On the Resurrection of the Dead 12–20

The argument from the cause is this. We ask whether the human being was made simply and to no purpose, or for some purpose; and if for some purpose, whether he was made simply to live and to continue in the nature in which he was made, or for someone's use; and if for someone's use, whether for the use of the Maker himself or of some other being related to him and thought worthy of greater care. Considering this more generally, we find that every sensible person, when rational judgment moves him to make something, does nothing that he does deliberately to no purpose. He acts either for his own use, or for the need of something else he cares for, or for the sake of the thing he makes, moved by a natural attraction and affection toward bringing it into being. For example (let me use an illustration to make the point clear): a man builds a house for his own need; for oxen, camels, or other animals he needs, he makes the shelter suited to each, not for his own use, as it appears, though ultimately it is for that, but immediately out of care for the creatures he looks after; and he begets children neither for his own need nor for anything else of his, but so that those he begets may exist and continue as long as possible, consoling himself for his own death by the succession of children and grandchildren, and thinking in this way to make the mortal immortal. So much for human beings. But God would not have made the human being to no purpose, for he is wise, and no work of wisdom is purposeless; nor for his own need, for he needs nothing at all, and to one who needs nothing at all, nothing he has made could contribute to his own need. Nor did he make the human being for the sake of any of the other works he made. For none of the beings that use reason and judgment, whether greater or lesser, was made or is made for another's use, but for the sake of its own life and continuance. Reason finds no need that could be the cause of the creation of human beings: the immortals lack nothing and need no contribution at all from human beings in order to exist; and irrational creatures are by nature subject to rule, and serve human beings in the uses for which each was made, but are not made to use human beings. It never was and is not right to put what rules and leads to the use of lesser things, or to subject the rational to the irrational, which are unfit to rule. If, then, the human being was made neither without cause and to no purpose (for nothing made by God is purposeless, at least in the intention of the Maker), nor for the use of the Maker himself or of any other of the works made by God, it is clear that in the first and more general sense God made the human being for his own sake and for the goodness and wisdom seen in all his creation; and in the sense more closely bound up with the beings made, for the sake of their own life, not a life kindled for a short time and then wholly extinguished. That kind of life, I think, God assigned to creeping things and birds and fish, or, to speak more generally, to all irrational creatures. But to those who carry the image of their Maker within themselves, who bear intelligence and have received a share of rational judgment, the Maker allotted everlasting continuance, so that, knowing their Maker and his power and wisdom, and following law and justice, they may pass all eternity free of toil with those virtues by which they strengthened their former life, though they lived in corruptible and earthly bodies. Whatever has been made for the sake of something else will reasonably cease to exist when the things for whose sake it was made cease, and will not continue to no purpose, since nothing purposeless has any place among the things made by God. But beings made for the sake of existing and living according to their nature, since the cause is bound up with their very nature and is seen in their existence alone, could never admit any cause that wholly destroys their existence. And since this cause is always seen in their existing, the living being that was made must certainly be preserved, doing and undergoing what is natural to it, each of its two parts contributing its share. The soul exists and continues unchanged in the nature in which it was made, and carries out what is natural to it (and it is natural for it to govern the impulses of the body and always to judge and measure whatever befalls it by the proper standards and measures). The body is moved according to nature toward what is natural to it, and undergoes the changes allotted to it, including, along with the other changes of age, appearance, or size, the resurrection. For the resurrection is a kind of change, the last of all, and so is the change for the better of those who are still alive at that time.

Trusting in these things no less than in what has already happened, and considering our own nature, we are content with the life that is bound up with want and corruption, as befitting the present existence, and we firmly hope for continuance in incorruption. This hope we do not idly make up from human sources, feeding ourselves on false hopes; we have put our trust in a most unfailing pledge, the purpose of the one who created us. According to this purpose he made the human being of an immortal soul and a body, and furnished him with intelligence and an innate law, to preserve and safeguard the gifts he had given that befit an intelligent existence and a rational life. We know well that he would not have fashioned such a living being and furnished it with everything needed for continuance if he did not will that what he made should continue. If, then, the Maker of this universe made the human being to share in an intelligent life, and, having become a beholder of his majesty and of his wisdom in all things, to continue forever in the contemplation of these, according to God's purpose and the nature the human being received, then the cause of his creation guarantees his everlasting continuance, and his continuance guarantees the resurrection, without which the human being would not continue. From what has been said it is clear that the resurrection is plainly shown by the cause of creation and by the purpose of the Maker. Such being the cause for which the human being was brought into this world, it would be fitting to consider next the argument that follows from it naturally or in due sequence. In the order of inquiry, the nature of the human beings created follows the cause of their creation; the just judgment of their Maker upon them follows their nature; and the end of their life follows all of these. Having examined what comes first, we must next consider the nature of human beings.

The demonstration of the teachings of truth, or of anything put forward for examination, which gives unwavering conviction to what is said, does not take its starting point from somewhere outside, nor from what seems right to some or has been decided by them, but from the common and natural notion, or from the way secondary things follow from first things. Either it concerns first principles, and needs only a reminder to stir up the natural notion; or it concerns what follows naturally from first principles, and needs to proceed in due order, showing what truly follows from what is first or prior. So one neither neglects the truth or the certainty that goes with it, nor confuses what nature has ordered and distinguished, nor breaks the natural sequence. So I think that those who are serious about the question before us, and wish to judge sensibly whether the resurrection of human bodies takes place or not, should first consider well the force of each argument that contributes to proving it, what place each has, and which comes first, which second, which third, and which last. Having arranged them, one should put first the cause of the creation of human beings, that is, the purpose of the Creator in making the human being; and closely join to this the nature of the human beings created, not because it is second in order, but because one cannot judge both at the same time, even though they exist together and contribute equal force to the question. When the resurrection has been clearly shown by these, as the first arguments, which have their origin in creation, one can obtain conviction about it no less from the arguments of providence: I mean from the honor or punishment owed to each human being by a just judgment, and from the end of human life. Many who have treated the resurrection have rested the whole case on the third argument alone, thinking that the resurrection takes place because of the judgment. This is clearly shown to be false by the fact that all human beings who die rise, but not all who rise are judged. If the justice of the judgment were the only cause of the resurrection, those who have done neither wrong nor right, that is, very young children, ought not to rise. But since all rise, including those who died in infancy, they themselves prove our point: the resurrection takes place, in the first place, not because of the judgment, but because of the purpose of the Creator and the nature of those created.

Although the cause seen in the creation of human beings is enough by itself to show that the resurrection follows upon dissolved bodies by natural sequence, it is perhaps right not to shrink from any of the points proposed, but, in keeping with what has been said, to point out the grounds that each of the following arguments provides, for those who cannot see it from the first alone. And first of all there is the nature of the human beings created, which leads to the same conclusion and gives equal conviction about the resurrection. The whole nature of human beings in general is constituted of an immortal soul and of the body fitted to it at its creation; and God did not assign such a creation, or life and the whole course of life, to the nature of the soul by itself or to the nature of the body separately, but to human beings composed of both, so that, being born and living from these, they may, when they have lived their lives, come to one common end. Since, then, the living being made of both is one, and it undergoes all the passions of the soul and all those of the body, and acts and does whatever requires the judgment of the senses or of reason, the whole chain of these must be referred to one end, so that everything, in every respect, may come together into one harmony and the same fellow-feeling: the human being's creation, the human being's nature, the human being's life, the human being's actions and passions, his course of life, and the end that befits his nature. If there is one harmony and fellow-feeling of the whole living being, both of what springs from the soul and of what is carried out through the body, then the end of all these must also be one. And there will truly be one end only if the same living being exists in its own constitution, the being whose end it is. It will be precisely the same living being only if all the things of which it consists as parts are the same. And they will be the same in their proper union only if the things that were dissolved are reunited to constitute the living being. So the constitution of the same human beings necessarily shows that the resurrection of dead and dissolved bodies must follow; for without it the same parts would not be united with one another according to nature, nor would the nature of the same human beings be reconstituted. Again, if intelligence and reason have been given to human beings to discern intelligible things, not only substances but also the goodness, wisdom, and justice of the Giver, then, since the things for whose sake rational judgment was given endure, the judgment given for them must also endure. But it cannot endure unless the nature that received it, and in which it exists, endures. And it is the human being, not the soul by itself, who received intelligence and reason. The human being, therefore, consisting of both, must endure forever. But he cannot endure unless he rises. For if there were no resurrection, the nature of human beings as human beings would not endure. And if the nature of human beings does not endure, then in vain has the soul been fitted to the needs of the body and its passions; in vain has the body been held back from obtaining what it craves, yielding to the reins of the soul and guided by its bridle; vain is intelligence, vain is wisdom, vain the observance of justice and the practice of every virtue, the making and ordering of laws, and, in a word, everything noble in human beings and for their sake, or rather the very creation and nature of human beings. But if vanity is banished altogether from all the works of God and all the gifts he gives, then the continuance of the body, according to its own nature, must last through eternity together with the endless life of the soul.

Let no one be surprised that we call “continuance” a life interrupted by death and corruption. He should consider that the word does not have a single meaning, nor does continuance have a single measure, since the things that continue do not have a single nature either. If each thing that continues has its continuance according to its own nature, then one would not find equal continuance even among beings that are purely incorruptible and immortal, since the substances of the higher beings are not on a level with those that differ from them by descending degrees; nor is it right to look for that uniform and unchangeable continuance among human beings. The immortal beings were made immortal from the beginning and continue without end by the will of their Maker alone; human beings have unchangeable continuance from their creation in respect of the soul, but in respect of the body they receive incorruption through change. This is what the doctrine of the resurrection means. With our eyes on it, we await the dissolution of the body, which follows upon a life of want and corruption, and after it we hope for continuance in incorruption. We neither put our death on a level with the death of irrational creatures, nor the continuance of human beings on a level with that of immortal beings, lest we unwittingly put human nature and life on a level with beings to whom they do not belong. It is not right, then, to be troubled if some unevenness is seen in the continuance of human beings; nor, because the separation of the soul and the dissolution of the parts and particles of the body interrupt a continuous life, should one despair of the resurrection. In sleep, too, the natural slackening of the senses and natural powers seems to interrupt conscious life, as people sleep at equal intervals of time and in a way come back to life; yet we do not refuse to call it the same life. For this reason, I think, some call sleep the brother of death: not tracing them to the same ancestors or fathers, but because the same states come upon the dead and the sleeping, in their rest and in perceiving nothing of what is present or happening, or rather not even their own existence and life. If, then, we do not refuse to call the life of human beings the same life, though it is full of such unevenness from birth to dissolution and interrupted by all that we have mentioned, neither should we despair of the life beyond dissolution, which brings the resurrection with it, even if it is interrupted for a time by the separation of the soul from the body.

For this is the nature of human beings: from the beginning, by the purpose of the Maker, unevenness has been allotted to it, and so it has an uneven life and continuance, interrupted now by sleep, now by death, and by the changes of each stage of life, in which what comes later does not clearly appear in what comes first. Who would have believed, had he not learned it from experience, that so many and such great powers lie stored in the seed, uniform and unformed as it is, or the variety of masses that form and solidify from it: bones, I mean, and sinews and cartilage, and muscles, flesh, entrails, and the other parts of the body? None of these can be seen in the seed while it is still moist; nor does anything of what comes to adults appear in infants, nor anything of those past their prime in adults, nor of the aged in them. Yet though some of these stages show the natural sequence and the changes that come upon human nature not at all, and others only dimly, all who are not blinded by wickedness or sloth in judging these matters know that first the seed must be sown; then, when it has been formed in every part and particle and what was conceived has come forth into the light, there follows growth in the first stage of life, and the maturity that results from growth; after maturity comes a decline of the natural powers until old age; and then, when the bodies are worn out, dissolution. In this case, then, although the seed does not have the life or form of human beings written in it, nor life its dissolution into the first elements, the sequence of natural events makes it credible to those who cannot believe it from what is visible. Much more, then, does reason, tracing out the truth from the natural sequence, confirm the resurrection, since reason is safer and stronger than experience for establishing the truth.

Of the arguments I set out for examination a little earlier that confirm the resurrection, all are of the same kind, springing from the same origin, which is the creation of the first human beings. But some draw their strength from that first origin itself, while others, which accompany the nature and life of human beings, derive their credibility from God's providence over us. The cause according to which and for which human beings were made, being joined to their nature, has its force from creation; but the argument from justice, by which God judges human beings who have lived well or badly, draws its force from their end. These arguments spring from creation too, but depend rather on providence. Having shown the first arguments as well as we can, it would be good to show our proposition also through the later ones, I mean through the honor or punishment owed to each human being by a just judgment, and through the end of human life; and of these to put first the one that naturally comes first, and to examine first the argument from the judgment. I will say only this much beforehand, out of concern for the proper starting point and order. Those who have accepted God as the Maker of this universe must ascribe to his wisdom and justice the guardianship and providence of all that has been made, if they wish to remain true to their own principles. And thinking this, they must hold that nothing on earth or in heaven is ungoverned or without providence, but know that the Maker's care extends equally to everything unseen and seen, small and great. All things that have been made need care from their Maker, each in its own way, according to its nature and for its purpose; though I think it would be idle ambition to go into detail now, or to try to distinguish or list what suits each nature. The human being, of whom we are now speaking, needs food because he is in want, succession because he is mortal, and justice because he is rational. If each of these is natural to the human being, and he needs food for life, succession for the continuance of the race, and justice so that food and succession may be lawful, then surely, since food and succession belong to the composite, justice too must belong to it; by the composite I mean the human being made of soul and body. Such a human being must be answerable for all that he has done, and receive for it honor or punishment. If a just judgment brings the penalty for deeds done upon the composite; if neither the soul alone should receive the wages of what was done with the body (for by itself the soul has no inclination to the offenses that concern bodily pleasures or food and care), nor the body alone (for by itself the body cannot discern law and justice), but the human being composed of both receives judgment for each of his deeds; and if reason finds that this does not happen in this life (for merit is not rewarded in the present life, since many atheists who practice every lawlessness and wickedness live to the end untouched by misfortune, while, on the contrary, those who have shown their lives to be tested in every virtue live in pain, in abuse, in false accusations, outrages, and every kind of suffering), nor after death (for the composite no longer exists, since the soul is separated from the body, and the body itself is scattered back into the elements from which it was put together, keeping nothing of its former shape or form, much less the memory of its deeds): then what remains is clear to everyone. As the apostle says, this corruptible and dissoluble body must put on incorruption, so that, when the dead have been made alive by the resurrection, and what was separated or even entirely dissolved has been reunited, each may justly receive what he did through the body, whether good or bad.

To those who acknowledge providence and have accepted the same principles as we, but then somehow fall away from their own premises, one might use arguments like these, and many more, if one wished to expand what has been said briefly and in passing. But with those who disagree about the first principles it might be well to lay down another starting point before these. We would join them in their doubts about their opinions and consider with them questions like this: has the life of human beings, and the whole course of life, been utterly and once for all neglected, and has a deep darkness been poured over the earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both human beings themselves and their deeds? Or is it far safer to hold that the Maker presides over his own works, overseeing all that exists or happens in any way, and judging deeds and counsels? If there were no judgment anywhere of what human beings have done, human beings would have no advantage over irrational creatures; rather, those who master their passions and care for piety and justice or any other virtue would fare worse than the beasts. The life of cattle would be best, virtue foolish, the threat of judgment a great joke, the indulgence of every pleasure the greatest good; and the common creed and single law of them all would be the one dear to the licentious and lustful: “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.” For the end of such a life is not even pleasure, as some think, but complete insensibility. But if the Maker of human beings has some care for his own works, and the distinction between those who have lived well and those who have lived badly is preserved somewhere, it is either in the present life, while those who have lived in virtue or in vice are still alive, or after death, when they are separated and dissolved. But in neither case can a just judgment be found to be preserved. For in the present life the good do not obtain the rewards of virtue, nor do the wicked receive the wages of vice. I pass over the point that, as long as the nature we now have is preserved, a mortal nature could not bear a penalty proportionate to offenses that are many or grave. The robber or ruler or tyrant who has unjustly killed thousands upon thousands could not pay the penalty for them by a single death. And one who holds no true opinion about God, but lives in every kind of insolence and blasphemy, despises divine things, overturns laws, outrages boys and women alike, razes cities unjustly, burns houses with their inhabitants, lays waste a country and destroys with it communities and peoples or even a whole nation: how could he, in a corruptible body, suffice for a penalty proportionate to these crimes, when death forestalls what he deserves and mortal nature is not enough for even one of his deeds? So a judgment according to desert is shown neither in the present life nor after death.

For either death is a complete extinction of life, the soul being dissolved and destroyed together with the body; or the soul remains by itself, undissolved, unscattered, incorruptible, while the body is corrupted and dissolved, keeping no memory of what it did and no perception of what the soul suffers on its account. If the life of human beings is completely extinguished, it will be plain that there is no care for human beings who are no longer alive, and no judgment of those who have lived in virtue or vice; and the lawless life will come rolling back, with the swarm of absurdities that follow it and the chief of all this lawlessness, atheism. But if the body is corrupted and each of the dissolved parts goes to its kindred element, while the soul remains by itself as incorruptible, not even so will there be room for a judgment of the soul, since justice would be absent. For it is not right to suppose that any judgment comes from God and at God's hands in which justice is absent. And justice is not present in the judgment if the one who did the justice or the lawlessness is not preserved; for the one who did each of the deeds in life on which judgment is passed was the human being, not the soul by itself. To sum up: this view will preserve justice in no case.