Against Eunomius 1.387–1.401

And if the marks are alike, the realities are not otherwise. The Lord too says in a figure that fruits are the signs of the nature of trees, since such things are not exchanged against nature: the good do not suit the bad, nor, conversely, the opposite the good. "By their fruits," he says, "the trees are known." So too, when the fruit of providence shows no difference, we see one nature that put forth these fruits, even if the fruit is put forth from different trees. Through what is known to our comprehension, then (and the account of providence is known to us, seen alike in Father and Son), the likeness and fellowship in nature of the Only-begotten with the Father becomes beyond doubt, recognized by the sameness of the fruits of providence. But so that this may not be thought, he says, as though forced by some necessity, that he withdraws from the works of providence and is led back to the manner of generation, "because," he says, "the manner of likeness follows the manner of generation." What compelling proofs! How forcibly the abundance of his rhetorical skill compels us to agree with what he says! He says that the manner of likeness follows the manner of generation. How skillful and circumspect the assertion! Then if the manner of generation were known, the manner of likeness would be shown along with it. Now the manner of generation of all, or most, animals born through flesh is the same, and according to them the manner of likeness follows the manner of generation; so all things born in the same manner will certainly be alike to things born alike. If, then, the manner of generation, as the argument of the heresy says, makes what is born like itself, and this manner does not change at all in the varied differences of living creatures but is the same in most of them, the assertion, made universally and without any qualification, will be found to make all things like one another because their generation is alike: man, dog, camel, mouse, elephant, leopard, and all the others that are born naturally in like manner. Or he says that things born in a like way are not like one another, but each is like only the one from whom it has its generation. But if he wished to say this, he should have declared that what is born is like the one who begets it, not that the manner of likeness follows the manner of generation. Yet what is reasonable and seen in nature, that the begotten is of the same kind as the begetter, he does not accept, lest his construction be turned against him. For if he said that what is born is like the begetter, all that he laboriously put together about the unlikeness of the substances would be refuted as vanished and without substance. As it is, he says that the manner of likeness follows the manner of generation; and to those who know how to examine the sense of a thought precisely, this will be found wholly unintelligible. What we are to understand on hearing "manner of generation" is very hard to say. Does he mean the posture of the one giving birth, or the impulse, or the disposition, or place, or time, or the completion of the embryo through conception, or does he mean the generative organs themselves? Or none of these, but something else observed in birth? And how are we to learn what is meant? The impropriety and emptiness of the word "manner" makes us hesitate over what is signified, since everything falls equally under suspicion and each is equally unconnected with the subject. Likewise his "manner of likeness," said in this way, we suspect to be foreign to all sense, when we look to examples familiar from ordinary experience. For what is born is not like the form or manner of the birth. Birth, in generation through flesh, is a dilation of the body that brings out the living creature completed in its formation in the womb; what is born is a man or a horse or an ox, or whatever comes into existence through generation. How then the manner of the offspring's likeness follows the manner of generation, let him say himself, or anyone trained by him in the art of midwifery. Birth is one thing and what comes from birth another, and the account of each is different. That what he says is false in the case of beings born through flesh, no one with sense would deny. But if he calls making and constructing a "manner of generation," which, he says, the manner of likeness of what is made follows, here too the argument parts company with reason. Let us consider it through examples. Iron is shaped by blows, formed by the craftsman for some use in life. How the shape of the blade, say, is like the craftsman's hand, or the manner of making, the hammers, coals, bellows, and anvil by which the craftsman shaped it, no one could say. And what is said of this one example applies to everything produced by some construction: what comes to be is in no way like the manner of its generation.

For what has the form of a cloak in common with the spool, or the rods, or the shuttle, or in general with the manner of the weaver's work? And what has a bench in common with the working of the wood, or anything else that comes to be with the posture of the one who worked it? In sensible and bodily things, I think even our opponents agree, this argument is idle. It would remain to consider whether it contributes anything to the construction of the blasphemy. What, then, was the question? Whether the Son should be confessed to be like or unlike the Father in substance. Because he could not learn this, he says, from the accounts of providence, he went up to the manner of generation, so as to learn through it, not whether the one begotten is like the begetter, but some manner of likeness; and because this is unknown to most people, he busied himself about the begetting substance. Has he then forgotten his own definitions, in which he says that substances must be grasped from works? The begotten substance, which he calls the work of the one above it, has not yet been shown as to how it is in nature. How then does he pass over what he himself calls the lower, and therefore closer to the comprehension of those who inquire, and fasten upon the most sovereign and highest? And though in his own argument he maintains that he knows the divine sayings exactly, he now makes little account of them too, as though he did not know that one cannot come to the knowledge of the Father without drawing near through the Son. For "no one," it says, "has known the Father except the Son, and anyone to whom the Son wills to reveal him." But this man, whenever he means to insult the pious notions of the Only-begotten that befit his Godhead, says in bare words that he is less; yet in his account of the knowledge of divine things he establishes, without noticing it, that the Son is the greater, if he takes the substance of the Father as more readily understood and tries to track down and infer the nature of the Son through it. At any rate he goes up to the begetting substance and through it examines the begotten, because, he says, the manner of generation is shown by the natural dignity of the begetter. Again this, thrown out simply and without qualification, makes the inquirer's thought spread over all things alike. For doctrines laid down universally are such that their meaning extends to everything and nothing is exempted from the comprehensive assertion. If, then, the manner of generation is known in every case by the natural dignity of the begetter, and the differences of dignity among those who beget are many and are grasped under many conceptions (for there are born a Jew, a Greek, a barbarian, a Scythian, a slave, a free man), what follows from this? That however many differences of natural dignity there are among begetters, so many manners of generation will reasonably be found; so that generation is not fulfilled in the same manner for all, but natures change along with the dignities of the begetters, and for each one born some peculiar manner of generation must be newly devised according to the difference of ranks. For in every case certain natural dignities are seen in each individual, differing from one another as better or worse, as falls to each: race, rank, religion, country, power, slavery, wealth, poverty, freedom, subjection, all the things that make the differences of dignity in life. If, then, the manner of generation is shown by the natural dignity of the begetter, as Eunomius says, and the differences of dignity are many, then on the dogmatist's view the manners of generation too will certainly be found to be many, since the difference of dignity lays down for nature the law of birth. If he does not admit that such dignities are natural, since they are seen outside nature, we do not object either; but he will surely agree that human life is separated from irrational life by some natural dignity. Yet the manner of birth shows no variation corresponding to the difference of natural dignity, since nature brings rational and irrational creatures alike into life through generation in the same manner. But if he finds the natural dignity only in that substance which he himself calls most sovereign and highest, let us see what he means by saying this. As our doctrine holds, the natural dignity of God is Godhead itself, wisdom, power, being good, judge, just, strong, long-suffering, true, creator, ruler, invisible, endless, and whatever else is said in praise by the divinely inspired Scripture; all of which we say are seen properly and naturally in the only-begotten Son too. We recognize the difference only in the notion of being without beginning, and even this we do not cut off from the Only-begotten in every sense. But let no one tear our argument to pieces by slander, as though we were trying to show that the true Son is unbegotten; for we hold that those who say such things are no less impious than those who teach that the Son is unlike.

But since the word "beginning" has many senses and suggests many ideas, there are some senses in which we say that the title "without beginning" is not unfitting for the only-begotten Son as well. When "without beginning" is understood to mean not having one's hypostasis from any cause, we confess this to be proper to the Father alone. But when the inquiry concerns the other meanings of "beginning" (since a beginning is conceived of creation, of time, and of order), in these we bear witness that the Only-begotten too is higher than beginning, believing that he through whom all things came to be is above every beginning of creation, every notion of time, and every sequence of order. So he who, in the account of his hypostasis, is not without beginning has, by common confession, being without beginning in all other respects. The Father is both without beginning and unbegotten; the Son is without beginning in the manner described, but not unbegotten. To what natural dignity of the Father, then, does he look, in order to infer the manner of generation through it? He will certainly say, to unbegottenness. Then if we are to say that all the names we have learned for glorifying the God of the universe are idle and meaningless to you, the enumeration of such words, brought out in a bare list, is superfluous and redundant, if none of the other titles presents the natural dignity of the God over all. But if in each of the things said a distinct notion is recognized that befits the conception of God, then clearly the natural dignities of God are seen to be as many as the names; and through them the likeness of the substances is established, if indeed the dignities natural to substances make known the realities underlying them. And since the same dignities appear in each, the sameness in substance of the realities underlying the same dignities is clearly shown. For if the variation of one name is thought enough to show strangeness of substance, how much more will the sameness of countless names avail to show the commonness of nature? What, then, is the reason why the other names are overlooked and generation is judged by this one alone? And why do they lay down unbegottenness alone as the natural dignity of the Father, pushing aside the rest? So that by its contrast with the begotten they may villainously contrive their mode of unlikeness; but this too, when called to account at the proper time, will be found as feeble, unsubstantial, and worthless as what was said before. That all his constructions look to this is shown by what follows, where he congratulates himself on having taken that road properly to build the blasphemy: he did not strip bare the intent of his argument at once, nor assail ears still untrained with impiety before he had fitted together the construction of his deceit, nor declare at the outset of his discourse that unbegottenness is substance and harp on the otherness of substance. He says, word for word: "Or, as Basil legislates, we should have begun from the very things in question, declaring incoherently that unbegottenness is substance, and harping on otherness of substance, or sameness." After going through much on these matters in between, with jests, abuse, and insults (for this is how the wise man knows how to contend for his own doctrines), he takes up the argument again and, ostensibly addressing his opponent and laying on him the blame for what is said, speaks thus: "Since you before all others are guilty of these faults, you who have allotted the same substance to the begetter and the begotten. Therefore you have fashioned against yourselves the reproach for these things, like an inescapable snare, justice, as is fitting, casting its vote against you by your own words. For either you suppose that these substances are without beginning and separate from each other, and bring one of them into the rank of Son through generation, and insist that what is without beginning came to be from what is; and so you are subject to your own reproaches, for you attribute generation from another to him whom you imagine to be unbegotten. Or, confessing one and only one substance without beginning, and then circumscribing it into Father and Son by generation, you will say that the unbegotten substance itself was begotten from itself." What he wrote before the passage just read, since it contains mere shamelessness against our teacher and father and contributes nothing to the purpose at hand, I will pass over. But in what he says here he has cleverly sharpened against us these two-edged refutations on both sides and holds them out by means of dilemmas, so we too must not receive this war against the doctrine in silence; we must come to the aid of the argument as far as we can, and show that this fearsome two-edged sword he has whetted against the truth is feebler than the figures that appear in scene-paintings. He slanders the commonness of substance with a double notion. He says that either we name two unbegotten principles ranged against each other, the one Father and the other Son, saying that what is was begotten from what is; or that one and the same substance, conceived as one, takes each of the names in turn, becoming both Father and Son, brought forth from itself by generation.

I write this in my own words, not misrepresenting his meaning but correcting the bombast and crabbed density of his expression, so that his intent may be plain to all, uncovered by clear wording. For the man who mocks our lack of learning and reproaches us for coming to the argument without adequate preparation so adorns his own discourse with brilliance of expression, so polishes his words to a nicety, as he himself puts it, and so embellishes his treatise with this superfluous elegance, that he captures the hearer at once with the pleasure of his diction. The passage just read is of this kind, among many others; if you like, I will read it again: "Therefore you have fashioned against yourselves the reproach for these things, like an inescapable snare, justice, as is fitting, casting its vote against you by your own words." See the flowers of ancient Attica! How the smooth, polished diction flashes in the arrangement of the words! How elegantly and variously it is decked with the bloom of style! But let that be as anyone pleases. Let our course turn again to the sense of what was said, and, if you like, let us go through the speech-writer's words themselves: "For either you suppose that these substances are without beginning and separate from each other, and bring one of them into the rank of Son through generation, and insist that what is without beginning came to be from what is." That is enough. He says we champion two unbegotten substances. How can he say this, when he accuses us of mixing up and confusing everything by confessing one substance? If our doctrine too championed two natures foreign to each other in being, as those who teach the "unlike" do, it might well be thought to imply a division of the nature into two principles without beginning. But if we confess one nature in distinct hypostases, and the Father is believed in and the Son glorified, how can our opponents slander such a doctrine as championing two principles? Then he says that we bring one of these two principles down into the rank of Son. Let him show the champion of this doctrine, and we will be silent: whether he can convict some person who uttered these things, or simply knows this doctrine to be current in the church. Who is so deranged in his reasoning, so out of his mind, as to speak of Father and Son and then think there are two unbegotten beings, and again suppose that the one came to be from the one? And what necessity drives the doctrine to such suppositions? From which of our statements has he made this out, so that this absurdity necessarily emerges? If he had brought forward something we confess and then advanced such a slander from it, whether sophistically or with some demonstrative force, he might perhaps have had occasion to bring such things forward to discredit the doctrine. But if there is no such statement in the church, nor ever will be, if no one who said it is convicted and no one who heard it is pointed out, and no necessity is found that produces this absurdity by any logical consequence, I do not see what his shadow-boxing means. A man raving in a fever might think he is grappling with someone when no one is wrestling him, and then, throwing himself down in his eagerness, think he has thrown his opponent. The wise speech-writer has suffered something of the kind, fabricating suppositions unknown to us and fighting shadows shaped by his own reasonings. Let him say what necessity carries one who confesses that the Son was begotten of the Father into notions of two unbegotten beings. Or whose part is it rather to make out two unbegotten beings: his who makes out that the Son is so called falsely, or his who affirms that the name is truly borne out by the title? One who does not accept the true generation of the Son, yet confesses that he exists at all, might more fittingly be suspected of calling unbegotten one who exists but does not have his being through generation. But one who defines the distinguishing mark of the hypostasis of the Only-begotten as this very thing, that he subsists by generation from the Father, how could he be carried off into thinking him unbegotten? And yet on your view, you wise men, so long as it holds that the Son was not begotten by the Father, he too will properly be called unbegotten in one of the senses of "unbegotten." For since some things are born and others are constructed, nothing prevents us from saying that what does not subsist through generation subsists unbegottenly, in the sense of generation alone. And this is what your argument makes out about the Lord, when it defines him as a creature. So, most wise men, it is on your view, not according to our doctrine, that the Only-begotten will be called unbegotten by such a consequence; and justice, as you call it, is found casting its vote against us with your own words. It is fitting to spit back at the filth of the doctrine from the mire of his own words; for the other branch of his dilemma, too, is full of equal madness.

"Or," he says, "confessing one and only one substance without beginning, and then circumscribing it into Father and Son by generation, you will say that the unbegotten substance itself was begotten from itself." What is this new tale of marvels? How can anyone be begotten by himself, having himself as father and becoming in turn his own son? What nausea is this? What derangement? To think the ceiling is turned downward and to have the floor above one's head? This is what men heavy-headed with drink imagine, when they shout and insist that the earth is not firm beneath them, that the walls are running away, that everything whirls round in a circle and nothing they see stands still. Perhaps the speech-writer wrote with his soul in such a swell; he deserves pity for what he has written rather than loathing. Who is so unacquainted with the divine doctrines, who is so far from the mysteries of the church, as to accept such a notion against the faith? Or rather, it is perhaps too little to say that no one suspects the faith of this absurdity. Who, in the case of human nature or of anything else perceived by the senses, on hearing of a common substance, either supposes that all things that agree with one another in the account of substance are without beginning, or says that something comes to be from itself, giving birth to itself and being begotten by itself at once? The first man and the one who came from him had their being in different ways, the one from the union of parents, the other from formation by Christ; yet both are believed to be two and are not split from one another in the account of substance. Neither are they said to be two substances without beginning ranged against each other, nor were the two ever thought to be one in such a tale of marvels that each was considered his own father and his own son. This one is a man and so is that one, and the account of substance is common to the two: each is mortal, both are rational, both alike are capable of mind and knowledge. If, then, the account of humanity in Adam and Abel is not changed by their different generation (neither order nor mode of existence making any variation in their nature), but it is acknowledged by the common assent of sober people that they are alike (and no one would contradict this unless he badly needed hellebore), what necessity is there to construct this unreasonable notion against the divine nature? Having heard "Father" and "Son" from the Truth, we have been taught the unity of nature in two subjects, signified naturally by the names through their relation to each other and again by the Lord's own words. When he said, "I and the Father are one," what else does he present than both that he is not without beginning, by acknowledging the Father, and that the nature is common, by his unity with the Father? So, I think, by these words the account of the faith is kept pure of deviation toward either heresy. Sabellius has no room to confuse the distinctness of the hypostases, since the Only-begotten plainly distinguished himself from the Father in saying "I and the Father"; nor can Arius make out that the nature is foreign, since the unity admits no division of nature. What is signified by "unity" in this saying, in the case of Father and Son, is nothing else than unity in the substance itself. For as to the other good things seen in the nature, one would not be wrong to say that they are set before all in common, even before things that came into being by creation. For example, the Lord is called compassionate and merciful by the Prophet; and the Lord in turn wishes us too to become and be called these things: "Be compassionate," and "Blessed are the merciful," and the like. If, then, someone by attention and care has made himself like the divine will and become good, or compassionate and merciful, or meek and lowly in heart, as many of the saints are attested to have been in these excellences, are they therefore one with God, or joined to him through any of these? Not at all. What is not the same in all respects cannot be one with what differs from it in nature. That is why man becomes one with man when by choice, as the Lord said, they are perfected into one, the unity of choice being added to their natural bond. And the Father and the Son are one, their fellowship in nature and in choice running together into one. But if he were joined by will alone while divided in nature, how could he testify of himself to unity with the Father while split from him in what matters most? Hearing, then, "I and the Father are one," we are taught by these words both that the Lord is from a cause and that the Son and the Father do not differ in nature. We do not blend our notion of them into one hypostasis, but keep distinct the individuality of the hypostases, while not dividing the unity of substance along with the persons, lest two realities of different kinds be supposed in the account of first principle, and the doctrine of the Manichaeans gain entrance by this. For the created and the uncreated stand in diametrical opposition to each other in what they signify.