Refutation of Certain Doctrines of Aristotle 52–63

From the second book On the Heaven: “Each thing that has a work exists for the sake of its work. The activity of God is immortality, that is, eternal life; so that eternal motion must belong to God. … this the circular body has, which by nature always moves in a circle.” If nothing is the cause of the being of what is ungenerated and eternal, and the things that have a work exist for the sake of the work, then things whose works are the cause of their being are not eternal. If it belongs to inanimate things to perform their natural activities by their mere presence, but to rational beings to do so by will, how is the heaven God, when it does not perform immortality by will but by the motion and change of position of its parts? If the ungenerated needs the cooperation of nothing outside, either in order to be or in order to act, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it needs the earth, around which it moves, in order to be movable, and the sun, the moon, and the other stars in order to act? If there is no formula of the ungenerated in a maker, how, if the heaven is ungenerated, does it have an immaterial formula in the maker and a material formula in matter, because of which being heaven differs from being this heaven? If the heaven cannot do by will what it does by motion, how is it an eternal God, performing eternal life without willing it? If the heaven does not produce eternal life in eternal things (for they have this from their own nature), and generated and perishable things do not live eternally, where is the eternal life that the heaven performs? If the motion of the heaven is useful not only for the generation of the things that come to be, but also for [the perishing] of the things that perish, how is the heaven God, and its activity eternal life, when through it perishable things perish? If what comes from matter cannot be ungenerated together with matter, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it comes from matter? If what comes from two things is later than both, how is the heaven, which comes from matter and form, co-eternal with both? If the form comes not from the matter but from the maker, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it has its matter from one source and its form from another? If the heaven is a material body, and has a spherical shape, and is ungenerated, how does it not have both from matter, both its being what it is and its having what it has? If matter is what first underlies and is present in the things that come to be from it of themselves, how is the heaven ungenerated, when, like generated things, it has matter underlying it and present in it?

From the same book: “Since the heaven is a divine body, for this reason it has the circular body, which by nature always moves in a circle. Why then is not the whole body of the heaven such? Because something of the body that moves in a circle must remain, namely that at the middle; but of this body no part can remain, either at all or at the middle. For then its natural motion would be toward the middle (but by nature it moves in a circle); for the motion would not be eternal. Nothing … than what is according to nature, and what is contrary to nature is a departure, in generation, from what is according to nature. There must then be earth; for this rests at the middle. But if there is earth, there must also be fire. For of contraries, if one is by nature, the other too must be by nature, if it is indeed a contrary and has some nature. For the same matter belongs to the contraries, and [the positive] is prior to the privation; I mean, for instance, the hot to the cold. But if there are fire and earth, there must also be the bodies between them; for each of the elements has a contrariety to each. These existing, it is evident that there must be generation, because none of them can be eternal; for contraries act on and are acted on by one another, and are destructive of one another … it is not possible for motion to be eternal according to nature; and of these there is motion. That there must therefore be generation is clear from these things; and if generation, there must also be other locomotion, either one or more. For according to that of the whole, the elements of bodies too must be so related to one another. For now this much is clear, for what cause there are more circular bodies: that there must be generation; and generation, if there is fire; and fire and the others, if there is earth; and earth, because something must always remain, if something is always moved.” [If] … the body of the heaven is a body always movable around the middle, then the whole body of the heaven must move around the middle; but if the heaven has such a body but does not have such motion, clearly it moves contrary to nature. If the body of the heaven moves around the middle, but not as a whole, according to the locomotion of the element of which its body is said to be, but spherically, by the exchange of positions of its parts, how is not the sphe[rical shape] … in no way does motion belong to the bodies made of the elements according to their form, but according to the elements from which they are; how then has the necessity of motion been altered in the body of the heaven? For a body that has neither heaviness nor lightness, it is necessary to have motionless rest rather than restless motion. If … [remain]. For if it is neither borne downward by heaviness nor upward by lightness, it must remain motionless. If a stone were shaped in the form of a sphere and placed in the air, to be carried down to its own place, it would not be carried down rolling because of its shape, but would be carried in a straight line according to its own heaviness. How does the fifth element, … because it has no heaviness or lightness, not move as a whole with its parts around the middle according to its own nature, but move spherically by the exchange of its parts, a motion that belongs not to the nature of the element but to the spherical shape? If in eternal things there is nothing contrary to nature, nothing superfluous, nothing in vain, how is the heaven not moved contrary to nature, and does it not have the nature of its element in vain, since it does not move according to it, and is it not superfluously moved by the first unmoved mover with a motion with which it could have been moved even without him? If the resting thing did not always rest at the middle, the moving thing would not always move around the middle; how is it not false that the heaven always moves by its own nature? If the earth had not had the nature and position it has, and likewise the heaven had not had the nature and position it has, the moving thing would not move nor the resting thing rest. How then are these eternal and ungenerated, when the what and the how of each is through the other, which is proper to generated things? If in eternal things nothing is by providence or by spontaneity (for things that are by providence are secondary to providence; and the spontaneous, being either contrary to nature or accidental, is found among the things that come to be by choice; but what is contrary to nature is secondary to what is according to nature, for the contrary to nature comes to be by a turning aside from what is according to nature; and what happens accidentally in the things that come to be by choice is secondary to the choice), how does it belong to eternal things that this is because that other is? For example: since the heaven is, the earth too must be; and if the earth, the heaven too is. This is the work of providence, which made this universe from parts differing in substance and use. Either, then, the heaven and the earth and all that is in them, which contribute to one another's being, acting, and being acted on, are not eternal; or, if they are eternal, it is not necessary that this be because that is. Aristotle, having supposed one eternal necessity, hung many other eternal necessities from the one he supposed. There must, he says, be eternal motion; and if motion, there must also be eternal time, for time is the number of motion. And if motion is eternal, it must be continuous. And if motion is continuous, there must be a simple body besides the bodies here, having neither heaviness nor lightness; for heavy and light bodies, since they move in a straight line, cannot move continuously. And if it moves continuously, it must have a spherical shape; for only with this shape can continuous motion take place. And if it moves spherically, the earth must be in the middle, always at rest, so that the motion of the sphere may take place around it. And if the earth, there must also be the bodies between earth and fire; and if these, there must be generation; and since these cannot be eternal, nor generation, there must also be other circular bodies. But if “since this is this, that must be that” has no place among ungenerated and eternal things, then the things mentioned are not eternal and ungenerated. And if these are eternal and ungenerated, then neither is this because of that, nor that because of this. Since, if earth is, there must also be fire and the bodies between them, how, if the earth is ungenerated and eternal, is fire not eternal, which is light and moves upward? For if, as he says, of contraries, if one is by nature, the other must also be by nature, how is it not absurd that the earth should be eternal and ungenerated, but fire not eternal; or fire not eternal, but the earth eternal, when they exist through one another? If because of generation there must be other circular bodies, how is generation not the cause of eternal things? For the circular bodies are eternal, and generation takes place according to their motion. But if this is absurd, then the circular bodies are not ungenerated. For things whose being is because other things come to be are generated and not eternal. If what belongs to generated things, that this must be because that is, can belong to eternal things, then the ungenerated differ in nothing from the generated. For in eternal things, he says, the possible differs in nothing from being.

From the same book: “Since it is possible to move on the circle in two directions, and these are not contrary, but if nothing can be among eternal things by chance or from spontaneity, and the heaven and its circular locomotion are eternal, for what cause does it move in one direction and not in the other? For this too must either be a principle or have a principle. For if nature always does the best of the things possible, and as, of the motions in a straight line, that toward the upper place is more honorable (for the upper place is more divine than the lower), in the same way the forward motion stands to the backward, if indeed there are right and left; and the difficulty mentioned bears witness that there is prior and posterior; for this cause solves the difficulty. For if it is as well as it can be, this would be the cause of what was said too. For it is best to move with a simple and unceasing motion, and this toward the more honorable.” If nature, which always does the best of the things possible, made the heaven move forward and not backward, how is the heaven and its locomotion eternal, when it has been brought to be by nature and has its moving with the best motion? If the difference that the upper place has from the lower, the forward motion has from the backward in being more honorable, more divine, and best, how are these motions not contrary, when they differ so much from each other? If the motion of simple bodies is simple not by possibility but by necessity, how can the heaven, having a simple body, move in two ways, and move contingently? If the heaven is everywhere equal to itself, and has its parts equal to its parts, and preserves its spherical and circular motion however it is moved, then it can also be moved from south to north and from north to south, as it can be moved from east to west and from west to east. How then did nature not place in vain in the body of the heaven the powers of so many motions, if it has the powers four ways but moves in one …

From the same: “About the so-called stars it would follow to say of what they are composed and what their motions are. Most reasonable and consistent with what has been said is to make each of the stars of that body in which it has its locomotion, since we said that there is something that is of a nature to move in a circle. For as those who say the stars are fiery say so because they say the upper body is fire, it being reasonable that each thing be composed of the things in which each is, so do we too say. Heat and light come from them as the air is rubbed by their locomotion. For motion is of a nature to set on fire even stones, and wood, and iron. More reasonable, then, is it that what is nearer to fire [is set on fire], and the air is nearer; as also with missiles in flight, for these are so set on fire that their leaden balls melt; and since they themselves are set on fire, the air around them must also suffer the same. These, then, are heated because they are carried in air, which becomes fire through the blow of the motion. But each of the upper bodies is carried in its sphere, so that they themselves are not set on fire; but since the air lies under the sphere of the circular body, it must be heated as that sphere is carried round, and most of all where the sun happens to be fastened; therefore, when the sun approaches and rises and is above us, heat comes about. That they are neither fiery nor carried in fire, let this be said by us about them.” If the stars are from the same matter as the heaven, how is it not false to say, “The heaven came to be from all the matter,” and, “It has embraced all the matter”? If what is moved, and by its motion becomes a heater of another, cannot become a heater of another unless it is first heated itself by its own motion, how do the sphere and the stars in it heat the air by their motion without being heated themselves? If … necessarily this has either heaviness or lightness, how do the heaven and the stars in it, having neither heaviness nor lightness, perform heating activities? If things that have the same movable substance must move with the same motion of themselves and not accidentally, how is the sun not moved accidentally, if it is fastened to the sphere? And the same argument holds for the other stars, if they do not move their natural motions through themselves but through the spheres to which they are fastened. If the sun is of the same matter as the heaven, which has neither heaviness nor lightness, and has a spherical shape, as the heaven also has, why do they not both move in the same way, or [both] by the exchange of their parts, as the sun moves? If there is nothing contrary to nature in eternal things, how is it not contrary to nature for a thing not to move through itself with the motion it has by nature, but through another? For the sun and the stars move not through themselves but through the spheres in which they are fastened. If, as generated things are what they have come to be according to a formula, generated things are later than the formula, [then ungenerated things according to a formula would be later than it]. But if this is impossible, ungenerated things are not according to a formula. And if they are not according to a formula, how is each of them usefully what it is, and has what it has, and does what it does? For things that exist usefully are works of formula and providence. If being from formula and matter follows on generated things, then ungenerated things are not from formula and matter. How then are the heaven and all things in it ungenerated, and yet from formula and matter? If, as Aristotle said, there is nothing in vain or contrary to nature in eternal things, how, from what he said about the motion of the sun, do both befall the sun, the in-vain and the contrary to nature? For if the sun, not fastened to the sphere that moves it, would move by nature with the same motion with which it now moves, how was it not fastened to the sphere in vain? But if it would not move with this motion by nature, but with another besides this, either in quantity or in quality, how does it not now move contrary to nature?

From the same book: “That the circles move, but the stars rest and are carried fastened to the circles.” If the stars rest in the circles according to nature, they are fastened to the circles in vain; but if they rest contrary to nature, clearly they rest by force. But among eternal things nothing is in vain or contrary to nature. Aristotle, then, did not find the account of the motion of the stars; for he calls the stars eternal, and in what he said about their motion both appear, the in-vain and the contrary to nature. If the stars are eternal, and the heaven in which the stars are bound is eternal too, and each of them is called a god, how are they not gods dragged along by gods? For things fastened to what moves are moved by being dragged. If the composition of a substance (from matter and form) is one thing, and the composition from parts that have substance is another, how are these things called eternal, which have both compositions? For the heaven, having the sun and the stars fastened in it as parts, is composed of them; for the heaven is the heaven by having these in itself.

From the same book: “Besides, it is unreasonable that nature should have given them no organ for motion. For nature does nothing at random, nor would it take thought for animals but overlook things so honorable; rather, it seems to have purposely removed everything by which they might move forward of themselves.” If there is no maker of eternal and ungenerated things, and they neither are what they are nor have what they have by nature through anyone's care, how, if the heaven is ungenerated and the things that appear in the heaven exist ungenerated together with it, does it have nature as the maker and provider of the things done for their constitution? If it fitted one who gave an account of the motion of eternal things to say that nature does nothing at random, how is it not clear that the heaven and the things that appear in the heaven are works of nature, which removed their organs of motion?

From the same: “Since, then, the heaven must move with its own motion, but the other stars must not move forward of themselves, it is reasonable that each should be spherical. For so the one would most of all be moved, and the other …” If that is said to rest which can be moved with the motion from which it rests, how do the stars rest, having no proper motion according to which they ought to be moved? But if they have the power of moving, but are hindered by being fastened to the sphere, how is their always being moved not contrary to nature? If the spherical shape was given as fitting to things that are always moved, how, of the things that have the spherical shape, does one always move, as the heaven does, and another always rest, as the stars do?

From the same book: “So that, since this does not appear to happen always, none of them would move with an animate or a forced motion, as if nature were providing for what was going to be, that, if [the motion] did not have this manner, [nothing in the region here would remain] … would be in the same state.” How then are those things eternal and ungenerated which have received their being such and their moving thus according to the providence of nature? For things according to providence are secondary to providence, and eternal things are secondary to nothing. If what is going to be did not exist before it is, how is it possible for both to be true about the heaven and the stars and their motion: that it is going to be, and that they are eternal and ungenerated? For what is going to be is not yet, but the eternal and ungenerated is present. If nature provided that the motion of the heaven should be of the stated kind for the sake of the things around the region here remaining as they were, how are these things eternal and ungenerated, which are as they are and move as they move for the sake of generated things?

From the same: “Since it has been shown that they are not of a nature to move of themselves, and nature does nothing without reason or in vain, clearly it has also given the unmoved things such a shape as is least fit for motion. And the sphere is least fit for motion, because it has no organ for motion. So that clearly they would be spherical in bulk.” If nature has given to the things that always move the spherical shape, which is suitable for easy motion, how have the stars not received such a shape in vain, when they are fastened to the circles and unable to perform their natural motion? If the stars are not of a nature to move of themselves, then they do not have eternal motion by nature. How then are they from the same element as the heaven, which has neither heaviness nor lightness? If the heaven, because it is of such an element and has a spherical shape, is of a nature always to move around the middle of itself, while the stars, though of the same element and having the same shape, are not of a nature to move of themselves, then nature, it seems, gave them in vain a substance and a shape suitable for perpetual motion, if they have motionless rest. That the stars have a substance and shape always in motion and yet motionless rest — how is this not proof of the irrational … that the stars rest? If the substances of ungenerated and eternal things are above all making, both that by reason and that contrary to reason, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, are they what they are and have what they have by the providence of nature, which does nothing irrationally or in vain? If the stars ought not to be moved, why are they moved at all through others? But if they ought to be moved, why are they not moved through themselves but through others, when nature could have made them move through themselves with the motion with which they are now moved through others, she who made them unmoved in themselves in a most easily movable substance? If in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature, and it is contrary to nature to have a substance and shape always in motion but motionless rest, then either the things in which the contrary to nature is found are not eternal, or it is false that in eternal things nothing is contrary to nature. If none of the ungenerated has, or does not have, what it has or does not have by anyone's providence, how, if the heaven and the stars are ungenerated, do they, by the providence of nature, have no organ of motion, but have instead of the organ a spherical shape, which is better suited to continuous motion …

From the same: “The first [motion], being one, moves many of the divine bodies, but the others, being many, each move only one. For any one of the planets is carried with several motions. In this way, then, nature equalizes and produces a certain order, assigning to the one motion many bodies, and to the one body many motions. For the one sphere is carried fastened in many spheres; and each sphere happens to be a body.” If there is no maker of ungenerated and eternal substances, how are these eternal and ungenerated, of whose order nature is the maker, assigning to the one [motion] many bodies and to the one body many motions, and equalizing the number of the motions of one body with the number of the bodies? If these things are ungenerated and unmade, how can there be a natural order made among the ungenerated? [If] a sphere fastened to a sphere has the same substance as the sphere to which it is fastened, how does it not appear to have both absurdities that are not found among eternal things: to have in vain the movable substance by which it is not moved, and to be moved contrary to nature?

From the third book On the Heaven: “Of the things that come to be by nature, some are substances, others are works and affections of these. I call substances the simple bodies, such as fire and earth and the things of the same series as these, and the things that come from these, such as the whole heaven and its parts, and again the animals and the plants and their parts.” He who said that the heaven is from a simple element different from the elements here, and that it is not possible for another heaven to come to be, because this one has embraced all the matter, how does he now say that the heaven is from the same elements as the animals and the plants? But if he says that another heaven came to be from other elements, how does he not lie when he says, “It is not possible for there to be another heaven besides one”? … sometimes from an element other than those here, sometimes from the same elements; how is not one or the other [false]?

From the same book: “About the first of the elements, then, it has been said both what it is like in nature and that it is imperishable and ungenerated.” If an element is that from which what comes to be comes to be, being present in it, how can the same thing be both an element and ungenerated? If the element is first and what is from the element later, how is the element from which the heaven is ungenerated, and the heaven ungenerated together with it? If the element is ungenerated for this reason, that it is not from an element, how is the heaven ungenerated, when it is from an element?