Against Celsus 4.58

We say this further to Celsus, who said, “The soul is the work of God, but the nature of the body is different,” and who threw out so great a doctrine not only without proof but also without definition; for he did not make clear whether every soul is the work of God, or only the rational soul. We say to him, then: If every soul is the work of God, clearly that of irrational and most worthless creatures is too, so that the nature of every body is different from that of the soul. He seems, however, in what follows, where he says that irrational animals are dearer to God than we are and have a purer notion of the divine, to represent not only the soul of men but much more that of irrational animals as the work of God; for this follows from saying that they are dearer to God than we are. But if only the rational soul is the work of God, first, he did not make this clear; and second, it follows from his speaking without definition about the soul, as if not every soul but only the rational one were the work of God, that the nature of every body is not different. And if the nature of every body is not different, but the body of each animal corresponds to its soul, clearly the body of the one whose soul is the work of God would differ from a body in which dwells a soul that is not the work of God. And so it will be false that the body of a bat, a worm, or a frog will not differ from that of a man.