To Theopompus on the Impassibility and Passibility of God

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

One day, as I was about to go to the place where I usually stay, a man named Theopompus asked me whether God is impassible. I turned a little aside and said to him in a slighting tone: “How could we deny that God is not subject to sufferings, Theopompus?” And while he was preparing to put another question to me in reply to my answer, I hurried on instead to reach the place where the friends are accustomed to gather together. When I had sat down among those who came to meet me, I stretched out my hand toward them and was about to ask about what I had said the day before, when Theopompus came in, stood beside me, and began to speak thus: “It is fitting, Gregory, for those who are unlearned and unacquainted with knowledge to learn eagerly from teachers and from the well experienced, whatever it may be. And since I too have resolved to occupy myself especially with this question that lies before us, I ask you to be a physician for the conflicting thoughts that are constantly in my mind and give me no rest, by strengthening me with your clear and thorough discussions of the question.” When a deep silence followed this question, I too began to speak thus: “A precious and beautiful gift our beloved Theopompus has brought us, in wishing us to take up again a question that is, as it seems to me, urgent and necessary for all, when he asks whether God is impassible. To him I also gave the answer at once: How would it be possible for all of us not to confess that God is impassible, Theopompus?” And when a great murmuring arose among those present, I in turn asked Theopompus how he had understood what I had said to him. He answered thus: “If God has an impassible nature, then he cannot suffer at all, not even if he wills to, because his nature would then do what is against his will.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But I said to him: “Do not blaspheme, Theopompus, by subjecting God to the power of necessity and setting the power of his nature against his will. For if God cannot do something that he wills, that would be a great suffering befalling God. Far be it from us to say that God's will is under the sway of his nature; for that is the view of those who have taken into themselves, even if only a little, the spirit (literally, the breath) of disobedience, and who confine God under the power of necessity. But it is not fitting even to think, Theopompus, that the mighty power of necessity could ever keep God from doing anything that he wills, since we must say that he is exalted above all things and dependent on nothing. Or do you not know, dear friend, that God alone is free, exalted above all and ruling over all, and in no respect subject to the power of necessity? It is insolence, therefore, to deny God absolute freedom.” To this Theopompus answered and said to me: “Let it be as you have said, that God is free; for we are not so bold as to deny God freedom. But this answer of yours does not meet my question, wise teacher Gregory. For I had asked you whether God is impassible, and in your reply you confessed that God is impassible. Then I asked you again whether he is not prevented by his impassible nature from bearing human sufferings, since his nature is perfect and incorruptible. If, then, he is not in himself prevented from suffering, because he is at all times the same by the impassibility of his nature, I will gladly, since you so plainly love God, approach this discussion and learn from your love. For I am in doubt in my thoughts whether the impassible God can take upon himself something that does not befit him, because he is impassible, as we have already said. But this too comes into my mind, which some say not without reflection: whether his nature opposes his will; in that case, indeed, everything (that is, the whole discussion) would be useless. But if the impassibility of God is not capable of human sufferings, why should I not answer you without hesitation that in that case his nature opposes his will, just as I said from the beginning that his impassible nature is stronger than his will, even though he is God.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

And since a large part of those who had gathered were eager for my answer to this question, I at once replied to him with care, thus: “Man, who is composed of body and soul, my lovable Theopompus, cannot (as it is easy for us to say and to see) do everything that comes into his mind, because the structure of his nature and the constitution of his body are bound to the law of his Creator. Because of this power of necessity, which is stronger than he, the impulse of his will's activity is far from carrying out unhindered everything he intends, because each of the two (that is, body and soul) is governed by its own interests. Therefore man falls short of his Creator entirely and in every respect. For everything that is subject to coming into being and passing away is excluded from lordship over all. It is fitting for us, then, to consider the divine nature, which can be neither described nor explained, which has no equal at all, which is subject to no law, no necessity, no custom, no resistance, no fear, no growth and no sickness, but by its all-conquering and unconquered power is able to do all things.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Nor must one think of God, Theopompus, that he comes into conflict with his will when he gives himself up to suffering, although he is the God who is impassible by nature. For we do not separate the will of the Godhead from its perfect constitution of being, which is at all times the same; rather, the Godhead is one and the same in this its constitution. And in himself he is in one form and in one essence and in one unchangeable will, from which he receives direction and to which he gives command; and from it and in it and through it he can do all things, and his will is in no way at all prevented by his impassible nature, which is at all times the same, from doing what he wills. For I have said that God is one, and that it is precisely God who is prevented by no compelling power from doing what he wills, because his constitution of being does not consist of different beings opposed to one another. But the nature and constitution (literally, substance) of man consists, we assert, of natures unlike one another, namely of soul and body; and inasmuch as the will of one of the two parts does not agree with that of the other, it is indeed of necessity not given to them (that is, soul and body) to do in all things what it comes into the mind of one of these two parts to do, because the nature of the part that differs from the other prevents him (that is, man) from being able to do in all things what he wills. But he who alone is unbounded perfection and glory, and who determines all things by his goodness, holds under himself all that was and is, and is exalted above all, being incorruptible intelligence, alien to and far from all evil; just as I said earlier that he alone is simple and not compound and not mixed with evils, since his being is one, and also his good will is one, which is indivisible and not reviled and not disturbed and not weakened and not searched out and not conquered and subject to nothing and exalted above every strong thing; and it (that is, the will) obeys him (that is, God) in all that he purposes to do. And since he is in no respect prevented by his nature, because he is far removed from all agitation, and nothing strives with him or wrestles with him or resists him, he is also free, and his will rules over all, and by the might of his all-surpassing power he can do all things. Therefore do not suppose, dear friend, that the all-ruling power, which is wholly unsubject to any suffering, is prevented by anything from the striving that expresses its will.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But Theopompus answered and said to me: “I too know well, teacher Gregory, that God has unbounded will and absolute freedom and lordship over all, and it is by no means fitting that anyone should dispute these statements of yours. But what I was in doubt about is this: if the nature of the Godhead is able to suffer (literally, is not prevented from suffering), but its essence is [properly] free from suffering and opposes its will to bear sufferings, then [to suffer] is foreign to it (the essence) and not fitting for it, as has been sufficiently shown by your clear discussions of this subject. Whoever wished to oppose these explanations would be found not only uninstructed but also insolent and a very wicked man; for it is fitting to ascribe lordship and power over all to God. But because I would gladly choose the good and reject the bad, I wished to test and to search out whether God ever had the intention of subjecting himself to human sufferings, since his impassible nature is at all times the same.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But I said to him: “With earnestness and diligence, Theopompus, you wish to come back from these views of Isocrates, moving far away from them and turning to the wholesome and true thoughts that I have set before you in clear discussions. Hear, then, Theopompus, and weigh it carefully, receiving what I say into your heart in faith: suffering would only then be suffering if God intended something that did not profit him and did not befit him. But if the will of the Godhead is moved for the healing and remedy of the evil thoughts of the children of men, then we cannot say that it is a suffering of God that he, God, serves men by his lowliness and by his deepest humiliation. Since, then, the heart of men had turned away from true piety and, after the manner of beasts, honored matter more than God, and because of this condition was held without exception in lusts, when God wished to free it from this, what he endured willingly in sufferings for the salvation of all cannot be counted to him as suffering, since his perfect and impassible nature proved its impassibility precisely through its suffering.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For what suffers is only then in suffering when the power of destructive (harm-bringing) suffering rules over it without the will of the one who suffers. But he who willingly, by virtue of the impassibility of his nature, subdues the sufferings [precisely] by mixing with the sufferings, we do not say is subject to the sufferings, even if he joins himself to the sufferings by his will. See, therefore: physicians too, when they wish to give themselves to the healing of those tormented by stubborn diseases, we see gladly taking on themselves the toil of serving the sick, because they hope for the joy that comes to them from the recovery and the loving care in healing the infirm; and it (that is, this joy) makes them forget the humiliation and the physician's toil, although during that time he lays aside his dignity and subjects his will and is in the position of one who serves, ministering to the sick and exchanging the honor of his office for a servant's condition. And this humiliation too we do not call a humiliation, because of the kind of healing that springs from it, and we do not therefore deny him the dignity of his high position so long as we see him willingly performing the service of a slave, and so long as he does everything that the duty of his medical calling lays upon him. Then he returns with joy to his former dignity, since the healing of the sick is pleasant to him and gladdens him more than the honor of the dignity due to him; and he is in no way lowered by the short time in which he humbled himself and performed the duty of the service needed for healing the body, because he knows that by the humiliation undertaken for a short time he brings about the healing of the sick, through which he reaps a praise greater than his humiliation. How, then, could we deny that he who alone is perfect, and exalted above vain praise, and untouched by reproaches, and in sufferings not suffering, and more excellent than all things, rules over the sufferings by his impassibility, so that suffering suffers by his suffering? For the impassible one has become a suffering to the sufferings, so that through him the sufferings suffered, while impassibility revealed its impassibility through its suffering. For what the sufferings do to the impassible one, that very thing the impassible one, by suffering, inflicts on the sufferings, becoming by virtue of his impassibility a suffering for the sufferings. For since the sufferings, when he (that is, the impassible one) joins himself to them, are defeated in their working, how can we call that anything other than a suffering of the sufferings?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For if the diamond, however often it is struck with iron, does not suffer from the blow by it but remains as it is without suffering [harm], and the cause of the blow turns back against the one who strikes, because the nature of the diamond is impassible and not subject to the blow of sufferings, how could we deny that the impassible one became a suffering for the sufferings? For as to him who is not subject to harm and is not moved by fear, how can one speak there of a not-suffering of the sufferings, even if he willingly enters into union with them? Or must not he be impassible who suffers no harm from the sufferings in his suffering? Or must not he be immortal who was in death and was not held by death? For it was the death of death that God went into death without being held by it, and it was a suffering for the sufferings that God was impassible while [yet] he entered into the sufferings.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For if the things that are in the world show their strength when mixed with things opposed to them, and so prove their impassible nature, how much more must we recognize that the suffering of God was a suffering for the sufferings, just as iron, by its blow on the precious stone, achieves the opposite and is itself damaged by the hardness of the stone against which it is directed. But God, who is mighty in his will and impassible in his essence, when he bears sufferings, why should he not remain in his impassibility, even if he took on himself the test by iron and fire, since the nature of the Godhead is stronger than all things, even when it is in sufferings? For this must be declared a true proof of his impassibility and immortality: that he is within the working of the cause of suffering and yet at the same time himself appears as the cause of the sufferings, the test teaching what is [thereby] brought about.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For we would not know that he who is impassible is [really] impassible if he did not enter into union with the sufferings and the working of the sufferings did not reach him. For impassibility goes against the sufferings with violence, like a suffering, so as to make manifest by its suffering the suffering of the sufferings. For the sufferings cannot hold their ground at all against the strength of the power of impassibility. And we need not wonder at all, my understanding Theopompus, if the impassibility of God has despised the sufferings, just as …

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

And this does not produce, as many think, a stain and a weakness in God, because the divine majesty made known its unchangeableness while it was in sufferings. For he who was between the gates of death and as God, by virtue of his immortality, conquered death by his impassibility, may in truth be praised as God, since he is not subject to any dominion, nor confined under any power, nor fallen to corruption, nor moved by pain, nor held by death. This is the all-ruling God, and this is the true lordship, and this is the unconquered power which, going to meet death, suffers nothing from death. But those who wish to find fault with the wisdom exalted above all, and with the will hidden in his glory from everyone, and who neither understand how to behold with the eye of their mind the exalted omnipotence of God, through whose death impassibility has been spread over all men, nor, since they laugh at God's coming to death, the exalted splendor of his coming, and [therefore] believe foolish talk about the incomprehensible and inconceivable coming of God to death without corruption, these remain as in darkness in their erroneous knowledge, unto death and corruption (that is, so that death and corruption become their lot). Whenever a king or a governor goes into the prison and pronounces judgment on the evildoers imprisoned there, each according to his deeds, and endures the foul stench and the evil words there by going into the prison, it is not fitting on that account to declare the king also one of the evildoers because he went in willingly to the wicked men of the prison. The same view we must hold of God, who because of his impassibility has no share in mortality, and because of his immortality can go to meet death without fear, and because of the power of his Godhead, which is without suffering, stands outside death, and took on a deathlike appearance only in name.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

When, therefore, we hear that God suffers by his coming to death, we must consider that, since he experienced nothing of the sufferings of death but came to death in an immortal and impassible way by the strength of his power, he also went forth from death again as almighty God. For the strength of his Godhead together with the impassibility of his nature truly made known God's irresistible coming to death. For what nature of mortals could ever mock death, or which of men could ever escape the power of its dominion? But if this is not possible, as indeed it is not, it is fitting, as a consequence, to grant to God alone the lordship over death; and so God goes right into the gates of death without experiencing death. But those who are guilty of death because of the transgression of the law, to these is given a lasting abode with death. Why, then, do many laugh at God's wise coming to death as at a shameful charge and a disgraceful mockery, and speak of ignorance and folly concerning those who declare such things?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Because of this impassibility of God, who appears as victor through death and humiliation, give up the notion, my dearest Theopompus, that it is impossible for God to come to death without false appearance (that is, without deception) and to bear the marks of death. For the account of wise men of old tells of an animal that is small in strength and yet exalted above the nature of fire; for when it is in the midst of the all-consuming flame of fire and runs to and fro in it, it is in no way harmed by the burning coals. Why should we not say that it is exalted above the all-consuming fire, since it is not brought under the working of the flame but, because of the great coldness it has, cools the fury of the flame, taking on nothing of the working of the all-consuming flame? But if the salamander, a mortal animal subject to corruption, makes the working of the all-consuming flame ineffective by the greatness of its coldness, how could we deny that God, who is exalted above death and corruption, had impassibility in his coming to death, just as the animal subject to corruption is able to endure union with fire? And if opposed things can endure by the strength of their nature and do not perish when brought together with harmful things, why do we wonder if the being exalted above matter is also without suffering in every respect, having made known the impassibility of its nature by its union with death, and despised the sufferings and death by its death? For this is the unchangeableness of God's impassibility. For how can the perfect one be harmed by his coming into the evil world, he who for the salvation of men's souls became like the appearance of mortal men, while nothing of the power of his Godhead departed from him, but he always remained the same?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For how could the perfect one not be at all times the same, since his being is in no way harmed, nor his will forced, nor does he suffer compulsion from resistance? But he who at no time is diminished in the least by the things we have mentioned, why should he not be called impassible and be at all times what he is: he who by the unbounded will of his own person, in order to share his gifts, took on the form of mortal men for a short time, because in his wise mind he did what he willed and by his unbounded will carried out what he intended, keeping his divine power and remaining as he is, nor suffering anything in his sufferings, because his impassible nature remained as it is even in his sufferings? For if the being of the perfect one is divided by his own will, he is [thereby] in no way diminished, his being remaining the same, because his nature made known the unchangeableness of his Godhead, and harm and division and pain and sickness could not hurt God at all. For those who have deserved the sufferings and are changed by corruption we must call suffering; but the [sufferings] that took place according to the exalted wisdom of God and the counsel of God's admirable governance we may not call sufferings of God, because not one cause that could produce sufferings is found in God, because of the impassibility of his nature.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Whenever a sword passes through a flame of fire, it does not produce a separation by dividing the fire, although body passes through body. If, then, the division of bodies subject to corruption takes place imperceptibly, because the being of the fire remains wholly the same and does not admit a division at all, because of its unbroken coherence, despite the division by the iron (for the thinness of fire does not of itself admit an interruption, even when it is divided by the iron, because its vehemence surrounds it on all sides and, despite the passage of the iron that cuts it, it holds together on all sides and is not divided at all); if, therefore, the division of fire, which is a tangible body, can neither be searched out nor [more closely] shown, must we not say that he who is perfect and far from perishing, exalted above passible bodies and above beings and natures and higher than all concepts, remained always the same as he is even in his sufferings, his impassible nature not being seized by the sufferings in any respect in its mixing with the sufferings, but, because it can neither be touched by the sufferings nor subdued by them, despising the sufferings by its impassibility, since [precisely] when he takes on himself the test with iron he shows his power in every way, as one who cannot be harmed by it? For the purity of the Godhead (that is, its being unmixed with substances of another kind) and its foreknowledge and the incomprehensibility of the thin divine substance not only remains without division because of the smallness of the bodies that approach to pierce it, since he (God) is exalted and higher than all bodies, but we also assert that those bodies suffer division which would try to divide the Godhead, which [for its part] undergoes no division because of the fineness of its nature and the purity of its knowledge; and indeed it passes through all bodies and in a sense brings about a division in them, because it is easy for God to divide all bodies. Since this happens in this way, it is fitting for us to say that the Godhead makes known its impassibility through its sufferings and, even when it enters into sufferings, reveals its mighty wisdom in every respect.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

And do not suppose, my dear Theopompus, that the power of the perfect one cannot pass through all bodies that cause sufferings; just as we see that the light of the sun's rays also passes through clear glass, and that in general bodies are not prevented by other bodies unlike them from passing through them in a fine manner. If, then, one kind of matter does not prevent the power of another matter from passing through it by its fineness, must we not grant that the being of God, which is more exalted and stronger than all things, can by its fineness pass without hindrance through other bodies that meet it, and that the Godhead is in no way subject to the sufferings, because the perfect and incorruptible nature is found at all times remaining in the same condition, by its likeness to the appearance of the sun's rays of which we spoke? For the light remains in itself as it is, being diminished in nothing, even when it gives of its brightness to those in need. How much more is the perfect God, that is, God exalted above all, rich in his grace, in that he distributes of his gifts to those in need while remaining the same and losing nothing thereby; unlike what some say in their foolish tales, who call God's coming to the children of men, which can be neither searched out nor explained, a suffering of impossibility, and do not first consider that God cannot be searched out at all and is not prevented by his nature or by anything else from doing what he wills.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For we call him alone [truly] exalted and free who is not oppressed by the law of his nature, and who does not suffer compulsion because of resistance to his power, and is not forced by the might of riches to put off the dignity of his Godhead, and is not terrified before death. But if he were afraid of fire and alarmed at iron and anxious before the underworld and unwilling to venture among strong beasts, how could one call him God who so feared the sufferings that are harmful to men? But if God, the perfect and incorruptible, comes to the fire without fearing the fire, because he is at all times the same, he also despises the devouring fire, which is not always the same; for how could we say of fire, which slackens in its working, that it is always the same? But God, who despises iron and also mocks fire and does not fear death, is not he alone impassible, he who remains as he is even in his suffering, although he willingly takes human sufferings on himself, and does not suffer the pains that arise from human sufferings?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For he who is harmed by no suffering is God, and it is proper to him that he remains at all times as he is. But whoever is harmed by sufferings, afflicted by pains, and prevented by the power of necessity from doing good works ceases [to be God], even if he is called God. But he who is not subject to death and makes known his impassibility in his suffering comes and accomplishes what it is fitting for the helping God to do; and he changes for my sake into my (human) form while remaining in his unchangeableness, and he is all things while being outside all things. For that is an impassible will which is not prevented by the fetters of the power of necessity from coming to men who long for a godly way of life.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But if he regarded only the dignity of his Godhead, and because of the loftiness of his blessedness chose rest for himself and delighted only in the happiness of his own person, while showing disregard for all things, because above all he preferred an idle rule, must we not say that the race of mortals is far more exalted than this perfect one, namely those who did not spare their lives for their native city and out of love for their friends, and were exalted above sufferings by their will, and to whom, because of their extraordinary courage, their sufferings did not seem sufferings? In ancient times one named Theos (Codrus) chose death so that they would not become slaves of the Lacedaemonians; and Epaminondas too was killed so that the Athenians would not be subjected. Leucippus let himself be killed so that the Aetolians would not be carried off as captives. Theodorus cut off his tongue so as not to become a betrayer of his friends. Pison was crucified so as not to give up the freedom of speech that was his own. Anaxarchus was sawn apart so as not to have to flatter Nicocles with lies. Diagoras was driven out by the Athenians, Socrates was put to death, and Philoxenus had to hollow out stones. Callimachus and Cynaegirus we must not only praise but also admire; for when he was wounded all over his body by a multitude of spears and, as they say, was already dead, he was still a terror to his enemies and a helper and a wall for his countrymen. Chiron too gladly and unsparingly gave up his head to his enemies. And must one not admire Eumenes, who made light of the pain of his wound, came in a swift run to his city and announced the victory his people had won over their enemies, and as soon as he had come into the city and had announced to all at once, as well as he could, “Rejoice, for we have conquered,” at once fell down dead? Further, Eurotas, when he was confined to bed by illness and heard concerning the war that the Lacedaemonians were just then gaining the advantage in the war against his fellow citizens, driven by love for his countrymen ordered his servants nothing else than to carry him into the battle, so that he might be killed with his fellow citizens. Aristodemus, on the other hand, who withdrew from the war and fled to Sparta, appeared contemptible and shameful to all. Look, therefore, my good friend, at mortal men who showed such contempt of death for their native city and for their friends, and displayed excellence and wisdom and enthusiasm, and, because they felt themselves one with their friends, did not spare their wives and held their lives cheap and gave up their lives gladly and without hesitation for their native city; who, by virtue of their unrestricted freedom and in striving after perfection, gladly let themselves not only be sawn apart by tyrants but were not even ashamed to be fastened with nails to the wood, and gladly bought with their death the right to speak their thoughts freely. But God, who has no need of praise and is far exalted above sufferings, came willingly to death, without fear or terror touching him in the least.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But if [in our opinion] God takes a disgrace upon himself by his suffering, given the glory proper to him, then by wishing to ascribe honor to him we prevent him from showing his help to men. For what dishonor could God suffer, since by virtue of his immortality he despises death through his death in his death? But God also does not know the suffering of shame, so that he is not ashamed to suffer, because pride is wholly foreign to him. What weakness, or shame, or disgrace could befall God in going into death in order to separate death from men? For he who strives after vain glory and is afraid of losing it will never be willing to endure a suffering from death. For far from there being fear in God, as though his glory could be taken from him and he could lose it altogether, suffering by iron and fire is rather more welcome to him than the expectation of vain glory. For if the suffering of vainglory were present in God, it would be a suffering that could not be healed even by him.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But if God does not strive after glory, because he is exalted above all sufferings, he can go into death, he who is the life and exalted above death, inasmuch as he does not have to bear sufferings from death, and redeems mortals from death, by virtue of his being God, who remains at all times in his impassibility, even when he is in sufferings. For he who, being impassible, takes suffering on himself and at the same time keeps it far from himself, why should he not hasten with joy to go into death in order to destroy death?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For the life of those who fear to suffer death through death is no life; but if life is not subject to death, he (that is, God, who alone is not subject to death) challenges death, in order to make known through his death that he is the life. For see, we see with light also that when it mixes with darkness, its rays do not mix [with it] in the least and [so] become dark, although they are in the darkness. For through the mixing of darkness with light it does not darken the light, but on the contrary the light illuminates the darkness by the brightness that goes out from it, and it (the darkness) is swallowed up as something weaker than the greater, more excellent and stronger; but where the light does not pass through, the darkness remains in its darkness. In just the same way with God: when he willingly went into death, he was not so perverse as [only] to show his omnipotence by its (the omnipotence's) being seized by the resistance of the power of death; rather he emptied himself of the lordship over all that was his own, although his divine nature remained without corruption even in death and by the strength of its impassibility subdued the sufferings, after the manner of light when it unites with darkness.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For sufferings must then in truth be regarded as strong when they unite with beings opposed to them and yet those beings remain in the form proper to them; and [the union] must not be merely a mixing (of the sufferings with the sufferers) thought of in fancy and imagination, but they must in truth bear the stamp of their union (with the sufferers), even if these (that is, those struck by the sufferings) are beings opposed to them (that is, to the sufferings), which by the strength of their nature remain without pain and without suffering in their mixing with other beings: as the salamander, which can mock the flame, and as the diamond, when struck by the iron, as said above, remains impassible not merely in fancy and appearance. And talc too, when it bears fire upon itself, remains unharmed, being in no way damaged by its union with fire. If, then, we see useful material beings not changing their nature through their union with other, harm-bringing natures, remaining unharmed and unchanged, since they in no way give up their being, why do we hesitate, and why is it so hard for us to confess that the unchangeable being of God is also in the state of impassibility, even when it is in circumstances that bring about suffering? [24] Do not suppose either, dear Theopompus, what some craftily maintain only in order to persuade, that he is blessed and unchangeable who has no activity and gives to no one else; for he who is like that is also in weakness. For what word teaches that he who does not reveal his glory, and does not make men understanding, and does not instruct others in wisdom, and does not intend noble things, and does not direct the healing of souls, and is not able to accomplish good, that we must call him blessed and doing good? For what kind of blessed and unchangeable God would that be, who did not wish to root out the source of the rise of evil thoughts and, by the abundance of the goodness proper to him, to blot out the deadly impulses from souls as by a burning? Rather, he is unchangeable and perfect who kills the sufferings and makes men wise and plants divine wisdom [in them] and reveals his glory. But that, we assert, would be a great suffering for God, if he did not care for men and did not wish good works done and neglected the care of men. But he who roots out the destructive sufferings from the root of the stock of human disposition and who sees to it that the despised are changed and become virtuous men, must not he be called impassible, he who roots the sufferings out of men and [so] kills the sufferings? Consider, therefore, Theopompus, in your heart as before a tried tribunal, like one well versed in the paths of wisdom, and look and see with unprejudiced thoughts and an open mind, whether it is fitting to think that it is a suffering for the incorruptible and perfect one when he shows himself helpful and merciful and generous with his gifts of grace, or if he were hard-hearted and unmerciful and without all grace and mercy. But on the contrary, in our view, the impassible God is rather the one who performs noble deeds and makes the foolish wise. For there is no law by which we would have to call him perfect and incorruptible who does not care for men at all.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For if we recognize the wise and understanding man by the works he carries out by his skill, and [if] he is not called an artist and one skilled in art until he has shown that he can form shapes from poor and misshapen materials and by his skill bring a work into being (for the perceptible form of the works of art, when it appears, makes manifest the silent thought of the artist), how much more clearly, then, must we call the perfect one perfect when the perfect nature which he has and which is always his comes to light as perfect, inasmuch as we see the deeds from which we can learn most of all about him.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

But those who are of the opinion and view about the perfect one that he is occupied only in his dwellings and turns to himself and contemplates himself, despising all things alike and holding rest more desirable than care for all and taking his delight in it (rest), and who ascribe sufferings to him if he is zealously concerned for men, I do not know how to say how it can be fitting for them to call the perfect and unchangeable one perfect, if he cannot examine the nature of men. But if this is so, give up your opinion that this is God's true nature, since you have not yet known God at all, having asserted that he is always and from eternity at rest in his essence. For how can he be perfect and incorruptible who cannot be known by you, Theopompus, or how can he be wise and generous with his goods if he does not come to examine you? I, on the other hand, say this: that he is full of grace and bestows grace who shows himself a helper of men and a savior of those who are without hope.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For just as we cannot perceive with our reason the wickedness of evil men unless we first see their evil deeds (for we cannot see exactly the full extent of their actual doings while they are still hidden in each one's thoughts, until they have come to light), so too we call the perfect and incorruptible one perfect only when he carries out the deeds befitting his blessedness, the good works he reveals being clearly visible; for the sight of the visible bears witness to the invisible. For a wise and merciful man is not recognized in the character of his disposition until he gladly presents the performance of deeds corresponding to his virtue.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

For how can we set forth to men the nobility of the perfect one's disposition, if not even a possibility of comprehending the perfect one gives us anything to say? For as to him who does not exhort us by his good deeds and does not draw us to himself by his call, how can we ascribe perfection to him, if the evidence of his blessedness and his overflowing goodness is wholly hidden from us in every respect? But if you hold this opinion about God, that is your affair and not that of the perfect God who is generous with his gifts, from the knowledge of whom you are far removed, because he has not revealed to you his incorruptible nature exalted above all, being occupied, as he is, with an enjoyment exalted above wealth, which also befits God, as you maintained in your opinion that this is truly fitting for God: that he occupies himself with himself and delights in himself, and that he has no occupation and gives occupation to no one else. For everyone who is like that is weak.

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Tell us, therefore, wise one, what suffering or what weakness has befallen God, the perfect or unchangeable, because of the help that men can lay hold of, and more particularly for the sake of those who for lack of knowledge are without his goods, and are drawn to the underworld by the power of the dominion of the sufferings, and, as far as lies in them, cannot attain perfection. But if it is fitting to speak out boldly, yet truly: he is not perfect and incorruptible who does not call those who have, as it were, fallen from the ship and are sinking because they have not known his goodness, and does not seek to draw them to himself; namely, those who are drawn by the world as in a great sea, so that they cannot know virtue and [so] become estranged from God. What kind of perfect God is that, then, generous with his gifts and exalted by the riches of his grace, to whom belong neither activity nor providence nor abundance of blessing nor any deeds that correspond to virtue and form the resources of the God rich in resources?

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

If, therefore, you are moved by a lively fancy and wish to construct and fashion a God who loves himself and delights in his wealth and is happy in his glory and will not be moved to help another, while men are wholly despised and rejected and far from the help of the perfect one, oh, what lovelessness [of God], when many perish through ignorance of virtue! On the contrary: even if God were such a perfect and gracious one, he would at once give up [such a life] and go to the wise men and learn from them the practice of exalted philosophy, since they call with great zeal and bring near those who have fallen and let themselves be led astray by this natural world. But if the philosophers had kept silent despite the ruin of so many, Critias too would have perished through his love of power, because he kept silent, and Alcibiades would have perished through his extravagance with gifts, in spite of his speaking. And the Persians and Medes in Susa would have had greater advantages if they had not armed themselves to march against the Macedonians. Why, then, were you silent, blessed one (that is, God), when all these [many] perished, because the wise preferred rest instead of helping? This is the nature of virtue, perfect one; this is the fruit of philosophy: that those must be called blessed and beneficent whose zeal was not only for care of themselves but also for their neighbors, and especially for those seized by a sickness of soul. And Diogenes the Cynic too, when he was asked mockingly by an Attic youth why, if he praised the Lacedaemonians and thought little of the Athenians, he did not take up residence in Sparta, gave him this answer: “Physicians too usually go to the sick and not to the healthy.”

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

If, then, human philosophy teaches those who strive after perfection the healing of the soul's sicknesses, and does not allow them to despise or disdain even one suffering of one soul of one man, but they hasten and run diligently to restore those who have turned aside from virtue in their way of life, should we not be able to say of God, who is the teacher of all philosophy and at the same time truly perfect and beneficent, that he goes willingly to where the sufferings have settled in great numbers, to those who are struck down by the sufferings? Or is it not a suffering of the soul when someone does not perform deeds such as befit a virtuous way of life? See, therefore: Isocrates too said [already] long ago, writing to the Abderites: ‘A sickness of the soul is the love of money’; and he adds further the following: ‘Wretched is the life of men, because in each one, like winter storms, the love of money, which no one can endure, has found entrance.’ Concerning it he says: ‘Would that all physicians would gather and come to heal the torment of madness, and indeed the worst torment, because they sacrifice their happiness to it, while it only makes them sick and torments them.’ I too think that all sicknesses of the soul consist in the stubborn delusion that covetous pleasure and the fancy of the thoughts produce; only when he (man) is cleansed of it by virtue can he recover. Would that it were possible for you to root out the bitter root of the love of money, so that not a trace of it would be found any more; then you would see that men, and indeed together with their bodies also their sick souls, would be cleansed and purified! But since much evil in the world assails men, the perfect one can only be called perfect and beneficent when, by virtue of the impassibility of his nature, he is in a blessedness proceeding from himself, such as befits him as God, by reason of the thanks for the gifts that he imparts to men. For Plato too says thus: ‘Envy stands outside the bounds of the divine.’

Translated by Claude from V. Ryssel's German translation (1880) of the Syriac; neither is shown

Therefore, dear friend, Jesus came, he who is King over all, to heal the grievous sufferings of men, as the perfect and beneficent one; and he remained as he is, and the sufferings were scattered by his impassibility, as darkness is scattered by light. Therefore he came in haste and made (men) blessed and rich in goods, and instead of mortals made them immortals, and created them anew to be blessed for ever. To him, the most blessed King, be praise for all eternity. Amen.