On the Resurrection of the Dead 1–11

Alongside every teaching and argument that holds to the truth about things that exist, some falsehood grows up. It does not grow from any underlying principle, springing up naturally, nor from the cause proper to each thing, but is cultivated by those who value a lawless sowing for the corruption of the truth. This can be seen first from those who in the past devoted themselves to thinking about these matters, and from their disagreement both with their predecessors and with their contemporaries, and not least from the confusion of those who take part in public debate today. Such people have left no truth unslandered: not the being of God, not his knowledge, not his activity, nor the truths that follow from these in due order and sketch out for us the teaching of piety. Some despair utterly and once for all of the truth about these things; others twist it to suit themselves; others make a point of doubting even what is evident. So I think that those who labor on these questions need arguments of two kinds: arguments in defense of the truth, and arguments setting out the truth. Those in defense of the truth are for unbelievers and doubters; those setting it out are for the well-disposed, who receive the truth gladly. For this reason those who wish to examine these questions must consider the need at hand each time, measure their arguments by it, and adapt the order of their treatment to what is required; they must not, for the sake of seeming always to keep the same starting point, neglect what is fitting and the place that belongs to each argument. As regards proof and the natural sequence, the arguments setting out the truth always come before those defending it; but as regards usefulness, the order is reversed, and those defending it come before those setting it out. For a farmer cannot properly cast his seeds into the ground without first clearing away the wild growth that harms the cultivated seeds he sows; nor can a physician introduce healthful medicines into a body that needs treatment without first purging the disease within or stopping what flows in; nor can one who wishes to teach the truth persuade anyone by setting it out, while some false opinion lurks in the minds of his hearers and resists his words. That is why we too, with an eye to usefulness, sometimes put the arguments in defense of the truth before those that set it out; and in considering what is needed, it seems not unprofitable to do the same now with the arguments for the resurrection. For here too we find some who disbelieve entirely, some who doubt, and even some of those who have accepted the first premises as perplexed as the doubters. The most unreasonable thing of all is that they feel this way though they have no ground in the facts for their unbelief, and can find no reasonable cause to give for disbelieving or doubting.

Let us consider the matter in this way. All unbelief ought to arise in people not hastily or from some uncritical opinion, but for some strong reason and with the certainty that comes from the truth; for unbelief is only reasonable when the thing disbelieved seems itself incredible, while to disbelieve what is not incredible is the work of people who do not judge soundly about the truth. So those who disbelieve or doubt the resurrection ought not to give their opinion about it uncritically, according to what seems right to them and what pleases the licentious. Either they should attach the origin of human beings to no cause at all (which is very easily refuted), or, if they ascribe the cause of all that exists to God, they should look at the foundation of this doctrine and show from it that the resurrection deserves no belief at all. They will do this if they can show either that God is unable, or that he is unwilling, to reunite and gather together bodies that have died or even been entirely dissolved, so as to reconstitute the same human beings. If they cannot do this, let them cease from this godless unbelief and from blaspheming what they have no right to. That they speak the truth neither in saying that it is impossible nor in saying that God does not will it will become clear from what follows. Something is truly known to be impossible for someone either because he does not know what is to be done, or because he does not have sufficient power to carry out well what he knows. For one who is ignorant of something that is to be done could neither undertake nor do at all what he does not know; and one who knows well what is to be done, and from what and how it could come about, but has no power at all, or not enough, to do what he knows, would not undertake it in the first place if he were sensible and had considered his own power; and if he undertook it rashly, he would not accomplish what he intended. But God cannot be ignorant of the nature of the bodies that will be raised, whether as wholes or in each part and particle, nor of where each of the dissolved parts goes, and which part of the elements has received what was dissolved and passed back to its kindred element, even if what has been reunited naturally with the whole seems to human beings quite impossible to distinguish. For he knew, before each person was constituted, both the nature of the elements from which human bodies would come and the parts of them from which he was going to take what he chose to constitute the human body. Clearly, then, even after the whole is dissolved, he will not be ignorant of where each of the parts he took to complete each body has gone. As far as the order of things that now prevails among us and our way of judging other matters is concerned, it is a greater thing to know beforehand what has not yet happened; but as far as the dignity and wisdom of God are concerned, both are natural to him, and it is as easy for him to know what has been dissolved as to know beforehand what has not yet happened.

Moreover, that his power is sufficient for the resurrection of bodies is shown by their very origin. For if, when they did not exist, he made human bodies and their first principles at their first constitution, he will also raise them, however they have been dissolved, with equal ease; for this too is equally possible for him. And it does the argument no harm if some suppose that the first principles come from matter, or that human bodies come from the elements as first things, or from seeds. For the same power that can give form to what they regard as formless, adorn with many different forms what was shapeless and unordered, gather the parts of the elements into one, divide the seed, which is one and simple, into many, articulate what was unarticulated, and give life to what was not living, can also unite what has been dissolved, raise up what lies fallen, give life again to what is dead, and change the corruptible into incorruption. It would belong to the same being, and to the same power and wisdom, to separate out what has been broken up by multitudes of animals of every kind, which commonly attack such bodies and take their fill of them, and to reunite it with its own parts and particles: whether it has passed into one of those animals or into many, or from these into others, or has been dissolved along with them and carried back to the first principles by the natural process of dissolution into them. This is what seems to have troubled most of all some even of those who are admired for their wisdom, who thought, I do not know why, that the difficulties raised by the many were strong.

They say that many bodies of those who die miserably in shipwrecks and rivers become food for fish, and that many of those who die in wars, or who for some other harsher reason or turn of events are left unburied, lie exposed as food for any animals that come upon them. When bodies are consumed in this way, and the parts and particles that make them up are broken up among a great multitude of animals and united through nourishment with the bodies of those that feed on them, they say, first, that it is impossible to separate them; and to this they add a second difficulty, harder still. When animals fit for human food have fed on human bodies, and these bodies have passed through their stomachs and been united with the bodies of the animals that ate them, it is absolutely necessary, they say, that the parts of human beings that became food for those animals should pass into other human bodies, since the animals nourished in between pass on the nourishment they received to the human beings whose food they became. Then they add, in the manner of tragedy, the eating of children dared in famines and fits of madness, and children eaten by their own parents through the plots of enemies, and that famous Median table and the tragic feasts of Thyestes, and they string together other such calamities contrived among Greeks and barbarians. From these they establish, as they think, that the resurrection is impossible, since the same parts cannot rise with one body and with another as well: either the bodies of the first persons cannot be reconstituted, since the parts that made them up have passed to others, or, if those parts are given back to the first, the bodies of the later persons will be incomplete.

But such people seem to me, first, to be ignorant of the power and wisdom of the one who created and governs this universe. He has fitted to the nature and kind of each animal the food that suits it and is appropriate to it. He has not decreed that every nature should enter into union or mixture with every body, nor is he at a loss how to separate what has been united. He allows the nature of each created thing to do or suffer what is natural to it, and at other times prevents it; he permits or redirects everything as he wills and toward whatever end he wills. Second, they seem not to have considered the power and nature of each thing that nourishes or is nourished. Otherwise they would have known that not everything a creature takes in, yielding to some external necessity, becomes suitable food for the animal. Some things naturally perish as soon as they come into contact with the enfolding parts of the belly; they are vomited or evacuated or disposed of in some other way, so that they do not undergo even for a moment the first, natural digestion, much less the blending with the body being nourished. Likewise, not everything that is digested and has undergone the first change necessarily reaches the parts to be nourished: some things are separated from the nutritive power in the stomach itself, and others in the second change and the digestion that takes place in the liver, passing into something that has lost the power to nourish. Nor does all that is changed in the liver become food for human beings; it is separated into its natural residues. And the food that remains is sometimes changed into something else in the parts and particles being nourished, according to the predominance of whatever is in excess or superfluous, which tends somehow to destroy whatever comes near it or turn it into itself.

There is, then, great natural difference among all animals; the natural food of each kind of animal varies along with the body that is nourished; and there is a threefold purging and separation in the nourishment of each animal. So everything that is foreign to an animal's nourishment must perish and pass off in its natural way, or be changed into something else, since it cannot be blended in. The power of the nourishing body must be in accord with nature and with the powers of the animal nourished; and only when it has passed through the natural strainers and been thoroughly purified by the natural purgings does it become a perfectly pure addition to the animal's substance. This alone one could truly call food, since it rejects everything foreign and harmful to the constitution of the animal nourished, and all that great bulk taken in to fill the stomach and satisfy the appetite. No one would dispute that this is united with the body nourished, being woven into and molded around all its parts and particles. But food of another kind, contrary to nature, quickly perishes if it meets a stronger power, easily destroys what it overpowers, and turns into bad humors and poisonous qualities, since it brings nothing proper or friendly to the body nourished. The greatest proof of this is that pain, danger, or death follows for many animals when, through excessive appetite, they swallow something poisonous and unnatural mixed with their food. Such a thing would certainly destroy the body nourished, if indeed things that are nourished are nourished by what is proper and natural to them and destroyed by what is contrary. If, then, natural food is divided according to the differences among animals that differ by nature, and if even of this food not everything the animal takes in, nor any part of it at random, is blended with the body nourished, but only what has been purified through every stage of digestion and truly changed for union with a body of that particular kind, and is well fitted to the parts nourished, it is clear that nothing unnatural could ever be united with those for whom it is not proper and suitable food. Either it passes through the belly itself before producing some other humor, raw and corrupt; or, if it stays longer, it produces suffering or a disease hard to cure, destroying along with it both the natural food and the very flesh that needs nourishment. And even if it is expelled at last, overcome by medicines or better food or the natural powers of the body, it flows out with no small harm, bringing nothing peaceable to what is natural, because it cannot be blended with nature.

And in general, even if one grants that the nourishment coming in from such sources (let it be called nourishment, to use the ordinary word), though it is contrary to nature, is separated out and changed into one of the things that moisten or dry or warm or cool, not even so will anything be gained from the concession. For the bodies that rise are reconstituted from their own parts. None of the things mentioned is a part, or holds the relation or position of a part; nor does it always remain with the parts of the body that are nourished, or rise with those that rise, since nothing will then contribute to life any longer, neither blood nor phlegm nor bile nor breath. Nor will bodies then need what the nourished bodies once needed, since the need for what nourished them is done away with, together with the want and corruption of the bodies that were nourished. Again, even if one supposes that the change from such nourishment reaches as far as the flesh, not even so will there be any necessity that the flesh newly formed from such nourishment, when it attaches to the body of another human being, should serve as a part to complete that body. For the flesh that takes it on does not always keep what it has taken on; nor is the flesh so united permanent, remaining with the parts it naturally binds, covers, or warms, as does the flesh that nature has chosen and grown onto the parts with which it has lived out the natural life and its labors. So neither when the matters just examined are judged as they should be, nor when the arguments against them are accepted for the sake of argument, can it be shown that what the objectors say is true. Human bodies would never be blended with bodies of the same nature, even if people at some time, in ignorance, are deceived in their senses and partake of such a body through some other creature, or directly defile themselves with a body of their own kind through want or madness; unless there are beasts in human form that have escaped our notice, or beings of a nature mixed from human beings and beasts, such as the more daring poets like to invent.

And what need is there to speak of bodies not assigned as food to any animal, but assigned only burial in the earth, in honor of their nature? The Maker has not assigned any animal as food to others of its own kind, even if it is natural food for some creatures of other kinds. If the objectors can show that human flesh has been assigned to human beings as food, nothing will prevent cannibalism from being natural, like anything else nature allows; and those who dare to say such things may then feast on the bodies of their dearest, as being more their own, or even entertain their best friends with them. But if even to say this is impious, and for human beings to partake of human flesh is something most hateful and utterly abominable, more accursed than any lawless and unnatural food or deed; and if what is contrary to nature could never become nourishment for the parts and particles that need it, and what does not become nourishment would not be united with what it cannot naturally nourish; then human bodies would never be combined with bodies like themselves, for which they are unnatural food, even if through some most bitter calamity they often pass through the stomach. Instead, they are separated from the nourishing power and scattered back to the things from which they had their first constitution, and are united with these for however long it may be. And from there they are separated again by the wisdom and power of him who joined every kind of living creature with its proper powers, and each is united fittingly with its own, whether it has been burned by fire, or rotted by water, or consumed by wild beasts or any animals that came upon it, or cut off from the whole body and dissolved before the other parts. United again with one another, they take the same place for the harmony and constitution of the same body, and for the resurrection and life of what died or was even wholly dissolved. It is not the time to dwell on this any longer; the verdict is agreed by all, except those who are half beasts.

Since there are many points more useful for the present inquiry, I now decline to deal with those who take refuge in human works and their human makers, who cannot renew their works when they are broken, worn out by time, or otherwise destroyed. From the example of potters and carpenters they try to show that God too would not wish, or, if he wished, would not be able, to raise a body that has died or been dissolved. They do not consider that by this they insult God in the worst way, putting on the same level the powers of beings utterly different, or rather the very natures of those who use them, and things made by art with things made by nature. To take such arguments seriously is not above reproach; it is truly foolish to answer superficial and empty objections. It is far more fitting, and truest of all, to say that what is impossible with human beings is possible with God. And if the argument shows that it is possible, both by these very sayings, as authoritative, and by all that was examined a little earlier, then clearly it is not impossible. Nor, indeed, is it against God's will.

For what God does not will, he does not will either because it is unjust or because it is unworthy of him. And injustice, again, would be seen either with regard to the one who is to be raised or with regard to someone else besides him. That none of the beings outside him, counted among the things that exist, is wronged is obvious. The intelligible natures would not be wronged by the resurrection of human beings, for the resurrection of human beings is no hindrance to their existence, no harm, no insult. Nor is the nature of irrational or inanimate things wronged, for they will not exist after the resurrection, and nothing can be unjust toward what does not exist. And even if one supposes that they will exist forever, they would not be wronged by the renewal of human bodies. If now, while they submit to human nature and to the needs of human beings, who are in want, and are brought under the yoke and every kind of servitude, they suffer no wrong, then much less will they be wronged when human beings have become incorruptible and free of want, no longer needing their service, and they are set free from all servitude. If they had a voice, they would not accuse the Creator of lowering them below human beings contrary to justice because they did not share in the same resurrection. For the Just One does not measure out an equal end to those whose nature is not equal; and besides, where there is no sense of justice, there can be no complaint of injustice. Nor can it be said that any injustice is seen with regard to the one who rises, the human being himself. He consists of soul and body, and he suffers injustice neither in soul nor in body. No sensible person will say that the soul is wronged; for he would, without noticing it, be rejecting the present life along with it. If now the soul, dwelling in a corruptible and passible body, has suffered no wrong, much less will it be wronged when it lives with a body that is incorruptible and impassible. Nor is the body wronged at all. If now, being corruptible, it is not wronged by being joined with what is incorruptible, clearly it will not be wronged when it is itself incorruptible and joined with what is incorruptible. Nor could anyone say that it is a work unworthy of God to raise up and gather together a body that has been dissolved. For if the lesser work is not unworthy of him, namely to make a body that is corruptible and passible, much more is the greater not unworthy, a body incorruptible and impassible.

If each of the points examined has been demonstrated from what is first by nature and from what follows from it, it is clear that the resurrection of bodies that have been dissolved is possible, willed by God, and a work worthy of the Creator; for these arguments have shown that the contrary is false and that the unbelievers are unreasonable. Why need I speak of how each of these three implies the others and of their connection with one another? If indeed one should speak of connection, as though they were separated by some difference, and should not rather say that what is possible is also willed, and that what God wills is certainly possible and in keeping with the dignity of the one who wills it. That the argument setting out the truth is one thing and the argument defending the truth another has been adequately explained above: how each differs, and when and for whom each is useful. But perhaps nothing prevents us, for the sake of the general soundness of the argument and of the connection between what has been said and what remains, from making a fresh start from these very points and what belongs to them. To the one argument belongs the first place by nature; to the other, to escort the first, prepare its way, and clear out of its path whatever obstructs it or makes it steep. The argument setting out the truth, being necessary to all human beings for their security and salvation, stands first by nature, by order, and by usefulness: by nature, as providing knowledge of things; by order, as existing in and together with the things it makes known; by usefulness, as the source of security and salvation for those who know it. The argument defending the truth is inferior by nature and power, since it is a lesser thing to refute falsehood than to establish truth; and second in order, since its strength is directed against those who hold false opinions, and false opinion grew up from a later sowing and corruption. Yet even so it is often put first and is sometimes more useful, since it removes and clears away beforehand the unbelief that troubles some, and the doubt or false opinion of those who are just coming to the faith. Both are directed to one end, for both the argument that refutes falsehood and the one that establishes truth serve piety; yet they are not simply one. The one is necessary, as I said, to all who believe and care about the truth and their own salvation; the other is sometimes more useful for certain people and against certain people. Let this be said in summary, to recall what has been said already. We must now go on to the subject at hand, and show that the teaching about the resurrection is true: from the cause according to which and for which the first human being came into being, and those after him, even though they did not come into being in the same way; from the common nature of all human beings as human beings; and further, from the judgment their Maker will pass on them for the time each of them lived and the laws by which each conducted himself, a judgment no one would dispute is just.