On the Trinity 5.6–5.15

But suppose they think this argument should be resisted in this way: that the Father is indeed so called in relation to the Son, and the Son in relation to the Father, but “unbegotten” and “begotten” are said with reference to themselves, not in relation to each other. For to call him unbegotten is not the same as to call him Father, since even if he had not begotten the Son nothing would prevent his being called unbegotten; and if anyone begets a son, he is not therefore himself unbegotten, since men, begotten from other men, themselves beget others. So, they say, Father is said in relation to the Son and Son in relation to the Father, but unbegotten is said with reference to himself, and begotten with reference to himself; and therefore, if whatever is said with reference to oneself is said according to substance, and to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different, the substance is different. If they say this, they do not understand that they are indeed saying something about “unbegotten” that needs to be examined more carefully, because no one is a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten because he is a father, and so “unbegotten” is thought to be said with reference to oneself, not with relation to something; but with strange blindness they do not notice that “begotten” cannot be said except with relation to something. For a son is a son because he is begotten, and because he is a son he is certainly begotten. And just as son is referred to father, so begotten is referred to begetter; and as father to son, so begetter to begotten. And therefore the notion by which a begetter is understood is one thing, and that by which an unbegotten is understood is another. For although both are said of God the Father, the former is said in relation to the begotten, that is, to the Son, which they do not deny; but they maintain that what is called “unbegotten” is said with reference to himself. They say, therefore: “If something is said of the Father with reference to himself which cannot be said of the Son with reference to himself, and whatever is said with reference to oneself is said according to substance, and ‘unbegotten’ is said with reference to himself, which cannot be said of the Son, then ‘unbegotten’ is said according to substance; and since the Son cannot be called this, he is not of the same substance.” This cunning is answered by compelling them to say according to what the Son is equal to the Father: whether according to what is said with reference to himself, or according to what is said in relation to the Father. Not according to what is said in relation to the Father, since son is said in relation to father, and the Father is not son but father. For father and son are not said of each other in the way that friends or neighbours are. A friend is called so relatively to a friend, and if they love each other equally, the friendship is the same in both; and a neighbour is called so relatively to a neighbour, and because they are equally neighbours to each other (for as much as this one is neighbour to that one, so much is that one to this), the neighbourliness is the same in both. But since the Son is said relatively not to a Son but to the Father, the Son is not equal to the Father according to what is said in relation to the Father; it remains that he is equal according to what is said with reference to himself. But whatever is said with reference to oneself is said according to substance; it remains, therefore, that he is equal according to substance. Therefore the substance of both is the same. But when the Father is called unbegotten, what is said is not what he is but what he is not. And when a relation is denied, it is not denied according to substance, because the relation itself is not affirmed according to substance.

This must be made plain by examples. And first we must see that the same thing is signified when we say “begotten” as when we say “son.” For he is a son because he is begotten, and because he is a son he is certainly begotten. What is said, therefore, by “unbegotten” shows that he is not a son. But “begotten” and “unbegotten” are said conveniently, whereas “son” is said in Latin, but the usage of speech does not allow “unson” (infilius) to be said. Yet nothing is taken from the sense if one says “not son”; just as, if one says “not begotten” instead of “unbegotten,” nothing else is said. So too “neighbour” and “friend” are said relatively, and yet one cannot say “unneighbour” as one says “unfriend” (inimicus, enemy). Therefore in these matters we must not consider what the usage of our speech allows or does not allow to be said, but what understanding of the things themselves shines out. Let us, then, no longer say “unbegotten,” although it can be said in Latin, but let us say instead “not begotten,” which means the same. Do we then say anything other than “not son”? Now this negative particle does not make what is said relatively without it to be said substantially when it is put before it; it only denies what was affirmed without it, as in the other categories. For example, when we say, “He is a man,” we designate a substance. Whoever, then, says, “He is not a man,” does not state another kind of category, but only denies that one. As, then, I affirm according to substance, “He is a man,” so I deny according to substance when I say, “He is not a man.” And when it is asked how large he is, and I affirm, “He is four-foot,” that is, of four feet, I affirm according to quantity; he who says, “He is not four-foot,” denies according to quantity. “He is white”: I affirm according to quality; “He is not white”: I deny according to quality. “He is near”: I affirm according to relation; “He is not near”: I deny according to relation. I affirm according to position when I say, “He lies down”; I deny according to position when I say, “He does not lie down.” I affirm according to condition when I say, “He is armed”; I deny according to condition when I say, “He is not armed”; and it means just as much if I say, “He is unarmed.” I affirm according to time when I say, “He is of yesterday”; I deny according to time when I say, “He is not of yesterday.” And when I say, “He is at Rome,” I affirm according to place; and I deny according to place when I say, “He is not at Rome.” I affirm according to doing when I say, “He strikes”; but if I say, “He does not strike,” I deny according to doing, to show that he is not doing this. And when I say, “He is beaten,” I affirm according to the category called being acted upon; and I deny according to it when I say, “He is not beaten.” And in general there is no kind of category according to which we wish to affirm something without being shown to deny according to that same category, if we choose to put the negative particle before it. Since this is so, if I affirmed substantially by saying “Son,” I would deny substantially by saying “not Son.” But since I affirm relatively when I say, “He is a son” (for I refer him to a father), I deny relatively if I say, “He is not a son”; for I refer the same denial to a parent, wishing to show that he has no parent. But if “son” means as much as “begotten,” as we said before, then “not begotten” means as much as “not son.” But we deny relatively by saying “not son”; therefore we deny relatively by saying “not begotten.” And what is “unbegotten” but “not begotten”? Therefore one does not depart from the category of relation when “unbegotten” is said. For just as “begotten” is not said with reference to oneself, but means that he is from a begetter, so when “unbegotten” is said, it is not said with reference to oneself, but shows that he is not from a begetter. Yet both meanings turn within the same category, which is called relation; and what is pronounced relatively does not indicate substance. So, although “begotten” and “unbegotten” are different, they do not indicate a different substance; because just as son is referred to father and not-son to not-father, so begotten must be referred to begetter, and not-begotten to not-begetter.

Therefore let us hold this above all, that whatever that most excellent and divine sublimity is said to be with reference to itself is said substantially, but what is said with relation to something is said not substantially but relatively; and that the force of the same substance in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is so great that whatever is said of each with reference to themselves is to be taken, in the sum, not in the plural but in the singular. For just as the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, which no one doubts is said according to substance, yet we do not say that this most excellent Trinity is three gods, but one God; so the Father is great, the Son great, the Holy Spirit great, yet not three greats but one great. For it is written not of the Father alone, as they perversely think, but of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, “You alone are the great God.” And the Father is good, the Son good, the Holy Spirit good; and not three goods, but one good, of whom it was said, “No one is good but one, God.” For the Lord Jesus, lest he be understood only as a man by the one who had said “Good Master,” addressing him as a man, therefore did not say, “No one is good but the Father alone,” but, “No one is good but one, God.” For in the name of the Father the Father himself is meant by himself; but in the name of God, both he and the Son and the Holy Spirit, because the Trinity is one God. But position, condition, places, and times are said of God not properly but figuratively and by likenesses. For he is said both to “sit upon the cherubim,” which is said of position; and to be “clothed with the abyss as with a garment,” which is said of condition; and, “Your years shall not fail,” which is said of time; and, “If I ascend into heaven, you are there,” which is said of place. But as regards doing, perhaps it is said most truly of God alone: for God alone makes and is not himself made, nor is he acted upon as regards his substance by which he is God. So the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, the Holy Spirit almighty; yet not three almighties, but one Almighty, “from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things; to him be glory.” Whatever, therefore, God is said to be with reference to himself is both said of each person singly, that is, of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and at the same time of the Trinity itself, not in the plural but in the singular. For since to God it is not one thing to be and another to be great, but to be is for him the same as to be great, therefore, just as we do not say three essences, so we do not say three greatnesses, but one essence and one greatness. I say essence, which in Greek is called ousia, and which we more usually call substance. They do indeed also speak of hypostasis; but I do not know what difference they mean to put between ousia and hypostasis, so that most of our people who treat these matters in Greek are accustomed to say mian ousian, treis hypostaseis, which in Latin is “one essence, three substances.”

But because our usage of speech has already established that the same thing is understood when we say essence as when we say substance, we do not dare to say “one essence, three substances,” but “one essence or substance, but three persons,” as many Latin writers of authority who have treated these matters have said, since they found no more fitting way to express in words what they understood without words. For in fact, since the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, and the Holy Spirit, who is also called the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son, they are certainly three. And therefore it was said in the plural, “I and the Father are one.” For he did not say, “is one,” as the Sabellians say, but “are one.” Yet when it is asked, “Three what?” human speech labours under a great poverty indeed. Still, “three persons” has been said, not in order that that might be said, but in order not to be silent.

As, then, we do not say three essences, so we do not say three greatnesses, nor three great ones. For in things that are great by participation in greatness, for which it is one thing to be and another to be great, as a great house, a great mountain, a great mind, in these things greatness is one thing, and that which is great by that greatness is another; and a great house is certainly not the same as greatness. But that is true greatness by which not only a house that is great is great, and by which any mountain that is great is great, but also by which whatever else is called great is great; so that greatness itself is one thing, and the things that are called great from it are another. This greatness is certainly great in the first place, and much more excellently than the things that are great by participating in it. But God is not great by a greatness that is not what he himself is, as though God were a participant in it when he is great; otherwise that greatness would be greater than God, whereas there is nothing greater than God. Therefore he is great by that greatness which he himself is. And so, as we do not say three essences, neither do we say three greatnesses: for to God, to be is the same as to be great. For the same reason we do not say three great ones but one great one; because God is not great by participation in greatness, but is great by himself being great, since he is his own greatness. Let the same be said of the goodness, the eternity, and the omnipotence of God, and of all the predicates whatever that can be pronounced of God, which are said of him with reference to himself, not figuratively and by likeness but properly, if indeed anything can be said properly of him by the mouth of man.

But what is said properly of each one in the same Trinity is in no way said with reference to themselves, but in relation to each other or to the creature; and therefore it is clear that these things are said relatively, not substantially. For just as the Trinity is called one God, great, good, eternal, almighty, and the same God can be called his own deity, his own greatness, his own goodness, his own eternity, his own omnipotence, the Trinity cannot be called Father in the same way, except perhaps figuratively in relation to the creature, because of the adoption of sons. For what is written, “Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one Lord,” must certainly not be understood as excluding the Son or excluding the Holy Spirit; and we rightly call this one Lord our God also our Father, who regenerates us by his grace. But the Trinity can in no way be called Son. But “Holy Spirit,” according to what is written, “For God is spirit,” can indeed be said of the whole, because the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. Therefore the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since they are one God, and God is certainly holy and God is spirit, the Trinity can also be called the Holy Spirit. But that Holy Spirit who is understood not as the Trinity but as in the Trinity is spoken of relatively in what he is properly called, the Holy Spirit, since he is referred to the Father and to the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. But the relation itself does not appear in this name; it does appear, however, when he is called the gift of God. For he is the gift of the Father and of the Son, because he both “proceeds from the Father,” as the Lord says, and what the apostle says, “Whoever does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him,” he certainly says of the Holy Spirit himself. When, therefore, we say “the gift of the giver” and “the giver of the gift,” we speak of both relatively to each other. So the Holy Spirit is a certain unspeakable communion of the Father and the Son; and perhaps he is so called because the same name can fit the Father and the Son. For he is called properly what they are called in common, since the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. So that, therefore, the communion of both may be signified by a name that fits both, the gift of both is called the Holy Spirit. And this Trinity is one God, alone, good, great, eternal, almighty: itself its own unity, deity, greatness, goodness, eternity, omnipotence.

Nor should it trouble anyone that we have said that the Holy Spirit (not the Trinity itself, but the one who is in the Trinity) is spoken of relatively, because there seems to be no corresponding term for the one to whom he is referred. For we cannot speak here as we say “the servant of the master” and “the master of the servant,” “the son of the father” and “the father of the son,” since these are said relatively. For we say “the Holy Spirit of the Father,” but we do not say in turn “the Father of the Holy Spirit,” lest the Holy Spirit be understood to be his son. Likewise we say “the Holy Spirit of the Son,” but we do not say “the Son of the Holy Spirit,” lest the Holy Spirit be understood to be his father. For in many relative terms it happens that no word is found by which the things referred to each other may correspond. For what is said so plainly relatively as “pledge”? It is referred to that of which it is the pledge, and a pledge is always a pledge of something. When, then, we say “the pledge of the Father and the Son,” can we say in turn “the Father of the pledge” or “the Son of the pledge”? But when we say “the gift of the Father and the Son,” we cannot indeed say “the Father of the gift” or “the Son of the gift”; but so that these may correspond to each other, we say “the gift of the giver” and “the giver of the gift,” because here a word in common use could be found, while there it could not.

The Father, then, is spoken of relatively, and the same is spoken of relatively as “beginning,” and perhaps in other ways; but he is called Father in relation to the Son, and beginning in relation to all things that are from him. Likewise the Son is spoken of relatively; he is also called relatively the Word and the Image, and in all these names he is referred to the Father; but the Father is called none of these. The Son too is called the beginning: for when he was asked, “Who are you?” he answered, “The beginning, who also speak to you.” But is he the beginning of the Father? He wished to show himself as Creator when he said that he was the beginning, just as the Father is the beginning of the creature, in that all things are from him. For “creator” too is said relatively to the creature, as master to servant. And therefore when we say both that the Father is the beginning and that the Son is the beginning, we do not speak of two beginnings of the creature; because the Father and the Son together are one beginning in relation to the creature, as one Creator, as one God. But if whatever remains in itself and begets or works something is the beginning of the thing it begets or works, we cannot deny that the Holy Spirit too is rightly called the beginning, because we do not separate him from the name of Creator. And it is written of him that he works, and he certainly works while remaining in himself; for he is not himself changed and turned into any of the things he works. And see what he works: “To each,” he says, “is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good. To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit, to another faith in the same Spirit, to another the gift of healings in the one Spirit, to another the working of powers, to another prophecy, to another the discerning of spirits, to another kinds of tongues. But all these the one and the same Spirit works, dividing to each one his own as he wills,” that is, as God. For who can work such great things but God? “But it is the same God who works all things in all.” For if we are asked about the Holy Spirit by himself, we answer most truly that he is God; and together with the Father and the Son he is one God. God, then, is called one beginning in relation to the creature, not two or three beginnings.

But in relation to each other in the Trinity, if what begets is the beginning of what it begets, the Father is the beginning of the Son, because he begets him. But whether the Father is also the beginning of the Holy Spirit, since it is said, “He proceeds from the Father,” is no small question. For if it is so, he will be the beginning not only of the thing he begets or makes, but also of what he gives. And here light is shed, as far as it can be, on what troubles many: why the Holy Spirit is not also a son, since he too goes out from the Father, as we read in the Gospel. For he went out not as one born but as one given; and therefore he is not called son, because he was neither born like the Only-begotten, nor made so as to be born into adoption by God's grace, like us. For what is born of the Father is referred to the Father alone when it is called Son, and so it is the Son of the Father and not ours as well; but what is given is referred both to him who gave and to those to whom he gave. And so the Holy Spirit is called not only the Spirit of the Father and the Son who gave him, but also ours who received him; just as the salvation of the Lord, who gives salvation, is spoken of (“salvation is the Lord's”), and the same is also our salvation, who have received it. The Spirit, then, is both God's, who gave, and ours, who have received. Not that spirit of ours by which we exist, for that is the spirit of the man that is in him; but this one is ours in another way, as we also say, “Give us our bread.” Although we have certainly received that spirit too which is called the man's: “For what do you have,” he says, “that you did not receive?” But what we received in order to exist is one thing, and what we received in order to be holy is another. Hence it is also written of John that he would come “in the spirit and power of Elijah”: it is called the spirit of Elijah, namely the Holy Spirit whom Elijah received. The same must be understood of Moses, when the Lord says to him, “I will take of your spirit and give it to them,” that is, I will give them of the Holy Spirit whom I have already given you. If, then, what is given also has as its beginning the one by whom it is given, because it did not receive from anywhere else that which proceeds from him, it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the beginning of the Holy Spirit, not two beginnings; but as the Father and the Son are one God, and in relation to the creature one Creator and one Lord, so in relation to the Holy Spirit they are one beginning; but in relation to the creature the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one beginning, as one Creator and one Lord.

It is further asked whether, just as the Son has by being born not only that he is Son but that he exists at all, so the Holy Spirit has by being given not only that he is a gift but that he exists at all: whether, then, he existed before he was given but was not yet a gift, or whether, by the very fact that God was going to give him, he was already a gift even before he was given. But if he does not proceed except when he is given, he would certainly not proceed before there was someone to whom he might be given; how then did he already exist as substance, if he exists only because he is given, just as the Son by being born has not only that he is Son, which is said relatively, but that he is substance at all? Or does the Holy Spirit always proceed, and proceed not from a point in time but from eternity; but because he so proceeded as to be able to be given, was he already a gift even before there was anyone to whom he might be given? For “gift” is understood in one way and “given” (donatum) in another. A gift can exist even before it is given; but it can in no way be called given unless it has been given.