On the Trinity 6.9–7.2

And since we have shown how the Father can be called alone, because no one but he is Father there, we must consider that statement by which it is said that the only true God is not the Father alone, but the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. For if someone asks whether the Father alone is God, how shall we answer that he is not, unless perhaps we say that the Father is indeed God, but not that he is God alone, and that God alone is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit? But what do we do with that testimony of the Lord? For he was speaking to the Father, and had named as Father the one he was addressing, when he said: “And this is eternal life, that they may know you, the one true God.” The Arians usually take this as if the Son were not true God. Setting them aside, we must see whether we are compelled to understand, when it is said to the Father, “that they may know you, the one true God,” that he meant to suggest that the Father alone is also true God, lest we should not understand by “God” anything but the three together, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Do we then, from the Lord's testimony, call both the Father the one true God, and the Son the one true God, and the Holy Spirit the one true God, and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit together, that is, the Trinity itself together, not three true gods but one true God? Or, since he added, “and Jesus Christ whom you have sent,” must “the one true God” be understood again, and is the order of the words, “that they may know you and Jesus Christ whom you have sent as the one true God”? Why then did he say nothing of the Holy Spirit? Is it because it follows that wherever one is named who cleaves to one with such great peace that through it both are one, that peace itself is understood from this, although it is not mentioned? For in that place too the apostle seems, as it were, to pass over the Holy Spirit, and yet he is understood there as well, where he says, “All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's”; and again, “The head of the woman is the man, the head of the man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God.” But again, if God is only the three together, how is God the head of Christ, that is, the Trinity the head of Christ, when Christ is in the Trinity so that it is the Trinity? Or is what the Father is with the Son the head of what the Son alone is? For with the Son the Father is God, but the Son alone is Christ; especially since it is now the Word made flesh who speaks, according to whose humility the Father is also greater, as he says, “For the Father is greater than I”; so that the very being God, which he has as one with the Father, is the head of the man who is Mediator, which he alone is. For if we rightly call the mind the governing part of man, that is, as it were the head of human substance, although man himself is man together with the mind, why is not the Word, which with the Father together is God, much more fittingly and much more the head of Christ, although Christ as man cannot be understood except with the Word that was made flesh? But this, as we have said, we shall consider somewhat more carefully later. For now the equality of the Trinity and its one and the same substance have been shown as briefly as we could, so that however this question stands, which we have put off to be discussed with closer attention, nothing may prevent us from confessing the supreme equality of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

A certain writer, wishing to suggest as briefly as possible what is proper to each of the persons in the Trinity, said, “Eternity in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift.” And since he was a man of no small authority in treating the Scriptures and in asserting the faith (for it was Hilary who put this in his books), I have searched as far as I am able into the hidden meaning of these words, that is, of Father, Image, and Gift, of eternity, form, and use; and I think he did not follow anything in the word “eternity” except that the Father has no father from whom he is, while the Son is from the Father in order to be, and to be coeternal with him. For an image, if it perfectly fills that of which it is the image, is made equal to it, not it to its image. In this Image he named form, I believe, because of beauty, where there is already such great harmony, and first equality, and first likeness, differing in nothing, unequal in no way, and unlike in no part, but corresponding exactly to that of which it is the image. There is the first and highest life, for which it is not one thing to live and another to be, but to be and to live are the same; and the first and highest understanding, for which it is not one thing to live and another to understand, but what is understanding is living and is being, all one; like a perfect Word, to which nothing is lacking, and as it were the art of the almighty and wise God, full of all the living, unchangeable reasons; and all are one in it, as it is itself one from one, with whom it is one. There God knew all things that he made through it; and therefore, though times pass away and follow one another, nothing passes away from or is added to the knowledge of God. For these created things are not known by God because they were made; rather, they were made, even though changeable, because they are known unchangeably by him. That unspeakable embrace, then, of the Father and the Image is not without enjoyment, without love, without joy. That love, delight, happiness, or blessedness, then, if it can be worthily expressed by any human word, he called briefly “use”; and it is in the Trinity the Holy Spirit, not begotten, but the sweetness of the begetter and the begotten, pouring forth with vast bounty and abundance on all creatures according to their capacity, so that they keep their order and rest in their places. All these things, then, which were made by divine art, show in themselves a certain unity, form, and order. For each of them is both some one thing, as are the natures of bodies and the dispositions of souls; and is shaped by some form, as are the shapes or qualities of bodies and the learning or skills of souls; and seeks or keeps some order, as are the weights or placements of bodies and the loves or delights of souls. We must, then, perceiving the Creator through the things that are made with the understanding, understand the Trinity, a trace of which appears in the creature, as is fitting. For in that Trinity is the supreme source of all things, the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed delight. And so those three seem both to be defined in relation to one another and to be infinite in themselves. But here in bodily things one thing is not as much as three together, and two are something more than one; but in that supreme Trinity one is as much as the three together, and two are not more than one. And they are infinite in themselves. So each is in each, and all in each, and each in all, and all in all, and all are one. Whoever sees this, even in part, or “through a mirror and in a riddle,” let him rejoice in knowing God, and honour him as God, and give thanks; but whoever does not see it, let him strive through piety to see it, not through blindness to slander it. For God is one, yet a Trinity. Nor is “from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things” to be taken confusedly; nor is it said to many gods, but “to him be glory for ever and ever. Amen.”

Now let us inquire more carefully, as far as God grants, into what we put off a little earlier: whether each person in the Trinity, singly and by itself, not with the other two, can be called God, or great, or wise, or true, or almighty, or just, and whatever else can be said of God not relatively but with reference to himself; or whether these things are said only when the Trinity is understood. For this raises the question, because it is written that Christ is “the power of God and the wisdom of God”: whether he is the father of his wisdom and power in such a way that he is wise by this wisdom which he begot, and powerful by this power which he begot; and, because he is always powerful and wise, he always begot power and wisdom. For we had said: if this is so, why is he not also the father of his greatness by which he is great, and of his goodness by which he is good, and of his justice by which he is just, and of whatever else there may be? Or if all these, under several names, are understood in the same wisdom and power, so that the greatness is the same as the power, the goodness the same as the wisdom, and again the wisdom the same as the power, as we have already discussed, let us remember that when I name any of these it is to be taken as though I named them all. It is asked, then, whether the Father too, singly, is wise and is himself his own wisdom, or whether he is wise in the way that he is speaking. For he is speaking by the Word whom he begot: not by a word that is uttered, sounds, and passes, but by the Word who was with God, and the Word was God, and all things were made through him; by the Word equal to himself, by whom he always and unchangeably speaks himself. For he is not himself the word, just as he is not the son or the image. But speaking (setting aside those temporal utterances of God which are made in the creature, for they sound and pass away), speaking, then, by that coeternal Word, he is not understood singly, but with that Word, without whom he is certainly not speaking. Is he then wise as he is speaking, so that he is wisdom as he is the Word, and to be the Word is the same as to be wisdom, and also to be power, so that power, wisdom, and Word are the same, and are said relatively, like Son and image; and he is not powerful or wise singly, but with the very power and wisdom which he begot, just as he is not speaking singly, but by that Word and with that Word which he begot; and so he is great by and with the greatness which he begot? And if he is not great by one thing and God by another, but great by that by which he is God, since for him to be great is not other than to be God, it follows that neither is he God singly, but by and with the deity which he begot; so that the Son is the deity of the Father, as he is the wisdom and power of the Father, and as he is the Word and image of the Father. And since for him to be is not other than to be God, the Son would also be the essence of the Father, as he is his Word and image. And so, apart from the fact that he is Father, the Father would not be anything except because he has a Son: so that not only what is called Father (which is clearly said not with reference to himself but relatively to the Son, and he is Father because he has a Son), but absolutely whatever he is with reference to himself, he would be because he begot his essence. For just as he is great only by the greatness which he begot, so he is only by the essence which he begot, since for him to be is not other than to be great. Is he, then, the father of his essence as he is the father of his greatness, as he is the father of his power and wisdom? For his greatness is the same as his power, and his essence the same as his greatness. This discussion arose from what is written, that Christ is “the power of God and the wisdom of God.” And so our speech is driven into such straits, when we desire to speak the unspeakable, that we must either say that Christ is not the power of God and the wisdom of God, and so impudently and impiously resist the apostle; or confess that Christ is indeed the power of God and the wisdom of God, but that his Father is not the father of his power and wisdom, which is no less impious (for then he will not be the Father of Christ either, since Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God); or that the Father is not powerful by his own power nor wise by his own wisdom, and who would dare to say that?; or that in the Father to be is understood as one thing and to be wise as another, so that he does not exist by the very thing by which he is wise, which is usually understood of the soul, which is sometimes foolish and sometimes wise, as a changeable nature and not supremely and perfectly simple; or that the Father is not anything with reference to himself, and that not only what he is as Father but absolutely what he is is said relatively to the Son. How then is the Son of the same essence as the Father, since with reference to himself the Father is neither essence nor exists at all with reference to himself, but even his being is relative to the Son? But surely they are much more of one and the same essence, since the Father and the Son are one and the same essence, seeing that for the Father his very being is not with reference to himself but relative to the Son, whom he begot as his essence, and by which essence he is whatever he is. Then neither is with reference to himself, and each is spoken of relatively to the other? Or is the Father alone spoken of relatively to the Son, not only in that he is called Father but in whatever he is called, while the Son is spoken of also with reference to himself? And if so, what is said of him with reference to himself? Essence itself? But the Son is the essence of the Father, as he is the power and wisdom of the Father, as he is the Word of the Father and the image of the Father. Or if the Son is called essence with reference to himself, while the Father is not essence but the begetter of essence, and does not exist with reference to himself but by this very essence which he begot, as he is great by this very greatness which he begot, then the Son is also called greatness with reference to himself, and so also power, and wisdom, and Word, and image. But what is more absurd than for image to be said with reference to itself? Or if image and Word are not the same as power and wisdom, but the former are said relatively and the latter with reference to themselves, not to another, then the Father begins not to be wise by the wisdom which he begot, because he cannot be spoken of relatively to it without its being spoken of relatively to him. For all things that are said relatively are said reciprocally. It remains, therefore, that the Son is spoken of relatively to the Father even as essence. From this a most unexpected sense results: that essence itself is not essence, or at least that when essence is said, not essence but something relative is indicated. As when “master” is said, not an essence is indicated, but something relative, which is referred to a servant; but when “man” is said, or anything of the kind which is said with reference to itself, not to another, then an essence is indicated. When, then, a man is called master, the man himself is an essence, while he is called master relatively: for man is said with reference to himself, master with reference to the servant. But in the matter we are dealing with, if essence itself is said relatively, essence itself is not essence. Add to this that every essence that is spoken of relatively is also something apart from the relation: as a man is a master, a man a servant, a horse a beast of burden, and a coin a deposit; man, horse, and coin are said with reference to themselves, and are substances or essences, but master, servant, beast of burden, and deposit are said relatively to something. But if there were no man, that is, some substance, there would be no one to be called master relatively; and if the horse were not some essence, there would be nothing to be called a beast of burden relatively; so if the coin were not some substance, it could not be called a deposit relatively. Therefore, if the Father too is not anything with reference to himself, there is no one at all to be spoken of relatively to something. For it is not as with colour, which is referred to something coloured and is not said at all with reference to itself, but always belongs to something coloured, while the thing whose colour it is, even if, in being called coloured, it is referred to the colour, yet in being called a body is said with reference to itself: in no way are we to think that the Father is not called anything with reference to himself, but that whatever he is called is said with reference to the Son, while the same Son is said both with reference to himself and with reference to the Father, when he is called great greatness and powerful power, certainly with reference to himself, and the greatness and power of the great and powerful Father, by which the Father is great and powerful. It is not so, then; but both are substance, and both are one substance. And just as it is absurd to say that whiteness is not white, so it is absurd to say that wisdom is not wise; and just as whiteness is called white with reference to itself, so wisdom too is called wise with reference to itself. But the whiteness of a body is not an essence, since the body itself is the essence and whiteness its quality; hence the body is called white from it, though for the body to be is not the same as to be white. For there form is one thing and colour another, and both exist not in themselves but in some mass, which is neither form nor colour but formed and coloured. True wisdom, however, is both wise and wise by itself. And since any soul that becomes wise by participation in wisdom, if it becomes foolish again, wisdom nevertheless remains in itself, and when the soul has been changed into folly, wisdom is not changed: it is not in the one who becomes wise from it as whiteness is in the body which is white from it. For when the body has been changed into another colour, that whiteness will not remain, but will cease to be altogether. But if the Father, who begot wisdom, also becomes wise from it, and to be is not for him the same as to be wise, then the Son is his quality, not his offspring, and there will no longer be supreme simplicity there. But far be it that it should be so; for there is truly a supremely simple essence there: therefore to be is the same there as to be wise. And if to be is the same there as to be wise, the Father is not wise through that wisdom which he begot; otherwise he did not beget it, but it begot him. For what else do we say, when we say, “For him to be is to be wise,” but, “He is by that by which he is wise”? Therefore what is the cause of his being wise is the cause of his being; and so, if the wisdom which he begot is the cause of his being wise, it is also the cause of his being. And this cannot happen except by begetting or making him. But no one would ever call wisdom the mother or the maker of the Father. For what is more insane? Therefore the Father himself is also wisdom; and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father in the way that he is called the light of the Father; that is, as light from light, and both one light, so wisdom from wisdom is to be understood, and both one wisdom; and therefore also one essence, since there to be is the same as to be wise. For what to be wise is to wisdom, and to be able to power, and to be eternal to eternity, and to be just to justice, and to be great to greatness, that being itself is to essence. And since in that simplicity to be wise is not other than to be, wisdom there is the same as essence.

The Father and the Son together, then, are one essence, one greatness, one truth, and one wisdom. But the Father and the Son together are not both one Word, because they are not both together one Son. For just as the Son is referred to the Father and is not said with reference to himself, so the Word too is referred to him whose Word he is, when he is called Word. For he is Son by that by which he is Word, and Word by that by which he is Son. Since, then, the Father and the Son together are certainly not one Son, it follows that the Father and the Son together are not the one Word of both. And therefore he is not Word by that by which he is wisdom; because Word is not said with reference to oneself but only relatively to him whose Word he is, as Son to the Father; but wisdom by that by which he is essence. And therefore, because there is one essence, there is one wisdom. But since the Word too is wisdom, yet not Word by that by which he is wisdom (for Word is understood relatively, wisdom essentially), let us take it that when Word is said, it is as if “born wisdom” were said, so that he is both Son and image. And when these two words are said, “born wisdom,” in one of them, “born,” Word, image, and Son are understood, and in all these names essence is not shown, because they are said relatively; but in the other, “wisdom,” since it is also said with reference to itself (for it is wise by itself), essence too is shown, and that its being is to be wise. Hence the Father and the Son together are one wisdom, because one essence, and singly wisdom from wisdom, as essence from essence. Therefore it is not because the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father, or because the one is unbegotten and the other begotten, that they are not one essence; for by these names their relations are shown. But both together are one wisdom and one essence, where to be is the same as to be wise; but both together are not Word or Son, because there to be is not the same as to be Word or Son, as we have already shown sufficiently that these are said relatively.