehand in the discussion. For truly, if matter was without qualities, and God is the creator of the qualities, and evils are qualities, God will be the maker of evils.

Let the argument against him stand as well said; but to me it seems false to say that matter is without qualities. For it is not possible to say of any substance whatever that it is without qualities. Indeed, in the very act of saying that it is without qualities, one indicates its quality, describing what kind of thing matter is, which is a form of quality. So, if you please, take up the discussion with me from the beginning.

For to me matter seems to have had qualities without beginning. That is how I say that evils too come from its outflow, so that God may be guiltless of evils, and matter the cause of them all.

Orthodox: I welcome your readiness, my friend, and praise your zeal in the discussion. For truly it is fitting for every lover of learning not to assent simply and at random to what is said, but to make a careful examination of the arguments. For if the questioner, by an unreasonable definition, gave his partner in discussion an opening to draw what conclusions he liked, that will not thereafter persuade the hearer too; but if he thinks something can be said well, he will say it, being present. For one of two things will happen: either, hearing an answer to what seems to move him, he will be fully helped, or he will refute his partner as not speaking the truth.

But you do not seem to me to have spoken rightly in saying that matter had qualities from the beginning. For if this is so, of what will God be the maker? If we say substances, we say that these existed beforehand; if again qualities, we say that these too exist. Since, then, both substance and qualities exist, it seems to me superfluous to call God a creator.

But so that I may not seem to be constructing an argument for myself, answer me now when I ask: in what way do you say God is a creator? Was it that he changed the substances, so that they no longer were what they once were but others came to be besides them, or that he kept the substances that existed before this, but changed their qualities?

Companion: It does not seem to me that any change of substances took place; for that seems to me absurd to say. But I say that a change of the qualities took place, and in respect of these I say God is a creator. And just as one might say that a house came from stones, of which it cannot be said that the stones, having become a house, no longer remain stones in substance —

for I say that the house came about by the quality of the construction, the former quality of the stones having evidently been changed — so it seems to me that God too, while the substance remained, made a change of its qualities, and in respect of this I say that the coming into being of this world was from God.

Orthodox: Since, then, you say that a change of the qualities was made by God, answer me, as I choose to ask a few questions. Tell me, do evils seem to you likewise to be qualities of substances? Companion: They do.

Orthodox: And were these qualities in matter from the beginning, or did they have a beginning of being? Companion: I say that these qualities coexist with matter without having come into being.

Orthodox: And do you not say that God made a change of the qualities? Companion: I say so.

Orthodox: For the better, or for the worse? Companion: It seems to me right to say for the better.

Orthodox: Then if evils are qualities of matter, and God changed its qualities for the better, we must ask where evils come from. For the qualities did not remain such as they once were by nature.

Either, if the qualities were not evil before, but you say that from being changed by God the first such qualities came to be in matter, God will be the cause of evils, having changed qualities that were not evil into being evil; or does it seem to you that God did not change the evil qualities for the better, and you say that only the rest, as many as were indifferent, were changed by God for the sake of ordering? Companion: That is what I held from the beginning.

Orthodox: How, then, do you say that he left the qualities of base things as they were? Was he able to remove those too but unwilling, or did he lack the power? If you say he was able but unwilling, we must say that he is their cause, since, being able to make evils not exist, he allowed them to remain as they were, especially when he had begun to craft matter.

For if he had not cared about matter at all, he would not have been the cause of what he allowed to remain. But since he crafts one part of it and leaves another part of it as it is, though able to turn that too to the better, he seems to me to deserve blame, having left a part of matter evil to the ruin of the part he crafted.

Indeed, it seems to me that this part has been wronged in the greatest degree, in that the part of matter which he fashioned now perceives evils. For if one examines things carefully, he will find that matter now suffers worse than in its former disorder. For before it was separated out, it did not perceive evils; but now each of its parts receives perception of evils.

Take the example of a man. Before he was formed into an image and became a living creature by the Creator’s art, he had from nature the condition of perceiving no evils. But from the time he is made a man by God, he also takes on the perception of the evil that approaches him. And this very thing, which you say was done by God for the benefit of matter, turns out rather to have befallen it for the worse.

But if you say that evils have not ceased because God cannot remove them, you will be saying that God is powerless. And powerlessness will be either because he is weak by nature, or because he is overcome by fear, enslaved by someone stronger.

If, then, you dare to say that God is weak by nature, you seem to me to be putting your very salvation in danger. And if it is because he is overcome by fear of someone greater, you will be saying that evils are greater than God, overcoming the impulse of his will; which seems to me absurd to say about God. For why will these things not rather be gods, since on your account they can overcome God, if indeed we call God that which has authority over all things?

I want to ask you a few questions about matter itself too; come, tell me: was matter simple or composite? For the variety of the things that have come into being leads me to such an examination of this argument. For if matter was simple and uniform, while the world is composite and has its constitution from various substances and mixtures, it is impossible to say that it came from matter, since composite things cannot have their constitution from one simple thing; for what is composite indicates a mixture of certain simple things.

If again you wish to call matter composite, you will certainly say that it was composed of certain simple things. And if it was composed of simple things, the simple things once existed by themselves, and matter came into being when they were composed; from which it is shown to be begotten.

For if matter is composite, and composite things have their constitution from simple ones, there was once a time when matter did not exist, that is, before the simple things came together. And if there was once a time when matter did not exist, [and there was never] a time when the unbegotten did not exist, matter will not be unbegotten.

From this it will follow that the unbegottens are many. For if God was unbegotten, and the simple things too were unbegotten

from which matter was composed, the unbegottens will not be two only. — Does it seem to you that nothing that exists is opposed to itself? Companion: It does. Orthodox: And is water opposed to fire? Companion: It seems to me to be opposed. Orthodox: And likewise darkness to light, and hot to cold, and moreover moist to dry? Companion: So it seems to me. Orthodox: Then if nothing that exists is opposed to itself, but these are opposed to one another, they will not be one matter, nor indeed from one matter. — I want to ask again an argument similar to this.

Does it seem to you that parts are not destructive of one another? Companion: It does. Orthodox: And that fire and water are parts of matter, and likewise the rest? Companion: So I hold. Orthodox: What then? Does it not seem to you that water is destructive of fire, and light of darkness, and so with all the others like these? Companion: It does.

Orthodox: Then if parts are not destructive of one another, but these are destructive of one another, they will not be parts of one another; and if they are not parts of one another, they will not belong to one matter. Indeed, they will not themselves be matter either, since nothing that exists is destructive of itself, according to the definition of what is opposed.

For nothing is opposed to itself; opposites are by nature opposed to other things. For example, white is not opposed to itself, but is said to be opposed to black; and light likewise is shown not to be opposed to itself, but appears to be so toward darkness; and so with ever so many other things. If, then, matter were some one thing, it would not be opposed to itself. Since opposites are such, it is shown that matter does not exist.

Since I think that you too are ready to make the inquiry about evil, I think I should leave aside the argument about matter. For it seems to me that enough has been said to prove that matter does not exist.

We must come to the examination of evils and must necessarily inquire into those among men. Are the evils among men species of evil, or parts? If you wish to say that they are species of it, evil does not exist by itself as something other than these, since genera are found in their species. For example, “living creature” is a genus predicated of a species, that is, of man and of things like him, whatever are animate and have voluntary motion; but [a genus existing by itself] is shown to be impossible. For we do not say that a genus is something else existing by itself apart from the species. So one must say about evil too; for we said that the genus has its constitution in the species and is not something else by itself. And if this is so, evil will be begotten; for the species are shown to be begotten, such as murder and adultery and the like. If again you wish these to be parts of some evil, and these are begotten, that too must be begotten. For things whose parts are begotten must necessarily likewise be begotten; for the whole is composed of parts. And the whole will not exist unless the parts exist, but the parts will exist even if the whole is not present. Of nothing that exists is one part begotten and another unbegotten; and even if I were to grant this to the argument, there was once a time when evil was not complete, that is, before God crafted matter; and it becomes complete when man has been made by God, for man is the maker of the parts of evil. And from this God, by creating, will be the cause of evil’s being complete; which does not seem to me right to say about God. If you wish to say neither of these, but say that evil is the action of someone, you show that it is begotten; for the action of someone receives a beginning of being. Besides this, you cannot name evil as anything other than these. For what evil action can you show other than those among men? For I showed earlier in the argument that the one who acts is not evil in respect of his substance, but in respect of the manner of his choice, choosing to do such things as give him the title of being called evil.

I say first that nothing is base by nature, but that a thing is called evil by the manner of its use. … For the name of adultery signifies an intercourse of man and woman; but if someone has intercourse with his wife for the sake of begetting children and the continuation of the race, the intercourse is good. But if someone abandons lawful intercourse and outrages another’s marriage, he does an evil deed.

The intercourse is the same, but the manner of its use is not alike. … And the same argument holds for sexual immorality. … Intercourse, then, examined apart from the manner of its use, is not evil; it becomes so when the manner is made plain.

And I say that murder is likewise. For if someone wishes to kill a man caught in adultery, demanding punishment for what he dared, he does no evil. But if someone kills one who has done nothing forbidden, for no other pretext but to take away what is his, that is, either money or property, he does a base thing. The deed is the same in both cases, but the manner of the deed makes the difference.

Moreover, taking someone’s money also becomes evil by the manner of taking. For if someone gives, sharing from what he has, the one who takes does nothing base; but if again one takes it against the owner’s will or secretly, he does a wicked deed. Taking what belongs to another occurs in both cases, but the manner of taking makes it called evil or good.

Likewise reverence toward God becomes good or evil by its manner. For if someone worships the true God, he does a good deed; but if he abandons him and worships what does not exist, and wishes to attach the honor of the better one to wood or stones, he does evil. The name of reverence is the same, but the manner of its use alters what is done.

Companion: Since, then, you have made your argument about evils, wishing to show how evils exist and that men are their makers, I want to ask a brief question again: do men have the occasion from themselves, that is, becoming themselves the inventors of such use, or were they made such by God, or again is there someone else who urges men on to such things?

Orthodox: I do not think it right to say that men were made such by God. I say that the first man was made with free will, that is, free, and from him the successors of the race too inherited the like freedom. I say, then, that man was made free, serving whom he wishes.

For I say that this was the greatest gift granted him by God. For all other things serve the divine command by necessity. If you speak of the heaven, it stands bearing its master, not moved from its appointed place; and if you wish to speak of the sun, it completes its appointed motion, not refusing its course, but serving its master by a certain necessity. And you see the earth likewise fixed and bearing the command of him who ordered it.

Likewise the other things too serve their maker by necessity, none of them able to do anything other than that for which it was made. That is why we do not praise them for obeying their master in this way, nor is any better hope laid up for them, since they kept the command unwillingly.

But man received the authority to obey whom he wishes, leading himself into service, not held by necessity of nature nor deprived of the power. This, I say, was granted him for the sake of better things, so that he might receive from the better one something more than he has; and this comes to him from obedience, and he claims it as a debt from his maker.

For I say that man was made thus not for harm but for better things. For if he had been made like one of the elements, or of the things that likewise serve God by necessity, he would no longer receive a reward worthy of his choice, but would have been like an instrument of the craftsman, unreasonably incurring blame for what he did not do well; for the user would have been the cause of these things. Nor would man have known the better, knowing nothing else but only that for which he was made.

I say, then, that God, choosing to honor man in this way and that he should come to know the better, gave him the authority to be able to do what he wishes, and exhorts him to turn his authority to the better, not taking away his free will again, but wishing to show him the better. For the ability is present to him even when he receives the commandment; but God exhorts him to turn the choice of his ability to the better.

For just as a father exhorts his child, who has the authority to learn his lessons or not to learn them, to apply himself rather to his lessons, showing that this is better, and does not take away the child’s power of ability, even if he does not wish to learn willingly, so it seems to me that God too, in urging man to obey his commands, does not take away his authority of choice, of being able also not to obey the commands.

Indeed, the very fact of exhorting in this way shows that he did not take away the authority. He commands so that man may be able to enjoy better things; for this follows from obeying God’s command. So he wishes to command not in order to take away the authority he gave, but in order to bestow something better, as on one worthy to obtain greater things, in return for having obeyed God while having also the authority not to obey …

I say that man was made with free will, not as though some evil already lay ready beforehand, of which man received the authority to choose if he wished, but as the sole cause of obeying God or not obeying. For this is what free will meant.

And man, having been made, receives a commandment from God, and from this point evil already begins; for he does not obey the divine command. And this alone was evil: disobedience, which began to be. For no one can call it unbegotten, since the one who committed it was begotten.

But you will certainly ask where this disobedience came from. It is clearly set down in a certain divine Scripture. Hence I say that man was not made such by God, but that he suffered this through someone’s teaching; for man did not receive such a nature. For if he had been so, this would not have come to him through teaching, since his nature itself would have been so.

I said, then, that the beginning of evil was envy, and that the envy arose from man’s having been deemed worthy of better honor by God; and that evil is disobedience, from man’s falling under penalty by transgressing God’s commandment. … Often, even if what is done is not base by nature, yet because God does not wish it to be done, it is clearly evil.

I say, then, that God had many grounds on which he had to create: first, the knowledge of his art, which ought not to be idle, as though his ability to make what he knew were defeated; secondly, that he is good by nature, which did not seem fit to remain unprofitable; and many other things like these belonged to God, on account of which he began to make the world come into being.

For just as someone who has knowledge of music, or again of medicine or carpentry, so long as he does not apply himself to the work nor show his knowledge through it, seems to have his art in vain, neither himself enjoying what he knows nor giving others knowledge of these works, and from this becomes like one who does not know it at all, since his art is not active (for each of the arts receives its display through its activity and, so to speak, the constitution of its being);

and likewise again, if someone good had no one to benefit, he would seem to be good in vain (for the good is by nature something relative to another; and if there are none to whom it is directed, it will not be good at all, hidden in its possessor and known to him alone, because there are none at all who need it; but if there are some whom he can benefit, then first his goodness is shown, and next it becomes useful to the one who has such a nature, since many can enjoy his goodness) —

in the same way we must consider about God too: that, having knowledge of every art, if he had crafted nothing, he would seem to have his knowledge in vain, there being none to whom he could show that he was knowing. That is why I say he made the work, choosing to display his art in the works themselves; for knowledge alone, without the things in which it had to exist, was not enough for God. For such a thing appeared useless to him, or rather idle to remain so; and power that is not active would not be useful to its possessor, and, being good, he would not have enjoyed his goodness, having none who needed it.

Therefore, being good, he created and made the things that were not, choosing to show his goodness first through this (for it belongs to an exceedingly good nature to give being to things that once were not); and then also through the promise of better things, which he announced to those made by him. For he gave them not only being but also the enjoyment of better things, choosing in this way to display his goodness; for through this it appears that the good exists, since it has those who need it.

Moreover, if God had not made the world come into being, that he is God would have been unknown from the outset, there being none able to know him. Hence, wishing to lead some to knowledge of himself and to show that he exists, he created, in order to make himself known. … The rest of the structure of the world, then, I say came into being for man’s sake, to serve his needs, and man for the sake of God himself, so that he might glorify his master, and so that God might exercise his goodness toward some.

Do not say, then, man, that anything is self-constituted together with God, nor seek to take away the greatest part of his power. He himself gave being to all things, which did not exist before and do not have their constitution without beginning. Why do you want God to be only a craftsman? Why do you refuse his gift, as though he had granted matter art alone, and not also the constitution of its being?