Against Celsus 5.23

We, then, do not say that the body that has been corrupted returns to its original nature, just as the corrupted "grain" of "wheat" does not return to being the "grain" of "wheat." For we say that, just as an ear rises from the grain of "wheat," so a certain principle (logos) is present in the body, from which, since it is not corrupted, the body "is raised in incorruption." It is the Stoics who say that the body utterly corrupted returns to its original nature, because of their doctrines about indistinguishable things in each cycle, and they say that the very first composition, from which it was dissolved, will be composed again, establishing this, as they think, by dialectical necessities. Nor do we flee to "a most absurd escape" in saying that "everything is possible for God"; for we know how to understand "everything" as not applying to things that do not exist, or to things that are inconceivable. And we also say that God cannot do shameful things, since then God would be able not to be God; for if God does something shameful, he is not God. And since he states that God does not will "what is contrary to nature" either, we distinguish what is said: if someone calls vice contrary to nature, we too say that God does not will what is contrary to nature, whether what comes from vice or what happens irrationally; but if things happen according to God's reason and will, it follows at once that they are not contrary to nature; for what God does is not contrary to nature, even if it is marvellous or seems marvellous to some. And if we must use a forced expression, we will say that, in relation to what is more commonly understood as nature, there are some things above nature which God might sometimes do, raising man above human nature and making him change into a better and more divine nature, and keeping him such, as long as the one kept shows by his actions that he wishes it.