To Theopompus on the Impassibility and Passibility of God 1–14

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

One day, as I was about to go to the place where I usually stay, a man named Theopompus asked me whether God is impassible. I turned a little aside and said to him in a slighting tone: “How could we deny that God is not subject to sufferings, Theopompus?” And while he was preparing to put another question to me in reply to my answer, I hurried on instead to reach the place where the friends are accustomed to gather together. When I had sat down among those who came to meet me, I stretched out my hand toward them and was about to ask about what I had said the day before, when Theopompus came in, stood beside me, and began to speak thus: “It is fitting, Gregory, for those who are unlearned and unacquainted with knowledge to learn eagerly from teachers and from the well experienced, whatever it may be. And since I too have resolved to occupy myself especially with this question that lies before us, I ask you to be a physician for the conflicting thoughts that are constantly in my mind and give me no rest, by strengthening me with your clear and thorough discussions of the question.” When a deep silence followed this question, I too began to speak thus: “A precious and beautiful gift our beloved Theopompus has brought us, in wishing us to take up again a question that is, as it seems to me, urgent and necessary for all, when he asks whether God is impassible. To him I also gave the answer at once: How would it be possible for all of us not to confess that God is impassible, Theopompus?” And when a great murmuring arose among those present, I in turn asked Theopompus how he had understood what I had said to him. He answered thus: “If God has an impassible nature, then he cannot suffer at all, not even if he wills to, because his nature would then do what is against his will.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But I said to him: “Do not blaspheme, Theopompus, by subjecting God to the power of necessity and setting the power of his nature against his will. For if God cannot do something that he wills, that would be a great suffering befalling God. Far be it from us to say that God's will is under the sway of his nature; for that is the view of those who have taken into themselves, even if only a little, the spirit (literally, the breath) of disobedience, and who confine God under the power of necessity. But it is not fitting even to think, Theopompus, that the mighty power of necessity could ever keep God from doing anything that he wills, since we must say that he is exalted above all things and dependent on nothing. Or do you not know, dear friend, that God alone is free, exalted above all and ruling over all, and in no respect subject to the power of necessity? It is insolence, therefore, to deny God absolute freedom.” To this Theopompus answered and said to me: “Let it be as you have said, that God is free; for we are not so bold as to deny God freedom. But this answer of yours does not meet my question, wise teacher Gregory. For I had asked you whether God is impassible, and in your reply you confessed that God is impassible. Then I asked you again whether he is not prevented by his impassible nature from bearing human sufferings, since his nature is perfect and incorruptible. If, then, he is not in himself prevented from suffering, because he is at all times the same by the impassibility of his nature, I will gladly, since you so plainly love God, approach this discussion and learn from your love. For I am in doubt in my thoughts whether the impassible God can take upon himself something that does not befit him, because he is impassible, as we have already said. But this too comes into my mind, which some say not without reflection: whether his nature opposes his will; in that case, indeed, everything (that is, the whole discussion) would be useless. But if the impassibility of God is not capable of human sufferings, why should I not answer you without hesitation that in that case his nature opposes his will, just as I said from the beginning that his impassible nature is stronger than his will, even though he is God.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

And since a large part of those who had gathered were eager for my answer to this question, I at once replied to him with care, thus: “Man, who is composed of body and soul, my lovable Theopompus, cannot (as it is easy for us to say and to see) do everything that comes into his mind, because the structure of his nature and the constitution of his body are bound to the law of his Creator. Because of this power of necessity, which is stronger than he, the impulse of his will's activity is far from carrying out unhindered everything he intends, because each of the two (that is, body and soul) is governed by its own interests. Therefore man falls short of his Creator entirely and in every respect. For everything that is subject to coming into being and passing away is excluded from lordship over all. It is fitting for us, then, to consider the divine nature, which can be neither described nor explained, which has no equal at all, which is subject to no law, no necessity, no custom, no resistance, no fear, no growth and no sickness, but by its all-conquering and unconquered power is able to do all things.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Nor must one think of God, Theopompus, that he comes into conflict with his will when he gives himself up to suffering, although he is the God who is impassible by nature. For we do not separate the will of the Godhead from its perfect constitution of being, which is at all times the same; rather, the Godhead is one and the same in this its constitution. And in himself he is in one form and in one essence and in one unchangeable will, from which he receives direction and to which he gives command; and from it and in it and through it he can do all things, and his will is in no way at all prevented by his impassible nature, which is at all times the same, from doing what he wills. For I have said that God is one, and that it is precisely God who is prevented by no compelling power from doing what he wills, because his constitution of being does not consist of different beings opposed to one another. But the nature and constitution (literally, substance) of man consists, we assert, of natures unlike one another, namely of soul and body; and inasmuch as the will of one of the two parts does not agree with that of the other, it is indeed of necessity not given to them (that is, soul and body) to do in all things what it comes into the mind of one of these two parts to do, because the nature of the part that differs from the other prevents him (that is, man) from being able to do in all things what he wills. But he who alone is unbounded perfection and glory, and who determines all things by his goodness, holds under himself all that was and is, and is exalted above all, being incorruptible intelligence, alien to and far from all evil; just as I said earlier that he alone is simple and not compound and not mixed with evils, since his being is one, and also his good will is one, which is indivisible and not reviled and not disturbed and not weakened and not searched out and not conquered and subject to nothing and exalted above every strong thing; and it (that is, the will) obeys him (that is, God) in all that he purposes to do. And since he is in no respect prevented by his nature, because he is far removed from all agitation, and nothing strives with him or wrestles with him or resists him, he is also free, and his will rules over all, and by the might of his all-surpassing power he can do all things. Therefore do not suppose, dear friend, that the all-ruling power, which is wholly unsubject to any suffering, is prevented by anything from the striving that expresses its will.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But Theopompus answered and said to me: “I too know well, teacher Gregory, that God has unbounded will and absolute freedom and lordship over all, and it is by no means fitting that anyone should dispute these statements of yours. But what I was in doubt about is this: if the nature of the Godhead is able to suffer (literally, is not prevented from suffering), but its essence is [properly] free from suffering and opposes its will to bear sufferings, then [to suffer] is foreign to it (the essence) and not fitting for it, as has been sufficiently shown by your clear discussions of this subject. Whoever wished to oppose these explanations would be found not only uninstructed but also insolent and a very wicked man; for it is fitting to ascribe lordship and power over all to God. But because I would gladly choose the good and reject the bad, I wished to test and to search out whether God ever had the intention of subjecting himself to human sufferings, since his impassible nature is at all times the same.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But I said to him: “With earnestness and diligence, Theopompus, you wish to come back from these views of Isocrates, moving far away from them and turning to the wholesome and true thoughts that I have set before you in clear discussions. Hear, then, Theopompus, and weigh it carefully, receiving what I say into your heart in faith: suffering would only then be suffering if God intended something that did not profit him and did not befit him. But if the will of the Godhead is moved for the healing and remedy of the evil thoughts of the children of men, then we cannot say that it is a suffering of God that he, God, serves men by his lowliness and by his deepest humiliation. Since, then, the heart of men had turned away from true piety and, after the manner of beasts, honored matter more than God, and because of this condition was held without exception in lusts, when God wished to free it from this, what he endured willingly in sufferings for the salvation of all cannot be counted to him as suffering, since his perfect and impassible nature proved its impassibility precisely through its suffering.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For what suffers is only then in suffering when the power of destructive (harm-bringing) suffering rules over it without the will of the one who suffers. But he who willingly, by virtue of the impassibility of his nature, subdues the sufferings [precisely] by mixing with the sufferings, we do not say is subject to the sufferings, even if he joins himself to the sufferings by his will. See, therefore: physicians too, when they wish to give themselves to the healing of those tormented by stubborn diseases, we see gladly taking on themselves the toil of serving the sick, because they hope for the joy that comes to them from the recovery and the loving care in healing the infirm; and it (that is, this joy) makes them forget the humiliation and the physician's toil, although during that time he lays aside his dignity and subjects his will and is in the position of one who serves, ministering to the sick and exchanging the honor of his office for a servant's condition. And this humiliation too we do not call a humiliation, because of the kind of healing that springs from it, and we do not therefore deny him the dignity of his high position so long as we see him willingly performing the service of a slave, and so long as he does everything that the duty of his medical calling lays upon him. Then he returns with joy to his former dignity, since the healing of the sick is pleasant to him and gladdens him more than the honor of the dignity due to him; and he is in no way lowered by the short time in which he humbled himself and performed the duty of the service needed for healing the body, because he knows that by the humiliation undertaken for a short time he brings about the healing of the sick, through which he reaps a praise greater than his humiliation. How, then, could we deny that he who alone is perfect, and exalted above vain praise, and untouched by reproaches, and in sufferings not suffering, and more excellent than all things, rules over the sufferings by his impassibility, so that suffering suffers by his suffering? For the impassible one has become a suffering to the sufferings, so that through him the sufferings suffered, while impassibility revealed its impassibility through its suffering. For what the sufferings do to the impassible one, that very thing the impassible one, by suffering, inflicts on the sufferings, becoming by virtue of his impassibility a suffering for the sufferings. For since the sufferings, when he (that is, the impassible one) joins himself to them, are defeated in their working, how can we call that anything other than a suffering of the sufferings?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For if the diamond, however often it is struck with iron, does not suffer from the blow by it but remains as it is without suffering [harm], and the cause of the blow turns back against the one who strikes, because the nature of the diamond is impassible and not subject to the blow of sufferings, how could we deny that the impassible one became a suffering for the sufferings? For as to him who is not subject to harm and is not moved by fear, how can one speak there of a not-suffering of the sufferings, even if he willingly enters into union with them? Or must not he be impassible who suffers no harm from the sufferings in his suffering? Or must not he be immortal who was in death and was not held by death? For it was the death of death that God went into death without being held by it, and it was a suffering for the sufferings that God was impassible while [yet] he entered into the sufferings.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For if the things that are in the world show their strength when mixed with things opposed to them, and so prove their impassible nature, how much more must we recognize that the suffering of God was a suffering for the sufferings, just as iron, by its blow on the precious stone, achieves the opposite and is itself damaged by the hardness of the stone against which it is directed. But God, who is mighty in his will and impassible in his essence, when he bears sufferings, why should he not remain in his impassibility, even if he took on himself the test by iron and fire, since the nature of the Godhead is stronger than all things, even when it is in sufferings? For this must be declared a true proof of his impassibility and immortality: that he is within the working of the cause of suffering and yet at the same time himself appears as the cause of the sufferings, the test teaching what is [thereby] brought about.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For we would not know that he who is impassible is [really] impassible if he did not enter into union with the sufferings and the working of the sufferings did not reach him. For impassibility goes against the sufferings with violence, like a suffering, so as to make manifest by its suffering the suffering of the sufferings. For the sufferings cannot hold their ground at all against the strength of the power of impassibility. And we need not wonder at all, my understanding Theopompus, if the impassibility of God has despised the sufferings, just as …

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

And this does not produce, as many think, a stain and a weakness in God, because the divine majesty made known its unchangeableness while it was in sufferings. For he who was between the gates of death and as God, by virtue of his immortality, conquered death by his impassibility, may in truth be praised as God, since he is not subject to any dominion, nor confined under any power, nor fallen to corruption, nor moved by pain, nor held by death. This is the all-ruling God, and this is the true lordship, and this is the unconquered power which, going to meet death, suffers nothing from death. But those who wish to find fault with the wisdom exalted above all, and with the will hidden in his glory from everyone, and who neither understand how to behold with the eye of their mind the exalted omnipotence of God, through whose death impassibility has been spread over all men, nor, since they laugh at God's coming to death, the exalted splendor of his coming, and [therefore] believe foolish talk about the incomprehensible and inconceivable coming of God to death without corruption, these remain as in darkness in their erroneous knowledge, unto death and corruption (that is, so that death and corruption become their lot). Whenever a king or a governor goes into the prison and pronounces judgment on the evildoers imprisoned there, each according to his deeds, and endures the foul stench and the evil words there by going into the prison, it is not fitting on that account to declare the king also one of the evildoers because he went in willingly to the wicked men of the prison. The same view we must hold of God, who because of his impassibility has no share in mortality, and because of his immortality can go to meet death without fear, and because of the power of his Godhead, which is without suffering, stands outside death, and took on a deathlike appearance only in name.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

When, therefore, we hear that God suffers by his coming to death, we must consider that, since he experienced nothing of the sufferings of death but came to death in an immortal and impassible way by the strength of his power, he also went forth from death again as almighty God. For the strength of his Godhead together with the impassibility of his nature truly made known God's irresistible coming to death. For what nature of mortals could ever mock death, or which of men could ever escape the power of its dominion? But if this is not possible, as indeed it is not, it is fitting, as a consequence, to grant to God alone the lordship over death; and so God goes right into the gates of death without experiencing death. But those who are guilty of death because of the transgression of the law, to these is given a lasting abode with death. Why, then, do many laugh at God's wise coming to death as at a shameful charge and a disgraceful mockery, and speak of ignorance and folly concerning those who declare such things?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Because of this impassibility of God, who appears as victor through death and humiliation, give up the notion, my dearest Theopompus, that it is impossible for God to come to death without false appearance (that is, without deception) and to bear the marks of death. For the account of wise men of old tells of an animal that is small in strength and yet exalted above the nature of fire; for when it is in the midst of the all-consuming flame of fire and runs to and fro in it, it is in no way harmed by the burning coals. Why should we not say that it is exalted above the all-consuming fire, since it is not brought under the working of the flame but, because of the great coldness it has, cools the fury of the flame, taking on nothing of the working of the all-consuming flame? But if the salamander, a mortal animal subject to corruption, makes the working of the all-consuming flame ineffective by the greatness of its coldness, how could we deny that God, who is exalted above death and corruption, had impassibility in his coming to death, just as the animal subject to corruption is able to endure union with fire? And if opposed things can endure by the strength of their nature and do not perish when brought together with harmful things, why do we wonder if the being exalted above matter is also without suffering in every respect, having made known the impassibility of its nature by its union with death, and despised the sufferings and death by its death? For this is the unchangeableness of God's impassibility. For how can the perfect one be harmed by his coming into the evil world, he who for the salvation of men's souls became like the appearance of mortal men, while nothing of the power of his Godhead departed from him, but he always remained the same?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For how could the perfect one not be at all times the same, since his being is in no way harmed, nor his will forced, nor does he suffer compulsion from resistance? But he who at no time is diminished in the least by the things we have mentioned, why should he not be called impassible and be at all times what he is: he who by the unbounded will of his own person, in order to share his gifts, took on the form of mortal men for a short time, because in his wise mind he did what he willed and by his unbounded will carried out what he intended, keeping his divine power and remaining as he is, nor suffering anything in his sufferings, because his impassible nature remained as it is even in his sufferings? For if the being of the perfect one is divided by his own will, he is [thereby] in no way diminished, his being remaining the same, because his nature made known the unchangeableness of his Godhead, and harm and division and pain and sickness could not hurt God at all. For those who have deserved the sufferings and are changed by corruption we must call suffering; but the [sufferings] that took place according to the exalted wisdom of God and the counsel of God's admirable governance we may not call sufferings of God, because not one cause that could produce sufferings is found in God, because of the impassibility of his nature.