Against Celsus 4.68

Celsus, then, says that only the cycle of mortal things must necessarily, according to the appointed revolutions, always have happened, be happening, and be going to happen; but most of the Stoics say that not only the cycle of mortal things is such, but also that of immortal things and of the gods they believe in. For after the conflagration of the universe, which has happened infinitely many times and will happen infinitely many times, the same order of all things from beginning to end has come about and will come about. Trying, however, to remedy the absurdities somehow, the Stoics say, I do not know how, that in each cycle all will be indistinguishable from those of the earlier cycles, so that Socrates does not come into being again, but someone indistinguishable from Socrates, who will marry a woman indistinguishable from Xanthippe and be accused by men indistinguishable from Anytus and Meletus. But I do not know how the world is always the same and not one world indistinguishable from another, while the things in it are not the same but indistinguishable. But the fundamental argument against both Celsus's words and those of the Stoics will be examined more suitably elsewhere, since it does not fit the present occasion and the purpose at hand to enlarge on these matters here.