On the Trinity 7.6–8.4

But lest I seem to be favouring our own usage, let us look into this too. Although they too, if they wished, as they say three substances, three hypostases, could say three persons, three prosōpa. But they preferred the former, which perhaps was more fittingly said according to the usage of their language. For the same reasoning holds of persons: for to God it is not one thing to be and another to be a person, but wholly the same. For if to be is said with reference to oneself, but person relatively, then let us say three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as some are called three friends, or three kinsmen, or three neighbours, in that they are so to one another, not in that each of them is so with reference to himself. So any one of them is the friend, or kinsman, or neighbour of the other two, because these names have a relative meaning. What then? Shall we say that the Father is the person of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the Son the person of the Father and the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and the Son? But neither is person usually spoken of in this way anywhere, nor in this Trinity, when we say the person of the Father, do we mean anything other than the substance of the Father. Therefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, not by which he is Father but by which he is, so also the person of the Father is nothing other than the Father himself; for person is said with reference to oneself, not with reference to the Son or the Holy Spirit, just as God, and great, and good, and just, and anything else of this kind, are said with reference to oneself. And just as for him to be is the same as to be God, to be great, to be good, so for him to be is the same as to be a person. Why then do we not call these three together one person, as we say one essence and one God, but say three persons, though we do not say three gods or three essences, unless because we wish at least some one word to serve this meaning by which the Trinity is understood, so that we should not be altogether silent when asked “three what?”, since we confess that they are three? For if essence is the genus, and substance or person the species, as some think, then, to omit what I have already said, they ought to be called three essences, as they are called three substances or persons, just as three horses are called three horses and also three animals, since horse is the species and animal the genus. For there the species is not said in the plural and the genus in the singular, as if one said three horses are one animal; but as three horses by the specific name, so three animals by the general name. But if they say that by the name of substance or person not a species is signified, but something singular and individual, so that substance or person is not said as “man” is said, which is common to all men, but as “this man” is said, such as Abraham, such as Isaac, such as Jacob, or anyone else who could be pointed out present with the finger, the same reasoning will overtake them here too. For as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals, so they are called three men and three souls. Why then are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, if we discuss them too according to genus, species, and individual, not called three essences, as they are called three substances or persons? But this, as I said, I pass over; I say this: if essence is a genus, one essence no longer has species; just as, because animal is a genus, one animal no longer has species. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, then, are not three species of one essence. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, and those three which we call substances or persons have the same species in common, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common the species called man, then, not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob can one man also be subdivided into several single men; for it cannot at all, because one man is already a single man. Why then is one essence subdivided into three substances or persons? For if essence is a species like man, there is one essence as there is one man. Or, as we say that three men of the same sex, of the same bodily constitution, and of the same mind, are one nature (for they are three men but one nature), do we likewise say there three substances, one essence, or three persons, one substance or essence? This is in some way similar, because the ancients who spoke Latin, before they had these names, which have not long come into use, that is, essence or substance, said nature instead of them. We do not, then, say these things according to genus and species, but as according to a common and identical matter. As, if three statues were made from the same gold, we would say three statues are one gold, and yet we would not say that gold is the genus and the statues the species, nor gold the species and the statues the individuals. For no species goes beyond its individuals so as to include anything outside them. For when I define what man is, which is a specific name, all the single men, who are the individuals, are contained in the same definition, and nothing belongs to it that is not a man. But when I define gold, not only statues, if they are golden, but rings and anything else made of gold will belong to gold; and even if nothing is made from it, it is called gold, since even if statues are not golden, they are not therefore not statues. Again, no species exceeds the definition of its genus. For when I define animal, since the horse is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal; but not every statue is gold. Therefore, although in three golden statues we rightly say three statues are one gold, we do not say it in such a way as to understand gold as the genus and the statues as the species. Nor, then, do we call the Trinity three persons or substances, one essence and one God, as though three things subsisted from one matter, even if whatever that matter is were wholly unfolded in these three. For there is nothing else of that essence besides this Trinity; yet we say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence; but we do not say three persons from the same essence, as though what essence is were one thing there and what person is another, as we can say three statues from the same gold; for there to be gold is one thing and to be statues another. And when three men are said to be one nature, or three men of the same nature, they can also be said to be three men from the same nature, because from the same nature three other such men can also come into existence; but in that essence of the Trinity no other person whatever can in any way come into existence from the same essence. Then, in these things one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man; and in equal statues there is more gold in three together than in each, and less gold in one than in two. But in God it is not so: for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone; but those three substances or persons together, if they are to be so called, are equal to each singly; which the unspiritual man does not perceive. For he cannot think except of masses and spaces, small or large, as phantasms like images of bodies flit about in his mind. Until he is cleansed of this uncleanness, let him believe in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, one God, alone, great, almighty, good, just, merciful, maker of all things visible and invisible, and whatever can be said of him worthily and truly according to human capacity. And when he hears that the Father is the only God, let him not separate the Son or the Holy Spirit from him; for he is the only God together with him with whom he is also one God; since when we hear that the Son is the only God, we must take it without any separation of the Father or the Holy Spirit. And let him so speak of one essence as not to think that one is greater or better than another, or different in any respect. Yet not so that the Father himself is also the Son and the Holy Spirit, and whatever else each is called in relation to another, such as Word, which is said only of the Son, or Gift, which is said only of the Holy Spirit; and for this reason they also admit the plural number, as it is written in the Gospel: “I and the Father are one.” He said both “one” and “are”: “one” according to essence, because they are the same God; “are” according to relation, because the one is Father and the other Son. Sometimes the unity of essence is not mentioned, and only the relations are named, in the plural: “We will come to him, I and the Father, and will make our home with him.” “We will come” and “we will make our home” are plural, because it was said before, “I and the Father,” that is, the Son and the Father, who are spoken of relatively to each other. Sometimes it is wholly hidden, as in Genesis: “Let us make man in our image and likeness.” Both “let us make” and “our” are said in the plural, and must be taken only of the relations. For it is not that gods should make, or in the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit should make, in the image of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, so that man might subsist as the image of God. And God is the Trinity. But because that image of God was not made wholly equal, as not born of him but created by him, to signify this it is an image in such a way that it is “to the image”: that is, it is not made equal in parity, but approaches by a certain likeness. For one approaches God not by intervals of place but by likeness, and withdraws from him by unlikeness. For there are some who distinguish in such a way that they would have the Son be the image, but man not the image but “to the image.” But the apostle refutes them, saying, “A man ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God.” He did not say “to the image,” but “the image.” Yet this image, when elsewhere it is called “to the image,” is not said as though to the Son, who is the image equal to the Father; otherwise he would not say “to our image.” For how “our,” when the Son is the image of the Father alone? But because of the unequal likeness, as we have said, man was said to be “to the image”; and therefore “our,” so that man might be the image of the Trinity; not equal to the Trinity as the Son is to the Father, but approaching, as has been said, by a certain likeness; as in distant things a certain nearness is signified, not of place but of a kind of imitation. For to this end it is also said, “Be re-formed in the newness of your mind”; and to the same he says, “Be therefore imitators of God, as dearest children.” For it is said to the new man: “who is being renewed to the knowledge of God, according to the image of him who created him.” Or, if it is now agreed, because of the necessity of argument, to admit the plural number even apart from the relative names, so that one name may be given in answer when it is asked “three what?”, and to say three substances or three persons, let no masses or intervals be thought of, no distance of unlikeness however small, so that one should be understood there to be even a little less than another, in whatever way one can be less than another; so that there is neither confusion of the persons nor such a distinction as would make anything unequal. And if this cannot be grasped by the understanding, let it be held by faith, until he shines in our hearts who says by the prophet, “Unless you believe, you will not understand.”

We have said elsewhere that in that Trinity those things are said properly, as belonging distinctly to the individual persons, which are said relatively to one another, as Father and Son, and the Gift of both, the Holy Spirit; for the Father is not the Trinity, nor the Son the Trinity, nor the Trinity the Gift. But what is said of each with reference to themselves is not said in the plural as three, but as one, the Trinity itself: as the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Spirit God; the Father good, the Son good, the Holy Spirit good; the Father almighty, the Son almighty, the Holy Spirit almighty; yet not three gods, or three goods, or three almighties, but one God, good, almighty, the Trinity itself; and whatever else is said of each not relatively to one another but with reference to themselves. For these things are said according to essence, because there to be is the same as to be great, to be good, to be wise, and whatever else each person there, or the Trinity itself, is said to be with reference to itself. And therefore we say three persons, or three substances, not so that any difference of essence may be understood, but so that an answer may be given by at least some one word when it is asked “three what?” or “three things what?” And there is such equality in that Trinity that not only is the Father not greater than the Son as regards divinity, but neither are the Father and the Son together something greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is each single person, whichever of the three, something less than the Trinity itself. These things have been said, and if they are repeated by turning them over more often, they become more familiar; but some measure must be kept, and God must be entreated with most devout piety to open the understanding and take away the zeal for contention, so that the essence of truth may be discerned by the mind without any bulk, without any changeableness. Now, therefore, as far as the Creator, wonderfully merciful, himself helps us, let us attend to these things, which we shall treat in a more inward way than before, though they are the same; keeping that rule, that what has not yet become clear to our understanding is not to be let go from the firmness of faith.

For we say that in this Trinity two or three persons are not something greater than one of them. Carnal habit does not grasp this, for no other reason than that it perceives, as it can, the true things that have been created, but cannot behold the truth itself by which they were created; for if it could, this bodily light would be in no way more evident than what we have said. For in the substance of truth, since it alone truly is, nothing is greater except what more truly is. But whatever is intelligible and unchangeable, one is not more truly than another, since it is equally, unchangeably eternal; nor is what is there called great great from anything else than that by which it truly is. Therefore, where greatness itself is truth, whatever has more greatness must have more truth; so whatever does not have more truth does not have more greatness either. Further, whatever has more truth is certainly truer, as that is greater which has more greatness; so there that is greater which is truer. But the Father and the Son together are not more truly than the Father singly or the Son singly. Both together, therefore, are not something greater than each of them singly. And since the Holy Spirit too is equally truly, neither are the Father and the Son together something greater than he, because they are not more truly either. The Father and the Holy Spirit together, too, since they do not surpass the Son in truth (for they are not more truly), do not surpass him in greatness. And so the Son and the Holy Spirit together are something as great as the Father alone, because they are as truly. So too the Trinity itself is as great as each person in it. For there one is not greater that is not truer, where truth itself is greatness. For in the essence of truth, to be true is the same as to be, and to be is the same as to be great; therefore to be great is the same as to be true. What, therefore, is equally true there must also be equally great.

In bodies, however, it can happen that this gold is as truly gold as that, yet this is greater than that, because there greatness is not the same as truth, and for it to be gold is one thing and to be great another. So too in the nature of the mind: a mind is not called true in the respect in which it is called a great mind. For even one who is not great-minded has a true mind; since the essence of body and mind is not the essence of truth itself, as the Trinity is, one God, alone, great, true, truthful, truth. If we try to think of him, as far as he permits and grants, let no contact or embrace through spaces of place be thought of, as of three bodies; no framework of joining, as fables tell of three-bodied Geryon; but whatever of this kind occurs to the mind, so that there is more in three than in each, and less in one than in two, let it be rejected without any hesitation; for so everything bodily is rejected. And in spiritual things, let nothing changeable that occurs to the mind be thought to be God. For it is no small part of knowledge, when we breathe up from this depth to that height, if, before we can know what God is, we can already know what he is not. For certainly he is not earth, nor heaven, nor something like earth and heaven, nor anything such as we see in the heaven, nor anything such as we do not see and is perhaps in the heaven. Nor, if you increase in the imagination of your thought the light of the sun as much as you can, whether to make it greater or brighter, a thousand times or countless times, is this God either. Nor is God as the angels are thought of, pure spirits breathing life into heavenly bodies, and changing and turning them at the will of him whom they serve; nor, if all of them, though they are “thousands of thousands,” were gathered into one and became one, is God anything of this kind; nor if you think of these same spirits without bodies, which is indeed most difficult for carnal thought. See, behold if you can, O soul weighed down by the body that is corrupted, and burdened with many and various earthly thoughts; see, behold if you can: God is truth. For this is written, “For God is light”: not as these eyes see, but as the heart sees, when you hear, “He is truth.” Do not ask what truth is; for at once the fogs of bodily images and the clouds of phantasms will set themselves in the way and disturb the clearness that dawned on you at the first flash, when I said, “Truth.” See, in that very first flash, by which you are dazzled as by lightning when “Truth” is said, remain if you can; but you cannot; you slip back into these usual and earthly things. By what weight, I ask, do you slip back, but by the birdlime of the desire for the filth you have contracted, and by the errors of your pilgrimage?

See again, if you can. Certainly you love nothing but the good, because the earth is good with the height of its mountains, the moderate rise of its hills, and the level of its plains; and a pleasant and fertile estate is good; and a house is good, laid out in balanced parts, spacious and bright; and animals, living bodies, are good; and air is good, mild and healthy; and food is good, pleasant and fit for health; and health is good, without pains and weariness; and a man's face is good, evenly proportioned, cheerful in expression, and bright in colour; and the mind of a friend is good, with the sweetness of agreement and the faithfulness of love; and a just man is good; and riches are good, because they readily help; and the sky is good with its sun and moon and stars; and the angels are good by their holy obedience; and speech is good that teaches the hearer pleasantly and admonishes him fittingly; and a song is good, weighty in its measures and its thoughts. Why say more and more? This is good and that is good: take away this and that, and see good itself, if you can; so you will see God, not good by another good, but the good of every good. For among all these good things, whether those I have mentioned or others that are seen or thought, we would not say, when we judge truly, that one is better than another, unless there were impressed on us the notion of good itself, according to which we both approve something and prefer one thing to another. So God is to be loved, not this or that good, but good itself. For the good of the soul is to be sought, not one over which it flies in judging, but one to which it cleaves in loving; and what is this but God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or a good sky, but the good good. For so perhaps what I mean to say is more easily noticed. For when I hear, for example, a mind called good, just as there are two words, so from those words I understand two things: one by which it is a mind, the other by which it is good. And indeed, that it might be a mind, it did nothing itself; for there was not yet anything that could act so that it might exist. But that it may be a good mind, I see that it must act by the will; not because that very thing by which it is a mind is not something good (for how else is it called, and most truly called, better than the body?), but it is not yet called a good mind because there remains for it the action of the will by which it may become more excellent; and if it neglects this, it is rightly blamed and rightly called not a good mind. For it differs from one that does this; and since that one is praiseworthy, this one, which does not do it, is certainly blameworthy. But when it does this with zeal and becomes a good mind, it cannot attain it unless it turns to something that it is not itself. And to what should it turn to become a good mind, but to the good, when it loves and desires and attains it? And if it turns away from it again and becomes not good, by the very fact that it turns away from the good, unless that good from which it turns away remains in itself, there is nothing to which it may turn again if it wishes to amend. Therefore there would be no changeable goods unless there were an unchangeable good. When, then, you hear of this good and that good, which can at other times be called not good, if you can see, without those things which are good by participation in the good, good itself, by participation in which they are good (for you understand it too at the same time, when you hear of this or that good), if, I say, you can, with those things taken away, see good by itself, you will have seen God. And if you cleave to him by love, you will at once be made blessed. And it is shameful, since other things are loved only because they are good, to cleave to them and not love the good itself from which they are good. That too, which is a mind only because it is a mind, not yet good in the way in which it turns itself to the unchangeable good, but, as I said, only a mind: when it pleases us so much that, if we understand rightly, we prefer it even to all bodily light, it pleases us not in itself but in that art by which it was made. For it is approved as made there where it is seen to have been worth making. This is truth and the simple good; for it is nothing other than good itself, and therefore also the highest good. For a good cannot be diminished or increased except one that is good from another good. The mind, therefore, turns itself in order to be good to that from which it has its being a mind. Then the will is in harmony with nature, so that the mind may be perfected in good, when that good is loved by the turning of the will, from which comes also that which is not lost even by the turning away of the will. For by turning away from the highest good the mind loses being a good mind; but it does not lose being a mind, since this too is already a good, better than the body. The will, then, loses what the will attains. For the mind already existed which could will to be turned to that from which it was; but what might have willed to be before it was did not yet exist. And this is our good, where we see whether a thing ought to have been or ought to be, whatever we grasp that it ought to have been or ought to be; and where we see that it could not have been unless it ought to have been, even whatever we do not grasp how it ought to have been. This good, then, is “not far from each one of us: for in him we live and move and are.”

But we must stand by love towards that good and cleave to it, so that we may enjoy the presence of him from whom we are, and in whose absence we could not even exist. For since “we still walk by faith, not by sight,” we certainly do not yet see God, as the same apostle says, “face to face”; yet unless we love him already now, we shall never see him. But who loves what he does not know? For something can be known and not loved; but whether what is not known can be loved, I ask; because if it cannot, no one loves God before he knows him. And what is it to know God but to behold him with the mind and to perceive him firmly? For he is not a body, to be searched out by eyes of flesh. But before we are able to behold and perceive God, as he can be beheld and perceived, which is granted to the pure in heart (for “blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”), unless he is loved by faith, the heart cannot be cleansed so as to be apt and fit to see him. For where are those three, for the building of which in the mind the whole structure of all the divine books rises up, faith, hope, and love, except in a mind that believes what it does not yet see, and hopes for and loves what it believes? He is loved, then, even when he is not known; yet he is believed. But surely we must take care lest the mind, believing what it does not see, invent for itself something that is not, and hope for and love what is false. If this happens, it will not be “love from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned,” which is “the end of the commandment,” as the same apostle says. But when we believe bodily things that we have read or heard of and have not seen, the mind must invent for itself something in the outlines and forms of bodies, as it occurs to it in thinking, which either is not true, or, even if it is true, which can very rarely happen, it is of no use to hold it by faith, but it is useful for something else which is suggested through it. For who, reading or hearing what the apostle Paul wrote, or what was written about him, does not invent in his mind both the face of the apostle himself and that of all whose names are mentioned there? And since in so great a multitude of men to whom those writings are known, one pictures the outlines and figure of those bodies one way and another another, who pictures them more nearly and more like is certainly uncertain. Nor is our faith concerned there with what bodily face those men had, but only that by the grace of God they so lived and did the things that that Scripture testifies; this it is useful to believe, and not to despair of, and to desire. For even the face of the Lord's flesh is varied and invented by the diversity of countless thoughts, though it was one, whatever it was. Nor in our faith which we have concerning the Lord Jesus Christ is what the mind invents for itself, perhaps far otherwise than the reality, the saving thing, but what we think of man according to the species; for we have, as it were fixed as a rule, a knowledge of human nature, according to which, whatever such thing we see, we at once know it to be a man or the form of a man.