To Tatian on the Soul (complete)

… to send … and you thought it right to do this without using the testimonies of the Scriptures; though for those who wish to think piously the teaching of the Scriptures is in fact the true teaching, more demonstrative than any human reasoning. For you said that you sought this not for your own assurance, since you have already been trained to hold fast to the divine Scriptures and traditions and not to let your mind be shaken by the twists of human arguments, but for the overthrow of the opinion of the heterodox, who do not endure to be persuaded by the Scriptures but try by a certain cleverness to overturn those who are unused to such arguments. Therefore we were led to obey this command of yours readily, holding back nothing as though we were inexperienced in such construction of arguments, but trusting in your goodwill toward us. For you know how to set before the public what you judge to be good, and to [keep back] what falls short of what is needed, doing both out of kindness and friendship toward us. Knowing this, then, I have set out on the exposition with all confidence. I will make the argument following a certain order and sequence, which those also [follow] … who wish … First of all, then, I will lay down by what criterion …

… [whether the soul is a] body or incorporeal; then, whether it is simple or composite; then again, whether it is mortal …; last, … ; then, next, whether it is a substance; then, following these, whether … , whether rational or irrational. For these are the questions most usually asked in a discussion of the soul, as the most essential and the ones able to characterize its distinctive nature. As proofs to establish what will be examined we shall use common notions, whose credibility the matters at hand naturally attest. For brevity's sake and for usefulness we shall now use only those syllogisms that contain the proof bearing on what is necessary to the question, so that the thoughts, made clear and easy to accept, may give us a certain readiness in meeting our opponents. Let us begin the discussion here. By what criterion the soul is apprehended. 1. All things that exist are either known by sense or apprehended by thought. What falls under sense has sense as a sufficient proof; for at the very moment of contact it produces in us the impression of the object. But what is apprehended by thought is known not from itself but from its operations. The soul, then, being unknown from itself, [is known] from its [effects] … [Whether the soul exists.]

Our body, when it moves, is moved either from without or from within. That it is not moved from without is clear from the fact that it moves without being pushed or pulled, as inanimate things are. And again, though moved from within, it is not moved by nature, as fire is; for fire does not cease moving as long as it is fire, whereas the body, once it has become dead, is motionless though it is still a body. So if it is moved neither from without, as inanimate things are, nor by nature, as fire is, it is clear that it is moved by a soul, which also provides it with life. If, then, the soul is shown to provide life to our body, …

Whether the soul is a substance. 3. That the soul is a substance is shown thus. First, because the definition of substance may fittingly be said of it too. The definition is this: substance is that which, being the same and one in number, is capable of receiving contraries in turn. That the soul, without departing from its own nature, receives contraries in turn is clear to everyone: for justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, temperance and licentiousness are seen in it, and these are contraries. If, then, it is the property of a substance to be capable of receiving contraries in turn, and the soul is shown to admit this definition, the soul is therefore a substance. Next, since the body too is a substance, the soul too must be a substance; … [for it cannot be that what is given life] is … and that what gives life is without substance, unless one were to say that the non-existent is the cause of the existent; or again, that what has its existence in something and cannot exist without it is the cause of that in which it is, which only a madman would say.

Whether the soul is incorporeal. That the soul is in our body has been shown; we must then know how it is in the body. If it lies beside it as pebble beside pebble, the soul will be a body, and the whole body will not be … lies [beside it]. But if it is mingled or blended, the soul would become many-parted and not simple, expelled from the proper definition of the soul. For the many-parted is divisible and dissoluble; the dissoluble is composite; and the composite has three dimensions. And body added to body makes bulk; but the soul in the body makes no bulk but rather gives life. So the soul will not be a body, but incorporeal. Again, if the soul is a body, it is moved either from without or from within. But it is not moved from without, for it is not pushed or pulled, as inanimate things are; nor is it moved from within, as ensouled things are, for it is absurd to speak of a soul of the soul. So it will not be a body; it is therefore incorporeal. And again, if the soul is a body, it has sensible qualities and is nourished; but it is not nourished. And if it is nourished, it is not nourished bodily, as the body is, but incorporeally, for it is nourished by reason. So it does not have sensible qualities; for neither justice nor courage nor anything of the kind is seen, and these are the qualities of the soul. So it is not a body; it is therefore incorporeal. Again, since all bodily substance is divided into ensouled and soulless, let those who say the soul is a body tell us whether it is to be called soulless or ensouled. Again, if every body has color, quantity, and shape, and none of these is seen in the soul, the soul is therefore not a body.

Whether the soul is simple or composite. 5. That the soul is simple is shown, then, above all from the arguments by which it was proved incorporeal. For if it is not a body, and every body is composite, and what is composed is composed of parts and so will be many-parted, then, being incorporeal, it is simple, since it is both uncompounded and without parts.

Whether our soul is immortal. 6. I think immortality must follow from simplicity. And hear how: none of the things that exist is … destructive [of itself], since otherwise it would not even have come into being in the first place. For things that perish perish by their contraries; therefore everything that perishes is dissoluble; the dissoluble is composite; the composite is many-parted; what consists of parts plainly consists of different parts; and the different is not the same. So the soul, being simple and not composed of different parts, being uncompounded and indissoluble, will for this reason be incorruptible and immortal. Again, everything that is moved by something else, having its vital principle not from itself but from what moves it, lasts only as long as it is held together by the power working in it; and when the working power ceases, the thing that has its motion from it fails as well. But the soul, being self-moved, never ceases to be. For it follows from being self-moved that it is ever-moving; the ever-moving is unceasing; the unceasing is endless; the endless is incorruptible; the incorruptible is immortal. If, then, the soul is self-moving, as was shown above, it will be incorruptible and immortal by the argument already stated. Again, what is not destroyed by its own evil is indestructible. Evil is the contrary of good, and therefore destructive of it. For the evil of the body is nothing other than suffering, disease, and death, just as its virtue is beauty, life, health, and good condition. If, then, the soul is not destroyed by its own evil (and the evil of the soul is cowardice, licentiousness, envy, and the like, and none of these takes from it its life and motion), it is therefore immortal.

That our soul is rational one could show from many things. First, from its having discovered the arts, which are useful for life. For no one could say that the arts arose simply and by chance, since he could not show them to be idle and useless for life. [If, then, they are useful to] life, and the useful is praiseworthy, and the praiseworthy is constructed by reason, and these are [works] of the soul, our soul is therefore [rational]. Next, our soul is shown to be rational from the fact that our senses are not sufficient for grasping things. For we are not content with the impression of sense for knowing things, since we do not even wish to stop at them; at any rate, things equal in shape and alike in color but differing in nature, sense, being irrational, is too weak to distinguish. If, then, the senses, being irrational, produce in us a false impression of things, we must consider whether things can truly be apprehended or not. And if they can be apprehended, there is another power, stronger than the senses, which reaches them. But if they are not apprehended, neither will the things that are seen otherwise than they are be [apprehended] by us. That things can be apprehended by us is clear from the fact that we use each fittingly for what is useful, and again shape them into what we wish. So if things have been shown to be apprehensible by us, while the senses, being irrational, judge falsely, it will be the mind that discerns all things by reason and recognizes things as they truly are; and the mind is the rational part of the soul; the soul is therefore rational. Further, [it is shown] from our doing nothing without first … it in ourselves; and this is nothing other than a dignity of the soul. For knowledge of things does not come to it from outside; rather it adorns things, as it were, with its own conceptions. For this reason it first sketches them in itself and so brings them out into action. And the dignity of the soul is nothing other than doing all things with reason; in this it differs even from the senses. The soul has therefore been shown to be rational.