Against Marcion 2.13

But when evil afterwards broke out, and from then on God's goodness began to deal with an adversary, that same justice of God took on another task as well: to direct goodness now in view of the opposition. So, setting aside the freedom by which God is good even unasked, goodness is weighed out according to each one's merits: offered to the worthy, refused to the unworthy, taken away from the ungrateful, and likewise avenged against all its rivals. So this whole work of justice is a management of goodness: in that it condemns by judging, punishes by condemning, and, as you put it, rages, it serves good, surely, not evil. In short, the fear of judgment contributes to good, not to evil. For it was not enough for the good to be commended by itself, now that it was labouring under an adversary. For even if it was commendable by itself, it was not also preservable, being now open to attack by the adversary, unless some power of fear presided, to compel even the unwilling to seek and guard the good. Otherwise, with so many allurements of evil attacking the good, who would seek what he could despise with impunity? Who would guard what he could lose without danger? You have read that the way of evil is broad and far more crowded: would not all slide into it, if nothing were feared on it? We shudder at the Creator's terrible threats, and even so are scarcely torn away from evil. What if he threatened nothing?

Will you call this justice evil, which does not favour evil? Will you deny that it is good, when it provides for the good? What sort of god would you want? What sort would suit the wicked? Under whom would sins rejoice? Whom would the devil mock? Would you judge that god good who could make man worse by making sin safe? Who is the author of good, except one who also requires it? Likewise, who is a stranger to evil, except one who is also its enemy? Who is its enemy, except one who also fights it? Who fights it, except one who also punishes it? So God is wholly good, since he is everything on behalf of the good. So, in short, he is almighty, because he is powerful both to help and to harm. Merely to do good is less, because such a one can do nothing but do good. With what confidence should I hope for good from such a one, if this is all he can do? How should I pursue the reward of innocence, if I do not also keep in view the penalty of guilt? I must distrust him, lest he who was not able to do both should reward neither side. So far is justice the very fullness of divinity, displaying God as perfect, both Father and Lord: Father in clemency, Lord in discipline; Father in gentle power, Lord in severe; Father to be loved dutifully, Lord to be feared necessarily; to be loved because he prefers mercy to sacrifice, to be feared because he does not want sin; to be loved because he prefers the sinner's repentance to his death, to be feared because he does not want sinners who still do not repent. Therefore the law lays down both: “You shall love God,” and “You shall fear God.” The one it set before the obedient, the other before the one who strays.