On the Generation of the Divine Word (to Candidus)
The whole work on one page. Select a passage number to open that passage with its notes, Scripture references, and citation.
Chapter 1
1PL 8:1020c
Magnam tuam intelligentiam quis fascinavit, o generose Candide? De Deo dicere, supra hominem audacia est. Sed quoniam inditus est animae nostrae νοΰ; ηθικός, et spiritus desuper missus ad figurationes intelligentiarum inscriptas ex aeterno in anima nostra: movet ineffabiles res ad investigabilia mysteria Dei voluntatum atque operationum, quasi mentis elatio animae nostrae. Vult enim videre, et etiam nunc in tali sita corpore, quod difficile est intelligere solum, edicere autem impossibile. Dicit enim beatus Paulus: O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et cognoscentiae Dei, quomodo ininvestigabilia sunt judicia Dei, et sine vestigiis ejus viae! Dicit etiam Esaias: Quis cognovit mentem Domini, aut quis fuit ejus consiliator? Vides igitur quanti constat cognitio de Deo. Sed quoniam de divina generatione scribis tam audenter: et nos tibi primo quidem de scripturis ostendemus, filii Domini Jesu Christi generationem aeternam. An scripturas quas legimus, vanas opinaris? Si ut nomine, sic et re Christianus est quispiam; necesse habet venerari scripturas, inclamantes Dominum Jesum Christum. Si igitur necesse tibi est scripturas recipere; est et necessarium ea quae in ipsis de Christo dicuntur, sic quemadmodum dicuntur, accipias et credas. Dicunt autem Jesum Christum Filium Dei esse unigenitum, ut dicit David propheta: Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te. Et Paulus Apostolus: Quia ipse proprio suo filio non pepercit. Et rursus: Benedictus Deus et pater Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Deinde et ipse Jesus Christus frequenter dicit: Ego et pater unum sumus. Et: Qui videt me, videt et patrem meum. Et: Ego in patre, et pater in me est. Haec dicens Deus fuit, si mentitus non est: si autem mentitus est, non opus Dei omnimodis perfectum. Saepe et multi et millies dicunt ista: an tibi non apparet dici haec ita ubique?
Who has bewitched your great intelligence, noble Candidus? To speak of God is a daring beyond man. But since a paternal intellect has been placed in our soul, and a spirit sent from above to the figures of understanding inscribed from eternity in our soul, it moves ineffable things toward the unsearchable mysteries of God's acts of will and operations, like an uplifting of the mind of our soul. For it wishes to see, even now while it is set in such a body, what is difficult even to understand, and impossible to express. For blessed Paul says: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are the judgments of God, and his ways without trace!” Isaiah also says: “Who has known the mind of the Lord, or who was his counsellor?” You see, then, how costly is the knowledge of God. But since you write so boldly about the divine generation, we too shall first show you from the Scriptures the eternal generation of the Son, the Lord Jesus Christ. Or do you think the Scriptures we read are empty? If someone is a Christian in fact as in name, he must revere the Scriptures, which cry out the Lord Jesus Christ. If, then, you must accept the Scriptures, you must also accept and believe what is said in them about Christ, just as it is said. And they say that Jesus Christ is the only-begotten Son of God, as the prophet David says: “You are my Son; today I have begotten you.” And the apostle Paul: “For he did not spare his own Son.” And again: “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Then Jesus Christ himself frequently says: “I and the Father are one”; and: “He who sees me sees my Father also”; and: “I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.” In saying this he was God, if he did not lie; and if he lied, he is not a work of God perfect in every way. Many say these things, often and a thousand times: or does it not appear to you that they are said in this way everywhere?
Chapter 2
2PL 8:1020c–1021b
Audi de nobis aliud. Nos dicimus esse nobis patrem Deum, et eum quam maxime. Quae causa, et juxta quid? Quoniam, inquam, charitate praedestinavit nos in adoptionem per Christum. Numquid et Christum per adoptionem filium Deus habet, Nullus id ausus est dicere: fortasse nec tu. Videsne, qualis blasphemia ex hoc dicto nascatur? Dicimus esse nos haeredes Deo patri, et per Christum haeredes, per adoptionem existentes filii: et Christum esse verum filium, per quem nobis efficitur esse filios et cohaeredes esse in ipso Christo. Multa dixisti de Christo et vera, et ut se habent: quoniam potentia Dei est, et omnipotens, et universus λόγος, et omnis operatio, et omnis vita et alia plurima. Assecutus ergo est hujusmodi bona, effectus ex iis quae non sunt? Et beatum est, quod non est ex eo quod vere est? Qui sic concipit intellectus, sine Deo est, sacrilegus et plenus blasphemiae. Dominus ipse est super omnia quae sunt, omniaque quae non sunt. Et ipse igitur cum, ut dicis, sit factus ex iis quae non sunt, poterit ipse facere omnia quae sunt ex iis quae non sunt? Attamen Deum, id quod sit et semper sit, non quod aliquando non fuerit, credimus esse. Praestat igitur quod est, et praestat per ineffabilem generationem, et praestat exsistentiam, νούν, vitam: non qui sit ista, sed super ista et semper omnia. Si igitur Deus non est quod non est, est autem supra id quod est, vere wv, potentia ipsius τού οντος, quae operatione in generationem excitata, ineloquibili motu genuit τον όντα, omnibus modis perfectum, a toto potentiae totum. Deus ergo est totum π/ώον: Jesus autem ipsum hoc totum ov, sed jam in existentia et vita et intelligentia, universale omnimodis tAsov ov. Hic est finis, hic principium, hic filius, hic πάς λόγος, hic qui apud Deum et in Deo λόγος, hic Jesus Christus, ante omnia quae sunt, et quae vere sunt; prima et omnis existentia, prima et omnis intelligentia, primum et omnimodis tslsov ov, ipsum primum ov, nomen ante omnia nomina; ab ipso enim omnia nomina, sicut declarabitur.
Hear something else, about ourselves. We say that God is our Father, and that most of all. For what reason, and in what respect? Because, I say, in love he predestined us to adoption through Christ. Does God, then, also have Christ as a Son by adoption? No one has dared to say that; perhaps not even you. Do you see what blasphemy is born from this saying? We say that we are heirs of God the Father, heirs through Christ, being sons by adoption; and that Christ is the true Son, through whom it comes about that we are sons and co-heirs in Christ himself. You have said many things about Christ that are true and as they are: that he is the power of God, and omnipotent, and the universal Word, and all operation, and all life, and very many other things. Did he, then, attain such goods, having been made from things that are not? And is that blessed which is not from that which truly is? An understanding that conceives in this way is without God, sacrilegious and full of blasphemy. The Lord himself is above all things that are and all things that are not. And if he, as you say, was made from things that are not, could he himself make all the things that are from things that are not? Yet we believe that God is that which is and always is, not something that at some time was not. He provides, then, that which is, and provides it by an ineffable generation; and he provides existence, intellect, life: not as one who is these things, but as above these and always all things. If, then, God is not that which is not, but is above that which is, truly being, the power of that which is, which, roused by operation into generation, begot by an unspeakable motion the One who is, perfect in every way, whole from the whole of power: God, then, is the whole pre-existent, and Jesus is this whole existent itself, but now in existence and life and understanding, the universal existent, perfect in every way. He is the end, he the beginning, he the Son, he the whole Word, he the Word who is with God and in God, he Jesus Christ, before all things that are and that truly are; the first and whole existence, the first and whole understanding, the first existent, perfect in every way, the first existent itself, the name before all names; for from him are all names, as will be shown.
Chapter 3
3PL 8:1021b–1021c
Volo autem audire, o mi dulcissime Candide, quid esse aestimas, quod non est. Si enim Deus omnium causa est, et ejus cui est esse, et ejus cui non est esse, causa est Deus. Sed si causa, non est id quod non est. Causa enim ut ov est: quippe unde et a qua sit id, cui futurum est ov. Et hoc ipso, causa vere super ov. Quod igitur nondum ov, id est, quod non est; ad hoc, ov causa est. Ideo πρόον dicitur: et juxta istam rationem causa est Deus, et eorum quae sunt, et eorum quae non sunt.
But I want to hear, my sweetest Candidus, what you think “that which is not” is. For if God is the cause of all things, God is the cause both of that to which being belongs and of that to which being does not belong. But if he is cause, he is not that which is not. For a cause is as an existent: that from which and by which there is that which is to be an existent. And by this very fact the cause is truly above the existent. For what is not yet existent, that is, what is not, the existent is the cause. Therefore he is called pre-existent; and by this reasoning God is the cause both of the things that are and of the things that are not.
Chapter 4
4PL 8:1021c–1022a
Definiendum est ergo id quod non est: quod quidem intelligitur et vocatur quatuor modis: juxta negationem omnino omnimodis, ut privatio sit existentis: juxta alterius naturam ad alterius naturam, ut hoc non est illud: juxta nondum esse, quod futurum est et potest esse: juxta id quod super omnia quae sunt, habet est; ut quia non est aliquid istorum, nec convenit cum aliquo eorum. Quid igitur dicimus Deum? το ον, η το μη ov? Sed utique ipsum appellamus ov: quoniam eorum quae sunt, pater est. Sed pater eorum quae sunt, non est το ov, si nondum sunt ea quorum pater est. Hoc non licet dicere, hoc nefas est intelligere, eorum quae sunt, μη ov causam appellare. Causa enim prior est ab iis quorum causa est. Supremum ov igitur Deus est; et juxta quod supremum est, fui ov Deus dicitur: non per privationem universi ejus quod sit, sed ut aliud ov ipsum, quod est μη Sv: juxta ea quae futura sunt, τό μη όν: juxta quod causa est ad generationem eorum quae sunt, το ov.
We must, then, define that which is not. It is understood and named in four ways: by negation, absolutely and in every way, so that it is the privation of the existent; by the nature of one thing relative to the nature of another, so that this is not that; by not yet being, what is to come and can be; and by being above all things that are, so that it is not any of them and does not agree with any of them. What, then, do we call God: that which is, or that which is not? Certainly we call him that which is, since he is the Father of the things that are. But the Father of the things that are is not that which is, if the things of which he is Father are not yet. It is not permitted to say this, it is impious to think it: to call the cause of the things that are a non-existent. For the cause is prior to the things of which it is the cause. God, then, is the supreme existent; and inasmuch as he is supreme, God is called that which is: not by privation of everything that is, but as an existent other than these, which is non-existent: in respect of the things that are to come, non-existent; in respect of being the cause of the generation of the things that are, that which is.
Chapter 5
5PL 8:1022b–1022c
Verum est igitur dicere Deum patrem τού ov, juxta causam eorum quae sunt, et eorum quae non sunt. Voluntate igitur Dei in generationem veniunt et quae sunt, et quae non sunt. Et non aestimes quae non sunt, quasi per privationem eorum quae sunt. Nihil enim istorum neque existit, neque intelligitur. Si enim mundus et omnia superna subsistunt, omnia et sunt. Nullum enim p) ov, juxta privationem; sed subintelligentia quaedam est, ab iis quae sunt, privationem eorum subintelligere, non subsistentis, ne ipsius quidem subintelligentiae, nec sic existentis, ut eorum quae sunt. Quaedam vero quae non sunt, quodammodo sunt, ut ipsa quae nunc quidem sunt: quae post generationem et sunt et dicuntur, et ante generationem aut in potentia sua aut in idea fuerunt. Sed unde vel ex quo generata sunt? Secundum illos modos scilicet; juxta alterius naturam, et juxta id quod nondum est, quod futurum est, et potest esse.
It is true, then, to say that God is the Father of that which is, as the cause of the things that are and of the things that are not. By God's will, then, both the things that are and the things that are not come into generation. And do not suppose that the things that are not are so by privation of the things that are. For none of those either exists or is understood. For if the world and all things above it subsist, all things also are. For there is no non-existent by privation; but it is a kind of inferred understanding, from the things that are, to infer their privation, which does not subsist, not even as an inferred understanding, nor exists in the way the things that are exist. But certain things that are not are in a certain way, like the very things that now are: these, after their generation, both are and are called existent, and before their generation were either in their own power or in idea. But whence, or from what, were they generated? According to those modes, namely: by the nature of one thing relative to another, and by what is not yet, what is to come and can be.
Chapter 6
6PL 8:1022c–1023a
Primo ergo Deus et super quae sunt est, et super quae non sunt: quippe generator ipsorum et pater, juxta quod causa est. Deinde secundum generationem a Deo aut secundum effectionem, quae sunt apparuerunt. Apparuerunt autem et μή όντα. Ipsorum autem quae sunt, alia sunt vere quae sunt, alia quae sunt, alia quae non vere non sunt, alia quae non sunt. At illa quae vere non sunt, non recipit in esse plenitudo Dei. Juxta enim id quod est esse, et id quod est aliquo modo esse, plenitudo Dei. Plenitudo enim est τή μόνη ίμψάσει existente in intelligentia eorum quae vere non sunt: quae juxta subjectionem, ab his quae non vere quidem sunt. Quodam tamen modo νους cuncta incipiens, imaginata est circa id quod vere non est.
First, then, God is above both the things that are and the things that are not, as their generator and Father, inasmuch as he is cause. Next, according to generation from God or according to making, the things that are appeared; and the things that are not appeared too. Of the things that are, some are the things that truly are, some the things that are, some the things that are not truly not, some the things that are not. But the things that truly are not, the fullness of God does not admit into being. For the fullness of God is according to what is being and what is being in some way. For the fullness is, by mere appearance, existing in the understanding of the things that truly are not, which by way of subjection are distinct from those that are not truly. Yet in some way the intellect, beginning all things, formed an image concerning that which truly is not.
Chapter 7
7PL 8:1023a–1023c
Audi quemadmodum dico. Sunt quaedam ejusmodi, quae sunt natura manifesta, sicut quae sunt et omnia supercoelestia: ut το πνεΰμα, reci 6 νους, ύ ψυχή, το νόημα, η παιδεία, v αρετΊι, 6 λόγος, opinio, perfectio, sententia, vita, intelligentia: et adhuc superius, existentialitas, vitalitas, intelligentitas: et adhuc super omnia ista, δν μόνον: et istud δ εστι εν μόνον δν. In ista si ημών νους recte ingreditur, comprehendit ista et ab his formatur: et stat intelligentia, jam non in confusione inquisitionis existens. Sed quoniam intelligentia talis de altero est, comprehensio et definitio quaedam efficitur. Alia δντα solum δντα esse intelligimus: quoniam in eo quod quidquid tale est, alterius est et aliud, ut intellectuale ad intellectibile. Ergo intellectibilia sunt ea quae vere sunt: alia quae tantum sunt, intellectualia. Sunt autem ista omnia, animarum in natura intellectualium, nondum intellectum habentium; quae sunt, sed ad intelligentiam accommodata. Excitatus enim in anima δ νους, intellectualem potentiam animae illustrat et illuminat, et intellectuat ac figurat: et innascitur animae intelligentia atque perfectio. Idcirco et substantia dicitur anima, quoniam omnis substantia subjectum est. Subjectum autem alteri alicui subjacet: subjacet autem anima τω voce, et ττνεύματι αγίω ή υπαρξις τής ψυχής. Substantia igitur anima.
Hear how I mean it. There are certain things of such a kind, manifest by nature, such as the things that are and all things above the heavens: the spirit, the intellect, the soul, thought, instruction, virtue, the word, opinion, perfection, judgment, life, understanding; and higher still, existentiality, vitality, intellectuality; and still above all these, being alone, and that which is one, being alone. If our intellect enters rightly into these, it grasps them and is formed by them; and understanding stands still, no longer in the confusion of inquiry. But since such understanding is of something else, a kind of comprehension and definition is brought about. Others we understand to be only existents: since whatever is such is of another and is another, as the intellectual is in relation to the intelligible. The intelligibles, then, are the things that truly are; the others, which only are, are intellectual beings. All these belong to souls that are intellectual in nature but do not yet have intellect: they are, but are fitted for understanding. For the intellect, roused in the soul, lights up and illumines the soul's intellectual power, makes it understand and shapes it; and understanding and perfection are born in the soul. Therefore the soul is also called substance, since every substance is a subject. A subject underlies something else; and the existence of the soul underlies the intellect and the Holy Spirit. The soul, then, is substance.
Chapter 8
8PL 8:1023c–1024b
Omnia ergo quae animae, sunt, solum όντα sunt, non quae vere sunt. Anima igitur comprehendit quae vere sunt: quoniam si ingreditur νους in animam intellectualem, comprehendit item et δντα όάηθώς: intelligit enim anima quoniam anima est: et sic ab iis ά αληθώς όντα εΐσί, intelligentia efficitur eorum quae sunt. At vero alia quae non vere non sunt, et quae non sunt, ab istis intelligentiam sumunt per conversionem intelligentiae του δντος. Etenim non intelligitur τδ μή ov secundum quod non ens: sed juxta τδ δν intelligitur τδ μή δν. Accipitur ergo τό μή δν, quasi quaedam exterminatio τοΰ δντος. Exterminatio autem infiguratum quoddam est, et non est ut ov. Omne enim τδ δν in existentia vel qualitate figuratum et vultuatum est. Infiguratum autem, quoddam aliquid est: ideo τδ μή δν aliquid quodammodo est. Sunt ergo τα μη δντα: et ideo etiam sunt quae vere non sunt: et potiora sunt ad id quod est esse, ea quae non vere non sunt, quam quae μη οντα sunt. Propter quod efficitur τών οντων quidam naturalis ordo τον όντος, τα δντα.
All things, then, that belong to the soul are only existents, not things that truly are. The soul, then, grasps the things that truly are: for if intellect enters the intellectual soul, it grasps also the things that truly are; for the soul understands, since it is soul; and so from the things that truly are there comes about the understanding of the things that are. But the others, the things that are not truly not and the things that are not, take their understanding from these by a turning of the understanding of that which is. For non-being is not understood as non-being; non-being is understood by reference to being. Non-being, then, is taken as a kind of removal beyond the bounds of being. And such a removal is something unshaped, and is not as an existent; for every existent is shaped and given a face in existence or quality. But the unshaped is something; so non-being is in a certain way something. The things that are not, then, are; and so the things that truly are not also are; and the things that are not truly not are nearer to being than the things that are not. Because of this there comes about, from that which is, a certain natural order of the things that are.
Chapter 9
9PL 8:1024b–1025a
Diximus ergo quae sunt, et etiam quae vere sunt. Dicamus nunc quae sint quae vere non sunt, et quae sint quae non sunt. Intelligibilis et intellectualis cum sit Dei essentia et potentia, juxta intelligentiam apparuerunt cuncta quae sunt. Sed intelligentia dupliciter operatur: sua propria potentia intellectuali, et juxta limitationem intelligendi, etiam sensu. Rursus autem sensus, simulacrum cum sit intellecti et limitamentum intelligendi, si perfecte percipit operationem intelligentiae quae illum fortificat in operari atque agere, efficitur sensus propinquus atque vicinus purae intelligentiae. Et ista est quae coelestia comprehendit, et ea quae in aethere, et ea quae in natura et ea quae in ύλΐΐ gignuntur et regignuntur, et alia hujusmodi quorum est potentia in sensuali intelligentia: et est illud esse quodammodo esse et non esse. Coelum etenim, et omnia in eo, et universus mundus ex uty consistens et specie, in commixtione est: ergo non est simpliciter. Hujus ergo mundi quae partes sunt, participantes animae intellectualis potentiae et naturae, sunt in natura eorum quae non vere non sunt. Utuntur enim intelligentia, sed juxta sensum intelligentia, et sunt juxta sensum versibilia et mutabilia, juxta vero intelligentiam inversibilia et immutabilia. Quomodo autem sensus istud apprehendit? Sed non apprehendit nisi qualitates; substantiam autem, id est subjectum, nec percipit nec apprehendit: versibiles enim sunt qualitates; substantia vero inversibilis. Cum autem anima sit substantia, tamen est versibilis. Quomodo istud? Sic habeto.
We have spoken, then, of the things that are and also of the things that truly are. Let us now say which are the things that are not truly not, and which are the things that are not. Since the essence and power of God are intelligible and intellectual, all the things that are appeared according to understanding. But understanding operates in two ways: by its own intellectual power, and, at the limit of understanding, also by sense. Again, sense, since it is an image of what is understood and the limit of understanding, becomes close and neighbour to pure understanding if it perceives perfectly the operation of understanding which strengthens it to operate and act. And it is this that grasps the heavenly things, and those in the ether, and those that are generated and regenerated in nature and in matter, and others of this kind whose power lies in sensory understanding; and that being is in a certain way being and not being. For the heaven and all that is in it, and the whole world, consisting of matter and form, is in mixture; so it is not simply. The parts of this world, then, sharing in the power and nature of the intellectual soul, are in the nature of the things that are not truly not. For they use understanding, but understanding according to sense; and according to sense they are alterable and changeable, but according to understanding unalterable and unchangeable. How does sense grasp this? It grasps nothing but qualities; substance, that is, the subject, it neither perceives nor grasps; for qualities are alterable, but substance is unalterable. Yet although the soul is substance, it is alterable. How is this? Take it as follows.
Chapter 10
10PL 8:1025a–1026b
Cum suscipit anima et intelligit quae sunt in mundo, si illa intelligit quae sunt animalia et animata; in eo quod est habere animam, sunt quae non vere non sunt. Quodam enim modo μη οντα, juxta quod animam habent: quodam modo μη δντα juxta id quod conversibilem ύλην habent et qualitates versibiles: et sunt haec quae diximus μή όντως μή οντα. Cum autem intelligimus sub anima ύλην (in anima dico ύλην, quidquid sine intellectuali anima est, circumlato sensu) ipsa comprehendit circa qualitates quasi μη δντα quae sunt: sunt enim versibiles qualitates; et juxta hoc, μή οντα. Etenim ipsum subjectum quae ύλη dicitur, indeterminatum est; et ideo sine qualitate dicitur. Si autem determinatur, qualitas dicitur, et non qualis ύλη. Sed sunt primae qualitates in corporibus primis, igne, aere, aqua, terra: quae sunt, sed per se, sine commixtione vel alicujus unione. Si enim ista, qualitates; et ista, ύλη: qualitates igitur ύλη. Non enim ut accidens accidit τη ύλη; sed ipsa est qualitas: non potest enim esse qualitas, ipsa per semet, sed eo quod est; hoc ipso ύλη est. Et semper quidem ύλικη cum sit, nihil aliud quam ύλη est. Sicut et anima, juxta quod intellectualis est, anima est; et juxta quod semper movetur et a se movetur, non secundum duplicationem neque secundum accidens, ista anima est, sed quod istae qualitates, substantia est anima. Sic etiam ύλη ipsa qualitas, ipsa substantia ύλη. Differt autem anima ab ύλη. Dicunt enim quidam, quod anima ύλη est; quod subjectum et qualitas eadem sit substantia, eademque sit substantia et anima et ύλη. Sed differt, ut dixi: quoniam anima intellectualis cum sit, intelligit semetipsam. At vero ύλη omnimodis intelligens cum sit, neque intelligentiam neque sensum in sensu ullum habet. Et idcirco anima ea est quae sunt: cum ipsa sola et pura est, ex iis est quae sunt: mixta vero Tyi ύλη, ex iis est quae non vere non sunt. Sola autem η ύλη omnium quae non sunt nutrix est. Anima vero et η ύλη, omnium nutrix est, sed anima, propria virtute omnium nutrix est et vitae generatrix: η ύλη vero sine anima, effeta et densa facta, in aeternum manet, animationem ab anima habens. Sunt igitur et dicuntur ista, μη δντα. De iis ergo quae non sunt, ita se habet.
When the soul takes up and understands the things that are in the world, if it understands those that are living beings and animate, then in that they have soul they are things that are not truly not. For in one way they are non-existents, in that they have soul; in another way non-existents, in that they have changeable matter and alterable qualities; and these are what we have called the things that are not truly non-existent. But when we understand matter beneath soul (by matter in soul I mean whatever is without intellectual soul, sense being taken away), the soul grasps, concerning qualities, the things that are as non-existents; for qualities are alterable, and in this respect non-existent. For the subject itself, which is called matter, is indeterminate, and therefore it is called without quality. But if it is determined, it is called quality, and not qualified matter. But the first qualities are in the first bodies, fire, air, water, earth, which are, but by themselves, without mixture or union with anything. For if these are qualities, and these are matter, then qualities are matter. For quality does not befall matter as an accident; matter itself is quality. For quality cannot be by itself, but by what it is; by this very fact it is matter. And since it is always material, it is nothing other than matter. Just so, soul is soul inasmuch as it is intellectual; and inasmuch as it is always moved and moved by itself, not by duplication nor by accident, these things are soul, but in that these are qualities, the soul is substance. So too matter itself is quality, matter itself substance. But soul differs from matter. For some say that soul is matter, that subject and quality are the same substance, and that soul and matter are the same substance. But it differs, as I said, because the soul, being intellectual, understands itself; whereas matter, being in every way without understanding, has neither understanding nor any perception in sensation. And therefore the soul is among the things that are: when it is alone and pure, it is of the things that are; but mixed with matter, it is of the things that are not truly not. Matter alone is the nurse of all the things that are not. Soul and matter together are the nurse of all things; but the soul by its own power is the nurse of all things and the begetter of life, while matter without soul, exhausted and made dense, remains for ever, having its animation from the soul. These, then, both are and are called non-existents. This, then, is how it stands with the things that are not.
Chapter 11
11PL 8:1026b–1026c
Habes igitur quatuor: quae vere sunt, quae sunt, quae non vere non sunt, quae non sunt. Per conversionem autem et complexionem horum nominum, adhuc duo modi subaudiuntur: quae non vere sunt, et vere quae non sunt. Sedenim ea quae non vere sunt, ea tantum quae sunt significant: solum enim sunt, quae non vere sunt. At vero quae vere non sunt, ad id ut sint, locum non habent. Deo enim plenis omnibus, nefas et impossibile, quae vere non sint, et dici et esse: quae intelligentia sola, sicut declaravimus, differunt, non ab iis quae non sunt, sed ab iis quae sunt secundum privationem adnascuntur in anima, neque in sua substantia, neque in intelligentia positis quae vero non sunt.
You have, then, four: the things that truly are, the things that are, the things that are not truly not, and the things that are not. By turning and combining these names, two further modes are understood: the things that are not truly, and the things that truly are not. But the things that are not truly signify only the things that are: for these only are, which are not truly. But the things that truly are not have no place in which to be. For since all things are full of God, it is impious and impossible that things which truly are not should either be said or be. As we have shown, these differ by understanding alone, not from the things that are not, but from the things that are; they arise in the soul by privation, the things that truly are not being placed neither in their own substance nor in understanding.
Chapter 12
12PL 8:1026c–1027a
Eamus igitur ad videndum, quid sit Deus, et in quibus est. Quae vere prima et honoratiora sunt, numquid in ipsis Deus? Sed et his causa est, et ipsorum dator et pater. Nec est dicere, ipsum esse haec, quibus ipse dedit ut essent. Cum enim unus et solus sit, assimilata esse voluit; et non ipsa illum unum: sed illud quod est unum esse, hoc voluit ipsa multa esse. Forsitan dices, o Candide, Meus hic sermo est: et secundum istam rationem dico, ex iis quae non sunt, natum esse Filium Dei, secundum electionem, non secundum generationem. Sed μη δντα quae esse diximus? numquid ea quae omnino non sunt? Sed jam in confesso est, quod non: etiam in confesso est, quod quae non sunt, juxta modos dicuntur quatuor: ex quibus duo juxta nihilum omnino, et juxta super omnia: alii vero juxta alterius naturam, et juxta quod nondum est; et tamen est potentia ad esse, et nondum actione esse.
Let us go on, then, to see what God is and in what things he is. Is God among the things that are truly first and most honoured? But he is the cause of these too, and their giver and Father. Nor can it be said that he himself is these things, to which he gave their being. For since he is one and alone, he willed them to be made like him; not that they should be that one, but that which is to be one, this he willed to be many. Perhaps you will say, Candidus: “This is my argument, and by this reasoning I say that the Son of God was born from things that are not, by election, not by generation.” But the non-existents that we said are: are they things that are not at all? It is already agreed that they are not; it is also agreed that the things that are not are spoken of in four modes, of which two are by absolute nothingness and by being above all things, and the others by the nature of another and by what is not yet, which is nonetheless power toward being, though not yet being in act.
Chapter 13
13PL 8:1027a–1027b
Quid igitur Deus, si ne unum quidem est neque quae vere sunt, neque quae sunt, neque quae non vere non sunt, neque quae non sunt? Ista enim praestat Deus ut causa, istis omnibus. Eorum autem quae vere non sunt, Deum esse, nefas est suspicari. Necessario enim Deum per praelationem et eminentiam των δντων dicimus, supra omnem existentiam, supra omnem vitam, supra omnem cognoscentiam, super omne ov, et πάντων δντων δντα: quippe inintelligibile, infinitum, invisibile, sine intellectu, insubstantiale, incognoscibile: et quod cum super omnia, nihil tamen de iis quae sunt: et quoniam supra quae sunt, nihil de his quae sunt: μη ov ergo Deus est.
What, then, is God, if he is not even one of the things that truly are, nor of the things that are, nor of the things that are not truly not, nor of the things that are not? For God provides these, as cause, to all of them. And it is impious to suspect that God is among the things that truly are not. Necessarily, then, we speak of God by way of preference and eminence over the existents: above all existence, above all life, above all knowledge, above every existent, and the existent of all existents; for he is unintelligible, infinite, invisible, without intellect, without substance, unknowable; and since he is above all things, he is yet nothing of the things that are; and because he is above the things that are, he is nothing of the things that are. God, then, is non-existent.
Chapter 14
14PL 8:1027b–1028b
Quid autem istud τό μη ov, super τδ ov est? quod intelligatur ut ov, neque ut μύ ov omnino: sed ut in ignoratione intelligibile, quoniam δν, et quoniam μη ov; quod sola sua potentia, το δν in manifestationem adduxit et genuit. Est autem λόγος, istud sic se habere. Quid vero Deus qui supra ov est, ab eo quod ipse est, sicut ipse est, δντα produxit? An ab alio? an a nullo? Ab alio? Sed quo alio? Nihil enim ante Deum fuit. Sed neque ex altero ut Deo, quoniam nihil ei par. A nullo? Sed quomodo? Si enim το ov produxit, verum est dicere quoniam a semetipso qui super τό ov est, τό ov generaverit potius quam de nihilo. Quod enim super τό ov primo est, absconditum δν est. Absconditi vero manifestatio, generatio est. Siquidem et potentia ov, operatione ov generat: nihil enim sine causa in generatione. Et si Deus causa est omnium, causa est et τοΰ δντος in generationem: quippe cum super τό ov sit, vicinius cum sit τω ovrt, et ut pater ejus et genitor. Etenim gravida occultum habet quod paritura est. Non enim foetus non est ante partum, sed in occulto est: et generatione pervenit in manifestationem δν operatione, quod fuit δν potentia. Et, ut quod verum est dicam, ov operatione τοΰ δντος, etenim foris operatione generat. Quid autem generat? quod fuit intus. Sed quid fuit intus in Deo? nihil aliud quam ov; verum quippe τόδν: magis autem προov, quod est ύπιράνω τοΰ παντός οντος: genus, inquam, quod est eus super emis entia, δν jam operante potentia. Hic est Jesus Christus. Dixit enim ipse: Si interrogaverit, Quis te misit? dicito, ό $v. Solum enim illud Sv semper δν, δ ών est.
But what is this non-existent which is above the existent? It is understood neither as existent nor wholly as non-existent, but as intelligible in not-knowing, both as existent and as non-existent; and by its power alone it brought the existent into manifestation and begot it. And this is the Logos: that it should be so. But did God, who is above the existent, bring forth existents from what he himself is, as he himself is? Or from something else? Or from nothing? From something else? But what else? For nothing was before God. Nor from another as God, since nothing is equal to him. From nothing? But how? For if he brought forth the existent, it is true to say that he who is above the existent begot the existent from himself rather than from nothing. For what is first above the existent is the hidden existent; and the manifestation of the hidden is generation. For the existent in power begets the existent in operation; for nothing comes into generation without a cause. And if God is the cause of all things, he is also the cause of the existent's coming into generation, since, being above the existent, he is nearest to the existent, as its father and begetter. For a pregnant woman holds hidden what she is to bear. The fetus is not non-existent before birth; it is hidden; and by birth what was existent in power comes into manifestation as existent in operation. And, to say what is true, the existent is by the operation of the existent; for it begets outwardly by operation. But what does it beget? What was within. But what was within in God? Nothing other than the existent: the true existent, or rather the pre-existent, which is high above every existent: the genus, I say, which is being above all beings, the existent with power now operating. This is Jesus Christ. For he himself said: “If he asks, Who sent you? say: He who is.” For only that existent, always existent, is He who is.
Chapter 15
15PL 8:1028b–1028c
Filius ergo Jesus Christus τά μέν δντα-, et solus natus filius: quia ille πρόων nihil aliud genuit quam ov ante omnia et omnimodis perfectum ov; quod non potest esse cum altero, et quoniam quod omnimodis perfectum est, altero non eger. Universale enim ov, et solum δ», et unum et super genus generale δν, unum est et solum ov. Quoniam vero istud δν, non illud ov est quod perfectam potentiam habet, potentia natum est illud 3v, ante omnia quae vere sunt, et quae sunt ά/>χα?α δντα, Αγών πάντα sht. Ipse est, inquam, a quo sunt omnia quae sunt, et per quem, et in quo. Hujus gratia δν quod operatione est, imago est illius του ovVor. quod potentia est, secundum nullum progressum semper in semetipso manens.
The Son, then, Jesus Christ, is the existent and the only-born Son: because that Pre-existent begot nothing other than the existent before all things, the existent perfect in every way, which cannot be with another, since what is perfect in every way has no need of another. For he is the universal existent, and the existent alone, and the one existent above the general genus; he is the one and only existent. But since this existent is not that existent which has perfect power, this existent was born from power, before all things that truly are and the things that are, the primal existents through which all things are. He is, I say, the one from whom are all things that are, and through whom, and in whom. For this reason the existent that is in operation is the image of that existent which is in power, which remains always in itself without any going forth.
Chapter 16
16PL 8:1028c–1029b
Quid deinde? Dicimus Jesum τδ δν primum, ante omnia δν, per quem omnia quae sunt. Hoc est enim nomen super omne nomen: principium enim nominum τδ δν, et principium substantiarum, sicut frequenter et in multis declaravi. Rursus Jesum Christum το 8v naturaliter circa Deum esse, et magis et in principio λόγον, et ipsum istum λόγον Deum esse dicimus. Deinde tres per κβρουχί&α Joannem, αιωνίους quae confitemur: et dicimus hoc ita se habere. Dictum est enim quod in principio sit λόγος, et ut tu dicis, non est principium quod praecedit aliud principium: sine principio enim principium, si quidem et est dicitur principium. Qui igitur in principio fuit, ex βώΰνος est, sive in Deo sive circa Deum. Erat enim circa Deum λόγος, et in principio. Ergo semper fuit. Si semper fuit, necesse eum est esse, non cum iis quae non sunt, neque factum esse. Dicit Joannes: Deum nemo vidit umquam. Rursus (Ibid.): Unigenitus Dei filius qui est in gremio patris, ipse enarravit. Habemus igitur ista eadem, quoniam Jesus Christus h est, quoniam λόγος est, quoniam in principio fuit, quoniam circa Deum fuit, quoniam in gremio fuit et est. Ipsa omnia nonne manifeste et dilucide significant, filium Dei esse cui attribuuntur ista, ov et ante omnia ov; si pater Deus, antequam est Bv, esse potentia accipitur ipsius quod ov est? Quod quidem 8v a sua potentia in suo patre exsilivit; ipsum τό ov manifestationem accipiens, quod fuisset occultum: et ista, divina et ineffabilis generatio est. Exterminandum igitur dogma est, ex iis quae non sunt, esse sive prodiisse Jesum.
What next? We say that Jesus is the first existent, existent before all, through whom are all things that are. For this is the name above every name: for the existent is the beginning of names and the beginning of substances, as I have often shown in many places. Again, we say that Jesus Christ is the existent, naturally with God, and moreover the Word in the beginning, and that this very Word is God. Then this reality is proclaimed through John the herald, and even the demons confess it; and we say that this is so. For it was said that in the beginning was the Word; and, as you say, a beginning is not something that another beginning precedes: for a beginning is without beginning, if indeed it is called a beginning. He, then, who was in the beginning is from eternity, whether in God or with God. For the Word was with God, and in the beginning. He always was, then. If he always was, he must be, not with the things that are not, nor made. John says: “No one has ever seen God.” And again: “The only-begotten Son of God, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.” We have, then, these same things: that Jesus Christ is the existent, that he is the Word, that he was in the beginning, that he was with God, that he was and is in the bosom. Do not all these manifestly and clearly signify that the Son of God, to whom they are attributed, is the existent and the existent before all things, if God the Father, before he is existent, is taken as being the power of that which is existent? That existent leapt forth from its own power in its Father, the existent itself receiving manifestation, which had been hidden; and this is the divine and ineffable generation. The doctrine, then, that Jesus is from things that are not, or came forth from them, must be banished.
Chapter 17
17PL 8:1029b–1030a
Videamus rursus aliud. λόγος est Jesus. Quid igitur est λόγος? Dico; quoniam est patrica quaedam activa potestas, et quae immota sit, et quae se ipsam constituunt, ut sit in actu, non in potentia. Si ergo istud sic est, quare, λόγος circa Deum erat? Necessario circa id ipsum, ut per αύτον λόγον omnia gignerentur, et sine ipso nihil. Operatur ergo Deus per λόγον, et semper operatur λόγος. Est ergo activa potentia immota, et quae semper operetur, et quae constituat, ut sit actione quod fuit potentia. Istum ergo dicimus, quod in principio fuit. In principio autem esse, non generatum esse significat. Et vere propterea Deus est λόγος, quoniam in principio fuit sicut Deus, et circa Deum fuit. Non genitus est λόγος, cum Deus ipse λόγος sit, sed quiescens et silens λόγος: ut videas necessitatem cognoscendi, non genitum esse λόγον multo magis quam ipsum fieri ex iis quae non sunt.
Let us look again at something else. Jesus is the Word. What, then, is the Word? I say: it is a certain paternal active power, unmoved, which constitutes itself so as to be in act, not in power. If this is so, why was the Word with God? Necessarily for this very purpose: that through the Word himself all things might be begotten, and without him nothing. God works, then, through the Word, and the Word always works. It is, then, an active power, unmoved, which always works, and which brings it about that what was in power should be in action. This one, then, we say, was in the beginning. And to be in the beginning signifies to be unbegotten. And truly the Word is God for this reason, that he was in the beginning as God, and was with God. The Word is unbegotten, since God himself is the Word, but the Word at rest and silent: so that you see the necessity of recognizing that the Word is unbegotten, much rather than that he was made from things that are not.
Chapter 18
18PL 8:1030a–1030b
Quid deinde cognoscentia nostra? quemadmodum fertur? quomodo movetur circa λόγον? Non sic λόγον videt, quasi aut propter aliud est, aut alterius est juxta quod est. Ad hoc est, ut aliud esse constituat, et omnino non aliter. Pater ergo et generator omnium λόγος, per quem omnia effecta sunt, et sine quo factum est nihil. Sed αύτοΰ του λόγου potentiam, aliud constituendi et faciendi potentiam, sic non oportet intelligere et audire, sicut in omnium causa. Ipse enim constitutus est etiam et αύτοΰ τοΰ λόγου. Si enim prima causa, non solum aliorum omnium causa, sed sui ipsius est causa. Deus ergo a semetipso, et Deus est.
What next, then, of our knowledge? How is it carried along? How does it move concerning the Word? It does not see the Word as though he existed for the sake of something else, or as belonging to something else in respect of what he is. He is for this: to constitute something else in being, and in no other way. The Word, then, is the father and begetter of all things, through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. But the power of the Word himself, the power of constituting and making something else, must not be understood and heard in the same way as in the cause of all things. For he himself, God, is the constituter also of the Word himself. For if he is the first cause, he is the cause not only of all other things but of himself. God, then, is from himself, and is God.
Chapter 19
19PL 8:1030b
Sed quoniam esse hoc ipsum, quod est moveri et intelligere, hoc est agere; primum est potentia; et constitutiva potentia, primum, inquam, est. Necessario igitur ipsum esse praecedit. Ergo et intelligere et moveri et agere ab eo est, quod est esse. Est autem secundum quod est, in actu esse: hoc est, filium esse; et magis istud, quam illud ipsum esse quod est pater; quod est esse, hoc est agere et operari. Non enim aliud ibi esse, aliud operari. Simplex enim illud unum, et unum et solum semper. In patre igitur filius, et in filio pater.
But since being itself, which is to be moved and to understand, is to act, it is first power; and constitutive power, I say, is first. Necessarily, then, being itself comes first. So understanding, being moved and acting come from that which is being. And in respect of what it is, it is to be in act: that is, to be the Son; and this more than that very being which is the Father; for what is being, this is acting and operating. For there, being is not one thing and operating another. For that one is simple, one and alone always. The Son, then, is in the Father, and the Father in the Son.
Chapter 20
20PL 8:1030b–1031a
Quomodo igitur effectum est? quomodo filius et pater, si simul? Neque solum simul ambo, sed unum et solum et simplex. Sed hoc non oportet quaerere, sufficit enim credere. Dicamus igitur, cum fas est. Primum manifestum est; quoniam λόγος neque aliud, neque ab alio, sed circa Deum. Dicit enim Evangelium: In principio erat λόγος, et λόγος erat circa Deum. Rursus dicit: Unigenitus filius qui est in gremio patris. Quomodo ista dicta aut accipis aut intelligis? Romani προς τον θιόν, apud Deum dicunt, quasi ad intus, vel penitus intus, id est in Dei existentia: et hoc verum. In eo enim quod est esse inest et operari. In Deo enim λόγος: et sic in patre filius. Causa enim est, ipsum esse ad actionem: oportet enim esse primum, cui inest operari: et hoc est Deus. Ista ergo duo, duo dico secundum virtutem: secundum autem intelligentiam simplicitatis, dico unum solum. Si igitur principium causa est ipsum esse ad operationem et actionem, generatur agere ab eo quod est esse. Esse autem pater est: operari ergo filius.
How, then, was it brought about? How are there Son and Father, if they are together? Not only both together, but one and alone and simple. But this ought not to be inquired into; it is enough to believe. Let us speak, then, as far as is permitted. First, it is plain that the Word is neither other, nor from another, but with God. For the Gospel says: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God.” Again it says: “The only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father.” How do you take or understand these sayings? The Romans render pros ton theon as apud Deum, as if “toward within”, or “deep within”, that is, in God's existence; and this is true. For in what is being there is also operating. For the Word is in God, and so the Son is in the Father. For being itself is the cause of action: for there must first be that in which operating is; and this is God. These, then, are two: two, I say, by power; but by the understanding of simplicity I say one only. If, then, the beginning, the cause, is being itself, for operation and action, acting is begotten from that which is being. Being is the Father; operating, then, is the Son.
Chapter 21
21PL 8:1031a–1031b
Quae igitur generatio est, aut apparentia generationis? Primum autem si oportet istud dicere, ne quis e«<rtv temporis accipiat. Primum, secundum intelligentiam dico. Primum igitur dicimus in semetipsum conversum, et moveri et intelligere intus in requie positam beatitudinem, omnimodis perfectam custoditam. Est autem ipsum beatitudinis et magnitudinis Dei, et intus et foris, et moveri et operari. Omne enim quod est omne, et intus et foris est. Quomodo istud, et intus et foris, Deo existente et in omni et in toto, postea dicendum.
What, then, is the generation, or the appearance of generation? First, if one must say “first”, let no one take it as an indication of time. “First”, I mean, in the order of understanding. First, then, we say that God, turned toward himself, moves and understands within, a blessedness placed in rest, kept perfect in every way. But it belongs to the blessedness and greatness of God to be both within and without, to be moved and to operate. For everything that is all is both within and without. How this is, both within and without, with God existing both in all and in the whole, must be said later.
Chapter 22
22PL 8:1031b–1031c
Nunc autem accipe causas intelligendi, ίμοασιν temporis penitus abesse, si juxta prius et posterius, omnino sine tempore effectis omnibus. Ex aeterno enim omnia. Deus igitur omnimodis perfectus, et super omnimodis perfecta: is qui omnia creavit, et qui omnium causa est: non illud ipsum solum, quod unum fuit et solum; sed et multa et omnia quae potentia sunt esse, fuit et voluit esse omnia. Alia vero, sine actione, quomodo possibile fuit esse? Exsilivit igitur Dei voluntate actio: ipsa autem actio, Dei voluntas fuit: simplex enim omne ibi. Μτ,ος ergo qui est in Deo, ipse Deus est, ipse voluntas, ipse intelligentia, ipse et vita, ipse actio: ex se genito motu, ab eo quod est esse, processit in esse suum proprium: id est, in quo est agere; apparuit ipsum agere, quod quidem effecit omnia. Ipsum vero natura est ab eo quod est esse, in id quod est agere; habens in eo quod est agere, et esse. Sicut illud esse, et agere habet et esse: Sic hoc, agere habet et esse. Ipsum autem agere, hoc est esse; ut illud esse, hoc est quod agere. Unum ergo et simplex, ista duo.
Now take the reasons for understanding that every appearance of time is wholly absent, if we speak of prior and posterior, since all things were made wholly without time. For all things are from eternity. God, then, perfect in every way and above the things perfect in every way, he who created all things and is the cause of all, was not only that very thing which was one and alone; he also was, and willed to be, the many and all things that are in power to be. But how could the others be without action? Action, then, leapt forth by God's will; and action itself was God's will, for everything there is simple. The Word, then, who is in God, is himself God, himself will, himself understanding, himself also life, himself action: by a self-begotten motion, from that which is being, he proceeded into his own proper being, that is, into that in which acting is; acting itself appeared, which made all things. And by nature it is from that which is being into that which is acting, having, in that which is acting, being as well. As that being has both acting and being, so this has both acting and being. And acting itself is being, as that being is acting. These two, then, are one and simple.
Chapter 23
23PL 8:1031c–1032a
Id si ita est, neque ex nihilo Jesus, qui ab eo quod est esse, apparuit actio; cum ipsa actio, et hoc fuit quod est esse: neque non est propter ista duo τό ό/χοούσιον; quia idem est, quod substantiae unius ejusdem est. Unum utique est una actio: quippe cum ipsum agere et esse sit. Hic est filius, hic a patre, hic circa Deum, hic qui in gremio patris, hic est intus, hic est foris. Opere enim foris, in eo quod est esse intus: et in Patre ipse Deus in Deo, qui idem omnino est ei: actione autem qui sit filius. Et ubicumque est, et esse est et actio: et isto modo, et pater est et Deus est, et filius est et λόγος.
If this is so, Jesus is not from nothing, for he appeared as action from that which is being, since action itself was also that which is being; nor, because there are these two, is the homoousios lacking, for that is the same which is of one and the same substance. One action, certainly, is one, since it is both acting and being. This is the Son, he is from the Father, he is with God, he is in the bosom of the Father, he is within, he is without. For by his work he is without; by that which is being, within; and in the Father he is God in God, who is altogether the same as he; but by action he is the Son. And wherever he is, he is both being and action; and in this way he is both Father and God, and Son and Word.
Chapter 24
24PL 8:1032a–1032b
Ubi igitur est ille nefarius intellectus et blasphemas? Ubi habet locum aliud quid esse, et ab alio habet locum? Ubi est quod amplius dicit, ex nihilo esse Jesum Christum, filium Dei? Ubi est illud, quod nihilum est? Quomodo quod nihilum est, potest incidere in Deum aut in cogitationem Dei? Vera enim excogitatio, ex veris est. Porro quod vere non est, falsum est. Non igitur excogitat Deus, quod vere non est. Sed nos fallit, quoniam Dei potentia in isto magis credimus, si ab iis quae vere non sunt, efficiat ea quae vere sunt. Sed in quantum Dei potentia omnia potest, in tantum juxta quod potentia est, nihil aliud generat quam quorum potentia est ut sint. Eorum autem quae vere non sunt omnimodis, omnino nulla potentia est.
Where, then, is that wicked and blasphemous understanding? Where is there room for something to be other, and to have its room from another? Where is what it goes on to say, that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is from nothing? Where is that which is nothing? How can what is nothing fall upon God, or into God's thought? For true thinking comes from true things; and what truly is not is false. God therefore does not think what truly is not. But we deceive ourselves, since we think God's power is greater in this, if he makes things that truly are from things that truly are not. But insofar as God's power can do all things, insofar as it is power, it begets nothing other than the things for which there is power to be. And for things that in every way truly are not, there is no power at all.
Chapter 25
25PL 8:1032b–1032c
Quomodo ergo nulla existente potentia eorum quae vere non sunt, effecta est actio eorum quae sunt? Quippe si est Dei potentia, ut ad esse ducantur ea quae esse non possunt, jam secundum potentiam habent esse, vel sunt δντα, illa ipsa quae omnino sunt μή δντα. Et idcirco non esse illa diximus, quae in abscondito posita et in potentia, nondum tamen apparuerunt in actione. Fuerunt enim omnia in Deo. Eorum enim omnium quae sunt, λόγος semen est. Λόγος enim in Deo: in operatione, id est in virtute Dei, qui est filius Dei, apparuerunt omnia quae facta sunt.
How, then, since there is no power belonging to the things that truly are not, was the action of the things that are brought about? For if it is God's power that leads into being the things that cannot be, then by power they already have being, or are existents, those very things which are wholly non-existents. And that is why we said that those things are not which, placed in hiding and in power, have not yet appeared in action. For all things were in God. For the Word is the seed of all things that are. For the Word is in God: in the operation, that is, in the power of God, who is the Son of God, all the things that were made appeared.
Chapter 26
26PL 8:1032c–1033b
Sed dicunt quidam sacrilegi: Si circa Deum fuit λόγος, et supra gremium Dei exsistens filius, non intus in gremio, sed foris intelligitur. Quid vero? Anima homini inspiravit Deus ex se, ex intus: omnium autem creatorem, liberatorem ac sanctificatorem illius ipsius animae, et totius corporis redemptorem et erectorem, non ex intus? Nonne angelicam naturam ex intus emisit? Quando autem hominem de terra formavit, et altera pecora et quadrupedia, et rursus ex aqua animantia cuncta, et caeterorum in acre ea ex alio in aliud, et illud ex quo primum ex iis quae non sunt: Jesum vero unde dicis? Ante omnia namque filius. Num ergo ab inani, et omnino de nullo? Deinde corpus ejus formavit: animam vero aut spiritum corpus non habuit, antequam in mundum ingrederetur? Habuitne animam? Eam igitur insufflavit, sive insibilavit: neque enim in eum. Quomodo enim in ipsum, cum nondum haberet corpus? Sed si quod insibilavit, fuit id ipsum filius. Si istud ita est, est ergo a Deo filius: sic et spiritus. Non enim ex nihilo spiritus. Dicit enim Deus: Omnem spiritum ego emisi. Insufflando ergo, super se insufflavit Deus, et sic natus est filius: non ergo fecit illum Deus. Non ergo circa Deum vel supra gremium foris est, sed intus. Utrumque testificatur David dicens: Eructavit cor meum Verbum bonum. Non ergo, quod est filius, factum est, sicut omnia: contra id quod dicit Deus. Nam si factus est; antequam fieret, non erat Verbum Dei.
But certain sacrilegious men say: “If the Word was with God, and the Son existed upon God's bosom, he is understood to be not inside in the bosom but outside.” What then? God breathed into man a soul from himself, from within; and the creator of all things, the liberator and sanctifier of that very soul, the redeemer and raiser of the whole body, was he not from within? Did he not send forth the angelic nature from within? But when he formed man from the earth, and the other beasts and four-footed creatures, and again all living things from the water, and the rest in the air, one thing out of another, and that from which the first came out of the things that are not: from where do you say Jesus is? For the Son is before all things. From the void, then, and from nothing at all? Then he formed his body; but did he not have a soul or spirit before he entered the world? Did he have a soul? Then God breathed it, or whispered it, forth; for not into him. For how into him, when he did not yet have a body? But if what he breathed forth was the Son himself, if this is so, then the Son is from God; and so too the Spirit. For the spirit is not from nothing. For God says: “Every spirit I have sent forth.” By breathing, then, God breathed forth from himself, and so the Son was born: God, then, did not make him. So he is not outside, with God or upon his bosom, but inside. David testifies to both, saying: “My heart has poured forth a good Word.” What the Son is, then, was not made as all things were made at God's word. For if he was made, then before he was made there was no Word of God.
Chapter 27
27PL 8:1033b–1033c
Quid igitur dicimus? Nonne est necessarium confiteri, si Verbum fecit omnia, primum omnium esse Verbum, velut Verbum omnimodis Verbum, Verbum quod nos et prophetae et evangelistae nominamus λόγον et filium? Moses sic dicit: In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram. Secundum Aquilam hoc idem sic: In capitulo fecit Deus: ut Hebraei Mosis dictum pronuntiant: sive in principio, sive in capitulo, in Christo eum fecit Deus. Principium ergo et caput, Christus. Et hoc frequenter dicitur: Creavit omnia in Christo. λόγος enim Christus ut semen est omnium. Primus ergo Christus: ante enim omnem creaturam fuit. Unde igitur Christus? Si Verbum est, a Deo: si voluntas, a Deo: si autem motus aut actio, a Deo: et si ipsum agere et esse est, juxta ipsum esse pater est, filius autem actio est: et quoniam ipsum esse actio est, et agere est esse; idcirco ομοούσιον et pater αύτός λόγος.
What, then, do we say? Is it not necessary to confess that, if the Word made all things, the Word is first of all, as the Word that is in every way Word, the Word whom we and the prophets and evangelists call Logos and Son? Moses says: “In the beginning God made heaven and earth.” According to Aquila the same is: “In the head God made”, as the Hebrews pronounce the saying of Moses: whether “in the beginning” or “in the head”, God made it in Christ. Christ, then, is beginning and head. And this is often said: “He created all things in Christ.” For Christ, the Word, is as it were the seed of all things. Christ, then, is first, for he was before all creation. Where, then, is Christ from? If he is the Word, from God; if will, from God; if motion or action, from God; and if acting itself is being, then according to being itself there is the Father, and the Son is action; and since being itself is action, and acting is being, therefore the Father and the Word himself are homoousios.
Chapter 28
28PL 8:1033c–1034a
Sed quomodo ό/χοούσιον, nondum exsistente substantia? Nomina vero ab iis quae posterius sunt, et ab iis quae post Deum, et inventa et assumpta sunt. Et quoniam non est invenire nomen dignum Deo, ab iis quae scimus nominamus Deum; habentes in intellectu, quoniam non proprie nominamus nec appellamus: quemadmodum dicimus, Vivit Deus, intelligit Deus. Proinde a nostris actionibus nominamus actiones Dei, existente tamen illo super omnia; neque tantum exitente, sed quasi existente, ουδέ δντω; υπάρχοντας, αλλά δντο; μικρού υπάρχοντας. Isto etiam modo substantium, existentiam, et caetera hujusmodi apponimus Deo, et ejus essentiae ουσίαν aliter dicimus, aliter se habente substantia creata ad quod inest sibi, et ad suum etiam esse.
But how homoousios, when substance does not yet exist? Names are found and taken from the things that are later and from those that are after God. And since no name worthy of God can be found, we name God from the things we know, keeping in mind that we do not name or call him properly; as when we say, “God lives”, “God understands”. So from our actions we name the actions of God, though he exists above all things; and not only existing, but as it were existing, not existing in the way existents exist. In this way too we apply substance, existence and the rest of this kind to God; and we speak of the substance of his essence in another sense, since created substance stands otherwise toward what is in it, and toward its own being.
Chapter 29
29PL 8:1034a–1034c
Similiter et cum dicimus, quod Deus factus est Christus vel homo: non quod vere factus sit, sed quoniam unus sit, et in omnibus sit, et omnes in ipso: idcircoque dicatur omnibus omnia factus, ut essent: non quod factus sit ut sed quod effectus sit ad ita esse. Siquidem non dicitur. Filius Dei factus est, sed quod est factus nobis Dominus; sicut Salomon dicit: Et fecisse me supra vias tuas. Nam de aeterna divinaque generatione supponit statim: Ante omnes me genuit Dominus. Dicitque Joannes: Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Quid deinde? Nonne Deus creaturam fecit, et in creatura primum coelum et terram? Non ergo fecit Christum. Natus est ergo Christus, non factus. Ubicumque enim dicitur factus, post primum et aeternum generari, dicitur post effectus esse. Sicut de muliere dicitur factus; et in Actibus Apostolorum: Certissime igitur cognoscat domus Israel, quoniam istum Christum Deus fecit, quem tulistis in ligno crucis. Ista omnia post generationem, quae una est et sancta et ineffabilis, haec inquam omnia dicuntur. Non ista dicuntur in ejus existentiam, sed in actus et administrationem potentiae et virtutis ejus. De generatione igitur quae est filius Dei, manifestum est et quod όμοούσιον substanti ejus, in majestate, in propria significantia intelligentiaque, intellecta secundum esse existentiae substantiae. Et sic demonstratum, quomodo ομοούσιον.
Similarly, when we say that God was made Christ, or man, it is not that he was truly made, but because he is one, and is in all, and all are in him; and therefore he is said to have been made all things to all, that they might be; not that he was made, but that he was brought into being so. Indeed it is not said, “The Son of God was made,” but that he was made Lord for us, as Solomon says: “And that he made me over your ways.” For of the eternal and divine generation he adds at once: “Before all things the Lord begot me.” And John says: “What was made, in him was life.” What next? Did not God make the creation, and in the creation first heaven and earth? He did not, then, make Christ. Christ, then, was born, not made. For wherever “made” is said, after the first and eternal generation, it is said of what was brought about afterwards: as he is said to have been made of a woman; and in the Acts of the Apostles: “Let the house of Israel know most certainly, then, that God made this one Christ, whom you hung on the wood of the cross.” All these things are said after the generation, which is one and holy and ineffable; all these, I say. They are not said of his existence, but of the acts and administration of his power and strength. Concerning the generation, then, which is the Son of God, it is plain also that he is homoousios with his substance, in majesty, in its proper signification and understanding, understood according to the being of the existence of substance. And so it has been shown how he is homoousios.
Chapter 30
30PL 8:1034c–1036a
Habes mi Candide, quod reliquum est dicere. Si filius Dei Jesus, generatione filius. Dicis enim: « Si generatio motus, et motus mutatio; mutationem autem in Deo esse, impossibile est intelligere: ergo nefas dicere necesse est, nonnihil a Deo gignibile: non igitur Jesus Dei generatione filius. » Bono quidem ordine deduxisti: sed quem circumduxisti? Forte me? sed magis te. Dixisti enim, quod fecit Jesus Deum. Quid deinde? Facere nonne motus est? nihilo minus quam agere. Agere enim, facere est: sicut et facere, agere. Ambobus ergo in motu existentibus, necesse est sequi mutationem: quam in Deo constituere, sicut est declaratum, incongruum est. Confitendum igitur aut facere non esse motum, aut non omnem motum esse mutationem. Sed enim facere, motus est: et Deus juxta motum fecit; cui nullo modo mutari contingit, et omnino non congruit quomodolibet accidens recipere. Relinquitur ergo, non omnem motum mutationem esse. Si non omnis motus mutatio est, quid magis eligendum circa Jesum? secundum generationem illum esse, aut secundum effectionem? Juxta divinam intelligentiam, secundum generationem. Etsi enim Deus simul ac dicit, facit quae facit: Sed dicere, motus est, praeexistente silentio: mutatio est igitur, silenti dicere. Si autem per Verbum fecit Deus, ante fuit Verbum quam facere. Si ante fuit Verbum quam facere, Juxta generationem ante fuit. Generat enim ο νους Verbum. Generatio igitur Jesu, qui λόγος est. Quem Jesum gnari rerum dicunt secundum tres modos filium esse, veritate, natura, positione. Secundum veritatem esse filium, hoc ipso quod substantia est: et ipsum idcirco et simul et ejusdem substantiae esse, quomodo et pater et λόγος et filius et Deus. Natura autem filius in animali generatione. Insitione vero in adoptione. Sunt et alii modi: ut moribus, aetate, disciplina: ut Apostolus Paulus dicit: Ego vos genui. Modus igitur secundum veritatem et altior modus est, et omnibus divinior. Quis autem modus sit generationis sive filietatis ejus, sive juxta significatos, sive alios modos: confiteor ego Deo, cujus hoc potentia factum est.
You have, my Candidus, what remains to be said. If Jesus is the Son of God, he is Son by generation. For you say: “If generation is motion, and motion is change, and it is impossible to conceive of change in God, then it must be impious to say that anything can be begotten from God; Jesus, then, is not Son by generation from God.” You have drawn the argument out in good order; but whom have you led astray? Me, perhaps? Rather yourself. For you said that God made Jesus. What then? Is making not motion? No less than acting. For to act is to make, as to make is to act. Since both are in motion, change must follow, and to place that in God, as has been shown, is unfitting. One must confess, then, either that making is not motion, or that not every motion is change. But making is motion; and God made according to motion, God to whom it in no way befalls to be changed, and for whom it is wholly unfitting to receive any accident in any way. It remains, then, that not every motion is change. If not every motion is change, what is rather to be chosen concerning Jesus: that he is by generation, or by making? By divine understanding, by generation. For although God makes what he makes in the very moment he speaks, yet to speak is motion, silence having gone before: speaking, then, is a change for one who was silent. But if God made through the Word, the Word was before the making. If the Word was before the making, he was before it by generation. For the intellect begets the Word. There is, then, a generation of Jesus, who is the Word. Those who know these matters say that Jesus is Son in three modes: by truth, by nature, by position. Son by truth, by the very fact that he is substance; and therefore he is both simultaneous and of the same substance, as are the Father and the Word and the Son and God. Son by nature, in animal generation. Son by grafting in, in adoption. There are also other modes: by character, by age, by teaching, as the apostle Paul says: “I begot you.” The mode by truth, then, is both higher than all and more divine. But what the mode of his generation or sonship is, whether according to the modes named or other modes, I confess to God, by whose power this was done.
Chapter 31
31PL 8:1036a–1036b
Dictum est a nobis sufficienter, ut credo, in aliis libris, a quo sit progressio et descensio; regressioque promissi sancti Spiritus declarata est: et de triplici unitate et unali trinitate. Nec suffero audiens dogma vestrum de Spiritu sancto, blasphemia plenum: « Quod iste Spiritus in sanctificationem est, et qui tantummodo sanctificet et doceat: et quod ipse factus sit, sicut omnis creatura. » Cum tamen ipse Spiritus differat propria sua actione a filio, cui tamen semper praesens est: sicut et ipse filius actione differt a patre suo, qui tamen sit pater juxta id quod est esse. Sicque istorum trium unum et idem existentium, una divinitas et non multifida majestas; sed ούs4 άντίθεια μήτι αθεια: sed tria unum, et unum tria: et ter posita, unum idemque atque solum. Sed de iis tribus alio nobis oratio.
We have spoken sufficiently, I believe, in other books about the one from whom the procession and descent come; and, through the promised Holy Spirit, the return has been set out, and the threefold unity and the single trinity. Nor can I bear to hear your doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which is full of blasphemy: “that this Spirit is for sanctification, and only sanctifies and teaches, and that he himself was made, like every creature.” Yet the Spirit himself differs by his own proper action from the Son, to whom he is nonetheless always present, just as the Son himself differs by action from his Father, who nonetheless is Father in respect of that which is being. And so, since these three exist as one and the same, there is one divinity and not a manifold majesty; there is neither a rival godhead nor godlessness; but three are one and one is three; and, posited three times, it is one and the same and alone. But of these three we shall speak elsewhere.
Chapter 32
32PL 8:1036b–1036c
Salva nunc nos, pater, concede nobis peccata nostra. Et hoc quidem de Deo dicere, quid sit, peccatum est: et quomodo sit dicere, peccatum est: et non una voce venerari, quantam fieri potest sobria, sed enuntiare velle. Sed quoniam dedisti nobis, Domine sancte pater, Spiritum dividentem nobis prout vult, des nobis et cognoscentiam. Fidem enim habemus, et dicimus: omnigenam tamen de te ignorationem habentes. Attamen te patrem Deum, et filium Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, et Spiritum in omni verbo semper confitentes, qui cum tecum et filio eodem vivit in aeternum. Amen.
Save us now, Father; forgive us our sins. Even to say what God is, is a sin; to say how he is, is a sin; and so is wishing to express him, rather than venerating him with one voice, as soberly as can be. But since you have given us, holy Lord Father, the Spirit who distributes to us as he wills, give us knowledge too. For we have faith, and we speak, though we are ignorant of you in every way. And yet we always confess, in every word, you, God the Father, and the Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, and the Spirit, who lives with you and with the same Son for ever. Amen.