Against Celsus 4.25

But if you belittle the smallness of man not because of the body but because of the soul, as being inferior to the other rational beings, especially the good, and inferior for this reason, that wickedness is in it, why should the bad among Christians and those among the Jews who live badly be a cluster of bats or ants or worms or frogs, rather than the wicked among the other nations? In this sense everyone whatever who indulges in overflowing wickedness is a bat, a worm, a frog, and an ant compared with the rest of men. Even if someone is a Demosthenes the orator, with wickedness like his and the deeds he did from wickedness, or an Antiphon, another who was considered an orator, who abolished providence in his books entitled On Truth, like Celsus's title, these are no less worms rolling in a corner of the mud of stupidity and ignorance. And yet no rational being, of whatever kind, could reasonably be compared to a worm, since it has the starting points for virtue. For these rudiments of virtue do not allow those who have virtue potentially, and who can never wholly lose its seeds, to be compared to a worm. It appears, then, that neither men in general could be worms compared with God, for reason, which has its origin from the Word who is with God, does not allow the rational animal to be thought wholly alien from God; nor could the bad among Christians and Jews, who in truth are neither Christians nor Jews, be compared rather than the rest of the wicked to worms rolling in a corner of the mud. And if the nature of reason does not allow even this, clearly we shall not insult human nature, made for virtue, even if it sins through ignorance, nor liken it to such animals.