Against Celsus 4.58–4.73

We say this further to Celsus, who said, “The soul is the work of God, but the nature of the body is different,” and who threw out so great a doctrine not only without proof but also without definition; for he did not make clear whether every soul is the work of God, or only the rational soul. We say to him, then: If every soul is the work of God, clearly that of irrational and most worthless creatures is too, so that the nature of every body is different from that of the soul. He seems, however, in what follows, where he says that irrational animals are dearer to God than we are and have a purer notion of the divine, to represent not only the soul of men but much more that of irrational animals as the work of God; for this follows from saying that they are dearer to God than we are. But if only the rational soul is the work of God, first, he did not make this clear; and second, it follows from his speaking without definition about the soul, as if not every soul but only the rational one were the work of God, that the nature of every body is not different. And if the nature of every body is not different, but the body of each animal corresponds to its soul, clearly the body of the one whose soul is the work of God would differ from a body in which dwells a soul that is not the work of God. And so it will be false that the body of a bat, a worm, or a frog will not differ from that of a man.

For it is absurd that stones should be thought purer or more defiled than stones, and buildings than buildings, according as they have been built for the honor of the divine or to receive the most dishonorable and accursed bodies, while bodies should not differ from bodies according as their inhabitants are rational or irrational, and, among rational ones, according as they are the better people or the worst of men. Such a view has led some to dare to deify the bodies of eminent men as having received a good soul, and to cast out or dishonor those of the worst; not that such a thing has always been done soundly, but that it had its origin in a sound notion. Or will the wise man, after the death of Anytus and Socrates, care alike for the burial of the body of Socrates and that of Anytus, and build a similar monument or tomb for both? And we have said these things because of the phrase “of which none is the work of God,” the “of which” referring to the body of a man, or the serpents that come from the body, and to that of an ox, or the bees that come from the body of an ox, and to that of a horse or donkey, and the wasps from a horse and beetles from a donkey; on account of which we were compelled to take up again the statement, “The soul is the work of God, but the nature of the body is different.”

Then next he says: “The nature of all the aforesaid bodies is common, and one, going and returning in a cycle of change.” To this too it is clear from what has been said that the nature is common not only to the bodies listed before but also to the “heavenly” ones. And if this is so, clearly, according to him (I do not know whether also according to the truth), the nature of all bodies is one, going and returning in a cycle of change. And it is clear that this is so according to those who make the world perishable; but those who do not make it perishable, while not admitting a “fifth body,” will also try to show that according to them too the nature of all bodies is one, going and returning in a cycle of change. So too what perishes remains in change; for the underlying matter remains when the quality perishes, according to those who hold that matter is unbegotten. But if some argument can show that matter is not unbegotten but was made for some use, clearly it will not have the same nature as regards permanence as it would if it were supposed unbegotten. But it is not our present task, in answering Celsus's accusations, to discuss natural philosophy.

He says also: “Nothing born of matter is immortal.” To this it will be said that if nothing born of matter is immortal, either the whole world is immortal and not as born of matter, or it too is not an immortal thing. If, then, the world is immortal, as is held even by those who said that only the soul is the work of God and say that it came from a certain mixing bowl, let Celsus show that it did not come from matter without qualities, if he keeps to “nothing born of matter is immortal.” But if, since the world is born of matter, it is not immortal, the world is mortal: is it then also perishing, or not? If perishing, it will perish as the work of God; then, in the perishing of the world, what will the soul, the work of God, do? Let Celsus say. But if, twisting the notion of the immortal, he says that it is immortal in the sense of being perishable but not perishing, as capable of death but not actually dying, clearly there will be something, according to him, both mortal and immortal at once, by being capable of both; and it will be a mortal thing that does not die, and what is not immortal by nature will be called immortal in a special sense because it does not die. In what distinct sense, then, will he say, “Nothing born of matter is immortal”? You see that the thoughts in his writings, when pressed and examined, are refuted, not admitting what is noble and incontestable. Having said these things, he adds: “On this subject so much is enough; and if anyone is able to hear and inquire further, he will know.” Let us then, whom he considers foolish, see what has followed from our being able to hear him and inquire even a little.

Next after this he thinks that we can learn, through a few petty phrases, what has been variously investigated through many not contemptible arguments about the nature of evils and differently interpreted, saying: “Evils among beings could be neither fewer nor more, either before, or now, or again; for the nature of the universe is one and the same, and the origin of evils is always the same.” He seems to have paraphrased this too from the Theaetetus, where Socrates in Plato said: “But it is not possible for evils to perish from among men, nor for them to be established among the gods,” and so on. And it seems to me that he who includes the truth in this one treatise and entitles his book against us The True Word has not even listened to Plato accurately. For the passage in the Timaeus which says, “When the gods purify the earth with water,” has shown that the earth, when purified by the waters, has fewer evils than in the time before it was purified. And we say that according to Plato evils are at times fewer, because of the passage in the Theaetetus which says that “evils cannot perish from among men.”

I do not know how, while positing providence (at least as far as the words of this book go), he says that evils are neither more nor fewer but, as it were, fixed in number, doing away with the finest doctrine, that vice and evils are unlimited and by their own nature boundless. And it seems to follow from the claim that evils neither have been nor are nor will be fewer or more, that, just as according to those who hold the world to be indestructible the balance of the elements comes about by providence, which does not allow any one of them to gain the upper hand, so that the world may not perish, so, as it were, some providence presides over evils, which happen to be just so many, so that they become neither more nor fewer. Celsus's account of evils is refuted in another way too, by the philosophers who have examined questions of good and evil, and who have shown from history as well that at first courtesans hired themselves out to any who wished outside the city, wearing masks; then later, growing contemptuous, they laid the masks aside, and, not being permitted by the laws to enter the cities, they stayed outside them; but as corruption grew day by day, they dared to enter the cities too. Chrysippus says this in his Introduction to Goods and Evils. From this, since evils become more and fewer, one can gather that those called ambiguous once stood in public, suffering and inflicting outrage and serving the lusts of those who came in, but that later the market officials drove them out. And about countless things that have entered human life from the spreading of vice one could say that formerly they did not exist. At any rate, the most ancient histories, though they accuse sinners of countless things, do not know of those who commit unspeakable acts.

How, from these and similar facts, does Celsus not appear ridiculous, thinking that evils could never become more or fewer? For even if the nature of the universe is one and the same, it does not follow at all that the origin of evils is always the same. For just as, though the nature of this or that particular man is one and the same, the state of his ruling faculty, his reason, and his actions is not always the same (at one time he has not yet acquired reason, at another he has vice together with reason, and this spread either more or less widely; and sometimes he has been turned toward virtue and makes more or less progress, and occasionally he even attains virtue itself, and that in more or in fewer contemplations), so one can say still more of the nature of the universe that, even if it is one and the same in kind, the same things, or things of the same kind, do not always happen in the universe. For there are not always good harvests, nor always bad ones, nor always floods of rain, nor always droughts; and in the same way neither the good harvests nor the bad of better souls are fixed, nor is the outpouring of worse souls always greater or less. And for those who wish to examine everything as precisely as possible, the account of evils is necessary: evils do not always remain at the same level, because of the providence that either preserves what is on earth or cleanses it by floods and conflagrations, and perhaps not only what is on earth but also what is in the whole world, when it needs cleansing because vice has become great in it.

After this Celsus says: "What the origin of evils is, is not easy for one who has not studied philosophy to know; but it is enough to say to the multitude that evils do not come from God, but cleave to matter and dwell among mortals; and the cycle of mortal things is alike from beginning to end, and according to the appointed revolutions the same things must always have happened, be happening, and be going to happen." Celsus says that the origin of evils is not easy to know for one who has not studied philosophy, as though the philosopher could know their origin easily, while the non-philosopher cannot easily discern the origin of evils, though he can know it, if only with toil. But we say in reply to this too that the origin of evils is not easy to know even for one who has studied philosophy, and perhaps even for such people it is not possible to know it purely, unless by God's inspiration it is made clear what evils are, and shown how they came into being, and understood in what way they will be done away with. At any rate, since ignorance about God is among evils, and not to know the manner of worshipping God and of piety toward him is the greatest evil, certainly, even according to Celsus, some of those who studied philosophy did not know it, as is clear from the different schools in philosophy. But in our view no one who has not come to know that it is an evil to think piety is preserved in the laws established according to the commonly understood constitutions of states will be able to know the origin of evils. And no one who has not grasped the facts about the one called the devil and his angels (who this one was before he became the devil, how he became the devil, and what the cause was of those called his angels revolting along with him) will be able to know the origin of evils. And one who is to know it must also have understood more exactly about demons, that, insofar as they are demons, they are not God's creations, but only insofar as they are rational beings, and whence they came to be such that their ruling faculty took on the condition of demons. If, then, any other subject among those in human life that need examination is hard for our nature to track down, the origin of evils would be counted among them.

Then, as one who could say something more secret about the origin of evils but keeps silent about it and says what suits the multitude, he says that it is enough to say to the multitude about the origin of evils that "evils do not come from God, but cleave to matter and dwell among mortals." It is true, then, that evils do not come from God; for according to our Jeremiah too it is plain that "out of the mouth of the Lord shall not come evil things and the good." But that matter dwelling among mortals is the cause of evils is not true in our view. For the ruling faculty of each person is the cause of the vice that exists in it, which is evil; and the actions that come from it are evils too. And nothing else, in our view, strictly speaking, is evil. But I know that this subject needs much working out and argument, which can come, by the grace of God who enlightens the ruling faculty, to the one judged by God worthy of knowledge on this topic as well.

I do not know how it seemed useful to Celsus, writing against us, to throw in a doctrine that needs much demonstration, even plausible demonstration, showing as far as possible that "the cycle of mortal things is alike from beginning to end, and according to the appointed revolutions the same things must always have happened, be happening, and be going to happen." If this is true, free will is abolished. For if according to the appointed revolutions the same things must always have happened, be happening, and be going to happen in the cycle of mortal things, it is clear that Socrates must always practise philosophy and be accused of new divinities and of corrupting the young, and Anytus and Meletus must always accuse him, and the council on the Areopagus must always condemn him to death by hemlock. So too, according to the appointed cycles, Phalaris must always be tyrant, and Alexander of Pherae must commit the same cruelties, and those condemned to Phalaris's bull must always bellow in it. If this is granted, I do not know how free will can be preserved, or how praise and blame can be reasonable. And to such a hypothesis this will be said to Celsus: if the cycle of mortal things is always alike from beginning to end, and according to the appointed revolutions the same things must always have happened, be happening, and be going to happen, then, according to the appointed cycles, Moses must always come out of Egypt with the people of the Jews, and Jesus must again come to live among us to do the same things, which he has done not once but infinitely many times according to the cycles; and the same Christians will exist in the appointed revolutions, and Celsus will write this book again, having written it infinitely many times before.

Celsus, then, says that only the cycle of mortal things must necessarily, according to the appointed revolutions, always have happened, be happening, and be going to happen; but most of the Stoics say that not only the cycle of mortal things is such, but also that of immortal things and of the gods they believe in. For after the conflagration of the universe, which has happened infinitely many times and will happen infinitely many times, the same order of all things from beginning to end has come about and will come about. Trying, however, to remedy the absurdities somehow, the Stoics say, I do not know how, that in each cycle all will be indistinguishable from those of the earlier cycles, so that Socrates does not come into being again, but someone indistinguishable from Socrates, who will marry a woman indistinguishable from Xanthippe and be accused by men indistinguishable from Anytus and Meletus. But I do not know how the world is always the same and not one world indistinguishable from another, while the things in it are not the same but indistinguishable. But the fundamental argument against both Celsus's words and those of the Stoics will be examined more suitably elsewhere, since it does not fit the present occasion and the purpose at hand to enlarge on these matters here.

After this he says: "Nor were visible things given to man, but each thing comes into being and perishes for the sake of the preservation of the whole, according to the exchange I spoke of before, from one to another." It is superfluous to spend more time refuting these things, as we have already set out our view as best we could. It has also been said in answer to this: "Neither goods nor evils could become fewer or more among mortals." An answer has also been given to this: "Nor does God need new correction." But God does not bring correction to the world as a man who has built something defectively and made it unskilfully, cleansing it by flood or conflagration; rather he prevents the spread of vice from ranging further, and I think he also does away with it altogether, in an orderly way, to the benefit of the whole. Whether after the abolition of vice there is reason for it to come into being again or not will be examined in the fundamental treatise. God, then, does will always to take up errors by new correction. For even if everything has been ordered by him most beautifully and most securely in the creation of the universe, he nonetheless needed some healing art for those sick with vice and for the whole world, defiled as it were by it; and nothing has been or will be neglected by God, who at each time does what it befits him to do in a world that is changeable and mutable. And as a farmer does different farm work on the land and on what grows on it according to the different seasons of the year, so God administers whole ages as if they were years, so to speak, doing in each of them whatever reason concerning the universe requires, which is most clearly understood and carried out, as the truth holds, by God alone.

Celsus put forward an argument about evils of this kind: "Even if something seems evil to you, it is not yet clear whether it is evil; for you do not know what benefits you or another or the whole." The argument has something cautious in it, but it also hints that the nature of evils is not wholly wicked, since what is thought to be evil in individual cases may benefit the whole. However, so that no one who misunderstands what is said may find an occasion for his own ruin, as though his vice too were useful to the universe or could be useful, it will be said that, free will being preserved for each person, even if God makes use of the wickedness of the bad for the ordering of the universe, assigning them to the service of the universe, such a person is no less blameworthy, and has been assigned, as blameworthy, to a service that is undesirable for each individual but useful to the whole. It is as if in cities someone said that a man who had committed certain sins and for his sins had been condemned to some public works useful to all does something useful to the whole city, while he himself has come into an undesirable condition, one in which no one with even moderate sense would wish to be. And Paul, the apostle of Jesus, teaching us that even the very worst will contribute something to the service of the universe but will be, through their own fault, among things undesirable, while the most earnest will be most useful to the universe, and will be placed in the finest position through their own doing, says: "In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver but also of wood and earthenware, some for honour and some for dishonour. If then anyone cleanses himself, he will be a vessel for honour, sanctified and useful to the master, prepared for every good work." I think it necessary to have set this out in answer to "Even if something seems evil to you, it is not yet clear whether it is evil; for you do not know what benefits you or another," so that no one takes occasion from the topic to sin, as though he will be useful to the whole through his sin.

Since after this Celsus, not understanding the passages in the Scriptures about God as though he had human passions, ridicules those in which words of anger are spoken against the ungodly and threats against those who have sinned, it must be said that, just as we, when talking with very small children, do not aim at the full measure of our own ability in speaking, but adapting ourselves to the weakness of those in our charge say these things and also do what seems useful to us for the conversion and correction of children as children, so the Word of God seems to have arranged what is written, measuring what is fitting in the telling by the capacity of the hearers and by their benefit. And in general, about this manner of telling things about God, it is said in Deuteronomy: "The Lord your God bore with your ways, as a man would bear with the ways of his son." It is as though the Word, taking on human ways for the benefit of human beings, says such things; for the many did not need God, speaking in his own person, to say in a manner befitting himself what was to be said to such people. But one who cares for the clear understanding of the divine writings will find in them the things called spiritual for those who are named spiritual, comparing the intent of what is said to the weaker and of what is proclaimed to the more practised, both often lying in the same passage for one who knows how to hear it.

We do speak of God's wrath, but we say that it is not a passion of his, but something he uses to educate, by sterner ways, those who have committed so many and such sins. That what is called God's wrath and what is named his anger educates, and that this is the view of Scripture, is clear from what is said in the sixth psalm: "Lord, do not rebuke me in your anger, nor discipline me in your wrath," and in Jeremiah: "Discipline us, Lord, but with judgment and not in anger, lest you make us few." And whoever reads in the second book of Kingdoms of the "wrath" of God that moved David to number the people, and in the first book of Chronicles of "the devil," and compares the texts with one another, will see to whom the wrath is assigned: the wrath of which Paul says all human beings have become "children," saying: "We were by nature children of wrath, like the rest." That wrath is not a passion of God, but each person prepares it for himself by his sins, Paul will show in the words: "Or do you despise the riches of his kindness and forbearance and patience, not knowing that God's kindness leads you to repentance? But by your hardness and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and of the revelation of God's righteous judgment." How then can each person "store up wrath for himself on the day of wrath," if "wrath" is understood as a passion? And how can a passion of wrath educate? Moreover, the Word that teaches us never to be angry, and says in the thirty-sixth psalm, "Cease from wrath and forsake anger," and in Paul, "Put away all these things yourselves: wrath, anger, malice, slander, foul talk," would not attach to God himself the passion from which it wishes to free us altogether. It is clear that what is said about God's wrath is figurative from the fact that sleep too is recorded of him, from which the prophet, as though waking him, says: "Arise; why do you sleep, Lord?" And again he says: "And the Lord awoke as one asleep, like a mighty man who has been drunk with wine." If, then, sleep means something else, and not what the obvious understanding of the word shows, why should not wrath also be understood in a similar way? And threats are announcements of what will happen to the wicked, as if someone called threats the words of a doctor telling his patients: "I will cut you and apply cauteries to you, unless you obey my rules and follow this diet and conduct yourself in this way." We therefore do not attach human passions to God, nor do we hold impious opinions about him, nor do we go astray when we set out the accounts about him from the writings themselves compared with one another. Nor is the purpose of those among us who wisely represent the Word anything other than to free the hearers from simple-mindedness as far as possible and to make them wise.

In keeping with his failure to understand what is written about God's wrath, he says: "Is it not ridiculous that a man, angered at the Jews, destroyed them all, young and old, and burned their city, so that they were nothing; while God the greatest, as they say, being angry and wrathful and threatening, sends his Son, and he suffers such things?" If, then, the Jews, after doing to Jesus what they dared against him, perished young and old and were burned, they suffered these things from no other wrath than that which they stored up for themselves, God's judgment against them having come about by God's decree, which is named wrath by a certain ancestral custom of the Hebrews. And the Son of the greatest God does suffer, by his own will, for the salvation of human beings, as has been said above as well as we could. After this he says: "But so that the argument may not be about the Jews alone (for that is not what I am saying) but about the whole of nature, as I promised, I will make plainer what I said before." Who, reading this, if he were modest and aware of human weakness, would not shrink from the offensiveness of one who promised to give an account of the whole of nature and boasted in the same way as in the title he dared to give his book? Let us see, then, what it is he promises to say about the whole of nature and what he will make plain.