Against Celsus 5.61–6.10

Next he says: "Let no one think that I am unaware that some of them will agree that their God is the same as that of the Jews, while others say he is another, to whom this one is opposed, and that the Son came from that other." If he thinks that the existence of many sects among Christians is an accusation against Christianity, why should not, by analogy, the disagreement among the schools of philosophers, not about small and ordinary matters but about the most essential, be thought an accusation against philosophy? It is time for medicine too to be accused because of its schools. Let there be among us, then, those who say that God is not the same as the God of the Jews; but those who show from the same writings that the God of the Jews and of the nations is one and the same are not therefore to be accused, as Paul too plainly says, who came over to Christianity from the Jews: "I thank my God, whom I serve, as my forefathers did, with a pure conscience." Let there be also a third kind, those who call some people natural and others spiritual; I think he means the followers of Valentinus. And what has this to do with us of the church, who accuse those who introduce natures saved by their constitution or lost by their constitution? Let there be also some who profess to be Gnostics, like the Epicureans who proclaim themselves philosophers. But neither would those who do away with providence truly be philosophers, nor would those who have introduced strange fabrications, which do not please those in the succession from Jesus, be Christians. Let there be also some who accept Jesus and on that account boast of being Christians, yet still wish to live according to the Jewish law like the multitudes of the Jews; these are the two kinds of Ebionites, who either confess, as we do, that Jesus was born of a virgin, or that he was not born so but like other human beings: what charge does this bring against those of the church, whom Celsus named after their great number ("the great church")? He said that there are also some Sibyllists, perhaps having misheard some who accuse those who think the Sibyl was a prophetess and call such people Sibyllists.

Then, pouring a heap of names over us, he says he knows also of some Simonians, who, revering Helena or a teacher Helenus, are called Helenians. But it escapes Celsus that the Simonians in no way confess Jesus as the Son of God, but call Simon the power of God, telling marvels about him, since he thought that if he pretended to do things like those Jesus seemed to have done, he too would have as much power among human beings as Jesus had among the many. But neither Celsus nor Simon could understand how Jesus, as a good "farmer" of the word of God, was able to sow much of Greece and much of the barbarian world and fill it with words that transfer the soul from all evil and lead it up to the Creator of the universe. Celsus, then, knows also of Marcellians from Marcellina, and Harpocratians from Salome, and others from Mariamme, and others from Martha; but we, who out of love of learning, as far as we could, have examined not only the contents of our faith and the differences within it, but also, as far as possible, investigated with love of truth the views of the philosophers, have never met these. Celsus also mentioned Marcionites, who have Marcion as their head.

Then, so as to seem to know others besides those he named, he says, in his usual way, that "some have one teacher and demon, others another, wandering miserably and rolling about in great darkness, more lawless and foul than the revellers of Antinous in Egypt." And in touching on the facts he seems to me to have said something true: that some, wandering miserably and rolling about in the great darkness of ignorance, have found one demon or another as their patron. About Antinous, who is compared with our Jesus, we have spoken earlier and will not repeat ourselves. "And these people," he says, "utter against one another dreadful blasphemies, speakable and unspeakable; and they would not yield in the slightest to agreement, loathing one another utterly." To this too we have said that in philosophy and in medicine one can find schools warring with schools. But we who follow the word of Jesus, and have trained ourselves to think and say and do his words, "when reviled, we bless; when persecuted, we endure; when slandered, we entreat"; and we would not say things speakable and unspeakable against those who hold views different from ours; but, if we can, we would do everything to change them for the better, by attaching themselves to the Creator alone and doing everything as those who will be judged. And if those of other opinions are not persuaded, we keep the word that commanded such things about them: "After a first and a second warning, have nothing more to do with a heretical man, knowing that such a person is perverted and sins, being self-condemned." Further, those who have understood "Blessed are the peacemakers" and "Blessed are the meek" would not loathe those who debase the things of Christianity, nor would they call those who have gone astray Circes and wily deceivers.

He seems to me to have misheard both the apostle's words that say, "In later times some will depart from the faith, paying attention to deceitful spirits and teachings of demons, through the hypocrisy of liars whose own conscience is seared, who forbid marriage and require abstinence from foods which God created to be received with thanksgiving by the faithful," and those who have used these words of the apostle against those who have debased the things of Christianity. That is why Celsus said that some among the Christians are called "cauteries of the ear." He says also that some are called "riddles," which we have not come across. It is true that the word "stumbling block" occurs often in these writings, which we are accustomed to use of those who pervert the simpler and easily deceived from sound teaching. As for "certain Sirens dancing lewdly and sophistical, sealing up the ears and giving swine's heads to those who obey them," we do not know of any so named, nor, I think, does anyone else among those of our faith or in the sects. But this man, who professes to know everything, says such things too: "And you will hear," he says, "all of them, though so divided and refuting one another most shamefully in their quarrels, saying: 'The world has been crucified to me, and I to the world.'" This seems to be the only thing Celsus remembers from Paul; for why do we not also quote countless other things written, such as: "For though we live in the flesh, we do not wage war according to the flesh; for the weapons of our warfare are not fleshly but powerful for God for the destruction of strongholds, destroying reasonings and every high thing raised up against the knowledge of God"?

And since he says "you will hear all of them, though so divided, saying: 'The world has been crucified to me, and I to the world,'" we will refute this falsehood too. For there are some sects that do not accept the letters of the apostle Paul, such as both kinds of Ebionites and those called Encratites. Those who do not use the apostle as a blessed and wise man would not, then, say "The world has been crucified to me, and I to the world"; so Celsus lies in this too. And he dwells on accusing the differences among the sects; but he does not seem to me to distinguish at all clearly what he says, nor to have considered it carefully, nor to have understood how the Christians advanced in learning say they know more than the Jews, and whether they do so while accepting the books but interpreting their sense differently, or not even accepting their writings; for we would find both among the sects. After this he says: "Come then, even if they have no foundation for their doctrine, let us examine the doctrine itself. But first we must state what they have misheard and corrupt through ignorance, arrogantly overbearing, without good taste, right from the beginning about things they do not know; these are the following." And at once, against certain expressions constantly used by those who believe in the Christian doctrine, he sets passages from the philosophers, wishing to show that the good things that Celsus supposes are said among Christians have been said both better and more clearly among the philosophers, so as to draw toward philosophy those who are captivated by doctrines that plainly display what is noble and pious. And ending the fifth book here, let us begin the sixth from what follows.

In beginning this sixth book against Celsus's accusations against the Christians, holy Ambrose, we do not intend to contend in it against the things he sets out from philosophy, as someone might suppose. For Celsus has quoted a great many passages, chiefly from Plato, setting side by side with them those passages from the sacred writings that can impress even an intelligent man, and claiming that these things were said better among the Greeks, and without exaggerated claims and the profession that they come from God or the Son of God. We say, then, that if the aim of those who are ambassadors of the truth is to benefit as many as possible and, so far as they can, to bring to it out of love for mankind everyone whatever, not only the clever but also the foolish, and again not only Greeks but also barbarians (and it is a great mark of gentleness if one is able to convert even the most boorish and unlearned), it is plain that such a person must take care to use a style of speaking that is of common benefit and able to win over every hearer. But those who have bidden a long farewell to the unlearned as though they were slaves, unable to follow a train of thought set out in polished phrasing and ordered arrangement, and have cared only for those brought up in literature and learning, have confined what is meant for all into a very narrow and small compass.

I have said this in defence against the charge brought by Celsus and others concerning the plainness of style in the Scriptures, which seems to be put in the shade by the brilliance of elegant composition. For our prophets, Jesus and his apostles, had regard to a manner of expression that not only contains the truth but is also able to win over the many, until, once encouraged and brought in, each according to his ability ascends to the things spoken in an ineffable way in words that seem plain. And if one may venture to say it, the very beautiful and studied style of Plato and of those who wrote in a similar way has benefited few, if indeed it has benefited any; but the style of those who taught and wrote more plainly, yet practically and with an eye to the many, has benefited more. One can see, at any rate, that Plato is in the hands only of those who are thought to be lovers of letters, while Epictetus is admired even by ordinary people who have an inclination to be helped, since they perceive the improvement that comes from his discourses. We say this not to find fault with Plato (for the great world of mankind has usefully produced him too), but to show the intention of those who said: “My speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, that our faith might not rest in the wisdom of men but in the power of God.” The divine word says that what is spoken, even if it is true in itself and most persuasive, is not sufficient to reach the human soul unless some power is also given from God to the speaker and grace blossoms on what is said, and this grace itself does not come to those who speak effectively without God. So the prophet says in the sixty-seventh Psalm: “The Lord will give a word to those who preach the good news with great power.” Grant, then, that in some cases the same doctrines are found among the Greeks and among those of our faith; yet they do not have the same power to win souls and dispose them accordingly. That is why the disciples of Jesus, unlearned as far as Greek philosophy is concerned, went round many nations of the world, disposing each of their hearers, as the Word wished, according to his worth; and these, in proportion to the inclination of their free will toward accepting the good, became much better.

Let the ancient and wise men, then, make themselves known to those who are able to understand; and let Plato, the son of Ariston, point out what concerns the first good in one of his letters, and say that the first good is in no way “expressible,” “but from long association” it comes to be, and “suddenly, like light kindled from a leaping fire, in the soul.” When we hear these words we too agree with them as well said, “for God revealed” these things “to them,” and whatever else has been well said. For this very reason we say that those who have grasped the truth about God, but have not practised the piety worthy of the truth about him, are liable to the punishments of sinners. For Paul says of such people in these very words: “The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who hold down the truth in unrighteousness, because what can be known of God is manifest among them; for God revealed it to them. For his invisible things are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, both his eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse; because, although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks, but became futile in their reasonings, and their senseless heart was darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man and of birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things.” So those who hold that the first good is “in no way expressible,” and who say that “from long association with the matter itself and living with it, suddenly, like light kindled from a leaping fire, it comes to be in the soul and then nourishes itself,” do “hold” the “truth,” as our own Scripture also testifies.

But those who wrote such things about the first good go down “to the Piraeus” to pray to Artemis as to a god and to watch the festival held by ordinary people. And after philosophizing so loftily about the soul and describing the way of life of the soul that has lived well, they abandon the greatness of what “God revealed to them” and think mean and small thoughts, paying “a cock to Asclepius.” And though they imagined God's “invisible things” and the Ideas “from the creation of the world” and from sensible things, from which they ascend to the things known by the mind, and saw not ignobly his eternal power and divinity, they nonetheless “became futile in their reasonings,” and their “senseless heart,” so to speak, wallows in darkness and ignorance about the worship of the divine. And one can see men who pride themselves greatly on wisdom and theology worshipping “the likeness of an image of corruptible man,” in his honour, they say, and at times even going down with the Egyptians to birds or four-footed beasts or creeping things. And even if some seem to have risen above these things, they will nonetheless be found to have “exchanged the truth of God for a lie” and to “worship and serve the creature rather than the Creator.” Therefore, since the wise and learned among the Greeks go astray in their practice concerning the divine, “God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the wise,” and “the low-born” and “the weak” and “the despised” and “the things that are not, to bring to nothing the things that are,” and truly “that no flesh might boast before God.” But our first wise men, Moses, the most ancient, and the prophets after him, knowing that the first good is “in no way expressible,” wrote, as though God showed himself to those who are worthy and fitted for it, that God “appeared,” for example, to Abraham or to Isaac or to Jacob. But who he was that appeared, and of what kind, and in what manner, and to which of the faculties within us, they left to be examined by those able to make themselves like those to whom God appeared; for he was seen by them not with the eyes of the body but with the pure heart. For according to our Jesus, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.”

But that “suddenly, like light kindled from a leaping fire,” light is kindled “in the soul,” the word of God knew first, when it said in the prophet: “Light for yourselves the light of knowledge.” And John, who lived later than he, says that “what came to be” in the Word “was life, and the life was the light of men,” which “true light enlightens every man coming into the” true and intelligible “world,” and makes him “the light of the world.” For this light “shone in our hearts to give the light of the gospel of the glory of God in the face of Christ.” That is why a very ancient prophet, who prophesied many generations before the reign of Cyrus (for he was older than him by more than fourteen generations), says: “The Lord is my light and my saviour; whom shall I fear?” and “Your law is a lamp to my feet and a light to my paths,” and “The light of your face has been signed upon us, O Lord,” and “In your light we shall see light.” And the word in Isaiah, urging us to this light, says: “Be enlightened, be enlightened, Jerusalem, for your light has come, and the glory of the Lord has risen upon you.” And this same prophet, prophesying about the coming of Jesus, who would turn men away from the worship of idols and statues and demons, says: “To those who sat in the region and shadow of death a light has risen,” and again: “The people who sat in darkness have seen a great light.” See, then, the difference between what Plato said well about the first good and what is said in the prophets about the light of the blessed; and see that the truth about this in Plato did not help his readers toward pure piety, nor even the man himself who philosophized so about the first good, whereas the plain style of the divine writings has filled with divine inspiration those who read them sincerely. In them this light is nourished by the oil spoken of in a certain parable, which keeps the light of the torches burning in the five wise virgins.

Since Celsus also sets out another passage from Plato's letter, which runs thus: “If it had seemed to me that these things could be adequately written or spoken for the many, what finer thing could I have done in my life than to write something of great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of things to light for all?”, let us discuss this too briefly. Whether Plato held something more sacred than what he wrote and more divine than what he left behind, or not, we leave to each to examine as he can; but we will show that our prophets too had in mind certain things greater than what is written, which they did not write. For Ezekiel receives a roll “of a book” written “in front” and behind, in which were “lamentation and song and woe,” and at the command of the Word he eats the book, so that he might not write it and betray it to the unworthy. And John too is recorded to have seen and done something similar. Moreover, Paul “heard inexpressible words, which it is not permitted for a man to speak.” And Jesus, who is greater than all these, is said to have spoken the word of God “to his disciples privately,” and especially in his withdrawals; but what he said has not been recorded. For it did not “seem” to them that these things “could be adequately written for the many” or “spoken.” And if it is not tiresome to speak the truth about such great men, I say that, from the thoughts they received by the grace of God, these men saw better than Plato what things are “to be written” and how, and what are in no way “to be written for the many,” and what are “to be spoken” and what are not. And again John, teaching us the difference between what is to be written and what is not, says that he heard seven thunders instructing him about certain things and forbidding him to commit their words to writing.

And many things may be found in Moses and the prophets, who are older not only than Plato but also than Homer and the invention of writing among the Greeks, that are worthy of the grace of God given to them and full of greatness of mind; and they did not say such things, as Celsus supposes, because they had misunderstood Plato. For how could they have heard a man who had not yet been born? And even if someone applies Celsus's argument to the apostles of Jesus, who lived later than Plato, see whether it is not plainly unconvincing to say that Paul the tentmaker, and Peter the fisherman, and John who left his father's nets, handed down such teachings about God because they had misunderstood what Plato says in his letters. Celsus has already harped many times on our being required to believe at once, and he says it again as though it were something new beside what he had said before; what we have said on these points is enough for us. But since he also sets out another passage of Plato, in which he says that wisdom shines upon those who philosophize after his manner “as they use questions and answers,” let us show from the sacred writings that the divine word too urges us to dialectic: in one place Solomon says, “Instruction that is not examined goes astray,” and in another Jesus the son of Sirach, who left us the book called Wisdom, says, “The knowledge of the senseless is words that have not been examined.” Kindly refutations are, then, rather to be found among us, who have learned that the one who presides over the word must be able “to refute those who contradict.” And if some are negligent, not training themselves to attend to the divine readings and to “search the Scriptures,” and, according to the commandment of Jesus, to seek the meaning of the Scriptures, to ask God about them, and to knock at what is shut in them, that does not make the word empty of wisdom.

Then, after other Platonic passages which show that the good is known “to few,” since the many, filled “with an improper contempt” and “a lofty and empty hope,” say certain things as true “as though they had learned something sacred,” Celsus says: Although Plato said this beforehand, he nevertheless does not tell marvels, nor does he stop the tongue of the one who wishes to inquire what it is that he professes; nor does he command people to believe at the outset that God is of such a kind and has such a Son, and that this Son came down and conversed with me. To this I say that about Plato, Aristander, I believe, wrote that he was not the son of Ariston but of a phantom that approached Amphictione in the form of Apollo; and a good many other Platonists have said such things in their Life of Plato. And about Pythagoras, who told a great many marvels, who showed his ivory thigh at a festival of the Greeks and said he had recognized the shield he had used when he was Euphorbus, and who is said to have appeared in two cities on one day, what need is there even to speak? And anyone who wishes to accuse the stories about Plato and Socrates of marvel-mongering will set out the swan that was introduced to Socrates in his sleep, and the teacher saying, when the youth was introduced to him, “So this was the swan.” And he will count as a marvel the third eye that Plato saw himself as having. Nor will slander and abuse be lacking to the malicious who wish to disparage the things that have appeared to superior men beyond the many; such people will also mock Socrates' divine sign as a fiction. We, then, are not telling marvels when we relate the things about Jesus, nor did his genuine disciples write such stories about him. But Celsus, who professes to know everything and quotes much of Plato, deliberately, I think, passes over in silence the saying about a son of God found in Plato in his letter to Hermias and Coriscus. The words of Plato run as follows: “and swearing by the God of all things, the ruler of what is and of what is to be, and the Father and Lord of the ruler and cause, whom, if we truly philosophize, we shall all know clearly, so far as is possible for fortunate men.”

Celsus also sets out another passage of Plato which runs thus: “I have it in mind to speak about these things at still greater length; for perhaps what I am saying would be clearer if this were said. There is a true argument that stands against anyone who dares to write anything at all about such matters, an argument I have often stated before, but it seems that it must be stated now too. For each of the things that exist there are three things through which knowledge must come; knowledge itself is the fourth; and as fifth one must posit the thing itself, which is knowable and truly real. Of these, one is the name, the second the definition, the third the image, and the fourth knowledge.” Along these lines we might say that John, “the voice of one crying in the wilderness,” was brought in before Jesus as the counterpart of Plato's name; and second, after John and pointed out by him, is Jesus, to whom applies “The Word became flesh,” being the counterpart of Plato's definition (logos). Plato says the third is the image. But we, assigning the term image to something else, will say more clearly that the imprint of the wounds which comes to be in the soul after the Word, that is, the Christ in each person that comes from Christ the Word, is the third. And whether Christ, the wisdom “among” our “perfect,” is the counterpart of the fourth, which is knowledge, anyone who is able will consider.

Then Celsus says: You see how Plato, although he firmly declared that the good is not “expressible,” nevertheless, so as not to seem to take refuge in what cannot be examined, gives a reasoned account of this difficulty; for perhaps even “nothing” might be “expressible.” But since he brings this forward to establish that one should not simply believe but should give a reasoned account of what is believed, we too shall use a saying of Paul that rebukes the person who believes at random, in which he says: “unless you believed in vain.” Celsus, so far as it rests with him, forces us to repeat ourselves by repeating himself, saying, after the boasts he spoke of as those of boasters, that Plato does not boast and lie by claiming that he himself has discovered something new or has come from heaven to announce it, but acknowledges where these things come from. Someone wishing to answer Celsus might say to this too that Plato also boasts in the speech of Zeus in the Timaeus, where he says: “Gods of gods, whose maker and father I am,” and so on. But if someone defends these words by the meaning of the Zeus who makes the speech in Plato, why should not one who examines the meaning of the words of the Son of God, or of those spoken by the Creator in the prophets, say something even greater than the speech of Zeus in the Timaeus? For what marks divinity is the announcement of future things, spoken not according to human nature, which are shown by their fulfilment to have been announced by a divine Spirit. We do not, then, say to everyone who comes to us, “First believe that the one I am introducing to you is the Son of God”; but we bring the word to each one in the way suited to his character and condition, since we have learned “to know how we ought to answer each one.” And there are some to whom, since they can do no more than be urged to believe, we preach this; but others we approach, so far as possible, by demonstration through questions and answers. Nor do we say what Celsus mockingly says, “Believe that the one I am introducing to you is the Son of God, even though he was bound most dishonourably and punished most shamefully, even though only yesterday or the day before he was rolled about most disgracefully before the eyes of all.” Nor do we say, “For this reason believe all the more.” For on each point we try to say even more than we set out above.