Against Eunomius 1.301–1.315

For it would be the height of silliness for one who agreed about the reality to quibble about the words. But as it is, by attesting “highest” and “most proper” to the substance of the Father alone, he has allowed us, through his silence about the rest, to infer that they do not exist in the proper sense. For how can one say that something truly is, when proper being is not attested to it? Where “proper” is not admitted, one must agree to the opposite terms; for what is not proper is certainly improper. So the construction of not being in the proper sense becomes a proof of complete non-existence; and Eunomius seems to have this in view in innovating these names in his own doctrine. For no one will say that out of perplexity he fell into a foolish supposition and distinguishes the “high” locally, as what is above, assigning to the Father a kind of hilltop look-out and settling the Son in the lower hollows. No one is so childish in mind as to conceive a difference of place in the intellectual and incorporeal nature; for position in place belongs to bodies, while what is intellectual and immaterial by nature is admittedly far removed from any notion of place.

What, then, is the reason why the substance of the Father alone is called “highest”? One would not easily suspect that he is carried about into these notions through some ignorance, since he pretends to be wise in the many things he displays, and, as divine Scripture forbids, is over-wise. Nor will he say that the “high” indicates a superiority of substance in power, or goodness, or anything else of the kind. For this too is known to everyone, not only to those reputed to excel in wisdom: that the hypostasis of the Only-begotten and that of the Holy Spirit lacks nothing as regards perfect goodness and power and all such things. For all good things, so long as they do not admit their opposite, have no limit to their goodness, since they are by nature bounded only by their opposites, as one can see in particular examples: power stops when weakness takes over; life is bounded by death; darkness is the limit of light; and, to put it briefly, each particular good ends in its opposite. If, then, he supposes the nature of the Only-begotten and of the Spirit to be changeable for the worse, he naturally diminishes the notion of goodness in them, as capable of meeting with their opposites. But if the divine and unalterable nature cannot admit the worse — and this is admitted even by the enemies themselves — it is certainly seen to be unlimited in goodness; and the unlimited is the same as the infinite. To conceive of excess and diminution in what is infinite and unlimited is the height of unreason. For how could the notion of infinity be preserved if more and less were taught to be in it? We recognize the more from comparing limits with one another; where there is no limit, how could one conceive the excess?

Or does he not mean this, but conceives some superiority in time, and assigns the greater share according to the privilege of age, and therefore says that the substance of the Father alone is highest? Then let him say by what he has measured the excess of the Father’s life, when no interval of time is conceived before the hypostasis of the Only-begotten. And even if this were so — let it be said for the moment by way of hypothesis; who would conceive such a thing of the nature that is before the ages? — what more being does the substance that precedes in time have than the later substance, I mean according to the very definition of being, so that the one should be called highest and proper and the other not so? Of the older compared with the younger, the time of life is longer; but the substance is not, on that account, either more or less. This will become clearer by examples. What less did David, who appeared fourteen generations later, have than Abraham as regards the definition of substance? Was anything of humanity altered in his case? Was he less a man because he was later in time? And who is so foolish as to say this? For the definition of substance is one in both, in no way altered along with the passage of time; nor would anyone say that the one is more a man because he is earlier in time, while the other shares less in the nature because he came into life after others — as though either the nature had been used up beforehand in those who went before, or time had spent its power in those who have passed. For it is not for time to set the measures of the nature for each; the nature remains in itself, preserving itself through those who come after, while time is carried along in its own way, whether containing or flowing past the nature, which remains firm and unchangeable within its own bounds.

So even if it were granted that the Father has more in respect of time, as the argument supposed, they could not properly attest the “highest” of substance to the Father alone; and when there is no difference by seniority of time, how could they? For since every measuring interval is found below the divine nature, what ground is left to those who try to split the substance that is before time and incomprehensible by a difference of high and low? But the argument leaves no doubt that what these men teach is a plea for the Jewish doctrine. They show that the substance of the Father alone subsists, which alone they maintain properly is, while they reckon that of the Son and of the Spirit among things that are not. For everything that is not in the proper sense is said to be in word only and by a misuse of ordinary speech. So too “man” is properly said not of what is shown by imitation in a picture but of the one properly so called; he is not a likeness of a man but the archetype of the likeness, while the picture is a man only in name, and therefore what is said of it is not said properly, since it is not by nature what it is called. So here too, if the substance of the Father alone is spoken of in the proper sense, and that of the Son and the Spirit no longer, what else is this — is it not a plain denial of the saving proclamation? Then let them run back from the Church to the synagogues of the Jews, since by not granting that the Son properly is, they establish that he is not at all; for the improper is the same as the non-existent.

And since he wishes to be wise in such matters, and spits on those who attempt to write without skill in logic, let him tell us whom he despises from what wisdom he has learned the more and the less of substance. What argument has established such a difference — that one substance is more than another, I mean in respect of the very meaning of substance? Let him not bring forward differences of qualities or properties, which are grasped about a substance by the process of conception and are something other than the subject. It is not differences of odours, or colours, or weight, or power, or rank, or manners and character, or anything else observed about body and soul, that we now have to examine; I mean the subject itself, to which the name of substance properly belongs: whether it has any difference from another substance in being more. But we have never yet heard, of two things admitted to exist, that so long as both exist one is more and the other less. Each equally is, so long as it is what it is, setting aside, as was said before, the question of greater honour or greater duration. If, then, he does not grant at all that the Only-begotten is seen in substance (for his argument seems to be slipping secretly toward this), let him who does not grant that he properly is not concede “less” in his case either. But if he confesses that the Son is a substantial power, however he subsists (for we are not yet fighting about this), why does he take back again what he grants, establishing that the one confessed to be does not properly be — which is equal, as was said, to not being at all? For as there can be no man to whom the definition belonging to the name does not perfectly apply, but along with the one who lacks the properties the whole definition of the substance is cancelled, so with every thing to which being is not attested perfectly or properly: a partial assent to its being gives no proof of its subsistence, but the construction of its not perfectly being establishes the total abolition of the subject.

So, if he is sensible, let him change to the pious way of thinking, removing from his doctrine the “less” and the “improper” in regard to the substance of the Only-begotten and of the Holy Spirit. But if he has resolved to be impious in any case — and I do not know why he wishes to repay his Creator, God, and benefactor with blasphemy — let him at least forfeit the reputation of being anyone in learning, since he ignorantly places substance above substance, declares one high and the other low by an argument found nowhere, and attests “proper” to one and not to the other. For we know of none even of those who have philosophized outside the faith who talked such nonsense; nor does such a thing agree either with the God-inspired words or with common notions. I think, then, that the aim of the invention of these names has been sufficiently shown from what has been said: he lays these words down beforehand as a base of operations or a foundation for all his villainy about the doctrine, so that, having established that one substance alone is to be considered highest and most proper, he may easily overrun the others as being seen among the lower and not in the proper sense. He shows this especially in what follows, where, setting out his views about the Son and the Holy Spirit, he does not come to these names, lest, as I said before, he present even against his will the kinship of their nature by the titles; this teacher of doctrine makes nameless mention of them, while laying it down that the minds of the hearers must be led by connatural names and words.

And yet what name is more connatural than the one named by the Truth himself? But he teaches against the Gospels, not naming the Son but “the substance existing through that one and holding first place after it among all beings.” That this is said in order to destroy the pious belief about the Only-begotten will become clearer from the rest of his construction. But since what was said here seems neutral, so that even one who says nothing impious about Christ might sometimes use these words, I too will pass over the discussion about the Lord for now, keeping the refutation for his plainer blasphemies against him. But concerning the Holy Spirit, since he uses open and unveiled blasphemy, saying that he is not ranked with the Father and the Son but subordinated to both, I will now examine his statement as far as I am able.

Let us first consider what subjection means, and of what things divine Scripture uses such a word. Honouring man by his having come to be in the image of the one who created him, God the Creator subjected to him the whole irrational nature, as the great David praised in his hymns when recounting this grace. “He subjected all things,” he says, “under his feet,” and he mentions by name the things subjected. Again, there is another meaning of subjection in divine Scripture. Ascribing to the God of all the cause of his successes in war, he says, “He subjected peoples to us, and nations under our feet”; and again, “Who subjects peoples under me.” And one may often find this word in the divine Scriptures signifying power over those who stand in opposition. As for the Apostle’s word about the subjection of all men to the Only-begotten that is to come later, and through him to the Father — where, in the depth of wisdom, he says that the mediator between God and men is himself subjected to the Father (hinting at the obedience of all men to the Father through the subjection of the Son, who shared in humanity) — since it needs a fuller and more laborious exposition, I shall put it off for the present. But in the plain cases, where the meaning of subjection has no ambiguity, in what sense does he declare the substance of the Spirit subjected to that of the Son and of the Father? As the Son is subjected to the Father, in the Apostle’s sense? Then in that respect the Spirit is ranked with the Son, not subjected to him, since both are persons among those subjected. Or not so — then how else? As we have learned in the psalm that the irrational nature is subjected to the rational? Then it differs as much as cattle differ from man. But perhaps he will reject this account too. Then he will come to the one that remains: that, being opposed and warring at first, it was afterwards compelled by a stronger necessity to bow to the one who prevailed. Let him choose whichever of these he likes; but I do not know which of them he can choose and escape the inescapable condemnation for blasphemy — whether he says that the Spirit is subjected on a par with the irrational beings, as fish and birds and sheep are to man, or brings him like a captive, after the manner of rebels, to the one superior in power.

Or he says none of these, but that he did not use the word “subjection” in the sense of Scripture, but says in some other meaning that the Spirit is subjected to the Father and the Son. What, then, is this? Is it because he is third in the order handed down by the Lord to the disciples that he lays it down that the Spirit is “subjected” and not “ranked with”? Then by the same argument let him subject the Father to the Only-begotten, since in many places divine Scripture puts the Lord’s name first and makes mention of the God over all second. “I and the Father,” says the Lord, putting himself first; and, “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God”; and countless such texts may be gathered by those who diligently search out testimonies from the Scriptures, such as this: “There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of services, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but the same God.” So by this argument let the God over all be subjected to the Son and to the Spirit, since he is mentioned in third place by Paul. But we have never yet heard of this wisdom: that what is named second or third in some sequence is pushed into the rank of subjects and subordinates. Yet this is what this man wishes the sequence in which the Persons were handed down to indicate, as he constructs superiorities and inferiorities of rank and of nature. For he defines the sequence of order as indicating a difference of natures — I do not know where he imagined such things, or from what necessity he fell into this notion.

For the order of counting does not produce a difference of natures. The things counted remain as they are by nature, in themselves, whether they are counted or not; and number is a sign that makes known the quantity of things. It does not necessarily send to a second rank whatever is lower in dignity of nature; it makes the sequence of the things signified by number according to the wish of those who count. “Paul and Silvanus and Timothy”: three persons are mentioned here, according to the wish of the one who mentions them. Did the number show that Silvanus, placed second after Paul, is something else and not a man? Or was Timothy, placed third, thought on that account to be of some other nature because of the sequence chosen by the one who mentions them? Not so. Each of them is a man both before the counting and after it. But since the word could not show the three at once with a single utterance, it mentions each separately in the order it pleased, and joins the names by the conjunctions between them, so as, I think, to show by the joining of the names the concord of the three into one.

But this does not please the new teacher of doctrine. He legislates against the ordinance of the divine voice; having cut off from its proper and natural order and conjunction what was ranked with the Father and the Son by the Lord himself, he has counted it among the subordinates, and says that it is the work of both: of the Father, as supplying the cause of its construction, and of the Only-begotten, as having himself produced its hypostasis; and he defines this as the cause of the subjection, without yet having disclosed the meaning of subjection itself. Then he says: “There are of course included the activities that accompany the substances and the names connatural to these.” The meaning of these words is not very easy to see, covered as it is with a thick darkness of impiety; but as far as one may conjecture, it is this. He calls “activities of substances,” I think, the powers that produced the Son and the Holy Spirit, by which the first substance wrought the second and the second the third; and he says that the names of the works produced were connaturally constructed along with the works. The mischief about the names we have already examined as far as possible, and when we come to that part of the examination we shall add more, if the argument requires it.

For now it is worth considering: how do the activities accompany the substances? What are they in their own nature? Something other than the substances they accompany, or part of them and of their nature? If something other, how, or by whom, did they come to be? If the same, how are they cut off, and, instead of coexisting with them, accompany them from outside? For nothing can be learned so simply from what he said — whether some natural necessity, without choice, forces the activity, whatever it may be, to follow the substance, as burning follows fire, and vapours and exhalations follow the bodies from which they arise. But I think he would not say this, so as to consider God’s substance a variegated and composite thing, which has its activity inseparable from it and observed along with it, as an accident shown in a subject. Rather he says that the substances, moving by choice and free will, produce by themselves what they please. And who says that what comes about willingly, from forethought, “follows” like something accompanying from outside? We do not know of the word worn in common usage for such things, so as to say that the activity of one labouring at something follows the labourer. For it is not possible to separate the one from the other and grasp what remains by itself: he who says “activity” has included in the word what moves according to it, and he who mentions the agent has also signified the activity without saying it. This will be clearer through examples. We say that someone works bronze, or builds, or does some other such thing. Then by a single word the expression presents both the work and the one who practises the craft at once, so that if one were separated the other would not subsist. If, then, the two are conceived together, the activity itself and the one who moves according to it, how is the activity that produces the second substance said here to follow the first substance, somehow mediating by itself between both, neither agreeing with the first in nature nor joined to the second? For it is separated from the first by being not a nature but a movement of a nature; and it does not agree with the one after it, because what it brought into subsistence through itself was not a bare activity but an active substance. Then let us examine this also besides: he calls the substance a work of the substance, the second of the first, and again the third of the second.

By what means did he first prove this statement? What arguments did he use for it? By what method did he compel us to believe that each in turn must be the work of the one before it? If one had to reason by analogy about these from the rest of what is observed in creation, even so it would not be right to conjecture about what lies above from what is below; still, the argument would perhaps have had something pardonable, straying in what is incomprehensible by way of what appears. But as it is, who will try to say that heaven is the work of God, the sun the work of heaven, the moon of the sun, the stars of the moon, and something else in creation of them? All are the works of one, since there is one God and Father of all, from whom are all things. And if some things do come into being through one another, like the generation of animals, even then one thing does not come into being as a different kind from another, since the nature remains in the offspring. How, then, when he cannot say such a thing of anything observed in creation, does he establish it of the transcendent substance, that the second is the work of the first and this of the next? And if, thinking of the generation of animals, he imagined from it that he could reason in a similar way about the pure nature, so that what comes next is conceived as a work of what goes before, even so he does not keep his argument consistent. For things that come into being from others are certainly of the same kind as those from which they come. But he attributes what is foreign and alien to things born one from another, so as to show the abundance of his falsehood, like a skilful fighter trying to strike the truth with both hands. For to show that the Son and the Spirit are lowered and lessened in natural dignity, he says that each comes into being as a different kind from the other, so that those who have learned of their generation one from another may never come to a notion of kinship from such a mode of existence; and he fights against the very definition of nature, both saying that a thing of a different kind comes into being from another and declaring the begotten to be a bastard in relation to the nature of the begetter.

But what one might more reasonably blame before these things is this. If he were one of those who are inexperienced in speaking, unpractised and untrained in such constructions, and then declared whatever occurred to him as it chanced, he might perhaps be pardoned for not using the accepted methods in constructing his doctrines. But since he has such a surplus of ability in this that he even reaches beyond our nature by his method of comprehension, how did he not know the principle by which every hidden thing is comprehended in these logical arguments? For who does not know that every argument takes its starting points from what is evident and known to all, and through these brings belief to what is disputed, and that nothing hidden could be grasped otherwise unless what is agreed leads us by the hand to understand what is obscure? But if what is taken as the starting points of argument for disclosing what is unknown were in conflict with the assumptions of the many, hardly could the unknown be disclosed through them. Now the whole battle and dispute about the doctrine between the churchmen and the Anomoeans is whether the Son and the Spirit must be conceived as created, according to the account of the opponents, or as belonging to the uncreated nature, as the Church has believed. This man, then, declares the very thing disputed by all as agreed; and having found no proof that the next substance is the work of the one before, he boldly teaches that it is so. I do not know from what education or wisdom he took this boldness. For if every construction and proof must be preceded by some uncontested and unambiguous admission, so that the unknown is proved by being properly linked through the intermediate steps to what is already grasped, the one who puts forward what is still in question to establish other things establishes nothing but ignorance by ignorance and deceit by deceit. This is making the blind a guide of the blind, as the Gospel says somewhere. For truly to the blind argument that gropes in the void, which says that the Creator and Maker of all is a creature and a thing made, they yoke another blind argument: that the Son is alien in nature to the Father, unlike in substance, and in every way without share in natural kinship. But not yet about these things; where he uncovers the impiety of his thought more nakedly, there it will be timely for us too to put forward the refutation of the impiety. For now we must return to the sequence of what he said: “Again, since each of these substances is purely simple and wholly one, both in being and in being conceived, according to its own dignity, and since the activities are bounded together with the works, and the works measured by the activities of those who wrought them.”