Against the Manichees 2.27–2.44

Besides all this, if there were never any hindrance to the things God commonly gives to all men, men would ascribe their supply to the course of some unchangeable nature, and on receiving them they would not give thanks to the giver, nor would they ask when they did not have them. So they are sometimes deprived for a little while so that they may ask, and they receive again so that they may give thanks to the giver, knowing that it is he who provides, and not some other nature beside God, undiscerning and unchangeable, that supplies them. And God wishes men to be grateful to him so that they may become more worthy to receive what is from him, not so that he may gain anything for himself. He wishes them to ask for good things so that, on receiving them, they may be aware of the giver. For he rejoices to give what is his, but rejoices more to give to the worthy; since his love for mankind is in a way dishonoured if it is shown to the unperceiving, but proves very reasonable if those who receive value the giver above all in receiving.

And if cities fall when impiety springs up (as happened recently in the time of the man who was very impious and revived the error of idols), sin is destroyed and the error against God diminished; nothing more than natural death happens, and divine correction is by no means evil. On the contrary, it is good, like a kind of medicine; and the only evil is to decry the beneficial economy. For the man who slanders the begetting of children as increasing matter, and decries death in great numbers, would he seem to have a human mind, imagining things so contrary to himself? But neither is the begetting of children evil, which makes the mortal race ever-living and adds those born to creation; nor is death (even if much of it comes at once) wicked, since it was not laid down by God for men’s loss but appointed for the highest benefit of righteous and unrighteous alike. What happens naturally to each individually, if it comes upon many at once, comes according to nature and nothing more; but it shows the care of the one who arranges it to be greater than in the individual case, in that the one has no sign of the condemnation of sinners, while the other, by apparent indignation, benefits those who die in the manner described earlier, and turns back the living,

And if someone, since such things often happen, points out that human life is entangled in the same wrongs, such a man seems to me to be in the same case as one who, seeing fish in lakes and the sea, thinks the fisherman’s art is idle, because he does not see those that are caught but sees those swimming in the waters; or as one who, seeing many sick, should think that medicine does nothing. For while many are benefited toward piety and virtue by the means through which God sometimes arranges fearful things, the fault-finder denies what is achieved and reproaches the contentiousness of the many toward sin. Yet we ourselves do not say that such things compel the many, but that they turn the well-disposed away from sinning. Indeed, brought on for a little while, they quickly cease, so as not to force rather than persuade to change; and then the usual things return, producing an approved purpose in those who change, so that the well-disposed may have even the mere memory of the examples as a prop for their weakness. Rather, we must say: if, even when such things happen, those who change are few and easily counted, how far would human reasoning not have advanced in wickedness if the deterrence through such things did not come? And even if no one were benefited from it (which is foolish to say), it is better that men be convicted as not yielding even in this way than that God bear the blame of neglect as no longer using correction; and this argument is to be used against those who do not perceive. For it is plain to the well-disposed that fear not only leads some to the completion of change for the better, but also secretly lessens in others the impulse and daring toward injustice.

Let us come now to the discussion of creation, which the deceiver slanders, and let us first examine darkness and night, which he decries most of all, darkened as he is in mind. For he takes the darkness that appears at night as evidence of that darkness which Mani imagines exists, as of something that does not exist, seeing and understanding nothing at all, but stumbling against things like a blind man. And he calls it darkness and, as it were, shudders, as though needing no argument to prove his false account, taking the name as of a thing proclaimed by its very self.

We must say, then, that this darkness is indeed called so, but does not exist in substance; it comes and goes daily, existing as a consequence and in the manner of a shadow. It was not created to exist as a substance at all, but when the world was created it is a shadow. A man is born by himself, and the shadow accompanies him according to the bulk of his body; and it would surely not seem to have been made along with him in himself, but it comes about according to the position of the body and the circuit of the light. So too night and darkness (the world being plainly bodily) are only a consequence, not made as something substantial in the manner of a created thing. For when the sun completes its daily course and turns to its own withdrawals, all things inside the world are necessarily shadowed, since what gives light is outside; for so God willed it, for reasons we shall state a little later as far as we can. Indeed, by day too the bodily masses that stand up send their shadows toward the side opposite the position of the light, and the shadow moves round with the light to the opposite side. Where the sun is until noon, there is shadow after noon; and where the shadow is before noon, there the sun comes after it. And the shadow by day is a shadow and not wholly darkness, since the surrounding air, open on every side, gives a share of brightness to the shaded places too. If you shut up a house completely, leaving not even a narrow entrance for the light, you will make night even at noon. This happens at night, when the sun has gone to its own regions; so night would be a privation of light. One would learn what happens more clearly by considering that at night the sun is somewhere, remaining and existing, but by day darkness is nowhere, but is wholly dissolved and vanishes; so light has come into being as a substance, but darkness not at all.

But let us consider how necessary night is. It is first a rest common to all. For sleep by day shows the necessity of night all the more, since night, long as it is, is not enough to rest the senses of men. And not all share equally in sleep by day; but at night the measure of rest is common and equal for all, with no unevenness according to the advantages of life; which bears witness no less to the Creator’s equality toward mankind as one race.

Then, if it were always day, with an uninterrupted stretch, time would not have been measured, not being divided into parts; but the daily division of time makes it possible to count it by these portions, and without the recognition of time the life of most men would have become irrational. And what is more, there would have been no enjoyment of light, if the darkness of night were not beside it in the way described. For uninterrupted bodily light would not even have been known to be light; for light is named and is in contrast to darkness. So there would have been nothing wonderful in its appearing as a created thing, if the position of what seems opposed did not show it. So we must give thanks to the all-wise Creator for many other things in the matter of night, but most of all because it produces the perception and enjoyment of light, which would not otherwise have been recognized for what it is.

But one might be struck by the ineffable wisdom of God: though so many and still more necessary and useful things come to men through darkness, yet, since there was both a name and a thing called darkness, he did not make it in substance, but made it come and go, so that as existing it might provide what has been said and still more, and as not existing it might not at all bring blame on the Creator. Night, therefore, is blameless, and indeed wonderful in its use in every way.

They say that the robber does his evil at night. And what has that to do with night? If it were not possible for those who wish to do evil also by day, the time of night would have to be blamed; but since the doer waits for the opportunity of evildoing, whether it falls by day or by night, it is the purpose of the doer, not the time, that must be blamed. Besides, if he obeyed the night, every evildoer would have been asleep; for that is all it urges.

We must observe, besides, that light and darkness, truth and falsehood, seem to be opposed to each other in proportion. For what light is to the body, truth is to the soul; and what darkness is to the eyes, ignorance and falsehood are to the mind. For man is nothing else than soul and body, and having from God provision for each, he enjoys bodily light through the body and intelligible truth through the soul. And as darkness does not exist in substance but is only permitted to come on, as has been shown, in the same way falsehood is not carried from some existing substance, which that man calls an unbegotten principle, nor is it a substance existing and living; it is permitted to exist only in thought, coming and going like darkness, and this very usefully and necessarily. For if the thought of falsehood had not been permitted, men’s choice of truth would have been untested and unproved, and it would have been named in vain if falsehood had not been permitted to thought. For no one would be a lover of truth unless he also had in his own power the thought of lying. I do not say that falsehood would be a favour to truth, but that the choice of truth would not seem to exist if the power of lying were not at hand; and this is for the sake of lovers of truth, not for the sake of truth. For the one who speaks truth must have it in his power, and it must be possible for him, to lie, and by keeping from it he speaks truth. So the possibility of lying brings men to prefer truth, as the presence of darkness stirs the perception of light. And as light shines in the darkness (for when it comes it dissolves it, since it does not exist in substance), so truth, prevailing over falsehood, wholly shows it to be non-existent, slipping in through thought by the power of reason, so that truth may be chosen. For how could anyone choose truth if he did not also have in his own power the choice of its opposite?

If, then, it could be shown that darkness exists in substance, and does not only come and go as has been said, a substance of falsehood might be posited too. But if neither he nor anyone else can show that this darkness is not dissoluble, coming about in the manner of a shadow, so that light exists even at night while darkness does not exist by day, then plainly falsehood, which corresponds to it, does not exist in the manner of a substance either, but has of necessity only been permitted to arise in thought, for the choice of truth. And since light exists in substance, one might clearly think that truth too exists in substance, so that the exactness of the proportion may be kept. And what prevents us from holding and thinking that God is truth itself? For if God is light (light for the mind, for he is not visible), plainly the light is truth; for intellectual light is nothing else than truth. Yet God, being light and truth itself, keeps from falsehood not through inability but because he does not wish ever to lie. And if we say he cannot (for it is not absurd to say it), it is because there is never a time when he does not not-will it. For in those in whom willing and not willing come about in different ways, ability too is reasonably defined; but to God, since willing it never comes about, inability must be ascribed, yet so, because he never wills it, not because he cannot, in the manner of weakness and inability. For it is not unreasonable to say that a created thing (I mean bodily light) is fettered by nature, so that being light is not in its own power but in that of its maker; but it is very absurd to think the Creator subject to the necessity of nature, so that speaking truth seems not to be in his power but forced on him by nature. Yet what he is, he alone is; and in those he created he has placed being what they are by nature and necessity, but no one has placed in him being truth by necessity. So he who made natures is above nature, and he himself is free of the necessity of nature; for so he will be confessed to be truly good. So, from what has been said, there is no falsehood itself, but the liar is the one who lies; for the name comes from the one who pursues it, not the pursuer from what does not exist. For falsehood would not exist before the one who thinks it up; and similarly darkness was not created but comes in, being the shadow of this universe; except that darkness is not only permitted to steal in but is also very useful, while the thought of falsehood makes plain men’s choice of truth, yet, when preferred to truth, is most harmful. And very naturally so: for falsehood is thought up by men, while bodily darkness is laid down by God. That is why we must, with understanding, flee the one, and not revile the other, which has been laid down of necessity by the Creator.

The inventor of the emptiest blasphemy against God reviles not only this, but also the animals that have received a wild nature from the Creator, plainly moving against created things like an enemy who finds fault with everything … and the discourse will refute the deceiver’s irrational blasphemy in these things too. For in decrying all wild beasts, four-footed and creeping, he seems to me to be in the same case as a sinful and very wicked slave who accepts his master’s other things as blameless, but hates and slanders a whip that is merely seen somewhere, showing by his very hatred that what lies at hand is necessary. For men, being ready to forget God, if they had nothing in creation that appeared worthy of fear, would have separated themselves still more from God by their purpose, and would not be reasonably blamed, since they were roused by nothing they saw. For even if we have by nature freedom to choose the better, yet through ease we easily fall into forgetfulness. So there are necessarily many things that rouse our reasoning by fear toward God, as again there are very many that move it, by kindness and the enjoyment of good things, to confess thanks to the Creator. For we are trained by both: by those we enjoy as pleasant and by those through which we are turned back as fearful.

What is wild by nature, then, is fearful, not wicked. For wickedness and evil are a passion of reasoning, while a natural impulse so constituted is free of all blame. And God, sparing men, has made it so that by fear of irrational animals we may pursue the rational quality of nobility. And there is nothing evil in these. For how can that be evil which does not know what it is? And in this way too the madman’s account of evil itself (which he invented and calls an unbegotten principle) is refuted no less. For he does not grant it reasoning and knowledge of evil, lest it be found to have perception of the good as well; for in this way it would be shown not to be evil, since knowledge of the good is testimony to a nature that is not evil. But in defining it as irrational and void of knowledge, he takes from it even the knowledge of what it itself is. For if it perceived and knew that it was evil, it would certainly perceive its opposite, being made good. For evil is detected by reason through the perception and comparison of the good, so that, if the opposite is plain, it will be evident. For every opposite is the test of its opposite, by knowledge and judgement; without knowledge neither is plain to the other. If, then, evil does not know itself and does not pursue evil by reasoning, it would not be evil, and would be accused in vain. He admits that evil is freed from reasoning. For example, all of us are accustomed to pardon a man in delirium, in the grip of fevers or some other affliction, who does not know what he does; rather we bend to pity, freeing from evil the man who strikes out wildly, and even, if he finds a sword, the man who kills. So it is evident to all, and this is a common judgement and consequence of nature, not to call evil what does not know what it does. If, then, neither what knows must be called good, nor what does not know what it itself is would seem to be evil (the first because he himself does not posit it, the second because he defines it so in error and outside the common view)…

So no wild beast is evil, being deprived of reason; but a man of bad character would be evil, pursuing by reason what he by no means ignores. For the addition of reason to nature brings the charge of evil, making beforehand plain what is being done; and the removal of knowledge is the removal of blame. So man, knowing both virtue and vice, is named from whichever he chooses (for knowledge comes before choice); but before he knows, being an infant, he is called by neither extreme. It is plain from every side, then, that we reckon vice and virtue by reasoning and by the choice that follows knowledge. Wild beasts, then, which have no share in reason, would not be evil, nor brought forth from evil; since, even if evil were so, it would not be evil,

Besides, you may often see even the most grievous thing in creeping creatures, I mean their venom, taken by the most exact physicians for healing, and, mixed with substances able to counter it, sometimes purging the most grievous diseases; and their very flesh, combined with other kinds and herbs, makes an excellent medicine for bodies; and likewise with the other wild beasts. For certain parts and members and blood often benefit the sick by themselves. How, then, do things that are partly beneficial come from evil? All these things, therefore, are to be thought useful only because of men, and called neither good nor evil, since they necessarily produce in men only fear, for turning to the better; and their idleness hinders idleness among men. For they are placed like a whip seen in a house, to produce caution in the servants, if anyone should be idle or do wrong in the household.

And if one can see wicked men unharmed by these, wonder at the master’s forbearance, but no less consider the whip that lies at hand. And on the contrary, if good men fall in with them, we must know that the master would rather spare, for conversion, a good man who has erred than one wholly given up; for the one errs curably, while the other is kept for incurable punishment. Very many such examples we can see recorded in the divine Scriptures. God, then, cares greatly for man; that is why he has set beside him in every way things that stir him to reverence, so that not even his sleep is free of frequent disturbance, but even this, hindered by certain vermin, pricks the reason like a goad. And many things help human weakness wonderfully toward remembering God. For by what he suffers bodily he is freed from passions of the soul; and by what he could suffer, even if he does not, he is turned to reverence. And man necessarily falls into bodily sufferings so that he may escape the most grievous and only true suffering, sin. For what feels no pain is unrestrained, and what sins unpunished is wholly destroyed. For if, with so many things set before them for fear, men are mostly sick with fearlessness, how could they even have lived with one another if no fear hung before their eyes? So sickness softens a harder mind; a shipwreck has often changed the perjured ways of merchants; poverty in turn has brought down the man lifted up by wealth; loss of children has chastened the man who was greedy for his children’s sake; and if it did not chasten him, it gave an example to those who perceive. And the children were not harmed at all, but rather benefited, being freed from the upbringing of bad parents, and the greed is exposed. Again, when other parents are well disposed, their sons die either because they would become unworthy of those who begot them, so that they may not stand as a bad monument to good parents, or, being good, because if they grew up further they would change and become bad; they are benefited by not remaining to their own harm, since God governs all things by his foreknowledge.

And fears are very necessary, and their causes, which God arranges, are varied and countless in number. And the same things often happen for various reasons. One man is ill, being turned back from his sins; another is exercised still more, for his virtue, toward bearing witness; another is convicted for the excess of his evil. And of the same misfortune the causes vary. One man loses his wealth for not using it well; another, because he used it well, by God’s sparing; another being trained in virtue through poverty; another willingly throws off the weight of his money so as not to be hindered toward virtue. And one could not easily see in detail the exactness of what God arranges in sparing men; but the few things that are grasped become grounds of faith for those not grasped. Some things he himself makes clear to men, so that they may have, as it were, an ascent to him through what they perceive; but most he hides in obscurity, so as not to become the teacher of unbelief toward himself. For it is not fitting to demand of God a demonstration of each thing that happens; since such knowledge becomes worse than ignorance, the mind being put to shame by what it learns, and otherwise not accepting as a just economy anything God governs. Better is faith and disposition toward God, trusting the uprightness of the governor even without seeing the meaning of what is done; since to be brought over everywhere by demonstrations would be plain unbelief rather than faith. Many do not even scrutinize genuine friends, granting genuineness to the unexamined character of their company, since they would easily be accused of distrust if, after testing, they never gave them confidence. So God too, wishing most of all that we be disposed toward him, does not make clear the whole working of his providence (for he wishes us to trust him), nor does he hide it all, but by some examples he in a way props up our mind. The well-disposed in purpose and most pious, then, both perceive and keep the memory for ever, flowering toward what is good like good soil that has received seeds. But those whose mind is buried under the greater weight of the habit of sins, or under the prejudice of other fictions against God (such as Mani brought forth, and such as one could find among others), are struck in mind, but repel the perception and benefit of the examples. Let this be added concerning the general providence of the God of all.

What we were examining was about all wild beasts, and it was shown by natural reasoning that these are neither evil nor from any evil, but very useful to men for producing fear. For if everything in creation were only pleasant and full of cheerfulness, and there were nothing at all that frightened even gently, men would have seemed to be badly trained toward fearlessness. And these things also have the beauty of variety, and a comeliness mixed with what is fearful. Besides these, there are others that are neither fit to feed men nor provide clothing, nor are they beastly and wild, but only fill out the variety of the world. And plainly all, tame and wild and those in between, remain subject to the creation and will of one, escaping mutual destruction and secured by various advantages. Some have invincible strength; the weaker gain their safety by the speed of their nature; others are armed in other ways; and those that seem unarmed have their safety contrived in some other manner: either they have the nature of birds or hide under the earth. So the Creator has provided order by variety, and by setting up differences distributes safety to all, so that no kind of them may perish, betrayed by weakness of nature. So too they are clothed for the seasons with coverings that grow of themselves, thick hair and tough hides, able to ward off the harm of winter and heat, and making lying down and rest on the ground easier, so that a natural bedding seems to be spread beneath them. And some are given few offspring, either as hard to catch or as long-lived, while those easily caught and given over to daily use last and are preserved by many offspring. They have different foods at different times, and abundant supply lies before all. So too not one of the herbs thought deadly has been made destructive by nature. For how could what is harmful to one kind and beneficial to another be both destructive and saving in its nature? The difference of the kinds that use them requires the variety of provision among them, so that even in irrational creatures a trace of reason may be shown by the law of the Creator. For none of them is ignorant of what is proper to it, nor, through its irrational and beastly nature, does it take what is deadly to itself as food; but each sets out for what is beneficial to it. For if every herb and root were suitable for all, the Creator’s law ruling even in irrational creatures would have been shown less. But that what is harmful to some lies by as saving to others proclaims more clearly the wisdom in all things: that even in irrational creatures there is a natural discernment of what lies at hand for food. If this were not naturally present in each, one might reasonably accuse harmful things of having been brought forth from evil. But if natural discernment in animals comes before judgement, and each chooses what is proper to it, plainly every herb and root is useful (even if not to all), and the things laid out in various ways are various.