On the Trinity 7.3–7.5

Why then is almost nothing ever said of wisdom in the Scriptures except to show that it is begotten or created by God? Begotten, namely, the wisdom through which all things were made; created or made, as in men, when they are turned to that wisdom which is not created and made but begotten, and are enlightened; for in them something comes to be which is called their wisdom. Or else the Scriptures foretell or narrate that “the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us”; for in this way Christ was made wisdom, because he was made man. Or is it that in those books wisdom does not speak, nor is anything said of it, except what shows it to be born of God or made, although the Father himself is also wisdom, because that wisdom was to be commended to us and imitated, by the imitation of which we are formed? For the Father speaks it, so that it is his Word: not as a sounding word is uttered from the mouth, or is thought before it is pronounced; for this is completed in spaces of time, but that is eternal, and by enlightening it speaks to us both of itself and of the Father what must be spoken to men. And therefore he says, “No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him”; because the Father reveals through the Son, that is, through his Word. For if this word which we utter, temporal and passing, shows both itself and what we are speaking about, how much more the Word of God, through whom all things were made? It shows the Father as the Father is, because it itself is so, and is what the Father is, according as it is wisdom and essence. For according as it is Word it is not what the Father is, because the Word is not the Father, and Word is said relatively, like Son, which the Father certainly is not. And therefore Christ is the power and wisdom of God, because from the Father, who is power and wisdom, he too is power and wisdom, as he is light from the Father who is light, and the fountain of life with God the Father, who is certainly the fountain of life. For “with you,” he says, “is the fountain of life, and in your light we shall see light”; because “as the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son to have life in himself”; and “he was the true light that enlightens every man coming into this world,” and this light, the Word, was with God, but the Word was also God. But “God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all”: a light not bodily but spiritual; and not spiritual in the sense of having been made by enlightening, as it was said to the apostles, “You are the light of the world,” but the light that enlightens every man, that very supreme wisdom, God, of which we are now treating. The Son, therefore, is wisdom from the Father who is wisdom, as light from light and God from God; so that the Father singly is light and the Son singly is light, the Father singly God and the Son singly God; therefore also the Father singly is wisdom and the Son singly is wisdom. And as both together are one light and one God, so both are one wisdom. But the Son “was made for us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification,” because we turn to him in time, that is, from some point in time, so as to remain with him for eternity. And he himself from a certain time “was made flesh and dwelt among us.” For this reason, then, when anything is pronounced or narrated in the Scriptures about wisdom, whether wisdom itself speaks or is spoken of, the Son is chiefly suggested to us. By the example of this Image let us also not depart from God, since we too are the image of God: not indeed equal, for it was made by the Father through the Son, not born of the Father like that one. And we are so because we are enlightened by light; but that one is so because it is light enlightening; and therefore that one, which has no example, is an example to us. For it does not imitate anyone going before it to the Father, from whom it is never at all separable, because it is the very same as he from whom it is. But we, striving, imitate him who abides, and follow him who stands, and walking in him we press on to him; because he was made for us a way in time through humility, who is our eternal dwelling through divinity. For since to pure intellectual spirits who have not fallen through pride he, “in the form of God” and “equal with God” and God, offers an example, so that he might offer the same example of return also to fallen man, who because of the uncleanness of sins and the punishment of mortality could not see God, “he emptied himself,” not by changing his divinity but by taking on our changeableness; and “taking the form of a servant” he came to us into this world, he who was in this world, because the world was made through him; so that he might be an example to those who see God above, an example to those who marvel at man below, an example to the healthy to persevere, an example to the sick to recover, an example to the dying not to fear, an example to the dead to rise again, “that in all things he himself might have the first place.” For since man ought to follow nothing but God to blessedness, and could not perceive God, by following God made man he would follow at once one whom he could perceive and one whom he ought to follow. Let us love him, then, and cleave to him, by “the love poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.” It is no wonder, then, that because of the example which the Image equal to the Father offers us, so that we may be re-formed to the image of God, when Scripture speaks of wisdom it speaks of the Son, whom we follow by living wisely; although the Father too is wisdom, as he is light and God. The Holy Spirit too, whether he is the supreme love joining both and joining us to them (which is not unworthily said, since it is written, “God is love”), how is he not also himself wisdom, since he is light, because “God is light”? Or if the essence of the Holy Spirit is to be named singly and properly in some other way, since he is God he is certainly light, and since he is light he is certainly wisdom. And that the Holy Spirit is God, Scripture cries out in the apostle, who says, “Do you not know that you are the temple of God?” and immediately adds, “and the Spirit of God dwells in you.” For God dwells in his temple. For the Spirit of God does not dwell in the temple of God as a servant, since he says more clearly in another place: “Do you not know that your bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom you have from God, and that you are not your own? For you were bought with a great price: glorify God, then, in your body.” And what is wisdom but spiritual and unchangeable light? For this sun too is light, but it is bodily; and the spiritual creature is light, but not unchangeable. The Father, then, is light, the Son light, the Holy Spirit light; but together not three lights but one light. And therefore the Father is wisdom, the Son wisdom, the Holy Spirit wisdom; and together not three wisdoms but one wisdom; and since there to be is the same as to be wise, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one essence. Nor is it there anything other to be than to be God: therefore the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God.

And so, for the sake of speaking about things unspeakable, so that we might in some way utter what we can in no way utter fully, our Greek brethren have said “one essence, three substances,” and the Latins “one essence or substance, three persons”; because, as we have already said, in our language, that is, Latin, essence is not usually understood as anything other than substance. And provided that what is said is understood at least “in a riddle,” it was agreed to speak so, in order that something might be said when it was asked what the three are, which the true faith declares to be three, since it says that the Father is not the Son, and that the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son. When, then, it is asked “three what?” or “three who?”, we set ourselves to find some specific or general name by which we may embrace these three, and none comes to mind, because the surpassing eminence of the Godhead exceeds the power of ordinary speech. For God is thought more truly than he is spoken of, and he is more truly than he is thought. For when we say that Jacob is not the same as Abraham, and that Isaac is neither Abraham nor Jacob, we certainly confess that they are three, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But when it is asked “three what?”, we answer “three men,” calling them in the plural by a specific name; or by a general name, if we say “three animals” (for man, as the ancients defined him, is a rational, mortal animal); or, as our Scriptures are accustomed to speak, “three souls,” when it is agreed to call the whole by its better part, that is, to call both body and soul, which is the whole man, by the soul. So it was said that seventy-five souls went down into Egypt with Jacob, meaning so many men. Again, when we say that your horse is not the one that is mine, and that a third belonging to someone else is neither mine nor yours, we confess that there are three; and to one who asks “three what?”, we answer “three horses” by a specific name, but “three animals” by a general one. Again, when we say that an ox is not a horse, and that a dog is neither an ox nor a horse, we speak of three things; and to those who ask “three what?”, we no longer say by a specific name three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because they are not contained in the same species, but by a general name, three animals; or by a higher genus, three substances, or three creatures, or three natures. Now whatever things are expressed in the plural specifically by one name can also be expressed generally by one name. But not all things that are called generally by one name can we also call specifically by one name. For three horses, which is a specific name, we also call three animals; but a horse, an ox, and a dog we call only three animals or substances, which are general names, or anything else that can be said generally of them; but we cannot call them three horses, or oxen, or dogs, which are specific words. For we express by one name, though in the plural, things that have in common what is signified by that name. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common what man is; and so they are called three men. A horse, an ox, and a dog also have in common what animal is; so they are called three animals. So three laurels we call also three trees; but a laurel, a myrtle, and an olive only three trees, or three substances, or three natures; and so three stones we call also three bodies; but a stone, a piece of wood, and a piece of iron only three bodies, or by some higher general name if they can be so called. Since, then, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three, let us ask what three they are, and what they have in common. For what the Father is is not common to them, so that they are fathers to one another; as friends, since they are spoken of relatively to each other, can be called three friends, because they are so to one another. But this is not so there, because only the Father is father there, and not father of two but of the only Son. Nor are they three sons, since the Father is not son there, nor the Holy Spirit. Nor three holy spirits, because the Holy Spirit too, in the proper sense in which he is also called the gift of God, is neither the Father nor the Son. Three what, then? For if three persons, what person is is common to them; so this is a specific or a general name for them, if we look to the usage of speech. But where there is no difference of nature, several things are expressed generally in such a way that they can also be expressed specifically. For it is the difference of nature that causes a laurel, a myrtle, and an olive, or a horse, an ox, and a dog, not to be called by a specific name, the former three laurels or the latter three oxen, but by a general one, the former three trees and the latter three animals. But here, where there is no difference of essence, these three ought to have a specific name, which yet is not found. For person is a general name, so much so that even a man can be called so, though there is such a great difference between man and God. Then, in this general word itself, if we say three persons because what person is is common to them (otherwise they could in no way be so called, just as they are not called three sons, because what son is is not common to them), why do we not also say three gods? For certainly, because the Father is a person, and the Son a person, and the Holy Spirit a person, therefore there are three persons; since, then, the Father is God, and the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, why not three gods? Or, since because of their unspeakable union these three together are one God, why not also one person, so that we could not say three persons, although we call each one singly a person, just as we cannot say three gods, although we call each one singly God, whether the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit? Is it because Scripture does not say three gods? But neither do we find Scripture mentioning three persons anywhere. Or is it because Scripture calls these three neither three persons nor one person (for we read of “the person of the Lord,” not of the Lord as a person), that it was therefore permitted, by the necessity of speaking and arguing, to say three persons, not because Scripture says it, but because Scripture does not contradict it; whereas if we said three gods, Scripture would contradict us, saying, “Hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one God”? Why then is it not permitted to say three essences either, since Scripture likewise neither says it nor contradicts it? For if essence is a specific name common to the three, why are they not called three essences, as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three men, because man is a specific name common to all men? But if essence is not a specific name but a general one, because a man, a beast, a tree, a star, and an angel are each called an essence, why are these not called three essences, as three horses are called three animals, and three laurels three trees, and three stones three bodies? Or if because of the unity of the Trinity they are not called three essences but one essence, why, because of the same unity of the Trinity, are they not called, not three substances or three persons, but one substance and one person? For as the name of essence is common to them, so that each one singly is called an essence, so is the word substance or person common to them. For what we have said must be understood of persons according to our usage, and of substances according to the usage of the Greeks. For they say three substances, one essence, as we say three persons, one essence or substance. What remains, then, but to confess that these words were produced by the necessity of speaking, when there was need of full argument against the snares or errors of the heretics? For when human poverty tried to bring out in speech to the senses of men what it holds, as far as it can grasp, in the inner chamber of the mind concerning the Lord God its Creator, whether by pious faith or by some kind of understanding, it feared to say three essences, lest any difference be understood in that supreme equality. On the other hand, it could not say that they are not three somethings, for Sabellius, because he said this, fell into heresy. For it is known most certainly from the Scriptures, what is to be believed piously, and it is grasped by the sight of the mind with undoubting perception, that there is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and that the Son is not the same as the Father, nor the Holy Spirit the same as either the Father or the Son. It sought what to call the three, and said substances or persons; by these names it did not wish difference to be understood, but did not wish singleness to be understood either; so that not only unity might be understood there, from saying one essence, but also trinity, from saying three substances or persons. For if for God to be is the same as to subsist, then three substances were not to be spoken of, just as three essences are not spoken of; in the same way, because for God to be is the same as to be wise, as we do not say three essences, so neither do we say three wisdoms. For so, because for him to be God is the same as to be, it is not right to say three essences any more than three gods. But if for God to be is one thing and to subsist another, as for God to be is one thing and to be Father or to be Lord another (for what he is is said with reference to himself, but Father is said with reference to the Son, and Lord with reference to the serving creature), then he subsists relatively, as he begets relatively and is Lord relatively. So substance will no longer be substance, because it will be relative. For just as essence is named from being (esse), so we name substance from subsisting (subsistere). But it is absurd for substance to be spoken of relatively; for every thing subsists with reference to itself; how much more God?

If indeed it is fitting that God be said to subsist. For this word is rightly understood of those things in which, as subjects, are the things said to be in some subject, as colour or shape in a body. For a body subsists, and therefore is a substance; but those things are in the subsisting and underlying body, and are not substances but in a substance; and therefore, if that colour or that shape ceases to be, they do not take from the body its being a body, because for it to be is not the same as to retain this or that shape or colour. Changeable and not simple things, therefore, are properly called substances. But if God subsists in such a way that he can properly be called a substance, there is something in him as in a subject, and he is not simple, he for whom to be is the same as whatever else is said of him with reference to himself, such as great, almighty, good, and anything of this kind that is not unfittingly said of God. But it is wicked to say that God subsists and underlies his goodness, and that that goodness is not substance or rather essence, and that God himself is not his goodness, but that it is in him as in a subject. Hence it is clear that God is called substance by a misuse of the word, so that by a more usual name may be understood essence, which is said truly and properly; so that perhaps God alone ought to be called essence. For he truly alone is, because he is unchangeable, and he declared this as his name to his servant Moses when he said, “I am who I am,” and, “You shall say to them: He who is has sent me to you.” But yet, whether he is called essence, which is said properly, or substance, which is said by misuse, both are said with reference to himself, not relatively to something. Hence for God to be is the same as to subsist; and therefore, if the Trinity is one essence, it is also one substance. Perhaps, then, it is more fitting to say three persons than three substances.