Christian Questions to the Greeks 1

[Christian question 1] If the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good among human beings, and the greatest good among human beings is to know the one who truly is, God, then the greatest evil is to be ignorant of him. But since this evil is present in some human beings, which is more fitting for the Creator of the world: to change the present state of life and free human beings from the greatest evil, as the teaching of the Christians holds, or to let the world remain in the same state and human beings be held fast by the greatest evil?

[Greek answer] First, to the first difficulty it must be said that there is no greatest evil. For if the greatest of goods is God, then clearly, if anyone were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly. For it is absurd that God should not comprehend all things and should not shine his goodness on all. So there is no greatest evil. And ignorance, in fact, is often given to human beings for their good: we see in many cases that people more often despise what they know than what they do not know. Besides, the soul suffers ignorance of the one who truly is, God, from nothing else but its own forgetfulness. And knowledge of God comes to souls here as well, just as we see human beings here who know God. Indeed, if one wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance at all about God; for all agree, by a common notion, that God exists. That human beings can know God even while they are here, the faith of the orthodox also shows clearly, when it says that God himself came down and was known to human beings. If, then, it is possible for human beings to know God even while they are here, no greatest evil befalls them from being here. For those who are ignorant, as has been said, are ignorant of God because of their unbelieving nature. And if one should concede, absurd as it is, that the things here are the greatest evil, and that it would be better for the things here not to exist than to exist: if he says that the Creator made the things here evil through weakness, he is foolish, for he is saying that God's power does not comprehend all things; but if, being able to make the things here good, he allowed them to do evil, this too will be an accusation against God. For one who is able to stop something and looks on is more truly its doer himself. And if the God who made the things here is the same God, clearly, since the same God remains, the same things will be later and always. For what he could do of old he can do now. If now he can do something more than before, his power will be temporal, which is absurd; for what is temporal is perishable. And if, though he was able of old to prevent so great an evil, he did not prevent it, he would be envious, which it is impious even to imagine. So he, being the same and remaining in the same state, must do the same things.

[Christian rebuttal] Refutation of the answer, which was not rightly given.

[1] The argument itself, once understood, would have been enough to refute its incoherence. For when he says at the beginning of the argument that there is no greatest evil, and at the end of the argument that to think things unworthy of God, even in imagination alone, is impious, how is the greatest evil not deliberately brought back in, after the answerer had thrown it out without judgment? If speaking is added to this impiety of imagination alone, the impiety becomes greater; and if writing is added to speaking, the impiety necessarily holds every excess of evil. If this is so, and there is impiety in everything said and written unworthily about God, or even only imagined, … the glory of God; therefore the greatest evil among human beings comes from ignorance. But since it pleased your piety that the incoherence of the argument should be refuted by us in writing as well, I write what follows in a volume. For to refute an obvious falsehood at greater length is wearisome both to the writer and to the reader.

[2] The answerer laid down in his answer two kinds of greatest evil and three kinds of ignorance of God: the former according to the Manichaeans, the latter according to the answerer himself. Of the two kinds of greatest evil, he spoke of one as according to essence, the other as according to the activity of what is according to essence. Of the three kinds of ignorance of God, he spoke of one as according to forgetfulness, one according to the unbelieving nature, and one according to a good gift. Making his refutation of those according to the Manichaeans and of those according to himself brief, he said, when he was refuting the opinion of the Manichaeans: “There is no greatest evil. If anyone were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly”; and when he says: “The soul suffers ignorance of the one who truly is, God, from nothing else but its own forgetfulness,” in the first he does away with the greatest evil according to essence, in the second with the one according to activity. And doing away also with the kinds of ignorance of God that he himself laid down, he says: “There is no ignorance at all about God; for all agree, by a common notion, that God exists.” If, then, there is no ignorance at all about God, it is clearly false that ignorance of God befalls human beings either through forgetfulness, or through the unbelieving nature, or through a good gift. And if he calls the notion common to all, which is destroyed by the specific notion of each heresy of wrong belief, not even so will there be knowledge of God in all. We, however, did not set down in the question either the greatest evil according to the Manichaeans or the ignorance of God according to the answerer himself; we called the greatest evil according to ignorance the falsehood against God, and ignorance of God the ignorance that has spoken the falsehood. This is the third kind of greatest evil, which befalls human beings from their own voluntary disobedience and unbelief. The answerer did away with the two kinds of greatest evil according to the Manichaeans, but did not do away with the one according to us. So we must say one of two things about the answerer: either he did not understand the third kind of greatest evil, ours, or he was not supplied with a just counterargument to refute it. That the greatest evil according to us befalls human beings from ignorance of God is shown as follows. The greatest evil, which does not exist according to essence, human beings through ignorance of God supposed to exist in their doctrines; and the answerer himself testifies to this … “and if anyone were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly. For it is absurd that God should not comprehend all things and should not shine his goodness on all. So there is no greatest evil.” In these words the greatest evil according to essence is done away with, but the one by supposition in doctrine, which we set down in the question, remains. But since the answerer, reaching out to do away with the greatest evil according to us, said, “There is no greatest evil,” the answerer clearly either did not understand, as has been said, the greatest evil according to us, or was not supplied with a just counterargument. And if this is so, clearly there is a greatest evil among human beings by supposition in doctrine.

[3] “For if,” he says, “God is the greatest of goods”: true and pious is the statement that God is the greatest of goods. But since some human beings, from ignorance of God, deprive the one who truly is God of his rightful titles and honors and attach them to those who are not gods, does it not seem to the answerer to be a plain impiety, than which there is none greater, to be ignorant of the one who truly is God and to honor one who is not with his titles and honors? And how can his denial hold, which says that there is no greatest evil among human beings, when the greatest impiety exists among human beings, unless perhaps he does not consider the greatest impiety to be the greatest evil? “If anyone,” he says, “were to posit a greatest evil, another principle opposed to God would be found, which is what the Manichaeans say, speaking evilly; for it is absurd that God should not comprehend all things and should not shine his goodness on all. So there is no greatest evil.” If there is no greatest evil among human beings, how did you accuse the Manichaeans of speaking evilly? For if the Manichaeans speak evilly what they say, then clearly what they say is evil; for whoever speaks evilly speaks what is evil. And the evil according to the Manichaeans is such that there is none greater. But if this is true, then truly there is an evil among human beings, if not according to essence, yet in supposition and doctrine.

[4] “For,” he says, “ignorance is often given to human beings for their good; we see at any rate in many cases that people more often despise what they know than what they do not know. Besides, the soul suffers ignorance of the one who truly is, God, from nothing else but its own forgetfulness; and knowledge of God comes to souls here as well, just as we see human beings here who know God. Indeed, if one wishes to speak the truth, there is no ignorance at all about God; for all agree, by a common notion, that God exists. That human beings can know God even while they are here, the faith of the orthodox also shows clearly, when it says that God himself came down and was known to human beings.” He said that ignorance is often given to human beings for their good. But if he means ignorance of God, which is what our argument is about, it is plainly absurd to say that ignorance of God is given for their good to those who are ignorant. For by this argument all the religions that are ignorant of God will be ignorant of God for their own good, while the religion that knows God is not for its own good. And if he means another ignorance, about which we had not set out to speak, the citation is out of place, offering the ignorance not under inquiry in place of the one under inquiry. He said that the soul suffers ignorance of God from its own forgetfulness; he said that knowledge of God comes to souls even here; he said that we see people even here who know God; he said that there is no ignorance at all about God, for all agree by a common notion that God exists; he said that human beings can know God even here; and as proof of this he cited the faith of the orthodox, which says that God himself came down and was known to human beings. But if it is true that the soul suffers ignorance of God through its own forgetfulness, then clearly it is false that “there is no ignorance at all about God, for all agree by a common notion that God exists.” And what need was there for knowledge of God to come to souls here, if all know God and agree by a common notion? And when he says, “We see human beings here as well who know God,” which human beings does he mean? If he means those who have known God, who came down and was made known to them according to the faith of the orthodox, the statement is true; for we see them. But how can one who used the presence of God among human beings as proof that human beings can know God even here himself disbelieve what he himself said about the re-creation of the world? For a proof that is not believed does not make credible the thing it is put forward to show. And if he does not mean those who have known God here from the teaching of the God who came down, the statement that says, “We see human beings here who have known God,” is false; for I do not see them. And if there was no ignorance at all about God, “for all agree by a common notion,” what knowledge of God has come to human beings here, except the specific knowledge by which all the religions on earth … the one honoring the true teaching, while the religions differ from one another not simply by falsehood but by the differences of their falsehood? But if this is so, then according to the answerer's argument it is not knowledge of God that comes to souls here but rather ignorance, if indeed the religions differ from one another not by the general knowledge of God that is in them, but rather by the specific knowledge here.

[5] “If, then, it is possible for human beings to know God even while they are here, no greatest evil befalls them from being here. For those who are ignorant, as has been said, are ignorant of God because of their own unbelieving nature.” The answerer wove together two statements that destroy each other and set them in his answer: “If it is possible for human beings to know God while they are here, no greatest evil befalls them,” and, “Those who are ignorant are ignorant of God because of their own unbelieving nature.” The greatest evil that he threw out by the first statement he brought in by the second, if the greatest evil is to act impiously toward the one who truly is God with a double impiety: to deprive him of the glory that is his by essence, and to honor falsely with his glory those who are not gods. This leaves no excess of evil untouched. And to say that because it is possible for human beings here to know God no greatest evil befalls them is not the removal of the greatest evil but its increase. For even where it is possible, human beings are made powerless by their own voluntary unbelief; and though they could practice the simple piety that saves human beings, they prefer the double impiety to it. Not to call this the greatest evil is the most absurd of all things.

[6] “And if one should concede, absurd as it is, that the things here are the greatest evil, and that it would be better for the things here not to exist than to exist: if he says that the Creator made the things here evil through weakness, he is foolish, for he is saying that God's power does not comprehend all things. But if, being able, … to do evil, this too is an accusation against God. For one who is able to stop something and looks on is more truly its doer himself.” If, according to what was said above, those who are ignorant of God are ignorant of God from their own unbelieving nature, which is an acknowledged greatest evil, how does the answerer now concede this by way of an absurd concession? And if it is not this, but he concedes another greatest evil by the absurd concession, that greatest evil is not ours but the Manichaeans'. For according to us all the things here are good, since they have the greatest of goods as their Creator; and there is no greatest evil in them according to essence, nor according to the activity of what is according to essence, but only according to the voluntary choice of human beings, which prefers falsehood to truth, by the double impiety already mentioned. To correct this, the Creator and God of the world has appointed the day on which he will make an end of all the evils in the world that come from unbelief and disobedience toward God, according to the faith of the orthodox who have come to know God here, and according to the answerer's own testimony. So the answerer, whose argument concerned the greatest evil according to us, ought not to have turned to the one according to the Manichaeans … this is a sign also of the refutation of the difficulty, as has been said. He permits us to do the evils that we voluntarily choose, not through weakness of his power, but so that our free will and his long-suffering may be shown; without these, neither could we be human beings nor could he be good, in the present state of things.

[7] “And if the God who made the things here is the same God, clearly, since the same God remains, the same things will be later and always. For what he could do of old he can do now; and if now he can do something more than before, his power will be temporal, which is absurd; for what is temporal is perishable.” Of whomever “having made” is said, “has made” and “will make” are said as well; and they can be substituted for one another without hindrance, as having the same force. But “having made” precedes “will make” by natural necessity, and these signify the two extremes of time. Whoever has the two extremes of time, that is, the past and the future, must also have what lies between the extremes of time, that is, the present. And since “having made” has a temporal sense, then necessarily God too, having made the things here, according to the answerer's own expression, made them in time. But God, having made the things here, made both the imperishable and the perishable, for these are parts of the things here. Hence clearly the answerer reasonably applied “having made” to God, but unreasonably distinguished the perishable from the imperishable by what is temporal, since by the word “having made” they are not distinguished from one another, if indeed he made both the perishable and the imperishable. If, then, whoever says of God “he will make” is speaking of the re-creation as the acquisition of a temporal power, then whoever says of him “having made” will also be speaking of the acquisition of a temporal power, since “having made” everywhere precedes “will make.” But if, having made, he did not make by acquiring a temporal power, neither will he make by acquiring a temporal power.

[8] “And if, though he was able of old to prevent this greatest evil, he did not prevent it, he would be envious, which it is impious even to imagine. So he, being the same and remaining in the same state, must do the same things.” That because of ignorance of God human beings act impiously in many ways, if they are ignorant of the one who truly is God, we have shown above. For either they set God aside, depriving him of his own glory, and falsely honor those who are not gods with his names and attributes; or they suppose the making and the providence of the world to belong to makers who fight one another; or they give the parts of the world the name “unbegotten,” which befits only God the Creator of the world, and, though the parts do not create, they toss at God the name of Creator; to pass over the other kinds of greatest evils among human beings, which carry an impiety equal to or greater than the impiety of those who imagine God to be envious. But if these and such things are the greatest evils among human beings, and the answerer disbelieves the re-creation preached by the Christians, in which all evils among human beings, in soul and in body, are done away with, how, according to him, is God not envious, who, though able to prevent the greatest evils among human beings, does not prevent them, but makes those who act impiously toward him and toward one another remain always in the same state? And for what reason does the answerer disbelieve the re-creation of the world? Because of the inability of the maker, or because the work would be unfitting? If because of the inability of the maker, then God is not a maker at all; for of the things whose remaking God does not have the power for, neither does he have the power for their making, since these follow one another and stand or fall together. But if because the work would be unfitting, then the better work is not fitting for him; which is absurd, to say that it is fitting for him to make perishable human beings but not fitting for him to make imperishable ones.